

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on
Anti-Oedipus III

1973-1974

On *Anti-Oedipus* III, 1973-1974

1st session, December 03, 1973

Transcription: WebDeleuze; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni

About little Hans¹

... even in terms of little Hans' relationship with the horse, we will see a number of responses that will consist in saying that the relation is analogical, or else responses that would amount to saying that the relationship is homological and that we must establish the structural system that accounts for this. We, on the contrary, will go in a completely different direction by speaking of a *machinic assemblage*² that excludes both imaginary analogies and structural homologies.

I would add that we are far from being done with this business of the internal contract in psychoanalysis, because if Melanie Klein announced the move, "I exchange your affects for fantasies", and that this was a way of breaking the child and of preventing him from producing his own utterances or from bringing forth his unconscious, a move even worse than that of Freud, now we have a third phase. They have found another way: I take a recent book by André Green called *L'enfant de ça*³ which is very interesting in this respect because Green asks: what is it that has been lacking in psychoanalysis? What has been lacking in psychoanalysis is a theory of thought, and he says: in the end, I, Andre Green, consider myself a disciple of Wilfred Bion – an English psychoanalyst – rather than of Lacan, because Bion is the first to have come up with a psychoanalytical theory of thought... but to know what this psychoanalytic theory of thought consists in, you have to read Green's texts.

And he says very eloquently that the real psychoanalytic exchange would be "you give me your affects, and in return I will give you thought". The psychoanalyst assumes the role of thinker, and what happens when the psychoanalyst assumes the role of thinker can hardly be believed: the hour of the cogito makes its return. It has returned under the name of holy castration. The current state of the analytic exchange is no longer: "you give me your affects, and I'll give you perception", or "you give me your affects, and I'll give you fantasy", now it's – and note the Kleinian nonsense of this – give me your affects and take care of your own fantasies, that is to say, of a theater. And it's no trouble for anyone to set up a little theatre in the corner, as long as it doesn't burn down your school. That's what an affect is, it's a fire! Melanie's famous ideal amounts to the same thing: we find ourselves faced with these little paranoiacs and a child who experiences his body-machine... who experiences it as a power, a potency, that is to say that he is indeed a little paranoiac. But there's nothing wrong with these little paranoiacs, they're not bad people. All they want is for the machine to work. They are even very ingenious; a little paranoiac isn't sick, they have no need of anyone.

And what does Melanie Klein want? Her great battle cry is: I will make you pass from the paranoid position to the depressive position – I'm not making this up – she constructs a whole theory so as to show the superiority of the depressive position, which attains the sacred unity of the ego with the good object and so on, all that crap, considering the culture of fantasy as a particularly life-enhancing thing. This is the good position, the depressive position: we have broken the little paranoiac. And this is considered a successful cure. I still have a vivid memory of Lacan's texts where he speaks about didactic psychoanalysis and where he says that intensive psychoanalysis is that which must pass through the depressive position.

Now the objections that Green makes, and it is not by chance that Mr. Green objects to me, saying: "you never talk about depressives; you don't know what a depressive is".⁴ This is precisely his whole trick: to transform a kind of paranoid potency into a depressive impotence that it is at one with the exchange: affects-forces replaced by fantasies, or programs replaced by fantasies, and meanwhile the little guy is in his corner, not saying anything, that is, he is unable to produce his utterances.

We had left it at this, an extraordinary operation: little Hans in a vital way -- in a vital way, quite independently of what the psychoanalysts say about it -- little Hans describes the horse, and we don't ask ourselves what this description of the horse signifies, we don't take it as the object of an interpretation to be made. We just noticed last time that this description consisted of an enumeration of affects, and that these affects did not refer to the horse defined as an organism, to the horse such as a naturalist or a biologist might define it, but that it referred to the horse as a part or as a cog of a machinic assemblage, the assemblage in question being: horse-carriole-weight-driver of the horse.

And it was within the framework of this machinic assemblage that the affects by which little Hans not only described, but experienced the horse were distributed. I say "experienced" because he was launching himself into a kind of becoming-horse, in terms of a becoming-animal. This is a very curious or paradoxical operation, the temptation or the attempt to define or describe something or someone by the affects they supposedly experience. The question we will begin with today is: what does such an attempt mean? What does it imply? Because, after all, it is hardly self-evident. What would it mean logically or not logically? What is this way of living things, animals or persons according to the affects we lend them? What is it opposed to? What is little Hans trying to get across by this method? What is he trying to resist? To resist the oppression that comes from the family, the oppression that comes from the street and the city, the oppression that comes from psychotherapists, and this attempt by little Hans to maintain... no, no, the horse is a set of affects considered in terms of a machinic assemblage.

For us, this is very important because it already gives us the feeling that between an affect and a machinic assemblage, there is a relation, but which is not at all the same as the relation there is between organic determinations and an organism; that is something else altogether. So, what is it that he wants to assert and that psychoanalysis prevents him from so doing? It contains a description of things, of beings and of animals in terms of affects. He is looking for something, what he wants is something that is inseparable from a becoming-horse. This engages us already a little: the fact that *the affect is inseparable from a becoming*, the affect is inseparable from a

passage. To what does a descriptive thought by affects oppose itself? But here we should proceed very much in order...

André Scala: There is a very important text, because it contains everything we need to know about Freud's method, it's on page 98 of "Little Hans", note 3. Following a reflection by little Hans on the way little girls make pee-pee, little Hans says that little girls have a pee-pee maker because they make pee-pee. Freud says that one could be disturbed by this early alteration of the childish intellect. Why don't these investigators affirm what they actually see, which is that little girls don't have a pee-pee maker. So why doesn't Hans himself ask this question? We can say that Hans links the pee-pee maker, not to a form or function, but to a functioning, to a machinic assemblage, which means, he says, that everything has a pee-pee maker except chairs or tables. A locomotive has a pee-pee maker, a cow has one, a horse, the father, the mother. One can ask the question: if little girls do not have a pee-pee maker, how do they pee? Freud answers that this is not the question, it is only of secondary importance; peeing is secondary to the pee-pee maker. We will see in Hans' experiments, when he holds himself back from urinating, that this is perhaps how one can know if it's possible to pee through another organ. There is a first stage of organ analogies, that is to say that Freud replies that yes, little girls do pee but it happens differently. It's a bit like fish who have gills and men who have lungs, they both breathe but they don't breathe in the same way and the organs – gills-lungs, little girl-little boy – these are organs called analogues. That's the first thing.

Secondly, Freud makes little Hans say: I want to have a pee-pee maker as big as a horse's. There doesn't seem to be a text where Hans actually says: I want a pee-pee maker as big as a horse's. He never says this because for him the horse is not a goal, it's a becoming. The second thing is Freud's assignment of the becoming-horse, in terms of transcendence, that is to say that the horse is obviously bigger than little Hans. It has a penis that is much, much larger than that of little Hans, and this will allow Freud, by way of the obvious, to introduce the element of phobia. Of course, in the experimentation, in the becoming-horse, there is fear and anguish, but there is never phobia in terms of confrontation with a model.

And here we have the third reversal concerning Freud's erroneous perception: Freud says that the erroneous perception of little Hans is, finally, the work of his unconscious. He says that he guesses that little girls have a pee-pee maker in the form of the clitoris, and this is the moment of structural homology. The clitoris-penis homology exceeds the analogy of function. We should see these three stages and how Freud, through these three moments – analogy, eminence, and homology – how he closes the loop of erroneous perception, unconscious, and how this circuit is that of Freud's analysis and how he short-circuits the affects and injects phobia.

Deleuze: If I understand correctly, there is a point that touches on psychoanalysis in its most fundamental domain, and this concerns the problem of the difference of the sexes. According to what Scala has said, it is very striking that as soon as psychoanalysis gets involved in thinking about the problem of the difference of the sexes, it does so by borrowing modes of thought that are logically easy to inventory, namely, either the large analogy of perception, what we can call the learned analogy or the homology that we would now call structural. A typical example in psychoanalysis is where little Hans says, sometimes in the form of questions, sometimes in the form of assertions... he says that girls, too, have a pee-pee maker. This is one of little Hans'

propositions, which perhaps involves many things. But what we notice is the way that in the psychoanalysis of a child an idea is already crushed because what Hans hears is precisely this: I know that they don't have one, but they have it by analogy. Last time we saw the famous analogy Freud proposes between the penis and the clitoris. And immediately, Freud says: why does he want to maintain that little girls have a pee-pee maker, if only by analogy? It is because of his fear of castration.

In my view, in everything that little Hans said, there is nothing that in any way, shape or form, indicates this, absolutely nothing. It's all in Freud's head. It is Freud who believes that little girls do not have a pee-pee maker and that, if they have one, it can only be by analogy. Therefore, female sexuality is conceived by way of analogy with male sexuality. Freud's position is well known; basically, it is that there is only one sexuality, the sexuality of the boy, whereas feminine sexuality is indeed a sexuality by analogy. When, with Melanie Klein, psychoanalysis began to lean in a slightly more progressive direction in this domain, it consisted in saying: yes, finally, there are two sexualities, a male sexuality and a female sexuality. So at that point, between the two sexualities, what relation could there be? No longer a relation of rough analogy, but a relation of so-called structural homology, as if there were homology between two structures.

Now, following Scala's remark, the problem has arisen of this perpetual procedure of thinking sexuality in terms of analogy or homology. We'll look at this, and we'll just keep it in mind for now. Perhaps little Hans thinks in a different way; perhaps the thought processes of little Hans are completely different, which is why he will never be able to say what he has to say because from the beginning, his thought is molded in terms of schemas and processes that have nothing to do with him.

Where will this business of analogies and homologies lead us? You understand, if we are looking for what is truly original or creative in statements, we rediscover our initial question: what is original in an attempt to define things, beings or animals in terms of affects and not through anything else? Now, as for the affects of the horse, we have made a list of these and we have seen what assemblage they fit into. Suppose I say that between a table, a horse, a dog, a girl, a boy, the differences consist only in the fact that they are not affected by the same things. In other words, these differences are always... they always concern *powers of being affected*. This may not seem very important, but oddly, things, animals and people already tend to lose their form. Everything still functions if I'm told that a dog is a mammal, that it has four legs, that it barks, whereas a horse is something else... well. But we enter a completely different atmosphere if we say that what really counts are *the affects of which someone or something is capable*.

Here, we venture into an unknown forest where things are distinguished only by the affects of which they are capable. Already, we are forced to go beyond the simple notion of affect. We go beyond the notion of affect by means of a more precise notion: the power of being affected. To be affected is a power. So, we define things, beings, animals, by powers. We can immediately at least see to what other kinds of scenarios this is opposed: we no longer define them by or in terms of genera or species. I would not say that a table is a manufactured thing, whereas a horse is an animal, just as I would not ask whether a person is male or female, but rather I would ask, what affects are you capable of? That is to say, what are your powers of being affected? In terms

of a certain very, very simple way of thinking, it is perhaps here that we will see the most bizarre things happening: what is the meaning of this power of being affected?

So the list of horse-affects that little Hans drew up as his experience went on, you remember, whether it was kicking, having hindquarters, being an anal animal, that is, making dung, pulling carts, pulling overweight carts, falling under excessive weight, all of thi defines the horse's power of being affected.

A student: In industry, in transportation, we use this term: assignment. You can be assigned to or deassigned from something: such and such a locomotive is assigned to transport goods. I don't know if we can talk about powers; it's more a question of efficiency rather than powers.

Deleuze: Well, what does it mean to be disaffected? To be disaffected, that is to say, no longer to be affected in the order of certain affects.

The student: An affect is something that is free, that is susceptible to being affected in different ways, free in the sense that Freud speaks of free energy that can oscillate between various poles, whereas in practice it is something more determining. We would need to find something which allows us to pass from the affect to something more precise, but more free. To pass from the affect in the machinic assemblage... which would be embodied in something individualized...

Another student: When you say that energy is embodied, it doesn't work anymore. An affect already constitutes a system in a certain sense. There are no free affects. You don't do anything with oil, for example. You don't do anything with water, which is to say that each affect is already something affected...

Deleuze: Thanks to what you two have said, we have now a group of notions: affects, assignments of function and powers.

Richard Pinhas: What I liked very much in the little text that André read, and in the commentary that he made, is that it very clearly shows an operation that is at the same time that of psychoanalysis – it pertains to psychoanalysis in the sense that it's part of the contract – and that also pertains more or less to capital, but only to a certain extent and in another manner. And the whole process that we see at work in Freud's analysis of little Hans is this transformation, which is practically a real transmutation of intensities into intentions, intentions that will play the role of simulacra of intensities. And these intensities, finally, we can put them in conjunction with the notion of affect, in a certain way. It's a bit adventurous, but I see it as a kind of qualification of the quantitative.

In other words, I would see the affect as a point, as a point that we would take in a chain – but the chain is a crude metaphor – that we would take in a flow – this is already less metaphorical – and a point that would note, that would denote or rather designate a variation and a fluctuation of intensities, in other words a rise or a fall, whatever you want to call it, you can call it anything you like, and that's why in the affect we would only have singular positions and we would have no link ...

Deleuze: Yes, but in these variations and fluctuations, we should also see thresholds, thresholds to cross.

A student: [*Inaudible remarks*].

Pinhas: I was talking about the passage from intensity to intention. If I try to define the intensity-affects pole, what we have is a pole that is composed of singularities, whereas in intention, that is to say in the simulacra of intensities, in the simulacra of affects, in the simulacrum of identity or in this identity that capital makes for you, in this kind of organic body that capital makes for you, we are in a completely different sphere: we are in that of exchange. What I liked is that in the very nature of affect, and on the side of intensities, we have a kind of plane where there are only metamorphic processes. We pass from one affect to another without causes, without reasons, without goals. It happens and it happens as a pure process. Whereas on the side of the intention, we would have something that could be called fixity. We have what Freud is trying to do, that is to say fix desire, something that does not flow anymore, that no longer metamorphoses.

And the whole of Freud's operation, finally, will be to identify the affective moments, the moments in the sense of affective powers, and to fix these powers in order to precisely exchange them in a movement that we saw last week: namely, to make this exchange: you give me your affects, I give you words. Finally, it is this process that, through the intermediary of simulacra, representations, images, will make your symptom disappear. I believe that there is something extremely important in this consideration of affect as a purely metamorphic process as opposed to a kind of fixity that the desire of psychoanalysis wants to impose at all costs.

A student: We have not yet put enough emphasis – and I realize that part of your intervention fits into this – on potential energy as something profoundly discontinuous that is capable of both gradual fluctuations and jumps, discontinuities, thresholds, very rapid passages. At the level of potential energy, for example, there cannot be something like an equalization, there will be a very abrupt passage where we pass ... [*Inaudible remarks*] [*End of recording*]

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus* III, 1973-1974

Lecture 02, 14 January 1974

Transcribed by [WebDeleuze](#); transcription modified, Charles J. Stivale

Translated by Timothy S. Murphy

The Univocity of Being

I must pass through a kind of terminological detour. This detour consists in recalling a certain terminology. We find that, in the whole current of the Middle Ages up to and including the seventeenth century, a certain problem is posed concerning the nature of being. And this problem concerning the nature of being adopted some very precise notions: equivocity, analogy, univocity.

At first sight these terms appear dead to us. They make up part of the great discussions of Scholasticism, but the great metaphysical disputes always hide something else: people are never burned or tortured over ideological questions, even less over metaphysical ones. I would like for us to try to feel what was very concretely in question in these stories which were presented under an abstract form: is being equivocal, is it analogical, is it univocal? And after all, this is not because today, except among the seminarians, we have abandoned these terms, not because we do not continue to think in them and through them.

I would like to content myself with very simple definitions. There are people who said: being is equivocal. They argued, they burned one another for things like that. But “being is equivocal” meant a precise thing: being is said in several senses. That means: being is said in several senses of that of which it is said. That is to say that the implication [sous-entendu] of the proposition was already: being is said of something. I'm not even interested in knowing if it's an ontological problem; it's a problem of utterances [énoncés] as well. Being is stated [s'énonce] in several senses of that of which it is stated. Concretely, what does that mean? One assumes that a table is not in the same manner as an animal and that an animal is not in the same manner as a man; that a man is not in the same manner as God. Therefore there are several senses of being.

Those who were called the partisans of equivocity, no matter who they were, argued a very simple thing: that the different senses of the word “being” were without common measure and that, in all rigor—and what is interesting in theology are always the limit points at which heresy peeks out—in every doctrine one can always locate the exact point where, if the person says a word more, that's it, the machine is set in motion, one starts a process. That runs through the whole history of the Middle Ages, it's very interesting because it's an actual struggle of an obviously political nature.

Well then, the heretical point of equivocity is that those who said that being is said in several senses, and that these different senses have no common measure, understood that at the limit they would have preferred to say: “God is not,” rather than to say “He is” to the extent that “He is” was a utterance which was said of the table or the chair. Or else He is in a such an equivocal manner, such a different manner, without common measure with the being of the chair, with the being of man, etc... that, all things considered, it's much better to say: He is not, which means: He is superior to being. But if they had a sense of wordplay this became very dangerous, it sufficed that they insist only a little on “God is not,” if they were discreet they said “God is superior to being,” but if they said “God is not,” that could turn out badly. Broadly speaking they were partisans of what is called the equivocity of being.

Then there were those who were partisans of the Univocity of being. They risked even more because what does this mean, univocity, in opposition to the equivocity of being? And all the treatises of the Middle Ages are filled with long chapters on the univocity or equivocity of being, it's very interesting. But those who said that being is univocal, supposing that they had done so and were not immediately burned, what did that mean? That meant: being has only one sense and is said in one and the same sense of everything of which it is said. Here one feels that if the equivocists already had such a possible sin in themselves, the univocists were thinkers who told us: of everything which is, being is said in one and the same sense—of a chair, of an animal, of a man or of God. Yet again, I'm simplifying everything because perhaps they didn't dare go that far, perhaps there's only a single thinker who would have gone that far, perhaps none, but in the end there is this idea.

And then inevitably there are those who were between the two, between the univocists and the equivocists. Those who are between the two are always those who establish what we call orthodoxy. These people said that being is not univocal because it's a scandal; to claim that being is said in one and the same sense of God and of the flea is a terrible thing, we must burn people like that; and then those who say “being is said in several senses which have no common measure,” we no longer know where we are with them: there is no order anymore, there's no longer anything. Thus these third people said: being is neither equivocal nor univocal, it's analogical. Here we can say the name, the one who elaborated a theory of analogy on the basis of Aristotle, Saint Thomas, and historically he won. Being which is analogical meant: yes, being is said in several senses of that of which it is said. Only these senses are not without common measure: these senses are governed by relations of analogy. Thus the equivocity of being, the univocity of being, the analogy of being, you're going to ask me where all this leads us?

So what does this mean: being is said in several senses of that of which it is said? And these senses are not without common measure, they have an analogical measure. Well then, in Saint Thomas' theses, which I am simplifying a lot, this means two things, because analogy, which is taken here in a technical or scientific sense, analogy was double, in any case taken in a technical or scientific sense, that is to say that it was not a question of common analogy. Common analogy is simple similarity of perception: something is analogous to something else. If you like it's the similarity of perception or the analogy of imagination, generally speaking. Scientific or technical analogy, the analogy of concepts, is double: the first sense was termed by Saint Thomas “analogy of proportions” and the second was termed by Saint Thomas “analogy of proportionality.”

The analogy of proportion was the following: being is said in several senses and these senses are not without common measure, they have an internal measure, they have a conceptual measure, they have a measure in the concept. Why? Well, in the first sense of the analogy of proportion, that meant—because there's a primary sense of the word “being” and then derived senses—the primary sense of the word “being” was what's often translated by the term “substance” or sometimes by the term “essence.” The other senses of the word “being” were the different senses of the word “being” which were derived from the primary sense following a law of proportion. Thus being was said in several senses, but there was a primary sense from which the others were derived.

This has hardly carried us forward because the primary substance was not univocal, it wasn't said in a single sense. At the level of substance in its turn there were going to be analogies, namely: substance was said in several analogical senses, and of that which was substance it was necessary to say that certain substances were primary in relation to others, which were not substance in the same sense. For example, the so-called “incorruptible” substances were primary in relation to the perishable substances. Thus the analogy of proportion consisted in setting out a plurality of hierarchized and methodical senses on the basis of a sense that was assumed to be primary. This was the analogy of proportion.

And then the second form of scientific analogy, which was not opposed to the first, this was the analogy of proportionality, which consisted this time in a figure quite close to its equivalent, mathematical analogy: A is to B as C is to D. Example given by Saint Thomas: God is good. Following the analogy of proportion: God is good and man is good; following the analogy of proportion God is formally good, that is to say possessing in Himself goodness in the plenitude of this quality, and man is only good by derivation insofar as he is a creature of God, thus man is secondarily good. This is the analogy of proportion. The analogy of proportionality is the same example, but you must sense how it changes. What infinite goodness is to God, finite goodness is to man.

I would add, to finish with this: yet again do we not continue to think theologically? To this whole group of notions, analogy, analogy of proportion, analogy of proportionality, was linked a very precise notion which was that of category. In what way did the categories make up part of the analogical vision or the analogical conception? For example, the categories, common to Aristotle and much later to Kant, let's put down substance, quantity, etc. Why categories and not concepts? What difference is there between the concept of causality or quantity and the concept of lion? Quite simple: every thing, all that is not [connected?], alternatively everything that is substance, has a quality, a quantity, etc. Hence the very strict definition of what must be called a category: one calls categories the concepts which are said of every possible object of experience. Lion is not a category because you cannot say “lion” of every possible object of experience. On the other hand, every possible object of experience has a cause and is itself cause of other things. There, that clarifies everything. The categories, thus defined, are strictly inseparable from an analogical conception; one calls categories the concepts which are said of every possible object of experience, or what amounts strictly to the same thing: the different senses of the word “being.” And the categories in Aristotle are presented as the different senses of the word “being,” exactly as in Kant the categories are defined as the concepts which are said of every possible object of experience. Therefore there's no question of a thought proceeding by categories if it

does not have, as background, the idea that being is analogical, which is to say that being is said of what is in an analogical manner.

At this point I make a leap: what appears to me the strangest thought, the most difficult to think, if it has ever been thought, is univocity. Suppose someone arrives there, in an assembly of priests, or even here and says: being is said absolutely in one and the same sense of everything of which it is said. One could say that this does not go very far, but this means precisely that being is univocal, that is to say neither analogical nor equivocal—and understand well that in the Middle Ages those sorts were very up-to-date on all this, as you are—if someone happened by speaking of univocity of being, he was quickly spotted, he could pack his bags; that meant, yet again, that a chair, an animal, a man and God are in one and the same sense. Then what: you treat God as matter? Are a dog and a man in the same sense? Quite tricky, that.

And nevertheless there is a man, the greatest thinker of the Middle Ages, who says yes, being is univocal, that is Duns Scotus. This story of Duns Scotus' univocal being turns out rather badly—but happily he took precautions, he said yes but be careful: being is univocal insofar as it is being. That is to say that it's metaphysically univocal. He said: sure it's analogical, which is to say that it's said in several senses physically. This is what interests me: he was at the border of heresy, had he not specified metaphysically univocal and physically analogical, he would have been done for. But for Duns Scotus' disciples, less prudent than he was, it turned out badly. Because I say: being is univocal, this means there is no categorical difference between the assumed senses of the word “being” and being is said in one and the same sense of everything which is. In a certain manner this means that the tick is God; there is no difference of category, there is no difference of substance, there is no difference of form. It becomes a mad [démence] thought.

My question is, if I say being is univocal, it's said in the same sense of everything of which it's said, then what could the differences between [beings?] be? They can no longer be differences of category, they can no longer be differences of form, they can no longer be differences of genus and species. And why can they no longer be all that? Because, once again, if I say: the differences between beings are differences of form, are formal, generic, specific differences, at that moment I cannot escape from the analogy of being for this simple reason: the categories are the ultimate genera of being. If I say: there are several senses of the word “being” which are precisely the categories, I must say that what is, that of which I say, “this is,” is distinguished by the form, the species, the genus. On the other hand, if I say that being is univocal and that it's said in one and the same sense of everything of which it's said, I fall into that which becomes the mad thought, the thought of infamy, the thought of the formless, the thought of the non-specific, the thought of the non-generic.

The only means of getting out of this is to say: of course there are differences between beings, and in any case being is said in one and the same sense of everything which is. Then what do the differences between beings consist in? The only difference conceivable at this very moment, from the point of view of a univocal being, is obviously difference solely as degrees of power [puissance]. Beings are not distinguished by their form, their genus, their species, that's secondary; everything which is refers to a degree of power.

Why is the idea of degrees of power fundamentally linked to that of the univocity of being? Because beings which are distinguished solely by the degree of their power are beings which realize a single univocal being, except for the difference in the degree of power or its withdrawal. So between a table, a little boy, a little girl, a locomotive, a cow, a god, the difference is solely one of degree of power in the realization of one and the same being. It's a strange way of thinking, since once again it consists in saying to us: the forms, the functions, the species and the genera are secondary. Beings are defined by degrees of power and there you are. Insofar as they are defined by degrees of power, each being realizes one and the same being, the same being as the other beings since being is said in one and the same sense, except for the difference in degree of power. At this level, there are no longer any categories, no longer any forms, no longer any species.

In a sense, it's a thought so very far from the ordinary notions of species and genus that, once again, between two members of the same species there can be more differences, more differences in the degree of power than between two beings of different species. Between a racehorse and a draft horse, which belong to the same species, the difference can perhaps be thought as greater than the difference between a draft horse and an ox. Which comes down to saying that the draft horse and the ox are taken in the same assemblage [agencement] and that their degrees of power are closer to one another's than is the draft horse's degree of power to the racehorse's.

A further step can be taken, that is, that this thought of degrees of power is linked, no longer to a conception of genera and species, but to a conception of assemblages into which each being is capable of entering. We had begun with Spinoza for Spinoza is perhaps the only one to have worked from the point of view [sous les espèces] of reason, to have pursued a kind [espèce] of mad thought. There's always in Lovecraft, the author of novels of terror and science fiction, there's always reference to a mysterious book which falls from the hands of whomever touches it and this book is called the *Necronomicon*, the famous book of the mad Arab. And Spinoza's *Ethics* is just that, the famous book of the mad Jew. The true name of the *Ethics* is the *Necronomicon*. I had begun by explicating the following: imagine how Spinoza saw things; when he directed his eyes toward things he saw neither forms nor organs, neither genera nor species. It's easy to say, but less easy to live like that. It's necessary to train oneself, although there are those who are gifted.

I open a parenthesis: French philosophy...there are bits of nationality about which I understand nothing, but I note that the French are the sort who believe for example in the ego [moi]; it's not by chance that their only philosopher said "cogito." The subject, the ego; there are some strange people who say "the ego." I don't understand. I think of the differences of nationality because the English are the sort who have never understood what the Ego means. There was a famous colloquium to which all the sorts of so-called analytical philosophy, of current English logic, had come, and then there was Merleau-Ponty on the French side, and the others, the English, were there like they were at the zoo. It's not that they were against him.

But it's quite curious, if you take the great English philosophers—of course, they say "I," but yet again it's not this that's the problem—for them it's the most comical notion and they ask themselves from where can such a belief, that of the ego, come. A belief in the identity of the ego is a madman's trick [truc de fous]. And they really think like that, they don't sense "egos" in

themselves. The English novelists are similar: their heroes are never presented as “egos.” Think of French novels, then it's truly the opposite, one wallows in “egos,” everybody says “cogito” in the French novel.

Let's try to imagine how Spinoza saw things. He did not see genera, species, he did not see categories, so what did he see? He saw differences of degrees of power... I said broadly that to each thing will correspond a kind of degree of power and that, if need be, two things said to be of the same species might have degrees of power much more different than two things of different species. To make this more concrete we say that to each degree of power corresponds a certain power of being affected. Its power of being affected is what reveals the degree of power of a thing, of an animal, of [*unclear word*]. In other words, you will not be defined by your form, by your organs, by your organism, by your genus or by your species, tell me the affections of which you are capable and I'll tell you who you are. Of what affects are you capable? It's self-evident that between a draft horse and a racehorse the power of being affected is not the same, in a fundamental way; the proof is that if you put a racehorse into the assemblage of a draft horse, it's quite likely that it will be worn out in three days.

We have this group of notions: being is said in one and the same sense of everything of which it's said; hence beings are not distinguished by their form, their genus, their species, they're distinguished by degrees of power. These degrees of power refer to powers of being affected, the affects being precisely the intensities of which a being is capable. Now it's becoming more coherent. With the result that, I assume, when Spinoza directed his eyes toward whatever, he grasped powers of being affected. He grasped populations of intensities, he grasped capacities and perhaps he confused an ox and a draft horse, and on the other hand he did not confuse a racehorse and a draft horse. As we would say today, he makes these cuts [*coupures*] differently than the others. Then there's no more than an effort to accomplish.

In any case, it's not necessary to believe that power [*pouvoir*] means a possibility that might not be fulfilled. Power [*puissance*] and degrees of power, this is no longer the Aristotelian world which is a world of analogy, it's not power which is distinguished from the act. The power of being affected, in any case, is or will be fulfilled, is fulfilled at each instant; it's necessarily fulfilled, and why? It's necessarily fulfilled at each instant by virtue of the variable assemblages into which it enters. That is, the affect is the manner in which a degree of power is necessarily actualized [*effectué*] as a function of the assemblages into which the individual or the thing enters.

A power of being affected is always fulfilled; it can be fulfilled in different ways, everything depends on the assemblage. In what ways can it be fulfilled, since it's fulfilled in any case? This is Spinoza's last thought: he says broadly that it's fulfilled in any case, but it can be fulfilled in two fashions. A degree of power is necessarily realized, or a power of being affected is necessarily fulfilled, that refers to these same two propositions, but very broadly speaking it can be fulfilled in two directions: either my power of being affected is fulfilled in such a way that my power of acting increases, or in such a way that my power of acting diminishes. Spinoza specifies: when my power of acting diminishes, this means, very broadly speaking, that my affects are sad; my power of being affected is completely fulfilled by sadness. For example “I'm

guilty” or “I’m depressed” or “it’s not going well”; but “it’s not going well” completely fulfills my power of being affected.

And why, when my affects are sad, is my power of acting diminished while my power of being affected is fulfilled? The way in which Spinoza views people is very, very beautiful. It’s even more beautiful when one sees the objections that people made to him, for example that imbecile [débile] Hegel. When Hegel says, against Spinoza, “ah that one never understood anything of the labor of the negative,” it’s perfect, the labor of the negative is a load of crap. It’s not that he doesn’t understand, he understands very well: the labor of the negative or the sad passions are those which fulfill my power of being affected in conditions such that my power of acting necessarily diminishes. When I’m sad, my power of acting diminishes.

It’s obvious, it sufficed to think it: when you’re affected with sad affects, there’s an object, something, an animal or a person which combines with you and that person or thing affects you with sadness. But in the case of the sad affect, the power of the other thing and your own would be subtracted since all your efforts at that moment would consist in struggling against this sadness and hence your power and the power of the thing which affects you would be subtracted. When, on the contrary, you are affected with joyful affects, the power of the thing which affects you with joyful affects and your own power are combined and added so that your power of acting, for that same power of being affected which is your own, is increased. Thus everything is crystal clear.

There you are, the linkage of notions: univocity of being, differences of degrees of power, powers of being affected each of which corresponds to a degree of power, power of acting which increases or diminishes depending on whether the affects which fulfill your power of being affected are by nature sad or joyful.

A student : Are the degrees of power degrees of the same power?

Deleuze: Obviously. Power is being, therefore there’s only one single power and the differences of power are intensive differences.

The student: Isn’t this in fact a model of causality? Several years ago we had interpreted causality in Spinoza in terms of structural causality. For my part, I think that one could interpret Spinoza’s thought in terms of energetic causality. Effectively this would be a substance defined as potential energy, and I would take this potential energy as an operational concept, a concept rigorously equivalent to the Nietzschean concept of the will to power.

Deleuze: Okay. This seems dangerous to me because we’re just barely getting out of the abstract, and you’re putting us back into it. It’s not simply a question of a peculiar vision of the world; it’s again eminently a question of politics. Spinoza’s basic idea is very simple, it’s that there are two plagues of the human genus, and it’s in this that Spinoza is Nietzschean and Nietzsche is Spinozist. He says that there are two scourges: hatred and remorse. Nietzsche will say that there are two scourges: man as malady, resentment and bad conscience. Resentment and bad conscience are literally what Spinoza called hatred and remorse.

Here one could find a kind of psychiatric tableau of the affections of hatred and the affections of remorse. But what interests him in this way of seeing all that -- this is not a psychiatry -- what interests him is obviously politics. Spinoza asks himself: what are those things called powers-that-be [pouvoirs]? He posed the question of power in a ridiculous enough way: power [pouvoir] is opposed to power of action [puissance]; power of action [puissance] is concerns us personally, concerns each one of us, concerns animals, concerns things. But power [pouvoir] is something else. He asks how it functions: people take power over others. What does it mean to have power over someone? Having power over someone is being in a position to affect her or him in such and such a way. The powers-that-be are fundamentally institutions built to affect you with sadness, they work like that and can only work like that. Things like hope, reward and security are put on the side of sad affects.

A student: Desire also.

Deleuze: No, how awful, what are you saying? Don't listen to him. -- The powers-that-be only keep hold on us by affecting us, which is to say by fulfilling our power of being affected with sad affects, and undoubtedly thousands of ways of doing this exist. And what Spinoza had in view is the power of the State and the power of the Church. He thinks that the power of the State and the power of the Church are fundamentally powers which take hold of their subjects by affecting them with sad affects, which is to say that power depresses them. This is the fundamental operation of power; affecting us with sadness, which obviously implies a whole play of compensations, "if you were wise, you would have had a reward," it's for that reason that Spinoza puts the taste for medals on the side of the sad affects, rewards are like a kind of compensation for a fundamental sadness of being.

Power [pouvoir] and power of action [puissance] are opposed since power [pouvoir] is an institution which functions essentially by affecting us with sad affects, which is to say by diminishing our power of acting. It needs to diminish our power of action precisely in order to exercise its own power over us. On the contrary, the powers [puissances] of liberation are, or will be, those which affect us with joyful affects. If you're sad you are oppressed, depressed... you've been had. How do they live, the sad and depressed? They live under the form of contagion, they won't let you go. A depressed person is an explosive force, you grasp that. It's tragic, it's tragedy itself. Nietzsche developed this quite simple idea even further: the man of resentment is venomous; his idea is to render you ashamed of the least happiness. Spinoza won't even say that social institutions furnish us with models. He will say that they fulfill us with affections. A social institution is a machine of affects; it fulfills your power of being affected. This is not ideological.

He's really very, very clever, and truly in the Nietzschean sense of "why I am so clever," he takes terms which are current in his epoch, most notably the Cartesian vocabulary, and turns it against Descartes.

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: The whole discourse of representation is structured by analogical principles and thus Spinoza's whole operation consists in making, in imposing a kind of assemblage of affects which implies likewise a critique of representation.

The *Ethics* is a book which proceeds via a quite malicious system; this system consists in producing texts, and then notes and notes to notes, and then notes to notes of notes. It's obviously in the notes to notes that an enormous thing will be let loose. Spinoza himself found a far more formidable thing, and doubtless the geometrical method was necessary for that. His book has the appearance of being completely continuous, but in fact when one looks at it, one sees that there are propositions—like geometrical propositions—there are demonstrations, and then there are corollaries and then there are these strange things he calls *scholia*.

At first glance, it all follows. If you look closely, you'll notice that in fact it's not so tightly knit, that is to say the proposition-demonstration-corollary system is an autonomous system, that is the demonstrations always refer to other demonstrations or to other corollaries. And then the system of scholia is another system which coexists with the first and the scholia refer to one another. Thus there are two *Ethics* in one: an *Ethics* which functions in the mode of continuity and a secret *Ethics* which functions in the mode of discontinuity, and which is constituted by the scholia. If need be, there are forty pages without scholia and two scholia which refer to one another across these forty pages, and it's in the scholia that he gives an aggressive version of what he says geometrically in the other system; so much so that, literally, the *Ethics* is simultaneously written twice: a violent and affective version and a rational and geometrical version.

It's in the scholia that he says what an ethics is, to make an ethics is to make a theory and a practice of powers of being affected, and an ethics is opposed to a satirics [satirique]. What he calls a satirics is tremendous enough: it's everything that takes pleasure one way or another in sad affects, everything which is depreciating and depressing. That's the satirics. It's obvious that all of morality goes under the name of satirics. What exactly does powers-that-be mean? And in what ways do the powers-that-be take hold in order to depress, to affect people with sad affects? ... [End of the text]

Gilles Deleuze

On *The Anti-Ædipe III*, 1973-1974

3rd Session, January 21, 1974 [Part 1]

Transcription: WebDeleuze; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni

I would like us to be able to organize our paths of research here in line with the point we have reached. It seems to me that, given what we saw last time, we have three main directions.

The first direction is relative to what we saw last time: we had looked at a matter that we could call *the plane of composition*. This plane of composition was something we sometimes referred to as the plane of consistency, perhaps to place it more in relation with the operation of desire. Thanks to Spinoza, whose thinking was necessary in this regard, we were able to find a kind of compositional plane, a plane of consistency, which was defined by the unity of its materials, or in a certain way – which amounts to the same thing – by the position of univocity. This is a kind of thought that does not pass by way of forms, nor through organs or organisms, a kind of informal thought.

And to say that the plane of consistency is defined by a unity of materials also refers us to a system of variables, and these variables consisted – once we had established that they were the same materials in all assemblages – the variables consisted in the positions and the connections. It was the variation of positions and connections of the materials that constituted the so-called machinic assemblages, machinic assemblages whose common point was that they all realized the plane of consistency according to this or that degree of power.

So we have a first very marked link between the plane of composition or consistency and the machinic assemblages which realized this plane in various ways, according to the position and the connections of the materials in each assemblage. And finally, according to each assemblage, circulations and transformations of affects were produced, a machinic assemblage being like a place of passage, a place of transformation of intensive affects, and these intensive affects corresponded to the degrees of power of each machinic assemblage.

This opens up a research path that will allow us to pose the question of the relation between intensities, intensive affects and forms. What is the relation between intensive quantities and forms, specific forms, categorical forms and generic forms, and so on? How is an intensive thought which does not pass by way of these forms possible? The whole of Scholasticism is traversed by a problem which is of vital importance to it, since it lies at the crossroads of physics and theology. This is the problem they were very conscious of during the whole of the Middle Ages, that of the relation between intensities and forms. In medieval philosophical terms, this problem was known as the latitude and remission of forms. The question is to know if a form is

in itself susceptible to intensive variations, that is to say if it enjoys a dimension of latitude. The latitude of forms consisted in the possible variations of a form in terms of its intensities. For example, can one be *more or less* reasonable? Here, we can see how it will be up to us to transform this old problem, and at least we can situate it as an old classical problem: man being defined for example as a reasonable animal, a reasonable animal as a form composed both of a generic determination: animal, and of a specific difference: reasonable.

To be more or less reasonable. What can it mean when a form is susceptible to a certain latitude? If one can be more or less reasonable, is it that, at a push, there will be a degree zero of being reasonable which will certainly not be the same thing as the way in which an animal is not reasonable. How could they pose this problem of the relationship between intensities and forms? And once again, this runs through all the physics of the Middle Ages, all these attempts to make a science of intensive quantities. We had a kind of mixture that we must take in a very muddled way and that revolved around a kind of thought of degrees of power, of the assemblages into which these degrees of power entered, of a critique of forms, and of the effort... of Spinoza's own effort to think degrees of power independently of forms, functions, species and kinds. All this constitutes a curious philosophy that revolved around thinking immanence or the univocity of being. It all turns around a kind of theory of the machinic assemblages that one tries to pursue.

When we are told about a latitude of forms, before we have even seen what was meant by latitude in the Middle Ages, either we can say... I believe that in the Middle Ages, there were two main positions. There is the position which tells us, among other things, that a form itself can only be perfect, this is all that it has, therefore the notion of reasonable, for example, cannot be considered in terms of more or less. The plus or minus of the intensity, the latitude, that is, the thresholds between which *the play* of form takes place cannot come from the form itself. It can only come from the subject in which this form is realized or to which this form lays claim. *Latitude is not a property of the form itself; it is a property of the subject that receives it.* But there are others who would say that it is the form itself that is susceptible, under certain conditions, to a certain latitude, that is to say, that it plays between certain thresholds. What the two positions at least have in common is a certain subordination of the intensive latitude to the form.

In terms of the business of the egg, we had a very different position. There, it is the forms themselves that are as if subordinated to the intensive variations that determine them. In the question of the egg, the egg is considered as an intensive medium, and it is the thresholds of intensities which determine this or that form. It is as if the subordination between forms and intensities had been reversed. This is very important for us because, after all, it is by no means given that the egg is our past; this is a very dangerous conception, to consider that the egg is our past, since it naturally leads us on the path of regression. Is it not possible, not only from the point of view of embryology, but also from the point of view of the most lived experience, to conceive of the egg as being strictly always contemporary with ourselves, that is to say, that each of us carries our own egg with them, and what we call someone's egg is his or her milieu of experimentation? So the egg is no longer in any way a refuge in the mode of a return to the mother, but is, if you like, the strictly contemporary placenta of ourselves. It is, finally, the milieu of strict contemporaneity. The egg is not at all the form in which I descend from a mother and incidentally from a father. The egg is like the contemporary plasma in relation to which

father or mother and child are strictly contemporaneous with each other. The egg, strictly speaking, is the contemporary milieu where one cannot establish succession and in relation to which one cannot establish succession. From this point of view, the egg is really the contemporary intensive matter of any experimentation as such. It is always in the egg that one experiments. This is obviously a conception that always makes the egg our own past.⁵

A student: [*Inaudible remarks*].

Deleuze: Here is a text by a contemporary embryologist, who says that "Forms are contingent upon a kinematic dynamism" – it is about the development of the egg – "It is secondary whether or not an orifice forms in the germ. All that counts is the process of immigration itself; what yields an orifice fissure or primitive line is not invagination, but pure chronological and quantitative variations"⁶ – that is, whether an energetic flow reaches a certain threshold or not. There, forms, including organic forms, are really secondary to thresholds of intensities.

Kyryl Ryjik: When was this text written?

Deleuze: About 1930.

Ryjik: That's as far from us as...

Deleuze: Why do you say that?

Ryjik: You're talking in terms of intensities, whereas he's talking as a phenomenologist, an observer. Biochemistry wouldn't work, and where you would have to go back to intensities is in quantum biochemistry, for example, at the level of electronics. It is the structure of proteins that determines the forms.

[WebDeleuze note: *A long polemic ensued*]

Deleuze: I have the impression that this is not at all the same problem. Embryology deals with the way in which the egg develops and differentiates. When the embryologist claims around 1925-1930 that the determination of forms in relation to the development of the egg appeals to distributions of intensities, that is one thing; it does not claim to be molecular biology. To say that molecular biology goes beyond or is called to go beyond this point of view, seems to me to be without foundation. I am not saying that we should be satisfied with the egg as the ultimate unit. I am saying that whatever the state of physics or whatever the state of biology, there is indeed a problem which is the development of the egg as a – let's use any word – a giant molecule, or molar unit. When someone is interested in the development of the egg and in the organization of intensities, to say to him: tell us about quantum physics, that is to say, about the molecular elements which are, if necessary, mixed with this, takes on a whole other dimension.

Ryjik: It's not "if necessary"; you're talking like a finalist. You're looking at the egg as if it were the pole that attracts the intensities.

[WebDeleuze note: *The discussion continues for some time.*]

Deleuze: That was the first direction for me. Second direction...

Georges Comtesse: In your view, is it the conflicting difference between the forces of attraction and repulsion that determines the production of intensities on the egg?

Deleuze: No. Regarding that, I would say that the distributions of intensities on the egg are much more linked to molecular machinic assemblages.

The second direction, one that we have addressed on all the previous occasions, is that machinic assemblages have nothing to do with forms, with separable forms, specific forms or generic forms. Machinic assemblages always problematize units of levels and contents that are completely different. Insofar as machinic assemblages are not representations of something, but transformations of affects, they put into play all kinds of becomings, and for a simple reason: it is that *affect itself is a becoming*, it is an intensive passage. Among the becomings put into play in machinic assemblages, are a becoming-animal and a becoming-molecular. But it is these affects that fill a capacity of being affected, or that circulate within a machinic assemblage, that mark the notion of the becoming-animal. For example, the becoming-horse of little Hans, the notion of becoming-molecular, and all these various becomings occur either in relation to machinic assemblages or involve real movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

It is this whole becoming-animal, becoming-molecular, and the movements of deterritorialization that must be analyzed in terms of a machinic assemblage. And in this respect, we had sketched out a kind of possible program for the becomings-animal. Once again, we had had the presentiment that becomings-animal were not sufficient, that they were perhaps compromises, compromises between forms and intensities, and that beyond becomings-animal, there were still becomings-molecular. We had seen the famous becomings-animal that occurred in Africa. Are there not very profound historical links between certain war customs and becomings-animal, where you have this whole notion of wild-man warriors. Would there also be a relationship between becomings-animal and certain secret societies, for example, secret societies in Africa?

And finally, the third direction. This was that in these machinic assemblages, there always intervened – precisely because any arrangement put in relation units... [*Text interrupted*]

[WebDeleuze note: *A discussion of the notion of program follows*]

... The psychoanalytic operation is an operation of exchange that consists in saying: I will replace your affects with fantasies. When we talk about the psychoanalytic contract, we have to see that, by nature, it is double: there is an external contract which is the visible contract: you give me money and I listen to you; and the invisible contract: you give me your affects for the benefit of a scene of fantasy representation.

Richard Pinhas: There's no real secret about it, since Freud devoted an entire text to explaining that he was exchanging people's lived configurations, emotions and affects for discourse and representative configurations.

Deleuze: Yes, but that doesn't prevent it from arriving at a new stage with Melanie Klein. There, the object of the exchange passes through the fantasy, whereas with Freud, it was not posed like that at all.

A student: I don't really see the distinction between fantasy and representation as long as we consider that the social machine consists in inscribing affects in a generic conceptual language.

Deleuze: We all agree that there is no difference; fantasy is a kind of matrix of representation.
[*Text interrupted*]

... The first thing I see is that there is always something left to cover, namely the genesis of affects. This is the way in which the molecular elements affect each other according to the positions and the variable connections that will generate the affects that run through the machinic assemblage. It is even in this way that we will be able to justify the formula: only machines are affective, it is the machines that are affective. They are not representations of something, they are affective and they are programs of affects.

The second thing is that the signs of affect are indeed like indices of representation from which one induces [*indistinct words*]. Here, I am less sure of what I'm saying because if we take up again [*indistinct words*], once again, if we take up the way little Hans defines the horse, what is important for us is not the horse in general, it is the ONE horse that he programmed as part of his machinic assemblage. When he says that he has blinkers, black around his mouth, and what have you, if you separate each thing – because it is still representation, the representation of a street scene, the horse that little Hans saw dragging... but in another way and along another line which would be the affective program of little Hans, it is already something other than a representation, namely *circulations of affects*. Little Hans won't see a horse wearing blinkers, he will instead be affected by what he experiences as the blindness of the horse, the active blindness of the horse as it is caused by man. And here, we are no longer in the domain of representation. If you separate the elements, you will say that each one refers to a representation. But if you establish the circulation in terms of this mystery, you will ask how little Hans makes an affect circulate, how he passes from one affect to another. For example, an essential problem, it seems to me, in little Hans's assemblage is: does the horse bite because it has fallen or for some other reason? What is the affect that is transformed into biting?

If we transform this in terms of fantasies, you see that the answer is the psychoanalytic answer, namely that "making noise with his feet" refers to the primal scene, to the fantasy representation of the primal scene. Previously we said that as far as we were concerned, we didn't give a damn about all that, that the machinic assemblage was completely sexual in itself and had nothing to do with a fantasy. At that point, it is enough to reintroduce the movement of affects in the machinic assemblage so that it becomes the programming of this assemblage where nothing is exactly a representative index anymore, although, at each moment, if you make a cut, at such and such a moment, you reduce things to signs of representation.

So, I believe that it would be necessary to introduce a double point of view because it is true that it is, in the last instance, molecular relations that account for the distribution of affects in a machinic assemblage, while, at another level, it is the machinic assemblage that causes molecular

lines, becomings-molecular or at least becomings-animal to take flight. It is in this sense that I ask the question: wouldn't the becoming-animal still be a compromise?

The becoming-animal, however fascinating it may be and whatever it is used for... here I again take up the example of the war machine: in the war machine in general, there is indeed a notion of becoming-animal. I take again the example of the wild-man warrior. And then there is something else, in the war machine there is not only the notion of becoming-animal, there is also a kind of becoming-molecular, like a kind of molecular line. This is at the level of a consistent machine: the war machine. But at the level of the scientific machine and its possible unities with the war machine, the becomings-molecular will perhaps represent a kind of becoming that, in terms of intensities or in terms of deterritorialization, goes much further than the becoming-animal.

We can present things in two ways: either we can say that finally, what happens at the level of machinic assemblages is a kind of intensive continuum. There is an intensive continuum or, instead of there being forms separated from one another, there is a transformation, a passage from one form to another through intensive continuity, which does not prevent us from marking the thresholds of this continuity. For example, I can very well present the relation of becoming-animal and the relation of becoming-molecular in the form of an intensive continuum. Here I take a classic example: the double aspect in science fiction where we have a certain notion of becoming-animal, and the way in which the becoming-animal is relayed by something that goes even further, namely a becoming-molecular. We can say that there is a kind of intensive continuum on which we can stagger the becoming-animal and the becoming-molecular, and there is a passage, a kind of threshold, the crossing of a gradient. If we reintroduce in one way or another the notion of form, however, we will find ourselves back in this business of analogies, homologies and structures.

On the other hand, as long as you stick to the notion of a program, it doesn't bother me. There is an intensive continuum of substance where a threshold is crossed. For example, here I come back to my example: in terms of the question of transplants or eggs, it is quite simple: something that was destined to become the caudal appendage of the newt, for example, is displaced. What does it mean to "shift on an egg"? It means: to graft upon a region of a different intensity. Instead of becoming a caudal appendage, it produces something else; precisely, a threshold has been crossed through migration. Through migration, which is to say that, in the very egg itself, a process of deterritorialization is inscribed, since a part that was normally destined to become such a thing at such a threshold of intensity, will, by means of migration, now produce something else; there is a crossing of a threshold. Here, I can say that the forms are not important, that what determines these forms as a secondary product from the point of view of representation, are purely the migrations. And by migrations I do not at all mean migrations in terms of spatial extension, I mean in terms of changes in intensity.

I would say, on the other hand, that this intensive continuum can be expressed in another way. There are even three ways of expressing it, and these three ways are like three coordinates of a machinic assemblage. We can say that there are no more forms, that instead there is an intensive continuum of substances... [*End of first part; second part missing*]

Notes

¹ Right from the first plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, “Rhizome: introduction”, Deleuze and Guattari are greatly concerned with the figure of Freud's “Little Hans”. See p. 13 on Melanie Klein's “Little Richard”; see also the collective text (with Guattari, Claire Parnet, and André Scala) “The Interpretation of Utterances”, in *Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975-1995*, trans. Ames Hodges & Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotexte 2006), pp. 89-112.

² The standard English translation of *agencement machinique*, which we follow here is “machinic assemblage”. However it should be pointed out that the term “assemblage” lacks the notion of agency and in particular of giving agency that the word *agencement* implies.

³ See Jean-Luc Donnet et Andre Green, *L'enfant de ça* (Paris : Minuit, 1973).

⁴ We can assume that this objection appears in the book cited above.

⁵ Let us note that this sentence seems to contradict the previous statements. Without any recordings, we are unable to verify Deleuze's statement.

⁶ The source of this quotation is Albert Dalcq, *L'œuf et son dynamisme organisateur* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1941), p. 95, quoted in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 532, note 7. See also *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 164, “The egg is the milieu of pure intensity, spatium not extension, Zero intensity as principle of production. There is a fundamental convergence between science and myth, embryology and mythology, the biological egg and the psychic or cosmic egg: the egg always designates this intensive reality, which is not undifferentiated, but is where things and organs are distinguished solely by gradients, migrations, zones of proximity. The egg is the BwO”.