

Gilles Deleuze

On *Anti-Oedipus* III, 1973-1974

1st session, December 03, 1973

Transcription: WebDeleuze; modified transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Graeme Thomson and Silvia Maglioni

About little Hans¹

... even in terms of little Hans' relationship with the horse, we will see a number of responses that will consist in saying that the relation is analogical, or else responses that would amount to saying that the relationship is homological and that we must establish the structural system that accounts for this. We, on the contrary, will go in a completely different direction by speaking of a *machinic assemblage*² that excludes both imaginary analogies and structural homologies.

I would add that we are far from being done with this business of the internal contract in psychoanalysis, because if Melanie Klein announced the move, "I exchange your affects for fantasies", and that this was a way of breaking the child and of preventing him from producing his own utterances or from bringing forth his unconscious, a move even worse than that of Freud, now we have a third phase. They have found another way: I take a recent book by André Green called *L'enfant de ça*³ which is very interesting in this respect because Green asks: what is it that has been lacking in psychoanalysis? What has been lacking in psychoanalysis is a theory of thought, and he says: in the end, I, Andre Green, consider myself a disciple of Wilfred Bion – an English psychoanalyst – rather than of Lacan, because Bion is the first to have come up with a psychoanalytical theory of thought... but to know what this psychoanalytic theory of thought consists in, you have to read Green's texts.

And he says very eloquently that the real psychoanalytic exchange would be "you give me your affects, and in return I will give you thought". The psychoanalyst assumes the role of thinker, and what happens when the psychoanalyst assumes the role of thinker can hardly be believed: the hour of the cogito makes its return. It has returned under the name of holy castration. The current state of the analytic exchange is no longer: "you give me your affects, and I'll give you perception", or "you give me your affects, and I'll give you fantasy", now it's – and note the Kleinian nonsense of this – give me your affects and take care of your own fantasies, that is to say, of a theater. And it's no trouble for anyone to set up a little theatre in the corner, as long as it doesn't burn down your school. That's what an affect is, it's a fire! Melanie's famous ideal amounts to the same thing: we find ourselves faced with these little paranoiacs and a child who experiences his body-machine... who experiences it as a power, a potency, that is to say that he is indeed a little paranoiac. But there's nothing wrong with these little paranoiacs, they're not bad people. All they want is for the machine to work. They are even very ingenious; a little paranoiac isn't sick, they have no need of anyone.

And what does Melanie Klein want? Her great battle cry is: I will make you pass from the paranoid position to the depressive position – I'm not making this up – she constructs a whole theory so as to show the superiority of the depressive position, which attains the sacred unity of the ego with the good object and so on, all that crap, considering the culture of fantasy as a particularly life-enhancing thing. This is the good position, the depressive position: we have broken the little paranoiac. And this is considered a successful cure. I still have a vivid memory of Lacan's texts where he speaks about didactic psychoanalysis and where he says that intensive psychoanalysis is that which must pass through the depressive position.

Now the objections that Green makes, and it is not by chance that Mr. Green objects to me, saying: "you never talk about depressives; you don't know what a depressive is".⁴ This is precisely his whole trick: to transform a kind of paranoid potency into a depressive impotence that it is at one with the exchange: affects-forces replaced by fantasies, or programs replaced by fantasies, and meanwhile the little guy is in his corner, not saying anything, that is, he is unable to produce his utterances.

We had left it at this, an extraordinary operation: little Hans in a vital way -- in a vital way, quite independently of what the psychoanalysts say about it -- little Hans describes the horse, and we don't ask ourselves what this description of the horse signifies, we don't take it as the object of an interpretation to be made. We just noticed last time that this description consisted of an enumeration of affects, and that these affects did not refer to the horse defined as an organism, to the horse such as a naturalist or a biologist might define it, but that it referred to the horse as a part or as a cog of a machinic assemblage, the assemblage in question being: horse-carriole-weight-driver of the horse.

And it was within the framework of this machinic assemblage that the affects by which little Hans not only described, but experienced the horse were distributed. I say "experienced" because he was launching himself into a kind of becoming-horse, in terms of a becoming-animal. This is a very curious or paradoxical operation, the temptation or the attempt to define or describe something or someone by the affects they supposedly experience. The question we will begin with today is: what does such an attempt mean? What does it imply? Because, after all, it is hardly self-evident. What would it mean logically or not logically? What is this way of living things, animals or persons according to the affects we lend them? What is it opposed to? What is little Hans trying to get across by this method? What is he trying to resist? To resist the oppression that comes from the family, the oppression that comes from the street and the city, the oppression that comes from psychotherapists, and this attempt by little Hans to maintain... no, no, the horse is a set of affects considered in terms of a machinic assemblage.

For us, this is very important because it already gives us the feeling that between an affect and a machinic assemblage, there is a relation, but which is not at all the same as the relation there is between organic determinations and an organism; that is something else altogether. So, what is it that he wants to assert and that psychoanalysis prevents him from so doing? It contains a description of things, of beings and of animals in terms of affects. He is looking for something, what he wants is something that is inseparable from a becoming-horse. This engages us already a little: the fact that *the affect is inseparable from a becoming*, the affect is inseparable from a

passage. To what does a descriptive thought by affects oppose itself? But here we should proceed very much in order...

André Scala: There is a very important text, because it contains everything we need to know about Freud's method, it's on page 98 of "Little Hans", note 3. Following a reflection by little Hans on the way little girls make pee-pee, little Hans says that little girls have a pee-pee maker because they make pee-pee. Freud says that one could be disturbed by this early alteration of the childish intellect. Why don't these investigators affirm what they actually see, which is that little girls don't have a pee-pee maker. So why doesn't Hans himself ask this question? We can say that Hans links the pee-pee maker, not to a form or function, but to a functioning, to a machinic assemblage, which means, he says, that everything has a pee-pee maker except chairs or tables. A locomotive has a pee-pee maker, a cow has one, a horse, the father, the mother. One can ask the question: if little girls do not have a pee-pee maker, how do they pee? Freud answers that this is not the question, it is only of secondary importance; peeing is secondary to the pee-pee maker. We will see in Hans' experiments, when he holds himself back from urinating, that this is perhaps how one can know if it's possible to pee through another organ. There is a first stage of organ analogies, that is to say that Freud replies that yes, little girls do pee but it happens differently. It's a bit like fish who have gills and men who have lungs, they both breathe but they don't breathe in the same way and the organs – gills-lungs, little girl-little boy – these are organs called analogues. That's the first thing.

Secondly, Freud makes little Hans say: I want to have a pee-pee maker as big as a horse's. There doesn't seem to be a text where Hans actually says: I want a pee-pee maker as big as a horse's. He never says this because for him the horse is not a goal, it's a becoming. The second thing is Freud's assignment of the becoming-horse, in terms of transcendence, that is to say that the horse is obviously bigger than little Hans. It has a penis that is much, much larger than that of little Hans, and this will allow Freud, by way of the obvious, to introduce the element of phobia. Of course, in the experimentation, in the becoming-horse, there is fear and anguish, but there is never phobia in terms of confrontation with a model.

And here we have the third reversal concerning Freud's erroneous perception: Freud says that the erroneous perception of little Hans is, finally, the work of his unconscious. He says that he guesses that little girls have a pee-pee maker in the form of the clitoris, and this is the moment of structural homology. The clitoris-penis homology exceeds the analogy of function. We should see these three stages and how Freud, through these three moments – analogy, eminence, and homology – how he closes the loop of erroneous perception, unconscious, and how this circuit is that of Freud's analysis and how he short-circuits the affects and injects phobia.

Deleuze: If I understand correctly, there is a point that touches on psychoanalysis in its most fundamental domain, and this concerns the problem of the difference of the sexes. According to what Scala has said, it is very striking that as soon as psychoanalysis gets involved in thinking about the problem of the difference of the sexes, it does so by borrowing modes of thought that are logically easy to inventory, namely, either the large analogy of perception, what we can call the learned analogy or the homology that we would now call structural. A typical example in psychoanalysis is where little Hans says, sometimes in the form of questions, sometimes in the form of assertions... he says that girls, too, have a pee-pee maker. This is one of little Hans'

propositions, which perhaps involves many things. But what we notice is the way that in the psychoanalysis of a child an idea is already crushed because what Hans hears is precisely this: I know that they don't have one, but they have it by analogy. Last time we saw the famous analogy Freud proposes between the penis and the clitoris. And immediately, Freud says: why does he want to maintain that little girls have a pee-pee maker, if only by analogy? It is because of his fear of castration.

In my view, in everything that little Hans said, there is nothing that in any way, shape or form, indicates this, absolutely nothing. It's all in Freud's head. It is Freud who believes that little girls do not have a pee-pee maker and that, if they have one, it can only be by analogy. Therefore, female sexuality is conceived by way of analogy with male sexuality. Freud's position is well known; basically, it is that there is only one sexuality, the sexuality of the boy, whereas feminine sexuality is indeed a sexuality by analogy. When, with Melanie Klein, psychoanalysis began to lean in a slightly more progressive direction in this domain, it consisted in saying: yes, finally, there are two sexualities, a male sexuality and a female sexuality. So at that point, between the two sexualities, what relation could there be? No longer a relation of rough analogy, but a relation of so-called structural homology, as if there were homology between two structures.

Now, following Scala's remark, the problem has arisen of this perpetual procedure of thinking sexuality in terms of analogy or homology. We'll look at this, and we'll just keep it in mind for now. Perhaps little Hans thinks in a different way; perhaps the thought processes of little Hans are completely different, which is why he will never be able to say what he has to say because from the beginning, his thought is molded in terms of schemas and processes that have nothing to do with him.

Where will this business of analogies and homologies lead us? You understand, if we are looking for what is truly original or creative in statements, we rediscover our initial question: what is original in an attempt to define things, beings or animals in terms of affects and not through anything else? Now, as for the affects of the horse, we have made a list of these and we have seen what assemblage they fit into. Suppose I say that between a table, a horse, a dog, a girl, a boy, the differences consist only in the fact that they are not affected by the same things. In other words, these differences are always... they always concern *powers of being affected*. This may not seem very important, but oddly, things, animals and people already tend to lose their form. Everything still functions if I'm told that a dog is a mammal, that it has four legs, that it barks, whereas a horse is something else... well. But we enter a completely different atmosphere if we say that what really counts are *the affects of which someone or something is capable*.

Here, we venture into an unknown forest where things are distinguished only by the affects of which they are capable. Already, we are forced to go beyond the simple notion of affect. We go beyond the notion of affect by means of a more precise notion: the power of being affected. To be affected is a power. So, we define things, beings, animals, by powers. We can immediately at least see to what other kinds of scenarios this is opposed: we no longer define them by or in terms of genera or species. I would not say that a table is a manufactured thing, whereas a horse is an animal, just as I would not ask whether a person is male or female, but rather I would ask, what affects are you capable of? That is to say, what are your powers of being affected? In terms

of a certain very, very simple way of thinking, it is perhaps here that we will see the most bizarre things happening: what is the meaning of this power of being affected?

So the list of horse-affects that little Hans drew up as his experience went on, you remember, whether it was kicking, having hindquarters, being an anal animal, that is, making dung, pulling carts, pulling overweight carts, falling under excessive weight, all of thi defines the horse's power of being affected.

A student: In industry, in transportation, we use this term: assignment. You can be assigned to or deassigned from something: such and such a locomotive is assigned to transport goods. I don't know if we can talk about powers; it's more a question of efficiency rather than powers.

Deleuze: Well, what does it mean to be disaffected? To be disaffected, that is to say, no longer to be affected in the order of certain affects.

The student: An affect is something that is free, that is susceptible to being affected in different ways, free in the sense that Freud speaks of free energy that can oscillate between various poles, whereas in practice it is something more determining. We would need to find something which allows us to pass from the affect to something more precise, but more free. To pass from the affect in the machinic assemblage... which would be embodied in something individualized...

Another student: When you say that energy is embodied, it doesn't work anymore. An affect already constitutes a system in a certain sense. There are no free affects. You don't do anything with oil, for example. You don't do anything with water, which is to say that each affect is already something affected...

Deleuze: Thanks to what you two have said, we have now a group of notions: affects, assignments of function and powers.

Richard Pinhas: What I liked very much in the little text that André read, and in the commentary that he made, is that it very clearly shows an operation that is at the same time that of psychoanalysis – it pertains to psychoanalysis in the sense that it's part of the contract – and that also pertains more or less to capital, but only to a certain extent and in another manner. And the whole process that we see at work in Freud's analysis of little Hans is this transformation, which is practically a real transmutation of intensities into intentions, intentions that will play the role of simulacra of intensities. And these intensities, finally, we can put them in conjunction with the notion of affect, in a certain way. It's a bit adventurous, but I see it as a kind of qualification of the quantitative.

In other words, I would see the affect as a point, as a point that we would take in a chain – but the chain is a crude metaphor – that we would take in a flow – this is already less metaphorical – and a point that would note, that would denote or rather designate a variation and a fluctuation of intensities, in other words a rise or a fall, whatever you want to call it, you can call it anything you like, and that's why in the affect we would only have singular positions and we would have no link ...

Deleuze: Yes, but in these variations and fluctuations, we should also see thresholds, thresholds to cross.

A student: [*Inaudible remarks*].

Pinhas: I was talking about the passage from intensity to intention. If I try to define the intensity-affects pole, what we have is a pole that is composed of singularities, whereas in intention, that is to say in the simulacra of intensities, in the simulacra of affects, in the simulacrum of identity or in this identity that capital makes for you, in this kind of organic body that capital makes for you, we are in a completely different sphere: we are in that of exchange. What I liked is that in the very nature of affect, and on the side of intensities, we have a kind of plane where there are only metamorphic processes. We pass from one affect to another without causes, without reasons, without goals. It happens and it happens as a pure process. Whereas on the side of the intention, we would have something that could be called fixity. We have what Freud is trying to do, that is to say fix desire, something that does not flow anymore, that no longer metamorphoses.

And the whole of Freud's operation, finally, will be to identify the affective moments, the moments in the sense of affective powers, and to fix these powers in order to precisely exchange them in a movement that we saw last week: namely, to make this exchange: you give me your affects, I give you words. Finally, it is this process that, through the intermediary of simulacra, representations, images, will make your symptom disappear. I believe that there is something extremely important in this consideration of affect as a purely metamorphic process as opposed to a kind of fixity that the desire of psychoanalysis wants to impose at all costs.

A student: We have not yet put enough emphasis – and I realize that part of your intervention fits into this – on potential energy as something profoundly discontinuous that is capable of both gradual fluctuations and jumps, discontinuities, thresholds, very rapid passages. At the level of potential energy, for example, there cannot be something like an equalization, there will be a very abrupt passage where we pass ... [*Inaudible remarks*] [*End of recording*]

Notes

¹ Right from the first plateau of *A Thousand Plateaus*, “Rhizome: introduction”, Deleuze and Guattari are greatly concerned with the figure of Freud's “Little Hans”. See p. 13 on Melanie Klein's “Little Richard”; see also the collective text (with Guattari, Claire Parnet, and André Scala) “The Interpretation of Utterances”, in *Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975-1995*, trans. Ames Hodges & Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotexte 2006), pp. 89-112.

² The standard English translation of *agencement machinique*, which we follow here is “machinic assemblage”. However it should be pointed out that the term “assemblage” lacks the notion of agency and in particular of giving agency that the word *agencement* implies.

³ See Jean-Luc Donnet et Andre Green, *L'enfant de ça* (Paris : Minuit, 1973).

⁴ We can assume that this objection appears in the book cited above.