

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on  
Anti-Oedipus I  
Logic of Flows**

1971-1972

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**Codes, Capitalism, Flows, Decoding Flows, Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Psychoanalysis**

... What is it that moves over the body of a society? It is always flows, and a person is always a cutting off [*coupure*] of a flow. A person is always a point of departure for the production of a flow, a point of destination for the reception of a flow, a flow of any kind; or, better yet, an interception of many flows.

If a person has hair, this hair can move through many stages: the hairstyle of a young girl is not the same as that of a married woman, it is not the same as that of a widow: there is a whole hairstyle code. A person, insofar as she styles her hair, typically presents herself as an interceptor in relation to flows of hair that exceed her and exceed her case and these flows of hair are themselves coded according to very different codes: widow code, young girl code, married woman code, etc. This is ultimately the essential problem of coding and of the territorialization which is always coding flows with it, as a fundamental means of operation: marking persons (because persons are situated at the interception and at the cutting off [*coupure*] of flows, they exist at the points where flows are cut off [*coupure*]).

But now, more than marking persons—marking persons is the apparent means of operation—coding has a deeper function, that is to say, a society is only afraid of one thing: the deluge; it is not afraid of the void, it is not afraid of dearth or scarcity. Over a society, over its social body, something flows [*coule*] and we do not know what it is, something flows that is not coded, and something which, in relation to this society, even appears as the uncodable. Something which would flow and which would carry away this society to a kind of deterritorialization which would make the earth upon which it has set itself up dissolve: this, then, is the crisis. We encounter something that crumbles, and we do not know what it is, it responds to no code, it flees underneath the codes.

And this is even true, in this respect, for capitalism which for a long time believed it could always secure simili-codes; this, then, is what we call the well-known power [*puissance*] of recuperation within capitalism—when we say recuperate we mean: each time something seems to escape capitalism, seems to pass beneath its simili-codes; it reabsorbs all this, it adds one more axiom and the machine starts up again. Think of capitalism in the 19th century: it sees the flowing of a pole of flow that is, literally, a flow, the flow of workers, a proletariat flow: well, what is this which flows, which flows wickedly and which carries away our earth, where are we

headed? The thinkers of the 19th century have a very strange response, notably the French historical school: it was the first in the 19th century to have thought in terms of classes, they are the ones who invent the theoretical notion of classes and invent it precisely as an essential fragment of the capitalist code, namely: the legitimacy of capitalism comes from this: the victory of the bourgeoisie as a class opposed to the aristocracy.

The system that appears in the works of Saint Simon, Augustin Thierry, Edgar Quinet is the radical seizure of consciousness by the bourgeoisie as a class and they interpret all of history as a class struggle. It is not Marx who invents the understanding of history as a class struggle, it is the bourgeois historical school of the 19th century: 1789, yes, it is a class struggle, they are struck blind when they see flowing, on the actual surface of the social body, this weird flow that they do not recognize: the proletariat flow. The idea that this is a class is not possible, it is not one at this moment: the day when capitalism can no longer deny that the proletariat is a class, this coincides with the moment when, in its head, it found the moment to recode all this.

That which we call the power [*puissance*] of recuperation of capitalism, what is it? [It consists] in having at its disposal a kind of axiomatic, and when it sets upon [*dispose de*] some new thing which it does not recognize, as with every axiomatic, it is an axiomatic with a limit that cannot be saturated: it is always ready to add one more axiom to restore its functioning.

When capitalism can no longer deny that the proletariat is a class, when it comes to recognize a type of class bipolarity, under the influence of workers' struggles in the 19th century, and under the influence of the revolution, this moment is extraordinarily ambiguous, for it is an important moment in the revolutionary struggle, but it is also an essential moment in capitalist recuperation: I make you one more axiom, I make you axioms for the working class and for the union power [*puissance*] that represents them, and the capitalist machine grinds its gears and starts up again, it has sealed the breach. In other words, all the bodies of a society are essential: to prevent the flowing over society, over its back, over its body, of flows that it cannot code and to which it cannot assign a territoriality.

Need, scarcity, famine, a society can code these, what it cannot code, is when this thing appears, when it says to itself: what is up with these guys? So, in a first phase, the repressive apparatus puts itself into motion, if we can't code it, we will try to annihilate it. In a second phase, we try to find new axioms which allow it to be recoded for better or worse.

A social body is well defined as follows: there is perpetual trickery, flows flow over from one pole to another, and they are perpetually coded, and there are flows that escape from the codes. And then there is the social effort to recuperate all that, to axiomatize all this, to manipulate the code a little, so as to make room for flows that are also dangerous: all of a sudden. There are young people who do not respond to the code: they insist on having a flow of hair which was not expected, what shall we do now? We try to recode it, we will add an axiom, we will try to recuperate [it] but then [if] there is something within it that continues not to let itself be coded, what then?

In other words, this is the fundamental action of a society: to code the flows and to treat as an enemy anyone who presents himself, in relation to society, as an uncodable flow, because, once again, it challenges [*met en question*] the entire earth, the whole body of this society.

I will say this of every society, except perhaps of our own—that is, capitalism, even though just now I spoke of capitalism as if it coded all the flows in the same way as all other societies and did not have any other problems, but perhaps I was going too fast.

There is a fundamental paradox in capitalism as a social formation: if it is true that the terror of all the other social formations was decoded flows, capitalism, for its part, historically constituted itself on an unbelievable thing: namely, that which was the terror of other societies: the existence and the reality of decoded flows and these, capitalism made its proper concern.

If this were true, it would explain that capitalism is, in a very precise sense, the universal form of all societies: in a negative sense, capitalism would be that which all societies dreaded above all, and we cannot help but have the impression that, historically speaking, capitalism... In a certain sense, is what every social formation constantly tried to exorcise, what it constantly tried to avoid, why? Because it was the ruin of every other social formation. And the paradox of capitalism is that a social formation constituted itself on the basis of that which was the negative of all the others. This means that capitalism was not able to constitute itself except through a conjunction, an encounter between decoded flows of all kinds. The thing which was dreaded most of all by every social formation was the basis for a social formation that had to engulf all the others: that what was the negative of all formations has become the very positivity of ours, this makes one shudder.

And in what sense was capitalism constituted on the conjunction of decoded flows? It required extraordinary encounters at the end of a process [*processus*] of decodings of every kind, which were formed with the decline of feudalism. These decodings of all kinds consisted in the decoding of land flows, under the form of the constitution of large private properties, the decoding of monetary flows, under the form of the development of merchant fortunes, the decoding of a flow of workers under the form of expropriation, of the deterritorialization of serfs and peasant landholders. And this is not enough, for if we take the example of Rome, the decoding in decadent Rome, all this clearly happened: the decoding of flows of property under the form of large private properties, the decoding of monetary flows under the forms of large private fortunes, the decoding of laborers with the formation of an urban sub-proletariat: everything is found here, almost everything. The elements of capitalism are found here all together, only there is no encounter.

What was necessary for the encounter to be made between the decoded flows of capital or of money and the decoded flows of laborers, for the encounter to be made between the flow of emergent capital and the flow of deterritorialized manpower, literally, the flow of decoded money and the flow of deterritorialized laborers. Indeed, the manner in which money is decoded so as to become money capital and the manner in which the laborer is ripped from the earth in order to become the owner of his/her labor power [*force de travail*] alone: these are two processes totally independent from each other, there must be an encounter between the two.

Indeed, for the process of the decoding of money to form capital that is made all across the embryonic forms of commercial capital and banking capital, the flow of labor, the free possessor of his/her labor power alone, is made across a whole other line that is the deterritorialization of the laborer at the end of feudalism, and this could very well not have been encountered. A conjunction of decoded and deterritorialized flows, this is at the basis of capitalism. Capitalism is constituted on the failure of all the pre-existent codes and social territorialities.

If we admit this, what does this represent? The capitalist machine, it is literally demented. A social machine that functions on the basis of decoded, deterritorialized flows, once again, it is not that societies did not have any idea of this; they had the idea in the form of panic, they acted to prevent this — it was the overturning of all the social codes known up to that point — ; so, a society that constitutes itself on the negative of all pre-existing societies, how can it function? A society for which it is proper to decode and deterritorialize all the flows -- flow of production, flow of consumption -- how can it function, under what form? Perhaps capitalism has other processes than coding to make it work, perhaps it is completely different.

What I have been seeking up until now was to reground, at a certain level, the problem of the relation capitalism / schizophrenia, and the grounding of a relation is found in something common between capitalism and the schizo: what they have totally in common. And it is perhaps a community that is never realized, that does not assume a concrete figure; it is a community of a principle that remains abstract, namely, the one like the other does not cease to filter, to emit, to intercept, to concentrate decoded and deterritorialized flows.

This is their profound identity, and it is not at the level of a way of life that capitalism renders us schizophrenic. It is at the level of the economic process: all this only works through a system of conjunction -- say the word then -- on condition of accepting that this word implies a veritable difference in nature from codes. It is capitalism that functions like an axiomatic, an axiomatic of decoded flows. All other social formations functioned on the basis of a coding and of a territorialization of flows and between a capitalist machine that makes an axiomatic of decoded flows such as they are or deterritorialized flows, such as they are, and other social formations, there is truly a difference in nature that makes capitalism the negative of other societies. Now, the schizo, in his own way, with his own tottering walk, he does the same thing. In a sense, he is more capitalist than the capitalist, more `prole' than the `prole': he decodes, he deterritorializes the flows and knots together a kind of identity in nature of capitalism and the schizo.

Schizophrenia is the negative of the capitalist formation. In a sense, schizophrenia goes further, capitalism functioned on a conjunction of decoded flows, on one condition, that is, at the same time that it perpetually decoded flows of money, flows of labor, etc., it incorporated them, it constructed a new type of machine, at the same time, not afterwards, that was not a coding machine, but an axiomatic machine.

It is in this way that it succeeds in making a coherent system, on condition that we say what profoundly distinguishes an axiomatic of decoded flows and a coding of flows. Whereas the schizo, he does more, he does not let himself be axiomatized either, he always goes further with the decoded flows, making do with no flows at all, rather than letting himself be coded, no earth at all, rather than letting himself be territorialized.

What is their relation to each other? It is from this point that the problem arises. One must study more closely the relation capitalism / schizophrenia, giving the greatest importance to this: is it true and in what sense can we define capitalism as a machine that functions on the basis of decoded flows, on the basis of deterritorialized flows? In what sense is it the negative of all social formations, and along the same lines, in what sense is schizophrenia the negative of capitalism, that it goes even further in decoding and in deterritorialization? And just where does it go, and where does that take it? Towards a new earth, towards no earth at all, towards the deluge?

If I try to link up with the problems of psychoanalysis, in what sense, in what manner—this is strictly a beginning—, I assume that there is something in common between capitalism, as a social structure, and schizophrenia as a process. Something in common that makes it so that the schizo is produced as the negative of capitalism -- itself the negative of all the rest --, and that this relation, we can now comprehend it by considering its terms: coding of flows, decoded and deterritorialized flows, axiomatic of decoded flows, etc.

It remains to be seen what in the psychoanalytic and psychiatric problem continues to preoccupy us. One must reread three texts of Marx: in book I: the production of surplus value, the chapter on the tendential fall in the last book, and finally, in the *Grundrisse*, the chapter on automation.

Richard Zrehen: I did not understand what you said in regard to the analogy between capitalism and schizophrenia, when you said capitalism is the negative of other societies and the schizo is the negative of capitalism, I would have understood that capitalism is to other societies what the schizo is to capitalism, but, I would have thought, on the contrary, that you were not going to make this opposition. I would have thought of the opposition: capitalism / other societies and schizophrenia/ something else, instead of an analogy in three terms, to make one in four terms.

Cyril: Richard means to say the opposition between: capitalism/ other societies and schizophrenia and neuroses, for example.

Deleuze: Haaa, yes, yes, yes, yes. We are defining flows in political economy, its importance with actual economists confirms what I have been saying. For the moment, a flow is something, in a society, that flows from one pole to another, and that passes through a person, only to the degree that persons are interceptors.

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: Let me take an example, you say that in a society one does not stop decoding, I'm not sure: I believe that there are two things in a society, one of which pertains to the principle by which a society comes to an end [*se termine*], one of which pertains to the death of a society: all death, in a certain manner, appears—this is the great principle of Thanatos—from inside [*dedans*] and all death comes from outside [*dehors*]. I mean that there is an internal menace in every society, this menace being represented by the danger of flows decoding themselves, it makes sense.

There is never a flow first, and then a code that imposes itself upon it. The two are coexistent. Which is the problem, if I again take up the studies, already quite old, of [Claude] Levi-Strauss on marriage: he tells us: the essential in a society is circulation and exchange. Marriage, alliance, is exchanging, and what is important is that it circulates and that it exchanges. There is, then, a flow of women—raising something to a coefficient flow seems to me to be a social operation, the social operation of flows. At the level of society, there are no women, there is a flow of women that refers to a code, a code of age-old things, of clans, of tribes, but there is always flow of women, and then, in a second moment, a code: the code and the flow are absolutely formed face to face with one another.

What is it the problem then, at the level of marriage, in a so-called primitive society? It is that, in relation to flows of women, by virtue of a code, there is something that must pass through. It involves forming a sort of system, not at all like Levi-Strauss suggests, not at all a logical combinatory [*combinatoire*], but a physical system with territorialities: something enters, something exits. So here we clearly see that, brought into relation with a physical system of marriage, women present themselves in the form of a flow. Regarding this flow, the social code means this: in relation to such a flow, something of the flow must pass through, i.e.: flow; something must not go through; and, third — this will make up the three fundamental terms of every code — something must effect the passing through or, on the contrary, the blocking: for example, in matrilineal systems, everyone knows the importance of the maternal [*utérine*] uncle, why, in the flow of women, what passes through is the permitted or even prescribed marriage.

A schizo, in a society like that, he is not there; literally, it belongs to us, over there, it is something else.

There, it is different: there is a very good case studied by Pierre Clastres; there is a guy who does not know, he does not know whom he must marry, he attempts a voyage of deterritorialization to see a faraway sorcerer.<sup>1</sup> There is a great English ethnologist named [Edmund] Leach whose whole thesis consists in saying: it never works like Levi-Strauss says it does, he does not believe in Levi-Strauss's system: no one knows who to marry; Leach makes a fundamental discovery, that which he calls local groups and distinguishes from groups of filiation. Local groups, these are the little groups that machine [*machinent*] marriages and alliances and they do not deduce them from filiations: the alliance is a kind of strategy that responds to political givens. A local group is literally a group (perverse, specialists in coding) that determines, for each caste, what can pass through, what cannot pass through, that which must be blocked, that which can flow.<sup>2</sup>

In a matrilineal system, what is blocked? That which is blocked in all systems, that which falls under the rules of the prohibition of incest. Here, something in the flow of women is blocked; namely, certain persons are eliminated from the flow of marriageable women, in relation to other persons. That which, on the contrary, passes through is, we could say, the first permitted incest: the first legal incests in the form of preferential marriages; but everyone knows that the first permitted incests are never practiced in fact, it is still too close to that which is blocked. You see that the flow is interrupted here, something in the flow is blocked, something passes through, and here, there are the great perverts who machine marriages, who block or who effect passages. In the history of the maternal uncle, the aunt is blocked as an image of forbidden incest, in the form

of a jesting kinship, the nephew has, with his aunt, a very joyous relation, with his uncle, a relation of theft, but theft, injuries, these are coded; see [Bronislaw] Malinowski.

A student: These local groups have magical powers?

Deleuze: They have an overtly political power [*pouvoir*], they sometimes call upon sorcery, but they are not witchcraft groups, they are political groups who define the strategy of a village in relation to another village, and a clan in relation to another clan.

Every code in relation to flows implies that we prevent something of this flow from passing through, we block it, we let something pass: there will be people having a key position as interceptors, i.e. so as to prevent passage or, on the contrary, to effect passage, and when we take note that these characters are such that, according to the code, certain prestations return to them; we better understand how the whole system works.

In all societies, the problem was always to code flows and to recode those that tended to escape—when is it that the codes vacillate in so-called primitive societies: essentially at the moment of colonialization, there where the code flees under the pressure of capitalism. For that is what it represents in a society of codes, the introduction of money; it scatters to the winds their entire circuit of flows, in the sense that they distinguish essentially three types of flows: the flows of production to be consumed, the flows of prestige, objects of prestige and flows of women. When money is introduced therein, it is a catastrophe -- see what [Robert] Jaulin analyses as ethnocide: money, Oedipus complex.<sup>3</sup>

They try to relate money to their code, as such it can only be a prestige good. It is not a production or consumption good, it is not a woman, but the young people of the tribe who understand quicker than the elders take advantage of money in order to seize hold of the circuit of consumption goods, the circuit of consumption that was traditionally, in certain tribes, controlled by women. So the young people, with money, seize hold of the circuit of consumption. With money which itself can no longer be coded, within a certain framework, we begin with money, and we end with money.

M[oney]-C[ommodity]-M[oney], there is absolutely no means of coding this thing here because the qualified flows are replaced by a flow of abstract quantity whose proper essence is the infinite reproduction for which the formula is M-C-M. No code can support infinite reproduction. What is formidable in so-called primitive societies is how debt exists, but exists in the form of a finite block, debt is finite.

So, in this sense flows pass their time by fleeing, it does not prevent the codes from being correlative and coding the flows. Undoubtedly, it escapes from all sides, and the one who does not let her/himself be coded, and so we say: that's a madman; we will code him/her: the village madman, we will make a code of the code.

The originality of capitalism is that it no longer counts on any code. There are code residues, but no one believes in them: we no longer believe in anything. The last code that capitalism knew how to produce was fascism: an effort to recode and reterritorialize even at the economic level,



at the level of the functioning of the market in the fascist economy. Here we clearly see an extreme effort to resuscitate a kind of code that would function like the code of capitalism; literally, it could have lasted in the form in which it has lasted. As for capitalism, it is incapable of furnishing a code that covers the ensemble of the social field like a grid [*quadrille*], because its problems no longer pose themselves in terms of code. Its problem is to make a mechanism of decoded flows as such, so it is uniquely in this sense that I oppose capitalism as a social formation to all the other known social formations.

Can we say that between a coding of flows corresponding to pre-capitalist formations and a decoded axiomatic, there is a difference in nature, or is there simply a variation? There is a radical difference in nature! Capitalism cannot furnish any code.

We cannot say that the struggle against a system is totally independent of the manner in which this system was characterized. It is difficult to consider that the struggle of socialism against capitalism in the 19th century was independent of the theory of surplus value, in so far as this theory specified the characteristic of capitalism.

Suppose that capitalism can be defined as an economic machine excluding the codes and making decoded flows function by taking them into an axiomatic. This already permits us to bring together the capitalist situation and the schizophrenic situation. Even at the level of analysis that has a practical influence, the analysis of monetary mechanisms (the neocapitalist economists, this is schizophrenic) when we see how the monetary practice of capitalism works, at the concrete level, and not just in theory, its schizoid character, can we say that it is totally indifferent to revolutionary practice?

All that we are doing in relation to psychoanalysis and psychiatry comes down to what? Desire, or, it matters little, the unconscious: it is not imaginary or symbolic, it is uniquely machinic, and as long as you have not reached the region of the machine of desire, as long as you remain in the imaginary, the structural or the symbolic, you do not have a genuine hold on the unconscious. They are machines that, like all machines, are confirmed as such by their functioning. Confirmations: the painter [Richard] Lindner obsessed by "Boy with machine", a huge little boy in the foreground holding a strange little machine, a kind of little kite and behind him, a big social technical machine and his little machine is plugged into the big one, in the background.<sup>4</sup> That is what I attempted last year to call the orphan unconscious, the true unconscious, the one that does not pass through daddy-mommy, the one that passes through delirious machines, these being in a given relation with the large social machines.

Second confirmation: an Englishman, W.G. Niederland, did research on Schreber's father.<sup>5</sup> This is what I object to in the text of Freud: it is as if psychoanalysis was a veritable millstone which crushed the deepest character of the guy, namely, his social character... When we read Schreber, the Great Mongol, the Aryans, the Jews, etc. And when we read Freud, not a word about all this, it is as if it was just some manifest content and that one had to discover the latent content = the eternal daddy-mommy of Oedipus. All the political, politico-sexual, politico-libidinal content, because in the end, when Schreber père imagined himself to be a little Alsatian girl defending Alsace against a French officer, there is political libido here. It is sexual and political at the same

time, the one in the other; we learn that Schreber was well-known because he had invented a system of education == Schreber Gardens. He had produced a system of universal pedagogy.

Schizoanalysis proceeds in a direction that is the opposite of psychoanalysis, indeed, each time that the subject narrates something that brings her/him in the vicinity of Oedipus or castration, the schizo being analyzed says "Enough." What he sees as important, is that: Schreber père invents a pedagogic system of universal value, that is not brought to bear on his own child, but globally: Pangymnasticon. If we suppress from the delirium [*delire*] of the son the politico-global dimension of the paternal pedagogic system, we can longer understand anything. The father does not supply a structural function, but a political system: I am saying that the libido passes through here, not through daddy and mommy, through the political system. In the Pangymnasticon, there are machines: no system without machines, a system, rigorously speaking, is a structural unity of machines, so much so that one must burst the system to reach the machines. And what are Schreber's machines: they are sado-paranoiac machines, a type of delirious machine. They are sado-paranoiac in the sense that they are applied to children, preferably to little girls.

With these machines, the children stay calm; in this delirium, the universal pedagogic dimension clearly appears: it is not a delirium about his son, it is a delirium that he constructs about the formation of a higher race. Schreber père acts against his son, not as a father, but as a libidinal promoter of a delirious investment of the social field. It is no longer the paternal function, but rather that the father is there to make something delirious pass through. This is certain, but the father acts here as an agent of transmission in relation to a field that is not the familial field, but that is a political and historical field, once again, the names of history and not the name of the father.

Georges Comtesse: We do not catch flies with vinegar, even if it's machinic.

Deleuze: Schreber père's system had a global development (belts for good conduct). It was a big social machine, and it was, at the same time, sown in the social machine, full of little delirious sado-paranoiac machines. So too, in the delirium of the son, certainly it is papa, but as a representative of what authority does he intervene. He intervenes as an agent of transmission in a libidinal investment of a certain type of social formation. On the contrary, the drama of psychoanalysis is the eternal familialism that consists in referring the libido, and with it all sexuality, to the familial machine, and we can go on to structuralize it, it changes nothing, we remain within the closed circle of: symbolic castration, structuring function of the family, parental characters, and we continue to crush all the outside [*dehors*]. [Maurice] Blanchot: a new type of relation with the outside.<sup>6</sup>

Yet, and this is the critical point, psychoanalysis tends to suppress any relation of itself and of the subject who has just been analyzed with the outside. On itself alone it pretends to reterritorialize us, onto the territoriality or onto the most mediocre earth, the most shabby, the oedipal territoriality, or worse, onto the couch. Here, we clearly see the relation of psychoanalysis and capitalism: if it is true that in capitalism, flows are decoded, are deterritorialized constantly, i.e. that capitalism produces the schizo like it produces money, the whole capitalist project [*tentative*] consists in reinventing artificial territorialities in order to

reinscribe people, to vaguely recode them: they invent anything: HLM [*Habitation à Loyer Moyen*, i.e.: government-controlled housing], home, and there is familial reterritorialization, the family, it is after all the social cell, so they will reterritorialize the guy in a family (community psychiatry): they reterritorialize people there where all the territorialities are floating ones, they proceed through an artificial, imaginary, residual reterritorialization.

And psychoanalysis—classical psychoanalysis—fabricates familial reterritorialization, most of all by skipping over all that is effective in delirium, all that is aggressive in delirium, namely, that delirium is a system of politico-social investments, not just of any type: it is the libido that hooks itself onto political social determinations. Schreber is not dreaming at all when he makes love to his mother; he dreams when he is being raped like a little Alsatian girl by a French officer. This depends on something much deeper than Oedipus, namely, the manner in which the libido invests social formations, to the point that one must distinguish two types of social investments by desire: social investments of interests that are of the preconscious type, that, if necessary, pass through classes. And below these, not exactly in harmony with them, unconscious investments, the libidinal investments of desire.

Traditional psychoanalysis enclosed the libidinal investments of desire in the familial triangle and structuralism is the last attempt [*tentative*] to save Oedipus at the moment when Oedipus is coming apart at the seams.

The task of schizoanalysis is to see that parents play a role in the unconscious only as agents of interception, agents of transmission in a system of the flows of desire, of desiring machines, and what counts is my unconscious relation with my desiring machines. What are my own desiring machines, and, through them, the unconscious relation of these desiring machines with the large social machines with which they carry out...and that hence, there is no reason to support psychoanalysis in its attempt to reterritorialize us.

I take an example from [Serge] Leclaire's last book [*Démasquer le réel (Paris: Seuil, 1971)*; see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 323-324]; there is something that no longer works: “The most fundamental act in the history of psychoanalysis was a decentering that consisted in passing from the parents' room as referent to the analytical office.” There was a time when we believed in Oedipus, and in the reality of seduction, it was not going strong even then, because the whole unconscious had been familiarized, a crushing of the libido onto daddy-mommy-me: the whole development of psychoanalysis was made in this direction [*sens*]: substitution of the phantasm for real seduction and substitution of castration for Oedipus. Leclaire: “To tell the truth, the displacement of the living kernel of the oedipal conjuncture, of the familial scene to the psychoanalytic scene, is strictly correlative to a sociological mutation in which we can psychoanalytically demarcate a recourse to the level of the familial institution,” page 30. The family is shabby: the unconscious protests and no longer works to triangulate itself, happily there is the analyst to serve as a relay.

It no longer supports the family, custody and the concealment [*dérobement*] of an all-powerful real. We say, ouf!, we will finally have a relation with the extra familial real, ha! no! says Leclaire, for that which serves as a relay for the family, and that which becomes the guardian, the unveiling veiling of the all-powerful real is the office of the analyst.

You can no longer triangulate, oedipalize in the family; it no longer works. You will come onto the couch to triangulate and oedipalize yourself. And indeed, adds Leclaire: “If the psychoanalytic couch has become the place where the confrontation with the real is unfolded.” The confrontation with the real does not take place on the earth, in the movement of territorialization, reterritorialization, of deterritorialization, it takes place on this rotten earth that is the couch of the analyst. “It is of no importance that the oedipal scene has no referent exterior to the office, that castration has no referent outside the office of the analyst,” which signifies that psychoanalysis, like capitalism, finds itself faced with the decoded flows of desire, finds itself before the schizophrenic phenomena of decoding and deterritorialization, has chosen to make for itself a little axiomatic. The couch, the ultimate earth of European man today, his very own little earth.

This situation of psychoanalysis tends to introduce an axiomatic excluding all reference, excluding all relation with the outside whatever it may be, appears as a catastrophic movement of interiority when it comes to understanding the true investments of desire. From the moment we seized upon the family as referent, it was all screwed up. The last earth, the couch that valorizes and justifies itself on its own terms. It was compromised from the beginning, from the moment when we cut desire off from the double dimension—what I call the double dimension of desire: and its relation, on the one hand, with desiring machines irreducible to any symbolic or structural dimension, to functional desiring machines, and the problem of schizoanalysis is to know how these desiring machines work, and to reach the level where they work in someone's unconscious, which assumes that we will skip over Oedipus, castration, etc.

On the other hand, with social-political-cosmic investments, and here one must not say, that there would be any desexualization of the findings of psychoanalysis, for I am saying that desire, in its fundamental sexual form, can only be understood in its sexual investments. In so far as they do not bear on daddy-mommy, this is secondary, but in so far as they bear, on the one hand, on desiring machines, and on the other hand, in so far as they traverse our sexual, homosexual, heterosexual loves.

What is invested is always what cuts up [*des coupures*] of the dimensions of a historical social field, and certainly, the father and the mother play a role within it, they are agents of communication of desiring machines, on one hand of the machines with each other, and on the other hand, of the desiring machines with the large desiring machines.

Schizoanalysis is made up of three operations: A destructive task: skipping over the oedipal and castrating structures in order to reach a region of the unconscious where there is no castration etc., because desiring machines ignore this.

A positive task: That is to see and to analyze functionally, there is nothing to interpret = we do not interpret a machine, we grasp its functioning and its failures, the why of its failures: it is the oedipal collar, the psychoanalytic collar of the couch that introduces failures into desiring machines.

The third task: Desiring machines only work as long as they invest the social machines. And what are the types of libidinal investments, distinct from the preconscious investments of

interests? These sexual investments -- cross all the beings that we love, all our loves -- it is a complex of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, that which we love. It is always a certain mulatto, a movement of deterritorialization and reterritorialization; it is not the scrawny and hysteric territoriality of the couch. And across each being that we love, what we invest is a social field; these are the dimensions of this social field, and the parents are agents of transmission in the social field.

See George Jackson's letter,<sup>7</sup> the classic black mother who says to her son, don't fool around and marry well, make money. This classic mother here, is she acting like a mother and like an oedipal object of desire, or is she acting in such a way that she transmits a certain type of libidinal investment of the social field, namely the type that marries well, he makes love, and this in the strictest sense of the term, with something through his wife, unconsciously, with a certain number of economic, political, social processes? And that love has always been a means through which the libido attains something other than the beloved person, namely a whole cutting up [*découpage*] of the historical social field, ultimately we always make love with the names of history.

The other mother [of Jackson] -- the one who says "grab your gun" -- it follows that the two act as agents of transmission in a certain type of social-historical investment, that from one to the other the pole of these investments has singularly changed, that in one case, we can say that they are reactionary investments, at the limit fascist, in the other case, it is a revolutionary libidinal investment. Our loves are like the conduits and the pathways of these investments that are not, once again, of a familial nature, but of a historico-political nature. And the final problem of schizoanalysis is not only the positive study of desiring machines, but the positive study of the manner in which desiring machines carry out the investment of social machines, whether it be in forming investments of the libido of a revolutionary type, whether it be in forming libidinal investments of the revolutionary type.

The domain of schizoanalysis distinguishes itself at this moment from the domain of politics, in the sense that the preconscious political investments are investments of class interests that are determinable by certain types of studies. But these still do not tell us anything about the other type of investments, namely specifically libidinal investments -- desire. To the point that it can happen that a preconscious revolutionary investment can be doubled by a libidinal investment of the fascist type = which explains how displacements are made from one pole of delirium to another pole of delirium, how a delirium has fundamentally two poles—which Artaud said so well: "the mystery of all is `Heliogabalus the Anarchist,'" because these are the two poles. It is not only a contradiction; it is a fundamental human contradiction, namely a pole of unconscious investment of the fascist type, and an unconscious investment of the revolutionary type. What fascinates me in a delirium is the radical absence of daddy-mommy, except as agents of transmission, except as agents of interception for there they have a role. But on the other hand, the task of schizoanalysis is to release in delirium the unconscious dimensions of a fascist investment and a revolutionary investment, and at a certain point, it slips; at a certain point it oscillates, this is the deep domain of the libido.

In the most reactionary, most folkloric territoriality, a revolutionary ferment can surge forth -- we never know -- something schizo, something mad, a deterritorialization: the Basque problem.

They did much for fascism; in other conditions, these same minorities could have determined -- I am not saying this happens by chance -- they could have secured a revolutionary role. It is extremely ambiguous: it is not at the level of political analysis, it is at the level of analysis of the unconscious: the way it whirls about [*comment ça tourne*]. (Maud Mannoni: antipsychiatry in the question of the court judgement on Schreber = a completely fascist delirium).<sup>8</sup> If antipsychiatry has a sense, if schizoanalysis has a sense, it is at the level of an analysis of the unconscious, to tip delirium from the pole that is always present, the reactionary fascist pole that implies a certain type of libidinal investment, towards the other pole, no matter if it is hard and slow, the revolutionary pole.

Richard Zheren: Why only two poles?

Deleuze: We can make many, but fundamentally, there are clearly two great types of investment, two poles. The reference of libidinal investments is daddy-mommy; these are the territorialities, and the deterritorializations, this must be found in the unconscious, especially at the level of its loves. Phantasm of naturality: of a pure race, movement of the pendulum = revolutionary phantasm of deterritorialization.

If you're saying that, on the analyst's couch, what flows still flows, alright then. But the problem that I would pose here is: there are types of flow that pass beneath the door, what psychoanalysts call the viscosity of the libido, an overly viscous libido that does not let itself be grasped by the code of psychoanalysis, alright here yes, there is deterritorialization. But psychoanalysis says: negative reaction [*contre-indication*]. What annoys me in psychoanalysis of the Lacanian camp is the cult of castration.

The family is a system of transmission, the social investments of one generation passed on to another, but I absolutely do not think that the family is a necessary element in the making of social investments because, in any case, there are desiring machines that, on their own, constitute social libidinal investments of the large social machines. If you say: the madman is someone who remains with his desiring machines and who does not carry out social investments, I do not follow you. In all madness, I see an intense investment of a particular type of historical, political, social field, even in catatonic persons. This goes for adults as well as children, it is from earliest childhood that the desiring machines are plugged into the social field.

In themselves, all territorialities are equal to each other in relation to the movement of deterritorialization, but there is something like a schizoanalysis of territorialities, of their types of functioning. And by functioning, I understand the following: if the desiring machines are on the side of a great deterritorialization, i.e. on the path of desire beyond territorialities, if to desire is to be deterritorialized, one must say that each type of territoriality is able to support such or such a genre of machinic index: the machinic index is that which, in a territoriality, will be able to make it flee in the direction [*sens*] of a deterritorialization.

So, I take the example of the dream, from the point of view that I am attempting to explicate the role of machines, it is very important, different from that of psychoanalysis. When a plane flies or a sewing machine -- the dream is a kind of little imaginary territoriality, sleep or a nightmare is a deterritorialization -- we can say that deterritorialization and the reterritorialities only exist as

a function of each other. But you can evaluate the force of a possible deterritorialization from the indexes on such or such a territoriality, i.e. how much it supports of a flow that flees. Flee and in fleeing, makes flee, not the others, but something from the system, a fragment.

A machinic index in a territoriality is what measures the power [*puissance*] of flight in this territoriality by making flows flee, in this regard all territorialities are not equal to each other. There are artificial territorialities; the more it flees and the more we can flee while fleeing, the more it is deterritorialized. Our loves are always situated on a territoriality that, in relation to us, deterritorializes us or else reterritorializes us. In this regard, there are misunderstandings + a whole game of investments that are the problem of schizoanalysis. Instead of having the family as a referent, it has as a referent the movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

Richard Zrehen: I want to say that you employed the term “code” for so-called primitive societies. While I think it is not possible to think of them in terms of code, because of the well-known mark, because there is a mark, which requires exchange, it is because there is a debt that we have an obligation to exchange. What happens from their society to ours, is the loss of the debt, so when you say that the schizo is the negative of the capitalist and that capitalism is the negative of primitive societies, it is evident exactly what is lost, it is castration.

With this mark of principle, you are anticipating what makes up capitalism while crossing out castration. What is foreclosed in capitalism is this initial mark and what Marx tried to do was to reintroduce the notion of debt. When you propose to me a reactionary pole of investments and a revolutionary pole, I say that you are already taking the concepts of “revolutionary” and of `reactionary as already instituted in a field that does not permit an appreciation of what you are trying to say. You are using breaks [*coupure*], I will certainly admit that Oedipus and castration are *dépassé*, but capitalism... [*End of the session*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus I*, 1971-1972**

**Lecture 02, 14 December 1971**

Transcribed by [WebDeleuze](#)

Translated by **Karen Isabel Ocaña; translation modified, Charles J. Stivale**

... I would like to pursue the problem of the economy of flows; last time, someone wanted a more precise definition of flows, more precise, that is, than something which flows upon the socius. What I call the socius is not society, but rather a particular social instance which plays the role of a full body. Every society presents itself as a socius or full body upon which all kinds of flows flow and are interrupted, and the social investment of desire is this basic operation of the break-flow to which we can easily give the name of schizz. It is not yet important for us to have a real definition of flows, but it is important, as a starting point, to have a nominal definition and this nominal definition must provide us with an initial system of concepts.

As a point of departure for our search for a nominal definition of flows, I'll take a recent study by a specialist in the flows of political economy: [*Study of*] *Flows and stocks* by Daniel Antier.<sup>9</sup> Stocks and flows are two primary notions in modern political economy, remarked upon by [J.M.] Keynes, such that we find in Keynesian economy the first great theory of flows in his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* [1936]. Antier informs us that, "from the economic point of view, we can call flows the values of the quantities of goods and services or money that are transmitted from one pole to another"; the first concept to be placed in relation with that of flows is that of pole: a flow, inasmuch as it flows on the socius, enters by one pole and exits by another.

At our last session, we had tried to show that flows implicated codes, in the sense that a flow could be called economic insofar as something passed, and where something else blocked it and made it pass; the example given was that of the rules of alliance in so-called primitive societies, where taboos represent a blockage of the flow of possible marriages; the first permitted marriages, i.e. the first permitted incests, called preferential unions, which are, in fact, hardly ever realized, represent something like the first modes of passage: something passes, something is blocked (this blockage taking the form of incest taboos), something passes, the preferential unions, something blocks it and makes it pass, for example the maternal [*utérine*] uncle. There is, in any case, the determination of an incoming and of an outgoing flow; the notion of a pole implicates or is implicated in the movement of flows, and this takes us back to the idea that something flows, that something is blocked, that something makes it flow, that something blocks the flow.

Antier continues: "In the knowledge that the term pole will be given to an individual or a firm, or alternately a group of individuals or group of firms, or even a fraction of a firm..." -- Here are



defined the interceptors of flows... when the operations carried out by these – “the interceptions of flows can be described by a coherent accounting system...” Thus, a correlative of the notion of flow is that of an accounting system; when the operation carried out - such as the passage of a flow from one pole to another - may be described by a coherent system, this evidently being expressed in terms of capitalism, by which I mean that in this context we are in the framework of capitalism at the level of abstract quantities, as the final residue of something that has an entirely different scope in pre-capitalist societies, to wit, what in pre-capitalist societies present themselves as veritable codes. It's when a society is completely decoded that flows are prone to incorporation into an accounting system, that is, into an axiomatic of abstract quantities instead of referring to qualified codes; the accounting system under capitalism is the residue of quantities, abstracted from the coding of flows, and capitalism functions on the basis of decoded flows, from which point on these flows are taken up by a system based on accounting.

Antier continues: “...We can consider all goods arriving at the same level of material or legal transformation at the precise moment at which they arrive as constituting one and the same flow...” Here you have a third correlative notion: material or legal transformation, “and if one is speaking of flows that are exchanged between industrial sectors, one must specify the notion of sector, if one is interested in precisely determining the flow of production, the flow of revenues, the flow of consumption, then one has to determine these terms carefully; take for example the flow of monetary revenue reached by calculating the totals of all liquid assets...”

The question is, what is meant by 'all liquid assets' [*tous les biens en monnaie*]? This is what economists refer to as nominal salaries - a concept that covers real wages, as well as management salaries and dividends (interest on assets). Take for example the flow of cash revenues [*flux de revenus monétaires*]: this is determined by the total of all liquid assets at the disposal of all of the individuals making up the collectivity, where the revenue of a large number of individuals can be precisely evaluated since it is paid out by other individuals, such as state contractors, and since it has been precisely calculated; but for many kinds of revenue the importance of which must not be undervalued, one can't give an exact definition; well, well, so there's a sphere of indetermination in the sector?

This is doubtless related to something very profound in what is, as we shall see, the accounting sector; but, for all that, we now have a triple reference: the flows refer for one thing to poles and for another to codes or accounting systems, then - in fourfold fashion - to rates of transformation, next to sectors and finally to stocks. This amounts to five correlative notions. From an economic viewpoint we will refer to stocks of goods and monetary stocks, as the goods held and the money held by only one pole; the flow, then, is what flows from one pole to another, what goes in and what goes out, and the stock is what is brought back as the material and legal possession of one of the poles considered; this clearly shows the correlative character of the two notions.

We can thus define stocks in the following way: the utility of stocks changes from case to case, but is linked in one way or another, at one time or another, to the existence of flows -- we will, nevertheless, receive the distinct impression that stocks and flows are effectively the same thing as they relate to two different units: first, the passage from one pole to the other, and secondly, attribution to one of the two poles, as two units of measure for one and the same thing. -- The utility of stocks varies with every given case, but is linked in one way or another, and at one time

or another, to the existence of flows; and yet, whereas flows allow one to extract the movements of values between different poles, stocks represent a sum of values that are at the disposal of a given pole; there are no goods related to a stock which are not, at a specified time, also correlated to a flow; this is, in fact, one of the fundamental principles of accounting, because the influx and output of a stock constitute flows; only the study of flows allows one to realize the role of the incoming and outgoing movements involved in stock variations.

So, we have just seen the correlation between the notion of flux and five other notions: pole, code or accounting system, stage of transformation, sector and stock. If we try to simplify all of this, I think that the notion which I was attempting to launch last time may be able to concentrate or group together all of these five references, this notion being that of the break-flow. For this notion of the break-flow has to be understood simultaneously in two ways: it is to be understood as the very correlation of flux and code, and if, returning once more to capitalism, we are aware that flows are “accounted for”, it is in favor of a movement of decoding such that the accounting system has simply taken the place of codes; it is at this point that we come to realize that it's no longer sufficient to speak of an accounting system, but rather of a financing system or structure.

The strict correlation of flux and code implies, apparently, that in a society - and this is clearly our point of departure - it's impossible to seize flows other than by and through the operation which codes them; the fact is that a non-coded flow is, strictly speaking, an unnamable or merely a thing. This is what I was getting at last time, this is the terror of society - it is the flood, the deluge which is the flow that breaks through the barriers of codes. Societies aren't exactly in mortal dread because everything is coded - the family is coded, death is coded; but what makes societies panic is when something or other breaks down, something that forces the codes to crack. A flow is thus not recognizable as an economic and social flow except by and through the code which encodes it.

And this operation of coding implies two simultaneous interruptions, and it is this simultaneity which allows us to define the notion of a break-flow: simultaneously, in an operation of coding the flows, a subtraction [*prélèvement*] from the flows is produced, due to the code, and this subtraction from the flows defines its poles: it defines a certain entry point and a certain exit, and it is between the two that the break-subtraction takes place; this occurs at the same time as the code itself relates to a break of another sort which is strictly simultaneous, meaning once more that... there is no subtraction from a flow which is not accompanied by a detachment of or from the code which encodes this flow, although it is the simultaneity of the subtraction of the flow and the detachment of a segment of code that permits one to define the flow with reference to poles, sectors, rates and stocks. This notion of a break-flow presents itself in two-fold fashion, for it implies at once a break-subtraction of a flow and a break-detachment of a code. Here you've got the mechanism of delirium: it's this double schizz operation -- it's the schizz which consists both in an operation of subtractions of flow as a function of detachments of code, and vice versa.<sup>10</sup>

If, to begin, I take an indeterminate flow as a purely nominal starting point, then what flows on the socius, cannot appear socially speaking as a flow, except in correlation to a code, or at least to an accounting system, and the flow itself is qualified as a function of the code, and the correlation of the two is where you have a break-subtraction on this flow itself (as qualified by

the code), at the same time as and in reaction to which you have a break-detachment of the code. A detachment of code is correlative to a subtraction of flow. This is simply a formal description.

At first glance, a madman is someone who passes on the unnamable, who carries decoded flows: “a god speaks to me, but it's not your god”. The Greeks had a notion of the *daimon*, they had gods and the gods were allotted, everything was very properly allocated, they had powers and spaces; in a way, they couldn't move, they were sedentary, they had their territory and the daimons carried out the coding. Religions are not to be understood from an ideological viewpoint, but at the level of their pertaining to a social code. Daimons were above all powers which did not respect the codes. In *Oedipus*, there is a text which is badly translated, and which reads, “which daimon has leapt the longest leap,” a text which frankly leaps beyond the limits, it had to do with unnamable powers, with excess, and it is not forcing things to translate this as “decoding”. Thus, a daimon speaks in a certain way so that a madman receives decoded flows, and in turn emits decoded flows, such that it flows and escapes on all sides, messing up all the codes. Which is why in Oedipus' case, it just won't stick, because literally, Oedipus is a screwed-up code.

When something goes bad, you always have to go back up to a higher level to see where things start to go bad (cf. the USSR), and psychoanalysis goes bad, but why and how so? Derrida has seen very clearly in what way psychoanalysis, at least at the level of its first intentions, is opposed to the code; it is in fact a system of decoding, and this is why this affair just couldn't help going bad.<sup>11</sup> Because decoding means either to read a code, to penetrate the secret of a code, or else it means to decode in an absolute sense, i.e. to destroy the codes in order to make the flows flow freely; a major part of the project of psychoanalysis was intended as an absolute decoding of the flows of desire and not as a relative decoding, to make the walls of the code cave in, and to make the flows of desire run wild.

It is in this sense that psychoanalysis was very close to a desiring economy, and properly speaking, to desiring-machines, the producers of the flows of desire; and this is seen very clearly in Freud's writings, such as *The Interpretation of Dreams*, where he says: what distinguishes my method from the method of the key of dreams? The major difference is that the key of dreams proposes a code of desire; Freud says that they have seen everything, but that they propose a systematic coding: this means that, that is the key of dreams; and from the perspective of a key of dreams, if one decodes the dream, one decodes it in a relative sense, i.e. one discovers the cipher of its code. Now Freud says that psychoanalysis has nothing to do with all of that, that it does not interpret. And Derrida, in his article on Freud in *Writing and Difference* shows this very well. It carries out an absolute decoding, rendering the codes as flows in the raw state, and thereby psychoanalysis is opposed to codes. It goes without saying that, at the same time, and from the outset, they are inventing a new code, that is, the Oedipal code which is even more of a code than any other code; thus, the flows of desire pass into the Oedipal code, or else, whatever the flow of desire, it is stuffed into the Oedipal grid. At this stage, psychoanalysis proves less and less capable of understanding madness, for the madman is really the being of decoded flows.

And who has shown this in a most vital and convincing way if not [Samuel] Beckett, whose strange creatures spend their time decoding things, they make non-codable flows pass. Social processes can't capture flows except in relation to codes which operate on them, and which are

simultaneously a detachment of a flow and a subtraction of chains or codes, and the madman makes flows pass on it, flows from which it is no longer possible to detach anything; there are no more codes, there is a chain of decoded flows, but one can't cut into it. There is a sort of deluge or failure of the body, maybe that's it, after all, the body-without-organs, when on the body, or from the body flows enter and exit by way of poles, flows on which one can no longer carry out any subtraction because there are no longer any codes from which to detach anything.

The state of the body of someone who has undergone a fairly severe operation, the eyes of this patient are the eyes of someone who has not been very far from death, who has not been very far from madness, the eyes are elsewhere in a certain sense - he has gone through the wall. It is interesting that what we call convalescence is a kind of return. He's had a brush with death, it is an experience of the body, very strange, psychoanalysis: why does Freud cling so strongly to the notion of a death instinct? He tells his secret in "Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety" [1926]. It seems that if there is a death instinct, it's because there is neither a model nor an experience of death. When pressed, he admits that there is a model of birth but not of death, thus, all the more reason to make of it a transcendent instinct. Bizarre. Perhaps the model of death could be something like the body-without-organs.<sup>12</sup>

Horror-story writers have understood, after Edgar Allen Poe, that death wasn't the model for schizophrenic catatonia, but that the contrary was true, and that the catatonic was the one who made of his body a body-without-organs, a decoded body, and that on such a body there is a kind of nullification of the organs.<sup>13</sup> On this decoded body, flows can flow under conditions where they can no longer be decoded. This is why we fear decoded flows - the deluge; because once flows have been decoded, you can no longer subtract anything or break into them, no more than you can detach segments from any codes in order to dominate, orient or direct the flows.

And the experience of one who has been operated on, of her body-without-organs, is that, on this body, there are literally noncodable flows which constitute a thing, an unnamable thing. At the very moment that she breathes, there is great confusion of the flows that form one great indivisible flow, no longer susceptible to subtractions, one can no longer interrupt it. One long stream that cannot be tamed, where all of the flows that are usually distinguished by their codes are united in one and the same indivisible flow all flowing on one and the same non-differentiated body, the body without organs. And as for the mad patient who has undergone an operation, every breath of air he takes is at the same time a breath of spittle, a flow of air and spit that tend to get mixed up together, so that there are no longer any distinctions. Moreover, each time that he breathes and spits, he feels a vague desire to defecate, a vague erection: it's the body-without-organs that escapes on every side. It is sad, but then again, it has moments of great joy, mixing up all the codes, it has its great moments, and this is what makes Beckett a comic writer.

Though here again, one can't help saying, "and then, and then", though this is what constitutes the madman and his place in society, as the place of one through whom all of the decoded flows pass, which is why he is perceived as the fundamental danger. The madman doesn't decode in the sense that he would harbor a secret the meaning of which ordinary people have forgotten, but rather he decodes in the sense that he sits in his little corner and makes little machines which make the flows pass and which make social codes break down. The schizophrenic process as such, of which a schizo is only the schizophrenic continuation, well that schizophrenic process is

a revolutionary potential in itself, in opposition to paranoid investments which are fundamentally of a fascist type.

This leads to a first result, namely, that the economic operation of coding flows involves a double break-flow, a break-detachment and a break-subtraction; and on the socius of a society one encounters these strange creatures, the mad, who make all of these decoded flows carry on. The strangest phenomenon of world history is the formation of capitalism because, in a certain sense, capitalism is madness in its pure state, and in another sense, it is likewise the opposite of madness. Capitalism is the only social formation which presupposes, as its condition of emergence, the breakdown of all preceding codes. In this sense, the flows of capitalism are decoded flows, and this poses the following problem: how could a society, with all of its repressive formations, create itself on the basis of what constituted the terror of all other social formations: namely, the decoding of flows.

The intimate bond between capitalism and schizophrenia consists in their common basis and installation on decoded flows (insofar as they are decoded). How then was this decoding carried out? One has to keep the following two requirements clearly in mind: the basic affinity between schizophrenia and capitalism, but, at the same time, find in this basic affinity the reason for which the repression of madness under capitalism is conducted with much greater harshness and specificity than under pre-capitalist formations. In the one case there is a political economy and a libidinal economy, and, in the other, an economy of decoded flows.

I'd like to show that, historically, this shift took place over a long period of time: there are synchronic social machines and there are diachronic social machines; despotic Asiatic social machines are of a truly synchronic nature - Marx's Asiatic state emerges in one blow, and all of the cogs and wheels of its state apparatus appear synchronically. The formation of the capitalist machine extends over many centuries. It's a diachronic machine and has taken two long periods to come about; it isn't capitalism that decodes the flows, rather, they are decoded on what we call the ruin and decline of great empires, and feudalism is only one of the forms of this ruin and decline. Capitalism does not proceed from the decoding of flows because it presupposes them, it presupposes flows that have lost their codes.

Marx is the author who has demonstrated the radical contingency of the formation of capital. Any history of philosophy is either theological, or else it is the history of contingencies and unforeseen encounters. The originary phenomenon of capitalism is this: decoded flows qua decoded flows must enter into conjunction. What then assures that this conjunction will take place? Here, one feels that history can teach us as much about the process of the decoding of flows, as about what ensures the conjunction of the decoded flows as such, and this can be nothing else than the processes of a specific historic sector. This tale of capitalism implies a generalized decoding of flows and at the same time something else, as if what ought to be put in place were an apparatus for conjugating decoded flows.

This is what gives capitalism its purely illusory appearance of liberalism. It has in fact never been liberal, it has always been state capitalism. This tale begins in Portugal in the 12th century, this tale of state capitalism. There has never been a time when flows were decoded and when everything was free, bringing recuperation, which is an awful thing. If it's true that capitalism

replaces the old ruined codes with conjugating machines, and axiomatic machines which are infinitely more cruel, crueller than the cruelest despot, although of another cruelty, it is at the same time as the decoding takes place [*que ça se décode*] that it is taken up by another machine which is a machine for conjugating decoded flows; whence capitalism's affinity with schizophrenia, for it is based on decodings, and its opposition to schizophrenia, because instead of making the decoded flows pass, it blocks them in another way, and it makes them enter into a machine for conjugating decoded flows.

Take an example from the history of painting, the very bizarre history of the Venetian School: it is marked very late by the so-called Byzantine style, while Venice itself was already very advanced in mercantile capitalism, but this merchant and banking capitalism remained entirely nestled in the pores of the old despotic society. And all of Christianity at that time finds something like its pictorial form in these pyramidal structures, literally, in hierarchical mode, which respond to despotic overcoding. These Byzantine paintings of the Venetian school continue until the middle of the 15th century.<sup>14</sup>

Here you have this beautiful Byzantine style, and what do you see? - overcoded Christianity, Christianity interpreted according to the style and the manner of overcoding: there is an old despot, there is the father, there's Jesus and there are the tribes of the Apostles. In one of Delphiore's paintings, there are rows of pyramids which are spread in fine rows facing straight ahead. It is not just the people who are coded and overcoded in Byzantine art, it is also their organs which are coded, coded and overcoded, under the great unifying influence of the despot, whether this despot is God or the father or whether he is the great Byzantine Emperor. We get the impression that their organs are the object of a collective hierarchic investment. It would be mad for a Virgin to be looking to the right while baby Jesus was looking the other way. You've got to be mad to invent something like that; you couldn't do something like that under a regime where organs are collectively invested, are coded by the collectivity and are overcoded.

Under Christianity, the codes are mixed up, but this is because despotic codes coexist with territorial codes, and the colors themselves enter into the pictorial code. And if, in a museum, you change rooms, you will discover something else altogether, it is a great joy and a great anxiety too, for they are in the process of decoding the flows, a process which doesn't coincide with the explosion of capitalism but comes quite a bit later. The great decoding of the flows of painting takes place around 1450, right in mid-15th century, and it's a kind of radical break: all of a sudden, we see the hierarchy of overcoding breaking down, the ruin of the territorial codes, the flows of painting go insane too, destroying all of the codes, a flow passes. We get the impression that painters - occupying their usual position amongst artists in relation to the social system - create Christs that are totally queer, they are totally mannerist Christs, it's all sexualized, they create Virgins who stand in for all women, and baby boys who have just nursed, little boys pooping, they really play at this process of decoding flows of color.

And how does this happen? Everything happens as if, for the first time, the characters represented became the owners of their own organs: the collective hierarchic codification of organs, the social investment of organs is done with; from now on the Virgin and every other character will, literally, start to run their own affair; in fact the painting escapes on all sides: the Virgin looks to one side, there are two guys looking at baby Jesus, a third is looking on as if

something were happening, there are scenes in the background and the picture explodes in all directions so that every one starts possessing their own organs. They are not insane, there is one member of the Venetian School who makes a creation of the world that is incredible: generally the creation of the world “a la Byzantine” was done according to a hierarchy; there was a kind of cone or big pyramid of the despotic order and at the very bottom, the territorial codes. The creation of the world that interests me is a departure from this: there is God the Father up in the sky in the position of a runner, and he gives a starting signal; in front of him are ducks and chickens who are racing away as fast as they can, and in the sea there are fish who are also racing away, and God is the one who sends it all away, it is the end of all the codes.

And what do they do with the body of Christ? The body of Christ is useful as a body without organs; so they machine it in every way and direction, they make it amorous, suffering, tortured, but you can feel that it is joyous. The perspective, you see, the perspective, that's nothing, a useless trick; those who have done without it, it's because they didn't need it, they had other problems. Perspective is lines of flight and can only be useful in a painting of decoding, but it is very secondary, it doesn't even count in the organization of a painting. So what are they trying to do, we're going to cut low along Christ's hip, we're going to make a mannerist Christ, all the tortured bodies are good bodies without organs, Saint Sebastian with his arrows sticking out in all directions.

Once again, in this overthrowing of the pictorial system, perspective is only a little thing. The generalized decoding of flows has to be taken up again by something other than a code, and in effect, there is no longer a pictorial code, but instead a strange sort of pictorial machine that conjoins and that will give rise to the unity of the picture, no longer a signifying unity of a code or overcode, but a system of echoes, of repetitions, of oppositions, of symmetries, a veritable conjugating machine, where flows of colors and decoded features are conjugated. There emerges a real pictorial axiomatic that replaces the failing codes. Capitalism doesn't arise by means of the simple decoding of flows, for it does not appear until such time as flows, since they are decoded, enter into conjunction with one another.

Marx has said that when this happens it proves his great theory of contingency. In Rome, as at the end of feudalism, the decoding of flows brought in a new kind of slavery and not at all capitalism. For what had to take place was the meeting of the flow of decoded capital and that of deterritorialized labor. Why did this encounter take place? Refer to Marx's notion of primitive accumulation, on one condition and that is that primitive accumulation, this can be a dangerous thing, if we say: oh yes, primitive accumulation, this is what served to fuel the process of accumulation, and we might as well say the formation of stocks at the beginning of capitalism. One has to see that primitive accumulation is called primitive to distinguish it from other types of accumulation, not primitive because it comes first.

The way capitalism functions, even if we are talking about its industrial essence, is the way banking and trading work, and we must hold that capitalism is essentially industrial, although it only functions through its banking system and through its trade circuits. Why? There is a kind of conjunction: capital starts to take control of production, but is it the first time? No. So, we take up Marx's analysis again, an analysis which Marx insists on: the control of production by capital has existed in a certain guise from the beginning, but it appears in another guise with capitalism.

I mean to say that even from the perspective of banking and mercantile capitalism, the banks and merchants create a monopoly for themselves: there is at the outset of capitalism, the way in which English mercantile capitalism forbids foreign capitalists from buying wool and woolen cloth; in that case, this exclusive clause is the means whereby the local merchant capitalists ensure that they control production because the producers can only sell through them.

So, we have to mark two times: a first time where merchant capitalists, in England for example, make the producers work for them by means of a system of delegation whereby the producer becomes a sort of sub-contractor, and this is where commercial capital directly takes possession of production; it is the great historic moment when merchant capital declared war on the leagues, i.e. the associations of producers. It's a war between producers who looked with trepidation upon their being in the service of merchant capital, and merchant capital which, on the contrary, was trying to obtain greater and greater control of production via this sub-contracting method.

But it would take, as Marx declared, a second time ... [*End of the session*]



**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus I*, 1971-1972**

**Lecture 03, 21 December 1971**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring; revised transcript, Charles J. Stivale**

... What Toul [Prison]'s Dr. [Edith] Rose is doing goes further than denouncing an institution; it turns out she's denouncing the authorities behind the institution. Hence why, like she can't take anymore, she kind of breaks one of the system's unwritten rules, i.e., that anything said to a psychiatrist never leaves the room. She goes over a lot of things—an epileptic locked and chained in solitary confinement for eight days—things newspapers had only glossed over. Denouncing the institution in general... The GIP [Prison Information Group] has been rallying support for Dr. Rose from psychiatrists and analysts.

There's something I'd like to come back to. Last year, I tried to argue that social investments are what the libido is working with.<sup>15</sup> So far as the libido is concerned, parents only figure in as either agents of production or agents of anti-production—they never come in at the level of the unconscious. The unconscious is ignorant of parents; the idea of an unconscious libidinal investment of the social field implies a clear distinction between investments of the social field we should think of as the preconscious investment of interests and a completely different type of investments: the unconscious investments of desire, or libidinal investments. Something that initially bothered me in Freud's writings is the way in which he establishes a kind of inverse relationship between sexual investment and social investment. There are clear-cut moments in the Schreber case where Freud writes: you know, social investment implies a desexualization—the unfortunate concept of sublimation—And the social field as such is resexualized only in the case of regression. And that's how he interprets the whole social aspect of Judge Schreber's delirium, i.e., that it's a regression undoing desexualization, the original sublimation. Our whole assumption, on the other hand, is that the social field is invested by a sexual libido as such, and that that's actually the libido's primary function: to fuel the social field's unconscious investments of desire.

Where does individual sexuality come in? Here, there's already an assumption—one that doesn't line up with the inverse relationship Freud suggests: since the field of consciousness is entirely filled by the social field's preconsciously invested interests—beneath the real libidinal investments of the social field, investments of desire that don't necessarily coincide with the preconscious investments of interests—they can only manifest across erotic sexual relations and in the way individuals and groups conceptualize sexuality itself, i.e., that it [*missing*] mean just anything, taking Marx's well-known expression literally, where the relationship between man and woman offers a way of measuring his [*sic*] relationship with his fellow man [*sic*]. In other words, unconscious libidinal investments in the social field only appear through the series of a person's or group's lovers, series of sexual relationships, and in that sense it's really true that

libidinal or sexual investment, through its erotic objects, invests an entire social field. And not for the sake of desexualization—it throws everything up in the air.<sup>16</sup>

Yet, in concrete terms, in his writing, there's something rather curious in Freud, completely in line with the bourgeois families he's describing, and it has to do with the role of maids. Roughly speaking, this comes either from Freud himself or from one of his cases.<sup>17</sup> The first basic feature: when he discovers the Oedipus complex, it's in relation—he says so himself<sup>18</sup>—it's in relation to his own situation; it's funny, when it comes to his childhood, folks always bring up his father and mother. Really, there are two key figures: a maid who gets accused of theft, and a half-brother who has the maid locked up, who has the maid “locked up,” as he puts it. So, there's a link between this half-brother and the maid. That alone is enough to break down any pseudo-Oedipal structure because it turns out the half-brother goes to live in Manchester, and that's the rich side of the family.

Right away, I'd like to point out how Freud, per his psychoanalytical custom, has always oedipalized that, i.e., projecting it [*rabattre*] onto daddy-mommy—meaning that he only ever depicts his half-brother as a stand-in for his father and the maid as representing his mother. That might well be—that's not for me to say—but I think it was a tough decision for Freud, when he was discovering Oedipus, faced with a context where the libido obviously didn't just fill in familial roles but social agents of projection or social agents of enunciation—the maid and the half-brother—that option was on the table, where the libido was an unconscious investment of the social field rooted in a childhood divide between Rich-Poor. A possible direction he was aware of—we'll see—he represses it, he sublimates it for the sake of a wholly familial, oedipal interpretation. Freud's arguments always, constantly allude to or even directly cast the theme of rich-and-poor in terms of unconscious libidinal investment—in the Rat Man, for example. In what he's so beautifully written in “The Neurotic's Individual Myth,” Lacan is the first to underscore how significant this theme was even in childhood, the choice between rich woman and poor woman in the case of the Rat Man, rooted in a running theme throughout the Rat Man's case, i.e., this sort of circulating debt, a circulating debt which the Rat Man libidinally invests around the two poles of rich woman and poor woman.

In the Wolf man, the same sort of problem: the Wolf Man invests heavily in a maid he saw as a child washing the floor on her hands and knees, and this poor woman's position gives rise to an incredibly powerful investment that has a part in determining his adult sexuality. What does Freud say? He waffles between two positions, but we can tell he's already made up his mind—the first option is that the libido invests class determinations the child only apprehends empirically in the form of wealth-or-poverty. And what does the middle-class Wolf Man do, according to Freud? Having caught the maid on the floor, he develops a life-long habit of debasing women, as if all women belonged on the side of the poor woman. At once debasement and love. If we take that route—and we're not used to hearing Freud speak this way—there's only one way out: recognizing that libidinal or sexual investment, insofar as it is sexual, doesn't invest familial determinations at all, but through family arrangements, invests social divides from one's social field.

But that's not what he wants, and in these passages, he tells us that the tendency to debase women and view every woman as a poor woman is only a rationalization. We can see when Freud moves in one direction, explores it for a bit and then no, he says, I was only trying to show how that was a dead end. He says that has nothing to do with the Wolf Man's habit of debasing women because the child, he claims, identifies servants helping him as his mother insofar as they show him affection. We're seeing the detours and doubts of a brilliant mind play out in real time: he almost goes one way and then ends up turning back. You know why the child invested his maid on all fours: it's because—recalling the famous thesis affording him his bizarre oedipal reduction—because he had previously caught his mother in the same position. Not washing the floor, but in a sexual position with his father. Which means the fact that the woman scrubbing the floor is poor no longer matters; that rationalization comes second to the daddy-mommy investment—the only investment.

A third kind of passage—A bourgeois family in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, it's easy to see why maids come up in Freud's writing; what might he say about us today, when many families have their children looked after by Portuguese women, who have children of their own? My first question is whether the child, small as they are, confuses and identifies his mother—the poor Portuguese woman—with the bourgeois woman whose house she works in. I believe that, even if her baby tends to mix them up, that gets straightened out soon enough. And conversely, whether the child, small as they are, confuse the poor Portuguese woman washing the floor with their mother making love to their father.

I wonder if, from childhood, there aren't properly unconscious and libidinal investments that aren't at all directed at the family or family determinations, that only target the family coincidentally, or where the parents are understood in relation to other social agents and aren't confused with them, such that the libido, from early childhood, invests determinations from their social-historical field, and invests them—not as a Marxist thinker would, obviously, that only comes later, and at the level of the preconscious investments of interests—but invests them in the directly empirical form of: rich – poor. In other words, the rich and poor play, as Lacan might put it—though perhaps in a non-Lacanian way—they play the role of the other, the big Other, which is non-familial, which comes through in the structure of the family; they are extra-familial divisions in the social sphere; and that's what the libido invests.

Third, in his writing, there's this whole Freudian business with family romance.<sup>19</sup> It's always about maids, and with bourgeois families, it has to get framed that way. With the family romance, we again see Freud's oscillation and the choice he makes. He only hesitates inasmuch as he's already decided between his two options, has already opted for the puerile, familial understanding. Freud discovers the family romance in the context of neurosis, and the neurotic's family romance is presented as a fiction whereby the neurotic fantasizes their origins in one way or another. Again, we find the libidinal theme of wealth and poverty—sometimes the subject's fantasy about their origins takes the form, "I'm from a lesser background, I am not my mom's son, I'm the maid's son"; sometimes it takes the form, "I'm of superior descent, I am the son of a prince, Mom had me with a prince."

A famous example of the first sort of fantasy, the turn toward lower origins, is what we find in Sophocles' famous *Oedipus Rex*: recall the famous exchange between Oedipus and Jocasta where Oedipus says, "I absolutely have to know where I come from," and Jocasta—who understands the Oedipus complex well enough to know it isn't a problem—responds, "Don't worry about it, why does it matter?" And he is already so oedipalized that he says, "You don't care about your origins because you're from a rich, lustrous family, while, as the son of a poor shepherd, from a poor family, I've had to make my own success." It really makes for a family romance, and he turns on Jocasta, saying, "Well, if you don't want to talk about where I really come from, it's because you're ashamed of it." So, he fantasizes his origin: I'm the son of a poor family, I'm the servant's son.

What happens in Freud's case? At first, when he discovers the family romance, it isn't linked to neurosis in general; it was more precisely related to paranoia, and he had to some extent grasped the fullness of a sexual investment of the social field *qua* sexual investment. But that's not what he wants; he'll continue to stifle the possibility of that line of thinking, to the point that, when Reich brings it back up in a distorted form, he takes it badly, maintaining that the family romance is solely a defense against oedipal incest. That is, if the neurotic reconfigures their origins, it's to escape the pressure of incestuous desire, so that again, when he's on the verge of understanding the properly libidinal and sexual investments of the social field, he recants and falls back to the oedipal triangle, turning any social investments into merely preconscious derivatives of the only really libidinal investments, solely reserved for the incestuous oedipal familial arrangement.

This other theme, which Freud constantly muffles out, is always there, subsisting as a haunting reminder. What about the maid ultimately disturbed little Freud so much? I argue that if there's a sexual investment of the social field, it happens at the level of childhood. It's so important to Freud that it forms as an adult—ah, yes, any investment of the social field comes later—it's because he wants for investments of the social field to not be libidinal, strictly speaking, but for them to presuppose a desexualization of the libido in order to maintain the libido's narrow familial scope. But our whole hypothesis is that rich-and-poor, on the contrary, is really the sort of empirical apprehension of a class struggle as it's invested, not by preconscious interests, but by unconscious desire: the child's libidinal investment, insofar as it directly bears upon the social field, follows suit. Rich-and-poor is the Other in the sense of the nonfamilial, and there is, directly and immediately through the family—I believe children don't have any familial investments, it's laughable—on the contrary, through family determinations, family determinations playing an inciting rather than an organizing role, we find a different, non-familial, investment, along the lines of rich and poor; it's in this sense that class struggle involves more than simply preconscious investments (although it plays a rather decisive role in preconscious investments); it goes through the ordeal of desire, and does so from childhood. It's easy to see how what plays out next is the kind of fanatic oedipalization carried out by psychoanalysis. Everything proceeds as though even child sexuality opened onto a social historical field, investing it in its childish or unconscious way. What it invests in such a field based on major rich/poor divides that thereby determine an exteriority regarding the family. The

family is divided and split by these cuts; it's not that such cuts are determined by the family. What these divisions are, are veritable schizzes.

From the start, what's invested is a transfinite set, the transfinite set of the social field—it isn't a closed set by any stretch; it's a transfinite set with divisions, and divisions of divisions. You cannot close it; it's a kind of open set. This transfinite set of the social field includes machines, agents of production, agents of anti-production, and all that gets invested by the sexual libido. And what we look for in the succession of our later lovers—assuming we're looking for something from our childhood—is certainly not some family nonsense but something more profound, namely familial investments of the non-familial from our childhood.

When psychoanalysts are shameful enough to claim that the worries of a child or woman going in for analysis—Why do they go in for psychoanalysis? The typical response is that it has something to do with the phallus. In Freudian terms, famously, a woman's basic motivation for seeking analysis is her penis envy, and the same goes for children because, being the phallus without having one, they're in a conflicting situation. It's an oedipal reinterpretation. But it's more than obvious that—to put it moralistically—taking up the position of being a woman or the position of being a child in our capitalist society is really impossible; and if it's impossible, then, it takes unusual means to get out of it. Why? It's certainly not “phallus or no phallus,” we're missing something, namely that what makes it impossible for a child to assume their situation as a child is their economic dependence, both politically and libidinally. For a woman, it's her economic dependence, which prevents or compromises investments of the social field. Yet it's necessary, when socio-libidinal investments are blocked off by veritable impasses set up by said social field, it's necessary that things come back to the familial field where the child or woman finds themselves totally imprisoned, tied down, and as a result, they may very well be sympathetic to the idea that *there* [in the family] lies the root of your troubles—and that isn't the source of their worries at all; on the contrary, it's a symptom and way of sidestepping the issue. That's still the best way of repressing things.

The best means of repression: if you want to stifle social investments at the level of the unconscious and the libido, because that is something, there's already the investment of the social field by preconscious interests; there's already a whole system of repression at work when it comes to revolutionary or class interests, but with the unconscious libidinal investments of the same social field, taking place in a whole other mode, they don't just need to be repressed; they need to be driven back. They're just as shaped by society and by social determinations; they create real impasses in the social field that take desire back to the familial domain... You can see how it works: starting with a transfinite set invested by the libido, the social field is sexually invested by the libido. It's not a coincidence that the characters in the family romance are always presented as connected to, or as having been derived from historical characters. It's like the family romance says: yes, Genghis Khan is my real father, Catherine de Medici is my real mother, or the maid is the proletarian. That's exactly the way in which, by way of some stimulus or other from the family, child sexuality starts to search for suitable divides in the social field and what it might invest therein.

It's a transfinite set. Regardless how we describe what Oedipus does, whether we call it symbolic, imaginary, etc.—it's always an act of reflection [*rabattement*], in a mathematician's sense of the term. Which is when you project or rotate [*rabattre*] a starting set onto a target set, only the starting set is the social field invested by the libido, a transfinite set, [and] the target set is a finite set, the familial set. You go through this reflection or projection [*rabattement*], unseen and unknown, desire is trapped, sort of like, "Hey, this is what you wanted, buddy." The part psychoanalysis plays is encouraging or, through its own means, carrying out this reflection—which it certainly didn't invent, but for which it has found new methods.

This reflection is basically a race towards death. The familial target set everything gets projected onto is finite. 4, 3, 2, 1 0—the more it narrows in, the better, until desire is completely choked off and the only desire left is what gets psychoanalyzed. Tragic. 4, 3, 2, 1... *Four*—indeed, we're told that in order for there to be an Oedipus, there must be a fourth term, as a prerequisite for its triangulation: this fourth term is famously missing: the phallus, missing in place, etc. The prerequisite for Oedipus is that its fourth term is always missing in place. Traditionally, there are three terms in the oedipal arrangement—they say there's father, mother, and me. I'll let you in on a secret. Narcissus, narcissism, comes *after* Oedipus, not before. The oedipal machine is an oedipal-narcissist machine; they were wrong to place Oedipus before—a fatal error. It's a set-up of three, and then the entire social domain, with all its investments, is reflected onto it. That's what desire gets reduced down to while it was beginning to conduct a fantastic experiment, a machinic experiment—humanity's greatest activity: machining things. *Three*, Oedipus enters the scene; the fourth term was necessary for setting things up, then it wanders around the other three, it won't stand on its own—the notorious phallus in relation to which all three positions get defined.

The motivation (save for those who have already gone through their first analysis) is always economic, i.e., a subject's dependence, and not their dependence on daddy and mommy. That money matters are so embedded in psychoanalysis; it isn't the first time that monetarization is hidden behind means of payment. If, for psychoanalysis, monetary relationships are so embedded in the patient/doctor relationship, and if gets justified under the silliest, most laughable pretexts, it's because such internalization has the advantage of hiding something, namely the basic economic dependence defining [the patient's] motivation to get analyzed. None of us see how, as such, women and children—I can't see how a woman, *as* woman, could possibly assume her role as a woman in such a society. Even less so for children. From the perspective of desire, it's impossible, and again, it's not because of any penis-envy. As soon as the oedipal machine starts to function, it gets reduced again; it's down to only two.

There are actually several possible outcomes; the oedipal machine can work in three different ways, depending on which of the three terms is excluded. First, father and mother join forces to dump the child. The first function of the oedipal machine, the giant grinder, is something we find all over part of Oedipus: the primitive scene, parental coitus, the child's castration—father and mother join forces to maintain order, a secret order.

The second outcome is when it's the child who gets rid of the father in order to join up with the mother. The incestuous side of things, the other aspect of Oedipus. Third: the mother joins forces with one or the other to suppress the third—the terrible mother, the so-called pre-oedipal mother, who is absolutely integral to Oedipus. Now, with only two terms left, another effort to get to its sought-after result, the death of desire. Already, when desire learns that what it desires above all is really to kill one's father, to love one's mother, it finds itself in a small territoriality, its private life, its tiny little secret—only two terms is still too many, which leads to the oedipal machine's third phase. Here there's only one term left, and it's narcissism. It's pretty obvious that narcissism is the result of the oedipal machine and not the other way around. And big Narcissus is still too much; the outcome of this race toward death is zero, and zero is what Freud, out of psychoanalysis, labels as “the death drive.” Desire can no longer be anything other than a desire for abolition—sadness.

Here's where I claim schizo-analysis is the opposite; where do we find this kind of infinite reduction? It's what I find so striking in recent books written by certain analysts, who go so far as to say, ([Serge] Leclaire) there's a sort of radical decentering of analysis today, i.e., where you don't even need to refer to the familial scene anymore, the psychoanalytic scene stands on its own; it's never been better said: psychoanalysis has become axiomatic, *verum index sui*, i.e., the psychoanalytic scene no longer needs external references, even the family is too extrinsic; it draws on its own internal references, it props itself up—the real proving ground is now the couch. The zero term approaches; after leaving the couch, there's abolition.

Let's picture a schizo-analytic process. It should absolutely regroup this field, i.e., in practice, in terms of individual analyses, [it should] denounce the death drive, i.e., its practice should combat the extreme lengths the oedipal machine takes to bring us to zero, and then shatter its familial prison at the level of investments and recover its opening—and this is what makes it schizo-analysis—bringing the subject to delusions about their social historical field instead of bringing them to neurosis about daddy-mommy. Whereby it ought to be thought of as a militant analysis since, again, class struggle doesn't simply take place at the level of preconscious interests; it moves to the level of the libidinal investments of the unconscious. To use a proposition as classical as Freud's, the libido invests the social field only inasmuch as it is desexualized (see the ego and the id and the Schreber case). I see that as just a way of telling us: desire has nothing to do with the social field; the domain of desire *qua* unconscious desire is Oedipus. Which is why schizo-analysis's basic proposition is, on the contrary, that libidinal investment as such concerns the social field and, as such, doesn't entail any desexualization. And an individual's sexual relations or a group's sexual relations are only exponents of such investments by unconscious desire of the social historical field.

We should revisit what Freud says about maids. Last year, I said: acknowledged or not, explicit or latent, all this familialism driving psychoanalysis is rather serious because, once desire has been oedipalized, the only freedom desire enjoys takes the form of a death drive. What I mean is that once we've oedipalized life—as Nietzsche might put it—one can only find the essence of life in the guise of life turned against itself, as death. And again, it's not that any desire from one's social field only appears in adulthood—that wouldn't make sense because it would be like

saying, okay, child sexuality has to be desexualized in order to invest the social field; it's that way even in childhood. Before, the patient wasn't anchored in the family; that was a 19<sup>th</sup> century development in psychiatry, a bourgeois idea, as Foucault demonstrated. And he's absolutely correct in saying that psychoanalysis—through completely new means—isn't opposed to 19<sup>th</sup> century psychiatry; it pulls off what 19<sup>th</sup> century psychiatry had started and failed to achieve, since the latter didn't have the powerful family tool, the couch. It had the asylum. Freud finished what Pinel started. You have to see where the cuts are made.

What I can't help but notice is how even the most leftist takes—no matter how daring, even the folks who are anti-psychiatry—come up short because they don't get past this damned familialism. [R.D.] Laing sees the danger; his account of schizophrenogenic families is a lot of fun.<sup>20</sup> See Laing and [Aaron] Esterson's *Sanity, Madness, and the Family*<sup>21</sup> — they analyze families and attempt to show what makes a family schizophrenogenic. They first begin with a schizo and work up to the family. They set the scene for us and then, when we look at what they describe as a schizophrenogenic family, the big twist is that it's actually a typical oedipal family. What they call a schizophrenogenic factor is an organizing determination of the family: the famous double bind, i.e., sending contradictory signals where the subject supposedly goes crazy, caught in a double impasse. For a characteristic example, see the book written by one of Laing's patients, who was miraculously cured<sup>22</sup>—she was painting with her excrement. In group discussions, some patients argued to let her do it, others didn't because it wasn't clean. One day Laing, looking at one of her scatological paintings, said, “Not bad, but it needs color.” The woman starts to add color and then becomes a painter—she offers an account of her life, a description of her family.

But what family doesn't constantly put out double binds? What father doesn't take his kid with one hand and say, “I'm your best friend,” and at the same time, with the other hand, “You'll get a smack if you act up.” That's exactly what the double bind is, and the joke's on all of us if that's what we're calling schizophrenogenic. [Gregory] Bateson's whole deal is how the neurotic is determined by the oedipal family. In *The Self and Others*, Laing says at the end that the schizo is someone who has fundamentally—he proposes the two concepts of infirmation and confirmation—who has been infirmed, or who has only gotten a false confirmation à la the double bind. This etiology of schizophrenia is still familialist and ultimately brings things back to a neurotic framework: the so-called schizophrenogenic factor is a factor normally attributed to Oedipus, and it's back to business as usual, still oedipalizing things. But when we're dealing with a schizo, we're sure they have family problems, but it's somewhere else, they're from another world, so much so that they'll agree, “Sure, fine, my father, my mother...” [because] they're fed up, they're tired. They hear voices, and these voices aren't daddy-and-mommy; it's their social-historical field.

It seems to me that neither anti-psychiatry nor institutional psychiatry get out of this familialism, but I argue that the study of schizophrenia can only begin to understand its object if we sever this pseudo-relationship between desire and family.



I'm told that I'm being totally unfair to Leclaire; I claim that isn't my intent whatsoever. What stands out to me in S[erge] Leclaire's work is how there are two poles: one pole is completely oriented toward overcoming Oedipus and the other leans toward making psychoanalysis into a sort of internal axiomatics, and I don't know how he's able to reconcile these two directions.<sup>23</sup>

Moving over to the economic side of things, my whole basic assumption is that there's a major affinity between the capitalist machine and schizophrenia. In other words, the functioning of capitalism is sort of a schizo way of functioning. But, but, but the hypothesis I'd like to work toward is that they are, at the same time, perfectly similar—the processes of capitalism and schizophrenia ought to be evaluated economically and not at all ideologically; the affinity between the capitalist machine and the schizophrenic machine breaks out at the level of economic activity—and at the same time, they are completely different, because... the affinity between the capitalist and schizophrenic processes is due to the identity in their nature, but their difference is owing to the fact that there's an essential difference in their regimes. Identity of nature, difference of regime—that's where we're aiming. Last time, we started with the idea that the identity in their nature is as follows: if the schizo is someone who emits and channels decoded flows, who decodes every flow—which is why he doesn't get caught up in Oedipus, because Oedipus is a recoding [*recodage*]*—the neurotic is someone who avoids schizophrenia thanks to a recoding, only this recoding can't be an ordinary (social) recording; it's an Oedipal recoding.*

Capitalism, historically, has been constituted on the basis of decoded flows, and it's the decoding of flows which has made capitalism possible as such. Its existence doesn't come down to decoding flows, because flows can be decoded without making and forming a capitalist machine, as is clear with Ancient Rome, with feudalism—capitalism comes to be when a conjugation of decoded flows is established, when decoded flows as such enter a determinable relationship.

In the pre-capitalist social field, it's decoded all over, literally, it escapes as a series of independent leaks [*fuites*], and we've seen how capitalism emerges when two decoded flows form a conjugation, namely, the decoded flow of money and the deterritorialized flow of labor. And when the money-owner—money which will turn into capital via this conjugation, this encounter—and the deterritorialized, possessing only the force of their labor, come face to face in the market. And we can only make sense of this development if we recognize how this double decoding entails two completely independent series—which is why their encounter might not have happened, why we find decoding at a certain point in Roman history without their conjugation taking place—it's radically contingent.

But what form does this encounter take? The money-owner—with all the historical circumstances we've seen—once it was in their interest to sell their land and once it was in their interest to invest their money in industry, well, private owners of decoded money will purchase the labor of deterritorialized workers. And in the process, it appears that capital truly becomes—insofar as capital buys labor—industrial capital. There was capital before, but not in a capitalist sense; there was merchant's (commercial) capital and bank capital, but—to borrow Marx's wonderful turn of phrase—it only functioned in the pores of the old formation. What does that

mean? Literally, that means it functioned as alliance capital, allied with prior pre-capitalist societies, be they feudal or despotic.

The Chinese empire, for example: there is fully merchant capital, fully bank capital, which works in alliance, with everything that entails such as surveillance, with everything that entails such as state power, the great despot—it functions as capital in alliance with previous pre-capitalist society. After the encounter between both series of decoded flows, which will be constitutive of industrial capital, the capital which will become industrial capital undergoes a sort of mutation, a mutation whereby alliance capital is transformed into what we might call filiation capital. This transformation is well-described in a great passage from *Capital*, the section of *Book I* titled, “The General Formula for Capital,” where Marx writes, “[value] suddenly presents itself as an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own [...] in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts off”—that is, as merchant capital and bank capital, commodities and money now fall under this new form. “Nay, more: instead of simply representing the relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, into private relations with itself. It differentiates itself as original value from itself as surplus-value,” in the same way that, in his person, God differentiates himself from himself as Father and Son. There’s no better way of describing how capital becomes filial capital. Thus, it’s the work of surplus value, which itself depends on the conjunction of both decoded flows, the flow of money and the flow of labor, which turns capital into industrial filial capital. But what is the formula for this filial capital? If you like, we might represent it as  $x + ax$ . It’s the form whereby money becomes capital, and money becomes capital to the extent that money engages in what Marx calls expansion [*bourgeoisement*] that is, to the extent that money produces money. An ineffable mystery: how money can produce money.  $X + ax$ , “ $ax$ ” here referring to surplus value, i.e., the form whereby money makes money—that’s the “ $+ ax$ .” Where does this surplus value come from? We know that, according to Marx, it comes precisely from this encounter, this conjugation between whoever owns the flow of money and whoever owns the flow of labor, because the latter sells their labor.

From there, there are basically two patterns: an arithmetical pattern that might be expressed as  $A' - A = \textit{surplus value}$ , where surplus value is understood as an arithmetical difference. That’s the tendency in all of Marx’s writing; he says the one buying labor does so in the form of paying wages. These wages correspond to what it takes to maintain and renew the worker’s labor force. Let’s say it’s 6 hours—so, 6 hours = what’s needed for the maintenance and reproduction of the labor force. But when he buys the labor, he hasn’t bought 6 hours, even if he pays by the hour; he’s bought a day’s worth of labor, let’s say 12 hours. Therefore, there’s a difference between what the buyer gets from labor (by making them work for 12 hours) and what he pays for it, which is for 6 hours—hence the formula for surplus value is  $A' - A$ , an arithmetical difference. Obviously anti-Marxist economists are working on a similar basis, which isn’t a Marxist idea. Yet, in the same passages, he says something quite different. He tells us that there’s a difference between labor power with respect to its exchange value and labor power with respect to its use value.

At these points of the text, the difference is no longer arithmetical because the difference between considering something in terms of its exchange value and considering the same thing in terms of its use value comes down to a quantitative [*sic*] difference. Indeed, he says, wages paid by the owner of money-capital represent the exchange value of labor power, while the labor supplied by the owner of labor power itself has to do with use value. As a result, it's no longer an arithmetical difference, but a qualitative one. At which point, the formula for surplus value is no longer  $A' - A$ , i.e.,  $12 - 6 = 6$  surplus value, but is  $\mathcal{A}y / \mathcal{A}x$ , where  $\mathcal{A}y$  is the fluctuation at a given moment in the flow of capital possessed by the money-capital owner, and  $\mathcal{A}x$  the fluctuation in the flow of labor possessed by the owner of labor power. In other words, it's no longer an arithmetical difference; it conforms to the difference in nature between the two flows. It's a differential relationship. This second formula,  $\mathcal{A}y / \mathcal{A}x$ , has the upper hand, and we'll see right away where this  $\mathcal{A}x$  just now comes from: it's precisely because  $\mathcal{A}x$  and  $\mathcal{A}y$  are the elements of a differential relationship that  $\mathcal{A}x$  is produced by adding it to  $x$ . There, the variation whereby the filiative form of capital produces  $\mathcal{A}x$  provides the nature of the differential relationship  $\mathcal{A}y / \mathcal{A}x$ . We have to try to understand what this differential relationship is, and perhaps the entire capitalist economy hinges on such a relationship, and it does, but that remains to be verified.

And here my hypothesis bears out, namely, my assumption that capitalism either never runs on codes, or else, any codes are there for fun. It's the first social regime that doesn't use codes, and in that sense it's very close to schizophrenia. But in another way, they aren't close, because [capitalism] has come upon a wonderful trick: in place of failing and absent codes, it's swapped in an axiomatic, an axiomatic machine a thousand times crueler, more cynical, more terrifying than the code of the great despot. More than anything, an axiomatic implies that—perhaps for the first time—capitalism presents itself as a society determining a field of immanence, and it forms the conjugation of decoded flows therein. The axiomatics of flows forms a field of immanence which capitalism will fill in with its own content, whereas before, there was always a relationship between the social field and codes invoking ideologically transcendent determinations.

What do we make of this qualitative difference? We can no longer get away with calling them two heterogeneous flows, especially since we no longer have codes qualifying these flows; we've gone beyond such a simple perspective now that we've seen how these two qualitatively distinct flows are caught up in a very particular sort of relationship, a differential relationship, just like how in differential calculus you have the relationship of the differential of the abscissa and the differential of the ordinate. If it's true that both flows concerned are the flow of money capital convertible into means of production, of which part, if you like, is convertible into constant capital, and the other part into the purchase of labor power, i.e., into variable capital. [If that's true,] the two flows are heterogeneous, but they're like two parts of capital: constant capital, variable capital. From there, there's no doubt that the qualitative duality of these flows must show up again in money, and that moreover, the mechanism of money brings us to the type of relationship that exists between the two.

The nature of their differential relationship is such that the two quantities [*grandeurs*], understood as heterogeneous, qualitatively distinct, are not of the same power [*puissance*]. One of the two must be a power, with the other a mere quantity. We should get a handle on the nature of both flows and how they're related to money. I'd like to propose the following principle: in essence, money sort of plays out on two tables, and the coexistence of these two tables will form the most general basis for the mechanisms of capitalism. I'm relying on two current economists: Suzanne de Brunhoff<sup>24</sup> and then a neo-capitalist economist whose theory is unwittingly completely schizophrenic, so much so that we might ask what difference there is between a text of scientific ambition in economics and a schizophrenic text when it comes to the mechanisms of capitalism. This economist, who is so spirited, so talented, is Bernard Schmitt, and I'll refer to his book, *Money, Wages, and Profit* [Paris: PUF, 1966].<sup>25</sup>

Now, phenomenologically speaking—which is the only thing I'm concerned with, at the moment—Suzanne de Brunhoff, a Marxist, and the other one, who certainly isn't Marxist, both say exactly the same thing. Basically: there are two forms of money, which lead to two different consequences. The Marxist's takeaway is that the mechanisms of capitalism can only function by establishing a fictitious convertibility, more specifically, between both kinds of money. This convertibility is completely fictitious—it depends on the gold standard, it depends on the unity of markets, it depends on interest rates. In fact, it isn't meant to function; according to Suzanne de Brunhoff, it's meant to conceal the working of capitalism. This fictitious, hypothetical, constant convertibility from one form of money to the other ensures that how it works remains hidden. What I find interesting about this concept of concealment is that, where Brunhoff's analysis is concerned, it's no longer an ideological concept but an operational, organizational concept. That is, the capitalist monetary circuit can only function on the basis of an objective concealment, which comes down to the convertibility of one form of money to another.

What Schmitt has to say comes down to the same thing: he fully acknowledges both forms of money and attempts to define them. One, he says, is a pure creative flow—you can already sense how the basic phenomenon in capitalism is what every banker recognizes as the creation of money, a creative flow in the form of the creation of money. The other, completely different form is revenue-money, i.e., money defined as purchasing power. What's so devious about Schmitt's argument is how he says, look, what creates purchasing power is the transformation of the first form of money, the flow creating money, into the second form, revenue-money; purchasing power does not predate the form of revenue-money. That could be—why not? In fact, there is a form of money, creation of money, mutant power—monetarization famously transforming an economy by creating money. Central banks play a determining role here, creating money. There's another form, revenue-money, purchasing power. What creates purchasing power is revenue-money and mutations in the flow of creating revenue-money; purchasing power doesn't exist beforehand. One immediate consequence: the worker hasn't been bought; there can't be theft, there is no surplus value. Schmitt says that Marx was wrong, that, for there to be surplus value, it's necessary that the worker's labor power be bought, but it can't be through wage-income because purchasing power is created by income; income cannot

presuppose it. Therefore, he says, wages are not a form of purchase; it's a form of mutating one money into another.

At this level, Brunhoff and Schmitt say more or less the same thing: in both cases, there are two irreducible forms of money, there's a passage or mutation from one form to the other, and that's the only way a capitalist system can function. On a purely descriptive level, it's all too obvious that the money flowing through a firm or from a bank are signs of capital's power, or if you like, it's a force prospective in nature, which, strictly speaking—save for when the firm declares bankruptcy—at that point passes from one form of money to the other, signs of economic power which cannot be actualized here and now since, in effect, they imply an entire system of relationships between differential coefficients, involving other firms, finance banks, etc.

So, on the one hand, you have a system of signs of economic power, of unrealizable prospective forces, a detachment-cut in a system of capitalism's monetary signs, and broadly speaking, we'll file these signs of economic power away under the general heading of the structure of finance. It's the whole structure of finance that goes through a company, connecting it to banks, going to other companies, connected to other banks.

As for employees, what they receive, the money they're working with doesn't have to do with signs of economic power that can't be realized here and now, with a prospective value, but with signs of exchange value that don't represent a financial structure but a means of payment, i.e., payment for their labor, payment they'll actualize by buying goods. This system of means of payment and exchange values is convertible into goods and into use-values, and it [*missing, enters*] into a sort of one-to-one relationship with an imposed range of products, suggested by the market. They have their means of payment; they acquire certain types of suggested goods. This time it's not as a detachment-cut [*coupure-détachement*] into a set of signs of economic power; they're withdrawal-cuts [*coupures-prélèvements*] on a series of products, the appropriation of which depends on my possessing a number of means of payment.

I'm just trying to mark out concrete domains. Money has two distinct, fundamental aspects that confirm our initial assumption:  $\mathcal{A}y$  and  $\mathcal{A}x$  refer to quantities which evidently don't have the same power [*puissance*], i.e., the money that goes in and out of a company is not at all the same as the money going in and out of the employee's pocket. And again, once we pretend that the two are interchangeable, they *are*, effectively—and that's what's funny about it, because it doesn't matter, since that doesn't change anything about their difference in nature. By no means do they have the same capacity [*puissances*]. One is really a sign of economic power, while the other is nothing of the sort—strictly speaking, it's the sign of the employee's powerlessness. One defines a financial structure; the other defines a series of payment methods—but that isn't the same thing at all, and that at least confirms our initial assumption, namely, that it was necessary for at least one of the two quantities [*grandeurs*] to be an incommensurable power unrelated to the other, the other being quantity [*grandeur*] pure and simple. As a result, when we try to use one to measure the other, it's like trying to use centimeters to measure astronomical distances. It's an aspect of money that functions in a completely different way.

There are two things I'd add. This same duality, if we try to define it in more precise terms, the first idea that comes to mind is that means of payment are more or less what we call the money of exchange, and the other, the making of money, would refer to so-called credit money.

But it turns out that won't do, and we can take this relationship even deeper: we actually find these two forms within credit money. How so? The distinction made between bank credit and commercial credit—commercial credit refers to phenomena of circulation, so-called simple circulation. For example: bills of exchange with a fixed maturity are credit money acting as payment money. The nature of bank credit is completely different; it implies a particular sort of circulation which is completely unrelated to the circulation of commodities. It implies a special circuit, the circulation of drafts, throughout which credit gains and loses its exchange value.

Thus, it's not just in the overall dualism between exchange-money/credit-money—more specifically, we find it there in credit money as such, in the dualism between commercial credit and bank credit: the dualism between payment and financing. In the end, the two flows we started with, the flow of money-capital and the flow of labor, have been transformed by the differential relationship between two very different flows of money: the flow of money as financial structure and the flow of money as means of payment. Which puts us in a position to amend something I said earlier, which turns out to be false, that we only get capitalism as such with industrial capitalism. Yes and no. I mean, it's true that capitalism as such can only emerge in the form of commercial or banking capital—which always colludes with, or would have always colluded with, other forms of society—were it not for industrial capital, but we ought to add that, sure, capitalism is fundamentally industrial, but it functions solely as commercial and banking capital, which has its sights set on industrial production. And there, then, such commercial and banking capital is no longer allied with pre-capitalist society. It finds its true ally, its alliance with industrial capital itself, an alliance which entails all sorts of violence, all the pressure and power that banking capital exerts over the very organization of production.

A student: [*A question regarding economics*]

Deleuze: I have a concern (*souci*). I've given two approximations of the regions where this form of money appears: one is the distinction between money in a bank-business circuit and the other form of money as means of payment, i.e., what goes in and out of an employee's pocket. The second was the distinction between two domains of credit money: commercial credit and bank credit. It would be interesting to add other domains where this distinction is borne out; we'd have to demonstrate how the bank has power over both forms of money, i.e., how it issues payments and how it works out finance structures, and how that corresponds to banking activities that are theoretically convertible but which are, in reality, distinct.

## Gilles Deleuze

### Seminar on *Anti-Oedipus I*, 1971-1972

#### Lecture 04, 18 January 1972

#### Translation: Billy Dean Goehring; revised transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Richard Pinhas: One thing I'd like to bring up—not that I'm necessarily arguing against it—earlier you outlined the two main axes for our investigation, the first being “code and axiomatics” and the second being the way in which desire invests the social field, the question being how it does so. I'm curious why you didn't take that line of inquiry further and ask *why*. What I'm getting at is something along the lines of what happens in fascism—to take a random example—there's a relationship which shows us why the desire/social field relationship is sort of transformed; it's the fact that the object [of desire] completely disappears. [Its] link has been severed, wrecked. This is illustrated rather well in certain surrealist films from 1940-40 [*sic*], where we see money depreciating, inflation, for example. And there's an element that sort of makes the object of desire completely disappear; some essential aspect gives rise to, lends itself to fascism as we know it. I suppose that after a given period of transformation, we more or less find the same process—different, but similar.

Gilles Deleuze: You began with the necessity of asking “why.” I understand everything you said afterwards, but I don't quite understand why this question is necessary, and how it fits in with the rest of what you said. I think there's no need to ask “why” because this whole system of machines is due to functionalism. If you ask “why,” you're back to working with categories of signifiers; it's a risky question. I believe there's a domain—the domain of machines we call machines of desire, or desiring machines—where what we get is functionalism, that is, our only question is “How does it work?”—“How” and not “Why.” And this is why certain ethnologists are still in touch with how desire manifests in the social field—when they ask themselves, “What exactly is the purpose of psychoanalysis? Does it really serve our purposes as ethnologists?” And they say yes and no, because for us, as ethnologists, at the end of the day what we're interested in has nothing to do with what something means—however one poses that question—it's actually: “How does it work in the social field?”

Then it's clear where the argument goes from there: never does the function or the use of something explain its production. For example, the way in which an organism functions could never explain that organism's mode of production, or how an institution functions could never explain how the institution itself is formed. I think this anti-functionalist argument is spot-on, but in what context? [It's spot-on] at the level of large aggregates, of molar aggregates.<sup>26</sup> There, indeed, how something is used always comes second to how something is formed. But if we're trying to approach the unconscious in terms of machines, in terms of factories, in terms of units of production, in terms of desiring machines, I don't think these are big machines; they are

micro-machines. The machinic unconscious, the unconscious of desiring machines, is essentially a micro-unconscious, a micro-logical, micro-physical unconscious. Or, if you prefer, it's a molecular unconscious.

Yet, in other words, at the level of molecular formations, as opposed to molar aggregates, strictly speaking, there is no possible difference between form and function. If I say how something works, there's nothing else I can say. For schizo-analysis, the question isn't at all — I recognize that the question "What does it mean" is rather complex because at a certain point, "What does it mean" might simply refer to a signified, or as they say, the whole question is knowing, when talking about the signifier, whether the question is still "What does it mean," or whether it's something else. Personally, I think it's the same question. The question is still "What does it mean," only crossed out, but it still falls under "What does it mean," while desiring machines, strictly speaking, don't *mean* anything—neither in terms of signifieds, nor in terms of signifiers — for schizo-analysis, the problem is: "What are your machines?" And that's not easy to figure out.

A guy comes in; what are his desiring machines? It's not enough to point out that he likes to drive, that he has a fridge—that's all related to his desiring machines, but that's not what his desiring machines are. On the other hand, neither are his desiring machines fantasies; they aren't imaginary objects that function as doubles—it isn't the dreamed car as the real car's double... Desiring machines are molecular formations that exist objectively in larger technical machines and in larger social machines. That's why, I think, we have to critique everything that's dream, fantasy—the unconscious doesn't dream, doesn't fantasize, no more than the unconscious is a theatre. Dreams and fantasies are by-products of one's reflection. They are territorialities of Oedipus; dreams are always oedipal. If analysts always stuck to dreams, they'd necessarily come back to Oedipus.

There's a wonderful part of Bergson where he writes that it's no surprise that matter and intelligence dovetail together, that matter and intelligence are tailor-made for each other, since they both come from differentiating the same one movement, and well, it's the same with Oedipus and dreams. It's not surprising that all dreams are inherently Oedipal, because the same movement constitutes both dreams and Oedipus.

But that has nothing to do desiring machines, so where things get tricky—I suppose—in schizo-analysis, is finding someone's desiring machines. What's the deal with your things, what are your machines? Then, if the person doesn't answer in terms of machines, or if we can't manage to find their machinic elements... obviously, that raises the question: what is our criterion? What allows us to say, ah, *there*, we've pinned down someone's desiring machines? I think there are very solid criteria, and they specifically come down to this: desiring machines are molecular formations, never molar aggregates—but I get the feeling I'm not addressing your comment—all I'm saying is that, at the molecular level and only at the molecular level, functionalism reigns supreme, and that's because function, production, form, are all one, strictly speaking. A desiring machine is defined only by how it functions, which is to say how it's formed, which is to say how it's produced. As it stands, I'd say that the question "why" never comes up.



Pinhas: I think maybe I didn't word my question the right way. I wasn't trying to question the fact that it works, or to reintroduce linguistic-psychoanalytic categories, etc. What I was trying to ask is, after the question of how, there are processes—I tried to offer an example of something I think fits the description: fascism—there's why it works, in that sense, and then there's why it works in another way, if you will. It works this way at one moment, and meanwhile, in another country, for example, it works another way. I think that, in that context, over and above the question how, we might afterwards ask the question why.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. That's a very particular "why," then. It's a "why" concerning the nature of the social field invested by desire and desiring machines. Where the social field's characteristics come from, at such and such time, under such and such circumstances. Here, again, it's pretty complicated. We'd need to maintain, like, two practical guidelines or principles, alongside there being desiring machines, which run along molecular lines, what I'd like to call lines of flight.<sup>27</sup> It's not even enough to reach lines of resistance in the unconscious. The essential thing about the unconscious is that it escapes; it goes along lines of flight. Yet Oedipus, fantasies, dream, and what not—far from being real productions or formations of the unconscious—are all tourniquets, plugging up the unconscious's lines of flight or escape. That's why we have to blow all that up to reveal its lines of flight, which then lead us to a molecular unconscious of desiring machines. These are molecular formations, micro-formations, whereby it becomes a non-figurative, non-symbolic unconscious. It's neither figurative nor symbolic—it's what Lacan calls the Real, only not just a possible real, but a functional real.

Then, we have to simultaneously maintain, basically, two poles: one pole would be one like—it gets tricky; fortunately, at one level we'd distinguish two poles: the first being investments of molar aggregates, investments of the social field and everything that comes with that, including family investments, the family being one molar aggregate among others, a molar sub-aggregate.

And then, at the other end, there'd be molecular lines of flight, just as you might distinguish between macro-physics and micro-physics. Really, then, schizo-analysis would operate in terms of units of production of the micro-unconscious of small, molecular formations—that would have to be our first principle, but at the same time—so, again, we'd need to distinguish between investments of molar aggregates and investments of molecular formations, of desiring machines, on the other side of social and technical machines. Which is how we would define one of the main activities involved in the practice of schizo-analysis: nothing can get off the ground until we get to the desiring machines of someone's unconscious, i.e., their molecular functioning formations. If we can't reach them, we can't do anything; we're still dealing with big aggregates: Oedipus, the family, etc. As I see it, the signifier is a molar sign, fundamentally, a sign structuring big, molar aggregates, thus completely unrelated to desiring machines.<sup>28</sup>

So, that would be the first task for schizo-analysis: reaching the lines of flight of the unconscious. Which means the unconscious doesn't express itself, doesn't attract; it escapes, and it causes its desiring machines to function based on its lines of flight. As Plato might put it, when it draws near its opposite, it either retreats or perishes<sup>29</sup>—in the same way, the unconscious either perishes under Oedipus or escapes through its lines of flight.

But, from another perspective—one which doesn't cancel out the first—we'd have to make what seems like the opposite point: that all investments, no matter what kind, are necessarily molar or social. Any investment is necessarily the investment of big aggregates; all investments are investments of big aggregates by molecular formations one can identify as desiring machines. No matter what, desiring machines—their parts and their cogs—invest big molar aggregates.

The second task of schizo-analysis would be to discover the nature of these social investments in a person, at the level of the unconscious. And I'm saying the two aren't contradictory: in one, we say there are two positions: big aggregates defined by social and technical machines, and on the other side, molecular lines of flight and desiring machines. With the other, it's that all investments are molar and social, just that social investments have two poles: a paranoid pole, which we could just as easily call fascist, reactionary investment, which consists in subordinating desiring machines to big, repressive apparatuses, to the big apparatuses of the state or of the family. The vulgarized psychoanalytical framework has to be flipped: paranoia is what comes first, what comes second is oedipal neurosis, and then third is Narcissus. The Oedipus complex is first of all a paranoid idea; it's only secondarily a neurotic feeling, i.e., the neurotic is someone who's been fooled, who's been fooled by the paranoiac. It's a father's notion, and it's not a father's notion regarding his son—he doesn't care about his son—the paranoiac is someone who starts hallucinating their social field by sadistically subordinating all their desiring machines to the repressive apparatuses of their social field.

At any rate, desiring machines are within real machines; they don't resemble them, as in that absurd way of understanding dreams, and so on...it's not about saying, ah, yes, uh, uh—it's not about making psychoanalysis some kind of gizmo, uh, for market research, where we go, *hmm, what dream car lies behind the real car?* That's not it. Desiring machines exist objectively. They exist in the cogs and parts of social machines and technical machines; they just can't be extracted at the macroscopic level. That's why it takes a microscopic analysis to draw out someone's desiring machines. Someone who's paranoid isn't worried about their son. Schreber's father is *the* paranoiac. You can see how his paranoia works, and in this regard, you can see the extent to which psychiatric understandings of paranoia are reactionary. If they didn't link paranoia to family events, they'd be forced to acknowledge that paranoia, precisely because it has nothing to do with family relationships, is an inherently fascist, reactionary investment of one's social field. The paranoid man's delusions aren't about his wife or about his son; his delusions are about race, education, culture. The schizophrenic too, but in a different way. At its root, the paranoiac's delusion is "let's create a pure race": a sense that everything is in decline, that we're no longer pure Aryans. Although he's looking at his little kid, that's only secondary. And there he applies—Oedipus is always an act of reduction [*rabattement*], application—he presents himself as the great pedagogue, the great restorer to the races. Schreber's father started with a whole other dimension: the deviation of his social field. Our world's been ruined; let's recreate the pure race—and with what? With machines.

First, the paranoiac is delusional about the social field. I argue that paranoia ought to be defined in absolutely non-oedipal terms, as a particular way of investing the social field. A kind of investment of the social field, an investment that completely subordinates the system of desiring

machines, or molecular formations, to greater molar aggregates. That in mind, in application to his family, as a privileged molar sub-aggregate, he applies his reform, his pure race, and produces an oedipalized little guy. Which is thus a product of earlier paranoid investment. It's in this sense that the Oedipus complex is something experienced by the neurotic son inheriting his paranoid father's big idea, but the latter's idea isn't oedipal; it consists in investing the entire social field.

The other idea is that everything is social investment, only it ranges between two poles: from paranoia, which broadly subordinates desiring machines to the apparatuses of large aggregates, to schizophrenia, schizophrenic escape, molecular lines of flight, desiring machines—it's the same thing. And it's no less deeply connected to the social field than paranoia's sweeping integrations. It isn't more delirious; it's just a different sort of delirium. Because delirium has like two ends of the spectrum (constantly oscillating), and the schizophrenic side of delirium carries out the inverse sort of subordination, subordinating big molar aggregates to molecular formations. Which is why lines of flight don't just consist in doing something; they also entail driving something away.

As a result, schizo-analysis basically has three tasks.

- A destructive task: taking a big curette to the unconscious, i.e., has to blow up: Oedipus, dream, fantasy, myth, tragedy, no more theater—at the same time (not later on).
- Its first positive goal: reaching someone's desiring machines. And you can never get at them directly; all we have are machinic indices, which might as well be practically hidden—that's fine, that's inevitable, there are only indices, not at all in the sense of "why" that I denounced earlier, but because they belong to a different regime, they're micro-formations and only along lines of flight, or what amounts to the same, lines of decoding, of deterritorialization. The unconscious constantly deterritorializes itself; there are endless lines, lines of flight, abstract lines—again, neither symbolic, nor figurative, nor imaginary, nothing of the sort—lines of flight marked out with machinic indices. The only thing noteworthy about dreams is that they're full of machinic indices. In dreams and fantasy, we get nothing but indices of desiring machines, and we get them in the form of molar machines; as often as daddies-mommies appear in dreams, so too do machinic indices. It isn't a desiring machine because desiring machines aren't dreamt, but they're machinic indices. All the time, in fantasies, little machines appear; you have to follow their escape routes [*voies de fuite*] to get out of dream analysis; you have to delve into these kinds of machinic lines in order to go further.
- Alongside the work of scraping everything out, the sort of violent countermeasure to the unconscious pseudo-formations that have to be ruthlessly destroyed, stamped out, and the main positive task of uncovering desiring machines, the second positive task—there are criteria if you follow the lines of flight as far as you can—the second task is uncovering the nature of the social field's unconscious investments, granted that the social field's preconscious investments don't work the same way. You could have rather revolutionary preconscious investments and still have paranoid, reactionary unconscious investments. What analysis needs is some equivalent to the

revolution of abstract painting—that is, it needs to reach parts of the unconscious that are no longer figurative or symbolic: a molecular, abstract, machinic unconscious.

A student [*comment about Schreber's father*]: It doesn't start with the father's generation; we have to go up a level (the grandmother), which is also quite something (dreaming of having a "real" man). You get the sense that it's the paranoiac's father who should be committed, and not his delusional son (delirium being the imaginary resolution of his fantasies). The one driving things is perfectly socially integrated, and it's in that sense that he has delusions about the whole social field and then afterwards applies it to his son—but he's firmly planted in his social field, which is why he avoids getting sent to the asylum. Whereas those who end up in the asylum, like paranoiacs, are those who aren't connected enough to be spurred on by familial investments; there's a barrier that absolutely prevents them from having any delusion about the social field. It takes three generations to make someone paranoid; as for schizos, who's to say?

*Deleuze*: I take issue with your wording, but that's beside the point. If there were only paranoiacs, there never would have been asylums. The paranoiac gets along fine. The paranoiacs who do get hospitalized are either really poor, so they think they're little leaders, or else it's because of schizoid elements that always get mixed in with paranoia. If they're hospitalized, it's certainly not because of their paranoia; it's owing to some latent schizoid element, lying beneath the paranoia.

Mannoni's argument about the decision on Schreber's case as the first act of anti-psychiatry misses the mark, since the reason Schreber was released was that his schizophrenic elements did not prevail.<sup>30</sup> I'm reminded of another case, perhaps the opposite of Schreber's, of someone with quite pronounced paranoid aspects and even more pronounced schizophrenic tendencies: Nijinsky, the dancer. No way the court would let Nijinsky go free—he went around shouting, "I am the clown of God, death to the Stock Market, the Stock Market is death, money is death!"<sup>31</sup> You could argue that saying that is unreasonable since it was just said here.

With rich paranoiacs, it's great; they have a fundamental social function. The paranoiac is well integrated, and no one who's paranoid will get committed to an asylum unless they fall into one of those two categories.

My second point addresses matters regarding the three family members. Looking at the three generations, we find with the most ardent anti-psychiatrists—Gisela Pankow, [R.D.] Laing, [Daniel] Cooper—what do we end up with? When it comes to psychosis, the Oedipus complex obviously falls apart, so the question is how to salvage Oedipus. As [Guy] Rosalato naively puts it: "How do we bring psychosis back into an Oedipal framework?"<sup>32</sup> Posed in that way, the problem can play out in one of several ways. We can take a structuralist route—which isn't at all what Lacan is doing—we can use structuralism to form a structural Oedipus complex and figure out where psychosis fits into said structure. Or—these aren't mutually exclusive—we can extend Oedipus. If the Oedipus complex doesn't work, we widen it a bit, i.e., we bring in the grandmother, the grandfather; we argue that Oedipus no longer involves two generations but three. We'll have to account for the grandfather. If that doesn't work, we'll bring in a fourth generation.

If I'm privileging the role of the father or the role of the grandfather, it's certainly not for the sake a new take on Oedipus. At a certain point, I could ask: what comes first, the father or the child? That is, the chicken-or-egg questions doesn't make any sense—but at the same time, it must be addressed. The father or mother comes before the child. If I claim that the father has primacy over the child, that can be interpreted in one of two ways. [First,] regressively, as an infinite regress—every child has a father—we can keep climbing further and further back up to the presupposition of a first father, the Father of the primal horde, for example. But there's another, completely different way of interpreting it, in a way where we don't get caught up in an indefinite familial reduction. It could mean—and this is where the question becomes nonsense—what comes first is actually the social field covering both father and child, who are simultaneously immersed in said social-historical field. In truth, the idea that the father has primacy over the child means that social investments come before familial investments.

That means understanding the unconscious as a cycle, as per Marx's well-known response to Aristotle regarding the "cause of man [*sic*]"—yes, but there's a cycle, the cycle whereby man produces man. The unconscious of desiring machines is a cyclical unconscious. Accounts of schizophrenogenic families fail to explain anything about how schizophrenia is produced; the most ordinary family mechanisms get portrayed as schizophrenogenic mechanisms. The father has primacy over the child, but not *as* a father—it's that the social field and social investments have primacy over father and son.

Why do we only find indices of the little desiring machines that invest the entire social field? These machinic lines of flight are necessarily lines of deterritorialization as such, because deterritorialization is like the inverse or opposite of the movements of reterritorialization. Even Beckett's most extreme protagonists can't completely deterritorialize themselves; they integrate small patches of land<sup>33</sup>, Malone's room, a trash can. The movement of deterritorialization can only be grasped through the gene and the nature of the reterritorializations carried out by an individual.

It's always by way of a reterritorialization's countermovement that we can determine the degree of deterritorialization. For example, the neurotic has already found a foothold to cling onto: Oedipus. The analyst's couch is the second thing that won't budge, the bit of land one must cling to—otherwise everything gets rocky.

We have to demonstrate how capitalism never stops deterritorializing and, with its axiomatics, reterritorializing. For example, fascism was a process of reterritorializing the masses, however terrible. You can only read someone's deterritorialization—and how far it's gone—that is, someone's schizophrenic terror, through their counter-terrors, the reterritorializations they carry out. That's why we shouldn't think of perverts in terms of their impulses. We should think of them in terms of their territory: perverts are folks who want neither the territoriality of Oedipus nor the territoriality of the couch. That won't do—they invent artificial territory, artificial groups. They have their own way of reterritorializing themselves, and if all else fails, as a last resort, you reterritorialize yourself as a body without organs, i.e., lying catatonic in the hospital, the poorest territory of all. You've recreated your little foothold.

What matters is that the movement of deterritorialization isn't simply susceptible to getting taken up in a perverse reterritorialization, be it psychoanalytic or perverse in the strict sense, but that the movement of deterritorialization is strong enough to—cleaving to its revolutionary lines of flight—create for itself a new type of land. Perhaps that's what Nietzsche means when he says that one day “the earth shall become a place of healing.”<sup>34</sup> Perhaps, rather than being reterritorialized on artificial land, under certain conditions, the movement of deterritorialization might come to be the creator of a new earth. It would be nice, at any rate.

Eric: Three generations are relevant. It doesn't go any further than that. There's been a psychotic episode—there must be a mechanism there linking it to something, the “name of the father,” triggering the patient's hospital psychosis. The same way you distinguish between schizophrenia and hospital schizophrenia, there's also a difference between psychosis and hospital psychosis. Hence Lacan's work, which demonstrates the role of exclusion, which is linked to the father in a certain way—not the real father, but the father as an investment of the social field—in this idea of hospital paranoia.

Deleuze: We'll have to pick back up on this next week. I disagree.

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on *On Anti-Oedipus I*, 1971-1972**

**Lecture 05, January 25, 1972**

**Transcript: WebDeleuze; modified by Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring**

... [either that or] community psychiatry, i.e., a sort of adaptation police force, as Mrs. [Maud] Mannoni says, where you get split up into districts or sectors—that is, you get oedipalized (Hochman’s work).<sup>35</sup> The point is to triangulate people as much as possible, extending the triangular relationship beyond the family. For those not doing community psychiatry, there are three fundamental problems—institutional analysis, for example, uses group psychotherapy.<sup>36</sup>

What’s risky about group psychotherapy—I’m not trying to criticize psychiatry as though individual psychiatrists had to find everything on their own; there needs to be a mass movement behind it. An individual psychiatrist can’t be expected to figure it out on their own—they’re well aware that lots of things can go wrong with their groups. Sometimes the group ends up being just perverts—a pervert slips in, pretty dangerous, everyone is dangerous except for me—neurotics pose the greatest risk. They won’t let you go until they pass their stuff onto you: they’re contagious *par excellence*. Better to have ten times as many schizos [*sic*] than a single neurotic, since a schizo will leave you alone. A neurotic person is the spitting image of what Nietzsche calls a “toxic patient.” They’ll do whatever they can to get their vampire fangs in you—they can’t bear the fact that you *aren’t* depressed or depressive.

One of the potential risks with institutional analysis is that its group therapy sessions might be infiltrated by perverts, perverting the whole group, or—which isn’t any better—the group might be oedipalized, neuroticized, with a group superego, a group father, or at worst,<sup>37</sup> [group therapy risks] reconstituting so-called catatonic schizophrenia, and the most open groups an asylum structure will form around catatonic schizophrenics. How do you prevent any of these three sorts of groups from forming? When a pervert starts working a group over from the inside, or starts oedipalizing at top speed—the risks are clear.

The pervert falls under the third [?] category; they’re proud and want to [be] treated as an equal, on an even playing field. It isn’t about drive, or whatever; it’s about desire’s place in relation to territorialities. There’s an insane fear of madness and catatonia. They’ve over-adapted; it made them cold inside. No matter the perversion, what all perverts have in common, I think, [is] this two-fold aspect of over-comfort, over-adaptation—I don’t think there are many perverts—that manifests as a sort of joviality, but not at all as some psychotic euphoria. You have to be wary and can’t trust your little girl, and at the same time, you get the feeling that they’ve been hollowed out—a little shard of ice behind the massive armor of their over-adaptation. What do they do with it? The perverse body is certainly no longer catatonic; it’s what Sade calls apathy, the sadistic apathy Klossowski famously focused on so much. Either that or the explicit theory of

coldness we find in the anti-Sade, in Masoch. [The pervert] doesn't want a territoriality like Oedipus. "It's beneath me." They're proud. They don't want a sub-aggregate.<sup>38</sup> They build themselves magnificent territorialities—[Raymond Roussel's] *Impressions of Africa* is a perverted text.<sup>39</sup> The definitive text on the body without organs and catatonic-psychotic territorialization is Schreber, it's Artaud. Most writing is run-of-the-mill neurosis.

*Impressions of Africa* [by Raymond Roussel] is about constructing an exotic, artificial territoriality, which, from the depths of its coldness and over-comfort, will claim to be on equal footing with any other power. The pervert has invented their territoriality, their group, their secret society—it has nothing to do with a drive; everything is neurosis, everything is psychosis. You could say that everything is a schizophrenic process, only not in the same way, fortunately. Everything is a schizophrenic process insofar as every other aspect is defined in relation to [schizophrenia].

We perpetually find ourselves situated tangentially to the schizophrenic process. We could say that everything is psychosis because, ultimately, even when it comes to other territorialities, what's at stake is the body without organs. And in any analysis, you haven't done anything until you get to the repulsing mechanisms of the body without organs. And then, we could say that everything is neurosis insofar as it is the only sickness, and all sicknesses are defined in relation to the neurosis of Oedipus and castration, because Oedipus is the primary frame of reference, the primary means for recoding [*recodage*].<sup>40</sup> And the psychotic is someone who refuses Oedipus, who says, "Better the desert of my body without organs than Oedipal territoriality. I'd rather say nothing than say 'daddy-mommy.'" And the pervert is someone whose way of relating themselves to Oedipus is to say, "I would be so ashamed." In that sense, everything is neurosis.

And everything is also perversion, since perversion is the archetypical model of reterritorialization: with how perversion operates, we see the creation of artificial territorialities, of so-called perverse groups, recognizing that the schizophrenic process isn't the same thing as clinical schizophrenia [*Responding to Eric*].

How is clinical schizophrenia produced?

A student: What would authentic reterritorialization be?

Deleuze: You're skipping ahead. We're not going to ever make the mistake of saying, "Ah, the good old days, when the earth [*terre*] was real earth." Capitalism—I forget who said it—was about neo-archaisms, i.e., restoring what appear to be archaisms but with modern functions, returning to the land [*terre*], for example. It's only apparently archaic; it's a neo-archaism because it actually has a perfectly current function for the societies bringing it back.

The third point would be to ask the question: Is the process of deterritorialization itself—not insofar as it gets reterritorialized in a factitious or artificial way in capitalism—is it capable of creating new land [*terre*], or something equivalent to new land? Is it possible to create new land? That remains to be seen; it comes back to the problem of revolution... [*Continuing his response to Laurent*]



Deleuze: You say the real as sexed. For me, even with your stipulated conditions, I would agree. For me it gets tricky when we ask, what sexuality are we talking about? You mentioned human sexuality, but that isn't just Oedipus. It's also a bisexuality, that is, there are men and there are women. There's also the assertion that castration is valid for both sexes. All that together: Oedipus, sexual difference, castration, as the source of difference, the main distributor of Oedipus. Together they define, not sexuality, but the anthropomorphic representation of sex.

What I'm getting at is that there is no human sexuality; the only thing human is a representation of sexuality. It's the anthropomorphic representation of sex that culminates in the phallus: the phallus is the fundamental principle of the anthropomorphic representation of sex. The question isn't whether it exists but how it exists, how it works. I'm asking whether this anthropomorphic representation of sex is a determination of the unconscious, or an element of the preconscious, or even an illusion consciousness has of the unconscious. Is the castration machine, the phallic machine and its oedipal offspring, part of an illusion consciousness is led to form about the unconscious? Schizo-analysis has to reach non-human sex... [*text missing*]

... It seems to me that any introduction, even indirectly, of chains of foreclosure, of lack, of the name of the father, would fall back onto an anthropomorphic representation of sex. So, I'm not all that receptive to the question of "sexual undifferentiation." It's not a real problem; it's the existence of *n* sexes, that statistically there are good men and good women, as molar aggregates. At the molecular level of schizo-analysis or the delirious unconscious, it's impossible to distinguish a man from a woman—certainly not owing to some bisexuality, which does nothing to distance us from anthropomorphic representation—but at a completely different level, the level of *n*, little 'n' sexes. There, distinguishing man or woman is absolutely impossible. In anthropomorphic representation, there are men and women; when it comes to non-human sex, there's neither man nor woman.<sup>41</sup>

Now, to my delight, one author who's taken to be the most oedipal, but who understood and knew how to smash Oedipus once and for all, was Proust. There's a level of sexuality, the relationships between *n* sexes have this sort of character. Homosexuality, heterosexuality, man, woman—it's lost all meaning. Words that can be used in one context and not in another. At the level of non-human sex, there's no name of the father, no foreclosure, no castration, no... and so on. In these contexts, those things don't exist. It doesn't describe the unconscious; it's part of the image that consciousness forms of the unconscious. In fact, under the name of the father, you find Joan of Arc, President Schreber, Mao—names from history.

Richard Pinhas: Would you agree that... and I'm on board with what you said about difference and how we think about castration. In the system you're describing as the anthropomorphic representation of sex, [there are] like oppositions, simple oppositions in a positivity, and on the other side, you have difference—that is, we can no longer think of difference as sexual difference, but difference still exists—a difference other than opposition. I'd opt to think of it in terms of life and death, through a Freudian lens: the constancy principle and the nirvana principle, average tension and absolute zero; that's ultimately what life and death is. What if we

took that as real otherness, as difference in the face of castration, which we could consider an opposition only within the same unity?

Deleuze: No, I wouldn't agree—any time we're dealing with difference, what matters to me is the number of terms involved. If there are two terms at play, it seems to me it would inherently depend on anthropomorphic representation—unless we're working with  $n$  terms, where “man” and “woman” have lost all meaning, strictly speaking.

Pinhas: That doesn't work with life and death.

Deleuze: Well, in that case, sure, but life and death... then death is going to bring us back to...

Pinhas: Real death!

Deleuze: Should I ask what you mean by real?

Pinhas: When it stops flowing...

Deleuze: We haven't even touched on the role death plays in this. For me, the question would come down to the relationship between death and desiring machines. But here, again, I don't think I'm all that Freudian, i.e., the death drive still strikes me as horrible, like some nasty trick played on the unconscious.

A student: On the power of affect being measured in  $n$  gradients...

Deleuze: Yes, exactly—they're “names in history,” big gradient operators. If the body without organs is a plenitude, it's because it spreads itself out. It's effectively the intensity = 0 on the basis of which all the intensities of the unconscious are produced—non-figurative intensities, intensities that don't represent anything, but which are designated by names in history.

This level of zero intensity is where death comes in. In other words, contrary to what Freud says, there is no death drive, but there is a model. Freud says the opposite: there is a drive but no model.

Pinhas: We might find a model of death, a representation or rather a glimpse into what death might be—in *jouissance*, in orgasm.

Deleuze: That's not [what we find in] Freud's *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*. There is a death drive, and there is no death model.

Richard Zrehen: If you have a body without organs that's full, indeed, a death drive is out of the question. Only when your body without organs is full, but [there's some] middle ground afterwards where you can indeed have a death drive, [but] you can't maintain both...

Deleuze: So, there isn't any [death drive].

Zrehen: It's logical to exclude it. That's where there's a major disagreement: it isn't exactly a life force. What he meant was that when we think about these terms in terms of life and death, it isn't a symmetrical difference. There's precisely a divide that goes so far it can't be pinned down to

anything, and it's because of that that no model is possible, that whenever we try to talk about it, we can't help but be reductive. We say, "stuff gets out of the system," or we'll say, "there's something that gets out of the system," and we talk about it, and we end up back with Lacan. That's the real threshold in store for us, the way you portrayed capitalism, how whenever capitalism reaches its limit it pushes it further away. Here, it's the other way around: every time we get our hands on the ungraspable, whenever we get it up close, it becomes grasped—and we have to look even further. We might largely disagree about fullness without lack. Perhaps it's no longer a lack; it's something else. Something more radical, something unattributable to a subject. A death drive is not attributable to a subject, they aren't tied together. It runs its course without any regard whatsoever. It isn't assigned, it doesn't provide—it just runs.

Deleuze: There's an awful idea I'm trying to avoid. If it's true that psychoanalysis and Freud completely missed desiring machines, the production of desire, i.e., everything that makes up unconscious life, that makes me feel pretty romantic, pretty vitalist. The truth of the matter is really on the side of [D.H.] Lawrence and [Henry] Miller; they're the only ones who've understood anything about the unconscious.<sup>42</sup>

After psychoanalysis screwed that up, it could only approach the essence of desire as something turned against life, and they did their thing with the death drive [*Deleuze sighs*]. It's awful. This chapter of psychoanalysis is stained by a sort of death cult. [Wilhelm] Reich described it so well; it was all downhill from there. Reich's *The Function of the Orgasm* is great: once they introduced the death drive, it just so happened that everyone stopped talking about libido and starting talking about Eros. It was all downhill from there—people were talking about Eros, and nobody talked about sexuality anymore. That's not to say that the sort of anti-sexuality found in Jung and Adler primarily took place in high church Freudian psychoanalysis, and that the death drive was a way of conforming to conventional standards, which is what the death drive was used for.<sup>43</sup>

Zrehen: Sexuality isn't what's important. We're on the same page. When Freud does the death drive or Eros (see *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* [1938])... we land right back in the neo-Heyelianism [*sic*] of 1935, and when Reich is done, there's Marcuse, and then it's perfect; we'll find reconciliation. Not only will we return to the earth, but we'll be screwing in our cars (thank goodness!).

Pinhas: Freud says that the libido is on both sides, since the libido is the energy powering both Eros and the death drive, and the libido belongs to the reservoir of energy that is the self.

Deleuze: That isn't so self-evident. That's [Jean] Laplanche's interpretation, and we need to look at Freud's own writing. Personally, I can make out two key works: *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety*—the parts where he attacks [Otto] Rank—and a great text of his, *The Ego and The Id*, where he explicitly says, "there isn't any immediate conversion of energy; I maintain a dualism between drives." And monism would be romanticizing the unconscious—he insists on dualism. His dualism precludes any direct conversion from one type of energy to another. Any direct transformations happen within libidinal energy; at no point is there a direct energetic conversion between the libidinal drives then labeled as Eros—bizarrely, you could very well object that it

doesn't matter, but it matters quite a bit—and death drives. No direct conversion. Any conversion takes place via what Freud calls desexualization, whereby he claims to reestablish his annoying concept of sublimation. What I'm saying is that, if it's true that the death drive doesn't have its own energy—as Laplanche claims, or as you seem to claim—then I can no longer make heads or tails of these passages. Because if the death drive doesn't have its own energy, I fail to see why this stage of desexualization is necessarily, or why Freud thinks direct transformations are impossible.<sup>44</sup>

Pinhas: That's easy enough to explain [*Laughter*]. We can't forget that for Freud, first in *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* and then in *An Outline*—he picks these ideas back up in *An Outline*—he says: now, I said this, then afterward I said that, but in the end, I'm convinced that it's this. You know Freud's style of exposition. Now, why there is desexualization: the energy that gets desexualized is what will transform—"transform" is a bad way of putting it, a poor metaphor—into Eros because it gets sublimated, Freud says. But what that means is that it turns into something socially and culturally invested. We go from an individual and family register to one that's fully cultural. That doesn't mean there isn't always this libidinal reservoir belonging to the ego, which, following a very rough outline, distributes energy to the death drives and to Eros, energy which converts to Eros. I don't know, then, whether there's a part that remains as it is and another part that gets desexualized. But there definitely is a big part that is desexualized, in order to constitute higher, ever more complex units. Right, but that's not the case with the death drive. The death drive stays that way; it has energy, and it uses it.

Deleuze: Desexualization, he tells us—explicitly, as I see it—is accomplished by transferring an amount of libidinal energy it has worked on, desexualized, into the death drive; the death drive is thereby transformed, right, but desexualization, the operation whereby some portion of the libido is desexualized and moves over to the death drive. Thus, what's missing is the middle term which ensuring that its conversion is indirect; we need desexualization as this middle term. For me, that says it all. Everything you just said amounts to saying: yes, for Freud, the libido—the sexual libido—falls under the domain of the ego, daddy-mommy, Oedipus, and beyond that, the libido must go through desexualization to carry out other investments. Which is what I've been saying from the start. That's what I think is confining the libido, its broad mystification. You might think he's right, then, but we're in total agreement on how to interpret these texts.

Pinhas: We'll see next week. I believe that through mediation [*Laughter*] as a means of exposure, of making things mobile, we'll be able to account for the death drive. [*End of lecture. However, as Deleuze didn't speak last as he does usually, it is likely the recording stopped abruptly*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar On *Anti-Oedipus* I, 1971 – 1972**

**Lecture 06, February 15, 1972**

**Transcript: WebDeleuze, modified by Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring**

**Libido and labor as subjective activities and their re-alienation – psychoanalysis and myth  
– bodies without organs and intensities**

... It would be a disaster if I came up with a theory of the unconscious. For me, it's really a practical problem: how does the unconscious function? And what I'm saying is that the way it works has never been about Oedipus, about castration or the death drive; I'm say all that gets introduced by psychoanalysis. There's a process that makes psychoanalysis fundamentally a part of capitalism—and again, I don't mean ideologically; I strictly mean in terms of practice. When Marx asks, "What lies at the root of political economy?"—a problem Foucault revisits in *The Order of Things*—Marx's answer is that political economy really begins with Adam Smith and Ricardo because before them, to understand the nature of wealth, one looked at what we could call the object, objectivity [*objectité*]. At which point we didn't have political economy; we had something else, an analysis of wealth. The nature of wealth was bound up with major objectivities—the land, for physiocrats; the state, for mercantilists.<sup>45</sup>

What's going on with this major revolution in political economy at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century with Smith and Ricardo? Marx says it best: with the development of capitalism, one no longer looked for the nature of wealth in terms of objectivities but, in a radical about-face—a sort of Kantian transformation at the level of political economy—it came back to the subject. Back to the subject, what does that mean? Smith and Ricardo, he says, did what Luther did in the world of religion: instead of tying religiosity to major objectivities, they turned it around in order to relate it to the subject, to subjective faith. Ricardo locates the nature or essence of wealth alongside the subject as a productive activity, as an act of production, any act whatsoever. Hence Marx's beautiful turn of phrase: "It was an immense step forward for Adam Smith to attribute the essence of wealth to productive activity in general, without privileging any form of production over another. Agricultural production was no longer privileged. And it took the conditions of industrial labor, that is, the development of capitalism, for the nature of wealth to be turned around and be revealed to belong to productive activity in general, for the essence of wealth to prop up this conversion and be discovered on the side of general productive activity, and it is on that basis that political economic was founded."<sup>46</sup>

In *The Order of Things*, Foucault revisits this in another form, looking for what constituted the birth of political economy. With A. Smith and Ricardo, we found in the subjective act of

production something irreducible to the domain of representation. It's rather clear this epistemological change transforming the domain of knowledge, steering towards a knowledge bearing on the non-representative: productive activity insofar as it subtends, passes through representation.<sup>47</sup>

What does Freud do? Before, the insane were linked to major objectivities—the madman of the earth, the madman of the despot. The same goes for wealth; wealth referred back to objective entities. 19<sup>th</sup> century psychiatry undergoes a rather similar transformation to what Ricardo undertook with political economy. This transformation takes off, that is, madness is no longer linked to great objectivities, but to a general subjective activity. What activity? Things break loose with Freud, which is why the divide isn't between Freud and 19<sup>th</sup> century psychiatry. Freud—just like the major reversal whereby Ricardo discovers the abstract nature of wealth, by no longer relating wealth to objectivities but to a general, unqualified act of production, which allows him to discover abstract labor.

Freud does the same thing. Freud is Ricardo; he's Smith; he's the Ricardo of psychiatry. He discovers the abstract nature of desire, and it's no longer alongside major objectivities—the madman of the earth or the madman of the despot. He finds it in the subjective activity of desire. He calls this subjective activity, or abstract essence, the “libido”—and this libido will have goals, sources, and objects. But Freud recognizes that the libido is more than its goals, sources, and objects. These objects, sources, and goals are still ways of attributing desire to objectivities, to territories. On a deeper level, the libido is a subjective activity of desire. From that angle, Freud and Ricardo are the same. Their similarities don't stop there; it goes even further.

Marx has more to say: he says that they revealed the essence of wealth as the general activity of production, and they call such general productive activity “abstract labor.” The Freudian equivalent is only a few steps away: he uncovers the general activity of desire, and his name for it is abstract libido. But, but, but—the similarities go further, because then, both Freud and Ricardo do something funny. Marx puts it well: “But as soon as Ricardo identifies the essence of wealth as productive activity in general, he keeps re-alienating it.”<sup>48</sup> What does that mean? There's no more objectivity; that's a given. But this productive activity will be alienated all over again. Does that mean Ricardo is reinstating big, objective representations and retreating to previous alienations? No. It comes down to inventing a sort of mystification for what they just discovered. Namely, Marx tells us, whereas before, wealth and labor were alienated in objectivities, i.e., as states (as in a state of affairs), now they take on a new form of alienation, to wit, a specifically subjective alienation corresponding to their subjective discovery. They get alienated as activities rather than as states, rather than alienating as an objective state of affairs. They're alienated as a subjective act, lining up with what they've revealed to be a subjective essence. Marx spells it out: from there, alienation will no longer be understood as and limited to an objective state of affairs; it will be grasped in its very act. What act? They'll alienate labor again, as the subjective essence of production; they'll re-alienate it under the conditions of private property.

Freud discovers the abstract libido, it sparks huge transformation: desire must no longer be understood in terms of its objects, nor in terms of its goals. It ought to be understood as libido. But Freud re-alienates this discovery on a new basis, corresponding to his own discovery; the new basis for the alienation of the subjective activity of desire, understood as libido, is under the subjective conditions of the family, which leads to Oedipus. Psychoanalysis is a sub-set of capitalism, which is why, in certain respects, all of capitalism is folded into psychoanalysis. In what sense? Ricardo says, “Alright, boys—I’ve discovered productive activity in general, but look out: private property ought to be the measure for this general productive activity, the essence of which I’ve attributed to the subject.” And Freud does much the same: we don’t get out of the family.

Why is it that way? Why couldn’t it be otherwise? Why is that fundamentally a part of both psychoanalysis and capitalism? There are two movements that always co-exist within capitalism. On the one hand, [you have] the decoding and deterritorialization of flows, the subjective activity that’s been uncovered. But at the same time, things constantly reterritorialize, neo-territorialize. Despite appearances, that doesn’t consist in resurrecting the body of the earth as an objectivity, nor the body of the despot as an objectivity, except at a local level. There is local despotism, but that’s not what this is. Reterritorialization doesn’t just mean resurrecting pure archaisms, i.e., bygone objectivities; reterritorialization should be subjective. On the one hand, it first takes place under the conditions of private property, which is political economy, and a second time in the modern subjective family, which is psychoanalysis. It needs both. What’s come about is the process of reterritorializing abstract activity.

In this respect, psychoanalysis is as much a part of capitalism as merchants, bankers, industrialists. It plays an incredibly precise role in capitalist economies. If there’s any justification for the peculiar exchange of money in psychoanalysis—because everyone jokes about the justifications for money and how it fits into psychoanalysis—it’s great because it works, and at the same time, no one believes it. But you don’t have to believe in it. It’s like in capitalism: you don’t have to believe in anything anymore. Codes need belief—absolutely not so with axiomatics; who cares?

The way money is exchanged in psychoanalysis is a lesser version of what we find in capitalism. The whole capitalist machine operates thanks to money’s being double-sided: as financial flows and payment flows. They’re completely different flows, and both are folded into money; the incommensurability of these flows is a necessary condition for the capitalist machine to function. In psychoanalysis, there’s a financing flow and a payment flow, and ultimately the psychoanalytic machine works thanks to both flows, whose dualism is concealed.

For example, say a woman goes in for analysis. In many cases, the analyst will have no trouble revealing conflicts with her husband, and at the same time, the husband is the one paying for the analysis. In which case, the financing flow that stems from the husband, the payment that goes from the woman to her analyst—how do you expect her to get out? The analyst is blissfully indifferent to where the money comes from; when it comes time to justify his fees, the question

“Who’s paying?” never arises. It’s a funny sort of loop where, literally, it’s just like the back-and-forth of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.

I’m thinking about the psychoanalytic attitude towards myth and tragedy, because in the end, it’s no coincidence that they turned to Oedipus. Did old Freud discover the Oedipus complex in his self-analysis, as everyone says, or did he find it in his culture? His culture was Goethean. He likes Goethe, he reads him at night. Is he pulling it from Sophocles or from his self-analysis?

A capitalist regime doesn’t require anyone to believe. What is required of them? Something that applies to capitalism as much as it does to the Roman empire, which Nietzsche captured so definitively in his depiction of people of the time, in what he calls a “motley painting of everything that has ever been believed”—everything that’s been the subject of belief is fit for reterritorializing. Like the Romans: we’ll take your God and set him up in Rome, so you get reterritorialized onto Roman land. Capitalism, too: over there is a feathered serpent—very well, the serpent’s coming with us.<sup>49</sup>

What about psychoanalysis’s peculiar attitude towards myth? There’s an article by [Didier] Anzieu on the subject.<sup>50</sup> He says there are stages. It’s smooth sailing at first—all myths get analyzed; every myth, every tragedy gets thoroughly picked apart. And then that falls out of fashion; that’s what Jung does, so we don’t want to get mixed up with him. Why weren’t they ever included with ethnologists or Hellenists? There’s a reason for such immense ambiguity, such an immense misunderstanding.

**Student:** And Lévi-Strauss—we have to explain how all myth analysis is picked up again after Freud, and any analysis of kinship is based on a kinship atom that determines the entire system of possible kinship, and this kinship atom is the [*audio unclear—perhaps “symbol”*] with a fourth term of either the brother or mother, which gets taken up by analysts like [M.C. and Edmond] Ortigues, claiming they’ve understood this fourth term to be symbolic. Lévi-Strauss is the one—which is why Lacan agrees with him on a bunch of points—the one who analyzed myth, and analysts don’t have to do it anymore.<sup>51</sup>

**Deleuze:** Then we should say it happens three times: there’s what Ricardo does in economics, what Freud does in psychiatry, and what Lévi-Strauss does in ethnology. Are we dissolving imaginary variations of the Oedipus complex while nevertheless maintaining a structure preserving the law-prohibition-transgression trinity? Oedipus isn’t preserved in the form of an abstract disfiguration.

**Student:** Lévi-Strauss starts dismantling Oedipus by demonstrating that the story isn’t what matters; he analyzes it in order to then generalize its structure, through the structure of the kinship atom.

**Deleuze:** Hmmm, hmmm. He discovered what he took to be ethnology’s most basic subjective activity, the prohibition of incest, and he re-alienated or folded it over into the kinship system.

Lastly: ethnologists and Hellenists are profoundly functionalist when they find themselves working with myth. What they really want to know is “How does this thing work?” And when



they explain what a myth or tragedy means, they go about it as historians; they relate it to the objectivities the myths refer to—the objectivity of the earth, for example. And what else can they do, from their rigorous scientific point of view, other than explain, e.g., the role of a myth or oedipal ritual in the context of territorial objectivities, despotic objectivities? Lévi-Strauss on Oedipus, for example. He demonstrates that it simultaneously refers to a perpetuation of autochthony, the fact of territorial objectivity, and to a failure of autochthony, the birth of despotic formations. Myths, tragedies are sent back to their objective references, and they're right because [the myth, etc.] is about a particular century, a particular Greek city, etc. For them, interpreting myth and tragedy is unintelligible without this systematic framework of historical objectivities.

From the outset, psychoanalysts have never been interested in historical objectivities; what they're trying to do is link myth and tragedy to the libido as a subjective activity, which is reflected in [Karl] Abraham's naïve formulation: "myth dreams of humanity."<sup>52</sup> In other words, myths are analogous to dreams on a humanity-wide scale. They tie myth to the subjective activity of the libido, accounting for changes in the unconscious and for work done on the unconscious. Hence the rather ambiguous attitude psychoanalysis has towards myth, where one moment, it appeals to myth, and the next, it renounces it. They're the first to ascribe myth and tragedy to the libido as their abstract, subjective essence, but at the same time—why do they keep myth and tragedy? It's unbelievable what it's gone through, [with respect to] understanding myth and tragedy as expressive units of the unconscious. How did they end up screwing around with myth and tragedy? How did they end up defining units of the unconscious in myths and tragedy?

Again, I'm asking from a clinical perspective: when a guy suffering from neurosis—or better yet, suffering from psychosis—Schreber comes along, and Freud says, "See, what he's saying sounds like a myth." Freud didn't find it in his unconscious; he found it in all the bad readings he was feeding on. He thought, "Hang on, doesn't this guy sound like Oedipus?" When a guy comes along, and things aren't going well for him, it makes you feel like there's a whole set of panicked, haywire machines. It's like we're in a garage, in a sabotaged factory where a wrench has suddenly been thrown in the works. Then—*Boom! Bang!*—it goes off all over the place; it's a crazy factory, but it's still a factory, and on top of that, Freud here comes along and says, "It's a theater, it's a myth"—we have to do something... [*text missing*]

Cell migration, for example, is when a group of cells cross a threshold. Thresholds are lines of intensity. It's intensive matter before it's an extended biological reality. The unfertilized egg, the non-active egg, is really an intensity = 0. I'm not speaking metaphorically when I say that it's the catatonic body, the catatonic egg. As soon as it's activated—all sorts of trajectories and transitions. Of course, these trajectories and transitions take place in extension, a group of cells migrating across the egg, but what do we find beneath their extensive path, their schizo promenade? There are transitions and becomings of a completely different nature, i.e., transitions and becomings in intensity. And that's why I'm not on board with the anti-psychiatric habit of renouncing medication. Medication has two uses: one possible use for it is "This one's bothering us, we need to calm him down," and calming them down means bringing them as close as possible to zero intensity. There are cases where psychiatrists intervene during an anxiety attack, and stopping it is catastrophic. But medicinal use can mean something else, as in drugs; a real

psychiatric pharmacy comes down to ways of activating the egg—i.e., drugs can carry out transitions between one threshold of intensity and another, can guide its trajectory in intensity.

It *does* have a trajectory in extension, an extensive migration, but beneath that there's a trajectory in intensity, i.e., on the body without organs, passing from one gradient to another, from one threshold of intensity to another. And that's not the same thing as delirium or hallucination; it's more fundamental—hallucinations and delirium are only secondary expressions of these intensive transitions. We go from one zone to another—strictly speaking, what does Judge Schreber mean when he says, "I'm growing real breasts"? What could that mean? It isn't a hallucination, but he will have hallucinations based on it. Is it delirium? I don't think so, but he will form delusions from it.<sup>53</sup>

It's the matrix that delusion and hallucination share. The female torso is literally there, on Schreber's body without organs. It transitions, it follows astonishing trajectories—historical, geographical, biological developments—and at this level, again, all the flows mix together: historical flows, geographical flows. Because he only becomes a woman from a historical perspective, hence the necessity of defending Alsace, being a young Alsatian woman defending Alsace against France. Everything's mixed together: the Judge's becoming-woman combines with Alsace's becoming-German again. The becoming-woman that Judge Schreber experiences physically follows a course in intensity. On his body without organs, he's entered the being-woman gradient; he's crossed over, reached another threshold—and these trajectories need to be helped along in extension, generally. Circling back to what I find so interesting about transvestites,<sup>54</sup> they're the ones where this journey, this trajectory, is the least metaphorical; they're the ones who risk and are the most invested in a journey with no turning back—and they know it. You can think about it in terms of extension—they dress like a woman, they take hormones—but beneath that, they pass through thresholds of intensity.

To make sense of all these phenomena, we need to disorganize them, to unravel them, to bracket the reality of something we're all too familiar with—the organism. Because the organism isn't organs in a body. An organism is a coding [*codage*], a combinatorial [*combinatoire*]<sup>55</sup>—the very same way we talk about a genetic code—of organs onto the body without organs. But my question is: as partial objects, do the organs not have a deeper, pre-organic relationship with the body without organs? This deeper, pre-organic relationship seems to entail abandoning any extensional point of view, i.e., organs are no longer territories with certain forms or certain functions. They are degrees of pure intensity. Embryology goes quite some distance in this regard: this gradient outlines the eye, that gradient outlines something else. They are thus intensive powers on the body without organs. But zero intensity is not the opposite of these intensive powers; it is the pure intensive matter that gets filled by intensive powers to one degree or another. That's what I mean when I say that the body without organs and the organs are the same in their common struggle against their organism.

Artaud has done a marvelous job of highlighting that: the true enemy of the body without organs is the organism.<sup>55</sup> So, beneath the organism, having bracketed the organism, we can clearly see the relationship between organs as intensive powers that end up filling matter to varying degrees,

to the point where, ultimately, the two are the same thing, strictly speaking. The schizophrenic journey or trajectory [*voyage*] is this way of passing through zones, and only subsequently does it take place in extension, in the form of going out on a walk or a journey—and only subsequently are there delusions and hallucinations. But there's a reality beneath the hallucinations and under the delusions—the reality of “I feel.”

Back to the egg. Even before there are determinate organs, it isn't simply undifferentiated—there are distributions in intensity, and these zones of intensity don't at all resemble the organs that will eventually occupy them in extension. What outlines the blueprint for the eye is a gradient. Something happens when a group of cells moves from one area to another; it isn't at all undifferentiated. But beneath this extensive migration, there's a transition from one intensity to another, without organs having any distinct shape yet. Later, out of these migrations, we will be able to make out, in extension, the organs' blueprints, and then the organs.

**Student:** It isn't enough to say there's a difference between the body without organs and the organism—that's obvious. Something more troubling is the idea that there are processes carried out on the body without organs. There are paranoid sorts of processes of repulsion, and [there is the] schizophrenic sorts of processes. But there's one issue you haven't brought up: if you think there's a life of the unconscious, and that the life of the unconscious comes down to the function of desiring machines, and you tack on “and then” there is the body without organs, as a full, unproductive, and sterile body, you haven't broached the subject of this body's production itself, i.e., how is it that at some point in the life of the unconscious, things take a turn? Where does the body without organs come from? What process produces this full body? For Artaud, an even greater foe than the organism is God, Satan, the great thief. A delirium and an intensity—perhaps it works at the same time. Artaud, for example, literally felt annihilated, dispossessed by God, who robbed him of his life, to the point that Artaud says, “I've carried out a reversion toward the breast-matrix.” And to avoid this theft, Artaud initiates this reversal on his body without organs. How is it that such a body is able to come about?

**Deleuze:** The relationship with God is rather straightforward. What Artaud calls God is the organizer of the organism. The organism is what codes, stifles flows; it's what combines them, what axiomatizes them, and looking at it that way, God is the one who makes an organism from the body without organs. That's what's unbearable for Artaud. Artaud's writing is one of the greatest attempts to channel flows under codes, or through the cracks, whatever those might be—his is the greatest attempt to decode writing. What he calls cruelty is a process of decoding, and when he writes, “all writing is rubbish,” what he means is that all codes, all combinatorics inevitably transform a body into an organism, and that's God's doing.

As for your other question: We do need to demonstrate how the body without organs, an unproductive entity, is produced where it is, in its place, within desiring production. I agree, but that's what I did last year. We get our cue from the fact that a similar phenomenon takes place in a social body, namely, what always forms in a social body, based on productive forces, there emerges, or is produced, a sort of full social body, which is unproductive on its own [but] takes credit for productive forces.

The problem isn't fundamentally different with schizophrenia, where it's necessary to show how, based on desiring production, which is connected in every way, an unproductive entity, the body without organs, is produced in the midst of such production. Coming at the problem the way you've presented it: the body without organs must itself be produced in the interplay between productive partial objects/organs; we need to explain how.

**Georges Comtesse:** You say that the life of the unconscious is that of desiring machines, and if it's desiring machines, it's precisely the "*objet petit a*." Desiring machines have nothing to do with life—they are mortifying machines, fundamentally mortifying.

**Deleuze:** Why?

**Comtesse:** Because they're the *objet a*. If we identify them as the *objet a*, they can't be anything other than mortifying machines, and from there, we can understand how the very operation of these mortifying machines could at some point produce a full body.

**Deleuze:** That's terrible! When I said that desiring machines were the *objet a*, all I meant was that, even in Lacan, a structure can only function if he sneaks in a machinic element, and the *objet a* is ultimately a machinic element, and not a structural one. Since last year, I've tried to argue that Oedipus is absolutely meaningless when it comes to the unconscious. Lacan is the first to say as much, but tragically, he didn't want to say the same for castration. And I'm claiming the same thing regarding castration. Moreover, castration only ever served as a foundation for Oedipus. Last year, I was told that Oedipus was a sort of disastrous, unfortunate code explaining the great misery of psychoanalysis. For castration, it was more difficult.

**Comtesse:** You don't say what castration is. When someone doesn't say what castration is, I don't see how, on that basis, one could wind it back.

**Deleuze:** But then, suppose we're only focusing on what I've said about Oedipus, I'm struck by this: if you more or less agree with me on Oedipus and castration, there are some who said: yeah, sure, but watch out for what's around the bend. There's the death drive, and don't think you're going to get rid of that one. As I see it, Oedipus, castration, and the death drive are three forms of sheer mystification, and we haven't gotten anywhere if we reintroduce the death drive. Hence why hearing you describe desiring machines as mortifying fills me with dread—because we'll end up with Oedipus again.

**Comtesse:** There's not a death cult. It exists, but for psychoanalysts wanting to work, the breakthrough of psychoanalysis is being able to say what about the processes of castration affecting...

**Deleuze:** You're on the same page, since our problem is this—what psychoanalysis puts the unconscious through: are they [really] processes of the unconscious, or are they artificial processes relayed via one's social field?

**Comtesse:** There were only positive desiring machines; I don't see how that could produce a full body.

**Deleuze:** Now, you're saying: you'll never get be able to generate the body without organs without introducing mortifying elements. I hope that's not the case. If the body without organs is a mortifying lump, everything I'm trying to do falls apart.

Subjects come in to be analyzed, with a particular request, Oedipus and castration. They bring it with them; it's not that the analyst introduces it. The question is whether these effects—given the transformations in the work of the unconscious—amount to formations of the unconscious or to completely different kinds of mechanisms, mechanisms whose goal and function is to prevent the formations of the unconscious from functioning? My claim is that psychoanalysts don't invent Oedipus and castration, but the entire analytic procedure consists in short-circuiting the problem: is what the subject brings with them equivalent to their unconscious formations? Obviously, it's sufficient for the analyst—Oedipus and castration are expressions, expressive components of one's unconscious formations. So, it's not that they've invented Oedipus, but in a way, it's worse: [the analyst] confirms [Oedipus and castration] by analytically enshrining them.

A guy brings in Oedipus, and the analyst turns it into an Oedipus of transference, i.e., an Oedipus of Oedipus. A guy brings his castration, and the analyst turns it into a castration of castration. It's just like with abortions: you have an abortion twice—once with the knitting mother and again with a specialist in an aseptized clinic.<sup>56</sup> The guy's been castrated once by family and society. He lies on the couch and is castrated again, brilliantly described as a “successful castration.” We'll succeed where the knitting mother failed. The opposition doesn't at all seem to be between analysts working in the clinic and philosophers working outside of the clinic. I think my main through-line has been: look at how the unconscious functions, and [you'll see that] the unconscious doesn't know anything about Oedipus, castration. All that's what consciousness projects onto the unconscious. I draw the line where analysts are wedded to the material their subjects bring to them, reckoning that, considering the work of the unconscious, [such material] represents the formations of the unconscious itself... [*End of session*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

***Anti-Oedipus I, 1971-1972***

**Lecture 7 – February 22, 1972**

**Transcript: WebDeleuze; transcript modified by Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring**

**Code Surplus value – The Wasp and the Orchid – Oedipus, Musical Axiomatics (Stockhausen), Finite Blocks, Axiomatics – Aspects of Capitalist Immanence**

... A perfectly good argument levied against anti-psychiatry: yeah, anti-psychiatrists are people who say, “Hurray for schizophrenia”—and they ascribe to [R.D.] Laing the idea that anti-psychiatry boils down to arguing that schizophrenia is what’s actually healthy. It’s such a misrepresentation.

I’d like for us to recall Laing’s basic idea, which isn’t at all what this article’s author claims it to be. Laing’s position is that schizophrenia ought to be understood as part of a process, and the question he asks is: how are schizophrenic patients produced? And he explores that question in the following way: do they come about following a schizophrenic process, or is it the opposite, i.e., are they the result of that process being interrupted, from its protracted absence, from its aggravation? And far from ignoring the fact that schizophrenic patients are suffering and unwell, he thinks they’re all the more so, since their being made into schizophrenics is linked, not to what we might call the schizophrenic process, but to what we should recognize as the interruption of such a process. It’s so dishonest to attribute to Laing and other anti-psychiatrists the idea that schizophrenia, as a diagnosis, is something to be admired.

Because there’s something else going on that gets overlooked: this same author explains how the main thing troubling psychiatrists is their fraught relationship with their patients. Not a word about what really stresses out young psychiatrists, namely, how from the very beginning, psychiatrists have not only had to help people re-adjust, but have had to act as quasi-police, policing patients in troubling ways. What’s the point of involuntary admissions, which aren’t about figuring out madness, but figuring out who to send to a psychiatric hospital—to what extent administration and psychiatry work together when it comes to involuntary admissions—what about medical-legal files that come down hard on any children who are the least bit disturbed, even those who are emotionally unstable and who actually have a psychiatric record? This *Nouvel Observateur* article doesn’t mention it at all. You might remember how a prisoner named Buffet took two hostages at Clairvaux Prison and ended up killing them. Shortly after, the Minister of the Interior made a statement to prefects, something like: You should be on high alert regarding open hospitals, after seeing what happened at Clairvaux. The current campaign is moving toward a more rigid structure for internment.<sup>57</sup>

I'd like us to go back to the state of flows and how they're structured in the capitalist state. Our problem is always how flows run along the surface of the full body of such a society, how flows run along the body without organs of money, since money-capital is, strictly speaking, the socius of capitalist society. I'd like to try to demonstrate that capitalist society, in the very form of its economics, forms a system of immanences. Capitalist immanence has three aspects, which we should describe economically. For us, the point is to figure out how the libido invests flows in a social field. But if it's true that libidinal investment is an investment of flows, the state of flows in a social formation ought to clue us in on the nature of the social investments, the collective investments, the unconscious investments within the social field itself.<sup>58</sup>

The first aspect of capitalist immanence has to do with a system of differential relationships between decoded flows (the first definition of axiomatics). These relationships have shown up at varying levels. They've shown up first at the level of industrial capital: a differential relationship between two flows with different capacities [*de puissance différente*], between incommensurable flows, the flow of capital and the flow of labor. These flows are incommensurable in that they have different capacities, and at the same time, they'd still only be virtual, mutually independent, i.e., independent of their reciprocal determination. And then, at the same time, in terms of financial capital, we saw a differential relationship between the flow of finance and the flow of revenue or payment. It's not about there being two forms of money, it's that money contains both of these forms, they're two sides of the same coin. On one side, as money-capital, there's a financial flow, and on the other side, there's a flow of revenue or wages. Then we saw a third sort of differential relationship at the level of market capital, namely the differential relationship between what could be called the market flow and the flow of knowledge, or innovation.

I always come back to Marx has famously written on the "tendency of the rate of profit to fall."<sup>59</sup> The gist of these passages is that, in capitalism, obviously there have been developments with machines and even automation. As automation improves, human labor becomes more and more closely bound to the machine. How then can we maintain that capitalism is based on human surplus value, with human surplus value being exported according to the flow of human labor, when it comes to the development of machines in at least some parts of capitalism, where human labor is increasingly tied to machines, and where are machines more and more productive? It seems that human surplus value is steadily declining in capitalism. [Maurice] Clavel, who isn't an economist and doesn't pretend to be an economist, asks Marxist economists to explain how they can maintain both that capitalism depends on human surplus value and that, at the same time, machines appear to be getting more and more productive, and human labor more and more tied to them.<sup>60</sup>

Now, Marx says: yes, there is a tendency for relative surplus value to fall, but there are multiple independent factors counteracting this tendency. We only find one of these factors in our third differential relationship: when it comes to the parts of capitalism that get automated, what happens? First off, when does capitalism invest in so-called innovation (innovating machines and automation)? We all know that it doesn't make such an investment to keep up with science and technology; it's based on profitability of project in question, the venture's profitability defined in terms relative to other ventures in the broader market. Which implies that areas with high levels

of innovation—see the book, *Monopoly Capital*, from Maspero<sup>61</sup>—implies that, by contrast, there are areas where old and outdated equipment is maintained, and where machines are only invested in when it's possible to lower the cost of production, which involves how the innovating business relates to businesses that have to keep their equipment in another area, and to the general market.

This third differential relationship is, as neo-economists say—the knowledge flow or the innovation flow in capitalist regimes—it's proprietary, it's paid, paid on the basis of an innovation flow and a knowledge flow, which is financially just like the revenue flow, the payment flow we discussed earlier in the context of finance capital. On the other hand, the market flow, where innovation is inscribed and which determines the latter's profitability, has a completely different character and an incommensurable capacity [*puissance*]—the case of a typically capitalist differential, a differential relationship between quantities that don't have the same capacity, by all appearances. For example: the form of money used to pay for innovation isn't the same as that used to ascertain the profitability of said innovation. Thus, we end up with three fundamental differential relationships corresponding to three fundamental forms of capital.

This system of differential relationships represents a fundamental shift in the capitalist machine compared to non-capitalist societies; generally speaking, the phenomenon of surplus value does not begin with capitalism. Surplus value is actually a component in all social formations. What we should say, however, is that, for non-capitalist social arrangements, surplus value is a surplus value of code. For example, there is a feudal surplus value, a despotic surplus value, because you get surplus value whenever there is surplus labor. Now, non-capitalist societies already have surplus labor, already have surplus value—only it's a surplus value of code. A surplus value of code; how might that work? It's almost as though there were a chain, a signifying chain, and then all of a sudden it intercepts a fragment of another chain. Bizarre, this phenomenon of interception. What I'm saying is that there are chains everywhere you look; there isn't one single chain. A major signifier is like a strip, where there are a ton of things going by, then one fragment intercepts another.

There's an orchid, for example, and this orchid's flower bears an incredible likeness of a wasp.<sup>62</sup> What's more, it [the flower] forms both bodies, bizarrely. The orchid's phylogenetic chain snatches up a fragment of a completely different chain: a wasp—there's a biologist who works on this, which he calls “aparallel evolution”—the signifying chain of the wasp, where the wasp's code and the orchid's code suddenly collide.<sup>63</sup> The orchid forms the pattern of a female wasp, to the point where the male wasp is fooled and lands on the orchid, believing he's found a female wasp. It's a well-known short-circuit, an interception between two chains.

I'd argue that in this area, there's a surplus value of code; it's like an animated code. A sort of bio-code pounces onto a fragment of a completely different code and appropriates it. Here, the orchid starts to depict female wasps. I'm simply assuming that that's how surplus value works in non-capitalist societies: at the level of code, there are jumps, what [Marcel] Griaule also calls the fructification of wealth, that show up as interceptions between chains of instances of surplus value. Such surplus value is a surplus value of code.<sup>64</sup>



With capitalism, what's the major shift? With capitalism, there's no longer a surplus value of code. How does it work under capitalism, looking specifically at code? There's this sort of conversion of surplus value: surplus value ceases to be that of code and becomes a surplus value of flow. One of the outcomes of capitalism isn't the existence of surplus value—since, again, it existed before—but the transformation of code surplus value into flow surplus value. And the surplus value of flow results from the differential relationship between the different types of flow that we were just discussing. I'd also say that the differential relationship between the flow of capital and the flow of labor generates what we ought to call human surplus value, since it's produced from human labor. The differential relationship between finance/revenue flows generates what we might call financial surplus value. And lastly, the third market/innovation relationship generates a specifically machinic surplus value. Those are the three forms of flow surplus value in capitalist systems.

As for how the most sterile, the sterile body, the unproductive body of money, can manage to produce something—in other words, if money is  $x$ , how can this  $x$  be added to a “+  $Dx$ ” which stands for the fluctuation and fructification of money? The answer comes to us in the following way: behind the fluctuation itself is the differential relationship between flows. In other words, if we write capital/surplus value as  $x + Dx$ , where does  $Dx$  come from? It always comes from these  $Dy / Dx$  sort of differential relationships, such as the three we just saw with human surplus value, financial surplus value, and machinic surplus value.

I'd like to return to the idea that none of these flows can be defined independently, since their differential relationship is one of reciprocal determination. There's no flow of capital if wealth is not convertible into means of production. It can be converted into means of production only when the capitalist encounters the worker who possesses nothing but his/her labor force. In other words, capital as industrial capital remains purely virtual if the capitalist cannot find anyone selling their labor on the market. And conversely, the worker is only virtually a worker if they do not find the capitalist to buy their labor force. In other words, both of these flows—the flow of labor and the flow of capital—are incommensurable and caught up in a reciprocally determining relationship, to the point that one cannot be determined outside its differential relationship with the other.

It's not at all a two-part sequence where, on the one hand, capitalism decodes and deterritorializes flows and then introduces an axiomatic to salvage it. Strictly speaking, it's in one fell swoop, and that's why, from the very outset, state capitalism—as historians well know, there's never been the slightest contradiction between private capitalism and state capitalism. In the very same move, capitalism substitutes an axiomatic for ruined code. That way, the differential relationships already fill in some of the immanence of the capitalist machine, this immanence being like the hollow of money-capital. That's clear enough.

This second aspect amounts to saying that, not only does it work, and not only does it presuppose decoded and deterritorialized flows, but it decodes more and more, deterritorializes further and further. Capitalism only appears to reintroduce code. There's an axiomatic of money; at any given moment, everything in the machine is simultaneous. It decodes, it deterritorializes at every

turn: the deterritorialization of the worker and their decoding is never done. We shouldn't interpret primitive accumulation as something that only happened early on—primitive accumulation doesn't stop! The flow of workers doesn't stop getting deterritorialized; the flow of capital doesn't stop getting decoded. It's always too coded for capitalism's needs, even though, in another sense, it hasn't been coded from the very beginning.

At the same time, it must be said: mutant capital, short-term capital, this sort of capital migration, all this about decoding and deterritorialization—it shouldn't be taken as metaphorical. These are physical processes, economic-physical processes. For all other societies, there was only the fear that flows would decode and deterritorialize, and the prayer in these societies was: God, spare us from the flood! God, don't let anything spill over. And all desire was involved; all of society's libidinal investments were involved—keep this horrible thing from happening, this unspeakable thing, i.e., flows running with no code, flowing with no lands [*terres*].

Yet, on the other hand, here capitalism is, fat and happy; it's a really devious turn of events. There's this wicked illustration by some Englishman: people are crying in a movie theater—we don't know why; we can't see the screen. And there's a little old man tucked away in the corner alone, who looks ridiculously spiteful, with beady little eyes, and he's busting a gut. It must be a vampire movie. Everyone's crying, but he's laughing. Well, that's capitalism. In what way does the machine work even harder with capitalism? This is the second aspect of capitalist immanence: looking at the capitalist flow itself, without qualifying it any further, an unnamable thing flowing over the body of money-capital—it's the flow of the unnamable, the unnamable out on a stroll. It's the flow whose limit is the schizo flow. In this sense, schizophrenia is the external limit of all decoding and all deterritorialization... [*Interruption*]

... Schizophrenia as the limit for the processes of decoding and deterritorialization. In that sense, capitalism does have an external limit, and saying that its external limit is schizophrenia is just another way of saying that it functions on the basis of decoded and deterritorialized flows. Hence capitalist economic processes and schizophrenic circuits are tightly intertwined. They don't cross wires because they describe different domains. But were we to make a sort of topography of so-called short term migrant capital, it would be constantly moving, deterritorializing. And were we to map the migrations of Beckett's characters, the great Schizo stroll, from an economic perspective, it wouldn't be any different. It all falls under the heading of deterritorialization and decoding, where schizophrenia is indeed the external limit. But it's true of the flows coursing over the surface of capital in and of themselves—it's their external limit.

And at the same time, we've seen that capitalism constantly counteracts its tendency, i.e., it fends off its limit. It's what I had proposed as an equivalent for the Marxist principle of declining surplus value: [capitalism] tends towards a limit that it perpetually resists; it constantly counteracts its tendency. The making of Schizos is fundamentally capitalist production. From the point of view of our differential relationships, it's an unconsumable product. It keeps driving away its own limit, to the point that we could say it has no external limit, that it only has internal limits, those of capital itself, internal limits that are constantly reproduced on a larger and larger scale. That's what I was getting at last week regarding Bernard Schmitt and his theory of

financial capitalism.<sup>65</sup> He highlighted how the reproduction of capitalism by no means occurs in the form of extensive reproduction; it happens sporadically through destruction-creation, according to the notorious capitalist understanding of money-economies—creating money, destroying money, creating money—and that at each sphere of destruction-creation, there's a sort of widening of limits. The way it happens isn't contained at all; like everything that happens on a full body's surface, it takes place in intensity.

In that regard, flows do have an external limit in capitalism: schizophrenia, the schizo flow, the schiz-flow. But just as they're caught up in differential relationships that make up an axiomatic, their external limit is constantly warded off. Strictly speaking, this machine has no external limit. From the perspective of its flows, there are, [but] there not from the point of view of the differential relationships between flows. On the other hand, the differential relationships between flows always have internal limits set by the state of capital and the differential relationships between the three differential relationships themselves, i.e., the second-degree differential relationships between industrial capital, finance capital, and market capital. There are thus internal limits that constantly get reproduced on a larger and larger scale. This is the second aspect of capitalist immanence as an economic system: the reproduction of internal limits on an ever-wider scale, this way of countering the external limit of decoded flows by substituting prior limits that refer to the differential relationships between decoded flows and that are constantly reproduced on a wider scale.

How does an axiomatic work, in the most concrete terms possible? Even if we approach the word through its mathematical roots—I don't believe that's where we'll get its true meaning—there's a social aspect to it; true axiomatics is social and not scientific. Scientific axiomatics is only one method whereby flows of science, flows of knowledge, are stored and maintained in the capitalist machine. It's no good to assume that the notion of axiomatics is consistent. Scientists do, because axiomatics allow them to ensure a kind of consistency. In fact, it's a thoroughly inconsistent notion; it's a mess, from top to bottom. An axiomatic consists of a process. But it's never fully exhausted by this process. What's more, this process is always anti-axiomatic, i.e., it's something that flows, and in flowing, increasingly verges toward its limit, toward a schizz. And the role of axiomatics is to counteract, to compensate for its limit, to bring it all back as best it can, not a code, but to substitute internal limits corresponding to the differential relationships between decoded flows, to substitute that for the very process of decoding flows in and of themselves.

Axiomatics follows the process of decoding and substitutes a combinatorial system for faulty codes, i.e., what it loses at one end it makes up for at the other. Every axiomatic is a way of tying science back to the capitalist market. All axiomatics are abstract forms of Oedipus; they're processes of abstract oedipalization, oedipalization without mommy and daddy. It consists in axiomatizing decoded Oedipus [*missing text*]... The ever-widening scale is—we add an axiom, we rework the axiomatic, something leaks [*fruit*] out the side. The axiomatic no longer holds—you rework the axiomatic, you re-axiomatize.

I'd like to offer an example from art and music. There's a certain trend in contemporary music towards combinatorial or axiomatic music. One of the most brilliant representatives—you'll understand where Oedipus fits in: there's a figurative Oedipus, the little daddy-mommy-me triangle, and we have to ask ourselves what it has to do with capitalism. It's not enough to point to bourgeois families; we need to show how Oedipus, defined by the daddy-mommy-me triangle, is necessarily bound up with capitalist economic axiomatics. When the figurative Oedipus doesn't work, there are all kinds of Oedipus we don't recognize because they aren't figurative—abstract versions of Oedipus. Hence, we can talk about Oedipal music or Oedipal painting. An Oedipal form of music might be great, but it's still Oedipal. How so? Through its opposition to Schizo music.

In *Lady Chatterley's Lover*, you have the gamekeeper, and Lady Chatterley is carrying his child. Because she needs a legitimate father—and it can't be the gamekeeper—she approaches one of her painter friends, who says, "I'll do it on one condition, that you pose as a model for me."<sup>66</sup> And Lady Chatterley is annoyed, not at the idea of posing as a model, but because she isn't sure what he's up to. And then there's this dreadful exchange between the gamekeeper and the painter, and the painter is pretty hostile, totally deranged. He bristles at the gamekeeper and despises him, and the gamekeeper sends it right back. Looking at his paintings, the gamekeeper says, "'It murders all the bowels of compassion in a man.'" And the painter responds—as twisted and hateful as he can—"Perhaps stupidity is murdered; sentimental stupidity." The gamekeeper looks and says, "No, I think all these tubes and corrugated vibrations"—going right for the jugular—"are stupid enough for anything, and pretty sentimental."<sup>67</sup>

I like this passage because it shows us how both versions of Oedipus can coexist. The gamekeeper is right. No one has gone as far as [D.H.] Lawrence in sort of de-oedipalizing sexuality, nature. The more Oedipus is concealed or abstracted, the harder it will be to scrape it out [curette]. You can take the curette to the figurative Oedipus, but the most pitiful and brilliant things can survive in the secret corners where Oedipus finds shelter, in art. You have to think like that gamekeeper: in all modern art, there are some truly ugly, dirty things. If necessary, what started out glorious has become mortifying, has become anal. Now, Oedipus is anal. Anality is foundational for Oedipus, since, as everyone knows, Oedipus is founded on castration. But what's behind the castration? It's obviously not the phallus; it's the anus. The anus is the very act of castration, and the phallus wouldn't exist without the anus. In other words, this whole aspect of Oedipus is defined by this infamous trinity (phallus – Oedipus – anus). But I think it started off gloriously and then began to go foul.

Take an international example: something that started out as a sort of song of life, something that was revolutionary—because I can't think of anything revolutionary that isn't a song of life. When that turns into a filthy culture of death. At first, pop art was incredible, not the least bit surrealist, in both music, like John Cage, and in painting; there was a great outpouring of life. And then before long, by the time you get to the tail-end of pop art, it turns to death, and not just because they were merely copying what had already been done. It goes much deeper than that. All of a sudden, its flow becomes disgusting: tortured bodies, machines, tubes—something like a non-figurative axiomatic.

When it comes to schizo-analysis, you have to look for both versions of Oedipus. Before he died, Stravinsky said, “Everything I’ve done has been because my mother didn’t love me and my father was never there.”<sup>68</sup> That’s his big, figurative Oedipus; that’s the musician’s Oedipus. But on another level, there might be an Oedipal painting, and that’s more or less what we find in Lawrence: these tubes and corrugations, this abstract painting which has become something dead, or pop art which has turned into a sort of death scare.

What are we to make of this axiomatic, which is no more than abstract Oedipus, informal Oedipus? So much so that when Oedipus has been run out of his little nook in the family, he necessarily shows back up in forms that have to be confronted all over again, combinatorial forms, axiomatic forms. Again, it’s for this reason that we’re taught we shouldn’t confuse psychoanalytic Oedipus and familial Oedipus—because the psychoanalytic Oedipus is an abstract Oedipus, one that tends towards non-figurative versions.

When a musician as brilliant as Stockhausen tries to explain what’s specified by a combinatory system, in what it does musically, I find his choice of words rather instructive: “My work constructs a multiplicity.” That’s very close to the very movement of the process of flows. What really makes up a multiplicity are flows that are decoded and deterritorialized. Stockhausen uses a term from physics and mathematics—where the term, “multiplicity,” was a noun referring to something that completely side-steps the choice between the one and the many. Multiplicity as a noun, the noun-form of multiplicity—that really dissolves everything about the one as well as the many, because “multiple” could no longer work as an adjective.

An ever-growing multiplicity of musical interpretation perhaps becomes possible through series of 17 periods.<sup>69</sup> So, his work will have 17 periods, and from one periodicity to the next, the multiplicity grows—what I had described as creeping or leaking [*fuir*] from one end. A sound flow slips under—under what? We know the extent to which Stockhausen participated in the whole movement of decoding that characterizes contemporary music; decoding, not in the sense of deciphering a code, but in the sense of destroying musical codes. He tells us: the idea of an ever-growing multiplicity means that it slips out from under anything you might reintroduce as code.

The result is a free dynamic process, dynamic because the multiplicity is constantly growing; that’s what I was getting at when I was describing a decoded flow tending towards its external limit. Multiplicity is process, not combinatory—since multiplicities are always growing and free, since they don’t reach limits and have no end in sight—indeed, its movement, its process tends towards its external limit, which is always beyond it, pushed further away as the decoded flow spills over. But we shouldn’t take that too far. What he was saying is: I’m going to unleash a dynamic process of growing multiplicities which is continually decoded, and which continually tends towards its limit. I argue that at this point, it’s not about combination or axiomatics; we’re dealing with process, but at the same time, any increase in multiplicity has to be compensated for by reducing and converging the formal elements to be interpreted and by a limitation concerning laws of combination. Great: in the first sentence, he was talking about process; in the second, he’s putting it in terms of combination and axiomatics.

What I'd like for you to appreciate is that, from our current perspective, this way of describing Stockhausen's music is absolutely no different from what we were saying earlier about the purest form of monetary political economy. Swap out the properties of the flows, and it's exactly the same thing. I'm well aware of what a genius Stockhausen is, but being brilliant doesn't stop you from making all sorts of compromises, or from producing what appears to be the most axiomatized or combinatorial work possible, while at the same time involving all sorts of pieces and fragments. Its combinatorial, axiomatic aspect is absolutely non-consistent; that doesn't stop it from working, from having a really peculiar function. In one sentence, he says: I'm going to put you through a dynamic process of growing multiplicities and decoding flows. But hang on, let's not get ahead of ourselves; the flow process itself—the growth of flows, the fluctuation of what's flowing—the flow flows via the multiplicity's expansion. That has to be compensated for. “Should be compensated for”—there's a legitimate and an illegitimate way of understanding “should.” Either he says it “should” because I, Stockhausen, want it to be that way, or he's describing the nature of how multiplicities expand, that the increase in its multiplicity be compensated for. Why, then? Sure, for Stockhausen since that's what he's doing. But does it inherently have to be so? Is it part of the music? It's what makes Stockhausen original, but one could very well imagine investigating the sonic process of expanding multiplicity, where the increase in multiplicities doesn't have to be compensated for. Why “should” it be? It's possible, but it doesn't have to be.

What does he mean by “compensate”? The flowing process with growing multiplicities is a process affecting time and space. It's a process whose basis is Space-Time, or duration, even. In such a spatio-temporal process with growing multiplicities, there's a whole outpouring of flows, and what's more, the flow increasingly has a ton of fluctuation. When he says that it should be compensated for, he's telling us that the mounting freedom in its spatio-temporal multiplicity has to be compensated for by restricting the combination of its formal elements: timbres, pitches. His thing has 17 periods—from one period to the next, the multiplicity expands, as he puts it, with “gradual indeterminacy in attack intervals and their sequence.” So, from one period to the next, this indeterminism, this musical indeterminism, which is tied to the multiplicity's growth across periods, is shaped and defined as a continuously expanding spatio-temporal multiplicity. That's what I'd call a more and more extended decoding and deterritorialization of flows.

But at the same time, there's something else covering that up: namely, the closer you get to the 17<sup>th</sup> period—where the growing multiplicity is closest to its limit—as you move toward the 17<sup>th</sup> period, the more this growing multiplicity and the freedom of its flow gets compensated for by a combinatorics of its formal elements—to the point where, Stockhausen says in the rest of the text, the 17<sup>th</sup> period—where the multiplicity has expanded the most—should also be the one closest to the first period, where the multiplicity was equivocal. There's no better way of describing how combinatorics replaces the process and its external limit with a set of formal internal relations.

When it comes to musical combinatorics, you could reach the same conclusions we did in our examination of an economic axiomatics of money. The first dimension has to do with the fluctuation and fluxion of flows moving toward an external limit and constantly coming up to

this limit which then tend to put something over the limit. Such art forms that have nothing to do with the schizophrenic as a clinical phenomenon. I ought to call them schizophrenic Art forms. The schizoid Arts, whatever form they might take, are about taking deterritorialization, decoding, all the way, causing flows of expanding multiplicity—our task will be to circle back later to this notion of increasing multiplicity—and then on that note, there's a quite different law that presupposes decoding and deterritorialization, one that backpedals. Namely: the external limit, as the threshold of absolute decoding, as the breaking through the wall and the wall's wall—thus, as the reality of the Schizo Arts—ends up getting replaced by something else.

The growth process of flows will get axiomatized, will get taken up in a combinatory system. At that point, rather than an external relationship limiting decoded flows, there'll be internal relationships limiting the differential relationships between decoded flows, i.e., what [Stockhausen] is calling the relationship between formal elements. It's the same operation as that of capitalism: it's a matter of warding off the external limit. It's about preventing flows from fluctuating in free multiplicities. So, instead of an external limit, an outside threshold as the limit of decoded flows, we instead find a system of internal relationships reproducing on a wider scale. [...] [*Interruption*]

... One side of axiomatics—but it's only an aspect of axiomatics inasmuch as they're failing, vanishing codes—at the other end, there's the process of decoding, the deterritorializing process of expanding multiplicities, with its external threshold, its external limit. Axiomatics swings from one end to the other: it takes the process a step further, but then it has to tie it off, prevent it from leaking out [*fuir*]. It recaptures it by combining formal elements; in place of the process tending toward its external limit, it substitutes an internal limit system, corresponding to its formal relationship. That's precisely how axiomatics operates.

There's no reason to talk about political economy any differently than we do music, if we're framing things in terms of flow, since the problem is this—don't all axiomatics, whatever they may be, form abstract Oedipuses, these figurative Oedipuses that constitute bringing back [*possible missing words*]?

As for the second aspect of capitalist immanence, it seems to me that it—if the first was a system of differential relationships between decoded flows—the second aspect is that, instead of the external limit of decoded flows, it substitutes a system or aggregate [*ensemble*] of internal limits that correspond to its differential relationships, a system of reproducible internal limits that can be replicated on an ever-wider scale.

An axiomatics that carries and operates on decoded flows—it compensates for the flows' free expansion by restricting the system of formal relationships defining the system's internal limits, even if that means reproducing these limits on a larger and larger scale.

Geometry has long been linked to signs we might think of as territorial, which are themselves linked to a set of codes. There are codes—right up to the end of feudalism—so long as there is no capitalist machine. Cartesian geometry: looking at it one way, doesn't it ruin a whole array [*tout un ensemble*] of prior geometric codes? But from another angle, isn't it still a code, with a

whole coordinate system, a whole system of territorialization? For territorialization isn't just about land [*terre*]; it's whenever signs are reflected onto whatever serves as territoriality for said signs.

The Cartesian coordinate system strikes me as an attempt to reterritorialize mathematical signs which are in the process of being decoded. As far as I can tell, [it comes down to] acknowledging a scientific endeavor that no longer goes through code but in fact goes through an axiomatic. It first happens in mathematics, around the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and it takes place in the context of differential calculus, that is, with [Karl] Weierstrass. He proposes a static interpretation of differential calculus, whereby differentiation is no longer understood as a process, and he turns differential relationships into an axiomatic. That only really takes shape under 19<sup>th</sup> century capitalism.<sup>70</sup>

*Student:* You said that in a code, each element is determined in itself, whereas in an axiomatic, flows are determined through their differential relationships. Morse code, for example: *dot, dash, dot, dash*—each element is determined separately. But when we have a group [*ensemble*] of elements, they're differentiated from each other, and we pin a meaning onto them.

*Deleuze:* I'm not so sure Morse code is a code. Neither is it a purely combinatorial system. It's a sort of residual combinatorics.

In the case of code, or a coding of flows, flows get their own qualities based on the code, i.e., they can only be indirectly related to each other. It makes no difference whether the flows are described separately or are necessarily related to each other indirectly, be it code or axiomatic, the [*word unclear*] only in their relationships with each other. In the case of a code, flows are interrelated, but their qualities are distributive, i.e., they inherently belong to the flow in question—that's how the flow of the unnamable is avoided. With code, flows each have to be described on their own, and they have to relate to each other indirectly.

For example: we're told that in a primitive machine, there are three flows: consumer goods, prestige goods, and authority over human beings. That gives us three loops: these flows are delineated separately. Granted, they don't exist outside the relationship they have with each other; the nature of their relationship is such that the relationship between flows [*unclear*]... and that, by virtue of the indirect relationship between flows, that is, under certain conditions, in certain places, under certain circumstances where, e.g., the flow of consumer goods ties back to the flow of prestige goods. Prestige goods will only be exchanged for consumer goods at the territory's periphery.

A whole system of indirect relationships between qualified flows; that's what a code is. From there, it follows that units of code are, by nature, finite blocks, because so far as code is concerned, a unit of code is something that draws in samples [*prélèvements*] from different flows. Each unit of code will be laden with different samples, and will be able to compound them, in their indirect relationships, in the form of a finite block—you restore the balance between these qualified flows, for example, in the form of consumption. But what goes into consumption loses something; there's a functional imbalance. It never works in the form of



exchange—it's always imbalanced, and this imbalance is compensated for by the prestige of the one giving to consumption, or by their right to women. It forms a finite block. Finite blocks are units of code, units of code not being the same thing as flows, but are veritable finite cuts, cuts forming finite blocks.

In an axiomatic, flows have no quality outside of their relationships. The capitalist is not the owner of a flow of capital; he's only the owner of a flow of virtual capital so long as he hasn't converted his titles to wealth into means of production, into machines, for example. And he doesn't convert his titles to wealth until he finds someone whose labor he can buy, and vice versa: flows cannot be characterized apart from their reciprocal determination, which has priority over their characterization. It follows that axiomatics always deals with the infinite; its matter is infinite, whereas there isn't any code for the infinite. That's why theologians, despite themselves, are progressive: they get into atheism, and find themselves confronted with the challenge—is this thing codable?

Here again, ideology is bullshit—we shouldn't think about theology in the Middle Ages through the lens of ideology; it's stranger than that: some aspect of social organization starts unfolding right away. Ideology does not exist. In the ideological field, what's at play is much more immediate. Theologians find themselves faced with something that calls into question the very form of their society: is it possible to code infinity? And the problem of heresy arises in their Trinitarian coding... [*Interruption*]

Once we're dealing with an infinite process, codes break down. Capitalism invents infinite, even economically speaking: at the level of capitalist production, of producing in order to produce. And, as a second infinity, capital in the form of  $x / Dx$  *ad infinitum*. Capitalism is what makes infinite debt possible. With capitalism, production, the social body in the form of money capital, and debt all become infinite processes, and it gets axiomatized. What escapes code, the process as infinite process, will be the sort of material or expanding multiplicity that axiomatics is responding to. As for axiomatics, what it carries back to the finitude of axiomatics is always an infinite material—it's the finite representation of an infinite process.

An axiomatic is an act of finitude performed on infinite matter. Weierstrass was the one who took every way of interpreting differential calculus, from Leibniz to [Joseph Louis] Lagrange, and threw it all out the window, claiming it had nothing to do with process. Yes, there is a process as pure matter, but we can't stop there; it all has to be axiomatized. Which means finding the finite grid to choke out the infinite number of possible combinations. Weierstrass interprets differential and infinitesimal calculus in a way he himself calls "static," where there's no longer any flux towards a limit, no longer any concept of threshold, but instead a system of choices, from the perspective of an ordinal interpretation. Differential calculus is completely turned around from the perspective of ordinal numbers, no longer from the perspective of cardinal numbers—thus, a static order with a system of assumptions or choices in an ordinal series, where the concepts of limit, threshold, of movement towards, have lost all meaning. In other words, differential calculus brings with it an infinite matter which relatively decodes mathematics,

compared to its previous state. Axiomatics is a finite network applied onto infinite material, since such infinite material had gotten away from codes.

Theologians have this machine: the Christian flow is one of infinite debt, the flow of its infinite process. It contaminates every code; the Roman code falters beneath it. The challenge is how to save the Roman Empire and Christianity at the same time. Theologians talk about the Trinity, but their discussion isn't what's important. What matters is the formal operation they carry out: through their theology, they're also working out a political economy. Christianity offers us the infinite, which is to say, we're in a social regime where nothing ends—it's for life. We need to approach infinity economically. In other words, I'll take the codes that caused finite blocks to circulate, and I'll make a finite block of alliance and kinship. The prisoner said to himself, "Well, they're going to kill me, and then it's over for me," in the sense of "this is finite." That's what Nietzsche's talking about in the second essay of *The [Genealogy of] Morality*: during the prehistoric age, debt is finite.

It takes an incredible series of events before you get an economy of infinite debt. There's never been an economy of exchange; exchange is a guise for the circulation of debt when it becomes infinite, but when it's still debt, it never looks like an exchange. When we're dealing with the problem of how to stop a process without reintroducing codes, the answer comes in the form of axiomatics, a finite grid, a number of finite principles marshalling a combinatorial system whose figures are infinite. That's how Oedipus works: the figurative Oedipus, the imaginary Oedipus, has a special territory, one of pure, infinite matter, since, no matter what happens, Oedipus will be there: you love your father, you don't love him, you're perverted, neurotic, or psychotic—regardless, it's Oedipus (infinite process), the figurative form of Oedipus. It's no secret that Oedipus has an unlimited number of permutations.

Psychoanalysis is the application of an axiomatic that far exceeds it. In part, it applies the social coordinates of capitalism: it's essential for capitalism that there be two sorts of individual: social individuals and private individuals. Social individuals—capitalists, bankers, workers—and private persons—family members—do not belong to the same order. Part of capitalism is how one sort of individual gets reflected [*rabattre*] onto another, and psychoanalysis is an application of capitalist axiomatics. But in its unending ambition, it gets sick of acting as a field of application for a pre-existing Oedipus—it tells us, for example, that the infinite versions of Oedipus are only imaginary. Which means that its Oedipal material is precisely the infinite process as reduced by psychoanalysis, but the problem is how to avoid an infinite process and to find a finite grid.

Fed up with being the application of capitalist axiomatics, psychoanalysis wanted to become an axiomatics in and of itself, i.e., to find a handful of finite principles the infinite combinations of its infinite material depend on. That's the structural Oedipus, the psychoanalytic Oedipus. It was axiomatized the moment it said, "But the infinity of Oedipus is imaginary," and that depends on a handful of principles forming a structure, which are able to generate, produce all the imaginary forms of Oedipus. At that point, axiomatization is exactly what the structural Oedipus does.

*Student:* Could we say that the way the stock market operates depends on an axiomatic?

*Deleuze:* Accounting activities, on the one hand, and stock market activities, on the other, might not be axiomatics *per se*, but they directly depend on economic axiomatics. An axiomatic is not defined by the constancy of certain quantities but by the establishment of formal relationships between flowing quantities.

*Student:* The body without organs of capital?

*Deleuze:* The body without organs of capital isn't the entire capitalist machine. The body without organs of capitalism is an idea that only works at the next level. Money *qua* money is incapable of producing anything; its role is sterile, unproductive. Therein lies a major paradox: it turns out that this big unproductive, sterile entity does produce—that money makes money. So, something has to be stuck onto money's BwO, but it doesn't come down to claiming that capitalism is money-as-BwO. It means that capitalism understands money as BwO and, thanks to a whole series of cogs and wheels, it makes money produce something. Money as BwO indicates a part of the machine. Something has to flow over the BwO, and capitalist desire is aimed at this whatcha flow over the BwO of money capital. The latter precisely being flows caught in reciprocal determination.

*Student:* Schizophrenia is when someone lives in a space and time different from ours. Is it possible for the schizophrenic to latch back onto our space-time, and if so, how would we relate capitalism to this modification in the space-time continuum?

*Deleuze:* I'll borrow the example of Mrs. [Gisela] Pankow's psychotherapy—she ends her account by saying, "Thus, I turned this bold schizophrenic into a timid paranoiac." A recoding of the schizo, then, converting the schizo into a paranoiac. Laing doesn't propose bringing schizos back to the reality of capitalism at work in our society. In reality, it can't come down to bringing the schizo back to this or that social code. Laing rejects that... [*End of the session*]

**Gilles Deleuze**

*Anti-Oedipus I (1971-1972)*

**Lecture 8: March 7, 1972**

**Transcript: WebDeleuze, modified by Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring**

**Code / Axiomatics; The Regime of Debt; Capitalist Immanence; Concealment in Axiomatics; Marking – Alliance and Filiation; On Christianity**

... We tried to figure out how the capitalist machine could take the form of a system of immanence, defined by three of the machine's rather afferent and inter-connected aspects:

- 1) A complex system of differential relationships between decoded and deterritorialized flows. This differential system doesn't replace one code with another or faulty territorialities with new territorialities. The first aspect of capitalist immanence is this kind of bookkeeping axiomatics, which consists in establishing differential relationships between decoded and deterritorialized flows as such.<sup>71</sup>
- 2) If it's true that decoded flows as such, deterritorialized flows as such, have a specifically schizophrenic external limit, i.e., that their limit is the "schizz," on the other hand, the differential between them wards off and resists this limit, substituting a set of internal limits that get reproduced on a wider and wider scale. The second aspect of capitalist immanence is the reproduction of the limits immanent to capital on an ever-larger scale.
- 3) The general effusion of anti-production into the apparatus of production, to the point that in such a system, no productive activity can occur without attesting to its place in an apparatus of anti-production. A point that allowed us to distinguish between ancient, imperial kinds of bureaucracy and modern bureaucracy, which served to make the apparatus of anti-production permeate throughout all productive activity.

If these are the three aspects of capitalist immanence, as an immanent machine, we can now determine how an axiomatic differs from coding [*codage*]. Capitalism doesn't restore code; it ushers in an axiomatic of decoded flows, which only happens to restore code.

I'm proposing that there are five differences between axiomatics and code, assuming that we won't find the model for axiomatics in science, though axiomatics does imply that science has reached a certain state, has taken on a certain shape.<sup>72</sup> Social axiomatics, which we have to interpret as a sort of extension of scientific axiomatics. On the contrary, it's scientific axiomatics, or science, that assumes an axiomatic form in a regime, in a form of society that, on its own terms, replaced codes with a properly social, quantifying axiomatic [*axiomatique comptable*].

Which means that scientific axiomatics, essentially, a new kind of social recording process,<sup>73</sup> expressed in the scientific domain.

The first difference—in any regime of code, what do we find? A code is never homogeneous; a code is made up of shreds, of chunks, joined together piece-by-piece and, piece-by-piece, crisscrossing a social field. Don't bother thinking in terms of linguistic homogeneity: a code borrows and mobilizes all sorts of signs; it mixes these signs together, and with this sort of multiplicity particular to code, a grid covers the social field by conjugating really diverse elements.

Yet, in every code, there are secret zones bound up with whatever collective investments of organs, which is included in any code. I'm saying that the collectivity, the group, invests organs. It's what [Paul] Parin demonstrates in his frustrating, awful book: *Les blancs pensent trop*.<sup>74</sup> He does a good job of demonstrating how, if there's any castration in so-called primitive societies, it comes from the mouth of cousins, based on a collectively invested organ, I believe that the collective investment of organs is a fundamental aspect of code. In *Mythologiques*, [Claude] Lévi-Strauss demonstrates the collective investment of organs and prohibitions: like, under particular circumstances, given particular conditions, you don't have the right to use particular organs—which certainly doesn't imply a defense or prohibition in general, but [it does imply] something positive regarding code, i.e., collective investment.

All organs are coded, or over-coded: you're not going to use your eyes in certain conditions, you're not going to see this. You won't use your nose, or, on the other hand, you're called on after a system of initiation. And initiation means marking the body, and what follows are instances of displacement. A mask cannot be understood as the very depiction of a collective investment of organs; what I find so interesting about a mask is the displacement between the organs of the wearer and the organs represented on the mask—for example, those masks where the wearer doesn't see through the holes in the eyes but through some other orifice. What does that suggest? It suggests this gap between one's own organs and organs taking on a new capacity by virtue of their collective investment.

This whole regime of collectively investing organs implies zones that are necessarily secret—you're not in a position to make use of a collectively invested organ under such-and-such conditions. It requires a system of initiation to reach the point where you can use such an organ under those conditions. We have to bear in mind that such collective investments occur whenever there's a marking of bodies. Thus, every code harbors secret zones that play a fundamental role... [text missing] Strictly speaking, you could say that, everywhere, the secret weighs down on singular points, singularities of code, singularities of code that appear to be fundamentally linked to organs defined by their collective investment. In a way, nothing is unspeakable. The secret might be that of a secret society, or else it's something that quite literally cannot be spoken of without contradiction or cannot be spoken of without the system rupturing. There's no hiding it. The worst crimes—there's no covering it up, even if they involve secret codes, because concealment is a horse of a different color entirely.

We ought to maintain a categorical distinction between secrecy and objective concealment. I mean, it's very different in a capitalist system: you're told that you don't have the right to know this, or you don't have the right to participate in that, because you lack the enjoyment or use of the organ presupposed by such knowledge or such participation. That's the secret. In code there are two ways of handling the worst crimes: by over-coding one's organs—you *haven't been coded enough, you did because you escaped the code, so we're going to over-code you*, which might mean torturing you—or else by moving, expelling: *get the hell out, get lost*. And in primitive societies, you often find a guy who's been expelled from his territoriality, from his group, who's gone away. He has a special status; sometimes he gets integrated somewhere else. Consider its latest forms in Greek cities, as the exile. You broke the secret, or you committed a crime—it was the movement of being run off.

What goes on these days? Every time we try to figure out how this machine works, we run into a wall. It's been the cornerstone of leftism: *we're going to try and figure out what's going on in this system!* A wall of police, of silence, opposes any such attempt, which leads us to believe that the search for or demand for information is singularly active. It's awful enough simply knowing what goes on in a factory. Literally, go to Renault on Émile-Zola, and see to what extent factories are prisons.<sup>75</sup> When you want to know what happens in a prison, what you're dealing with isn't a secret as a function of code; it's something else. We must know how a Swiss bank functions.

Once you concretely understand how a capitalist institution functions, you enter a domain where, literally, you either collapse or you get riled up. It's a regime that, in one sense, doesn't tolerate anything even when it comes to the simplest information, doesn't tolerate anything nearby—on one hand, that's what makes it fragile, but it makes up for its fragility with a global repressive force which, on the other hand, constitutes its strength. This system isn't one of secrecy—the striking example of Dr. Rose at Toul, reporting on what goes on in a prison, violating a sort of capitalist understanding that an institution's participants will be silent; they might object to the institution in principle, but they're not to say anything about it—[it isn't a system of secrecy] but a system of concealment [*dissimulation*], not the subjective, psychological sort of concealment of capitalists, but an objective concealment, per the apparent objective movement of capital.<sup>76</sup>

We'd be mistaken were we to say that, in capitalism, there are two forms of money, but we should recognize that the money-form functions in two different ways: as finance and as revenue, financial flows and revenue flows fundamentally linked in a kind of differential relationship, since that's part of the system of differential relationships at the heart of capitalism. Such a system, with money assuming two forms and there being an established relationship between both forms, can only work on the condition that a fictitious principle of homogeneity is projected between both forms, both figures. Namely, the nature of finance flows and revenue flows is such that, in terms of how they're related, they appear as though they're convertible, in the form of a “uniform interest rate” or “gold standard,” and that's the real purpose of gold in capitalist regimes: rather than preserving it, [its purpose is] fundamentally to cover up [*dissimuler*] the heterogeneity between both kinds of flows and the nature of the relationship between both kinds of flows.

I'd say that the first broad, illustrative way of distinguishing code and axiomatics is that codes always function based on and in relation to zones of secrecy, while an axiomatic always functions on the basis and in relation to objective concealment.

The second point of contrast is this: in a code, due to its fundamental heterogeneities, its fragments linking together piece-by piece, etc., a code or coding always applies to flows. What code specifically does is work out the qualification of flows, independently of how they're related, i.e., the relationship between coded flows will result from said flows having been qualified by code. For example, in a type of primitive society where, for example, you make out a machine with three or four flows—the flow of objects of consumption, the flow of prestige objects, the flow of rights over human beings (marriages, offspring, women, children, etc.)—I'm saying that code carries out coding, i.e., a qualification of such flows, each having its own circuit, where both the relationships between flows and the places where such relationships are established strictly depend on their first being qualified by way of code.

For example, in some places, usually on the outskirts of the group's territory, there might be exchanges between prestige objects and objects of consumption. Such relationships between withdrawn flows [*prélèvements sur les flux*] are strictly determined by the quality of the flows and each of their own autonomous circuits. We ought to say that code is an indirect system of relations deriving from the qualification of flows that code carries out.

In an axiomatic, it's the opposite, and it's clear why an axiomatic entails a generalized decoding. Now there aren't indirect relations between flows qualified by code, but on the contrary, the qualification of flows stems from the differential relationships between said flows, flows which possess no quality apart from how they're situated in their differential relationship. And that's fundamentally what characterizes axiomatics, that what determines the quality of each flow is the system of differential relationships between flows.

Example: we can't talk about a flow of labor and a flow of capital, we can't qualify these flows independently and prior to the differential relationship between them. And it's only from the encounter between virtual capitalism and the virtual worker -- that is, the differential between both kinds of flows -- that will result the qualification of one of these flows as the flow of capital purchasing labor power and the other as the flow of labor purchased by capital. Otherwise, there would be no way of qualifying flows, since if they didn't actually meet—forming differential relationships between flows with different capacities—if they didn't actually cross paths, the capitalist would forever remain a capitalist, and the worker, a virtual worker, unable to sell their labor force. In this respect, I can make out a second contrast, and I believe that historically, axiomatics began as a new interpretation, a static and ordinal interpretation of differential calculus, and that that was its origin.

Third contrast: If it's true that codes harbor and carry out qualifications of flows—which informs how flows are related to each other, and not the other way around—if that is indeed a point of contrast, I believe we can take the distinction further. In non-capitalist formations, just as flows are qualified and do not form indirect relationships stemming from their prior qualification, at certain points, points which can, by the way, constitute secrets, which can also be the subject of

initiation, which is why all these distinctions are linked together. If that's true, the fact remains that coding consists in a three-part operation precisely because there isn't one code that spits everything out. Fundamentally, a code is a rule for recording or registering distribution [*enregistrement de distribution*]. Coding always operates where it affords the means; it's a system of rules for siphoning off flows [*prélèvements sur les flux*], breaking off parts of chains [*détachements sur les chaînes*], and from there, distributing what remains, the residue, to consuming subjects. There are these three sides to any code: siphoning off flows, detaching from chains, and then distributing what's left. See [Pierre] Bonnafé's essay in *Nouvelle Revue de Psychanalyse* on the magic object,<sup>77</sup> where these three aspects of the magic object are delineated very clearly.

At this level, each fragment of code unites all the heterogeneous aspects at issue in an inherently finite combination, in a mobile, open, and finite combination. In the primitive market, in other words, if we're sticking to these kinds of flows, there's always an imbalance because, in point of fact, there is no form of exchange; there's no form of equivalence. There's a fundamental imbalance when it comes to each flow qualified in a particular way in the exchange relationship at stake in a combination. In other words, there is no exchange; there's a system of debt, and debt is fundamentally affected by a functional imbalance, a functional imbalance at the level of each finite combination, involving every aspect of coding and thereby all the different qualified flows, an imbalance compensated for by heterogeneous elements borrowed from another flow.

For example, the lack of equilibrium between giving and receiving objects of consumption effectively isn't rebalanced; its imbalance is fundamental, constant. It only works insofar as it's unbalanced. That's fundamentally what's in dispute with Leach and Lévi-Strauss: both agree that there's an imbalance, Leach claiming that the imbalance is a fundamental aspect of the system, integral to how it functions, while Lévi-Strauss maintains that it's a pathological outcome of the system. Leach is right. Looking at each flow, each combination, each flow contributing to a compound product, there's a fundamental imbalance relative to the flows in question, and it's as though this imbalance were perpetually made up for by siphoning off another flow, a flow with a different character.<sup>78</sup>

For example, the imbalance between the one distributing objects for consumption and the one receiving them will be compensated for by drawing off [*par un prélèvement*] a completely different flow, the flow of prestige, where the distributor gains prestige, or, from a third kind of flow, receives privileges over human beings, or from coats of arms, etc. I'd argue that, at that point, the economic unit in so-called primitive society are fundamentally finite combinations that both in themselves and in their unbalanced way of functioning inherently bring in flows of all different qualities, and there's a whole cycle of debt that forms around these circulating finite compounds. It's the regime of finite debt, and the regime of alliances is precisely what delineates the trajectory of finite debt.

On the other hand, what changes with axiomatics is how the system of finite and mobile combinations gets replaced by a regime of infinite debt, and how infinity fundamentally belongs to the regime of axiomatics, whereas coding implies the finitude of what it codes. And here, too,



the infinite appears at the level of capitalist economics in the way money produces money. Marx highlights this infinite growth, whereby money makes money. And in what seems like a different form—but which is only the extension of the first—the infinite of capital, whose mode is the process whereby, at every turn, capital has immanent limits, but limits that it reproduces on an ever-wider scale. In other words, this regime of infinity is one of destruction-creation, and we've seen why the money form is necessarily tied to the destruction and creation of money. If there is no axiomatics of infinity *vis à vis* its form as axiomatics, it is the case that the material such axiomatics bears upon is fundamentally an infinite material. In other words, axiomatics is the system of finite rules structuring a subject matter that itself is properly infinite. That much should be clear for scientific axiomatics, but also at a more basic consideration of axiomatics, of axioms, both as a way of treating and mixing a properly infinite material, one which is accounted for by the axiomatics of the infinite number of possible combinations deriving from the axiomatics itself.

Just as code is the system of finite debt and finite economics, so too is axiomatics the system of infinite debt. In the most basic terms, we will never fully pay our debt—infinite punishment, infinite repayment—economically, the great shift from archaic codes handling finite matter, with the capitalist sort of axiomatics that instead handle material that's fundamentally infinite.

The fourth difference: In a society, whether coded or axiomatized, there's a basic social component [*instance*], that of the body without organs, of the unproductive, of anti-production. With so-called primitive societies, we've seen that the Earth, as an indivisible entity, acts as the full body, as the body without organs, as the instance of anti-production. In imperial societies, the despot and his two-fold incest, with his sister and his mother—both kinds of incest outlining the two ends of imperial over-coding, one incest at the periphery and one incest at the center, so that everything gets over-coded—it isn't at all about fecundity. It's about sterility, one that appropriates all productive forces: nothing must be born from incestuous unions. On the other hand, whatever is born must depend on the sterile union itself, i.e., the great despotic incest—see the case of Oedipus, the club-footed despot—along the surface of the imperial full body, the great despotic incest forms its double union, with sister and mother, thereby ensuring an over-coding of the older territorial codes that are falling apart all over the place.

And here, indeed, imperial codes get added onto prior territorial codes a new full body, the full body. The body without organs of the despot, acting as an instance of anti-production and projecting [*se rabat*] onto every productive force, just as the full body of the Earth in so-called primitive societies was projected onto productive forces in order to appropriate them. I believe that, with such code, it's absolutely necessary for the full body being the appropriation, appropriating the forces of production, to be extra-economic in nature. That is, insofar as it's a prerequisite for the apparent movement, the objective movement of the recording process [*enregistrement*] in a particular form of society, it's inevitable that in a code, this apparent, objective movement emanates from and goes back to a non-economic entity. As Marxists might put it, that doesn't mean that the state of the economic process isn't what necessitates erecting such an economic full body, and the apparent movement whereby productive forces are attributed to the full body might come down to the state of these forces themselves.

The fact remains that, from the point of view of its objective movement, what appropriates productive forces is something extra-economic. Which itself explains the two-fold aspect of how anti-production operates: inhibiting, limiting productive forces on the one hand, and on the other, projecting [*se rebattre*] onto them in order to appropriate the productive forces. These two aspects are then separated in quality and in temporality from the work of productive forces themselves. The body of the earth, insofar as it both limits and appropriates productive forces, makes use of something it conjugates on its own surface—upon the full body of the earth, the primitive territorial machine conjugates filiations and alliances, a range of filiations and alliances appropriating the productive forces. And as its own nature isn't economic but geological and political, to the extent that there is a geology of politics, to the extent that the earth is what functions as a full body without organs. With imperial regimes, the full body of the despot securing these same functions shows up as a transcendent instance, an instance of anti-production whose nature is political, administrative, or even religious.

I believe that capitalist axiomatics offers us the only form society where what plays the role, functions as a full body, becomes a directly economic instance. Something no code could ever withstand; it goes without saying that this is what grounds concealment. It must be hidden, i.e., the full body of such a society is directly economic; it's money capital. It's what all flows run on, and what productive forces are attributed to. In contrast to previous systems, there's no longer a difference in nature or timing between labor and surplus labor. In the worker's workday, it's impossible to distinguish—except abstractly, in the form of an arithmetical difference which allegedly belied the true nature of capitalism, the nature of its differential relations—it's impossible to find the line between labor and surplus labor, as opposed to what happens with despotic over-coding, where the part of labor and the part of surplus labor are qualitatively and temporally distinct.

The fifth and final point of contrast: just as an aside, when biologists today talk about genetic codes, it's interesting how they use the word, "code," because it also has aspects of an axiomatic. We can come at the word, "code," in two ways. The reason they say there's a biological code is precisely because everything depends on something extra-chemical, on some entity [*instance*] or on forms of connection, capable of relating bodies stripped of any chemical affinity, in the same way I was saying that, if we're talking about code, it's because there's some extra-economic instance which productive forces are attributed to. Indeed, whenever we find an entity whose objective appearance is external to or transcends the field of linkage in question, then we're dealing with code.

And the second characteristic that supports modern biological code being code is that it's a system of indirect relationships—for example, with so-called allosteric bodies, where any relationship can only be indirect, precisely because the bodies involved have no chemical affinity. Under both these aspects, the concept of code is perfectly justifiable. In an axiomatic, there are direct relationships that qualities are derived from, and the appropriating entity is itself economic.

In both codes and axiomatics, people aren't what gets marked. Code marks flows, only in a primitive society, flows are marked according to how poorly developed productive forces are. Flows are marked based on organs, and the fact that flows are coded implies the collective investment of organs—this shows up with cultural relativists—the investment of organs is integral to coding flows, and it motivates the whole system of prohibitions. I suppose that such prohibitions are only a cover for some positive operation, this process of collectively investing organs. On the other hand, with capitalism, we've always said that it's built on the basis of a generalized decoding, and decoding doesn't affect flows without also affecting organs. Organs have gone through a fundamental collective disinvestment. The first organ to have been disinvested was the anus (see Max Weber). We can't ignore how African mythology illustrates that, whenever organs get disinvested, organic codes, the coding of organs, will lean towards the anus. The other organs followed. If this collective disinvestment of organs is what we call castration, then the anus is what's behind the main castration, and the phallus, as a transcendent object, wouldn't exist were it not for what the anus does. Oedipus is anal, from top to bottom.<sup>79</sup>

What led to a collective disinvestment of organs in capitalism? It's like, go ahead and use your eyes, your mouth, your anus, do whatever you want—our collective investments no longer involve collectively investing organs; your organs are your business. How come? Because the collective investment of organs always points back to something essential about code, that code is a machine for ripping up alliances with filiations. If I use the word, "machine," it's to indicate that it isn't an axiomatic, nor is it a deductive system. Alliances are never drawn from filiations; they never follow or are deduced from filiations. There's a machine that conjugates alliances with filiations, a machine that does something incredible when it comes to code, where the form of social reproduction goes through the form of human reproduction, and where the family, whether in the narrow or broad sense, is always a protocol, a strategy, a tactical approach in a society of codes. In other words, the family is anything but familial. The family is the direct embodiment of investments in the extra-familial social field, and there it acquires its strategic function as it conjugates alliances with filiations.

In that sense, it's coextensive with the social field insofar as family stimuli are like bases, elements of social investment, which is another way of saying that social reproduction goes through human reproduction, hence the need for a collective coding of organs. Everything changes in imperial societies, yet it remains the same. The whole system of alliances and filiations in primitive communities is preserved, and the specifically despotic category of the new alliance is overlaid on top of it. It's a new category of alliances; the despot ushers in new alliances which direct filiations derive from. Imperial societies keep it so that social reproduction, at both ends, takes the form of human reproduction: at one end, the despot's reproduction, the despot's body without organs addressing the question of the dynasty, and at the other end, the village communities still upholding the regime of ancient alliances and indirect filiation.

In capitalism, alliances and filiations retain their old meanings, only now in the context of the full body's new characteristics, as money capital. Capital is now what the categories of alliances and filiations are attributed to. We enter a regime of new alliances, and filiation is the process

whereby capital produces money as industrial capital. Industrial capital is the capital of filiation, while alliance capital is market capital in its banking and its commercial forms. And it's true about capitalism that, in its essence, in its specificity as a form of society, it is industrial—neither the merchant nor the banker would have been enough to establish the capitalist system. Had it not been for industrialization, they would have still found their roles and functions in the pores (as Marx puts it) of the previous form of society. Pores which are the little holes on the body without organs, whether territorial or despotic.<sup>80</sup>

It's true that the essence and specificity of capitalism lies in the industrial process whereby capital buys the means of production and the labor power of the deterritorialized worker. But if the specificity of capitalism resides with industrial capital, on the other hand, the functioning of capitalism is determined by banking and commercial capital, which then become fully autonomous and take on a leading role, based industrial capital. From there, it's appropriate to say that filiation is now something about capital, in the form of filial capital, money generating money *ad infinitum*, and on the other hand, alliance is a capital thing in the form of alliance capital, in the form of banking and trade. Then, not only does the registration of capital not apply to people, but neither does it apply to organs: capital is now geared towards alliances and filiations.

In capitalism, in an axiomatic regime, social reproduction no longer takes the form of human reproduction. Which means that the form of human reproduction stops determining, informing social reproduction. To put it like some of Aristotle's commentators, human reproduction is now only the form of the material; social reproduction still needs material, material provided by human reproduction, but the form of social reproduction has become independent of the form of familial reproduction. The family is no longer a protocol or strategy.<sup>81</sup> What is the purpose of human reproduction then? Among the characteristics of the capitalist machine we looked at earlier, one was that differential relationships have an internal limit that's reproduced on an ever-broader scale, whereby they ward off and drive back capitalism's real external limit, schizophrenia.

As for capitalism pushing its schizo-limit back further and further, its first method for doing so was to substitute internal limits, to be reproduced on a larger and larger scale. The act of displacing its limit, the different scales of capital. But there's another way in which its limit gets displaced, since the form of human reproduction no longer shapes social reproduction, precisely because the latter is secured by filiation capital and alliance capital, insofar as they've taken it upon themselves to conjugate alliance and filiation—the reproduction of capital, in and of itself, no longer needs human reproduction except for as a material. The limit gets displaced in a second way: far from being a strategic and tactical impulse coextensive with the entire social field, the family now forms a subset to which... far from lending its form to social reproduction, [it is a subset] whose form is imposed by social reproduction, and social reproduction will intersect with its entire form and every aspect of its form. This second displacement isn't about internal limits which are ever-expanding, but internal limits which are ever-narrowing. That's not a contradiction, since it comes down to two completely different displacements, which are closely interrelated: just as capital takes over the functions of alliance and filiation and thus

reproduces itself on a wider and wider scale, the form of human reproduction characterizes a more and more limited milieu, whereupon the now-autonomous capitalist social field can be reflected [*se rabattre*], applied to as its sub-set.

So much to say that: the more capitalist axiomatics distances itself from code, operating according to its always-expanding internal limits, the more restricted its field of application needs to be, and every capitalist determination finds its field of application in one sub-set, that of the family.

In *La Paix blanche* [The White Peace],<sup>82</sup> [Robert] Jaulin analyzes the example of deals missionaries make with Indians [*sic*]. The missionaries say, “We’re going to build small personal houses for you”—we’re witnessing the birth of Oedipus—“You’ll have your own place, no more collective houses.” And the Indians [*sic*] agree to it, thinking, this is the first time that white people are offering us part of their lives, so the Indians offer something from their own lives as well; they build a big collective house. A church! So, here’s what Jaulin says, which sounds to me exactly like the birth of Oedipus: “The condition of the colonized can lead to a reduction in the humanization of the universe, so that any solution that is sought will be a solution on the scale of the individual and the restricted family.”<sup>83</sup> To that, I’ll add that there’s an initial displacement of the limit. The limit is brought, in the condition of the colonized, to a more and more restricted scale: before, the Indian [*sic*] had whatever social field, and they invested it along with the social reproduction in said field. With its open family, its system of alliance and filiation, as Jaulin says, “the reduction of the humanization of the universe,” the limit of this field is no longer territorial or inter-territorial between allied groups, and undergoes a bizarre reflection [*rabattement*] where social reproduction completely escapes the Indian [*sic*]. It’s taken over by the colonizer, and it’s brought back under its limit: *you will no longer believe that the one who gave you life is a chief—we are the chief. The one who gave you life is just your dad.*<sup>84</sup>

See also [Victor] Turner’s account of the village where the chieftainship has been abolished, you get pinned down with a tighter and tighter limit, “with, by way of consequence, an extreme anarchy or disorder at the level of the collective: an anarchy whose victim will always be the individual—with the exception of those who occupy the key positions in such a system, namely the colonizers, who, during this period when the colonizers reduce the universe, will tend to extend it.”<sup>85</sup> His text offers us a way of expressing the connection between two displacements of the limit.<sup>86</sup> As the universe of the colonized shrinks, we see the limit makes two complementary moves: on the one hand, the internal limit expands further and further, and on the other hand, the internal limit defines a smaller and smaller subset, which becomes less and less capable of influencing the mechanisms of reproduction. In other words, the history and the constitution of the Western world, this heterogeneous whole, which can be taken up at any time and in any of its regions... [*Text interrupted*]

...this development concerning small personal houses represents the second way the limit gets displaced, and this is what Jaulin says: he gives us his depiction of the earlier collective houses, and from what I can gather it isn’t about there being large families. It’s not that the so-called primitive family was large; the houses were collective because fundamentally, as a strategy,

insofar as it determines the form of social reproduction, they were open to the outside, to what Jaulin calls the other. What's more, as a family, as subject to the investments of individual members, what the individual invests through [the family] are non-familial determinations in their social field: the land, alliances, etc. [The family] is fundamentally open to the other, i.e., to what isn't family—to the ally, if you will.

Which certainly doesn't suggest any shortcoming in the structure of the family. The fact that, under capitalism, it's now no more than material lends it a powerful function. It assumes a very specific function under capitalist axiomatics. I think that with capitalist systems, all revolutionary forms are those that break down, slip out from under the axiomatics of order. The problem we always run into is how to ensure that acts of decoding, acts of deterritorialization, are both revolutionarily positive and don't recreate some perverse or artificial version of the family, i.e., that they don't form their own codes and territorialities.

I'll elaborate using a somewhat less flashy example: psychiatry. Psychoanalysis has always been equal parts lovely and lousy. I'm of the persuasion that theories are formed piece-meal; the lovely is mixed in with the lousy. What's great about Freud is that you'll find gems and eyesores on the same page. Psychoanalysis entails—and here, it's revolutionary—breaking down codes, a kind of decoding of desire (*Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*). At high moments, we learn that dream interpretation shouldn't be confused for the dream dictionaries from Antiquity, because dream dictionaries are codes. Don't mistake that for psychoanalysis! But in the same book, this trickster gives us his account of Oedipus, and he doesn't know what to do with it; he's making a code. They make detention centers with groups, if necessary, almost militant groups, and what they're up against: preventing artificial families from forming again, artificial Oedipuses, at which point they'd be reterritorializing, recoding. The question is how to make way for decoded, positive, and revolutionary flows without reconstituting depraved families. That's the danger with militant groups.

In terms of the unconscious and how it relates to the social field, the territoriality of the party is a fundamental danger. How can there be a revolutionary link between people that mobilizes the libido, that mobilizes Eros, Desire, but doesn't wind up trapped in the coded or axiomatized structures of Oedipus? It's a problem at the level of practice.

[*Unrecorded discussion about the burial of Pierre Overney*]<sup>87</sup>

... Jaulin does a good job of demonstrating how intimacy or one's private life were completely upheld for the different families in the confines of a collective home,<sup>88</sup> since the family is always open to the non-family, to the ally. Collective houses provide small, private territorialities open to the ally, and there are rules for alliance and filiation so that some things are not permitted of allies. There's some kind of intense private life, which doesn't prevent the Indian [*sic*] in the collective home, by way of this private life, from investing the whole group. Jaulin, on the subject of individual houses: "There occurred an excessive ferment of the elements of the group"—he saw the urban state of Oedipus—"affecting the group itself most often results in exacerbating each element's familial or sociological characteristics and is translated by a domestic opposition experienced in the home, between the couple's original 'dimensions.'

Children are tossed around in this system, each (parent) vying to ‘hoard’ them for themselves, i.e., for the sake of their reference lineage.”<sup>89</sup> Oedipus is born!

Oedipus, for us cultured Europeans, is our little internal colony, and for Indians or Africans, it’s forced colonization. It’s one of the most immediate products of colonization, taking the form of: your father isn’t what you think, i.e., an agent of social reproduction, end of story. Social reproduction involves every colonizer. Jaulin says that, at that point, he looks at the kid, and one says, “he’s from my lineage,” and the other says “he’s from my lineage.” They take the kid by the arm and ask what the child prefers, which doesn’t come up in a regime of alliance or filiation, i.e., in the lineage machine, because there’s a system for visitation, for opening up to the outside, where lineage isn’t a problem.

Why does the capitalist system’s internal limit get displaced in two conjoined ways, as the more and more protracted reproduction of social limits, on an ever-wider scale, and consequently with increasingly narrow limits circumscribing the family? And how are the two related? Capitalist axiomatics, insofar as it concerns a regime where social reproduction has become autonomous, needs a subset for its application. As social reproduction, it’s constitutive of a first kind of image: the capitalist, the industrialist, the banker, the worker—the first order of images produced by social axiomatics. Consequently, its limits increasingly tighten around the family, which is where axiomatics finds its application, furnished by a second order of images. The second images are those formed using the material of human reproduction, i.e., family figures: daddy, mommy, me.

What capitalist political economy needs is a process called psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is the application whereby political economy defines its corresponding axiomatics. A perfectly acceptable formula.

There is transcendence not just when flows are coded, but when, on top of territorial codes, which don’t invoke any transcendence, which are an underlying system, a despotic over-coding is overlaid. Then there’s transcendence. The question of Christianity’s imperial character immediately shows up in the very form of catholicity, i.e., of one transcendent universal, or one truth for all religions. And historically, the way it shows up bears on the very essence of early Christianity: what will be our relationship with the Roman Empire, a decadent form of empire? In other words, do we go with entrism, using the debris of the Roman Empire to end up rebuilding a spiritually motivated empire? Or should we dissolve the Roman empire, start from scratch, return to the desert? Return to the desert in order to recreate a despotic formation from this sort of pact with the Roman Empire; we’ll build despotic formations from scratch, i.e., from anchorites, from convents. Early Christianity’s return to the East, against the Christians allying themselves with the Romans; in that respect, Christianity is like the last great imperial form of society. Indeed, what we might call the transcendent regime of infinite debt really begins with the great empires. What real punishment looks like has changes; all countries have made a sacred pact—you aren’t getting out of it; the debt is infinite.

But I wouldn’t say that Christianity offers us a dialectic of transcendence and immanence. What I would say is that it comes in bits and pieces. On the one hand, it’s the final attempt to rebuild an imperial society, but with this imperial form of society, the conditions are such that it cannot

be rebuilt that way. It has to be formed spiritually, i.e., the great empires are what establish infinite debt, what Nietzsche refers to as a cunning ploy: it takes some troubling artists to pull it off, but infinite debt was still external. The trick with Christianity—and this is very closely tied to its becoming—is that it not only subjects us to the regime of infinite debt, but the regime of internalized infinite debt. On the one hand, there's the aspect of despotic formation renewed by Christianity, and on the other hand, there's the way its formation lies deep within the development of capitalism, where it's no longer a regime of transcendence, but one of immanence.<sup>90</sup>

With immanence, assuming that it runs on an axiomatic and no longer on code, there's no more need for belief. Religion as belief only makes sense in the context of Christianity's place in an imperial form of society. When it comes to axiomatics, it's no longer a question of belief. That's why Christianity, as contemporary to capitalism, as we see it now, has always been like this: who cares whether they believe or not? It rubs me the wrong way granting Christianity an autonomy in terms of belief or religion because, when it goes through its conversion from transcendence to immanence, in its immanent aspect where it belong to capitalism, Christianity is *the* religion, and what makes it the religion of capitalism is that it doesn't operate in terms of belief. What they care about is it being the main religion, and looking at it that way, it's no longer a religion once belief isn't what matters. But Christianity guarantees a certain production of images in capitalism, and a certain relationship between such images, images which are part of the way in which the apparatus of capitalist immanence is fed. Religion is part of the economic machine.<sup>91</sup>

This business with the two poles of Christianity is the same as what we get with the death drive. Consider how death is coded in primitive systems: there is no death drive because it is more or less coded. It's when territorial codes break down that the death drive starts to show up, in processes of decoding. In imperial and despotic systems, the lion of the despot and death is ensured by a phenomenon that belongs to despotic formations—Freud lumped everything together under imperial forms of society, which is why he didn't understand capitalism—latency, everyone has a good laugh when latency comes up. Why did Freud invent latency? The real point of latency's implementation was as a historical determination, concerning the fate of despotic formations. Namely, why they were afflicted with a collective forgetfulness, which put them into a latent state—why the Greeks, the Egyptians, the Africans rejected, tamped down their imperial past into latency.<sup>92</sup>

How did the Greeks forget Mycenae? In despotic forms of society, the death drive is the great transcendent instance of anti-production, and it gets over-coded in the form of the new alliance, the revenge of the new alliance. Death is over-coded and turned into a veritable transcendent instinct. At the same time, for despotic regimes, it's a transcendent instinct because mortifying anti-production is separate from production, separated both in quality and in time. With capitalism, death is decoded: the whole apparatus of mortifying anti-production effuses into production. Freud says that the death drive is something transcendent and silent... [*End of session*]



**Gilles Deleuze**

***Anti-Oedipus I, 1971-1972***

**Lecture 9: April 18, 1972**

**Transcript: WebDeleuze, modified by Charles J. Stivale**

**Translation: Billy Dean Goehring**

**Marx-Freud; Capitalism; Despotism-Axiomatics**

### **Part I**

In his attempt to pin down the birth of bourgeois political economy, Marx is very clear: he claims that bourgeois political economy was established as soon as wealth was no longer linked to an external objective element, to an extrinsic objective element, but [became tied] to subjective activity as such, i.e., not to any determinate objectivity but to indeterminate subjective activity.<sup>93</sup> See, Marx says, there was no political economy in the way we mean it now; there was the analysis of wealth, and the analysis of wealth fundamentally comes down to relating wealth to some determinate objectivity; it varies. This determinate objectivity is the earth [*terre*].<sup>94</sup> For mercantilists, wealth is essentially tied to a determinate objectivity, the state, as the distributor of money.

Now, we have to pay attention to what Marx is saying: there was no political economy. When does political economy come about? It begins as soon as wealth is essentially tied to indeterminate activity, in relation to which no objective element is privileged over any other. That is, it's when so-called economists begin to distinguish what they call labor, which includes agricultural labor as much as manufacturing or industrial labor... [*text missing*] defining the general act of producing-whatever, which the field of political economy makes possible. Thus, the tipping point behind political economy involves relating wealth not to any determinate objectivity, but to subjective activity, defined as general production. Now, that's basically what [Adam] Smith and [David] Ricardo do. But I'm wondering whether, given this basic assumption concerning the very foundation of political economy, something is at stake in our analysis, though it seems like merely a parallel for the moment.<sup>95</sup>

Now, in the same way, or in an analogous way, what stands out in Freud's early work? It's a completely analogous kind of shift. Namely, just as political economy hinges on the revelation that the essence of wealth no longer lies in any determinate objectivity but is based on a general subjective activity—production—the reversal Freud carries out in terms of desire is analogous.<sup>96</sup> Perhaps it's the only circumstance in which desire's fundamentally unconscious nature could come to light, i.e., when desire is associated with a general subjective activity, a general productivity, which Freud will name—highlighting the originality of his discovery—will name the *libido*.

And, just at the surface-level of the text, what's so striking about his *Three Essays*? In particular, it's how Freud demonstrates that desire, as libido, cannot be identified with just any objects, cannot be identify with just any sources, cannot be identified with just any goals—as if the libido, as subjective activity, held the key to the objects it selected, the sources it channeled through, and the goals it intended. So, in that respect, in the same way that, in the context of political economy, wealth gets linked to general productive activity instead of being linked to an objectivity, the essence of desire will from the very beginning—and this might be the very start of psychoanalysis, and it's why the *Three Essays* portrays a kind of contingency in its sources, a kind of contingency in its objects, a kind of contingency in its aim within sexuality, in the realm of sexuality—it all ties back to so-called libidinal production, an activity producing symptoms, deviations, perversions.

In this respect, it seems to me that we're looking at is still merely a parallel; we have to ask ourselves what makes them similar, whether it isn't anything more than that. At the same time, it's already something more. How so? Why does it already feel like it's more than that? I see it as fundamental, but the sign that psychoanalysis—as much as political economy—belongs to the world of... [*text missing*] namely, that when we locate the essence of wealth in a subjective activity beyond objects, beyond aims, beyond entities, beyond objectivities, that's only the aftershock of the most deep-rooted process of the capitalist domain, the movement of deterritorialization. The deterritorialization of the capitalist form of wealth, whereby wealth is now only understood as a function of any-and-all productive activity and no longer as a function of some determinate element, neither the earth nor the state, and the process of deterritorializing desire, which can no longer be reduced to its objects, goals, or sources.

But we should immediately add that, right after that happens with political economy—we shouldn't even say "right after," we ought to say "as soon as"—as soon as that happens, something else takes place. As soon as it breaks ties with objectivities, as soon as it lays bare a general form of productive activity, there's something else that takes place. What? Here again, I think, we should pay attention to how Marx develops this with respect to political economy, this idea of productive activity or indeterminate labor, abstract labor, deterritorialized labor—no sooner than it gets discovered by political economy, it gets alienated again. Only look, he's very explicit—don't worry about the concept of alienation; Marx's point is that this re-alienation doesn't entail returning to a form of objectivity. It's a completely new form of alienation. Instead of alienating the activity of production into something—the earth, the state—such that its activity cannot be grasped, cannot even be perceived or made out, right, instead of alienating it as a thing, as an objectivity, as the state of a thing, just as the activity of production comes to light, it gets re-alienated as an act, and not at all as a state. Thus, it's not a return to how things were before; what gets re-alienated is the act itself.

And when it's re-alienated as an act, what form does that take? It is re-alienated under the conditions of private property. And that strikes me as crucial because private property doesn't show up in Marx as some new objectivity in the world of capitalism, but as the form of a new type

of alienation, alienation in action, as opposed to alienation as the state of something. Which, I think, amounts to saying that political economy simultaneously cuts ties with major objective representations, representations of the earth, the state. Thanks to this rupture, the essence of wealth is revealed to be general productive activity, subjective activity that cannot be reduced to an object. At the same time, this subjective essence is re-alienated in a completely different way—not circling back to a state of things, but a re-alienation in action. That is, it gets re-alienated not in some new objective representation but instead through systems of subjective representation. And the system of subjective representation is that of private property.

At this stage, so far, so good; all the more reason, I think, to explore the seeming parallel situation in psychoanalysis. I mean, all you need to do is change the words; that's all we're doing. Why are the situations so aligned, and why is it more than a mere similarity? All one has to do is swap some words out to see this play out in psychoanalysis. Namely, how at the same time as he cuts ties with the system of objective representation linking desire to extrinsic elements, to objects, to aims, Freud actually reveals its subjective essence as the libido. But at the same time, he re-alienates—not as another state of things, but as something equivalent to private property, something that certainly isn't identical. We'll have to say how they're related, what the realm of subjective representation will be when it comes to desire, just as private property was the realm of subjective representation for labor-production. This time, desire's essence, understood as libido—which cannot be understood in terms of objects, in terms of its aims, in terms of its sources—will get re-alienated in action, in the act itself, i.e., in family actions. And its system of subjective representation will be represented through oedipal coordinates.

Hence it seems to me that, literally, without forcing anything, it's the same development, the same discovery, and the discovery is used in the same way—whether it's the revelation that wealth essentially belongs to a subject as general production, which is subsequently re-alienated as an activity in terms of private property, or whether it's the Freudian revelation that desire, as subjective activity, can only be understood as libido, beyond the objects and aims of desire, which is immediately re-alienated—not as a state of things but as an activity, using the coordinates of the family. It's the same story. What I'd like to emphasize, then, is: in both the economic discovery and the psychoanalytic discovery, there's simultaneously something irreducible, something specific, as well as something non-specific. There's a real cut-off, and there's a way to recover what's been cut off. And yet, the rupture is there—I'm referring to psychoanalysis's extremely ambiguous attitude towards the whole subject of myth and tragedy.

I say “ambiguous” because, from a certain perspective, there's a profound disconnect between psychoanalysis and mythology, and then from another point of view, there are attempts to invoke or reinvolve an approach to mythology, one that purports to be new and purports to be incommensurable to the way, to the way experts think about mythology. I mean, why do we get the feeling that ethnologists or Hellenists and psychoanalysts seem to be constantly talking past one another? Both their approaches are actually irreducible. How does a Hellenist approach a myth? As a historian, they bring myths back to some underlying objectivity, which the myth

expresses in a particular way... [text missing] With psychoanalysis, they don't believe in myths or tragedies. Myths and tragedies are never linked to any objectivity whatsoever because that's beside the point for analysis. Myths aren't correlated to the earth's demands; tragedies aren't correlated to the despot's demands. In other words, psychoanalysis doesn't treat myth and tragedy as objective representations to be understood as referring back to their corresponding objectivities.<sup>97</sup>

What do they do? While there is a real critique of myth and tragedy, and they are devalued in an odd sort of way, at the same time, there is—in a completely different way, not at all contradictory—at the same time, there's a curious revalorization of myth and tragedy because, rather than taking them to be objective representations that ought to be understood by way of some objectivity holding the key to the society in question, psychoanalysis treats myth and tragedy as subjective representations fully capable of expressing the subjective essence of desire, of the libido. And I think that's why, in the history of psychoanalysis, there's this strange ambivalence regarding myth and tragedy, this two-faced impression we get that varies from period to period: there's a long period where psychoanalysts made major inquiries into myth, into tragedy. And then we also sense how Freud sort of takes back over, especially given his break with Jung, where some doubt is cast on psychoanalytic interpretations of myth and tragedy.

I think we need to pay attention to what's going on here in order to understand this double aspect: they devalue myth and tragedy specifically because desire is no longer tied to some big objectivities that might have shown up through myths and tragedies. At the same time, they revalorize and take myth and tragedy further than ever before, because before, they were associated with objectivities that governed how they were used and interpreted. Now, with psychoanalysis, myth and tragedy sort of take on the capacity to fully express the universality of the libido, since they're understood as subjective representations corresponding to the libido-as-production. So that, at some level, we find a kind of false belief in psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis will come running back to, in a modified form—we might call it a form of denial—to everything that was once believed: Oedipus, the earth, everything is brought back.

In other words, to make a long story short, they leave behind objective representation—whether it's economists or psychoanalysts. They discover subjective activity, and they reestablish a new form of representation, subjective representation itself. They tie it back down, i.e., in the terms I used before, no sooner than they uncover a deterritorialized essence, deterritorialized desire, one no longer tied to any objectivity, deterritorialized labor—as soon as it gets revealed, it gets reterritorialized, only it doesn't simply go back. They reterritorialize it in a new way: either under the conditions of the bourgeois family or the conditions of bourgeois private property.

If what I'm saying is true, in short, that there appears to be a parallel situation with what happens in economics and what happens in psychoanalysis—if that's really the case, why? Why both processes? Why was productive activity discovered twice, once as labor and again as desire? And not only why it came up twice, but why were they re-alienated into subjective

representations—on the one hand, private property, on the other, the family? Why these two moments? It seems to me that we ought to look for our answer in the structure of capitalism itself.

Generally speaking, what stands out as specifically characteristic of capitalism? I believe it's that there's a certain disconnect between social production and, if you will, between the form of social production and the form of human production. Why? With objectivities, social production is never independent from a social form of human reproduction as such. What I mean is that the way in which wealth is reproduced is never independent of the categories of human production, i.e., the two basic categories of human production: alliance and descent [*filiation*]. And it goes through a social machine, a machine conjugating alliances and lines of descent—never deriving alliances from descent, obviously. Alliance is never derived from a kinship system [*un régime filiatif*]; the two are conjugated within a social machine, which can vary quite a bit. The need for social reproduction to depend on the form of human reproduction is evidenced precisely by this machine conjugating alliances and lines of descent. In other words, wealth is reproduced in a series of relationships determined by how humans are reproduced.

Which is why under such conditions, the family, however we're considering the family, is really a strategy investing the entire social field, whether as the most basic family, conjugating alliances and lines of descent, or later as big empires, where we get fundamental categories indicating a shift, such a crucial shift—however, that's not what I'm getting at, which is that a despotic form of society brings with it categories that originate new alliances and, therefore, a new kind of descent.

The despot is really the new alliance type. He's someone who tells his people, “I bring you a new covenant [*alliance*].” In any case, the form of human reproduction then completely changes, which is clear when we look at the type of dynasty (see the Chinese). Really, the dynasty comes down to a new alliance—their differences here don't matter—under another lens; the fundamental difference is that between primitive forms of alliance and descent and the new alliance. But at this juncture, that doesn't matter; at any rate, social reproduction involves a determinate form of human reproduction, a determinate form concerning alliances and lines of descent.

In capitalism, there's a clear departure from both primitive contexts, i.e., territorial systems, and from imperial systems, and for one simple reason: money-capital takes charge of both descent and alliance. Lines of descent and alliances now fall under capital and become its immediate properties. They don't really need to go through humans anymore. Strike that—there *is* a need for humans, but in a very different way from before. As I'll explain in a moment, humans will be necessary as a resource [*matériau*], which effectively means that descent falls under capital as a bona fide filiative capital [*capital filiatif*].

Now, filiative capital is well accounted for in Marx: it's the production of surplus value. How is money able to produce money? The way money produces money in the capitalist system, under capitalist conditions, i.e., capital producing surplus value, is what we described earlier as  $x = Dx$ , what Marx calls the expansion of money, demonstrating how capital appropriates descent, as industrial capital. Previously, I tried to show how, on the other hand, as opposed to industrial capital, market capital is alliance capital, without which capitalist industry would not function, which determines, which has a determinant role in relation to industrial capital. Market capital is the form in which capital really is alliance capital.

Well, alliance and descent are no longer determinations of human reproduction and are now determinations whereby money produces money and allies itself with money. Henceforth, I understand that, as with any system, there *de facto* need to be guys in capitalism. Social reproduction no longer presupposes a form of human reproduction. In other words, everything's as though what capitalism basically does is take human reproduction and its form—the form of human reproduction as in the most general sense of the word “family”—out of the social domain. At the same time, of course, there is a need for guys. What do I mean by that?

Here again, that's not to say it returns to an earlier stage, but it means that human reproduction continues to have a form. In the capitalist regime it's the form of the family, but on its own, as human reproduction, it's no more than resource material for the application of the reproduction of capital, which has its own form, i.e., it's the material that gets applied to. Which is what? Of course, this resource material has its own form; there's a form of the material. In the capitalist system, the form of the material of human reproduction is the family. But the form of social reproduction no longer involves the form of this material; the family's only function is to inform, to give a form to human reproduction, a form subordinate to the autonomous form of social reproduction.

Where does that leave us, then? It seems we ought to distinguish between two stages. When it comes to capitalist regimes, the form of social reproduction must be applied to a resource of human reproduction, that is, families or human reproduction must provide human beings whose place it will not determine by itself but will determine based on how the family is situated within social reproduction, i.e., you have your capital, you have your labor power. It's inevitable, then, that capitalism fosters a certain abstract equality. Precisely because the form of human reproduction is, as it were, removed from the social field, with social reproduction taking other means and having its own form in capital itself. And for this very reason, the family can be thought of abstractly as the production of individuals who, in the abstract, are all equal since they receive their social standing, their basic social inequality, from the other form of reproduction, social reproduction as such, i.e., the reproduction of capital.

But then, at the same time—and this is what I find so crucial—this social reproduction must in some way be applied, the form of social reproduction must in some way be applied to the form of human reproduction. A system of correspondence must be established between the form of

social reproduction, whose secret lies in the ownership of capital, and the extrinsic form of human reproduction, determined as a family in the capitalist world. So that social reproduction no longer goes through human reproduction; it's assumed its own form, obtained a form of its own. But at the same time, it bears witness to a fundamental need, based on what we've just seen, to apply itself to the form of human reproduction itself. And it involves the political-economic figures of the social field sort of reflecting [*une espèce de rabattement*] onto the family roles particular to the family field. Namely, in the social political-economic field, we have the capitalist, the banker, the industrialist, the worker—and in familial reproduction, we have the father, the mother, and the child. And precisely because the form of social reproduction no longer involves the form of human reproduction but instead finds in the form of human reproduction a mere form for its own resource material, the first man, social reproduction, is reflected [*se fait un rabattement*] onto the figures of human reproduction. So, here, it's clear why this double ligature is necessary: that once subjective activity is shown to be production, that this subjective activity is revealed once to be production recoded, represented in the context of private property, i.e., a subjective system of representation, and once again in the family, and that moreover, the determinations of the social field get applied to the determinations of the family.

In other words, if the axiomatics of capitalism fully emerged with the bourgeois political economy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, psychoanalysis is its application, the necessary and inevitable application of such an axiomatic. Psychoanalysis is the application of the axiomatic corresponding to the political economy of capitalism. Which means that, in a sense—and this is where I'd like to stop—we can delineate three aspects I find most the most crucial when it comes to the idea of axiomatics:

The first is what's radically distinct about axiomatics, since an axiomatic doesn't work the same way code does. Why doesn't it work like a code? Because codes refer labor and desire to underlying objectivities, be it a territorial system, a despotic system... [*text missing*] whereas an axiomatic is a system of relations representing a subjective activity, a fundamentally deterritorialized activity. Which harks back to our hypothesis from the start of the year, that when flows are decoded—which is one of the processes of decoding—well, when flows are decoded, an axiomatic is substituted for a code; instead of a code, a system of differential relationships between decoded flows. So there's something specific, something radically different about axiomatics in comparison to the process of code itself. And again, what I find so striking about what we today refer to as genetic code is—I think it can be demonstrated that it both has parts that are code-related as well as parts that are completely different, that are axiomatic. The concept of genetic code is totally mixed together, thus there's a specificity to axiomatics. Which basically means yes, axiomatics describes subjective activity that's revealed to be indeterminate, breaking with the big objectivities that sought to code it.

At the same time, secondly, in a way, like a shadow theater, axiomatics returns us to everything codes had led us to believe. Only the way we come back to them is something different from belief. A mode of images where there's no need to believe; who cares if you don't believe in

them? Regardless, that's how it is. A very interesting sort of world that no longer needs belief but still requires lifeless images of whatever used to be believed. Nietzsche was the only one to profoundly see that, when he defined the man of... [*word missing*] as a "motley painting of everything that's been believed," the last of the popes. It doesn't make any difference because it no longer needs to be addressed, no longer needs to be believed; it doesn't need belief to function. It runs on images produced via an axiomatic of flows. Right, I said that axiomatics somehow brings everything back—why? Because, in the form of subjective representation, it brings us back to all the instances that were dethroned as objectities. The insistence of the great despot, which returns with Oedipus, and territorial insistence, which returns in every capitalist reterritorialization—which certainly isn't the objectivity of the earth as it appeared in territorial systems of alliance and descent but is the sort of artificial territoriality fundamental to the capitalist system.

And so, approaching it in the first way, which I talked about before, there's absolutely something unique about axiomatics; in no way can it be confused for a code or coding process. Coming at it in the second way, I'd say the opposite, but it's perfect, [it's] the same way but without being unique, because it's always getting torn between two poles: escape on one end, getting choked out on the other. With its escape, as we've seen from the very beginning, it's that flows get decoded, completely deterritorialized. But axiomatics avoids that by establishing a whole system of enunciable relationships between coded flows, a new type of relationship, which is what axiomatics is all about, i.e., a system of differential relationships. Thus, at one end, you have its escape, but at the same time, it cuts things off—and how does it cut it off? Again, not by reverting to its prior code of objective representation, but by re-alienating, re-attaching, re-ligating anything that's about to escape—by creating the ligatures again, this time at the level of subjective representation itself. And at the level of subjective representation, there will be an internalized despot, an internalized earth.

Which allows me to say that, on the one hand, axiomatics absolutely cannot be reduced to any code, to any code whatsoever, insofar as code, again, is what refers labor and desire to objectities. On the other hand, axiomatics lacks any specificity because it always oscillates between two poles, escaping at one end and, at the other end, resurrecting old bodies to counter its escape—this time not as a fictitious element, but as an element of subjective representation. Through this lens, it's not contradictory to say that, simultaneously, there is both something absolutely specific to axiomatics and, at the same time, that it's constantly torn between its two extremes, between a new way of resurrecting old instances and its escape.

And finally, as the third aspect of axiomatics, having described it in its specificity as well as its two poles, it absolutely needs—both with regard to its specificity and in order to avoid its tendency to escape—what it truly [needs] is to be applied. Insofar as it governs or expresses the laws of social production in the capitalist regime, it's vitally necessary that it be applied to the form of human reproduction, in the form of the family. In other words, I don't think it's any coincidence that political economy, defined as the science of economics under capitalism,



requires an exercise in its application, a sort of accessory—psychoanalysis, in particular, as its application. As an application, the trajectory psychoanalysis follows is that whereby the entire form of social reproduction is reduced onto [*se rabat sur*] the form of the family's reproduction, and it's only by way of this application that capitalist axiomatics effectively cuts off, is able to stifle the tendency of flows to get away or escape.

Until the day when—and this here is what I'd like to end on—until the day when, assuming that it's a market, things stop working.<sup>98</sup> No one believes in it anymore. Or this sort of implementation loses its grip, can no longer hold onto its flows. We've seen countless reasons why, that is, this sort of re-alienation of desire, applied using the coordinates of the family, no longer works. There's a generation where the social field is no longer reflected onto that of the family—new men [*sic*].

What's going on? I mean, in a way, it's what psychoanalysis calls malaise. Only, for psychoanalysis, so-called malaise is when, however psychoanalysts refer to it—because it comes in extremely different shades—and say it isn't even worth trying to figure out what's behind it because, strictly speaking, there isn't anything behind it at all. [Serge] Leclaire's *Démasquer le réel* [Unmasking the Real]: enough is enough—psychoanalysis should be its own axiomatic. Leclaire's book strikes me as rather characteristic in this regard, when he says, alright, there's an uneasiness or malaise in psychoanalysis at the moment [which] cannot be divorced from a process of decentering occurring in the field psychoanalysis operates in. This decentering, he claims, is a genuine shift from the “parent's room” to the “analyst's office,” i.e., the psychoanalytic process, strictly speaking, doesn't require an “intrinsic referent,” as though the parent's room were still too external. There's something even worse than the analyst's office—the (windowless) waiting room.

Now, what I find interesting about an idea like Leclaire's is that both aspects are there. I mean, there's the idea that psychoanalysis ought to pin down the real, to win back the real, to put psychoanalysis back in touch with the real, while at the same time, the approach is to make it so that psychoanalysis is no longer a mere inculcation of a different kind of axiomatic, the capitalist axiomatic of the social field. And he concludes that it should become its own axiomatic. In other words, what happens in the analyst's office, as Leclaire explains, doesn't need to refer to anything outside of the office itself, what so-called rationalist philosophers have long described as *verum index sui*—that truth is its own sign, that it doesn't refer to anything other than itself, and that it can be made out using its own outward characteristics. Which means that castration, Oedipus, and the like, are proven in the psychoanalytic process itself, having a place in none other than the analyst's office. Having left the parents' bedroom behind, psychoanalysis ceases to be the application of some other type of axiomatic in order to stand on its own as a true axiomatic. Now, I think this gesture is something of an achievement; psychoanalysis severed its ties with political economy in order to itself become political economy... [*End of Part I*]

## **Part II: The Body without Organs**

An axiom is an event's forward momentum. I'd like to try to do a bit of pop philosophy, pop analysis. The body without organs is effectively an intensive matrix. And if it seems like it's totally closed off, that's because we can't look in extension for its potential dynamism. I'm not even sure whether there is any dynamism, but if there is, it isn't in extension. It's sewn shut, closed off, it's without organs. At the same time, something happens upon it. It's like a surface; there's something courses over it—a flow, let's say. Let's say it's traversed by an intensive flow, and that it reacts to fluctuations in this flow.

Fluctuations in this flow over the body without organs—which already implicates what I've been looking for since last year, which I haven't made much progress on, since you aren't helping me. You might say that that already entails the sort of perspective we're trying to find in all these aspects of delirium, since delirium is what I'm interested in. For me, thought is delirium—it's the same thing. But precisely what it means to be delirious—and this has been my claim from the start—is to cross thresholds of intensity, to pass the threshold between one intensity and another. In other words, before being delirious, someone with delusions is someone who feels, and to feel means sensing intensive transitions in one's body without organs. Let's consider the example of Judge Schreber: no larynx, his stomach eaten away, a body without organs—and on his body without organs, he feels that he's becoming a woman, he's crossing into a flow... [*text missing*]

We've come to a domain of purely sensible experimentation, and I'm thinking of three bodies, or four—the masochist, schizophrenic, addicted, hysterical—they're so many approximations for the limit of the body without organs, a pure limit each of them is distinguished from. And yet, they all tend towards one same limit. How are they all distinct from each other? Here, it might be helpful for us to get into what happens with intensity. It's true that, ultimately, the masochistic body is touched; I'm not saying that that's what it's looking for, but anything inscribed upon it should be informed by a flow or an intensity of pain. I'm referring to so-called erogenous masochists—what runs along their body without organs is only collected according to some intensity or other, either a decrease or increase in an intensity of pain. It's what you might call writing on their body without organs, and if it isn't pain—whether less or more—their body without organs doesn't register it.

The drug addict, at least in some cases—and once again we have to know a little pharmacy, and I've been saying all along, pharmacy and psychiatry have it wrong—it supports a fundamental pharmaceutical experiment. The drugged body—with opium and opiates, at least—when it comes to drugs, the body without organs [is] a kind of full body; the body is so organ-less that the guy doesn't even know how to inject his stuff. With this body, it situates itself based on a flow of intensity running throughout the drug experience. Which means that, as much for delirium as for hallucinating on drugs, it becomes necessary to re-establish—just like with schizophrenia, with Schreber—an “I feel” that's deeper than delirium, an “I feel” deeper than hallucination. Prior to saying “I'm becoming a woman,” prior to the delusion of becoming-woman, Schreber *feels* that he's becoming a woman, and he's becoming-woman in intensity.

What does that mean? Well, the drug addict isn't like the masochist, [where] things happen on their body without organs based on a flow of pain that fluctuates in intensity, as if nothing stuck to the body without organs, in the case of the masochist, if it didn't capture the point where something running through the body without organs, which can only rouse it through pain, in the form of a fluctuating flow of pain. With the drug addict, it isn't about pain; it's about cold. The reason behind Americans' reference to cold as zero degrees is precisely in order to indicate the limit of intensity, just like the schizo. I mentioned an intensity = 0, which will form the scale of intensity corresponding to the schizo's delirium. Here, with the absolute zero cold on the body without organs, it's as though, just like the masochist started with a flow of pain, now what distributes intensity is a flow of hold and cold. It's no longer pain; what actually delineates zones of intensity is hot-and-cold, only a very particular cold and hot—an icy cold, sort of an absolute ice, an intensive ice, which the intensive metric for the drug experience itself is based on.

And in the case of schizophrenia, it's something different again, and when it comes to hysteria, like we were just saying, is it possible to define a mimetic flow in intensity? Now our problem is starting to take shape, as to the status of this body without organs—as the metaphor I can't get away from, at least—which makes me think it's something more than a metaphor. It goes back to the basic stuff we learn from embryologists, again, about the egg: how they claim, uh, well, before it's developed, there are dedicated parts of the egg—if nothing disturbs it, a certain region of the egg will generate a certain thing, e.g., generating the newt's tail, the newt's eye, the newt's respiratory system.

But the egg really comes across as a body without organs, precisely because its organs are still no more than blueprints. It takes the sacred form of an egg, a form that negates the organ, that negates organs, that negates any organic growth. And it goes without saying that the region dedicated to generating the oral apparatus, or the ocular apparatus, or the neural tube—all these regions predetermined to generate this rather than that—none of them resemble the organ they will later incur. The region of the newt egg that generates the neural arch doesn't resemble what it generates, and embryologists say, see, an egg is a closed circuit, but it's completely gridded, shot through by extremely complex systems of coordinates.

We ought to interpret these coordinate systems in terms of intensity; in other words, in any given space there are axes, parallels—the egg has a whole topology to it. If you're between such and such gradient of intensity, that's the region that develops into such and such. If you get its regions out of order, it's no surprise that the part that normally would have developed the newt's tail ends up developing its neural plate... The whole egg is covered by a grid, but the grid is intensive, as if a flow... [*End of Part II*]

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 148; the reference is to Pierre Clastres, “L’arc et le panier”, *L’Homme* (April 1966) p. 70.

<sup>2</sup> On Leach, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 149-150.

<sup>3</sup> On Jaulin’s analysis, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>4</sup> For the Richard Lindner painting, see the reproduction opposite the title page of the Vintage *Anti-Oedipus*.

<sup>5</sup> On the “W.G. Nierderland” reference in *Anti-Oedipus*, see p. 297, the reference to “Schreber, Father and Son”, *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, vol. 28 (1959), pp. 151-169.

<sup>6</sup> See Michel Foucault’s essay on Blanchot, often quoted by Deleuze: “The Thought from Outside,” in *Foucault/Blanchot*, trans. Brian Massumi, Maurice Blanchot, and Michel Foucault (New York: Zone Books, 1987).

<sup>7</sup> The actual reference is missing in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 277, to *Soledad Brother: Prison Letters of George Jackson* (New York: Bantam, 1970).

<sup>8</sup> This parenthesis in the transcript is quite ambiguous given that in *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari state their opposition to Mannoni on this question: “We can’t go along with Maud Mannoni when she sees the first historical act of antipsychiatry in the 1902 decision granting Judge Schreber his liberty and responsibility, despite the recognized continuation of his delirious ideas”, p. 364; the reference is to Mannoni’s *Le psychiatre, son fou et la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1970)].

<sup>9</sup> Although this work is in neither *Anti-Oedipus* nor *A Thousand Plateaus*, the reference is to Daniel Antier, *L’Étude des flux et des stocks* (Paris: SEDES, 1957).

<sup>10</sup> On the breaks and schizz operation, see *Anti-Oedipus*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 245-247.

<sup>11</sup> This reference no doubt corresponds to the one added by Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 301 footnote, to “Freud and the Scene of Writing,” in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (1967; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

<sup>12</sup> On death in Freud, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 331-333.

<sup>13</sup> On this point, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 329-330.

<sup>14</sup> On Venetian art at this period, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 368-370.

<sup>15</sup> “Invest” and “investment” for forms of *investir*, following Hurley, Seem, and Lane’s translation. See the translators’ note in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 9.

<sup>16</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977), pp. 352-353, for this discussion of sexual relations and investments. In what follows, see pp. 353-356.

<sup>17</sup> Deleuze refers to the *Five Cases*, a collection of famous Freud cases published in French. The collection includes the case of Dora, Little Hans, the Rat Man, Judge Schreber, and the Wolf Man.

<sup>18</sup> See Ch.1 of Ernest Jones, *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 1 (New York: Basic Books, 1953).

<sup>19</sup> *Roman familial* as “family romance,” following precedence in English translations of Freud, however outdated this use of “romance” may be for modern anglophone readers.

<sup>20</sup> The main reference to R.D. Laing in this context is to *Self and Others*, (New York: Pantheon, 1970), first published in 1961, then reissued in 1969; see *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 360.

<sup>21</sup> R.D. Laing and Aaron Esterson, *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (New York: Pelican, 1970).

<sup>22</sup> Mary Barnes. See Mary Barnes and Joseph Berke, *Mary Barnes: Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness* (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).

<sup>23</sup> Regarding these poles, see *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 27 where, in a footnote, the authors attribute these poles both to Lacan and to Leclaire, in the latter’s essay “La réalité du désir,” a contribution to a collective edition from the Centre Laennec, *Sexualité humaine* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1970).

<sup>24</sup> See Suzanne de Brunhoff, *Marx on Money*, trans. Maurice J. Goldbloom (Paris: Editions sociales, 1967; London: Verso, 2015). Besides this title, Deleuze refers to another title by de Brunhoff, *L’offre de monnaie* (Paris: Maspero, 1971). See *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977) pp. 229-232, for Deleuze and Guattari’s references to de Brunhoff.

<sup>25</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 237, for this precise reference to Schmitt.

<sup>26</sup> Per Hurley, Seem, and Lane's translation, *ensemble* here has been translated as "aggregate." See, for example, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: UMP, 1983), p. 181.

<sup>27</sup> *Ligne de fuite* is a ubiquitous term in Deleuze and Guattari's work (and in the scholarship surrounding their work). In addition to translating *fuite* as "flight," it also appears here as "escape," or "getting out." For readers with a background in electrical engineering, *ligne de fuite* is a term for "leakage distance" or "creepage distance."

<sup>28</sup> The tasks of schizo-analysis are defined in *Anti-Oedipus*, chapter IV.

<sup>29</sup> *Phaedo* 102d.

<sup>30</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 364. Deleuze and Guattari cite Chapter 7 of Maud Mannoni, *Le Psychiatre, son fou et la psychanalyse*.

<sup>31</sup> Deleuze and Guattari quote Vaslav Nijinsky's *Journal, or Diary* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953), in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 77.

<sup>32</sup> A possible reference is to Guy Rosalato's *Essais sur le symbolique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), cited in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 210.

<sup>33</sup> In this translation, *terre* appears as a patch of land, a foothold, a territory—for the sake of more comfortable English, the translation may obscure the word's connection to Deleuze and Guattari's paired terms, "deterritorialization" and "reterritorialization."

<sup>34</sup> *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

<sup>35</sup> In Chapter 2 of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari cite Mannoni's *Le Psychiatre, son fou et la psychanalyse* (Paris: Seuil, 1970), and Jacques Hochman, *Pour une psychanalyse Communautaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1971); see pp. 90 and 93, respectively. On the "adaptation police force," see p. 95.

<sup>36</sup> See the note on institutional analysis, *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 30.

<sup>37</sup> The text reads "*au père*," which may be a typo for "*au pire*."

<sup>38</sup> This translation follows Hurley, Seem, and Lane in putting *ensemble* as "aggregate." For example, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 181.

<sup>39</sup> Raymond Roussel, *Les Impressions d'Afrique* (Paris: Alphonse Lemerre, 1910).

<sup>40</sup> The punctuation in the text is as follows: "... recording and the psychotic. It's..." This translation moves the period such the second sentence describes "the psychotic."

<sup>41</sup> On sexuality and *n sexes*, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 294-296.

<sup>42</sup> Although the transcript from WebDeleuze reads "Lorenz", Deleuze and Guattari make no references in *Anti-Oedipus* at all to Konrad Lorenz whereas Lawrence and Miller are a pairing that one finds throughout the book.

<sup>43</sup> For more on Reich, see the note that begins on *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 291.

<sup>44</sup> On the impossibility of energetic conversion, in the context of these same writings, see the note on *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 333. Deleuze cites Jean Laplanche, *Vie et mort en psychanalyse* (Paris: Flammarion, 1970), p. 211.

<sup>45</sup> Deleuze and Guattari introduce the term, "objectities," in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 301.

<sup>46</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 270-271. The text in question (which Deleuze loosely paraphrases) is from Marx's *Grundrisse*.

<sup>47</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 299-300.

<sup>48</sup> The translator cannot find this line in Marx's *Grundrisse*, and so cannot cross-reference Deleuze's wording with the original text.

<sup>49</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 215-217.

<sup>50</sup> "Freud et la mythologie," *Incidences de la psychanalyse*, no. 1 (1970), pp. 126-129. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 300.

<sup>51</sup> Deleuze and Guattari seem to have adopted this line of thinking. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 157.

<sup>52</sup> Deleuze cites Abraham here, but—although they repeat this line—he and Guattari do not cite him in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 362. See Karl Abraham, "Dreams and Myths: A Study in Race Psychology," in *Selected Papers of Karl Abraham*, trans. Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1909).

<sup>53</sup> On Schreber and thresholds, gradients, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 19.

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<sup>54</sup> The term, “transvestite,” has been preserved here, since “transgender” would only later become the more acceptable and encompassing term. Given his reference to hormones, however, it is unlikely that Deleuze only has “cross-dressing” in mind. Note that the original text strictly uses masculine pronouns when discussing transvestites.

<sup>55</sup> On Artaud and the body without organs, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 7-9, and elsewhere.

<sup>56</sup> Because the revolutionary sense of *tricoteuse* seems unlikely, and because this translator is unfamiliar with Deleuze’s reference here, *tricoteuse* and *clinique aseptisée* are translated as “knitting mother” and “asepticized clinic,” following the translation in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 334.

<sup>57</sup> It’s unclear what article Deleuze is referring to.

<sup>58</sup> These comments roughly correspond to *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 226-229 and 249-253.

<sup>59</sup> Given the context of a discussion on *Anti-Oedipus*, it might be Marx’s *Grundrisse*, as well as *Capital*, volume I, Part 2, Ch. 4. See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 392, notes 71 and 72. See also their reference to Suzanne de Brunhoff, especially *Marx on Money*, trans. Maurice J. Goldbloom (New York: Urizen, 1976) on *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 392, note 73.

<sup>60</sup> On Clavel, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 232, and 392 note 76.

<sup>61</sup> Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy, *Monopoly Capital* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966). See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 392, notes 77 and 81.

<sup>62</sup> On this subject in an economic context, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 283-285. See also Guattari’s notes in *The Anti-Oedipus Papers*, trans. Kéline Gotman (New York and Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e) and MIT Press, 2006) since he developed this example as early as April 1970 (pp. 179-182).

<sup>63</sup> He’s referring to Remy Chauvin, *Entretiens sur la sexualité* (Paris: Plon, 1969). See *Thousand Plateaus*, p. 10.

<sup>64</sup> On this reference to Griaule, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 163.

<sup>65</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 236-238, 249-250.

<sup>66</sup> This exchange occurs in Chapter 18 of D.H. Lawrence’s *Lady Chatterley’s Lover*.

<sup>67</sup> Quote adjusted to match Lawrence’s text.

<sup>68</sup> On this Stravinsky reference, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 121.

<sup>69</sup> Deleuze is referring to Stockhausen’s “Zyklus” (1959), which is divided into 17 equal “periods.”

<sup>70</sup> Deleuze returns to Weierstrass in his discussion of Leibniz; see Lecture 3 of the first Leibniz Seminar (April 29, 1980), as well as Lectures 7 and 8 from the “Leibniz and the Baroque” Seminar (January 20 and 27, 1987).

<sup>71</sup> Deleuze and Guattari flesh out this analysis in *Anti-Oedipus*, especially in Chapter Three, under the section, “The Civilized Capitalist Machine,” which begins on p. 222.

<sup>72</sup> This line of analysis gets developed in *Anti-Oedipus*, starting around p. 248.

<sup>73</sup> See the translators’ note for “*enregistrement*” on *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 4.

<sup>74</sup> Text untranslated. Title reads, “White People Think Too Much.” Paul Parin et al, *Les blancs pensent trop*, (Paris: Payot, 1963). Referenced twice in *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 144 and 178.

<sup>75</sup> A reference to the assassination of Pierre Overney on February 25, 1972, right on Renault’s doorstep; see details below.

<sup>76</sup> Deleuze refers to Dr. Rose in Lecture 3 (December 21, 1971).

<sup>77</sup> Pierre Bonnafé, “Objet majique, sorcellerie et fétichisme,” in *Nouvelle revue de psychanalyse*, no. 2 (1970). See *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 326.

<sup>78</sup> On this disagreement, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 187-188. See also the Foucault Seminar, Lecture 9 (January 7, 1986).

<sup>79</sup> For more on this, specifically, see *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 144.

<sup>80</sup> On this reference to Marx, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 225, esp. Etienne Balibar’s comments from *Reading Capital*.

<sup>81</sup> For more on Aristotle in this context, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 263.

<sup>82</sup> Robert Jaulin, *La Paix blanche, Introduction à l’ethnocide* (Paris: Seuil, 1970).

<sup>83</sup> Following the translation of this passage in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 169.

<sup>84</sup> On Jaulin’s analysis and these passages, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 169-170.

<sup>85</sup> Although he mentions Turner and the direct citation is unacknowledged, Deleuze here (perhaps mistakenly) quotes the rest of the Jaulin passage cited in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 169. Quotation marks have been added to the original text.

<sup>86</sup> On Turner’s *A Ndembu Doctor in Practice* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 167-168.

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<sup>87</sup> A militant Maoist worker who was assassinated by a Renault security officer at the Regie Renault door in Boulogne-Billancourt on February 25, 1972. On March 4, 200,000 people marched with his coffin through Paris, carrying him on their shoulders. He was buried at Pere-Lachaise cemetery.

<sup>88</sup> *La Paix blanche*, p. 395f.

<sup>89</sup> The start of this passage follows the translation found in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 169—adjusted to reflect Deleuze’s changes to the original quote.

<sup>90</sup> On Nietzsche and infinite debt, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 216-217, as well as *The Genealogy of Morality*, II, para. 21.

<sup>91</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 213-216, for the links between religion, psychoanalysis, and capitalism.

<sup>92</sup> On latency and these turns of events, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 213-216.

<sup>93</sup> For Marx’s perspective on this, see *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 302-303. Deleuze and Guattari introduce the term, “objectities,” in *Anti-Oedipus*, p. 301.

<sup>94</sup> For the sake of Deleuze and Guattari’s constant reference to territoriality and de/re-territorialization, “earth” translates *terre*.

<sup>95</sup> See *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 299-300.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 301-302.

<sup>97</sup> Cf. *Anti-Oedipus*, pp. 299-306.

<sup>98</sup> Literally, when the *marché* no longer *marches*.