

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980

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Part 1

[In the first thirty minutes of this session, Deleuze develops a long answer to a question posed by a student before the start of the recording]

... the generic name to designate what? To designate peoples, if necessary, very, very varied peoples and who have like ... who have as a unity -- it is not a fundamental unity --, but who have in common to be in very diverse ways, if necessary, metallurgical peoples. And in fact, throughout history, there, throughout history, the question of metallurgical peoples, of their autonomy, of their relationship with other types of people, seems to me something fundamental, fundamental. What does their relationship with other types of people mean? This means, of course: the imperial peoples, on the one hand, that is, sedentary peoples, farmers, themselves working the metal, but then should we perhaps distinguish between all kinds of styles of metallurgy? It is obvious that the imperial sedentary peoples have very, very strong metallurgy, surely even acquired a kind of monopoly, but... but... they grafted themselves onto more directly metallurgical peoples. I mean a very simple thing: it's that many archaic empires lack mineral ores. They have no ore -- and yet they have a very, very elaborate metallurgy -- but, for example, the Near East is drastically lacking in ... tin, it is drastically lacking in copper. So there have to be other forms of metallurgical peoples who are at the same time prospecting peoples, extracting peoples and, much more, who bring ore to the imperial regions.

So, when we talk about the blacksmith problem, you know, it seems extremely complicated to me because there are all kinds of blacksmith: there is a blacksmith integrated into empires, there are quite different blacksmiths from that. So how do you tell them apart? I tell myself -- and that's what we were trying to do one year, I think, last year, by the way --: we tried to distinguish kinds of social spaces, social spaces.¹ And we tried to define first of all a kind of imperial space that we called a striated space, a striated space which was both the space of agriculture, and the space of sedentary lifestyle. Then we saw that nomadic peoples existed only on the condition of developing, unfolding, a very, very different type of space, and that these spaces were already in conflict; that the nomadic peoples developed and lived, they inhabited -- in the fundamental sense of "inhabiting", so in the almost Heideggerian sense of "inhabiting" -- they basically inhabited a smooth space; and that the question was not so much: the desert, the steppe, etc., but if the desert, the steppe and, if necessary, the sea were of great importance, well, it is because these were models of the realization of smooth space, but at the same time, that things were very

complicated because a smooth space such as the sea is at the same time a space that States and empires will striate, will striate very, very quickly. And then, just as smooth space becomes striated -- this will be the great defeat of the nomads -- so too striated space can restore smooth space. Fine.²

So... good, I... I seem to be getting off topic but, in fact, not so much because my question is: if we grant that... it is not even the question of Gypsies (*Tziganes*) -- the Gypsies pose, in a particularly acute way, only this problem which... is found throughout history at all kinds of levels -- -- if I am granted that there are peoples who are undoubtedly the most mysterious in history, even more mysterious than the nomads, ... that there are peoples that may roughly be called, these "metallurgical" peoples. For example, in European prehistory, there are very curious metallurgical peoples who seem to have been decisive in the constitution of Europe. It is these peoples that archaeologists call "chalice vessels", people-with-chalice vessels (or beakers) because in their tombs were found, right, ... this is their only point in common. There are reasons to think that they are racially very, very different from each other, but strangely enough, they have a sort of common marker (*sigle*), which we find in all their tombs, in the most diverse places: it ranges from Spain, ok, to Eastern Europe. They swarmed from everywhere, these so-called "beaker" or "chalice vessel" peoples who ... and these are beakers in the form of chalices.³ Ok.

Well, I mean, so what is this? If we... if we grant the category -- all that would be open to discussion -- if we grant the category of which the Gypsies can be an example, a privileged example, the category of... metallurgical peoples, if we say, however extensively that they mix, sometimes with the imperials, sometimes with the nomads, then this becomes a political problem once again. Among these peoples, there are some who form a sort of alliance with the imperial sedentary peoples. "Alliances", but in what form? This is very, very complicated. There are others who form an alliance with nomads; for example, the Tuareg nomads have their own metallurgists, their own metallurgists who seem very, very odd since research, ... ethnographic research and archaeological research offer very interesting hypotheses, that ... these metallurgists allied with the Tuaregs, allied with the ancient Tuareg nomads, could be either from Jewish colonies in Africa, descendants of Jewish colonies in Africa, or descendants of the Crusaders, or else again, [from] certain peoples of Africa, there, well, a people... a special African people.⁴

But in the end, if we try to find a clean space (*espace propre*) ... then it's understood: in fact, all this gets mixed up. You have alliances between nomads and sedentary peoples, between metallurgists and nomads, between metallurgists and imperial sedentary peoples, ... but the important thing is that these alliances are not of the same type at all. Understand that this means there is already a global market; from the earliest times, there is already a global market, and above all, a global market in metallurgy -- obviously much more metallurgical than agricultural --. What metallurgy brings is the "ingot" form (*forme lingot*). The ingot form has been known since antiquity, and it is something fundamental. In my opinion, one would have to show that the ingot form is not the same thing, nor the money form (*forme argent*), nor the... the currency form (*forme monnaie*), nor... the... nor the commodity form (*forme marchandise*). No doubt, it is a commodity, but the ingot is... it is... the very form of stockpiling, with the possibility of taking back, melting, refashioning, with the idea of an infinite process; recasting (*refondre*) will always occur ... [It's] very important, this ingot form in history. And there are caravans which

bring ingots into empires because they don't have, they don't have the ores. They have strong metallurgy; they don't have the ore. So that already assumes ... And the ore, they wouldn't have delivered it raw; there are all kinds of [metal] works, especially in the metallurgical process, which does not stop being worked, being undone and being reworked.

So, my question is: whatever the actual mixtures might be in the most ancient history, if one tried to define a properly metallurgical space, what would it be? Last year, I came up with a very simple idea, really: if we roughly grant this distribution "striated space of archaic empires" -- including the sea; they striate the sea: the shipping lanes striate the sea, -- [and] the smooth space of the nomads -- either desert nomads, or steppes, or even sea nomads... sea nomads -- how, on the other hand, would we define the strictly metallurgical space? Our hypothesis was: yes, there is a very, very particular space that we called "holey space" (*l'espace troué*),⁵ and holey space is something very, very odd -- this is perhaps how I will answer your question more precisely --: how is holey space, you understand, precisely that, metallurgical space? I mean, there, it's at the level of ... how to put it, of the most summary phenomenology: making holes. The metallurgist, not the imperial worker who receives the ore, but the prospector, the extractor, the blacksmith who works the ore to reduce it to the transportable "ingot" form, or already to draw from it some objects, on behalf of nomads or on behalf of sedentary people, well, he spends his time making holes in space. This is a holey space, which creates ... which obviously creates a lot of difficulty.

Suppose, here, that one must inhabit (*vivre*) things quite childishly: a ... a nomad in his desert, here, in whose space holes will get made, he doesn't necessarily like that; an imperial sedentary, a farmer, in whose space holes will get made, well you know, this not just a lark! This is a conflict between barely compatible social spaces. These peoples are not happy. If necessary, it will take all the emperor's might to enable the metalworking prospectors to make holes here and there. Sometimes, as it happens most often, it's that the great mineral resources are outside the limits of the empire. So there, well, they make their holes in the mountains... but with what? I believe that in the history of mankind, a holey space is one of the most fundamental, the most important points. If I look for -- myself, I admit that this is not... three is not enough... we tell ourselves: this is always annoying... we must never limit ourselves to three --, but the three basic social spaces, whatever their mixtures, their de facto mixing, the mixtures into which they enter..., these seem to me smooth space, striated space, and... and holey space. And there is no reason to ask, which one is primary.

Once again, smooth space is no less artificial than striated space. Striated space already implies, it seems to me, [that] it's the product (*le produit*). This is the product, so what is it? No, it mixes up a lot of things. Space, for example, forest space, seems to me a striated space, a basic striated space. However, the striated space of the empire occurs through land clearing or deforestation. Why? Because the forest space is a vertical striated space where it is very difficult to ensure, ... how to say, the equivalence of dimensions in space. What agriculture brings in relation to the forest space is a space striated in all directions, that is, homogeneous space -- this is what I was trying to say last year, right, but maybe I didn't manage; one has to wait a year to say it better -- homogeneous space is not at all on the side of a space smooth, it is not a smooth space at all. Homogeneous space is the abstract product or abstract representation of striated space. Homogeneous space is space striated in all directions, in all directions, so that a vertical striation can be folded back onto the horizontal, and you get a complete grid of the space. Henceforth, this

is an equivalent space in all directions; henceforth, it is a striated space. It is the abstract representation of striated space, whereas smooth space ... is absolutely not homogeneous, not at all homogeneous. On the contrary, what defines it is the variability of directions, the fundamental change of directions, such that no direction is equivalent to another, and no determination of a direction can be folded back onto or translated into another. Okay, no matter.

So, I come back: a holey space is something else again. Making holes in space is a very, very odd activity. I believe that as regards space, we have three... we have three possibilities, three basic possibilities -- and... if you yourself look, on the level of... [*Deleuze does not finish this thought*] you can tell yourself, if you are a nomad, a sedentary, or a metallurgist, then ... nothing but to own your tastes, right, this is all so ... I mean, there is, there is no need to even ask yourself: is this natural, is this artifice? Because ... it's both, obviously, like everything, it's both. There is no division here. And I tell myself: there are three ways of being in space, of being in space: there is a way in which really... well... we occupy the space without counting it. I mean: we consider ourselves as being multiple, and we occupy a space in a whirlwind fashion; I mean, the body, a body, considered as multiplicity, occupies a space in a whirlwind fashion without counting it. This is the formula for smooth space. So, who does this? Well, it can be a gust of wind, it can be a tribe, for me, it's completely ... it can be animals: the question "who?" does not even arise, you understand, and [nor] how it occupies [space] in this whirlwind manner, by artifice or by nature. These questions have no interest. There we are.

A space is striated, so what is it a striated space? You can, from there, it seems to me... -- or else you change, you invent; if you find me a fourth, a fifth, a tenth kind of space, nothing could give me greater pleasure! Right? It saddens me to have these things in threes ... but you have to find more of them at all costs; there is no reason that there should be three. -- Fine, how do you recognize a striated space? This time, it's in the fact that it relates to a body considered as one, which occupies the space by counting it, following linear directions, that is, by going from one point to another. It's in this way that last year, I was saying a migrant is not a nomad. A migrant in its pure concept is someone who goes from one point to another, even if he does not know where he is going to stop. A nomad isn't that, really. A nomad is someone who seizes hold of a non-punctual space. It's not someone who goes from one point to another. [*Pause*] So, it's really... I am not at all saying, and here, you get that I really mean this from the heart: I don't think that there is... that there is one type of space that is better than the other, but you will be a creature of striated spaces if you inhabit space... if you inhabit space this way! And if you ... if you yourselves, you inhabit space in this way, if you inhabit as a one body, which goes from one point to another, even if you do not stop moving, you will not say: I am a nomad. You will say: I am a sedentary person. That's just as good, right, that's just as good, but you won't have the right to say ... even if you move all the time!

On the contrary, a guy who does not move can say: I am a nomad. There are situated nomads (*nomades sur place*). It is enough dwell as situated -- involuntarily, not just to enjoy oneself -- but to inhabit things rather like this: one is not a single body, but the body is a multiplicity and which, even situated, occupies its space therefore like a multiplicity of elements animated by a whirlwind movement. This is no better than the sedentary conception; it's something else. I am saying: at that moment, you are... [*Deleuze does not finish this sentence*]

Well then, furthermore, I recall, while I'm at it, I recall the ... the ... the text that seemed so wonderful to me, last year, the text by Toynbee concerning nomads who says -- it's the only very, very intelligent page that I have ever read on nomads -- and he says: but you know, nomads are not at all people who move, they are people who do not move.⁶ These are people who do not move, that is, whereas all the other peoples get out of the desert, well, the desert grows -- just bring to mind: oh, Nietzsche, the desert grows! --,⁷ well, when the desert grows, that is, grows at once into the forest ... into the forest and onto the cultivated lands, like a kind of corner which develops there, when the desert grows, the peoples flee, except those known as nomads; they're the ones who don't want to leave. And so, the only way not to leave is to become a nomad, to hold onto the steppe, to hold onto the desert, with the variability of directions, well, all that.

So, I come back once again -- because I seem to dragging this out, avoiding the question that you asked -- I am saying, if ... if you live a little, in that way, your relations with space, then you can really be ... born in the city, I don't know... not to have any nomadic ancestry whatsoever, all that, and you can be a nomad. Obviously, there are city nomads! Obviously, it's ... and then there are sedentary people ... fine, there's whatever you want. So, I ask: even without touching a piece of metal, how will you recognize that you are a metallurgist? Well, it's not difficult, right: it's the space of holes. Create holes, create holes in space. So, if it is even to find something other than metallurgy, you can tell yourself, even if you do it to find something other than metallurgy, it is that you are in a relation with something metallurgical. Okay, well, so... I mean: where my heart is greatly saddened is when, for example, we think of... of certain psychoanalytic interpretations of the activity of creating holes, in which the link is not particularly clear with really what is the most important aspect, namely the constitution of a space.

And what is this? Creating holes isn't just about creating a vacuum, ok! It's finding something that exists in the holes. The holes are not a lack, they are not an absence. A "hole" is what we call a certain kind of receptacle. [This is] why there is such a fascinating term in the metallurgical vocabulary of all languages. In French, it is "gîte" [*mineral deposit, ore*]. *Gîte*. *Gîte*: that's what's in the hole.⁸ So, a holey space is not a space where something is missing; it is a space such that discovering what is in the holes is made possible. And what is in the holes, what is it? It's metal first and foremost, or maybe it's other things, but this something else, if it is experienced as what is in the holes, it will have some relation or another to metal. So ... fine, ... I'm leaping onto whatever ... metallic music, what is it? What is the metallic in its relationship with music? It's more important than looking for what relationship there is between the blacksmith and the musician on the level of myths! Because the relationship between the blacksmith and the musician, Gypsy music ... in my opinion, we can only understand something in this if we proceed through certain hypotheses about metallurgical space.

And, and, and I am saying: how do metallurgical peoples live? Here, it's very ... With the same basic things, I would like to say: the dwelling, the sedentary dwelling, what is it? The sedentary dwelling, well, it's well known, in whatever form -- there is the forest dwelling, maybe even sedentary, semi-sedentary, there is the forest dwelling ... fine. There is also the dwelling, well... oh well, I... I tell myself, to complicate things -- but, furthermore, metallurgists will have all kinds of common groups (*franges*), not only with the imperial sedentary peoples, not only with the nomads, but also with forest peoples. And why? For some very simple reasons which are the relations between metal and wood; to make things melt, you need charcoal. The site of the

metallurgical enterprise is at the border of forests, the border of woods because they have to have some, some wood, and as a result, at the level of the dwelling itself, we will find ... neither forest forms nor metallurgical forms.

So, what do I call ... -- well, here I'm just talking ... the sedentary dwelling, it's up to you ... it goes from the palace to the house, okay ... --: what is the perfect metallurgical dwelling? The quintessential metallurgical dwelling is the hole. The metallurgist and metallurgical people -- in my opinion, I believe, and I believe this needs to be confirmed -- are the great cave people (*trogloodytes*), and I believe that cave dwelling has been fundamental in the history of mankind. What is this? And currently, for example, [they are] peoples as metallurgical as those from which present-day Turkey descends. Turkey is still riddled with these ... these kinds of cave towns. You have to be particularly sensitive and even moved, but politically moved, by the kind of reactivation that occurs, where for example -- but I do not have enough information at all on that --: you know that Turkey currently is not only one of the most... one of the countries most in crisis and... who will... who will take in... in... in our current history, who will take over from... it will be the next country in which something fundamental is going to happen, I assume. Well, today's Turkey has -- like many other countries, by the way -- huge slums, right? Now in Turkey in particular, -- but I do not believe that this is the only case, I believe that there are cases also in South America, I believe -- in Turkey, there are huge cave dwelling slums, the cave dwelling of the Gypsies.

So, I am pointing out in order to return to... the precise question that... One of the greatest specialists on Gypsies,... and who was a professor at the Collège de France, is called [Jules] Bloch, b-l-o-c-h, and he wrote -- I am specifying all of this because... you all know the small collection *Que sais-je?* ... which obviously is very, very uneven, but every now and then, there is a masterpiece, a masterpiece in this collection -- and this isn't complicated: it's Bloch... who, I believe, is one of... really one of the most profound men on Gypsies and metallurgical peoples and who... wrote the little *Que sais-je?* edition on the Gypsies.⁹ And he insists a lot on... he says from the start -- in my memory: I did not reread the text, but I believe that this is true, that my memory must not be false -- it seems to me that he says a lot from the start: there are sedentary Gypsies, there are nomadic Gypsies, and in the end, this distinction is not absolutely relevant, applied to Gypsies.

That interests me a lot, you know, because it's as if... -- but he's the one who knows -- I could say: oh yeah, he proves me right. The distinction is irrelevant, it means: okay, there are... sedentary Gypsies; there are nomadic Gypsies. Why is it irrelevant, according to him? Because what matters are the meetings of the sedentary and the nomadic; it is the system of communication between each other: the great annual meetings, etc. And why? Because ultimately there is something deeper for them: they are sedentary or nomadic only secondarily, only secondarily; what they are first and foremost are cave dwellers (*trogloodytes*). So, you will tell me: yes, but, ultimately, I can very well live in a sedentary house as if it were a hole, that is, as if it were a shelter (*gîte*). I can ... what does that mean: living in a house as if it were a hole?

So, I come back to my tale about forest-dwelling metallurgists: the huts of forest-dwelling metallurgists are very fascinating; me, that's where I would like to live; I ... I would like to be a forest-dwelling metallurgist. First, it's better because ... it's less ... less specialized, [*Laughter*] ...

you understand? He has a hut, so there he is really a woodsman: the hut is the woodsman's thing, and it's a hut buried within the earth. So, with all the... all the... intermediaries, sometimes buried... into the earth one-third, two-thirds, or even up to the roof, you will ask me: and the ventilation? Is the ventilation guaranteed? Yes, yes, yes, there are chimneys, there are hole chimneys. So, these huts are very odd ... me, that's what I would like, right, that's ... that's where I would like to live.

So, ask yourself ... If you want to know your way of ... being with space, you have to ask yourself things like that, see, what is it? We could do a test ... then you can create a ... a palace: at that point, you're on the despot's side, but that's not bad, everything is there. [Laughter] If you create yourself a kind of hole there, then think... I don't know if I referred to it last year... well, there's a great movie [by] Eisenstein, *Strike*. In *Strike*, you have the splendid images of a holey space. Basically, that is, for those who remember, this image is a very beautiful, very beautiful space, made entirely of holes, and in each hole, there is a disturbing creature there, who is planted, which emerges halfway ... the variety, there, of the positions of guys emerging from their holes, there, who are there like a kind of people who emerge, there ... so, a rather disturbing people, ... everything, all the themes are there... who emerges from the hole? The metallurgist, the beggar, ... that which is disturbing.¹⁰

So, I just want to end on ... Given all that, we ask: you understand, mythology is always a disaster, and even ethnography in some respects is a disaster, because everyone notices that ... the blacksmith always posed enormous problems, and myths show a kind of ambivalence regarding the blacksmith. We are told all the time: the blacksmith is both hated and respected, revered or sometimes hated, sometimes revered, or a little of both constantly, etc. We feel that this is not the way to pose problems. First, what blacksmith? The blacksmith, by nature, is double, he is a twin. When [Marcel] Griaule studies the status of the blacksmith among the Dogons, he shows that very well.¹¹ If the blacksmith, for example, is ... feared, it is not at all because he is impure, as some ethnologists try to explain. It's because -- it's for a completely different reason -- it's because he's double, so because he can marry himself, because he's incestuous, because he's twin-like.

And why is he a twin? He necessarily has two heads: he has a head on the side of the nomads, and a head on the side of the sedentary peoples, and it goes without saying that there is complicity between the two heads, that there are arrangements between the nomads' blacksmiths and the sedentary peoples' blacksmiths, otherwise we no longer understand anything about the arms trade in the ancient world. How do the nomads come to have the Chinese sword... the Chinese sword? So, the legendary story tells us: ah, it's because there was a Chinese deserter who went over to the Mongol side ... No, that's not possible. It is not possible. It's like the atomic bomb, you understand: to use the steel saber, and to remake, reproduce steel sabers, it is not enough to... to... leak the secret; you need an entire ... an entire infrastructure, you need blacksmiths, you need a metallurgy. So, good. So, the blacksmith is fundamentally twofold since he has a shelter (*un gîte*) with nomads, a shelter with sedentary peoples. But what makes it possible to say "the blacksmith" then, if he is double? The answer is quite simple: it is because he is secondarily double; his specificity as a blacksmith -- wherever he is, among nomads or among sedentary people -- is to create holes and inhabit a holey space, and unroll, invent, a holey space. There you go, yes, so did I answer the question?

A student: Yes, yes.

Various voices: [*Inaudible; a question about the reference to Toynbee*]

Deleuze: Toynbee... it's... it's his great book on history, right, so... there are two kinds: there is a book in ten... there is a ten-volume version, it is even better, but not translated, right! Not translated, and there is his big summary that he did himself, which is translated with the title *L'histoire*, by Gallimard.¹² What were you saying?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The architecture of?

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes? Yes, yes, yes... Yes, yes, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes. Yes, Yes, Yes. Yes. Yes.

A student: I can only make approximations, but ...

Deleuze: We're all there, right? ... [*Laughter*]

Another student: It seems to me that someone who deals with space [*Inaudible*], very dissimilar spaces, and [*Inaudible*] together is Kafka, anyway! [*Inaudible*] The burrow... [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The holey space is Kafka, yes. Yes, Yes, Yes. And here I am asking myself: are there any Gypsies in Kafka?

The student: The singer [*Inaudible*] is a splendid text! [*Inaudible*] the singer is a mouse. I assure you that is fantastic.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah. Are there any forms of holey space with Kafka? I do not know...

The student: I think there are!

Deleuze: And also, we should think about painters, how painters proceed: are there spaces with holes in painting? I think there's all of that, fine. Anyway, think about it, there you go, good.

So, tell me, we still have to ... anyway, today we are finishing politics and the State; wherever we end up, we'll take it as finished. So, I am just adding ... good. I would like to know, in the third quarter, there's going to be the Easter holidays; there, in the third quarter ... do you have any requests?

A woman student (*sitting very close to Deleuze*): Yes.

Deleuze: Otherwise, I'll decide... Yes? What?

The student near Deleuze: I would like ... if you wanted to talk about abstraction in [Henri] Maldiney?

A student: Ah that guy!

The student near Deleuze: And then also... well, I don't know if it's really interesting, but also on... fuzzy set theory... in mathematics.

Deleuze: Oh yes! Ah that, that yes, then, that yes. ... In fact, there, you are going in a direction that it is very possible for us to do, that you are proposing to me, insofar as I can, to the extent of my skills, that you are proposing to me a certain number of topics which interest some of you and which I deal with, either a topic in two sessions or in one session. We can do that. So... you, you said: yes, uh... a theory of so-called fuzzy sets... Yes, well, it's possible, ... the theme of abstraction in painting and according to a contemporary author, Henri Maldiney¹³ ...

The student near Deleuze: I would especially like that.

Deleuze: Yes, we can. Are there other things? Because I have to think about it during Easter. And Leibniz ...

The student near Deleuze: No! Not Leibniz, please!

Deleuze: Yes, I would rather like to do that... that would almost allow us to develop two, three sessions which would be... a pure introduction to a possible reading of Leibniz. It doesn't matter, for those who don't care, they wouldn't come!

A student: Well, everything is interesting.

Deleuze: For those who are interested, then I say: yes, there you go. We're going to do that, then. I am confiding in you for the third trimester, and at the beginning, I will do ... I will do two or three sessions on Leibniz.¹⁴

The student: I like that.

Deleuze: So, those who might be attending these sessions, when we return from break, I ask them -- if they can, right, it's not absolutely essential, but all the same, it would be better -- by Leibniz, you know, he's both an author who writes brilliant texts, but also a multitude of small

texts, small texts. He multiplies the small texts. Much of Leibniz's work is even letters, or even little pamphlets (*opuscules*), as they say. Now, among these little pamphlets, among the easiest to find, I refer to three, it would suffice for you to try to get through one of the three: *On the Radical Origin of Things* -- these little pamphlets, the smaller they are, the more he gives them admirable titles -- one is called *On the Radical Origin of Things*; another is called, it must be... I don't know, twenty pages! ...

Student: Isn't it in [*Inaudible*] that was published in [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Oh sure, yes. Yes, yes, yes. ... The other is called *Monadology*, treatise on *Monadology* ...

The student near Deleuze: But this one is long.

Deleuze: No, it's ... forty pages ...

The student near Deleuze: Oh good! I must be confusing [something] ...

Deleuze: And another is the *Principles of Philosophy*, uh... *Princ...*, sorry: *Principles of Metaphysics, Principles of Metaphysics*.¹⁵ So, it's not about ... I'm not telling you at all that you have to read all three, right! I'm not telling you anything; I appeal to your professional conscience: it is better to read one. On the other hand, these are so beautiful ... So, it doesn't matter that you don't understand, right! [*Laughter*] I really care about... No, no, no... it's.... The question, I assure you, regarding philosophy texts, the question is not at all: do you understand? Because the question is above all: what appeals to you in the texts? You may very well feel that something appeals to you without yet understanding it. And you'll only understand if you have first grasped something that appeals to you. In that way, he has ... he's like a painter: he has his style, Leibniz ... if the style appeals to you, it's ... it's because this is something for you to get involved in. Fine. So, the little yellow [administrative] sheets for UV [course credit], you will take them at the end, and then you will give them back to me ... after ... when we come back from break, for those who want to take the seminar.

So, I'll finish very quickly, because we've had enough of this, all of this, we've had plenty, I apologize, this whole politics and the State thing. ... Ah yes! I was asked to do something on *The Idiot*!

A student: Oh yes!

Deleuze: On the subject of the idiot, which indeed is a very, very important theme in ...

The student: The idiot, generally!

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes.

The student near Deleuze: No, not at all.

Deleuze: What is an idiot? Yes.

The student: That's wonderful.

Deleuze: And why did the Russians take that, gave... to the character of the idiot this dimension, whereas it comes from Christianity, this character?

A student: [*Inaudible*; he suggests that another professor had considered this topic recently]

Deleuze: Did he do that? Ah no, then, ah no, ah no. Ah well, I did not know that. Ah well, too bad, a subject... Well, if there is already some students who spent a whole semester on *The Idiot*, ... I mean, the subjects are so numerous in the world: there's no point in taking them up... No, it's not that I would say the same thing, but it's that, it's that... well... no? So, ok.

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: And you, did you take the seminar? [*The student indicates that he attended the seminar; laughter*] Well, well, you'll discuss it! You'll discuss it! We would create a mix (*mélange*)? Right? The idiot.... So then, we'll see.

There we are. So, I am pointing out, to follow up on this "politics and State" topic, at the point we have reached, that... there is material for... in yesterday's issue of *Libération*, there is a very interesting text, at least for us, on the point that we've reached, which is precisely, when I was talking about the development of forms of temporary work, subcontracting, precarious work, in the central countries, there is a long text that I find very good ... on the organization of subcontracting and temporary work in the Dassault companies, right, so I think that ... this corresponds, this goes so well with what we were trying to analyze, that ... Those who have... who have read it, read it again or... and indeed, it's quite curious, because... no, I don't have time to go back over that.

A student: But in Hegel, he created a philosophy of law, a philosophy of history, but he did not create political philosophy; there is no politics in Hegel! On politics ... politics ... would you like, have you seen the term "politics" in Hegel once?

Deleuze: Have I seen the term "politics" in Hegel once?

The student: Do you see the legal [*Inaudible*]? You see the history, you don't see the problem? The political position?

Deleuze: No, indeed, that's not a Hegelian notion, no ...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: ... maybe not, I don't know. Isn't there a Hegelian here?

A student near Deleuze: Who's is it that ...?

Deleuze: Well then? So, you remember that in this “politics-State” topic, ... we were just trying to indicate some headings, right, to come to an end of this. And we saw a first heading "addition-subtraction of axioms", a second heading, "the saturation of an axiomatic", or, more precisely, the very particular nature, the paradoxical nature of the limit, when the limit is an immanent limit, that is, a limit not encountered from the outside but produced by the system. [*Pause*]

Third heading, we have seen: "the question of models of realization in an axiomatics", namely the models of realization, in a global axiomatic of capital, being the States themselves, hence the question in this third heading: in what sense can we say that these States, that the various forms of State, are isomorphic or not with respect to the axiomatic, with henceforth all kinds of bipolarity: bipolarity between the central States, second bipolarity between capitalist States and socialist-bureaucratic States, third bipolarity between States in the center [and] States of the periphery? Okay, that's where we were.

I say very quickly: fourth heading. This time, in relation to an axiomatic, this would be the question of power (*puissance*). And where does this question of power come from? Well... it's very different from the others -- that's why these are headings, but once again, you have to add, you can add, you can mix... -- I am saying: it's a different heading because what I would like to group under the title "the power heading" is ultimately the relationship of this axiomatic of capital to an actual war machine. And why is this the question of power? This is because, at the level of any axiomatics, we are told that the axiomatic is in relation to a certain power which goes beyond it, as if [the axiomatic] itself exuded, as if an axiomatic was fundamentally engaged with a power which nevertheless exceeds it.

Why would an axiomatic have to be fundamentally engaged with a power that emerges from it and yet exceeds it? The theoretical answer, the abstract answer, is relatively simple: it is that every axiomatic necessarily has models of realization in what are called denumerable sets, whether these sets are finite or infinite, that is, sets whose elements are denumerable.¹⁶ [*Pause*]

And there are powers that refer to ... non-denumerable sets, for example -- the simplest example -- for example, in mathematics, it is the power of the continuous. I would say, for example, that the series of integers is an infinite set, or the series of even integers is an infinite set as well, but it is infinite denumerable sets, so denumerable that you can even say that the series of integers is double the series of even integers. The power of the continuous, namely the power that refers to all the points on a line, it [the line] is not denumerable. Okay, let's suppose like ... -- that's the subject of theorems in axiomatic in mathematics -- let's suppose that a certain power of the continuous escapes axiomatic treatment, and yet, in a certain way, the confrontation of the axiomatic with this power, however inevitable, founded in the axiomatic itself: this is what I am calling the topic of power.

And I am saying a very simple thing: this is somewhat, if you will, the relationship of capitalism with its own war machine. It seems to me, under current conditions, not at all times. Everything happens as if the modern war machine -- well, all these are hypotheses, well, it is not so much ... [*He does not finish the sentence*] It seems to me... the more we proceed, the more it's really time to stop --, ... everything is happening as if the modern war machine, that is, let's say, since World War II, since the Second World War -- but there were principles before, there were

premises before -- everything happens as if it had somehow become autonomized, but in a very special way, that is, as if [the war machine] was witnessing a power of the axiomatic which nevertheless went beyond the axiomatic itself. What does that mean?

You still remember those Clausewitz concepts that I tried to propose because they seem very, to me very enlightening for understanding anything at all about the problem of war.¹⁷ This is because, just like capital -- since we saw this the last time -- just like capital, and this is undoubtedly the deepest link between war and capital, just like capital, war has an aim and an objective, and that the two are not the same thing. [Pause] And that the aim of war is the political aim pursued by the warring State or States, while the objective is the immanent objective of war, which Clausewitz defines as overthrowing or annihilating the adversary. I'm saying that, for a long time, we could almost define pre-capitalist wars like this: by saying that in pre-capitalist wars, the aim and the objective receive a kind of ... agreement, a variable and fairly well-determined agreement, namely: war continues its... -- war as war -- pursues its objective: to overthrow the adversary, under the condition of an aim, namely: to overthrow the adversary in order to obtain such and such a thing, for example, to conquer a province, to gain an economic market -- there are already trade wars (*guerres commerciales*) --, etc., etc. And to overthrow the adversary, that can mean all kinds of things, it depends on what way one identifies the adversary according to the aim: sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be to destroy the enemy army, sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be... [Interruption of the recording] [46: 24]

Part 2

... it works like this. The first sign of ... At that moment, the war machine is indeed caught up in the State apparatus: in fact, the objective which refers to the war machine is subordinated to the political aim which refers to the political aim of the State that makes war.

What occurred when the war tended to become total? I believe that one can, in fact, assign a tendency to total war from the moment when capitalism seizes the war machine and gives it development, material development, fundamental material development since it is even in this way that nomads -- who until then were the autonomous war machine --, it is through this that nomads will be dispossessed and will perish.

Well, what happens is that when the war tends to become total, at the same time the objective and the aim, it seems to me, tend to enter into a kind of contradictory relation. There is a tension between objective and aim. Why? This can already be seen with Napoleon: the main elements of ... the first great establishment of a total war is obviously the Napoleonic wars; everyone says it; it's ... it's a triviality. It won't get resolved: the second big step in total war is the 1914-18 war. The third great stage of total war is fascism. And what is there ... what is there ... in common with these three stages? It is ultimately, I believe, the declaration of a kind of tension, of contradiction between the political aim and the objective ... and the warlike objective. Why? Because as the war becomes total, the objective -- to use Clausewitz's term: overthrowing of the adversary -- knows no bounds. The adversary can no longer be identified with the fortress to be taken, with the enemy army to be defeated; it is the whole people and the whole habitat. It is the entire enemy people, at the same time as, from the perspective of the country which ... of the

other country that is pursuing the war, that is waging war, it is the entire [enemy] people who are invited. So, the objective -- to overthrow the adversary -- becomes such that the adversary can no longer be identified, assimilated to something definite, but becomes the totality of the enemy people, the totality of the enemy habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited, and that's total war.

You see, that's why the misinterpretations that are sometimes made about Clausewitz are based on a very specific point: when Clausewitz defined the objective of the war as annihilating the adversary, some, too hastily, say: ah well, Clausewitz is the creator of the concept of total war. Not at all: annihilating the... the adversary is what Clausewitz calls not "total war", but "absolute war", and [the] Clausewitzian absolute war has nothing to do with total war, since Clausewitzian absolute war -- namely, the objective: to overthrow or annihilate the adversary -- receives a variable figure according to what the adversary is identified with. To overthrow the adversary can once again be taking a fortress, and then that's it. But war becomes total when the overthrow or annihilation bears on the entire enemy people and the entire habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited; why? It's never ending.

And I recall the texts which seem to me the best,... analysis of... this... of fascism -- but in a way, it was already obvious for Napoleon -- when, for example,... Hannah Arendt does not stop saying that in her book on totalitarianism... -- so it doesn't matter that, for her, she identifies totalitarianism and fascism -- but what she says, in my opinion, only applies to fascism, and not to everything for totalitarianism.¹⁸ It is obvious that fascism can only be defined like this: not by a State apparatus -- the State apparatus, she shows this very well, in the analysis of fascist institutions, is a kind of facade, it's a kind of facade, it's an office (*bureau*) behind which there is always another office --. What fundamentally defines fascism is the initiation of a movement that has no other end (*fin*) than the movement, that is, the unlimited objective. A movement which has no other end than movement, therefore, which has no other end than its own acceleration, is precisely the movement of absolute destruction. So that is very, very important in Hannah Arendt's book.

The student near Deleuze: [*Inaudible; question on the reference to Arendt*]

Deleuze: It was translated into French under the title, I believe *Totalitarisme*, at the Seuil. And that fits very well with [Paul] Virilio's analyzes of the fascist State.¹⁹ It also overlaps with texts from ... Hitler's lieutenants, or Hitler himself, when they invoke a movement with no destination or purpose. The movement without destination or purpose is the movement of pure destruction, that is, it is the movement of total war.

So, I'm just saying: at that moment, you understand, there is a sort of autonomization of the war machine in relation to the State apparatus, and it's true that fascism is not a State apparatus. Moreover, I would say, to complicate matters, all that goes too much without saying: it is not enough for the military to take power somewhere for a war machine to become autonomous. In totalitarian regimes, strictly speaking, it is often the military who have the power: it is not at all a "war machine" regime! Not at all, on the contrary: it is a totalitarian regime in the sense that there is one of them that says: the minimum State.²⁰

But the fascist State is quite another thing! The fascist State is -- and precisely, it is not by chance that the fascists were not soldiers --. A General Staff, when it takes power, it can create a totalitarian regime; a fascist regime, [that's] much less certain. A fascist regime is ... it's ... it's such a ... twisted idea ... it's not even the military, that. The German General Staff was ... in the end, it was ... it would have liked to have been in power, but Hitler got there ahead of them. So, there could have been all the arrangements that one wanted, one cannot say that fascism is an emanation of the German General Staff. It is the emanation of ... something quite, quite different.

And this is where we see a war machine that becomes autonomous in relation to the State, hence once again Virilio's very good idea: the fascist state is a suicidal state. Of course, it is about killing others, but one will consider one's own death -- and this is the truly fascist theme of living death -- one will regard one's own death as the crowning death of others. You find that ... in fact, it's, that is ... you find it in all fascisms. Totalitarianism is not that at all, right? It's a lot more... how would I say, it's a lot more "petit bourgeois", totalitarianism; it's a lot more conservative! Well, little matter, we've already seen all that.

I am saying: that, all that, is rather a way to answer a question which, in a certain way, with hindsight of the years, seems less and less obvious to us: why the hell did the United States prefer to ally itself with Stalin's Russia, with the Stalinist USSR, rather than coming to an understanding with Hitler? We tell ourselves: after all, well, once it's done, we tell ourselves: fine ... this is not so obvious; at the beginning, it was not so obvious, even at the level of the allies, at the level of England and France, right! Everyone knows how there was an interesting political pattern, namely: they attacked... they attacked... fascist Germany [unleashed] itself... on Russia! That was interesting, ... well, it might have happened!

To the question "in the end, why did the tendency toward an alliance with the Stalinist regime rather than with the Hitler regime win out?" I think the answer is relatively simple: it is that the allies must have had, I suppose, the impression rather quickly that in the fascist regime, there was the autonomization of a war machine which finally, at the extreme, was uncontrollable by capital -- I am assuming, right? This is a hypothesis, like that, ... a very abstract hypothesis, perhaps an idiotic hypothesis, fine --, and that finally, the Stalinist regime or the bureaucratic socialist regime was able to give capital much greater security and guarantees. If you will, it's awful to... to say, it seems to me, but... what is awful to say is that in the fascist movements, there is a mass characteristic of which the countries capitalists must have been very wary, a sort of mass movement, a movement appealing to a kind of ... of ... "we'll get you, we'll destroy the world, and then we'll kill ourselves afterwards." There is something, there is a kind of machine there, of movement ... of movement for movement.

And one of the strongest points in Hannah Arendt's book is when she shows that the more the Nazis saw that they were going to lose the war -- they sense this very quickly, right? --, far from this ever being for them a motive to stop, or to moderate the movement, it is a motive to precipitate it. They can only endure, they can only postpone the outcome, namely the loss of the war, by accelerating the war; they cannot do otherwise. If this hypothesis is correct, I believe that this is the most profound reason why the allies made the alliance with the Stalinist regime and not with the regime... because, in other respects, they would have preferred much more to make the alliance with the regime... with the Nazi regime.

So there we have this very, very odd situation, right, where the objective of war, when the war becomes total, the objective of war becomes unlimited and, at that moment, comes into conflict with the political aims that a State apparatus pursued through war up to that point. How to bridge this abyss? Well, in fact, that's what's been said, and that is, that's what Virilio, it seems to me again, analyzes so well about the contemporary war machine. Where the fascists also, ... were only ... precursors, where the Nazis were only precursors, it's because they had constituted a kind of autonomy of the war machine, with a whole economic regime subordinated to this war machine, subordinated to armaments, etc.; they had done all that. But they still needed this war machine to be realized in wars. In other words, they kept something of the old approach, namely war will be the materialization of the war machine.

So, what I'm saying is very much a summary due to trying to shape (*tailler*) some notions, some concepts; I don't mean to say that today it's not like that. The war machine today, well, it's obvious, it pursues wars as well. It also needs ... it's obvious, we see that all the time. And I'm saying that nonetheless, there is something that has changed: it doesn't need this in the same way. I would say: we tend towards the following situation – in order to be careful, right? -- we tend towards the following situation in which the modern war machine no longer even needs to materialize itself or, at the extreme, no longer even needs to be materialized in real wars, for it would be the war machine itself which would be war materialized. In other words, the war machine does not even need to have wars as its object, since it discovers its object in a peace of terror. It has conquered its most extreme object, adequate to its total character, namely: peace.

Which implies what? Obviously, which implies all the catastrophic, apocalyptic visions of today. So, don't make me say that there is no more war: of course, there are still wars, but these wars have become parts of the peace itself! And what did the concept of "Cold War" mean if not that? The concept of "Cold War" meant, it seems to me, explicitly the state of a war machine which, for whatever reasons, no longer tended to be materialized -- except through ever possible accidents, we are told -- no longer tended to be materialized in a war, in a real war, but was in itself and by itself a materialized war, which already led many American authors to say for a long time, well, the Third World War, we are there; it has already started. Hence all of Virilio's remarks in this regard appear to me to be correct, when Virilio assigns and offers the following characteristics: this new war machine, which I call power (*puissance*), therefore, you see its relation with capitalism: at once how capitalism does not control it and how, at the same time, capitalism is in a fundamental relation with it, in a relation of fundamental confrontation with it; so, the characteristics indicated by Virilio, again, it is this war machine taking peace for its object and no longer war.

Henceforth, it's the whole topic of the enemy -- second trait -- it's the whole topic of the enemy that changes. The enemy becomes any enemy whatsoever (*l'ennemi quelconque*), and this is really an axiomatic notion, that of any enemy whatsoever. [*Pause*] This war machine acquires a power to capitalize, how to say this, a knowledge, and not just a knowledge: an almost unlimited scientific and technological power, [*Pause*] following which the tendency for the very distinctions between war and peace diminish, tend to disappear. Hence, finally, comes the general phenomenon of the militarization of civilian functions, particularly by assigning any object whatsoever which is anyone, anything. It could just as well be locusts on a radar screen, as ... as three Indians in a row, as ... as ... a rocket, as ... all of that. There, there is an odd cave

dweller's thing; so, I tell myself: in modern profession, yes, right! Atomic submarines ... what it is about these guys living there ... living in ... sheltering in the submarine, right? And what ... how do their eyes appear, right? Or they look at the radars where they see it as some kind of cloud to be interpreted, okay. Are they... are they... crabs? Or are these some enemies approaching? Well, ultimately, it's the any enemy whatsoever. Fine, there you go.

See, there you have it, all that ... I will try to group under this fifth heading, and in fact, how is this war machine the equivalent of some kind of power of the continuous? It is that at the level of this war machine -- and here I am thinking of ... once again, of texts by Paul Virilio which explain this, which develop this very, very well -- it is that all the points of space, however distant they may be, are put into contact, "are put into contact", that is, all the points of space exist in a topological neighborhood: however distant they may be physically and geometrically, they are in a topological neighborhood. This is called the age of nuclear war.

And it is obvious that, if nuclear war is presented to us as a kind of limit of... of... of... apocalypse, etc., it is almost in the sense... It would be necessary to compare, if you will, my heading 4, here, "Power", and heading 2, "saturation" since, there, the apocalypse of nuclear war is exactly the limit. This corresponds entirely with the limit of our other register, register 2, regarding saturation. This is an immanent limit: if it takes on the apocalyptic aspect, it is because, in another way, not quite at the limit, it is exercised as such already! It is exercised entirely as such: it does not stop pushing its limit, but at the same time, it is this [limit] which draws the new map of the world which, in fact, is a map that is no longer a geographical map, but a topological map, with the most distant points in contact. Good, there we are. So, that works, that works very well... Phew, what time is it? Right, I might have to stop before ...

A student: A quarter to...

Deleuze: What?

Various voices: A quarter to twelve.

Deleuze: What, before noon, what?

Various voices: A quarter to twelve.

Deleuze: Oh, no! So... good, good. So, at this point, it looks like everything is going for the worst. We tell ourselves: no matter how much we look at our registers, if you are ... our articles. Article 1: well, this is not great; if one has the choice between totalitarianism and social democracy, this offers no joy. Article 2, saturation, that kind of sneaky limit which recedes as one approaches it, and which is secreted by the system, it is ... it is not a delight, it is not ... Isomorphy as models of realization of the same axiomatic, this is hopeless, all that! Power, the power of a war machine of this type, which no longer even needs war because it is, it is itself material war, materialized war! This is... this is even sadder, right! So, that's why I had planned for the possibility that we all head to bed there... [Laughter] because if... if the time were...!

But now, what's left, of course, is much harder: the articles that might bring us hope! ... Well, you see, this is ... I almost have the impression, here, I dare not tell you, because it is up to you to fabricate your hopes! So, I'm just trying to... to say... well, here it is, I'll say it: you understand, once again, all that we tried to do here had a very, very modest rule: it's not because we... we are trying... I don't believe, in any case, myself, I'm not good at... it's not because we are trying to think globally that we aren't more pretentious than... than [thinking] locally. It's obvious that the political problems today, well, they're global, right? It is not harder to think globally than at the level of one's village, because, once again,... this is... this is one of the points -- here we must pay tribute to Régis Debray on this point, because that I believe that he is one of the few to point this out with obstinacy --:²¹ that really means nothing to... to speak about Europe today if one does not take into account, well, ... economies subject to everything that European regimes assume as third world enslavement, enslavement, etc., and... and all the problems that... whatever they are, education problems in France, well, refer to global determinations. This is too obvious. So, thinking globally isn't even a special effort, right?

So, I am saying: I am proposing a fifth article, like that, a fifth article -- always in my concern to insist on this parallelism axiomatic, or this "axiomatic-capitalism" co-presence -- I would say, well, everyone knows -- you remember, we saw it when we were interested in what an axiomatic is in science, precisely in order to be able to arrive at this graph -- I had insisted on this, it's that: an axiomatic is not only confronted with a higher power, of the type "power of the continuous" type -- that we have just seen --, but it is also confronted with very particular types of propositions that axiomaticians have called -- constrained and forced -- "undecidable propositions".²² So that's it: it's the first ... the first little bit of hope, for me, is that the capitalist axiomatic, or capitalism as axiomatic, does not cease generating undecidable propositions. And we will see what undecidable propositions are: these are not at all propositions faced with which we are left, like that, telling ourselves: oh well, what are we going to do? These are propositions which are the direct object of all companies -- I am not saying the certain triumph -- but which are the direct object of all companies and all revolutionary positions.

In fact, what is it, then, in this miserable parallel, what is an undecidable proposition in an axiomatic? Suppose that, in any axiom whatsoever, you collide -- for reasons ... it doesn't matter, I tried to state them very briefly, I will not come back to this -- you collide with propositions which you cannot demonstrate whether they are true or false, propositions which concern this domain, and you cannot prove that they are true or false. They belong to the domain of indemonstrability, very annoying, because these propositions are not axioms, and they are not theorems either, since a theorem is basically a proposition which you prove to be true or false by dint of the axioms of the corresponding axiomatic, and as a function of those axioms. There, as a function of the axioms of the corresponding axiomatic, you cannot do so: the proposition is undecidable.

And to be true or false, this seems a requirement of all knowledge or any understanding well known under the name of: the ... excluded third, namely a proposition is true or not-true, or between the true and the non-true, there is no third. I would say that an undecidable proposition is the subject of an included third; as a result, I can call my fifth heading, or my fifth article, I can call it, here, in relation to the axiomatic of capital: "the included third, or undecidable propositions." Well, what would that be? And I am saying that, once again, undecidable

propositions are only very relatively undecidable since they are the object, or they constitute the material of any enterprise, therefore, of any revolutionary decision. It is precisely the fact that they are undecidable in relation to the axiomatic that makes them belong to an entirely different system than the axiomatic, and that they are subject to an entirely different process than those of the axiomatic of capital.

So, the axiomatic of capital can always be able to attempt to deal with it; I mean, it can always try to constitute the axioms that refer to these propositions, yes. Or else, another way in which it could deal with them -- and that would perhaps explain this somewhat obscure story of power that we just saw earlier -- is extermination, [*Pause*] applying to them the power of destruction which makes their object no longer exist. But here we see, for one reason or another, the two methods by which axioms could recover these undecidable propositions or included thirds do not work. Why doesn't this work? Because axioms may be added, there is a certain type of proposition into which axioms do not take hold (*ne mordent pas dessus*). That's how it is. We will see; I have not yet tried to say what these propositions were.

Or else, the other case ... the other case ... the other case: we could apply to them the destructive power in a pure state, that is, the war machine, wham! All that ... like that, we no longer discuss it. Well then, no, no, no. No, why? Because even the fundamental phenomenon of modern axiomatics, namely the existence of camps, never provided a definitive solution from the axiomatic point of view. I mean, the camps multiply the people locked up there rather than suppress them. Just as organized hunger, organized famine, multiplies the hungry more than it kills people, it does both: it kills people and, at the same time, it multiplies them surprisingly. To me, the camps seem to be... something evident: far from bringing what we called a "radical solution" to one problem or another, namely: no more Jews, no more homosexuals, etc., oddly enough, that causes the victims to swarm forth.

A student: What if the whole world becomes one camp?

Deleuze: If the whole world becomes a single camp? This is ... this is the answer of power, yes; what is happening? Yes. Is it possible? Yes, it is possible, yes. I tell myself: what makes us think that this would be a false conception that would be required, if you will, to be able to say: well, it's very simple, after all... they would only have to make the whole world into a single camp; that would only be possible if we did not take into account this very particular nature of the limit. The whole world as a one and single camp, that would indeed be the limit. In fact, at that point, there wouldn't be so many problems, right. But it turns out that the whole mechanism of the limit, from the point of view of this axiomatic of capital that we have just seen, is a limit that does not cease to be produced in order to be, at the same time, perpetually pushed back. It is by virtue, it seems to me -- here, I would answer this question that ... whose meaning I understand well: it is an almost entirely logical question -- ... I would answer yes, that would only be possible if the limit did not have the nature that we tried to discern earlier, and that Marx already announced as the limit of capital. But finally, we cannot exclude anything, right! At that point, there would be no more hope; at that point, we would stop ... there you go.

A student: Is there the camp center of the and the camp of the periphery? Would it be different?

Deleuze: There would still be two! [It's] not certain because they could say: there is a good chance that ... in a certain period of time, the situation of the center and the situation of the periphery become more and more relativized. It is not a question of... This is my only difference – myself, I learned everything of... regarding... regarding these problems from Samir Amin --²³ but my only difference, what I'm not convinced of in Samir Amin's thesis is that the current, the current differences of the “Third World” situation, and of the “center” situation, in the great “center-periphery” opposition as he paints a political and economic picture of it, to me, this is ... it seems to me to fade away more and more, or to be called upon to fade away. There, we will end up in a "periphery-center" system of a completely different nature; for Samir Amin, I mean, the “center-periphery” distinction still operates under strictly geographic conditions. I believe that it is called upon -- it may still be true -- but that it is called upon to lose this localized geographic determination.

So, what I mean is, if... so let's suppose... this... good... I mean: let's get to the important question anyway, then: what are these undecidable propositions, or rather, what is their impact? Well, you remember -- here, I can go fast because these are just hopes, so we don't talk about hopes --,... you remember... regarding archaic empires, we tried to identify a kind of law. We were saying: the archaic empire is an ap ... it is an over-coding apparatus, it overcodes flows. Good. And... oddly -- and there, I was criticized, in fact justifiably, but that doesn't matter... -- we had tried to identify a movement, a vector, and we were saying -- what we can understand, vaguely, in that way, I am not going to reanalyze these points -- we managed to say: yes, but be careful, when an over-encoding device -- that is, which is established above codes, above territorial codes -- when an over-coding apparatus is established, in the form of an imperial State device... [*Deleuze sniffs something in the air*] Oh, that smells like dope, right? [*Laughter*]

Claire Parnet: It smells like something's burning.

Deleuze: There, I had a sniff, eh! [*Laughter*] I had a sniff! Yes, uh... uh... yes, yes, yes.

Well ... but what was...? Yes: when an overcoding apparatus is established, yes, well, as much..., it undoubtedly overcodes the flows, that is, over the territorial codes, it adds another code which is the code... the imperial overcoding. And we were saying: but in doing so, it will trigger something absolutely new, namely as a kind of fluxion of decoded flows. It does not overcode coded flows without also causing the flowing of decoded flows that it initiates itself. And we tried to analyze it at the precise level of how private property is formed within the archaic empire.

If you remember that, I mean: it's not the same vector, and yet it looks a lot like it, the one I would like to propose now. In fact, it is no longer about archaic empires, it is about the axiomatic of capital. And I am saying all that, precisely, quite simply, I am saying: well, there would almost be an equivalent vector, namely, you remember that, we had defined the axiomatic of capital as a generalized conjugation of decoded flows -- this is very important -- especially of two great basic decoded flows, at the basis of capitalism, namely the flow of labor and the flow of wealth, two distinct flows. It was the conjugation. They were decoded in the form of abstract wealth, and labor... and independent labor. Capital was the conjugation of these decoded flows as decoded. Fine. Well, I would say now: if the axiomatic is a general conjugation of decoded

flows, the axiomatic does not operate this conjugation without causing to flow at the same time, and without inciting, and at the extreme, without itself creating, arousing, opposing to oneself, some flows which escape conjugation, that is, which cannot be axiomatized, which are not axiomatizable. *[Pause]*

What are the four great rebel flows? We have only to consider the declarations of the grand capitalists; they say it all the time, for example, [Robert] McNamara's speech to the World Bank,²⁴ all that, they come back to it all the time: the four great flows, right, which... which are really of an undecidable nature from the point of view of capitalist axioms. These are: flows of raw materials, flows of food materials, flows of population, flows of urbanization-slums. We must agree: in what sense are they not controllable? That means: by virtue of the nature of the limit, the immanent limit that capitalism creates, even if it means constantly shifting it, these flows, these flows are always at the tangent to the axiomatic of the system and of something irreducible. We cannot axiomatize them. These are basically propositions that will have to be called "undecidable propositions". *[Pause]* Why? Because it's the system of capital that produces them, it's the capital system that produces them just like hunger in Brazil, as have seen from Linhart last week, right!²⁵ It is the system that produces them but produces them as its own limit. It produces them as its own limit such that they resist axiomatization.

So, there is ... there is something really undecidable: what will that become? There is something undecidable, in what sense? It's that, at that point, capitalism can only recover them perpetually by some sort of leap. As we have seen, this is the kind of formula, this is the law "depreciation of existing capital" in relation to which these flows were not capable of being tamed, "creation of new capital" which will attempt to appropriate them, or control them. But, as soon as the new creation of capital has taken place, things are flowing again. So, these undecidable propositions, I would say, are the lines of flight of the system, and -- I'm just recalling what we've seen in other years --... which is, if you will, the... the point at which... one of the points where I would feel really uncomfortable in... in a "classic"... Marxist thought, if you will -- is that for me, once again, a system or a social field is not defined by its contradictions. You will tell me: it is almost the same, but not quite; for me, it is defined fundamentally by what flows in there, along its lines of flight. And in my opinion, lines of flight are not quite the same thing, they are not at all the same as contradictions.

And the axiomatic of capital does not operate this conjugation of flows, without at the same time giving rise to flows that never cease to escape it. So, once again, there are four levels, and it's not the recreation of capital, it's not the recreation of a new capital, which will manage the control of flows, because the recreation of capital will impress its axiomatic on a particular type of proposition which will be axiomatized, for example: the nuclear industry, fine, but through that something else will escape.

So, these lines of flight, obviously, are ... I would say, ultimately, the revolutionary expression, what would it be if we dreamed? The revolutionary expression, if you agree, there -- it's... it's just in order to establish some notions, right, some terms, ok, it's... in order to reach a kind of minimum of rigor, solely in words --, I would say: if ... if you grant me that the axiomatic is really to conjugate flows, it is the conjugation of flows, or the generalized conjunction of flows, I would say, we must distinguish the connection and conjugation, and even oppose them.

Connections must be opposed to axiomatic conjunctions. The connections are the relations – so these types of relations should be defined -- the eventual relations between undecidable flows. What would that mean, to establish relations between this flow ... which have as common ... which have in common to draw lines of flight in the system, and which can be ... flows but entirely different? It can be -- I take, then -- it can be flows of materials, it can be flows... of urbanization, it can be flows of women, it can be flows... of artistic creation, etc. What would these connections be?

This is where I come back to this topic -- to plunge myself again into mathematics, but not to mathematize anything at all -- when some mathematicians opposed to the claims of axioms something they themselves called "constructivism" or "constructionism", namely a calculation of problems, that they specified,. Because finally, we should perhaps delete the word "calculation" which is too ... planned, but finally: these undecidable flows, these undecidable propositions, these lines of flight, which are undecidable in the sense that we do not know at all how they can turn, we do not know what their revolutionary charge is. Yes, we do! Someone knows, since they are not so undecidable: those who make the decision to create a revolutionary material from it, because it is possible. These people know; they don't know if they'll win, they don't know, right. But anyway, it's not at all so undecided then, the undecidable. What is undecidable is the objective character of a certain type of event or flow in the social field. And in fact, after all, capitalist axiomatic is an axiomatic, but what it can predict is extraordinarily tiny.

And I am saying: if we grant these kinds of constant undecidable propositions in a social field, can we say that it is ... -- well yes, there would be an answer here, we ... we saw it the last time -- what would this be through which the Third World would oppose a sort of force of resistance to this global axiomatic? Yes, we saw for what reason; in fact, Samir Amin evaluates the possibilities of resistance of the Third World, precisely by virtue of the fact that, at all these levels, the flows of raw materials, the alimentary flows, the flows... including the flows of famine, the flows of urbanization-slums, constitute undecidable propositions.

But what I am insisting on once again, well, that's what I was saying earlier: it's all the more important for us, all that, that I believe in a vector in this axiomatic whereby the situation in the so-called countries of the center and the situation in the Third World countries, of course not becoming homogeneous -- that ... it is not a question of homogeneity -- but can become isomorphic, in their own way. The current tendency, if you will, we had identified a tendency specific to the situation of the Third World, and that for a long time, namely the fundamental existence of a neo-slavery type labor, by calling this labor "neo-slavery" which is perfectly ... and which belongs perfectly to capitalism, which is incited by capitalism, but which is no longer even defined, and which can no longer even be defined by the category of salaried workers. Even when there is a salary, the salary is so tiny, or the price of food is so high, that the guy can't buy anything. So, it is not even wage labor when there is an appearance of wage labor. Nor are they archaic remnants, since it is adapted to the most modern capitalism, since it occurs in the midst of the large, highly industrialized capitalist plantations; it occurs in ... oil factories -- it's like temporary work at Dassault, well, ... we can't say that these are remnants or archaisms -- they are forms absolutely adapted to the situation, to actual capitalism, to modern capitalism, this surge of underground labor, contract labor, contingency labor, which once again, was, for the first time analyzed in Europe and reported by the Italians. And why by the Italians? Because the Italians

were the first economy in a country of the center to operate on this basis, we realize, ten or twenty years later, that it is happening to us.

And... it does reach us, in fact ... and we are told that this is a crisis: we know very well that this is not a crisis. We know very well that, even if it means predicting, ... -- and I realize that but ... that ... all of this is full of hope -- even if it means predicting, we feel that we are heading towards an abolition of wage labor. And what will that mean, an abolition of wage labor? It will obviously not be the destruction of capitalism, not at all, not at all, not at all. Capital will remain as a relation of production, even if [*Pause*] it disappears or even if it takes another form as a mode of production: the relation of production will still be capital and determined by capital. The mode of production will no longer be capitalist, that is, will no longer consist of wage labor. It will consist of what must be called "neo-feudalism" or, more exactly -- because they are not the same thing: feudalism and slavery, obviously --, "neo-slavery". And it will be: underground work, temporary work, subcontracting work, which will not be especially... there will be, there could be a maintained form of "salary", but in fact, it will no longer work like that, it won't work like that anymore.

You will ask me: how will it work? Well, you may well have the coexistence of two regimes, at the level of production methods, and we could have "the appearance of a wage earner"; you give a guy a pittance, and then at the same time, on this poverty salary, you force him, for example, to spend it in ... what we call that ... in stores ... in the company stores,... fine. And, on the other hand, part of the salary too, instead of being given in money, will be given, for example, as free meals, right. On the other hand, it will not be people from the company, in the form of employees, since it is a mobile workforce -- you see, again, the article ... we talked about this last time, but ... You see the detail of the analysis, there, in what Dassault is doing now, recently, but once again, in Italy, it has already been done that way for twenty years. -- In Third World countries, you see, or see... the little, if you remember, of what... the passages I read from Linhart's book, in Italy, and in... -- shit... [*Deleuze momentarily forgets the reference*] -- in South America, for a long time, in large agricultural or fruit companies, there has been a kind of form where there is a pittance, and then ... the store, the fruit company store, for example, that... who gives things to the guys and then... when the harvest is over, well, they go back to their slums, etc. We can no longer call it the wage system; you have to call it what it is: it's a ... either a new name would need to be found, or to call it perfectly contemporary neo-slavery. In the phrase "slavery," there is something disturbing, of course; it feels like it is, once again, a remnant. It is absolutely not a remnant, it is a completely new form, but it is no longer wage labor.

And so... good: I am choosing an example of connection. If I say: ok, "students and Third World, it's the same thing", what does that mean? "Students and Third World, it's the same thing", that does not mean that it is the same thing, but even if it means finding a revolutionary isomorphy, since it seemed to us that there was an isomorphy of "State" forms in relation to the axiomatic, what defines revolutionary connections? This is because students as a category were also among the first categories to pass, to be entirely marginalized in the sense of -- and this is not over -- in the sense of: subcontracting labor, temporary labor, labor ... starting with positions in education, right, where the forms of temporary labor very, very quickly took on enormous, enormous importance. And I am just saying: when work... -- it is not at all that salaried labor

seems to me a magnificent... regime: once again, this is not what interests me --, I am saying: the current crisis is not at all a crisis; it is... it corresponds exactly to the contemporary... conditions, of the formation of new capital. And this is not a moment to pass, it is rather ... it is salaried labor that has had its day. We're obviously going into a completely different world which, in my opinion, means that -- and that's what I mean, regarding this story from Samir Amin that I'm dragging along: it's not spot on for me, but which is my only reticence about Amin's analyses -- so in some ways, given the fundamental differences, somehow I believe the situation in the center and the situation on the periphery, in the Third World, will tend more and more, not to get homogenized... [*Interruption of the recording*] [92: 44]

Part 3

... But decision-making centers constitute the center, okay. But precisely, the center is becoming less and less geographical. And it is because the center is deterritorialized that the territorial acceptance they had, center and periphery, tends to lose its relevance, and that the situation at the geographical center and on the geographical periphery-Third World, tend to become or will tend to become more and more isomorphic.

And I am saying, in the case of undecidable propositions, I am saying: it is obvious that there is the chance there of a ... of what I call, if you retain this terminological difference, of what I call the chance of a connection, a revolutionary connection, or a connection that would technically be called a "problematic connection", as opposed to conjugations. Because, finally, we should not cry too much about the wage earners since what was the great accomplishment realized by recent capitalism? The great accomplishment realized by recent capitalism, since the Russian Revolution, was, of course, the integration of the European proletariat into the enterprise of global exploitation, namely the European proletariat of the center was caught precisely within an axiomatic system, which meant that, whether you prefer it or not, and more and more preferably, it actively participated in the exploitation of the center, either because, ... the armaments industry, ... or yet still under more direct forms.

But the compromise of the European proletariat in the exploitation of the Third World is a fact which explains precisely everything that all this time has caused us a problem concerning the attitude of the unions forever, since unions managed the interests of a European proletariat that had completely resigned himself. Look at a very interesting book, for example, in this regard: how the American proletariat was caught up in a very active participation in the Vietnam War, ... It's a book by [Paul] Baran, Baran : b-a-r-a-n, and [Paul] Sweezy, s-w-2 e-z-y, and it's called something like *Monopoly Capitalism*.²⁶ And I would say: the way in which the Western European and American proletariat has been determined to participate actively in the exploitation, this is precisely the case of an axiomatic conjunction. This has been, by dint of making axioms for the working class, etc., this has been the whole social-democratic tendency, it has been, well, it has a long history, in Europe and in America. A revolutionary connection, as opposed to an axiomatic conjugation or conjunction, would be like movement... not the reverse, it is not logical movements; simply it is when the chance would occur or arise for an alliance between the exploited Third World and a class of workers [*Pause*] in the center, which would no longer be exactly caught within the wage system.

So, I asked: why ... is it just a joke, when the Italians there asked: are we the Indians? Or was it, in a way ... in an infinitely more tragic way, when German terrorism was like ... existed in some kind of connection with the Vietnam War, and so many, so many, so many ambiguities arose from there? Isn't it... was it not the... the first outlines, or, if necessary, the first failures for the development of a connection of this type? But what I call the set of undecidable propositions is: in the provocation, in the operation which ... by which capitalism does not cease to create flows that are strictly speaking undecidable, the possibility that connections between a situation which tends to unite ... not to homogenize, once again, but ... let us choose this word for simplicity: which tends to be homogenized at the center and at the periphery, and to constitute there a kind of possible revolutionary material.

Here we have my first re... my fifth, anyway, my last [*remark*] and that I will leave blank, because I had treated it three years ago, so -- and that the hopes have been so fully confirmed since --, so I say for the record, because we are going to put this to bed, we are going ... we have enough, here it is: it is, ... the fact, the fundamental fact of the advance, and the development, and the activity of minorities. And what does that mean? Well, that means something fundamental, it seems to me, right, both in all our hopes and ... [in] almost all ... all the others ... all the other dimensions are hanging on this last article, namely: the development of minorities or so-called "minoritarian" movements. And why is ... why? It's because... the nation-State, it goes without saying... what time is it?

A student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: -- Oh là là, I'll finish at eighteen after, ok! So... I'll have not more than... so... you understand, it's going to go very, very quickly --... the nation-State is obviously, ... all nation-States are constituted by a kind of crushing of what we ... we have sometimes called "nationalitarian or minoritarian movements". There is no nation-State ... if nation-States are called and claim to be part of a nation, it is precisely because they were constituted by this kind of over-coding of all nationalitarian movements. Fine. For a long time, it was perhaps considered in early capitalist, that nationalitarian movements were crushed and that, instead, irreversible nation-States were established.

And I insist on distinguishing or recalling that we distinguished here, some time ago, three very different notions: majorities, minorities, and also minoritarian movements. And what matters to me is that "minorities" and "minoritarian movements" are not the same thing at all. "Majority" is not difficult, it is not difficult to define; I would say of a majority that it is a set which is adequate for its own criterion. That's a majority. It sounds... it sounds silly, but it's very... it's... it's very good, it's very true. You see, it is... it is at the level of contests: when we are told in contests -- moreover, it is completely illegal, it is... but... it is... necessarily, it is illegal --, we are told in contests: state your opinion on this,... say, for example, which lady seems the prettiest to you, or the most beautiful work of art, then you will win, but you will win provided that your choice coincides with that of others; otherwise you will not win. You see the scam, since you are asked two questions at once: say what you prefer, but you are told: be careful, eh, you have to prefer what others prefer, because otherwise you will lose. [*Laughter*] So we tell ourselves, oh well, so ... and ... am I being asked ... what I prefer, or what my neighbor prefers? It's a tense situation. The majority, that's it, exactly: it is a set which refers to its own criterion, in the sense

that belonging to the majority is that which represents the criterion according to which the majority has been predetermined. What is the majority, ... in our countries of the center? The majority is: European, adult, white, male, male ... what?

A student: Woman?

Deleuze: Ah no! Ah well no, ah, well! Let's see! ... There we are. At the level of the worker himself, what is this? There is a phrase that I like in a text by Yann Moulier.²⁷ He said: yes, the criterion ... the criterion used by the unions was: skilled worker, white, over thirty-five, etc. In short, this is: the ordinary man. This is exactly what Joyce called Ulysses. Ulysses, that is: nobody. He's the ordinary man. As Ezra Pound says wittily, it's the average European, sensual, city dweller, honestly sensual, city dweller, etc. You have a majority criterion: well, it's obvious that all white men, male, adult, count twice: once in the criterion, once in ... the whole. So that's what a majority is, right, I think.

What is a minority?²⁸ Well, it's a subset. A minority is a subset: not difficult. How is the subset defined? As opposed to the majority criteria. We will say "a minority" then, as opposed to "male" which is a criterion of majority, it will be "woman" or "child". No, oh well no: not the opposite of "male"! [*Laughter*] As opposed to "adult", it will be "child". As opposed to male, it will be... "female" -- yes, there, I am not mistaken --, as opposed to... yes... there you are, as opposed to "white", it will be "black", "yellow", all that you want; as opposed to ... to "skilled worker", it will be "OS",²⁹ well, all that. There you have it, you have a minority.

Notice that we fully recover our axiomatic at that point. A social democracy is defined by the fact that it will give you as many axioms as you want -- well, within limits -- for minorities, namely subsets. Ah, do you want axioms for the kids? Well, we're going to create kindergartens, okay? Want axioms for women? Okay, okay, abortion, okay, all of that, within limits, because you can't exaggerate, but there will be axioms, right! On the contrary, we will call "totalitarians" those who reject axioms for the subsets; they can just get lost. That's what a minority is.

What do you call a minoritarian movement? It is: neither one nor the other. Everyone knows that minorities die, either as subsets into which they are inserted, or as subsets that they make for themselves ... that they construct for themselves. They are screwed, really; they are screwed either because they carry out an operation literally of reterritorialization, or because they are, as they say, "integrated" within a system, in a kind of axiomatic, right, good.

What defines a minoritarian movement? Well, that's what I tried to say once before, so here I'm going to sum it up really, really quickly, before we leave. This is ... it is the determination really, there again, of a line of flight, namely: the minoritarian movement, as opposed to the minority; it is not an aggregate, it is a becoming.³⁰ It's a becoming, fine. Well then, what is it,... "woman" as a minoritarian movement? Well, this is the becoming-woman. It is not a subset, it is the becoming-woman. But who is it that becomes a woman? Well, the simple answer is that who becomes a woman first is women. Well yes, and... it's women who have to become women, because it's... it's only women who are in a good position to become women. But ... if, on the contrary, one considers "being a woman" to be the property of a subset, it is obvious that this is screwed. They have a sort of secrecy or exclusivity, or relative exclusivity of a becoming, but not

the property of a status at all. Fine. So, a minoritarian movement is the trail of a becoming, and it's exactly the same thing as saying: the trail of a line of flight. And this is not the constitution of a subset.

And at the same time as I say, "women have to become women", then that's not all: the Black Panthers said it very well: blacks have to become black, it is not done at all ... not completed. On the contrary, because if being black, that ... is ... like their daddy, well no, on the contrary; if the Black Panthers had a role and had a fundamental importance, it is precisely because, there, they initiated this topic, this kind of ... of revolutionary connection, namely that blacks had to become black, and that that was it, that that was already the fundamental activity, otherwise, they would be a subset, a minority, fine.

So, it's not about seizing the majority, but it's about answering the question: what ... how do you explain that it has always gone so badly? Obviously as soon as one wants to seize the majority, it is a disaster: it is neither a question of claiming minoritarian status, nor of taking the majority. It is about drawing these lines of flight where someone, someone, collectively or personally, embarks on a becoming. Becoming black for blacks, becoming woman for women, becoming a Jew for Jews, etc., etc.: fine, then, that's perfect. Not sure whether it is by... by... by being pious, for example, that the Jews become Jews, I am not sure, right! [*Pause*] So you get it?

So, I'll add right away: why yes, that's it. If even the black has to become black, if even the Jew has to become a Jew, what does that mean? But the result for us is fundamental! It's us as well. If the black has to become black, it is because this operation, this becoming is inseparable from a coexistent becoming through which the white also has to become black. Not in the same way: this will not be to copy him. He has to produce his own becoming black. Something which ..., if you will, culminates if you agree to the idea that, in this case, it was not quite poetry or words, in the kind of loud cry from Rimbaud: yes, I'm a negro!³¹ "Yes, I am a negro!", that is, this: only a white man, who is embarking on a kind of becoming. So, the black's becoming-black has as a correlate a possible, eventual black-becoming of the white; the becoming-woman of the woman has as a necessary, indispensable correlate, a becoming-woman of the man. And that, the English and Americans have understood it so greatly. And ... it is not by playing at being transvestites that ... you become a woman when you are a man;³² it is by ... it is undoubtedly by their ... ways of writing that the English and American novelists already have ... by ways of living, by an affectivity, by an entire affectivity.

What I am saying immediately -- I say it before you say it to me -- has an obviously disgusting aspect, because that seems to mean: you understand, ah, well yes, we see it coming, you could tell me, you necessarily are bringing back with your double becoming, in the end, you are bringing back a kind of mothering by the white, by the man. If the becoming-black of the black is accompanied by a becoming-black of the white himself, we say: this is suspicious; then there has to be a white man who embarks on this attempt, otherwise the black man could not do so by himself! I don't mean that; I mean, connections have to be established. This is not about mothering at all; it can turn into mothering, these kinds of alliance. Alliance between what and what? That would be a connection: it means that simultaneously and in two different ways, a white European or American, for example -- or some -- sort of his majoritarian aggregate

following a line of flight, and that simultaneously a non-white, a non-male, etc., departs from his minority aggregate, following another line of flight.

One of Faulkner's most beautiful sentences is in *Intruder in the Dust*; it is, he makes a character say: well yes, after the Civil War,... no, before... before the Civil War, we whites, -- Faulkner has him say -- we had only ... one choice comparable to what occurred at the time of ... the Second World War, namely: we white people had to be, either we had to become black – finally, this expression in Faulkner is... it is good for us, at the point of our analysis --, either we become black, or we end up as fascists. Yes, that seems to me the expression, always, that. That does not mean that it will take a white person to oversee, to sponsor the becoming-black of blacks, or the becoming-woman of women; that does not mean that at all. This means that it is at the same time that a minoritarian movement is composed as having two dissymmetrical heads: a head through which something flees from the majoritarian aggregate, and something at the same time flees from the minoritarian aggregate. In other words, the minoritarian movement is a becoming that passes between the two aggregates: the minority aggregate, and the majority aggregate. This is why the minoritarian movement does not identify with a minoritarian aggregate. They'd like it to identify with that, but it can't happen. In fact, it creates ripples, it ripples onto the white himself, it stains the man himself, etc. That said, fine, that's it, a connection. In other words, becoming is always a double becoming.

We can't get any further into the reasons for hoping, unless ... there you go ... after we return from break. It's the real [*incomprehensible word*]... unless, after returning from break, according to what suits you -- here, we can't take anymore, I imagine -- but we can do a session on all that, if you have some things to add.

Various voices: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: The little yellow forms? [*These are the administrative files that Deleuze must return to the secretariat; Deleuze makes an exasperated sound*] Ohhh, they mustn't avoid me ... [*End of the session*] [1: 51: 16]

Notes

¹ Only one session from 1978-79 is available, with the title (given by the anonymous transcriber at Web Deleuze) “Metal, metallurgy, music, Husserl, Simondon”. See the ATP IV seminar on The Deleuze Seminars site.

² It is useful to recall that Deleuze and Guattari devote the penultimate chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* to this topic, “14. 1440 – The Smooth and the Striated”. Deleuze also provided a summary of these concepts in the first session of this seminar, 6 November 1979.

³ On the subject of nomads, the blacksmith problem, the “beaker people” (*peuple-aux-vases-calices*), metallurgy in general and, farther on, the “ingot form” in particular, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 409-415 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 510-517). Regarding the “beaker people,” say Deleuze and Guattari, these are “people known for their bell shaped pottery... originating in Andalusia”, whom they contrast to the prehistoric “battle-ax people” (*peuples-aux-haches de combat*), “who came in off the steppes like a detached metallic branch of the nomads” (p. 414).

⁴ On the complexities of these lineages, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 392-393, and p. 560, note 72 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 488-489).

⁵ On “holey space”, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 413-416 and 480-499 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 515-17 and 600-624).

⁶ This reference to Arnold Toynbee is located in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 381 and p. 557, note 52, “*A Study of History* (New York: Oxford University Press 1947), ... vol. 1, pp. 164-186: ‘They flung themselves upon the Steppe, not to escape beyond its bounds but to make themselves at home on it’ (p. 168).”

⁷ This is a reference to Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, “Among Daughters of the Desert” “The deserts grow: woe him who doth them hide!”

⁸ We find this term in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 413 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 515).

⁹ The precise reference is in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 562, note 99: Jules Bloch, *Les Tziganes* (Paris: PUF, 1953). Numerous sources indicate the publication date as 1953, with 1968 (or 1969) as a later edition.

¹⁰ A reference to this film and the image of these holey spaces is also provided in *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 413-414 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 515-516).

¹¹ Among several references to Marcel Griaule and to this subject in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the most pertinent is to the book by Marcel Griaule and Germaine Dieterlen, *The Pale Fox* (Baltimore MD: Afrikan World Books, 1986); *Le renard pâle* (Paris: Institut d’ethnologie, 1965).

¹² Arnold J. Toynbee, *L’Histoire, un essai d’interprétation*, coll. « Bibliothèque des idées » (Paris: Gallimard, 1951) ; *A Study of History: Abridgement of Vols I-VI* by D. C. Somervell, preface by A. J. Toynbee (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1946).

¹³ Deleuze and Guattari refer several times in *A Thousand Plateaus* to the text by Henri Maldiney, *Regard, Parole, Espace* (Lausanne : L’Age d’homme, 1973), notably pp. 493, 495, 547 note 2, and 574 note 31. Deleuze refers to Maldiney as well several times, for example in this seminar session 9, in a Spinoza session on January 13, 1981, and in the introductory session to the Painting seminar, 31 March 1981.

¹⁴ In fact, five sessions, beginning 15 April 1980 and ending 20 May.

¹⁵ In fact, the title is *Discourse on Metaphysics*.

¹⁶ On the nondenumerable set, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 469-471 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 586-588).

¹⁷ We saw these distinctions in the preceding session; see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 419-421 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 523-524).

¹⁸ The Hannah Arendt reference in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33) is to her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York : Harcourt Brace & Co., 1951 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 283, note 31).

¹⁹ In the same note in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33), one finds a reference to Paul Virilio’s book *L’insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976 ; Galilée, 1993).

²⁰ It’s to Paul Virilio that Deleuze and Guattari attribute this term in the texts they cite in *A Thousand Plateaus* the corresponds to it, *Vitesse et politique* (Paris : Galilée, 1977) and *L’insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976) [*Speed and Politics*, Semiotext(e), 1986 ; no translation for the second].

²¹ Régis Debray is a political figure in France as well as a philosopher, activist, and creator of the research field known as “mediology”.

²² As we saw in session 8, 2 February 1980, where this term is considered, the final section of plateau 13 on the apparatus of capture is, in fact, titled “Undecidable propositions”, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 471-473 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 588-590).

²³ As we saw in the preceding session, Samir Amin was a Franco-Egyptian economist who wrote *Le développement inégal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme périphérique* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1973).

²⁴ Robert McNamara, after having served as Secretary of Defense under the presidencies of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, became President of the World Bank.

²⁵ This is a reference to Robert Linhart’s *Le sucre et la faim* (Paris: Minuit, 1980).

²⁶ The English title of Baran and Sweezy’s book is *Monopoly Capital: An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).

²⁷ Deleuze and Guattari cite Yann Moulrier as belonging to a group of French writers who analyze new forms of labor and struggles against labor, as do Mario Tronti, Antonio Negri, and Karl Heinz Roth. See *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 571, note 66 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 586, note 60).

²⁸ See the subsection, “Minorities,” in plateau 13, *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 469-471 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 586-588).

²⁹ OS is the abbreviation for “specialized worker” (*ouvrier spécialisé*), that is, a worker without affiliated qualification within a single, repetitive task.

³⁰ On becomings in relation to minorities and minoritarians, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 291-298 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 356-367).

³¹ This is an implicit reference to Rimbaud's *Une Saison en Enfer* (*A Season in Hell*, trans Louise Varèse (Norfolk, Conn: New Directions, 1952), p. 9. Deleuze, without and with Guattari, presents this quote very often, notably in *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 379 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 470).

³² This comment greatly resembles a famous article by Guattari, "J'ai même rencontré des travelos heureux", first published in *Libération*, 3 April 1975, and then collected in *La Révolution moléculaire* (Fontenay-sous-Bois: Editions Recherches, 1977), pp. 189-191. This text was translated by Rachel McComas and Stamos Metzidakis, published first in the "Polysexuality" issue of *Semiotext(e)* IV.1 (1981), pp. 80-81, and then in the collection Félix Guattari, *Chaosophy: Texts and Interviews 1972-1977* (Los Angeles and Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e)/The MIT Press, 2009), pp. 225-227.