

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980**

**Lecture 01, 06 November 1979**

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**Part 1 (45:12 minutes)**

This year I have several things to propose to you. The first thing concerns today alone: we will finish very early. We will finish unusually early, because I have to stop at midday. Because at two o'clock there is an important meeting which everyone should be able to go to if they want. Above all foreign students, but not especially. You know we already talked about these questions, I won't take it up again: the Department of Philosophy at Vincennes will carry on functioning as it functioned before, but in addition and at the same time, it will become an institute of Philosophy with a very particular function. It can work: we'll see. It can work. If it works, it will be very important for us, for Vincennes. Now, the presentation for this institute takes place at 2 o'clock, 14.00 hours, on the side of staircase E, room 210. So since I have meetings beforehand, I'll have to stop at midday on this occasion. Because it's an introductory session, it's not too serious.

Second point. I propose that at the start of this year, that is to say, for one semester or a little more than one semester, we take up what we did last year – if you weren't here last year, that's no problem – we take up what remained for us to do and what we didn't have time to do. I'll explain myself a bit more in a moment. But what was left over for us to do was: a certain conception of the State Apparatus, a series of studies and analyses on the State apparatus, with the stipulation that I don't want the analyses to reduce themselves to what is going on now, but rather to include and above all to flow out onto what is happening now. Each of us is well aware that the year is beginning, in every respect and in this respect in particular, in a sombre mood, even very sombre. So what will occupy us for a while, if you don't mind, are some analyses concerning the State apparatus in relation to what we did last year.

And then what will happen? Well, that will depend a lot on you. For my part, I hope that subjects will come from you. State apparatuses, that will take us one trimester, or at the maximum a semester, but for the rest of the semester, we can do, at your request, things on any authors you're interested in. For myself, I'd like us to return a little to literary authors; for example we could do three or two sessions on Beckett, two sessions on someone else ... It could be me or someone else, according to our competences. We could also do something on particular philosophers or on concepts.

Anyway, we'll always find something to do. But I'm saying that I want you to be involved. Already for the State apparatus I will have a great need of you because, last year, something happened that worked very well, that worked better and better ... What we did last year, above all at the end. There were many of you who brought me many things. Now, if that could happen in the same way for the State apparatus ...

So today, I would just like to content myself by very briefly recalling what we did last year, why the State apparatus looks into that, and at the same time to reassure those who were not here last year that they can be persuaded that there is no need to know what was said last year in order to follow this year. But it's right that they should have the basic principles of the hypothesis in which we were ensconced.

So, I'm starting with this, the way we had been induced to pose – but we were constrained, we didn't have enough time (happily, happily) to resolve anything – to pose a certain problem that appears to us to be the problem of the State. That one can pose it in a million other ways goes without saying. But we were induced to start from – and we were occupied with this for almost the entire year – a kind of abstract opposition (to say 'abstract' is right because it goes without saying, it is not an objection to say: 'but concretely everything is mixed in together' – obviously it is all mixed together), a kind of abstract opposition between what we called, broadly speaking, 'the war machine', and what we called 'the State apparatus' ... or (we already gave it a name to pinpoint it better) 'apparatus of capture'. And we said: the war machine and the apparatus of capture or the State apparatus: these are not at all the same thing.

And this was just that, a hypothesis. We attempted to develop this hypothesis by observing that even historically the war machine was quite literally the invention of nomadic organization. They are the ones who invented the war machine. I do not say – understand immediately where we are heading – above all, I do not say that they invented *armies*. Armies and the war machine are surely linked, but there is no reason to believe that it is the same thing. We supposed that it is the nomadic organisation or composition which invented the war machine. Whether it's good, whether it's bad – we already renounced the choice of which was worst, the apparatuses of capture or the war machines. Nothing could have been very good in any of that.

But what struck us was that, if it is true that the nomads invented the war machine, it is in specific environments, in determinate conditions and directed precisely against State apparatuses; and that the war machine was a kind of riposte or parry with regard to the State apparatus, to the apparatuses of capture. Even if the two entered into very complex relations and a very complex intimacy. For example, the nomadic war machines formed States, or the States appropriated war machines. But that is not what we wanted to focus on. This was our subject: that they participated in concrete mixtures that must indeed be concretely analysed, but from the point of view of polar oppositions, with a view to a certain kind of abstract opposition. I recall (because this is what preoccupied us for the whole year) the objection was raised that the war machine first of all implies ... The question was not to define it through *violence*.

Why? Because you can find violence everywhere. One of our objects this year evidently will be – and there are a lot of authors who discuss this, these are not matters we have discovered, there are many authors who concern themselves with this – one of our subjects this year will be to try

to distinguish, in our own way, the forms, the types, of violence. An issue that obviously touches us and that touches on many historical problems: the violence of the police is not the same as the violence of the army. The violence of the State is not the same as the violence of war. No. Of course, they can become mixed in together.

But then what did our polar oppositions consist in? They consisted in saying that the nomadic war machine develops itself in a very particular kind of space. That was one of our major focuses, and I found it very interesting – and if I'm undertaking this summary today instead of starting right in, it's because I'm not ruling out that, thanks to you, we may need to revisit and recast one of these concepts, or start from scratch if, in the meantime, some of you have had a chance to reflect on this.

In any case, from the point of view of the first polar opposition, I arrived at the point of saying something like this: the nomadic war machine develops in a space that one could call a smooth space. And smooth spaces are very particular spaces. And we gave a lot of time to the definition of smooth space, whereas one might say that at the other pole, the State apparatus, things were still very abstract, but necessarily so. At the other pole, the State apparatus operates and organizes a space it was necessary to call a striated space. And to striate space is a fundamental operation of the State. Isn't this already the case to the extent that it organizes agriculture? But does the State organize agriculture? That remains to be seen. We will have to see if there is an agriculture that is organised without a State, and I can say straightaway that what will confirm our analysis of the intimate relation between the State apparatus and agriculture ... [*Deleuze corrects himself*] and striated space is precisely that it is the State apparatus that creates agriculture. We shall see. So we had a first polar opposition: smooth space/striated space. I won't go back over that, but we'll see if we'll need to revisit it from a different perspective than last year.

All this was from the point of view of space. You see, the war machine develops a kind of smooth space. It is not by chance that it develops itself in the desert, the steppe, the sea, etc., which are types of smooth space. While the sedentary State apparatus passes its time by striating space, by organising a striated space, which also implies operations of an extreme violence, but precisely a violence of the State. Then there is a second point, no longer from the point of view of space, but from the point of view of composition. ... [But first] I anticipate straightaway a possible objection, above all for those who were not here last year: look, even if we barely understand smooth and striated spaces, that doesn't stop them from mixing all the time. And yes, there is a way of striating the sea, even though the sea is a smooth space. They're mixed in together all the time, okay. And on their side, moreover, striated spaces can yield up smooth spaces. Okay. They form part of concrete mixtures, and each time we had to analyse these concrete mixtures, because it is not in the same way that a striated space yields up smooth space and that a smooth space is striated. For example, the whole history of navigation involves a certain way of striating maritime space, but there are more or less closed ways of doing it; obviously, non-astronomical navigation does not end up striating the sea in the way that astronomical navigation made the sea into a striated space.

Second polar opposition, between the two machines, between the war machine and State apparatus, this time from the point of view of composition. For it is well known that the State

apparatus proceeds towards and through – everyone remembers this, every textbook says it – a territorial organization or composition. I would say that from the beginning – since we'll need to make appeal to this theme, I'll recall it here – the State apparatus proceeds via a territorial composition; but in a certain way this should not be taken literally, because it also means that the State is profoundly deterritorializing. Why does that go without saying?

It is because the territorial organization of men – in other words, organization under a State – is defined by this: that it takes land [*terre*] as object of organization, *through which* it brings about a deterritorialization. The land ceased to be the active agent and becomes object. Object of what? Object of production, of circulation ... of the limits of territory, frontier, etc. So when one says *the State is fundamentally territorial*, that also means that it is deterritorializing from another point of view. In all cases it is a composition ... the composition of the State is not exclusively but *above all* territorial.

On the other hand, we looked into whether there wasn't a composition proper to the war machine, some very particular composition. We tried to discover it and we said: well, what is new in the war machine is a very specific kind of composition of men. And to my understanding this is important because for as long as there have been men, they have only found three ways of composing themselves amongst themselves. And the war machine, for its part, operates through a composition of men that is no longer territorial in the slightest – necessarily, because it moves in smooth space the whole time, it is nomadic [*The sound of a motor interrupts*] – it has a space, It has a space ... yes ... and the war machine moves towards an arithmetical composition of men. And the idea of organizing men arithmetically is very curious. I would say it is necessary to understand what that means, an arithmetical composition of men. It is quite simple -- shit, shit, shit [*Again, the motor sound interrupts*] What's going to happen? -- its source was to be found in a point which appeared to be insignificant. -- [*Again, the motor sound interrupts*] What's going to happen? -- In a point which appears to be a small detail, namely the need for marching orders and displacements in the desert. That was it. And the Bible backed this up over and over again: In the famous Book of Numbers, Moses inherits numerical organization from the nomads.<sup>1</sup> He inherits from the nomads this numerical organization of humans in order to do what? Precisely when what is required is to displace oneself in the desert. As if by chance he finds himself, in a sense without having wanted it (which is curious in itself), more or less despite himself, in the position of having constituted a war machine. So, the Book of Numbers was an absolutely essential book for us last year.

But you see that here as well it is necessary to take account of concrete mixtures the whole time. I mean, it goes without saying that someone will say to me: hang on, States also attach a great deal of importance to arithmetical composition. Of course, of course. You will say to me: nomads also have principles of territory. Obviously, obviously! But this is not that which interests me. What interests me, from the point of view of the poles, is to isolate in a sufficiently abstract manner the autonomy, the primacy, of an arithmetical organization of men in the nomadic war machine and the primacy of a territorial composition of men in the State apparatus. Assuming that is the case, as a consequence and at the level of consequences, the mixed formulas will be numerous.

That was our second point of view. Following the polar opposition of spaces, a polar opposition of the composition. Our third point of view concerned activity. And we said: well, it is not at all the same type of activity even though the two types of activity end up being confused in concrete mixtures. It is not the same type of activity because the State apparatus invented a very curious mode of activity, which didn't just come about by itself. And I didn't elaborate the discussion of this mode of activity last year, although I did elaborate it on certain points, but in any case, we will rediscover it from another point of view; it's because of this problem that I need to make this recapitulation. Because there are things that it will be necessary to elaborate from the new perspective we will take this year. The mode of activity that the State apparatus invents and imposes is *work* [*travail*].<sup>2</sup> 'Work' meaning not just any activity. I mean that it is a mode that is defined not simply through the object on which it bears, the means that it employs, tools, for example. In fact, it is a very particular *mode* of activity.

Now, one of our hypotheses last year was that labour could not emerge ... here I would like to propose something for those who are familiar with these things; I will be coming back to it, don't worry. For those who don't know, it doesn't matter. For those who know and are familiar with the Marxist distinction of labour and surplus labour [*surtravail*], I would precisely like to deepen or attempt to deepen one hypothesis this year: *it is surplus labour that constitutes labour*. It is surplus labour that is constitutive of labour. That is to say, it is surplus labour that makes activity into labour, or that submits activity to the rule of labour. With the result that we better understand the connection ... If this hypothesis is true, we better understand that labour fundamentally belongs to the State apparatus. It is the State apparatus that puts people to work. There is no labour outside the State apparatus. There are other things, there are other activities, but labour never exhausted ...

And I'm saying this already because we are going to have to confront some problems ... I'm doing this to pay homage to – at present, they are all in prison, or almost all of them – that seems to me to be the considerable contribution -- [*A motor sound interrupts the class again*] shit, shit, shit, shit [*Deleuze strikes his fist on the table*] It seems to me to be the considerable contribution made by the Italian autonomists, starting with Toni Negri, to have pushed very far with a Marxist analysis (but of a new kind) of labour in contemporary circumstances; and being well placed – that is to say the case of Italy being very particular with regard to the modern problem of labour – I think they pushed very far a point of analysis that was simultaneously Marxist and completely novel (two things which are certainly not opposed) which will turn out to be of great importance for us, when it comes to new forms of labour and the new relations of labour and the State apparatus. We will therefore have to talk about all this.

So, you see, I would say that the third bipolarity is: activity becomes labour in relation to the State apparatus. And it is not by chance. There is a fundamental connection between the man of the State and the worker, which does not mean that the man of the State works. It means that there is a complementarity between the worker and the man of the State, and that the problem of labour is always posited in relation with a State apparatus, even when it doesn't appear to be the case, as well as inversely. So, labour in a way had to be redefined.

What type of activity is labour then? I would say: labour cannot be defined through the tool for the very simple reason that it is exactly the contrary. Namely: it is the tool that is defined through

labour. It is when there is labour that what activity makes use of can be called a tool. Therefore, one could say the contrary: that another problem is indeed involved at this point. We could put the problem otherwise. We have ended up posing the problem in this way: the impossibility of defining labour by the tool; the opposite is the case. Again, we could give as a definition of the tool: the tool is what activity makes use of when it is determined as labour. Then how to define labour since one cannot define it by the tool? One could say, finally, that work is the center of gravity; displacement, center of gravity, displacement of forces. Yes, linear displacement. Center of gravity, linear displacement. You see that everything is connected. I'll persist in this recapitulation one more time, in order to try to suggest that we have in fact constituted a totality that is finally, in spite of ourselves, rather coherent.

Why is all this connected? You can see what the problem 'centre of gravity, displacement, linear displacement of forces' refers back to. I don't need to explain in order to say that this is a very profound factor in the striating of space, that this constitutes a striated space. Fine. Force through displacements equals work. And work, what is that? It is irreducibly a social and physical concept. And it is not by chance that it is at the same time, in the physics of the 19th century, that this physico-sociological concept of 'work' is constituted. Work, as it is explained in all the physics textbooks used in the baccalauréat, you see, is: relations weight/height, forces/displacements; and then you have the elaboration of the status of work at the same time, in the 19th century, by the same people. And on this, certain amongst you have contributed very fundamental texts on the engineers of the 19th century who are precisely at the hinge point of the elaboration of the physical concept of work and the sociological concept of labour. All that is the same thing. On the side of the Mines, the school of Mines, and of all kinds of schools of engineers, one of the tasks of the civil engineer is a double elaboration of the physical concept and of the sociological concept.

Whereas on the side of the war machine, as activity ... Of course, in the war machine, work takes place as well. It goes without saying that work takes place. It can't be said that work doesn't occur; what can be said is: yes indeed, work takes place. But again, this is part of the concrete mixtures. Fine, everyone works; again, this is not what interests us. What interests us is to identify the poles or the prevalent potentialities, prevalences, preferences, primacies. Thus, at the level of mixed formulas, everything gets mixed together by definition, necessarily. But this does not change the fact that the war machine is not defined [in this way]. Even if [the war machine] involves work, this is not one of its constitutive elements. Why? Because the activity [the war machine] governs is of another type than work, or rather it does not govern activity in the work mode. In what mode does it govern [work]? I would say, to use terms from 17th century and 18th century physics, that it occurs much more in the form of 'free action' – on condition that one does not give to 'free' a democratic sense, but gives it a physical sense.

And what is free action? Well, this is closely studied in the physics of the 17-18th century, and in the 19th century there will precisely emerge the great distinction between free action and work. A purely physical distinction, purely of the physical sciences. And the [notion] [*unclear*] of free action, it was found – although I can't pursue this recapitulation in too much detail – almost in a model, a privileged model, namely: a vortical [*tourbillonnaire*] movement that simultaneously occupies a maximum of points of space. It is not by chance that the movement that the war machine invokes is always ... [*unclear word*] always ... is *very frequently* of this type. From the

vortex of the nomadic tribes right up to the whirling character of war machines properly speaking; from the Greeks onwards (namely Democritus, Archimedes, etc.), a vortical movement always appeared bound to the theme of the war machine ... no, not always, but *often*, to the theme of the war machine.

Here again I rediscover my points, for a whirling motion whose points occupy a maximum of positions in space raises the problem, what is the nature of this space? It is obviously a smooth space. It is obviously a smooth space [Deleuze repeats]. The whirling movement traces a smooth space. On the contrary, the criterion of labour, which we have seen was 'centre of gravity, linear displacements of force', defines a striated space. So everything went well for us last year. The important thing is that that continues this year. That was the third point. I hope this recapitulation is not useless.

Fourth point: here too, we had a fourth bipolar opposition from the point of view of expression. And we would say, look, because one gets the sense more and more that the State apparatus is in a very fundamental relation with labour, or rather labour is in a very fundamental relation with it, and in fact the State apparatus, you understand (and this is not very complicated): its fundamental elements of expression are what? I should say of 'action-expression', or rather 'expression-expression'. The answer is: tools and signs. And after all, that gives us a new direction: yes, there will indeed be a fundamental relation between tools and signs. In fact, everyone knows it, there is no State apparatus without an apparatus of writing. And when it comes to organizing surplus labour, when it involves making people work, there is a whole bureaucracy. There is no labor without a labor bureaucracy. And what is bureaucracy? Well, it implies a whole accountability, a whole system of writings. And this is a true conceptual couple that constitutes 'signs/tools' at the level of the State apparatus. To the point that it even constitutes the strongest unity joining the man of the State with the worker. The man of the State emits signs, while the subject activates his tools. So here too there are all sorts of combinations, but the necessity of writing is inscribed into work. Just as the necessity of tools is inscribed in semiological systems, in systems of signs.

And the first signs are signs of the type: 'Go over there', 'Are you ready?', 'Go to your work'. These are the great signs. We saw this last year, namely that the basis of language is the word of command [*mot d'ordre*].

And on the side of the war machine? Here again, you are already used to this mode of reasoning, so you cannot object to me, 'well, here there are also signs and tools'. Obviously: there are tools in the war machine as well, but for it, it is not what is essential. Moreover: where there are signs and tools in the war machine, the nomadic war machine, for its part, is quite happy to very freely borrow signs from neighboring State apparatuses. As for writing, [the war machine] has little need for it and does without it completely. Last year, I did not have the necessary information, so I couldn't [discuss it]. For example, there's a really good example, but since I don't understand it at all, I'm just mentioning it for the record. For example, in the Mongolian war machine, a really amusing piece of writing exists where they borrow Chinese writing and other more bizarre modes of writing and create a phonetic transcription of their language into Chinese characters. They don't have any especial need for writing, they didn't need it. As for tools? Yes, of course they had tools like everybody. Yes, they worked, they had

tools, but I say: that is not what defines them. Whereas, you understand – and this is the point that I'd really like to make very clearly for you – 'signs-tools', that is one of the defining and determining characteristics of the State apparatus. You will of course also find it in the war machine, but that is not what determines it, that's not what which defines it. That is another couple.<sup>3</sup>

For clarity, solely for reasons of clarity, of symmetry, it was necessary for us to search in the war machine for a couple, a distinct couple, to aid our comprehension. And we grasped hold of a quite distinct couple, we said: the war machine has a very bizarre couple, it is 'weapons' and 'jewelry'. Weapons and jewelry. 'Jewelry', why does that come in here? First, because it pleased us, and then in order to allow us to advance on several points. With regard to 'weapons', I made the same remark as I made earlier for the tool, namely: 'weapons', what will define 'weapons'? If you try to define 'weapons' and 'tool', taken in themselves, you will not succeed, because they are the same. They are the same thing. A pitchfork, such as the peasant's pitchfork, is it a weapon or a tool? It depends on what he does with it, eh? There are wars which are fought with weapons that are the tools of the peasantry. It was even the case that for a long time, the distinction *weapons* – *tools* was remarkably vague. So it is not at the level of objects that one can make a distinction *weapon/tool*. It is at the level of what? This confirms to us that it is always at the level of the type of activity. There will be 'weapons' as opposed to 'tools' when, instead of being taken as an object, of an activity defined as labor (that is to say, as 'center of gravity, displacement of force'), the same object is taken up in the other type of activity: the vortical motion occupying a maximum of points in a smooth space. This is why weapons are fundamentally projective and that the gesture of the weapon is always a whirling gesture that leaves behind the dimensions of the center of gravity, the exigencies of the center of gravity.

Okay, but none of that tells us why 'jewelry'? Well, because, you understand, signs of writing and jewelry can be compared with each other. It is not 'jewelry', simply 'jewelry', that was just a handy word. In fact, it is everything in the domain of decoration and goldwork. Goldwork-decoration. Now, what was striking to us, I recall here, because perhaps here we would have a new need, is that goldwork and decoration form a system that does not enjoy a single degree less abstraction than signs of writing, even phonetic ones. The only thing is that it is, quite literally, a completely different abstract machine. It is not less abstract. The abstraction in the decoration of goldwork has a power that is at least equal to the power of the most abstract signs. But it is an entirely different kind of organization. And it is clear that decoration, goldwork and jewelry [*joallerie*] do not constitute a writing. It is almost, if you will, the semiotic of weapons, whilst writing is the semiology of the tool. At the same time I take back this formula precisely because it is too easy. Nevertheless, it will do for the purposes of clarification.

Then of course there is also the minor objection: but jewelry exists in States. Obviously jewelry exists in States. Only, they have a comical history in States. It is in war machines that jewelry finds all of its – if I can dare to say this – splendor. Because these are the true signs in the war machine; in States, they only have derived utilizations ... how to put it? Decadent, degenerate. One can even speak through jewelry, there are languages of jewels. The languages of jewels are not ... [*unclear word*]; it is not that at all, it is not that. The force of jewelry, the force of decoration, the force of ornamentation, this is, once again, to construct a system of abstraction no less great than the most abstract signs. And why? In order to be a completely different kind of



abstraction, with a completely different object in view. Good: that was our fourth point, from the point of view of expression, then, ‘weapons-jewels’. The coupling ‘weapons-jewels’ of the war machine and the coupling ‘tools-signs’ of the State apparatus.

Finally, from the point of view of feeling – war machines and State apparatuses putting feelings into play – we attempted ... we will see whether later on this year, with regard to certain authors, we might not be able to take up this theme or elaborate it in a different direction. We attempted to distinguish two sorts of feeling: the *sentiments*, which refer back simultaneously to the theme of a development, of a formation, and which were really the feelings circulating in the milieu of the State apparatus, of work, of signs, etc. And on the other hand, something which is of another nature (although the two exist at one and the same time: on the one hand, the other hand), on the other hand, the *affects*. The affects, which for their part, are the feelings proper to the war machine. And in the two cases, it is no longer necessary to choose where the worst violence is, all of that is violent in every way, or it is not violent at all, that depends, that depends. I mean that in the war machine, there is another compassion, two justices. There is an admirable page of Kafka on the opposition of the two compassions, the two justices. An author I discussed frequently last year, namely Dumézil, has greatly elaborated this difference between the justice of the man of war, or his injustice, insofar as it is quite different to the justice or the injustice of the man of State. It is not the same compassion, nor the same graces, nor ... It’s not at all the same emotional system. In one case, for convenience sake, we talked of affects. And in the other case, we talked of sentiments.<sup>4</sup>

In fact, from the point of view of violence, which we have scarcely broached, it is again indeed because of this that one cannot say that the war machine must be more terrible, however terrible it can be. It is not more terrible than the State apparatus. Can one say that the army, that an army, however close to the absolute it might be, a global army, should be any more terrible than a global police force? There is no reason to confound these notions. There is no space for thinking that the war machine proceeds in the same manner as the police. The State apparatus, for its part, has need of a police, well before having need of an army. There are very curious things in what one has a presentiment of in certain archaic States, like already having a police and a developed bureaucracy, but not yet, it seems, having an army, an army in the proper sense. And what is the difference between these types of violence? The violence of war ... It could be in one sense that there is nothing worse ... But what is special in the violence of the State? Certain modern authors have invented a concept in order to give an account of this violence of the State, namely the concept of structural violence. We will have to ask what it is that one can call a ‘structural violence’. In any case, structural violence, is what rests with the police or what only has need of a police. Everything happens as if it was in the mode of the ‘already there’. It is always ‘already there’, it is always as already applied, it constantly presupposes itself. So that, in a certain manner, it can say: ‘who me? I’m nothing, I’m not a violence.’ Whilst the violence of the war machine is a violence that is perpetually on the horizon and never stops arriving.<sup>5</sup>

And what does that mean? It is to conclude this enumeration [of points] that there would therefore be at the end of the account a distinction between two violences, of the war machine and of the State, in the same way as we distinguished other poles. And here there is something that appears very striking to me precisely based on certain passing remarks by Dumézil ... Dumézil says on this, in some texts that are unfortunately very short, that from the point of view

of mythology, it would be very interesting to study the role played, even in mythologies, by the double character of policeman and jailer. And that, above all, it is not the same role, even mythically, even in the most ancient myths, it is not at the same role as that of the man of war. Dumézil insists on this – I think we talked about it a little last year – on a characteristic found very often in the myths, in the mythology of political sovereignty, he insists a great deal on the *mutilated* character of the man of State. The mutilated character of the man of State, to the point that he explains there is an alternation between two types of man of the State and that this alternation between the two types of men of the State, between the two great political sovereigns, is often represented as an alternation of the one-eyed man [*le borgne*] and the one-handed man [*le manchot*]. The one-eyed and the one-handed man.<sup>6</sup>

In Scandinavian and Germanic mythology, you have Odin the one-eyed and Tyr – *t-y-r* [he spells out] – the one-handed. These are the two poles of political sovereignty. Amongst the Romans, you have Horatius Cocles and [Mucius] Scaevola. The one is one-eyed, the other one-handed. This is a very frequent theme: the one-eyed and the one-handed. This is interesting, by the way, because the one-eyed man, you understand, is the man of the sign. From his single eye, he emits ... and in fact, in the mythologies, the one-eyed God is he who emits signs at a distance, who strikes down, who, with a sign, strikes with stupor. He looms up, his eye blinks ... This is the signifier. The one-handed man is the man of work. The one-handed man is generally the chief of those strange characters in mythologies, in many mythologies, who appeared as the ‘hundred-handers’ [*cent-mains*]. But not ‘sans’, *s-a-n-s*, ‘cent’, *c-e-n-t*. He who has only one hand is at the same time the leader of those who have all sorts of hands. So the man of the State is a kind of mutilated man, mutilated but ... [*Deleuze does not complete the thought*] And the worker too is a species of mutilated man.

It is curious ... In what sense? Everyone, in so far as they are in the State, is one of the mutilated. I mean, I don't want to put forward a facile anarchism, but, independently of Dumézil, it brings to mind a beautiful text by the German novelist [Ernst] Jünger (ambiguous, nevertheless). In his novel *The Glass Bees*, Jünger says this: it's quite curious, but when I read Homer and the narratives of combats between the Homeric heroes, I never see the least narrative of mutilation. It is necessary not to exaggerate ... You will say to me: surely one does see it in the narratives of war. But let's leave that aside. In Homer, one does not see it. And in fact, the gods of the war, strangely enough, are not mutilated, while the gods of work *are* all mutilated. They limp, they have only one hand, they have only one eye. And Jünger proposes a formula that I find apt, he says: in work everyone knows that there are workplace accidents, and it is true that there are accidents at work, but more profoundly, what is terrible about work is that a mutilation already precedes any accident. And that is perfectly valid in the coupling of State apparatus and work. There, it is as if the mutilation has already been done. Mutilation precedes the accident. There is already mutilation in the posture. Of course, this is not to say that mutilations in war are a pleasure or are worth more. Once again, certainly not. It is to say that maybe there is a regime of violence ... to suggest that there is perhaps a totally different regime of violence.

So, that was where we had got to. I add that we continually had the concern of ... [*Interruption in the recording*]

**Part 2 (45:06 minutes)**

... They cease to communicate ... and how? And we attempted to specify the milieu of communication. And we stated – and this greatly interests me, and we did not elaborate upon it, but we won't develop it any further, because I don't know ... well, not unless you want to – that communication is something we called matter-movement. It is a single and same matter-movement into which State apparatuses and war machines are plugged.<sup>7</sup> And by 'matter-movement', one must not just understand 'the inert', 'the inanimated'. Matter-movement can just as well be a human matter. It is finally (making use of or borrowing a word from biology) what we proposed to call a phylum, *p-h-y-l-u-m*, a veritable phylum that would traverse both the war machines and the State apparatuses, that is to say, into which both are plugged and from which both, the war machines and State apparatuses, do not borrow the same characteristics. Nevertheless, a same phylum would traverse all of them, a same phylum, inanimated, animal and human. And this phylum, by nature, for its part, would no longer be nomadic like the war machines, nor sedentary like the State apparatuses, it would be fundamentally – and this was the occasion for us to distinguish a third concept – it would be fundamentally *itinerant*.

And the situation of man in relation to this phylum – this would precisely be itinerance. And this phylum which would simultaneously traverse the State apparatus and the war machines and which would be the object of a kind of itinerance seemed to us to put into play a whole set of problems that have already absorbed our attention for some time, namely, the problem of metallurgy and of the history of metallurgy. And if this sort of phylum into which everything was plugged was fundamentally metallurgy, which does not mean 'inanimated', but is simultaneously made up of metals and those who follow metals; namely: the itinerant smiths and their metallurgic lodes. Okay, but is any of that valid today? Certainly, but it will depend on the phylum. There is absolutely a phylum of petrol. What happens when the phylum of petrol is immersed in the sea, that is to say, when petrol becomes maritime? What does that imply for spaces, and for maritime space in particular? What is ... well, these are problems that remain for us this year. Which is to say perhaps we will come across the history of this particular phylum again.

And this phylum has its own space, no longer either a smooth space like the war machine, nor a striated space like ... all that. It was a space we attempted to define, and what was said was fine, but something else could be involved, we might need to find something else. What we said was that it was a space with holes. And the space of mining is indeed a holed space, it is the space of what is beneath the earth. And it is a holed space that holes smooth spaces and striated, sedentary spaces alike. It is a space riddled with holes, and which in a subterranean way traverses things and makes ... Maybe this is what ultimately determines all the concrete mixtures between the two poles.

Okay, from all that we will now draw one conclusion. The conclusion we draw from all this was: we do not know much about what the State apparatus is, but at any rate, if one allows us the characteristics we attempted to pinpoint in defining the State apparatus, then the State apparatus becomes a prodigious mystery, all the more prodigious – how can that be, such a thing! – all the more prodigious, at least, in that we only know one thing: it does not derive from the war machine. The war machine cannot explain it. In fact, if all the abstract characteristics of the war machine, including its space, including its human composition, including its means [*moyens*] etc., etc. are opposed point-by-point to the characteristics of the State apparatus, one can at least

conclude: no, every explanation which would try to engender the State apparatus from a pre-existing war machine, for us ... – it might be quite satisfying for someone else who poses the problem in a different way, but that's their affair – for us, in the way we posit the problem, it has become impossible.

Understand: that does not mean to say that there is not all the same a fundamental problem. The fundamental problem is that, at the point we are, we say to ourselves: we have no idea how a thing like the State apparatus could constitute itself. We didn't know at all. But, if it is constituted, it is not through the war machine. The war machine even has a fundamental goal, namely: to destroy State apparatuses. It is understood as directly targeted against the phenomenon of the State, the urban phenomenon and the agricultural phenomenon. Then, of course, it is integrated into it. But it is integrated at a secondary level. But we will see how it is integrated and why it is integrated. But the ultimate explanation lies elsewhere. In order for the war machine to be integrated into the State apparatus, there already has to be a State apparatus. It is not that which explains the State apparatus. And in fact, at the other extremity, one can say to oneself: why, of course, everything that is known of the most ancient State apparatuses, or everything that archaeology reveals to us about the most ancient State apparatuses, seems to confirm that they did not dispose of an army.

Again, they did not make use of the war machine, they already made use of a bureaucracy – I talked of the most ancient States, we will return to that – they already made use of a bureaucracy, they already had a police force at their disposal, they already had prisons at their disposal, indeed they had many things at their disposal, but bizarrely, they did not make use of the war machine, nor even the army properly speaking. As a result, if one accepts that, the fundamental question of the State, once again, will be: 'But then where does it come from?', again, that is, if we are led for our own purposes to say: no, for the reasons we're attempting to explain, we refuse every explanation that would derive the State apparatus from a war machine or from war, the problem we fall into is that, assuming there are war machines which assert themselves and which are first of all directed against the State apparatus ... one of the fundamental problems will become: how to appropriate the war machine?

But, once again, this problem can only be posed if there are State apparatuses. So, yes there is a problem, there is an enormous problem, which will traverse all States. If they do not appropriate the war machine, they are lost. And how to otherwise explain the brutal disappearance of a certain number of very archaic States, which archaeology tells us disappear from one day to the next, leaving no trace, razed to the ground, only to reappear centuries later under other forms? Unless it is precisely because – no doubt one of the main reasons invoked by archaeologists – they find themselves completely liquidated by nomadic war machines, at a moment when they have not at all managed to appropriate the war machine yet. As a result, this will be a vital problem for the State: to appropriate the war machine, with the inconvenience that the war machine will create a huge amount of concern and will be enormously mistrusted by them, and that they will always be led into giving an immense power to this war machine, while they also have to control it, to ask themselves how to control this war machine.

And I mean, what happened in history? I'm asking that just in order to conclude this summary – no, I've already gone beyond the summary – but in history, how does this take place? We can see

that it is indeed as if there are two great poles, two attempts by the State apparatus to make itself a war machine. I would say, broadly speaking, that there is the *mercenary* pole and the *army* pole. ‘National’ army – in quotation marks, since I’m talking of peoples for whom the word ‘nation’ is obviously anachronistic – ‘State Army’, if you prefer. Hired mercenaries, paid mercenaries on the one hand, and the territorial army, the army coming from the territory of the State on the other. Now, in both cases, it is terrible, you know, that it should be either the system of the mercenariat or the system of the territorial army. These are two ways. I would say that the first way consists in *encasting*, literally ‘encasting’ a war machine in the State apparatus. The second way, obviously much more subtle, much more complex, consists in the State apparatus appropriating a war machine. I would say that armies of the State or military institutions have nothing to do with a war machine – if we rely on my definitions for convenience’s sake – but that armies and military institutions are not the form under which the State apparatuses appropriate a war machine and put it to their service.

Therefore I will never identify a war machine and a military institution. If you like, the war machine appears, according to the preceding hypotheses, to be much more on the side of the nomads without a State, but with a strong war machine, than from the side of the State apparatuses. The State apparatuses appropriate the war machine, and makes armies out of it, makes military institutions out of it. But these two poles – to encast or appropriate, as you see ... the maximum of appropriation will only emerge much later in the forms of national conscription. We encounter the problem much later and even still today: the professional army [*armée de métier*] versus the army of the nation. The [contrast of] professional army / the army of the people ... One sees that everywhere, everywhere. There will always be these two poles. Two special bodies. The famous special bodies that animate in their singular way modern armies and then national conscription ... all that will be in play in the most fundamental political problems on the interior of the State. Oh yes. But then, in both cases, I would say, moreover, that this is not the only problem, because if one reduces things to the relation *State apparatus – war machine*, how is it then that the State can *encast* the war machine under the form of the mercenariat or *appropriate* it under the form of the army known as ‘national’? If one reduces the problem to that, then all sorts of things still remain unsettled.

Because in fact, what is the really big problem? It is not so much which formula to choose, because whatever the case, be it mercenaries or soldiers who are called ‘national’, one must do something with them, one must take them into the system of the State apparatus. If not they quickly turn against the State apparatus. So how to do this? There is a broadly universal solution, but whose concrete figures are very varied, namely: one must give them pieces of land [*terres*]. They will literally have to be *territorialized*. It will be necessary to accord them territories, whether it be under the form of colonies, or internal territories. But what will the status of these military territories in the State apparatus be? In other words, I think it is less through the technical form ‘mercenariat – territorial armies’, than through financial, economic and territorial correlates – the distribution of territories, systems of taxes, codes of service – that the State apparatuses will succeed in assimilating war machines; but always still with the risk that the war machines will regroup themselves against them.

And this is not the happy day we have all been waiting for; this day is not yet the day of the revolution. When war machines turn against the State apparatuses, these can be very ambiguous

moments, and it can occur under the form of certain revolutionary movements, but it also comes about under completely different conditions, as we also must try to see this year. In any case I would say: the problem of the appropriation through the State of the war machine is all the more important in that it is a question that traverses all of history, at least all of history for those historians who are interested in the formation and the development of capitalism. The question is very simple: how does it come about that the development of capitalism should have to pass through the 'State' pole? When in capitalism there are so many factors which go against the State, that even proceed as a function of the abolition of States, how come capitalism triumphed by way of States and through the intermediary of the State apparatuses? It is not obvious. So you ask me: how could it manage to triumph?

Well, at any rate, there is another obvious solution: it could triumph by way of the 'town' pole. And town and State are not at all the same. The proof: at the beginning of capitalism, there are towns without States, and amongst the factors of capitalism, these are the most decisive factors. There was no absence of banking towns, commercial towns, and these did not at all belong to States. Any confusion between town and State would obviously be extremely annoying for us: they are completely different social formations. But here too they are found in [concrete] mixtures. I mean: sure, States are made up of towns. That doesn't mean at all that they have to involve the same social formation. So why is it that capitalism isn't developed and formed as a function of a network of towns that have not yet passed through the State apparatus? After all one can say that in some respects, that almost occurred. Here one would touch on points of contingency in history which would of course be very interesting.

You see, none of this ever goes without saying. What took place so that the State-form won? A real struggle was necessary; and first of all, a bloody struggle, for the State apparatuses seized control of the towns. For example, in Europe, this doesn't just happen by itself. They resisted, the towns. But all this is to say that I think, before going into the differences between the 'State' form and the 'town' form any further, that one of the fundamental reasons was precisely this: it was because only the 'State' form, only States were able to literally afford the cost of appropriating the war machine. For a town, for the towns, it would be much more difficult. We will have to look further into that. But I mean: when the triumph of the 'State' form over the 'town' form takes place at the moment of the development of capitalism, it is at the same moment that the appropriation of the war machine implies a very heavy investment of capital, which the commercial towns, even the richest, were not capable of providing. We would have to understand why. There could be a very simple explanation: that the commercial towns needed wars; commercial wars are an important kind of war. ... They needed wars, but they needed wars that were quick. They needed the quickest possible kind of wars, and finally, the least expensive types of war. We would have to look again at wars, like, for example, the war of Carthage. Carthage is a typical town. While Rome is already much more of a State apparatus. But Carthage: it cannot support Hannibal. Hannibal won everything he wanted, but he did not get any reinforcements. There was no investment in war. They needed a war of mercenaries; and a war of mercenaries, had to be carried out very quickly, otherwise it was screwed. It is the States that will invent, that will truly invent, the means of appropriating a war machine, by transforming war into a war of materials, that is to say, by investing more and more in the industry of war. At that point, yes, they will appropriate [the war machine] – except that's never a definitive solution -- provided that what's known as highly complex military industrial apparatuses are reconstituted,

and ultimately international apparatuses, that States can control only with great difficulty. All that is really complicated.

So you see, I would say: okay, there is indeed a problem of the relation of the State and the war machine, but the problem is how it appropriates it. Whatever the case, it cannot be that the State apparatus comes from the war machine. Now, in fact what is terrible is that, wherever one turns, wherever one turns in this story of 'what is the State apparatus and where does it come from?' wherever one turns, wherever one looks among the numerous theses on this subject, one comes up against the same thing, the same impression, namely that these theses are, as one says in logic, tautologies, that is to say that they presuppose what is in question. If I attempt to group together the classical theses on the origin of the State, I can observe that they are all found in one of the most profound authors on this question, namely: they are found, not at all in a confused state but under distinct headings, in Engels.

Now, the first kind of thesis involves invoking war, or (which is not the same thing but which is in the same current) phenomena connected to the war machine. It could be the act of war or the organisation of war. There were several theses along these lines. Engels deploys it when discussing Germanic peoples. He doesn't deploy it for any old case, he doesn't present a hotchpotch. He focuses on it in the case of the Germanic peoples. That's a first series of theses. If you don't mind, for greater simplicity I will call them *exogenous* theses (if that helps to simplify matters); that is to say, theses accounting for the formation of the State apparatus through reference to an extrinsic factor: the war machine, war. The State apparatus would be born, would be the product, of war.

Second kind of thesis: theses I call, for convenience sake, *endogenous*. They consist in invoking phenomena interior to economic and political development in the widest sense to give an account of the formation of the State apparatus. These theses are well known, these are factors which ... these are theses that mainly invoke two principal factors: how, starting from, and within, societies known as primitive, the elements of private property are constituted, the privatization of property and the monetarization of the economy. It is the emergence of phenomena of private property and of monetary and mercantile economics that would have brought with it the formation of the State apparatuses. Engels invokes this thesis notably in relation to Greece and Rome. Neither of these theses exclude each other; one can mix them together.

Third sort of thesis, which to me seems the most interesting but ... What for now we could call theses invoking specific factors. I hope you'll be able to see the very profound difference between these and the second kind of theses, the endogenous theses. If you look for these theses in Engels, you won't find them in *The Origin of the Family and of the State*, but in another book, namely: in the *Anti-Dühring*. They appeal to another stratum of cultures, to other geographical places. This is why it might seem at first sight that all these theses can be combined. And they consist in saying that what explains the formation of the State apparatus is the progressive emergence of public functions. The celebrated formula of Engels: "It is public functions that are at the origin of domination." What are these public functions? Well, with the advent, or rather with a certain development of agriculture, problems would have been posed that would have transcended the framework of primitive agricultural communities. In particular, one great problem: that of irrigation. And these are problems common to several communities, which

would have engendered public functions of the type: keeper of the waters, organizer of irrigation, and, from that moment on, the entrepreneur of works. You see: the organizer of irrigation, the entrepreneur of works, and if need be, the inspector of taxes, etc. These are public functions that are progressively singled out and which would have armed the State apparatus, brought with them the State apparatus.

Where do we stand in relation to these three types of theses? It's up to you to go and look at the books; as I said, Engels lays it all out very nicely. And well, I don't know, but for my part I have the impression ... but you know how it is, there will be some amongst you who say: yes, sure, one of these theses works for me. Once you've thought about it for a bit, or maybe you have already reflected on it. If [a thesis] suits you, that doesn't matter: either you won't listen to me [*Laughter*], or you'll just carry on listening to me all the same to see if things might work out better. That's quite possible! But for my part, I just say this: what is it that makes me think these theses presuppose what is in question? With regard to the first theses, the theses making a derivation from war, the thesis I call 'exogeneous', it's not that complicated. It's not complicated. Under what conditions, in fact, can war machines manage to produce a State? On the condition that one already exists. I would say that, yes, these are factors of the State, but they are secondary factors. They can only produce States in a derived form. It is to the extent that they are first directed against a pre-existing State – and again it is necessary that there be a pre-existing State – that, as a consequence, they can be integrated into a State. But they obviously presuppose that there is first of all ... that you're already assuming a State.

The endogenous theses, I would say, are even more striking, because the whole history of a formation of private property starting from the primitive commune, everything that's known as much in archaeology as in ethnology, that just doesn't work. I am just offering impressions: one truly has the feeling that it doesn't work. Why? One really cannot see how it could be done. One would have to indicate a mechanism. It is not enough to suggest that, all of a sudden, some great savage says: 'That belongs to me.' No. It would at least be necessary to have some idea of a basic mechanism that, starting from a communal property, or a tribal property, could engender a private property. How can that be done? On the other hand, everything archaeology teaches us – and you can find much clearer information there – is that private property is not or does not at all seem to be constituted, based on contemporary archaeological data, does not at all seem to be born from a system of so-called primitive tribal property. It is constituted starting from a system of public imperial property. In this, we see something I'll only say later, a very specific, assignable social mechanism, variable based on the case but still very assignable, through which a public State property – hence not at all private property, but a State public property – gets constituted as private property.

That makes sense, and it reinforces my basic hunch that the privatisation of property is only a factor in the State if one already assumes a State. For a simple reason, that the privatization of property, as the framework that makes it possible, implies the public property of the archaic empire. And what about money? On the side of money, we've reached a point where I'm appealing ... where I insist on appealing to ... because [it's] something I'll take up again next time, but I'll just say this for those amongst you ... to ask you to develop these points in advance. Couldn't one also say that a simultaneously mercantile and monetary development of the economy could have played a role in the constitution of the State? Here too the answer seems



to me: obviously not. No, for two reasons, one of which is self-evident, while the other seems to me much more devious, that is, much more interesting for us, if we manage to deepen it this year. The self-evident reason is almost the same as earlier, namely: the merchant economy is assignable to which moment? Even as merchant and monetary economy. It is precisely assignable. Money [*l'argent*], you understand, is a very complicated problem. But it is assignable precisely starting from the moment where there are very well-determined external circuits of commerce. These exist in primitive societies. Only, there is no monopoly. What appears with States is, as one says, the monopolistic character of external commerce. In other words, let us put it like this to move quickly: it is the emperor who holds the monopoly of commerce. And it is starting from this monopoly that the economy can be really monetarised. So that it is not at all on the side of commerce that one must search for the source of money.

The form 'money' does not come from commerce, rather the latter derives from it ... It comes into commerce starting from something else. And where does it come from, the 'money' form? There are many authors (and I don't claim to be the first to say this, on the contrary, I've got this from authors who seem to be saying some interesting things) who suggest the following hypothesis. It is that there are two sources (there is not much choice if you ask 'where does this thing of the form 'money [*argent*]', the form 'currency' [*monnaie*]', come from?'). It could come from two things: either from commerce or from what? Or from taxation. From taxation. Or rather it is a means. ... Either one will say that money is a means with which to exchange commodities, or one will say that money is a means of discharging you from tax. Let's leave to one side for the moment why it is that money discharges you from tax. We will see. But with a first glance, we can understand it at the level of summary propositions.

Now I do find very interesting this whole current of specialist writers on financial history who tend more and more towards this solution. They not only insist on the bipolar character of money (in saying that sometimes it is tax that is the origin of money, sometimes it is external commerce), but what interests me even more are those who tend towards the idea of a sole origin, namely that it is always tax. It is always tax which would be at the origin of money and it is starting from this moment, that an external commerce monopolised by the master of taxes becomes possible. I did not develop that at all because we would need to do some (albeit very simple) economic analyses. I personally think that it's true, that money does come from tax and not at all [from the exchange of commodities]. So you can see at any rate why this is so interesting for us. I'm saying this for those who already have some knowledge of these matters, but we will take the whole thing up more gently by looking at the story of the sequence of three kinds of rent .... The three famous rents. For example, when all the textbooks on economics distinguish between rent in products or rent in goods (that is to say, the peasant who gives goods to the landlord), rent in labour or services (the peasant who renders services, who gives services to the landlord), and rent in money (the peasant who makes payments to the landlord), very often these rents are presented as successive in history. But at the juncture at which we find ourselves, you can already see that in fact it is a single system, in which none of the three terms can exist without the other.

And why? Because the apparatus ... the State, defined as apparatus of capture, immediately has three poles. It is an apparatus of capture with three heads. And the three heads of the apparatus of capture, are: rent of the landlord, profit of the entrepreneur, tax of the despot. And why? They're

necessarily part of the same thing. There is something prodigious in the archaic States, in the archaic empires ... and it will also pose problems that will preoccupy the modern State, where things are no longer like that. But one must not say that the archaic State already discovered everything. Because our States went on to discover other things. What is formidable is the convergence of three forms: of the rent of the landlord, of the profit of the entrepreneur and of the taxes through which it maintains external commerce. How did that happen? It's not difficult, as we can see: necessarily, the State is simultaneously the public proprietor of the land ... I'm not bringing private property back into the equation: there is no private property, it is in so far as the emperor, the imperial instance, the instance of power, is the proprietor, therefore the public proprietor. There is no private property. There is a communal possession and an imperial property. It is a system, therefore, in which everything is public. There is no private element. The archaic emperor is the public proprietor and, by virtue of this title, receives ground rent. He is the master of surplus labour, the master of great works, and by virtue of this status receives profit from the entrepreneur. And finally, he collects taxes and monopolises external commerce. And the three heads, I would say, this is almost, if you like ... well, in Marx there is a famous trinary formula, for those who know it. For myself, I am thinking of another formula, but to some extent it comes down to the same thing ... but that has no importance, it's no discovery, it is ...

The trinary formula I am thinking of would be this: at the level of archaic empires there is already rent of land, profit of enterprise, taxes and external commerce. And these will be the three heads of the apparatus of capture. Hence you can see why, from where I'm standing, all the factors that have been proposed to me are factors that already presuppose what was to be explained. In relation to the previous arguments, not only is it not monetary economy and the development of the monetary economy which are capable of explaining the State, since the monetary form presupposes tax, which already returns to the State, but it is also not private property, the development of private property that is capable of explaining it, for the simple reason that private property derives, under predetermined conditions, from imperial public property.

And finally, is it the last hypothesis, the public functions which progressively [lead to it]? No. There are three archaic public functions. There are three. And the archaic imperial bureaucracy has three heads. This is the ground landlord, or the representative of the ground landlord, who is a functionary of the Emperor, because the ground landlord is the Emperor. So it is he who handles the ground rent. Secondly, it is the entrepreneur who receives profit; and the entrepreneur is also the Emperor or his functionary. Both are required: the emperor and his functionaries. Or rather, this is a second type of functionary. And thirdly, perhaps the best of all, the most mysterious, but who appears right from the beginning, is the banker. It is the banker. And there you have the triple imperial bureaucracy. The representative of the ground landlord, the entrepreneur, the banker. Why? Because the bank has never simply been an intermediary institution. The bank is an institution and when one understands ... but you already know this, I'm saying this for those ... we should try to make this clear, this is what we should do this year: the bank is not an intermediary ... or at least, it is only an intermediary institution, in some of its aspects, if it is already an institution that creates. A bank – but not any kind of bank. The others only derive from the more fundamental banks. A bank: meaning an institution for the emission and creation of money. To the question 'where does money come from?', the answer is:

obviously, money comes from what emits it, what creates it. There is a creation of money. It is the banks that bring about the creation of money.

Now, in the archaic Empire, the banker is precisely the master of taxes and the one who, in the name of the Emperor, takes care of foreign trade and the monopoly of foreign trade. More: he carries out the most mysterious operation, the most mysterious for us from the archaeological point of view, that could exist in the most archaic State, namely: he already carries out the operation of being an intermediary between the three poles. Namely: he exchanges money for goods. Because put yourself in the situation of a poor functionary of the Emperor. He owes a tax to the Emperor. He receives lands, but in a delegated title. He is not a private proprietor – we will see that more clearly the next time – there is no private property, there is a communal possession of the commons, there is an eminent property of the Emperor, but it is a public property, and it is a property of the function of functionaries of the emperor. There is no private property in any of that. Well, it is not easy, his situation, the functionary who gains lands with this functional title. He owes to the Emperor a tax. The peasants give him goods for taxes. But the Emperor, for his part, makes a conversion. You know, it's inspired as a system. It is inspired. I mean, if one doesn't understand that ... If understands that, one can better understand contemporary monetary operations which, nevertheless, have no relation to this, but must start with a device like that. He finds himself in a diabolical situation, because the Emperor, for his part, does not want goods. Or at least, if he does want them, it's for his stocks. He takes a small share of natural goods, okay. He puts aside some corn, things like that. But he also takes money [*argent*].

Therefore the functionary will have to bring about the conversion of a share of the goods that the peasants owe him into the money [*monnaie*] that he owes to the Emperor. It is necessary therefore that it passes through a bank. And the bank, for its part, how is it to procure that? How will it harvest it? It takes in natural goods and it gives out money [*argent*]. What will this creation of money [*argent*] be in the oldest Empires? It is formidable as a system. It will be one of those very strange systems. Understand that much of what was already known as the agrarian problem, in the most archaic epochs, is completely related to this system. Rent in nature, in natural goods, and then conversion of rent in nature into monetary rent through the intermediary of the bank. In every case, the three great public functions – I say this in order to finish up – are: the ground landlord, the entrepreneur of large works, and the banker, the banker of taxes and commerce. Now, how do these public functions account for the apparition of the State? When, on the one hand, they are strictly complementary – it seems to me – and, on the other hand, that from the moment they emerge, the State is already there.

So, at the point we've got to, I think I have said what this year's problem will be. When it is so clear-cut, we could stop here, and say: "there is no solution, it's perfect." The problem, from where we're standing, is: suppose that the State apparatus is defined as an apparatus of capture that is not explained through the war machine, which will appropriate the machine of war but which will not be explained through it - we can see that it functions like a trap. It is like a trap in the sense in which one talks of a trap in hunting. It is not war that is the model of the State apparatus. It is much more like capture. It would be much more like hunting. One could draw up a table of the apparatus, in the same way one can make a table of the hunting apparatus, or of a trap. It is an apparatus with three heads, constituted by: rents, profits, taxes. How could that have worked? How could that have worked? With a police, to be sure. With a bureaucracy. With a

policing bureaucracy. Why does that suffice? How did it come about that there was no need for an apparatus of war at this moment, of a war machine for such an apparatus? How come the problem of war is a completely different problem? So what happens at this level? What is this State that I call 'archaic', and which already presents these three heads? And what about the circulation between the three heads? We could say that this, therefore, is the strange role of the bank, between rents, profits and taxes; and our trinitary formula of the State apparatus of capture would be: rents, profits, taxes.

So the primary task for you this year is to do some political economy, if you don't mind, at this level of ground rent, taxes, and all that. There is surely a lot on that that can help me. Second task: when we arrive at some of the other problems, it would be good if there could be a group which this time – I will explain why in the next session – could get started as soon as possible on research into what is known as – this might sound surprising, but I'll explain next time – into what mathematicians call 'axiomatics'. And as I think that the relations between the Department of Philosophy and that of Mathematics are particularly close, if need be, I will ask the mathematicians if there is a way for some of you ... [*End of the recording*]

**Notes** [N.B. All notes established in 2020 or 2023]

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<sup>1</sup> On the Book of Numbers and Moses, and also for much of this development, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 387-388.

<sup>2</sup> *Travail* will be translated as 'work' or 'labour', depending on the context.

<sup>3</sup> On the questions of borrowed writing as well as weapons and tools, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 400-403.

<sup>4</sup> On the role of feelings (sentiment and affect) as well types of justice, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 399-400.

<sup>5</sup> On types of violence, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 425 and pp. 446-448.

<sup>6</sup> For this analysis from Georges Dumézil (in this paragraph and the following one), see the reference in *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 425-427 and p. 564, notes 3, 4, and 5, to *Mitra-Varuna* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948). However, Deleuze and Guattari also cite in this regard Ernst Jünger, *The Glass Bees* (New York: Noonday Press, 1960), p. 564, note 6.

<sup>7</sup> To clarify this gap slightly, and with reference to matter-movement in relation to the phylum, see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 406-409 and 415.