

**Gilles Deleuze – The Deleuze Seminars (deleuze.cla.purdue.edu), summaries: Charles J. Stivale**

**On *Anti-Oedipus* III, 1973-1974**

**Session 1**

**December 3, 1973**

This session's focal topic, Freud's case known as "Little Hans", emerges in *A Thousand Plateaus* as early as "Introduction: Rhizome" (p. 14), and with Melanie Klein's Little Richard and Agnes, is the topic of Deleuze's 1977 essay (with Guattari, Claire Parnet and André Scala) "The Interpretation of Utterances", in *Two Regimes of Madness* (New York & Cambridge MA: Semiotext(e)/MIT Press, 2006), pp. 89-112. In contrast to analysis establishing imaginary analogies and a structural system of homologies in "Little Hans", Deleuze insists on understanding the machinic assemblage whereas Melanie Klein emphasizes the child's phantasms, blocking the child's statements and production of unconscious, and André Green's third way robs the child of his/her affects. Deleuze argues that Hans's discourse enumerates diverse affects which are closely related to a becoming or a passage. André Scala intervenes to comment on the manner in which Freud's interpretation creates organ analogies, then introduces Hans's phobia rather than accept (or even see) his becoming-horse. Deleuze responds by pointing out the extent to which psychoanalysis gets involved with confusing the problem of differences between sexes and suggests that all these remarks reveal the importance of affects as part of assemblages and of revealing the potential of what someone or something is capable (clearly linked to the becoming-Spinozan developed in plateau 10 of *A Thousand Plateaus*). Richard Pinhas suggests that affects are linked to fluctuations of intensities and to passage from intensity to intention while another student suggests that this shift also corresponds to discontinuous movements of potential energy, the session ending during this student's remarks.

**Session 2**

**January 14, 1974**

While seeming to introduce this session as a "terminological detour", Deleuze remains within the problem of statements, the detour concerning the nature of being and notions connected to the topic, i.e., equivocity, analogy, and univocity. After developing these three facets, Deleuze insists that these notions are linked to another one, that of category, i.e. the concept said of every possible object of experience, which has a cause and which itself causes other things. He shifts the focus back to univocity as something strange and difficult to think about, introducing Duns Scotus's views on univocal being, at the border of heresy, but maintaining being as physically analogical while metaphysically univocal. To get out of the analogical-univocal impasse Deleuze concludes, with Spinoza, that differences between beings consist in difference understood solely as degrees of power (*puissance*), and not distinguished by their form, genus, or species. Deleuze explains the linkage between degrees of power and univocity of being, and drawing from Spinoza's *Ethics*, Deleuze distinguishes French logic of the "cogito" from English, non-egocentric logic, and both of these from Spinoza's thinking of degrees of *puissance*. To a student's comment, Deleuze distinguishes such potential energy from Nietzsche's concept of will

to power. For Spinoza, this is a political perspective, dominant *pouvoir* (power, power over) in contrast to *puissance* (power of action), and in contrast to a discourse of representation structured by analogical principles, Spinoza's assemblage of affects constitutes a critique of representation. Deleuze concludes the session by tracing how *The Ethics* functions to undermine analogical representation, via an appearance of continuity which, in fact, is sequences of propositions, demonstrations, corollaries, and *scholia*, hence a secret mode of discontinuity.

### **Session 3** **January 21, 1974**

As only the first part of the complete session, Deleuze starts by indicating three main directions for research in relation to the seminar's discussion to this point. The first concerns the plane of consistency, possibly in relation to the operation of desire, and referring to Spinoza, he indicates that this plane is defined as a position of univocity or unit of materials, in contrast to a system of variables or positions of connections, machinic assemblages with the common point of realizing the plane of consistency according to a certain degree of *puissance* (power of action). Deleuze then introduces a second research direction, the fact that machinic assemblages – as transformations of affect -- always put in question different units of levels and contents because affect is a becoming, an intensive passage, hence the movement of animal-becomings, molecular-becomings, and these becomings encompass movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Finally, the third research direction is omitted from the WebDeleuze transcript, but as he continues, Deleuze seems to indicate a linkage with the exchange in psychoanalytic sessions, the replacement of affects by phantasms, a process that evolved from Freud through Melanie Klein. Deleuze then proposes to consider the genesis of affects, i.e., how molecular elements manifest as affects in variable connection across machinic assemblages, allowing Deleuze to justify the statement “there is nothing affective but machines”. Deleuze considers the animal-becoming as a kind of compromise by raising the concept of the war machine and the warrior-animal, for besides the war machine encompassing the theme of animal-becomings, it also encompasses molecular-becomings that go farther than animal-becomings. Considering this process in terms of a program, the intensive continuum of substances includes a threshold being crossed, migration as changes in intensities. However, the second way is to envisage the intensive continuum as constituted by three coordinates, no longer forms but substance. Here the session is interrupted, and its second part is unavailable.

***[Please note: no transcripts for academic year 1974-75 are available online]***