

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on

A Thousand Plateaus II

1976-1977

On A Thousand Plateaus II, 1976-1977

Lecture #1 – February 15, 1977

Transcript: WebDeleuze; modified by Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Billy Dean Goehring

I'm going to spend a session consolidating things and going over our reading list. All semester, we've been trying to distinguish two different forms of segmentarity, or two types of multiplicity. There are seven avenues we might take: one is biography. The second approach, or the second context: organization. Third, centralization; fourth, *signifiance*; fifth, sociability; sixth, subjectivation; seventh, plan(n)ing.¹

First: biography. The idea was that what matters about someone's life, whether we're talking about an individual or a group, is a particular set of things we could think of as a cartography. A cartography is made up of lines. We, in other words, are made of lines, and these lines vary from individual to individual, from group to group, or perhaps there are some parts they share in common. We were trying to figure out what this linear composition implied. I'd like to draw our attention to the interference between these different headings. Already, these lines touch on what I referred to as the plane of consistency, or the plane of composition. They're lines on a plane, and this plane has to be drawn up at the same time as the lines. But what are these composing lines? Again, they're not points; we've given up the idea that we could ever pin down any points. We were contrasting between drawing lines and making points.

Last year, I turned to a very particular slice of literature: the novella, or short story. We had set out to do a morphological study—which we didn't actually do, but we could have compared the morphology of a short story and the morphology of a tale. The subject came up in the context of animal-becomings. So much to say, everything's tangled together. Or even the morphology of the novel. I felt that the morphology of the short story was exemplary because short stories are all about drawing lines. As far as our reading list goes, we picked up Fitzgerald as a particularly pertinent example. It's easy to see how Fitzgerald's short stories always involve at least two lines, maybe three, maybe more, and we were attempting to describe them. We had a rigid segmentary line, which was broken up and which distributed into binaries: young/poor/unskilled, etc., a rigid segmentary line where you could situate—not exclusively, but as one figure among others—the couple, with its binary machine, its own binary. So, a rigid segmentary line, distinguished by its meaningful cut-off points—*here*, “I was rich,” or *there*, “my marriage was going well”—organized as binaries, the quintessential binary being that of the couple.²

And then, beneath that, we found a much more subtle line, one that is supple or fine, or one that's molecular—not one that's broken up into cut-off points, but a line of cracks, tiny cracks that don't line up with these cuts or breaks. The micro-cracks of molecular segmentarity. And we

found a different sort of figure on the molecular segmentary line from that of the couple, whether as a binary machine or as part of a binary machine—this figure was far more troubling. It was the *double*.

And then we found a line we hadn't expected. It's funny. A line which is neither a cut nor a crack, but more like a line of flight, a rupture, whose form is ultimately neither the couple nor the double but the *stowaway* [*le clandestin*]. This third line, which we hadn't anticipated, was a pleasant surprise nonetheless, since it accounted for something that had been bothering us, namely, the ambiguity surrounding supple segmentarity, or molecular segmentarity. Supple segmentarity basically keeps waffling between being a rigid line and being a line of flight. When it swings toward being a rigid line, it tends to harden; when it swings toward being a line of flight, it verges on not even being segmentary anymore; it takes on a new guise.

We had arrived at two practical ways of understanding planes: either as a “plane of organization”³ or as a plane of consistency, immanence, or composition—which in no way the same practical understanding of the word, “plane.” Once again, we have two poles, and we can see that our segmentarities or our multiplicities oscillate; they can tend toward one sort of plane just as easily as toward the other sort of plane, and it ends up getting really complicated. Even in the life of a group or an individual, the moment where the plane is solidified, swings from one pole to the other—this wobbling back and forth, then, can explain quite a bit. Thus, a life is made up of lines. You have to find your lines, lines that don't exist beforehand; they aren't pre-established. The goal for any real analysis is to work out this cartography.

When, in the context of discussing the plane of consistency, we start talking about longitude and latitude, these clearly refer to lines drawn on this plane of consistency. Longitude and latitude are ideas that refer to a whole cartography. Our real analysis won't get off the ground so long as we remain in the realm of representation; insofar as we're still dealing with the feelings or sentiments that go through somebody, we only start getting somewhere when we start drawing abstract lines, with their corresponding segmentarity, their divides, their cracks, their ruptures. If someone starts playing the piano, or someone comes to love an animal or hate one, both our loves and our hates ought to be distributed along lines—and not figurative lines. Truly, as I see it, the analysis has to be carried out as a genuine cartography.

And what's a dead end? If you look at psychoanalysis today, my impression is that they brush up against this question all the time. They brush up against the problem of lines and cartography, and they keep missing it. Going back to Freud: what's the deal with Little Hans? You can't say it's family trouble. His father and mother do intervene, but only to close off segments, to block him. What's missing is a cartography, which is what Freud himself is constantly doing, when he claims that Hans's problem, first and foremost, is how to get him out of the apartment. A kid's problem, winning the outdoors—it's a question of cartography, a question of lines. What happens? Hans's problem is how to beat the building, how to leave his apartment and sleep with the girl who lives below or above him. And then, *cut*—he's caught by his parents. He was sketching out his line, and *bang*—rigid segmentarity.⁴

Second, there's a girl who lives across the street: little Hans's cartography starts to take shape—the apartment, the building, the café across the street. He has to cross the street. His mother goes so far as to tell him that, if he leaves the apartment, he won't come back. And then there's the whole business with the horse, with the becoming-horse of little Hans. But that scene takes place in the street. The horse is pulling a heavy load and falters, tries to get up, and is whipped. It's a beautiful moment, right out of Dostoyevsky, right out of Nietzsche (before his big meltdown), right out of Nijinsky (before his big meltdown). It isn't a fantasy: a horse falls in the street, a horse is whipped. It's about both the street as a line to be won and the dangers of winning it, and a becoming-animal caught in the middle of it all. Little Hans gets blocked from all sides.

In order to seal up these lines of flight, to assert a rigid segmentarity, to cut things off whenever he sketches out a line—what does it take? Two things: an instance of power, the family, and an abstract machine, psychoanalysis. Basically, the parents take action, they've had enough; they hand over to an abstract machine, represented by Dr. Freud. In a completely different context, we've run into the power apparatus – abstract machine duo. Whenever there's an apparatus of power, there's an abstract machine; whenever there's an abstract machine, there's an apparatus of power. Maybe not, maybe not—it could be that there are very different sorts of abstract machines. But it appears that some abstract machines appeal to power apparatuses, like, *power apparatus, please take me as an abstract machine*. And why should abstract machines appeal to power apparatuses?

So, that's my first point regarding segmentarity. Novellas appear to essentially come down to these lines intersecting and crisscrossing over one's life.

Student: What makes double the opposite of the couple?

Deleuze: At this point, what I'd really like is for you to answer your own question. If what I've said has resonated with you, you have as much of an idea as I do. The couple, as I see it, is the binary machine of conjugality, which involves meaningful slices using a rigid sort of segmentarity. With the double, it's not a question of whether they're the same or something else; instead, it seems to me that it comes down to cracks, a supple segmentarity. The double is always more or less an approximate label for the process of becoming, insofar as we're trying to contrast between history and becoming.

A person's history isn't the same as their becoming. The double, for example, is a man's becoming-woman, or a man's becoming-animal. By no means is the double one's reflection—I'm bound to form a double as I become something, and becomings are always something fundamentally minoritarian. A minority always has a becoming. It might even be that the same person is both part of a couple and part of a double, the same person simply serving very different functions on either line. What's more, on the second line, they aren't a person at all.

What do stowaways [*le clandestin*] have to do with lines of flight? What makes them hidden? It's because they are imperceptible. They are becoming-imperceptible. Ultimately, every becoming-animal results in becoming-imperceptible. Just what is this clandestinity? It's certainly not that it's a secret; secrets fall squarely under rigid segmentarity. Being a stowaway is ultimately the same thing as a becoming-molecular; it's when it's no longer about any one person, when it's no longer personological. When do we reach the point where we stop saying, as Virginia Woolf puts it, "I am this, I am that"? What's really secret is when there's nothing left to hide.

You are like everybody else... You can't even call it the form of a secret without content; the secret is there, totally laid out, and yet it's imperceptible. When the person is sufficiently undone, and with sufficient care, such that I can say: never again will I say that "I am this, I am that." You see how that ties back to our whole business with the plane of composition and affects, what we were trying to suggest was the difference between an affect and a sentiment or feeling. What's going on with these very special types of individuality, individualities that are perfectly individuated, only without any subjectivity? The individuality of "a day," "a spring," a "five o'clock in the evening," and so on.⁵

Student: [*Inaudible remarks, regarding planes*]

Deleuze: The secret fluctuates between this plane, where everything is visible. But then you wonder, what makes it a secret? Since what becomes visible, what becomes perceptible on this plane, is precisely what is imperceptible on the other plane.

Richard Pinhas: As we discussed last week, my problem has to do with expression. There was a sentence that really resonated with me: "what a terrible five o'clock in the evening." We all have our terrible five o'clock in the evenings, but what takes place on the plane of composition, or on the imperceptible plane, are events, however small they may be, a quick word, whatever it might be. And ultimately, I think that what's significant about the plane of consistency, what produces events, perhaps in a particular "time," I wanted to know if, for you, the plane of consistency or composition, if the visible and perceptible outcome will be a series of events or resonances of events.

Deleuze: That's great, since it saves me the trouble of recapping. I don't see life as possible without molar sets. Again, at no point was I trying to say: get rid of rigid segmentarity, you'll be happy—by no means; we'd all die. The body's organism, or its organization, is a molar organization, and it goes without saying that the claim isn't that you'll be better off if you throw out your organism. Like we were saying, it comes back to our plane of consistency, the relationship between the plane of composition and death. You'll be dead, and that's that. Basically, it's the problem of overdosing, and then that's it.

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: We're talking about something totally concrete. There are no abstract intensities. The question is whether an intensity works for someone, and whether they can bear it. An intensity is bad, profoundly bad, when it exceeds the power of the person experiencing it—bad, even when it's the most beautiful thing. An intensity is always related to other intensities. An intensity is bad when it exceeds its corresponding capacity, i.e., the capacity to be affected. A low intensity can sometimes ruin someone. A person's plane of consistency or composition is constituted by the intensities they're capable of withstanding. If the intensity isn't their thing, they're screwed—either they monkey or clown around, or they screw themselves. Cartography means knowing what your own line is. Let's circle back to our two different concepts of planes.

Imagine a world made up of particles along a plane, particles traversing a plane. These particles—so far, it's like I'm telling a story—these particles are grouped based on movement, on ratios of motion and rest, or—what amounts to the same thing—ratios of speed and slowness. They're purported to belong to an individual—I'm not saying a subject, or a person—inasmuch as they maintain a certain ratio of speed and slowness, or a certain ratio of motion and rest. If the proportion of motion and slowness changes, they shift to another individual. That's my first point.

I call a body's longitude the sets of particles that belong to it based on its particular ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness. If an individual is characterized by a highly complex ratio of motion and rest, whereby infinite particles are attributed to it, we might also say that these ratios correspond to levels of capacity, or capacities. What capacity? A level of capacity corresponding to a certain degree of speed and slowness, a certain degree of motion and rest—these degrees of power are literally the capacity to be affected. As opposed to before, this time it's no longer about the ratio of motion and rest between extended particles, which defines a longitude. It's much more a question of intensive parts: the affects someone is capable of, in correlation with the parts that make them up, following ratios of speed and slowness. So, the body's latitude is my name for this capacity to be affected. Notice I'm not talking about forms or subjects. An individual is neither a form nor a subject; something is individuated when we can determine its longitude and latitude, longitude meaning its ratios of motion and rest, speed and slowness, which provide its composing particles, its parts of parts—while on the other hand, all I'm looking at are latitudes, the affects filling out the level of capacity, the capacity to be affected, for individuals previously determined based on their longitude.

So, all bodies would have both a longitude and a latitude. What exactly is going on here? It works for us the same way Spinoza suggests looking at the world. It's how he sees the world. He tells us that all bodies are infinitely composed of infinite parts, which are what he calls the simplest bodies. Why is it that, with these simple bodies, a particular infinite set belongs to one individual rather than another? He says that these simple bodies, these particles, always have a certain ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness, and that this ratio is characteristic of an individual. Thus, an individual isn't defined by its form, be it a biological form, an essential form—any sense of the word, “form.” What defines an individual is a more or less compound relationship, i.e., a series of ratios, of motion and rest, speed and slowness, whereby infinite parts fall under it.

Ultimately, each individual is a collective; every individual is a swarm. Really, this is basic physics. On the other hand, an individual is a capacity to be affected. Thus, it isn't defined by any form, nor by any subject. What is a horse? You could say that a horse is, on the one hand, a form and, on the other, a subject. It's easy to find that sort of approach to defining a horse. Form would be the set of defining characteristics labeled either specific, generic, or accidental characteristics; naturalists define a horse specifically. On the other hand, it's a subject, i.e., *this* horse, with the whole traditional approach.

Again, the whole history of modern philosophy comes down to changing the relationship between subject and form. Well, that's one way of thinking: you can say "I see a form" and "I see a subject," and there's a complementarity between the form that informs substance or the subject. What we're suggesting is completely different: first of all, a horse is not a form, but a set = x particles. " $= x$ " isn't enough, so what characterizes this set? A certain ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness. I'm not talking about a form when I say: an infinite number of particles subject to ratios of motion and rest, of speed and slowness—and on the other hand, [when] I claim that it's a capacity to be affected, that it's a horse-capacity, I'm not referring to any subjectivity.

Enter Spinoza's great question: it's not about describing what the form of a body is; it's a matter of asking, "What can a body do?" That's his fundamental question: "What can a body do?"⁶ All the better that it's still incredibly concrete. But he buries it. With his approach to exposition, there's always a first principle; for Spinoza, famously, it's that there's but one substance. When someone says that, concretely, you can immediately see what that means, how it conflicts with religion. It isn't an innocent proposition. You can't really know a philosopher based on their first principle, only by their fifth or sixth. Then, Spinoza asks: what can a body do? It won't really tell me anything if you say that a body has such and such forms and functions. You have to tell me what that body is capable of. You might say that's the same thing! No, it's not. In the end, it probably all bleeds together; one's capacity always corresponds to one's organs and functions, but everything changes if I say that my organs and functions are only there to fulfill my capacity to be affected, or when I say that what first defines me is my capacity to be affected. Then we can talk about organs and functions.

Or it's the other way around, which is very different, and I say that, given its organs and functions, this is what the animal is capable of. It seems like these can be reconciled, but in fact, it's not the logic that matters: the people focused on the organs and functions of animals have never worried about affects, and those looking at affects remain rather indifferent to organs and functions—so much so that they had to coin a new word to describe what they were working on. They called it ethology. It's not the study of an animal's way of life; it's much more the study of what affects it's capable of. Spinoza calls his book *The Ethics*—not morality. Ethics, ethology. What can a body do, which means, what can it handle?

I therefore call the longitude of a body the set ratio of speed and slowness between the infinite parts composing said body, parts which only belong to the body based on these ratios of speed and slowness, motion and rest. It's the same individual so long as the overall ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness, remains. What does becoming-animal mean? It doesn't mean an imitation, though we have to imitate because there has to be something we can fall back on. Becoming-horse? Becoming-dog? What does becoming-beetle mean, for Kafka? It's not just when we start imitating. Can I, given a body's particular latitude and particular longitude, bring my component parts into a ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness, corresponding to that of a horse—and, following that, are the affects that flood me horse-affects, or not? That's how we defined the plane of consistency or composition: these latitudes with their becomings, their transitions, passing from one longitude to another, passing from one latitude to another. Let his body assume a new longitude and latitude, and Captain Ahab ends up dead, too. He dies upon his plane of consistency, his oceanic plane. On the plane of consistency or composition, there are only degrees of speed and slowness, on the one hand, which define longitudes, and on the other, affects or intensive parts which define latitudes. There's neither form nor subject. Affects are always becoming.

Student: [Inaudible, question regarding time as being a plane of consistency]

Deleuze: Why not, but measured time is one of segmentarity, a time of molar entities. If you're saying that the plane of consistency is time, it's a time where there's no impulse to cut or measure it.

Pinhas: That's exactly what Robert was getting at. What happens with the plane of composition? First of all, it's created based on what's laid out [*ses agencements*], and at the same time as what's laid out; there is no abstract plane of composition apart from its different arrangements. Really, it is strictly contemporaneous with its arrangements; it's produced at the same time. And it's both arrangements [*agencements*] and encounters. There will be encounters with, basically, molecules on the one hand and becomings on the other. What seems to be predominant, and you can really see it with music, is that there are different flow speeds that can resonate—you can see it in a very physical way, but that's too technical to get into right now—but you realize that the resonance of sounds, the resonance of harmonics, is brought about by differences in speed. That's one way of looking at it, at least.

And ultimately, what comes from these differences in speed isn't time—there isn't a time for the plane of composition, or any equivalence between the plane of composition and time—but, on the contrary, when it comes to the plane of composition itself, [what results is] the creation of multiple temporalities flowing at different speeds. I emphasize the multiplicity of different temporal planes, each with lines of effectuation, of events that resonate, that differ from line to line, and to lump it all together into a single Time would be similar to what Einstein did with time, i.e., a spatialization of time, or something analogous. And here, I'd argue that time is determined by affects and by compositions of affects. For example, you come in here on a Tuesday morning and find a blonde girl with blue eyes, which determines a particular time.

Deleuze: A plane of composition or consistency never exists ahead of time. It comes about at the same time as a group of individuals or individuations actually sketch it out. It's a plane of absolute immanence, immanence meaning immanent to the degrees of speed and slowness, to motion and rest, to the capacity to be affected that construct it, step by step. Literally, it's built brick by brick. The form it takes is anything but a Euclidean space that exists prior to the shapes that occupy it. It's a completely different type of space, formed proximity [*voisinage*] by proximity, and that's why it can snap at any [*audio unclear*]. It's when we understand the plane from the other end that we can see it as existing beforehand, with people or groups evolving on it.

Our starting point is the distinction between the two planes, since if we're defining the plane of consistency or composition with a latitude and longitude, and if the bodies on it are defined only by their latitude and longitude, I'd argue that the only variables to consider are speed, slowness, affect, and the capacity to be affected. And in a way, everything is both collective and individual because every ratio of motion and rest, every ratio of speed and slowness, is always perfectly capable of being individuated: such-and-such speed, this much speed—any affect can be individuated. We need a word to help keep us from confusing it for a subject's individuality. "Haecceity." Literally, it means "thisness," being "this," having a certain capacity. He was just now saying that it was time—that's true, if what we mean by time is the sort of liberated time that John Cage has in mind.

Pinhas: Instead of a sequence (of notes) that can be measured in linear or diachronic time, we get a sort of movement that makes a trail, and my sense is that the diagram Cage ends up with is there to produce different, or differential, performance times, opening times, non-limiting times, with landmarks perhaps.

Deleuze: When describing the role of the conductor, Cage talks about a stopwatch at variable speeds, objecting to how classical conductors act as a stopwatch with one uniform speed.⁷ Since the same movement in a work can be played at completely different speeds; Cage even accounts for the stopwatch stopping.

Pinhas: Just a quick note. Regarding the plane of composition or the diagram Cage sets out, at no point is there a predetermining or predominant dimension that can thus serve as a stratifying axis. Nothing is more important than anything else, whether it's composition, writing, performance, or the speed of the performance. Everything is possible all at once, and we still haven't defined the diagram, but the time hasn't come... What Cage is worried about isn't ever a question of writing surfaces.

Deleuze: It's obvious that there isn't any past or future on the plane of consistency—there is becoming. It's very different. We're looking for resonances of words. On the plane of composition, there is neither future nor past because, ultimately, there is no history; there is only geography.

Student: We ought to talk about what's in between, what's in the middle.

Deleuze: Well, let's talk about it. On the plane of composition, all we have at the moment are speeds and slownesses, and affects. No form. No subject. At the same time, these groups of affects, these ratios of speed and slowness, are fully individuated. The way they're individuated in a way completely different from how subjects are individuated—we referred to them as haecceities. They are haecceities. These degrees of speed and slowness moving into each other, changing through, if need be, through areas of interference or over a hole, a hole of silence—on a plane of consistency, you have holes, you have silences, interferences—at any rate, there are latitude/longitude assemblages [*agencements*] in the background.

And among a body's haecceities, its longitudes and latitudes, some haecceities in particular are means for transmission; affects are carried through a medium. There's a particular sort of haecceity where it isn't just longitudes and latitudes, but the factors or the relationships between longitudes and latitudes, the medium conducive for their transformation. As a result, the plane of consistency will accumulate more and more winters, springs, summers, days, which are themselves haecceities: *that* spring, *that* day. Bodies have the same sort of individuality as a day, a season, an hour.

There's absolutely nothing that develops in [Paul] Morand's writing; it's a genuine plane of consistency, like a fixed plane, with word-particles spinning off at different speeds. That's what I call sobriety. What I call the minor use of language is when there's no more development, no more organization; there is composition, on a fixed plane, with relative speeds and differential speeds.⁸

Changing gears, isn't that also the case for a social sphere? Of course, there's a plane of organization for the social sphere, but isn't it also immanently shot through with a plane of consistency or composition? Different things happen simultaneously on either plane—what has one shape and form on the plane of organization takes on a completely different shape and form on the plane of consistency. And you can't even say that one is good and the other bad.

You can't do anything without involving molar sets. There would be no MLF were it not for the things happening on another plane, a social plane of immanence; the MLF is sometimes well-positioned to highlight a completely different sort of phenomena, or microphenomena, processes that I'll call "becomings," becoming-woman—granted, women have a becoming-woman just as much as men do. It's all part of the plane of consistency, right, and both happen simultaneously. There's a constant tension: some things from the plane of consistency can't be digested on the other plane; some things from the plane of organization can't be digested *vice versa*. There's a power balance between both planes.

The plane of consistency doesn't put just anything into its arrangements [*agencements*]; that's not to say that forms and subjects don't exist! Again, it'll come back to bite you if you overlook forms and subjects; neglecting the organization of one's organization, of one's organism, means

death. All we're saying is that it doesn't belong to that plane. In place of subjects or forms on the plane of composition, there are holes, interferences, voids; what you do find are latitudes, longitudes, affects, experiments. You can't give up the subject, or interpretation—it just isn't part of the plane of consistency.

For an individual, it isn't a plane that exists beforehand; it's formed locally, bit by bit, one piece at a time. And it may well be that it isn't the same individual, i.e., the same haecceity. It might be one haecceity at one end and a different one at the other; either they don't line up, and there's a gap between them, or they do line up, and their different speeds are compounded together. Their different speeds form a compound, affects either circulate or are transformed, but then it's a local formation. Riemannian space is one that's formed locally; it's formed via local sections, and that's just how the plane of consistency is formed. And if there are risks with the plane of consistency, it's for two reasons: first, it will be catastrophic if the plane of consistency shatters the other plane, but it will also be a disaster for reasons of its own. Namely, that a whole series of connections won't come together, that its local construction won't go on long enough. In any case, that's all you'll find on this kind of plane: speed, slowness, motion, rest, haecceities, affects. The second you run into something else, you'll know you're dealing with a mix, that something from the other plane has crept in. [*End of text*]

Gilles Deleuze

A Thousand Plateaus II, 1976-1977

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Translation, Billy Dean Goehring

On Music, the Refrain, Haecceities

Deleuze: Last time we talked about a book by Dominique Fernandez. He has a few important things to tell us about music, so I'm taking a step back. It's unusual because the stuff he normally does is more along the lines of literary criticism based on psychoanalysis. And then, at the same time, he loves music, and so that draws him away from his psychoanalytic concerns. He forwards a claim that runs throughout his book, which is titled *La Rose des Tudor*.⁹ The whole point of the book is this: music dies out around 1830. More specifically, it dies—and tragically, like all good things—it dies with Bellini and Rossini. Tragically, because the circumstances surrounding Bellini's death are unclear; he either died from a then-unknown illness or from some sinister plot. And with Rossini, it was an abrupt end. A brilliant musician at the height of his career, and he up and quits. He had always had two loves: music and cooking. He was an excellent cook, and he went crazy. I know a lot of people who cut things off at a certain point; it's a sort of claim you find often enough: "For me, things come to an end at such-and-such point in time." Philosophy has always been dying: it died with Descartes, it died with Kant, it died with Hegel—it depends on who you ask, but what matters is that it died. And then I know some who say music ends with Gregorian chanting. Sure.

That's the sort of argument Fernandez is making: music ends with Bellini and Rossini. What makes such a claim possible? That can only mean one thing: something, whether you realize it or not—I'm not going to defend it, because I don't think he's right—something that used to be essential to music disappears after Rossini and Bellini, the two last musicians. What is it that, perhaps even indirectly, led to Rossini and Bellini's demise? What was different about music starting around 1830? It was the emergence of Verdi and Wagner. In other words, Wagner and Verdi made music impossible. Fernandez goes as far as to call them fascists. It isn't the first time that's been said of Wagner.

What, according to Fernandez, did they get rid of that was so essential to music? This is basically what he tells us—he says there used to be something inherent about music. Let me step in and explain something: we can think of any activity, any form of production, in correlation to two different planes¹⁰ or dimensions. One of these dimensions we could call expression, and we could call the other one content. Why expression and content? Because the word itself, "expression," has the upshot of not being mistaken for "form," while the benefit of using "content" is that it won't be confused with "subject," "topic," or "object."

What keeps us from confusing “expression” with “form”? It’s because there’s both a form of expression and a form of content. Content isn’t without form. But what is it? Adding to everything we talked about previously, I could argue that it isn’t that what we’ve been referring to as the plane of consistency comprises two chunks, but that from one angle it’s a plane of expression and from another angle it’s a plane of content.

Considering the sonorous¹¹ plane of consistency called music, I could ask what specifically musical expression and content might be, assuming said content isn’t what music is written about or what a voice sings about. Now, Fernandez claims that, as he sees it, music has always been permeated by content he’s particularly close to, which is that of spilling over or overcoming sexual difference. He hasn’t forgotten his psychoanalytic background—though he isn’t an analyst—he argues that music is essentially always a restoration of androgyny. If I attribute that content to music, that implies that I can show that such content really is musical, that it’s essentially musical, by virtue of the music’s form of expression. Now, it’s no secret that music is primarily vocal. We know the extent to which instruments have long been the object of surveillance, notably with the codification of music, the Church’s effort in the codification of music. For the longest time, instruments were kept out, held back; they shouldn’t be allowed to overwhelm the voice.

At what point does a voice become musical? Looking at it in terms of expression, I’d say that, essentially, the musical voice is a deterritorialized voice. But what does that mean? I think there are things that aren’t quite music but are very close to being music. There are types of singing that aren’t quite music; for example, Guattari attaches a lot of importance to a concept we’ve yet to flesh out, that of the refrain.¹² The refrain could perhaps be an integral component in the emergence of music. Little refrains will later be taken up again in music. Non-musical singing: *tra-la-la*. A frightened child? Perhaps the little refrain originated in what, last year, we called the black hole. A child in a black hole, comforting themselves, *tra-la-la*. I argue that this kind of humming voice is territorialized; it marks out territory. Which is why, if music goes back to the refrain, one of the most characteristic examples of the refrain’s reprisal is Mozart. [Alban] Berg uses this approach all the time. What topic is the most profoundly musical, and what makes it the most profoundly musical? The death of a child—and not a tragic death, a happy death: “Concerto to the memory of an angel” [1935]. Children and death are everywhere. Why? Why does such proliferation and abolition run throughout music, a line of both proliferation and sonorous abolition?

If the humming voice of the refrain starts out as a territorialized voice—if only in a black hole—music starts with the deterritorialization of the voice. The voice is “machined.” Musical notation fits into a machinic arrangement [*agencement*]. It forms an arrangement itself, it forms an arrangement in itself, whereas with the refrain, the voice is still territorialized because it’s working with [*elle s’agence avec*] something else. But once the voice is isolated in its pure state and forms a strictly vocal arrangement, it emerges as a deterritorialized sonorous voice.

What does this deterritorialized voice entail? I’m trying to put what Fernandez says in my own words, when he says that the voice in music is meant to overcome sexual difference. I claim that the sexes, with their particular vocal sonorities, territorialize the voice: *ah, this is a woman’s voice, that’s a man’s voice*. Deterritorializing the voice: there’s a key moment with musical

notation where it's plain to see. At first, European musical notation essentially had to do with voices. One of the most important considerations here is the twin roles played by both popes in Latin-speaking countries (such as Gregory) and Henry VIII, and the Tudors, when it comes to musical notation. Henry VIII was the one who insisted that each syllable ought to have its own corresponding note. This is not simply, as they say, to ensure that the text is properly understood when sung; it's a powerful factor for deterritorializing the voice, a key factor. If you make your musical notation account correspond to every syllable, you have a method for deterritorializing the voice.

But notice that we haven't quite drawn the connection between my claim that, in terms of expression—and as a form of expression—music is defined first as vocal music, and [the idea that] vocal music is the deterritorialization of the voice when it comes to content, as a form of content. When it comes to its form of content, I define music—vocal music, at least—in the same way Fernandez does, not as a return to primordial androgyny, but as the overcoming of sexual difference. Why is the deterritorialized voice, from the point of view of expression, the same as the overcoming of sexual difference from the point of view of content? Looking at it in terms of expression, this deterritorialized voice, once it's been arranged, having arrived at its own arrangement, arranged on its own, machined on its own—is the child's voice.

What do I mean by that? It's true that all music, up to a certain point in time, Fernandez tells us, a sort of sexual subversion permeates music. It's clear to see with Monteverdi. And whether it's the Italian/Spanish type of Latin music or whether it's English music—something like the two ends of the spectrum in the West—what are the key voices in vocal music? The main voices in vocal music are soprano, alto, and what the English call countertenor. The tenor is the one who holds the line, and then there are higher alto, soprano lines. But these are children's voices, voices intended for children. One of the high points in Fernandez's text is his indignation that women became sopranos. He's furious; it's terrible. That's only possible once music's dead. The child is the soprano—not the natural soprano, but the soprano in the musical scheme of things [*agencement musical*].

All three typical voices, children's voices: in Italian music—this is shared on either pole—in Italian music, there's the castrato, the castrated singer, and in English music, which oddly enough, didn't have castrati (castrati were a Latin development), you have the countertenor. And regarding the child soprano, the castrato and the countertenor are like two different solutions for the same problem. The English countertenor is still around, while there aren't any castrati anymore—thanks to civilization, Fernandez says, it's capitalism's fault, he's so unhappy. With Verdi and Wagner, music gets appropriated by capitalism.¹³

What makes the English countertenor a deterritorialized voice? It comes down to singing above than one's own voice. The countertenor is often described as a head voice. It's about singing beyond your voice, and it's a real act of deterritorialization, what [Alfred] Deller says is the only way to sing high. It's a voice that doesn't use the lungs. It's a great example of the voice's deterritorialization because the territoriality of the voice is sex: male voice / female voice.

But I could just as easily say that the little refrain is where you speak; I could also say that the diaphragm-lung system is where it emits from. Yet that's how the countertenor's voice is

described, as if it starts from the head. Deller insists that it has to go through the sinuses, that it's a sinus voice. Deller's story is a beautiful one: at the age of sixteen, like all choir schools, he's told to let his voice rest for two years, and he comes out as pure countertenor. It's funny, for anyone who's heard Deller, his voice comes across as artificial and overworked, and at the same time, as a sort of raw musical material, as though, through its artifice, it's both the most artificial and the most natural. So, the voice comes from the head, goes through the sinuses, without every going through the diaphragm. That's what makes a countertenor. You can more or less see, even if he doesn't like the term, what makes it a head voice.

The castrato's voice is different; it's a voice that's just as completely deterritorialized. It's a voice from deep in the lungs, from the belly, even. Fernandez's description is rather good. Purcell, the great child musician, also has a great backstory: as a child, he was a soprano, and then was later capable of singing both as a bass and as a countertenor. Hearing Purcell sing was incredible. Twice in his book, Fernandez attempts to pin down the difference between the castrato route and the countertenor approach, the English route. "Here we ought to examine the fundamental difference separating the art of singing in England from the art of singing in Spain. A countertenor's voice is in their head, giving the impression of almost unreal celestial purity, not devoid of sensuality but with a sensuality burning with the lust it ignites. Sopranos and altos have their voices seated much lower in the chest—you'd almost believe it were in their belly—closer to their genitals, at any rate. We assume that castrati had such an irresistible effect on their listeners not only because their voices were among the most beautiful, but also because they were charged with an intense erotic power. All the sap lacking other outlets in their bodies impregnated the air they expelled from their mouths, with the effect of transforming what's usually airy and impalpable into a pulpy, gooey substance. [*Laughter*] Whereas English countertenors ignore the fact that they have or could have a sex, Italian castrati make their song a complete and carnal act of expulsion, symbolizing the sexual act whose painful and voluptuous restlessness their voices betray. The sounds leaving their throat possess an *ow, ow* consistency—these boys make love with their voices."

The takeaway here is that these two methods for deterritorializing the voice—the countertenor's head voice, head-sinus-mouth, without relying on the diaphragm, and the castrato's voice from deep in the lungs and belly—what does that get us? It's easy to see here how the voice's musical arrangement [*agencement*], the musical process of deterritorializing the voice, effectively amounts to a kind of overcoming of sexual difference. Using our terminology, we might say that music is inseparable from becoming-woman and becoming-child. Becoming-woman as fundamental to music, which isn't... Why is music so preoccupied with children? My answer would be that, far beyond these themes, these motifs, these subjects, these references, it drills down to the content of music, and what defines properly musical content is a becoming-woman, a becoming-child, a becoming-molecular, etc., etc.

What about this becoming-child? It's not that music comes down to singing like a child or making your voice sound like a child's voice; the child might be totally fabricated. You almost need to distinguish between the molar child singing non-musically, the child of the refrain, and the molecular child who is musically situated. And even with a child singing in an English choir, it takes a musical artificial process for the molar child to stop being a molar child in order to become a molecular child. Thus, the child possesses a musically becoming-child. Meaning that

the child of music's becoming, the one that it makes, itself has a deterritorialized child for its content, just as the deterritorialized voice is its expression. It's not about imitating a singing child; it's about producing a sonorous child, i.e., deterritorializing the child while deterritorializing the voice.

Here we have the junction between music's form of content—becoming-woman, becoming-child, becoming-molecular—and music's form of expression—deterritorializing the voice, among other things, through the interplay of melody and harmony, through polyphony, and even through instrumental accompaniment. But at this level, music is still vocal, essentially, since as a form of expression, it's defined by the deterritorialization of the voice, in relation to which instruments only play a supporting, accompanying, or concomitant role. And on the other hand we have this becoming-child, this becoming-woman, and as we said last time, the child themselves who needs a becoming-child. Being a child isn't enough for becoming-child; it involves the entire choir training or the English cathedral, or worse, becoming-child requires the Italian castrato approach.

Bellini and Rossini were the last ones to musically arrange [*agencer*] the voice using these becomings, becoming-child and becoming-woman. What disappeared at the start of the 19th century was, on the one hand, the castrato tradition—I'm intentionally avoiding saying "castration"; if I call it castration we'll land right back into psychoanalysis—the machinic arrangement of the castrato doesn't lack anything. The castrato is within a becoming-woman that no woman has, a becoming-child that no child has. By that same token, he's caught up in a process of deterritorialization. By necessity, becoming-child is not becoming the sort of child that a child is, but becoming a child *qua* deterritorialized, which is carried out through a means of expression which is necessarily itself a deterritorialized expression: the deterritorialization of the voice.

Fernandez has some fairly reserved but noteworthy praise for [David] Bowie. He says he has a falsetto voice. But it isn't a coincidence that pop music came from the English. The Beatles: there ought to be some voices that aren't far off. Not countertenor, but one of them should have something approaching a countertenor range. It's odd that the French didn't take to castrati. It makes sense for the English; they're puritans. When Gluck was running some opera or other in France, he had to completely rewrite the lead role to have it sung by a tenor. So dramatic. We've always tended towards the refrain. So, Fernandez pays this sort of compliment to pop music. But you can see what he's getting at when he says that music ends with Bellini and Rossini. Again, it amounts to saying: down with Wagner, down with Verdi. It isn't as good now.

All I want to get out of Fernandez's book is this: music is inseparable from a becoming-child, a becoming-woman, a becoming-molecular. That's its form of content, even, just as its form of expression is the deterritorialization of the voice. And the deterritorialization of the voice ranges from the deterritorialized voice of the castrato to the deterritorialized voice of the countertenor. It forms a little block. It comes down to machining the voice, to a vocal sound machine, which entails deterritorializing the voice as far as expression is concerned, which, with regard to content, correlates to becoming-child and becoming-woman, etc.

Indeed, at first glance, Verdi and Wagner take us back to a sort of immense molar reterritorialization in our language, i.e., however sublime their voices may be, Wagnerian singers

are men with men's voices, women with women's voices. It's the return of sexual difference. They snuff out music's becoming. You can see why Fernandez blames that on capitalism—he claims that capitalism can't sustain sexual difference, there's the division of labor. In other words, instead of the voice being machined into musical arrangements, the deterritorialization of the voice becoming-child, it sort of gets put through the ringer: the binary machine—the woman's voice responds to the man's voice, the man's voice responds to the woman's voice. Tristan and Iseult. You know that in old opera characters like Caesar were sung by castrati. By no means were castrati intended for mincing about or for flourishes; an all-powerful Caesar or Alexander was supposed to overcome sexual difference, to the point where there's a becoming-woman to the warrior. Achilles was sung by a castrato. Indeed, Achilles has a becoming-woman.

It ought to be forbidden to talk about what one doesn't like. There ought to be an absolute ban on it. We always write for/about the things we love. Truly, any literature that isn't about love is shit. Fernandez is discreet; he says very little about Verdi and Wagner, but I think something else is going on: music is becoming symphonic. It doesn't stop being vocal when it needs to be, but it starts to become symphonic. A low point in Fernandez's writing is when he claims that the instrumental development is what forces voices to become male and female again, putting them through this kind of binary machine. Actually, countertenors are screwed when it comes to symphonic ensembles. He seems to be saying that instrumental or symphonic music makes too much noise, too much noise for any of these subtle becomings to be perceptible. We might picture it completely differently.

What happened once the voice was deposed like this? What happens when the musical machine is no longer mainly vocal, when the instrument is no longer merely an accompaniment for the voice, and music is instead instrumental and symphonic? I think what really changes is the musical machine, or the layout [*agencement*] of music. It's no longer a matter of arranging the voice, but of handling the voice, and that seems like the main revolution in music. It's a question of handling the voice as one element among others, as having its own specificity as one element among others in the instrumental machine. Flutes or violins are no longer there to accompany the process of deterritorializing the voice or to make this process possible. The voice itself has become an instrument, no more or less than a violin. The voice is put on equal footing with instruments, so that it no longer holds the key to musical arrangement. The whole arrangement is turned upside down. I'd say it's a genuine transformation.

No longer is it about finding or inventing a voice machine; it's about raising the status of the voice to that of an element in a symphonic machine. It's completely different. Unsurprisingly, Fernandez is right, only from a rather narrow point of view: Verdi and Wagner usher in a reterritorialization of the voice, and that continues with Berg ("Lulu"). But that has to be the case, since what makes the voice a musical element is no longer that it's a voice as such. Such that, if we consider as a voice, we revert back to its pseudo-natural determinations: male voice or female voice. We revert back to its binary machine since its place in the musical machine is no longer *as* a voice. As a voice, it effectively then falls back onto sexual difference, but that's no longer what makes it musical.

The huge advantage of symphonic instrumental music is that, instead of proceeding by via a simple sonic machination of the voice, it carries out a generalized sonic machination that no

longer treats the voice as anything other than an instrument on par with any other. So much so that, again, when you consider voices as voices, they revert to their natural or territorial male-female determinations. But at the same time, that isn't what makes them musical; they're musical through an entirely different lens, based on how they're related to the instruments whose equals they are, in their overall machination, where, ultimately, there's no longer any difference in kind between the sound of a flute and a voice's timbre. We've transitioned to a new type of arrangement. I'd almost argue that music's form of expression has changed—instead of a machination of the voice, you have a symphonic machination, an instrumental machination in which the voice is just one element among others.

But then its form of content changes too, and you get a change in their becomings. The form of content is still becoming, but you'll find it impossible to recapture what was so essential about purely vocal music, namely, its becoming-woman and becoming-child. What you'll find is that it opens onto other becomings. Before, musical becoming ended with becoming-woman and becoming-child; they were mainly becomings that more or less fell off at a borderline, that of becoming-animal, especially becoming-bird. Becoming is a constant throughline, i.e., musically manufacturing a deterritorialized bird. To put it plainly, deterritorializing the bird means snatching it out of its environment. Music doesn't reproduce bird songs; it produces a deterritorialized bird song, like with Mozart's bird, which I'm always bringing up.

Now, this new instrumental or symphonic music may have lost its grip on becoming-child or becoming-woman—things have changed—but has instead opened onto other becomings, as if animal-becomings were sort of unleashed, uniquely sonorous, uniquely musical animal-becomings, elementary power-becomings, elementary becomings—Wagner [and] the idea of continuous melodies, which is a sort of form of expression whose corresponding form of content is the unleashing of elements, of elementary sonorous becomings.

Ultimately, opening onto something which, in my opinion, simply does not exist in vocal music, but which the voice can take up in this new music, in this new musical arrangement: molecular becomings, unprecedented molecular becomings. I'm thinking about the singers in Schoenberg. It's already there in Debussy, in all modern music. [Luciano] Berio. In "Visage," it's clear that the face is only involved insofar as it's undone. There's the whole field of electronic music, where things are headed toward molecular becomings only possible with the Verdi, Wagner revolution. So, I'd argue that the form of musical expression is changing and that, as a result, its form of content opens up different types, different genres of becoming.

As for a very general definition of the sonorous plane of consistency or musical machine, how would we define it? I'd say that if we look at it in terms of expression, its form of expression always consists in machination, either directly machining the voice or a symphonic machination integrating the voice as an instrument, and then looking at this same sonorous plane of consistency from the content side of things, there are always uniquely musical becomings that never boil down to imitation or reproduction, all the becomings whose developments we've been following, and there's the theme as form and form of content: both are caught up in a process of deterritorialization.

I'm wondering if the same thing goes for cinema. Someone was working on this last year, on sound films. Couldn't you argue that in the early days of sound film, the voice wasn't as individualized? It wasn't really an individuating factor. Take American comedy, for example. It's as though the voice's individual characteristics were superseded. Sound film only adopted the voice in order to overcome the voice's individual characteristics. Ultimately, with the birth of sound film came an individualization by face or by type, and the voice, as a determining factor in so-called sound film, goes beyond particular or even specific determinations. It's only later that stars get recognized by their voices—Marlene Dietrich and Greta Garbo.

Now, there's no voice in American comedy, and yet sound film has one use that's fantastic, but voices aren't distributed using binary machines or using individuating machines. What's so great about Bogart's voice? It's that his voice isn't individuated at all; it's a completely linear voice. What made Bogart's voice so successful was that it was blank; it's the countertenor of film. It's a blank voice that's rather rhythmic, one that, strictly speaking, doesn't go through the lungs. It's a linear voice that comes from the mouth.¹⁴ When music is vocal, voices don't show up as individualized voices, as gendered, male/female voices; they serve as form of expression for a becoming, becoming-woman, becoming-child. In the same way, sound film began to use the voice as a form of expression for becoming.

We'd also have to define the fixed plane [*or "still frame"*]: just as there's a sonorous plane of composition bound up with the musical machine and all this machine's becomings, and the musical machine's becomings are what run through the sonorous plane of consistency—well, the musical machine could just as well be called a sonorous still frame. But "fixed" means absolute speed as much as it means absolute slowness or rest; it's the absolute of motion and rest. And the becomings inscribed on this plane are relative motion, relative speeds and slownesses, right, in the same way that cinematographic still frames could also be described as absolute motion and absolute rest: cinematic forms of expression and the role of the voice in sound film are inscribed on this plane, as well as the corresponding becomings based on changes in the forms of expression with new forms of content. I'd love to hear what you think.

The child's game of playing *fort-da* with his spool isn't at all what psychoanalysis thinks it is. It has nothing to do with a differential opposition between signifying elements. It's something else entirely: it's a little refrain. The little refrain of territoriality. By no means is the spool game a binary machine; there are so many in-betweens. It's not a phonological opposition; it's a refrain.¹⁵ Real music starts when you take your little refrain and deterritorialize it, putting the refrain through a process of deterritorialization. Which is what Mozart is constantly doing. It's what Alban Berg's "Concerto in Memory of an Angel" is: a deterritorialized child. A dying child, and the conditions for bringing about the child's deterritorialization.

I'd like for us to take what we've done thus far and take an overall review of it, recentering on a vary particular type of plane: the sonorous or musical plane of consistency, and the musical arrangements that get drawn onto this plane of consistency.

Student: What does Nietzsche think of Wagner?

Deleuze: It's a funny story. It's impossible to just read it as literature, however beautiful it may be. It's well known that Nietzsche himself made music, and everyone agrees that, with a few exceptions, it wasn't very good. This isn't a famous remark. Nietzsche put all his musicality into his writing; that's Nietzsche the musician. What's interesting is how much and how often his music resembles Schubert, or Schumann. I'm begging you: go and listen to Nietzsche's tunes at nightclubs. What's Nietzsche's problem with Wagner? He says his music is watery, that you can't dance to it at all, that it isn't music but morality. He says it's full of insufferable characters: Lohengrin, Parsifal.

What is he implying, more or less? There's a certain way of understanding the plane / plan where the forms you find are always still developing, however developed they may be, and subjects are still forming. Bringing it back to music, I'd argue that Wagner completely innovates the domain of musical forms; as innovative as it may be, it still has an aspect of form development. Boulez was one of the first to highlight his proliferating form; he credits Wagner for how he's continuously developing form, which was relatively new. But no matter how novel his approach to development was, it's still a development of sound forms. Hence there's a necessary correlation between the development of sound forms and how subjects are formed. Lohengrin, Parsifal—Wagnerian characters are those in apprenticeship, the notorious German theme of education. There's still something Goethean about Wagner. The plane of organization is defined by the two coordinates of the development of sound forms and the formation or training of musical subjects. Nietzsche contributes to an entirely different approach to the plane.

When I said that there were only two things the plane of consistency understood: it no longer registers developing forms; all it knows are speed and slowness, motion and rest. It only knows the speeds and slownesses between particles, between molecules. It no longer recognizes forms in the process of developing. It only knows speed differentials between elements. It doesn't know anything about the development of form. I'd add that, consequently, the same goes for the training of a subject; sentimental education is over. Wagner is still all for sentimental education. The Wagnerian protagonist says, "Teach me to fear." Not so, for Nietzsche. There are only haecceities, i.e., combinations of intensities, intensive compounds.

A haecceity isn't a person; it isn't a subject. When I think about Nietzsche, this is right where I think he's coming from. What's so great about *Ecce Homo*? It's not much of a stretch to say that Nietzsche is someone who makes it a point to tell us that there's nothing but speeds and slownesses.¹⁶ They all pay homage to Goethe, but they're really sneaky. Hölderlin and Kleist pay homage to Goethe, but that's still just their pure hatred. Nietzsche doesn't say, "be fast"—he himself wasn't very fast. You can be rather fast while moving slowly; again, it comes down to the differential relationship between speed and slowness. You can be very fast without moving; you can go on incredibly fast trips while standing in place, and then be back before you've left. *Ecce Homo* is incredible; it's one of the most beautiful books ever—how Nietzsche talks about seasons, climates, diets. He's always saying: I'm not a person, don't treat me like a person, I'm not a subject, don't try to shape me. That's what he says to Wagner; he says that it's music for Wagner. He's not interested in sentimental education. What he's interested in are haecceities and compounds of intensities, and he views himself as a collection of haecceities.

I think that this is what Nietzsche achieves in his writing, the disappearance of any apprenticeship or education in favor of spreading haecceities. When he says that Bizet's music is much better than Wagner, he means that there's something that stands out in Bizet's work that is later more successfully pulled off by Ravel. And this something is the liberation of musical speeds and slownesses, i.e., what after Boulez became known as the discovery of non-pulsed time, as opposed to the pulsed time of developing forms and forming subjects—a floating time, a floating line.

Richard Pinhas: Still, at one point Nietzsche's preference for Bizet is troubling, a difference that completely vanishes with *Ecce Homo*, where he completely turns around on Wagner, ultimately saying, "I love him," for a while; during his big falling-out, there's a sort of complaint he leverages at Wagner, and he frames Bizet as the positive creator of his age. It's a problem with the melodic line: Wagner supposedly messes up the melodic line, and what he likes about Bizet is how predominant his melodic line is. At the same time, he accuses Wagner of being a rhetorician and theater artist; his terms, and they're precisely the terms able to describe subjectivity and the creation of the subject. But it isn't clear to me how Bizet went any further than Wagner; it isn't obvious. The issues with melodic lines are ambiguous in Nietzsche, and in certain respects, despite how much I love and admire him, it might be a step backwards compared to the innovative benchmark found in Wagner. It remains to be seen.

What I found so interesting about what Gilles is working out is how quickly he divides things up. There are lines of transition, or even a wide variation of planes, when it comes to musical becoming in general. At one point, he posed the question: why haven't we been able to hold onto countertenor or castrato voice? They're disappearing. There's an easy answer: at a certain point in musical becoming there's absolutely no need for it, i.e., once a musical plane of composition or musical plane of consistency opens onto or is oriented toward a new method of sound production or creation, a method that applies as much to writing as it does to the materials or arrangements used.

I'll use a concrete example: what would it mean today, what would be the point, what use would there be for the sort of virtuosos we used to train in the past, when it comes to playing the music of today's composers? There's no place for that anymore. Musical composition no longer demands that level of performance. While virtuosity was a necessary factor in composition a century ago, today that element has completely disappeared. So, we're simultaneously witnessing the creation of new forms, new arrangements, new developments, new materials—so much is happening all at once. We're witnessing the loss—not even explicit rejection, but the fatigue or exhaustion of certain former components, virtuosity in this case. Really, you might say that there's nothing left for us to do with virtuosity.

Deleuze: Could we say—this might go against what you're trying to say—that virtuosity was a deterritorializing technique specifically tied, not to all musical becomings, but to music's becoming-woman and becoming-child? Throughout its history, very particular types of animal-becoming have always been a part of music.

Claire Parnet: We can assume that the most deterritorialized becomings always happen through the voice. Berio.

Deleuze: Berio is a striking example. It'd go back to the idea that the virtuoso is disappearing, as Richard brought up music's machinic evolution, and that, from then on, the problem of musical becoming is much more about molecular becoming. It's easy to see how, in electronic or synthesizer music, virtuosos are dispossessed, in a way. Which doesn't stop music as modern as Berio's, which uses all these processes, from holding onto virtuosos and maintaining a vocal virtuosity.

Pinhas: I see that as the persistence of a code, an archaic code; it's part of what makes Berio's composition innovative. Still, it's a funny way of treating this voice.

Deleuze: I'd agree with you there, because Berio inserts all sorts of refrains into his work. I'd defined the refrain by its contrast with music, deterritorialized voices or instruments. The refrain is sonic territorialization, as opposed to music as such, which is the process of deterritorialization. Yet, just as there are becoming-women, becoming-children, becoming-animals, there are becoming-people: hence the significance of all these folk themes in music. Little folk tunes fall under the refrain; little tunes from any given region, which a musician literally takes, snatches, and—what's more—transforms both its expression and content, sometimes leaving a phrase intact—the extent of its transformation can vary. Now, with Berio, he makes use of popular folk songs from every country; if necessary, he inscribes them in a multiple language, and in that way, he has a sort of vocal virtuosity. I'm interested in the little refrains of children or women, and in the deterritorializing machine that takes it and puts the voice or instrument, the folk song, through a special treatment, to the point where Verdi gets associated with the Italian revolution. That explains the connections. Verdi becomes the genius of nascent Italy.

Pinhas: From what you've said, I'd lay out four basic periods—there aren't any real divides, strictly speaking, but there are variations and transformations, translations leading to new planes of musical composition. The first, not in time, but in relation to what we've discussed, ends at Rossini; the second stops when Debussy and Ravel come in; the third, coincidentally, more or less lies with the aftermath of World War II; the fourth would be the musical forms found today, both in commercial pop music and in terms of what's thought of as avant-garde work. Allegedly contemporary music.

For the first and second periods, we find extremely close connections when it comes to content figures, between becoming-animals and becoming-children and becoming-women—in the first case especially, a becoming-child and a becoming-woman, the same in the second case, with another dimension of reformation unique to examples like those found in Wagner. And from Debussy and Ravel onwards, on the one hand we have molecular becomings and a particular relationship to becomings we haven't defined yet, to “terrestrial” materials. When Ravel titles a piece, “La Mer,” on the one hand there are molecular becomings, on the other, a particular ratio of elements.

Then, there's music today, which for me is primarily molecular, abstract. In the first two categories, or series, it's legitimate; all you can do is bring in an analysis referring to figures of content and figures of expression, and with that, let's say that my question from a few weeks ago has been fully answered, as I have the impression that, starting with Ravel and Debussy, the

figure of content gives way to something that, of course, could also be called a figure of content, but which would be much closer to singular type of arrangement which would replace these figures of content, at least so far as any analysis is concerned, and which would split the figure of expression into a figure of expression proper and lines of effectuation, whether material effectuations, writing effectuations, performance effectuations, or what compound affects are found. It's not mutually exclusive. It doesn't invalidate figures of content or figures of expression; it merely develops them. It seems to me that in today's music, especially with English and American composers, there's practically no content left; instead, what we're witnessing is a sort of generalization of molecular becomings.

Deleuze: But becoming is content like any other—molecular content.

Pinhas: Yes, but so long as it's general, it's not really something that you can get at in terms of analysis. But obviously, it is [content]. What I'm focusing on is how singular arrangements are a form permitting us to develop the term "figure of content." And I see how, when it comes to contemporary music, what's going to happen—and you can basically pick it out in any given country or any given trend in composition—is the assertion of extremely differentiated and elaborated times. For example: of course, we have two basic categories—pulsed time and non-pulsed time—but within these categories, or alongside them, we find that English music and some American music—I'm thinking of La Monte Young and sometimes Steve Reich—is a kind of music that references or builds a metallic time of execution and affection, hence composition, that we get a non-pulsed metallic time; on the other hand, some Americans like Philip Glass use pulsed metallic time, as well as other forms of time that'd fall under that same heading; while the Germans use a time that's just as abstract as the others, but a mechanical type with very precise rhythmic inscriptions.

In France, I'm thinking of a group called Magma; you see a comeback with a time of war, which isn't at all some sort of despotic hierarchy of sounds; it's a time that, in the context of its execution, has a totally innovative aspect to it, and you find tons of other times: live times, instant times show up in these sorts of music. On the other hand, in pop music, what we see is a sort of holdover, a sort of return to something that leaves me rather perplexed—something that plainly counts as figures of content, something that stands in for a signified, but which isn't really a signified. The best term to describe it would be an abstract icon. An abstract icon would be something that doesn't represent anything, but which acts and functions as an element of representation. So, we're finding something like that again.

Deleuze: A quick note, Richard. In these voices, in this sort of vocal machinery, in pop music—Fernandez isn't wrong when he says that there's also a voice that goes beyond the gender binary machine. It's not just Bowie; it's also the Stones, and Pink Stuff [*Pink Floyd, perhaps*]. Would you agree with that?

Pinhas: Yes, except that it doesn't really seem pertinent since referring any voice to the problem of sexual difference is such a despicable move.

Deleuze: Now you're pulling my leg. You can't be serious. If we say the binary machine, man/woman, is a territoriality of the voice, the milieu, the sexes, the types of refrains and the

parts of the body involved, the lungs, the throat, the diaphragm—it's all mixed together. That's what I'm calling the territorialized voice, with the refrain as its musical form. I claim that music begins by deterritorializing. So, as I see it, music's constitutive process of deterritorialization—you're right to say that [sexual difference] has nothing to do with music, since it's only with the deterritorializing process that music begins. There is no music except through the deterritorialization of the voice.

So, [in the two] techniques for going about the process of deterritorializing the voice—castrato, countertenor—the two aren't at all identical, they aren't the same parts of the body, they aren't the same milieu. So, there are methods for deterritorializing the voice which are integral to vocal music. And then there are deterritorializing processes that are strictly instrumental, which make the voice into just another instrument. I'd argue that all becomings first happen through the voice. Looking at how this arrangement unfolds: what I'm emphasizing is how the artificial/natural dichotomy gets replaced by the difference between territoriality/deterritorialization, because, ultimately, there isn't anything natural or anything artificial.

Student: [*Inaudible remarks about anachronisms*]

Deleuze: Completely. Every deterritorializing process also produces more or less artificial reterritorializations. When instrumental music, when instruments take precedence over the voice, the voice itself becomes a reterritorializing factor, whereas before it was essentially caught up in a movement of deterritorialization—it was even an agent of deterritorialization.

Student: Is Bob Dylan really [an instance of] deterritorialization?

Deleuze: Yes, yes. What is Dylan's voice, musically speaking? It's kind of a blank voice. It's very odd. It's increasingly nasal.

Pinhas: What you were saying earlier about the use of archaisms is pretty important because, once you use an anachronistic element and fold it into an innovative perspective, what you end up with is even more powerful. And at a certain level, the use of binary structures, which began in contemporary jazz with Miles Davis, is the advent of American neo-binarism. It picks up one of the most territorialized elements used today, the drums; it's what cuts musical times in seconds or thirds, using conventional standards. And what does he do with this most territorialized element? He invents, or reinvents, proliferating compound beats, to the point that, ultimately, with the help of this "old" or highly coded event, he creates a sort of quasi-absolute deterritorializing line at the level of rhythmic structures.

Deleuze: I think there are convergent and overlapping phenomena. Steve Reich says what all he owes to Eastern cultures, but that doesn't mean he didn't come to them after a convergent process that went through Eastern music. I'll quote Boulez: "Tempo is due to a written numerical relationship, but it's completely modified and carried by a rate of unspooling. Accounting for this phenomenon, it was much easier to get extremely complex relationships using intrinsically simpler relationships, adding modifications in speed to these numerical relationships. If you incorporate it into a fairly simple rhythmic structure"—with regard to form—"accumulations of

little notes”—this is already there in Mozart—“the accumulation of little notes making it possible to produce complex relationships between speed and slowness based on formally rather simple relationships, at every turn, you get a broken tempo. Thus, there’s music that can do without pulsation altogether, a floating music, where the writing itself makes it impossible for the instrumentalist to keep in line with a pulsed time. The little notes, the ornamentation, the multiplication of dynamic differences.”¹⁷ There are some critics who talk about these little notes in Mozart as “blocks.” We should also look for these little blocks in Debussy, which literally break down the form’s development, and against the backdrop of a relatively simple form, they generate extremely complex relationships between speed and slowness. Which is precisely what Richard was saying.

Pinhas: Yeah, basically?

Deleuze: Basically? Basically? Alright.

Pinhas: I’m basically saying, not with regard to what you’re saying or your interpretation of Boulez, but with regard to Boulez’s text itself, which is always ambiguous—it’s often right, but it’s ambiguous.

Deleuze: Ambiguous? I’d like to hear what you think about this business with the voice in sound film. The parallel I see? If we accept the idea of a musical machine—musical machine meaning what takes place on the sonorous plane of consistency—if we can describe the musical machine abstractly as sonorous deterritorialization, then I might say it’s the abstract machine of music. The abstract machine is the collection of processes for sonorous deterritorialization. We could very well understand this machine’s mutations such that its different elements completely change gear.

So while history figures into it, I’d say that if I look at concrete musical machines, there is a history there. As far as my abstract machine goes, which I described as a sonorous plane of consistency, I’d claim that this abstract machine is necessarily actualized in concrete machines. The first type of concrete machine: deterritorialization brought to bear on the voice; voices are no longer male or female. Deterritorialization of the voice by way of these sub-machines: the castrato machine, the countertenor machine, etc., all these different designs [*agencements*]. So, that’s how I define the first concrete machine effectuating my abstract machine.

Then, I think, we come to a different concrete machine. Granted, these concrete machines can be dated. I can say that such-and-such arrangement [*agencement*] happens here, while such-and-such sub-arrangement happens over there. The castrato machine takes shape in Italy at a certain point in time and then ends at a certain point in time. It’s a fact. Then I turn to another arrangement: sonorous deterritorialization continues, but it no longer operates on the voice; it’s an instrumental or symphonic deterritorialization that takes the voice and makes it part of the machine. It’s no longer a question of machining the voice; it’s about making the human voice a part of the machine. At which point, I’d argue that something in the machine has changed.

So, I can’t help but bring in, if not history, at least dates, just like proper nouns. A proper noun is an indicator for a concrete arrangement. I treat any noun I might use to point to a concrete

arrangement as a proper noun, including dates. And from one concrete arrangement to the next, every mode you can conceive: you can conceptualize mode by proliferating. Here's where I'd bring up real-life rhizomes. History would only play a strictly secondary role; I'm not trying to bring us back to a historical perspective. What I need are concrete coordinates for concrete arrangements, concrete coordinates like: proper nouns, dates, places, whatever sort of haecceity designating concrete arrangements which, with all the same degree of perfection—depending on how much perfection they're capable of, at least—all effectuate the same abstract machine. But that doesn't mean the methods for sonorous deterritorialization aren't very different, depending on whether they apply primarily to instruments, to forms, and so on.

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Gilles Deleuze: There wouldn't be a cut-off for when abstraction begins or ends in music; I'm not on board with the idea of abstract music.

Georges Comtesse: We ought to divide the vocal machine further, into a machine deeper than the vocal machine, on that entails the machine of silence. If it weren't for this machine of silence, Boulez wouldn't be able to say that there's a musical process within silence, a process of abolition, of destruction, and that in music, we always cherish the object we want to destroy. That's the machine of silence.

Pinhas: What you're saying is pretty serious. You're picking back up on the subject of "noises," turning musicians into carriers for the death drive, major factors in contemporary distress, the great figure of death, at the same time as repetition is becoming a phenomenon of its own in the case of stock "noises." So, on the one hand, there's a misunderstanding, and on the other, it rots away at everything attached to music, a decay that crystallizes precisely around the aspect of abolition you're referring to. But what's the deal with silence—the most theoretically elevated form of music, even? Ultimately, it's—my example is Cage, Boulez also references Cage—silence comes from the environment. Absolute silence does not exist.

Comtesse: The intensive silence of a musician has nothing to do with their environment. It's zero degrees.

Pinhas: I'd be happy to buy your "zero degrees" as soon as you give me a definition for it. I'm not so sure, and nobody in the history of music has been able to define what silence is, apart from Cage, who uses silence to refer to an environment that allows for ambient noise. I can't see what this zero-level silence, this absolute silence, corresponds to besides just a dimension of abolition, a new term for death tacked onto music. The problem facing musicians today is not at all one of subjectivity, nor is it their relationship to silence. It's about allocating sonorous matter, it's about speeds and slownesses, it's about metallic time. Never has it been about death, about representation, or about silence.

Deleuze: I'd like to add something because my heart is bursting with joy. I feel like Richard has his finger on something: in all of your comments—and you know I find them really interesting—I always tell you there's something I can't quite figure out; you're always confronting me with another machine, another arrangement. In every intervention you make, no matter the subject,

you're basically saying, "You forgot about an arrangement." Today, you're saying, "You forgot about the silence machine," which is different from the refrain or the deterritorialization of the voice, and you're always adding one more to the pile. Richard's saying that, by always adding more, meaning that in the best sense, aren't you flinging us back to something that acts as a death drive? Or a castration machine?

I sometimes have a similar feeling. When you say all that, when you say that I've forgotten a silence machine, silence especially being something I wouldn't make into a machine. For me, it goes without saying that silence is a creative element, among the most creative components of the musical machine; there is absolutely no silence outside the musical machine. In the act of deterritoriality, you have the refrain, with noise and the environment; in the musical machine, you have all sorts of elements in various proportions, and one outcome of these deterritorializing processes is silence.

As to the question whether silence can or cannot be defined—personally, my position is different from both yours and Richard's; I'd claim that silence is perfectly capable of being defined, but it can only be defined within the musical machine. In Boulez's text, the tendency towards abolition is wholly a component of the musical machine, and any other kind of trend towards abolition would be completely different, wouldn't have anything to do with the sort of abolition specific to sonorous abolition. So, for Boulez, abolition is fully integral to the musical machine. For you, we no longer get an arrangement or a machine; we end up with a death drive, or the equivalent of a death drive. That seems to be what Richard is saying.

Pinhas: It's the worst thing you could say about music.

Deleuze: There is no death drive. There are machines whose components drift towards abolition. If you extract all these abolitions, which comprise different machines—as I see it, if you isolate pure abolition for the sake of a dedicated machine, that messes everything up.

[Note from WebDeleuze: A lengthy discussion about the death drive.] [End of text]

Gilles Deleuze

On Mille Plateaux II, 1976-1977

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Translation: Timothy S. Murphy

Richard Pinhas: I have a series of questions which come from a very precise domain, the musical domain, but which open upon much more general problems, and I would like, if possible, to have replies of a general order and not ones particularly centered on music. I'm starting from what is easiest for me. The first question bears on a problem of time.

It seemed to me that there were two predominant, principal types of time, in short two categories which are called Chronos and Aion; I started off on a "reflection" on the positions of the skeptical school. Broadly they say that time, being neither engendered nor unengendered, neither finite nor infinite, time does not exist. It's a form of paradox, and it is found only at another level, in certain books, one finds [retrouve] a certain form of paradox uniting two forms of filiation: at the level of time, there is a part born of Aion and a part born of Chronos, and the typical paradox would be the position of the philosopher Meinong, who arrived at paradoxes of this sort: squared circle, unextended matter, perpetuum mobile, things like that.

What I asked myself is: can one not attend [assister]—and I have the impression that in certain musical procedures one attends to this, perhaps one can generalize it or at least rediscover it in other domains—to a kind of process which I call for the moment a process of metallization [métallisation], a metallic process which would affect for example the repetitive musical syntheses, and which would be a kind of mixture (of course, this notion of mixture remains to be defined), and where one would have a time which would be both continuous and event-ual [événementiel], which would be at the same time of the order of the continuum, which would be or which, rather, in certain respects, would cover—and I see it as a very particular form of Aion—this would be a non-barbarous mixed form because this would be a singular form to be defined, and which would be at the same time born of an uninterrupted line, from something which is not of the order of the event, which would be perhaps to reconcile [rapprocher] the chronological order, and which, from another side, would be proper to Stoic time, that is to say to the infinitive line and to an empty form of the present ?

I wanted to know if this form of mixture could be found. It's a mixture which would be situated on the side of Aion, but which would be a very singular qualification of Aion. And I have the impression, at the level of music, that one finds this time in a pulsed time, which is paradoxical, therefore a pulsed time on the side of Aion, which strolls about like that on an infinitive line, and that this pulsed time, by a series of extremely strong displacements, I'm thinking specifically of the music of Philip Glass, continuous displacement for example at the level of accentuations, this displacement would happen to produce an extra dimension. It could be called as you wish: a dimension + 1, a superpower [surpuissance] dimension, a dimension of superexecution

[sureffectuation]...of extremely powerful [puissante] execution which would be even more interesting in certain respects than the notion of non-pulsed time which, itself a priori, would be situated on the side of Aion.

Therefore, on the basis of this mixture or kind of interface between different times, between connected and differential lines of execution, one would attend to the innovation of this kind of time, which is a particular form of Aion, and which borrows some elements from a chronological time. Within the same idea, I have the impression that, on the basis of this pulsed time, which is directly opposed to the non-pulsed time of which Boulez, and a whole musical school, speaks, I have the impression that it is on the basis of a certain form of pulsed time (of course there are certain restrictions) that one happens to see executed movements of speed and slowness and extremely important differential executions.

It's on the basis of a certain form of pulsed time—and not on the basis of a non-pulsed time (contradictory examples could of course be found)—one is going to find executions of movements of speed and slowness and even more important differentials than in non-pulsed music. Once more, I'm thinking of the music of Philip Glass, and certain Englishmen, they make repetitive metallic music, they really play on the sequences, on the variations of speed inside these sequences, on the displacement of accents that are always inside these sequences, and who, at the level of a whole musical piece or even a whole diagram, they are going to make the speeds of the sequences vary, they are going to produce interferences or even resonances, not merely harmonic ones but resonances of speed between sequences which will melt away [s'écouler] in the same moment, at different speeds, if necessary it will be the same sequence which will be accelerated or even slowed down, reduced, then superimposed one on the other. There are numerous possible movements. Paradoxically as well, this play of speeds, which is extremely interesting, this execution of movements of speed, will be found on the side of a certain pulsed time, by locating it on the side of Aion. This is the first question: can this type of mixed time be seen to arise elsewhere than in music, what can the value and efficacy of this type of mixture be?

Deleuze: You have introduced a word which, I'm sure, has intrigued everyone: metallic synthesis. What is it?

Pinhas: It's merely the name that I would like to give to this form of time.

Deleuze: You would call it metallic synthesis ?

Pinhas: I would call it rather a metallic form of Aion. It's a metalized Aion. It's a name which has been claimed by this music and it's a name which goes [collerait] well with this kind of mixture. Metallic is a term that one finds often. The second thing that interests me comes from the problem which gives rise to a whole musical school, in reading Schoenberg's book, one notices that he adopts a certain point of view. One rediscovers the same themes, moreover, from Schoenberg to Boulez, the same theoretical themes: of course, there's the apology for the series, for structure, a whole pile of things that we like a lot here, and relations between (discrete) elements, it's the viewpoint of structuralism in music, I say this very crudely.

What appears to be extremely important is that Schoenberg seems to construct his music on the basis of a term which he himself employs, he employs many very Freudian terms: he calls his music a system of “construction,” he explains that what matters are problems of form, broadly the affections of these forms, the variety of forms, images, sketches, themes, motives and transformations. In relation to this system of construction that could be opposed to the complex notion of assemblages [agencements], the latter comes under another point of view, a totally different perspective, in an assemblage for example, the sounds would have value for themselves etc. This system of construction is built on the process of “variation.” From Schoenberg to Boulez, these contemporary composers utilize a process which is called variation, and which will permit them to find a new form of articulation between the musical sequences or series.

What is extremely interesting is that this process of variation functions with the aid of two operations which Schoenberg himself calls “condensation” and “juxtaposition.” These two notions, like that of construction, find a bizarre resonance in psychoanalytic theory, in the form of displacement and condensation, or metaphor and metonymy. I'm saying this merely to try rapidly to define [cerner] this type of music which excludes from the outset lines of force, rhythmic complexity, systems of accentuations, harmonic resonances, sound value taken for itself, repetition as positive principle, work on sound, compositions beyond [hors] structural unity etc.

Schoenberg's great haunting fear is repetition. He rejected it above all. Intervals, sequences, what he himself calls “cells,” the problem is that of transitions. For him, two schools exist: there are those who proceed by variations, he claims to draw upon this school, and there are those whom he doesn't like and who proceed by juxtaposition or even by simple repetition. One sees that, in one case as in the other, these are two types of writing or of composition which respond to something, which could be called here a fundamental plane, and an execution of lines coded in segments.

In this type of composition, it seems to me that the musicians of metallic music, “those I like,” proceed by a totally different mode which allows, it's a diagrammatic mode of composition which allows sequential logics, a treatment of sounds, multiple variables of writing, different principles of repetition, extremely powerful lines of execution, sonorous mutations, becomings-molecular, relations of attraction and repulsion between the sounds and perhaps between the sequences, movements of speed and slowness, etc. Among which are differentiations of musical time. That is, rather, a mutant flux music on thresholds, as you have tried to tell us. And I have the impression that this music, which entails a whole pile of fundamental resonances and in fact very important moves [jeux] of differentiation, this music is a music which proceeds by “translations” [translations], in opposition to a music which would proceed by variations or by juxtapositions, or by simple repetitions.

Broadly I would try to oppose a music which proceeds by transitions, the serial and neo-serial school, to a totally different music which would proceed perhaps by translations. But it happens that the notion of translation, which remains for us to define, is a notion which belongs to a certain “philosophical” domain. I would like for you to tell us what you think of this opposition on the one hand, and on the other hand, for you to give us a definition of the notion of translation.

Deleuze: You're the one who's introducing this notion of translation. In what music do you find it?

Pinhas: I couple this notion of translation with those of interference and harmonic resonance. It's a music that plays tirelessly with speeds, slownesses, strong differentiations or a complex repetition, or even both at once, there's nothing exclusive about it, it's a music which is built on totally inclusive syntheses. I suppose that it's the music I like, it goes from Hendrix to Phil Glass by way of Ravel, Reich, Fripp and Eno.

Deleuze: It makes a large group of problems, it's very good. Shall we begin right here? One thing disturbed me in what we did last time. We had spoken of the notions of mass and class, and of their utilization from the point of view of the problems which occupied us, and I tried to say a certain number of things. And then Guattari in turn said a certain number of things, and I was struck that we said opposite things. I told myself that it's perfect, but have those who listened been as sensitive as me, or was it the opposite? Well then, we commence upon this story of time. It would be necessary to find a definition of "pulsation," or else we cannot be understood. Or shall we bypass the difference between a pulsed time and a non-pulsed time? It's quite variable.

Pinhas: But my question doesn't bear on pulsed or non-pulsed time, I used that as an ornament, it actually bears on a notion of time, that is could one, on the basis of the difference between Chronos and Aion, on the basis of this absolutely irreversible or unfathomable [non creusable] difference, could one happen to find a form of time participating in Aion, and belonging to it, and with what specific characteristics ?

Deleuze: This is what's good in discussions, it's like we don't put the accent on the same bits, this is what makes them useful. Me, I believe on the contrary that the idea of pulsation is not something ornamental in what you said. It's the distribution [répartition] of pulsed and non-pulsed which commands, for me, the whole set of problems you are posing.

Chronos, Aion, it's a notion that has a whole history within the history of philosophy. Chronos, broadly it's chronological time, as the Greeks said, Chronos is the number of movement; Aion is time also, but it's a much less simple time to understand. Broadly, pulsed time is the order of Chronos. Our question, broadly, is: is there another time, non-pulsed time for example, very well we will take the word Aion. The Stoics took the Aion-Chronos distinction very far, and for them Chronos is a time of bodies, and Aion is a time of the incorporeal. But the incorporeal is not spirit.

I propose to start again [répartir] from the very notion of pulsation in order that we try to have a clear time of departure. If I should try to say that a time is pulsed, this is evidently not its periodicity: there are irregular pulsations. It's therefore not at the level of a chronometric regularity that I could define pulsed time or Chronos. The domain of Chronos, for the moment and by convenience, I identify Chronos and pulsed time, therefore Chronos is not regularity, it's not periodicity. Once again, there are perfectly irregular pulsations.

I propose to say that you have a pulsed time when you find yourself always before three coordinates. It suffices that there be only one of the three. A pulsed time is always a territorialized time; regular or not, it's the number of the movement of the step that marks a

territory: I cover [parcours] my territory! I can cover it in a thousand ways, not necessarily in a regular rhythm. Each time that I cover or haunt a territory, each time that I claim a territory as mine, I appropriate a pulsed time, or I beat [pulse] a time.

I would say that the simplest musical form of pulsed time is not the metronome, neither is it whatever chronometry, it's the ritornello [ritournelle], namely this thing which is not yet musical, it's the little ritornello. The little ritornello of the child, it can even have a relatively complex rhythm, it can have a metronomy, an irregular metrology, it's from pulsed time because it's fundamentally the way in which a sonorous form, however simple it may be, marks a territory. Each time that there is a marking of a territoriality, there will be a pulsation of time. The cadastral survey is a pulsation of time.

This is the first characteristic. A movement of deterritorialization is at the same time the release [dégagement] of a non-pulsed time. When great musicians seize hold of a child's little ritornello, there are two ways in which they can seize it: either they make a collage of it, at such a moment in the development or unfolding [déroulement] of their work they fling you a little ritornello, for example: Berg, *Wozzeck*. In this case it's above all of the collage type, the astonishing thing is that the work ends right there. It happens as well that a folkloric theme is tacked into a work, just as it happens that a becoming-animal is tacked into a work, Messiaen recording birdsongs. Mozart's birds are not the same thing, it's not a collage; it happens that at the same time that the music becomes bird, the bird becomes something other than a bird. There is a bloc of becomings here, two dissymmetrical becomings: the bird becomes something other than music, at the same time that the music becomes bird.

There are certain moments in Bartok when the folkloric themes are flung out, and then there is something totally different, when the folkloric theme is taken into a bloc of becomings. In this case, it is truly deterritorialized by the music: Berio. A musician like Schumann: ultimately [à la limite], we could say that all the sonorous forms are more or less borrowed from little ritornellos, and at the same time, the result is that these ritornellos are traversed by a movement of musical deterritorialization which makes us agree, in a time which is no longer precisely the pulsed time of the territory. Therefore, here is the first difference between pulsed and non-pulsed or between Chronos and Aion.

And then there is a second difference: I would say that there is pulsation whenever time measures—territoriality is a notion of scansion, a territory is always something scanned—whenever you can fix [assigner] a state of development of a form and when time is used now no longer to scan a territory but to punctuate [rythmer] the development of a form. This is again the domain of Chronos. It has nothing to do with regularity. Pulsed time: it will not suffice to define it by a rhythm in general, or by a chronicity in general or by a chronometry in general. Whenever time is like the number of the development of a form... Biological time, obviously: a biological form which passes... It's not by chance that biologists and embryologists thus encounter the problem of time and encounter it in a variable way following each species, according to the succession of living forms, growth, etc.

The same in music, as soon as you can fix a sonorous form, determinable by its internal coordinates, for example melody-harmony, as soon as you can fix a sonorous form endowed with

intrinsic properties, this form is subject to developments, by which it is transformed into other forms or enters into relation or again is connected to other forms, and here, following these transformations and these connections, you can fix pulsations of time. Therefore the second characteristic of a pulsed time for me is a time which marks the temporality of a form in development.

The third characteristic: there is Chronos when time marks or measures, or scans, the formation of a subject. In German this would be Bildung: the formation of a subject. Education. Education is a pulsed time. Sentimental education. It permits us to see again many things that were said: recollection [souvenir] is an agent of pulsation. Psychoanalysis is a formidable enterprise of the pulsation of time.

Pinhas: When you say that, you render pulsed time absolutely sad. Even if your definition of pulsed time is right, things are not as clear-cut nor as obvious. I take an example: a work by Philip Glass, "Music in Changing Parts," it's a pulsed music, there are extremely measured, extremely subjectivized, or rather extremely segmented sequences, and it happens that in this music, outside of the work on harmonic resonances -- and it's very important because it's entirely situated on the side of an incorporeal -- one has a whole series of displacements of accents, accents of strong beats [temps] or secondary beats becoming strong, or else beats of resonance which rise up just like that, not at all in an aleatory manner -- it could have been aleatory, but in this case it isn't that -- and these accentuations come to form practically an involution of a chronological time—as Claire [Parnet] said—and which disorganize, but in the sense of organic time, which disorganize therefore the organic body of something like the melody or harmonies. One attends precisely to a process of metalization which comes back to exacerbate certain lines of flight and to engage a becoming-molecular in something which belonged to a chronological time.

Then, one has a basic form, that can be called open-structured [structurelle] or structural [structural], subjectivized or subjectivizable, that can be called segmented or not, in short, everything we don't like, namely a chronological time, and on the other side, one has a process which comes completely to form an involution of this bit. And it's done perhaps with a surplus of measure, or with a mad measure, a kind of measure that plays precisely on the differences of speeds and which comes to get mixed up in this kind of chronological time. But if from the outset you say that every element of chronological time is negative, it closes many doors open to a transformation or to a metamorphosis of something which, a priori, is essentially, I would not say nihilist, because a nihilist essence is transformable only with difficulty, but an essence not totally finished off on the side of a becoming-molecular. [*Laughter from Deleuze*]

You're going to have a lot of trouble defining non-pulsed time because even in the least pulsed time possible, one would be able to find something pulsed, pulsation or the inmost, infinitely small mark of the stroke of the bow on the violin, or something of the sort. And ultimately, this would be very easy, this would be an exercise in style or a theoretical game of composing and of executing a music which will theoretically be on the side of a non-pulsed time, but which in fact will not bear in itself any line of flight and any possible becoming; which will be in essence completely nihilist.

Deleuze: You'll see, we agree. We don't have the same method at all, because if what you mean is: don't go right into your definitions, wanting to make us feel that, in advance, everything which isn't good is on the side of pulsed time. At first, we don't know. You've made a bit of a plea for reintroducing the beauties of pulsed time. I am saying a slightly different thing, namely that it goes without saying that one never finds oneself facing anything but mixtures. I don't believe that anyone whatsoever could live in a non-pulsed time, for the simple reason that he would literally die there. Likewise, when we spoke at length of the body without organs, and the necessity of making ourselves one, I never thought that one could live without the organism. Likewise, no question of living without relying on and being territorialized on a pulsed time, which permits us the minimum development of forms of which we have need, the minimal allocations of subjects that we are, because subjectivation, organism, pulsation of time, these are the conditions of living. If one leaps over that, it's what we call a suicide. Certain deaths by drugs are typical of it: the organism leaped. It's a suicidal enterprise.

Therefore, on this point, I would tell you that it's very obvious that, in this case, one finds oneself in a mixture of pulsed time and non-pulsed time. The question is: once the mixture is given, I consider that our task is to see what comes back to one such element of the mixture or to another. Therefore, if one is not held back and reterritorialized somewhere, one breaks out, but what we keep, taking this into account, what interests me is the other aspect. When Richard tells me that there is something good in pulsed time, I say that it depends: does this mean that pulsed time is absolutely necessary and that you won't live without it, then OK... *[An apparent interruption occurs here given the slight shift in the focus on the topic under discussion]*

The Wagnerian leitmotif, what does it mean? In the case of the mixture that occupies us, one sees well in what way the leitmotif in Wagner is typical of a pulsed time. Why? Because, and it's thus that many conductors interpret Wagner, understood and executed the leitmotif, it has in fact all the characteristics that we have just determined, the three characteristics of pulsed time: it indicates at least the germ of a sonorous form with a strong intrinsic or interior property, and it's executed like that.

Second characteristic: when Debussy made fun of the leitmotif in Wagner, he had a good formula, he said: it's exactly like a signpost, it's the signpost of a character, whose formation the Wagnerian drama will put on stage and in music, and the formation as subject. Parsifal formation, Lohengrin formation, it's the Goethean side of Wagner, his lyric drama will never cease to entail the formation of the character.

Third characteristic: the leitmotif is fundamentally and functionally in the music, it serves as a function of sonorous territorialization, it comes and comes again. And it's the hero, in his formation, in his territoriality, and in the forms to which he refers, who is there, taken up in the leitmotif. Many conductors have placed the accent on these functions of the leitmotif.

When Boulez plays Wagner, he has a completely different evaluation of the leitmotif. When he looks at the score [partition], he does not find such a leitmotif. Broadly he says: it's neither the germ of an intrinsic form nor the sign [indicateur] of a character in formation, he holds onto these two points, he says that the leitmotif is a veritable floating theme which happens to get stuck here or there, in very different spots. There is therefore another thing as well: there is a

floating theme which can float just as well over mountains as over waters, over one such character or over another, and the variations of which are going to be, not formal variations but perpetual variations of speeds, accelerations and slowdowns, I'm saying that it's a completely different conception of the leitmotif. At the level of orchestra conducting, it's obvious that many things will change when the Wagnerian leitmotif is understood in one way or in the other; this will obviously not be the same execution, this goes without saying. And here, I would say just like Richard that it's not a question of obtaining a non-pulsed time in the pure state.

Non-pulsed time, by definition, you can only wrest it from a pulsed time, and if you suppress all pulsation or pulsed time, then here I take over Richard's expression, it's pure nihilism; there's no longer even pulsed time or time that's not pulsed: there's no longer anything.

Non-pulsed time you can only conquer, and because of this I insist on the inequality of status: in a certain manner, pulsed time will always be given to you, or it will be imposed on you, you will be forced to comply with it and from another side, it will order you; the other must be wrested. And here, it's not an individual or collective problem, once again there is something common to the problem of the individual and that of the collective: the individual is a collective as much as a collective is individuated.

A student: When one makes a film, there is a screenplay, one secretes pulsed time, but this screenplay is going to situate itself in a non-pulsed time...?

Deleuze: In this connection, I would say that the example of cinema is marvelous. Pulsed time covers the whole development of internal sonorous forms, therefore the screenplay, the rhythm of images in the cinema makes up part of pulsed time. The question is how to wrest a non-pulsed time and what would it mean to wrest a non-pulsed time from this system of chronological pulsation? We can seek examples. What exactly does one wrest from sonorous forms in order to obtain a non-pulsed time? It consists in wresting what from forms, or from subjects, or from territorialities?

My problem of non-pulsed time becomes: wresting something from the territorialities of time, you wrest something from the temporal development of forms and you wrest something from the formation of subjects. Here, Richard... Some of us can be moved by certain voices in the cinema. Bogart's voice. What interests us is not Bogart as subject, but how does Bogart's voice function? What is the function of the voice in speaking him? It's not the same function at all in the American comedy or in the detective film. Bogart's voice, it can't be said that this is an individualizing voice, even though it is that also, this is the pulsed aspect of it: I deterritorialize myself on Bogart. He wrests something, as though an emission—it's a kind of metallic voice, Claire says that it's a horizontal voice, it's a boring voice—it's a kind of thread which sends out a sort of very very very special sonorous particles. It's a metallic thread that unwinds, with a minimum of intonation; it's not at all the subjective voice. Here as well one could say that there is Bogart as character, that's the domain of the formation of the subject, Bogart's territories, the roles he is capable of playing, one sees again the sorts who have a raincoat like Bogart, Jean Cau, it's obvious that he takes himself for Bogart.

Pinhas: Effectively we have two different methods for arriving at the same thing, that fits. But from this notion of mixture, it seems to me that you throw a kind of bridge, practically a bridge

between the realms [pont inter-règne] of my two questions, namely that from the moment when you speak of the mixture, you arrive very quickly at the notion of translation. I would like you to explain a little bit.

Deleuze: I arrive there very quickly, but I would not call it translation. If I were to try to define my non-pulsed time, Aion, or another word, the two parts of a mixture are never equal. One of the two parts is always more less given, the other is always more or less to be made. It's for this reason that I've remained very Bergsonian. He said very beautiful things on that. He said that in a mixture, you never have two elements, but one element which plays the role of impurity and that one you have, it's given to you, and then you have a pure element that you don't have and that must be made. That's not bad.

I would say therefore that this non-pulsed time, how to produce it? It's necessary to arrive at a concrete analysis of it. You have non-pulsed time when you have a movement of deterritorialization. Example: the passage of the ritornello in its function from childlike reterritorialization to the deterritorialized ritornello in the work of Schumann. Second characteristic: you fabricate a non-pulsed time, if from the development of any form whatever, defined by intrinsic properties, you wrest particles which are defined only by their relations of speeds and slownesses, their relations of movement and rest. Not easy. If, from a form with strong intrinsic properties, you wrest indefinite [informelles] particles, which have among themselves only relations of speeds and slownesses, of movement and rest, you have wrested non-pulsed time from pulsed time. Who does a thing like that? Just now I said that it's the musician who deterritorializes the ritornello, he makes non-pulsed time from that moment, and nevertheless he holds onto pulsed time.

Who makes particles wrest themselves into a form? Immediately I say the physicists, they do only that with their machines, they would agree and I hope that there are none of them here, just like that they agree in advance: they fabricate non-pulsed time. What is a cyclotron? I say it all the more joyfully because I have no idea about it. What are these machines? These are machines for wresting particles which have only differential speeds, to the point that at this particular level, one will not call it speed, the words are different, but this isn't our affair, from physical forms they wrest particles which have only kinematic [cinématique], quantum relations, the word is so pretty, and which will be defined by speeds, extremely complex speeds. A physicist passes his time doing that.

Third characteristic of non-pulsed time: you no longer have the fixing [assignation] of a subject, there's no more subject formation, it's finished, death to Goethe. I tried to oppose Kleist to Goethe; Kleist, subject formation, he could care less [se fout] completely. It's not his affair, his affair is a story of speeds and slownesses. I invoke the biologist. What does he do? You could be told two things: there are forms and these forms develop more or less quickly. Here, I would say that one is right in the mixture. There are forms which develop, I would say that there's a mixture of two languages in there: there are forms which develop, this belongs to language P, language of pulsed time, more or less quickly, this is from the mixture and belongs to language non-P, language of non-pulsed time.

The problem is not to render everything coherent, the question is to know [savoir] where you're going to put the accent.

Or else you're going to give primacy to the development of the form and you're going to say that the speeds and slownesses follow from the exigencies of the development of the form, here I could follow the history of biology and say, for example, that it has subordinated the whole play of speeds and slownesses to the theme of a form which develops, and the exigencies of a form which develops. I see others of them who, saying the same sentences—it's for this reason that beneath the language there are such settlements of scores, it's really at the moment when one says the same thing that it's war, inevitably—there are biologists who, on the contrary, mean that the form and the developments of form depend solely on the speeds, on finding particles, relations of speeds and slownesses, and even if one has not yet found these particles, and it's these relations of speeds and slownesses among ultimately indefinite particles that will command.

There isn't any reason to decide among them, but when our heart goes either to the ones or to the others, once more, one lives, all this is not theoretical, you don't live in the same manner according to whether you develop a form or you find your way in relations of speeds and slownesses among particles, or things functioning as particles, insofar as you distribute affects. It's not the same mode of life at all.

In biology everyone knows that there are broad differences among dogs, and yet they are part of the same species, while a cat and a tiger are not part of the same species, it's odd. Why? What defines a species? The form and its development define a species, but from another side, you would have the non-pulsed language in which what defines a species is solely speed and slowness. Example: what makes a Saint Bernard and a nasty greyhound the same species? As they say: it breeds, it bears a living offspring. But what makes it bear a living offspring? One can't even invoke the sizes, even when the coupling is impossible by virtue of pure dimensions, that changes nothing, in principle it's possible. What defines its possibility? Solely its speed, the speed with which the spermatozoa arrive at the ovum, where ovulation is done. It's solely a relation of speed and slowness, in sexuality, which defines fertilizability. While the cat and the tiger, it doesn't work, it's not the same period of gestation, while all dogs have the same period of gestation, the same speed of spermatozoa, the same speed of ovulation, so that however different they may be, it's a species not by virtue of a common form nor a common development of form, although there may also be that, but the system of speed-slowness relations.

Therefore, I say rapidly that the three characteristics of non-pulsed time are that you no longer have a development of the form, but a wresting of particles which have only relations of speed and slowness, you no longer have subject formation but you have hecceities; we saw this year the difference between individuations by subjectivation, the fixing of subjects, and individuations by hecceities, a season, a day. Deterritorialization. Emission of particles. Hecceities.

So there's the general formula that I would give for non-pulsed time: you really have the formation of a non-pulsed time, or else the construction of a plane of consistency, therefore, when there is the construction of what's called a continuum of intensities, second point when there are conjugations of flux, the flux of drugs can only be practiced, for example, in relation to

other fluxes, there is no monoflux machine or assemblage. Within such assemblages, there is always an emission of particles with relations of speeds and slownesses, there is a continuum of intensities and there is a conjugation of flux.

At this level, it would be necessary to take a case and see how it puts these three aspects together, I could say that there is a plane of consistency here, whatever the level of the drug, whatever the level of the music, there is a plane of consistency because there is a continuum of definable intensities, you have quite a conjugation of diverse fluxes, you have quite a few emissions of particles which have only kinematic relations. It's for this reason that the voice in cinema is so important, it can be taken as a subjectivation, but equally as a hecceity. There is the individuation of a voice which is quite different from the individualization of the subject who has it.

One could take up any disturbance whatever: anorexia for example... What makes anorexia, in what way does its endeavor fail, in what way does it succeed? At the level of a study of concrete cases, is one going to find this conjugation of flux, this emission of particles. One sees well a first point. One tries to forget everything that the doctors or the psychoanalysts say about anorexia. Everyone knows that an anorexic is not someone who doesn't eat, it's someone who eats under a very curious regime. At first sight, this regime is an alternation, really, of emptiness and fullness. The anorexic empties herself, and she never ceases to fill herself, this already implies a certain alimentary regime. If one says: empty and full, in place of: not eating, one has already made great progress. It would be necessary to define a pessimal [pessimal] threshold and an optimal threshold. The pessimal is not necessarily the worst. I'm thinking of certain pages of [William] Burroughs, he says that, finally, above all, it's a story of the cold, the cold inside and the warm... [End of the recording]

Notes

¹ Following Brian Massumi's decision to translate *planification* as "plan(n)ing" and *planificateur* as "plan(e) maker," in order to preserve both "plan" and "plane" senses of *plan* in French. Also following Massumi's decision to leave *signifiance* untranslated. See Massumi's notes in *ATP*, xvi-xix.

² This analysis appears in Plateau 8 of *A Thousand Plateaus*, "1874 – Three Novellas, or 'What happened?'"

³ *Plan d'organisation* is also a French equivalent for "body plan" or "Bauplan" in biology.

⁴ For a discussion of lines in this context, see *ATP*, pp. 256-260, 262-265.

⁵ Regarding individuation, see *ATP*, pp. 261-263.

⁶ See *ATP*, pp. 256-258.

⁷ See, for example, John Cage, *Concert for Piano and Orchestra* (New York: Henmar, 1960). The conductor is meant to convert "clock-time to effective time," moving their arms like the hands of a clock in order to indicate changes in speed.

⁸ Deleuze and Guattari refer to Morand's *Monsieur Zéro* along these lines in *ATP*, p. 279.

⁹ *La Rose des Tudor* (Paris: Julliard, 1976). See *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 303.

¹⁰ While *plan* can mean "plan," "plane," or in the context of cinema, "frame" or "shot," (among other things), it appears here as "plane."

¹¹ "Sonorous" (*sonore*) is less comfortable than "audio" or "sound," but the translator uses the former to follow precedent and to avoid ambiguity over "sound" as an adjective.

¹² Following precedent, the French *ritournelle* appears here as "refrain," though the reader might understand it as a "ritornello," a tune, a little ditty. On the "refrain," see plateau 11, "1848. Of the Refrain".

¹³ *Note from WebDeleuze*: Deleuze's mention of Wagner is an implicit reference to Boulez.

¹⁴ On sound film in American comedy, see Lecture 17 of the *Cinema 4* Seminar (March 26, 1985). On Bogart in particular, see Lecture 19 of *Cinema 4* (April 23, 1985).

¹⁵ See Deleuze's mention of the "fort-da" game in the *Thousand Plateaus* 8 Seminar.

¹⁶ Regarding haecceities in Nietzsche et al, see *ATP*, pp. 328-330.

¹⁷ Text by Boulez; in light of the discussion in *ATP*, pp. 330-331, esp. p. 542 no. 53. The text cited might be *Par volonté et par hasard* (Paris: Seuil, 1975).