

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Deleuze & Guattari at Vincennes, 1975-76**

***Il Senso in Meno*, Part 8 - Dimensions and Coordinates of a Multiplicity, the continuum of Significance and the Deterritorialization of the Sign**

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*[Please note that the transcription follows as exactly as possible the discussion in the filmed seminar, and therefore the translation differs at time with the discussion rendered in the subtitles on the YouTube versions. Also note that the session titled “Il Senso in Meno 9” belongs to the same session as this one, and we present it under Part 9]*

[2:23:07, start; 3:45:46, end, total, 1:22:39, of YouTube recording, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h1Po2tIgeD4>]

A student: ... With the tables it was more like a buffet...

Deleuze: Do you miss having the tables?

The student: [*Unclear words*] ... Oh, no...

Deleuze: It's no longer the same, eh?

Another student: It's more practical! *[During these exchanges, the camera slowly pulls back revealing the participants, stopping at Guattari seated opposite Deleuze toward the back of the room]*

Deleuze: [*Unclear words*] ... It's not bad this way; it's a bit like a waiting room. It's not bad. *[The camera returns to Deleuze]* Okay, enough dreaming. To work right now. No more pauses. *[Pause]* So let's get started! *[Tape interrupted]* [2:23:57]

Deleuze: So, it's good like this today... because I have to make some drawings... I have to make a few drawings because the last time I proposed a number of themes which were very disordered so you might reflect on them and so we might go about trying to organize them. So... at least we have chalk, but the blackboard is a bit dirty... *[Tape interrupted]* [2:24:32]

*[For what follows and the drawings that Deleuze develops, see A Thousand Plateaus, plateau 5 and specifically the drawing presented on pp. 135-137, the first one pertaining to “significance”; as the recording begins again, Deleuze stands at the board having already drawn a version of the initial illustration]*

Starting from what was said the last time - and we've spoken about it a little – let's call this the *schema of signification*. And we can immediately say why we have called it the schema of signification. Let's imagine that we can reduce it to a point... Here, perhaps, we have a centre of signification. And around it we have a number of concentric circles... concentric circles or spires, spires of a spiral. And on these spires, we can place any kind of sign.

I want to go back to something that struck me during the last lesson. How did it begin? At the beginning, there was a dog barking at the back of the room. A dog where there shouldn't have been a dog. So I'll put it on the outermost circle: it barks, it's a sign like any other. Or it would be a sign

like any other... but in what conditions? If we were, for example, paranoiacs... The dog barks. He's right to bark. And what happened afterwards? I was over there. I raised my head and suddenly I was afraid. This is an entirely different circle. I haven't drawn enough of them. I saw someone masked, who was wearing a kind of S&M mask. I hadn't noticed him before, [*Deleuze makes a gesture toward the back of the class*] I wasn't expecting this. [*Pause, he turns back to the board*] A dog barks, a mask can emerge...

I said to myself that I was going to need all this for later. I was thinking that here there was an atmosphere, a phenomenon of *mundanization* or *atmospherization*. I saw it and I wasn't the only one. Something was going to happen. I didn't know what. I didn't know where it would come from. And then on another circle there... someone who arrives who makes a sign, who emits his own sign saying: "It's the first time I come... what are all these tables doing here?" [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze is referring to the circumstances that occurred in the previous session's discussion*]

On one hand, there is a redoubling: there's a girl who appears to be taller than him because she's standing on a table and for that reason she emerges. She makes a speech... which is at times quite violent... and I'm thinking: "Let's take that route". And at that point, the tables take on an enormous importance, and they park themselves on all the circles. The tables... And then I turn to see somebody entering the room through the window. That's a whole other experience, different from the one with the dog. So, all I'm saying is: there is a center of signifiante -- and we will see what this consists of -- of numerous heterogeneous signs distributed across concentric circles or the spires of a spiral.

And what else is there? Maybe, to complete the schema, there is something I'm drawing now with a broken line: a *line of flight*. At the top of the outermost spiral is a line of flight. There may be different ones: those who leave because they're fed up. The door is more or less blocked. So you pass by the window, I don't know how... But I'll draw this broken line of flight, and there I have my first schema.

You will, I hope, recognize the point where we began, namely, the schema of "a something", and I am indeed saying of *a something* because we need to ask ourselves what this "something" is. There's "a something" that is defined through a kind of matrix or center which produces a sort of circular irradiation, an expanding circularity accompanied by a broken line of flight. So, beginning with this type of matrix, an expanding development occurs, which summons to itself, or regroups or redistributes along its spires signs of a most diverse and heterogeneous nature.

And then we had another schema. [*Pause; Deleuze starts working on a second schema on the board*] In this case it was no longer a schema of signifiante. We called it a *passional schema*, or a *schema of subjectivation*. And this schema is clearly very different from the previous one since, rather than proceeding from a center through an expanding circular irradiation, it proceeds from a point -- *a point of subjectivation* rather than a center of signifiante. In fact, I might be able to subjectivize myself from any point of departure. A fetishist is subjectivized -and is therefore defined as *passional* -- beginning from a pair of shoes or a single shoe or even just a heel. A lover can be subjectivized beginning from the eyes. We've already seen things of that sort, or maybe we haven't, no matter.

This point of subjectivation is like the beginning of a straight line. And this straight line is segmentarized. What form does it take? It's segmentarized through a certain number of successive proceedings. Remember how the two schemas were formally opposed - even before knowing to whom and to what all this referred, even if we've already looked at it? But we can put this aside for the moment...

The formal opposition of the two schemas consists in: irradiating circular expansion beginning from a centre that will distribute the most heterogeneous signs. And, in the second case, a small packet of determined signs fleeing along a straight line that is segmentarized in successive proceedings. So, we oppose the idea of a succession of linear proceedings to that of irradiating circularity. Just as we oppose the idea of a fleeing packet of signs beginning from a point of subjectivation to that of a group of heterogeneous signs subsumed by a center that organizes their distribution, expansion and irradiation.

So, I would just like to pose three questions, starting from these two schemas. First question. Supposing that here we have two semiotic schemas... for the moment, we still don't know what a regime of semiotic signs consists in... we are using the words approximately... Suppose that what we have on one hand is a semiotic of signifiante and on the other a passional semiotic or a semiotic of subjectivation: can we make a connection between them, even just on an abstract plane? To be able to do so would be reassuring. Reassuring, because we could say that, in concrete terms, they are continually mixing. In concrete terms, our semiotics of these things are mixed. They borrow a group from a certain system or regime and from another regime.

Can we link one of these schemas to the other? Clearly, we can. But only at a certain cost, and in certain conditions. I say “clearly we can” because this broken line [*at the end of the first schema*] is clearly the irradiating and circular system's line of flight. Isn't this line fully realized in the passional system? To the point that to link the two schemas, it would be enough to place this line [*the straight line, second schema*] right here [*to the end of the first schema*], [*Pause*] making the center of signifiante descend to this point which now becomes a point of subjectivation. It seems to me that that would work perfectly. I'm simply holding onto the possibility of linking the two schemas as if they were two little trains.

Second question: What do these two schemas refer to? That we already... Actually, it's up to you, and this poses the problem of method that we touched upon at the beginning. I would say: they refer to whatever you like. Because each of these two schemas is a *multiplicity*, even if we talk about a center of signifiante, even if there is an instance of unification. In any case, such an instance functions within a multiplicity. So, we have a multiplicity of signifiante and a passional multiplicity, or multiplicity of subjectivation. Actually, I cannot say that one of these characteristics is more important than the other. They are all on the same plane. I can say that each of these multiplicities has *n dimensions*. We'll see what dimensions we find. Here, for example, for the moment – and I insist on this point to convey how simple it is – for the moment, here... as I will try to explain... we have 7 dimensions. If someone tells me “I see 9...” or “Among your 7 some can be reduced...” it doesn't matter. What matters is that there is never a fixed number of dimensions. It proceeds by 2, by 3... There are 2, 3, *n* dimensions, whatever you want.

Here too, I have to define my schema [*the second one*] through *n* dimensions. And this is what defines it. Which is why I don't need to ask myself beforehand what it refers to. The question isn't what it refers to; the question is: how many dimensions does this one have [*the first schema*] compared to the number of dimensions of the other? On this point, if I openly enumerate my dimensions, it doesn't matter if someone comes along and says: “I would add one”. On the contrary, it's even better. What's more annoying is if someone arrives and says: “Here I would remove one or two”. But that's okay too.

When we have our number of dimensions, I suppose... it seems highly abstract but, in reality, it's just a kind of recipe. It really is a recipe. We should write a cookery book! Let's suppose it has two dimensions. For example, I take three. When I limit or else augment the number of dimensions, when I vary them, it's only then that I can say what it is they refer to. Before that, it could be anything... a determined multiplicity but of whatever character, an unassignable multiplicity. If you

take a precise number of dimensions, then you can ask what it refers to. So, let's do that. What does this refer to?

We can call these dimensions the system's *coordinates*. In function of the coordinates we take into consideration, we can attribute the schema to something specific. Today I can say all this in abstract terms because the other time, we looked at it concretely. In the schema of signifiante, if I consider certain dimensions, whether or not I state which these are, if I consider certain dimensions, I obtain this particular schema, this multiplicity which refers to a type of delirium. What is this type of delirium? We've already seen it: it's the paranoid delusion and delusion of interpretation, or a delusion of ideas. Why is this? -- We've already looked at it and I don't want to go back to that -- Because this delusion is constituted upon a matrix idea, a center of signifiante; it proceeds by way of irradiating circular expansion, and reunites, sutures or distributes the most heterogeneous signs.

If I consider other coordinates, you will say: "Which others?" We will have to look at them in detail. But please grant me that if I take other coordinates into consideration, the multiplicity's frame of reference will change. I would say this is important as a way to be able to avoid pointless objections. It will no longer be a paranoid or interpretive delusion, it will be a social formation, the type of formation we may call despotic. If I consider or privilege -- because it isn't simply a question of keeping or jettisoning but also of emphasizing a given dimension -- if I consider another dimension of this system, this multiplicity, I would ask, based on the other dimensions, or on this one, is this a system? I mentioned this to you yesterday while trying... no, I mean last week, while trying out different terms, especially since these terms don't come from Guattari or myself. It's an idea someone proposed, that someone suggested to us. -- And that's the way to proceed: if people give you ideas, at some point, you'll give them back in return. -- Someone suggested to us certain noticeable differences between the two systems as a function of particular dimensions. I would say that this multiplicity can be called the system or multiplicity of *deception*.

Why does one spend one's time deceiving in this system? It's not so clear cut. I said some things last week that we will have to go back to and try to develop further. I call that *common work* when, for example, on Monday I make this multiplicity the multiplicity of paranoid delusion. And we say, okay, you hold onto that. I make the multiplicity of despotic power. And then another person, man or woman, arrives and says: "I'll make the system of deception out of it..." So, you understand that it wasn't a schema after all, but a map, a map, a map of variable coordinates. You could turn it upside down, refer it to a particular coordinate, and then it becomes delirium. You could refer it to other coordinates, and it becomes instead a social formation. You could refer it to further sets of coordinates, and it became something of the order of deception and trickery. [*Pause*] There you are. Each of us can do the same for the other coordinate.

And we saw that for other one, it was the same: the same method applied. You should never ask at the beginning to whom or what something refers to. Establish your own multiplicity! Calculate it well or badly... and for each case it must be different. Don't do as Hegel does. Don't proceed 3 by 3. Don't proceed 2 by 2. Open yourself to all numbers! Say: if it's 7, then let it be 7. If 90 then 90. And in this sense, it's also by following the dimensions you take into account that you assign the multiplicity to this or that.

And we've seen how the multiplicity of passion-subjection could have been assigned - depending on the dimensions taken into consideration - to a type of delirium. You see clearly how I'm already lying and playing tricks with everything because, in fact, in a real method, this shouldn't be same now. I wouldn't have the right to find two sides, two forms of delirium. Nor would I have the right to find two sides in terms of two social formations. Except that, if I proceed in another way, we would be lost. It would be too difficult for you as it would be for us all. So we approximate, but it goes without saying that all this serves simply to cause the collapse of the

pseudo-unity of delirium just like the pseudo-unity of social formations.

So, we have to pass by way of this point. Therefore, if you consider certain dimensions of the second schema, you will extract a form of delirium, passional delusion or delusion of action, [Pause] and they are not the same thing. I won't spend much time on this because I've already developed it extensively... I just remind you that passional delirium, which is always opposed to, or assumes another figure with respect to paranoid or interpretive delirium, has been given different names throughout the history of psychiatry - all of which more or less refer to Esquirol's notion of monomania. The monomanias that Esquirol divided into three types: erotic monomania or erotomania, incendiary monomania...

A student: That's a good one!

Deleuze: It's not bad, not bad... and then homicidal monomania, reasoning monomania. Not bad... They more or less equate to what others would call sticklers. People who stick to procedures. A kind procedural delusion. And Esquirol had already defined monomania as a different form of delusion, not from paranoia, because he didn't yet know the word, but from mania. There wasn't an ensemble of things that undermined the exercise of faculties that otherwise remained sane, but a succession of acts, a delusion not of ideas but of acts. [On Esquirol, see the Foucault seminar, session 3 (5 November 1985), and on psychiatry of the era, see A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 119-120] And this, particularly in Germany, was called a *querulous delusion*. And this is where the legal procedural aspect came in. It was a delusion of querulants. They start a proceeding that arrives at its conclusion and then they embark upon a second and then a third and so on... Other psychiatrists would call them grievance delusions. And yet others would refer to them as passional delusions. And they were grouped into three main forms: jealousy, erotomania and redress.

So if you consider certain coordinates of the second multiplicity you will have, for example, a delirious formation: the group of passional delusions. While if you consider other or more coordinates, you will have – it's what we touched upon, perhaps rather hurriedly, and it will still have to be proved -- you will have something quite strange, no longer the despotic formation but something quite different we will have to find a name for this but maybe we will just look for a general name. Since we're talking about attributions and without seeking to be too symmetrical, we could call it the history of the Jewish People. [Pause]

But to what extent? Quite generally, since we tried to get an idea of this the last time, and naturally the history of the Jewish People raises a number of other questions. It's not by chance; I'm really glad that I first made the connection, the Jewish people with the exodus literally going off on a tangent from a despotic system, the system of the Pharaohs. [Pause] Everything happens as if they took upon their shoulders, and inserted themselves into, the line of flight... [Tape interrupted] [2:53:50]

[While several details seem to suggest that what follows occurs in an entirely different session – Deleuze now wearing a dark coat (that he removes at the end of this section) and a hat – the following 36 minutes is the result of an interruption in the work in progress, with the same schemas on the board evident in the subsequent part. Since this segment opens in mid-discussion, it is important to explain the substance of the debate which is revealed only gradually. Apparently during a break in the filming, a woman student made some unclear accusation to Deleuze concerning a “stolen text”, and Deleuze stated his refusal to continue and even threatened to leave, hence the coat and hat. Following this unrecorded part, the debate unfolds on two tracks, on one hand, on what basis could or should the assembled class members exclude the student in question, and on the other hand, if the material that Deleuze developed earlier – concerning despotic power, etc. – might prevent any such move. As the session opens, a student (designated here as “the first

*student*) is speaking on behalf of the second position]

A first student: ... first of all, you can't eliminate, for example, the despotic system. It's there. One has to admit that. You can't get rid of it. It's not that we don't want to, it's that we can't do so...

A woman student: What are you trying to ... [*Indistinct comments*]

Another student: Wait your turn, darling!

The woman student: [*Unclear remarks, pause*] ... It's not true what you're saying.

Another student: Shut up! [*Diverse noises, pause; the first student is visibly waiting*]

The first student: I'm not saying that we don't want to do it [*presumably, exclude the woman student in question*]; it's that we can't; we can't because the mode of repressive power is impossible to... it's everywhere. It can't work, it's unfeasible. I mean, that here, in this theatre where we are, we ... there are...

Another student: But we're not in a theater! We're not in a theater!

The first student: We cannot...

The previous student: [*Indistinct comment*]

The first student: It's truly impossible! How can it be done? [*Diverse voices, including the first woman student's*] What would we have to eliminate? By what means... [*Indistinct comment*]

Another student [*Philippe*]: I have a proposal to make. In my view, we're all being cowards. I'm doing something I've never done before in my life, and I take responsibility for it. I'm throwing you out! [*Pause*] I've never done anything like this in my life. [*He starts walking towards the students standing near the door; diverse voices, noises*] What you're doing is completely unacceptable.

The first student: No it's not, I'm saying...

The second student: I've never done this before.

Another woman student: You don't have the right to do that.

The second student [*Philippe*]: Otherwise, every Tuesday, we're the ones who are getting thrown out. Do you want it to be the same every day? And just because we're trying not to be repressive, so everyone lets themselves get aggressed. For us, that makes us... [*Indistinct comment; diverse voices; Deleuze becomes visible in his usual seat, wearing a hat*]

Guattari: Philippe! Oh! Philippe! [*Diverse noises, voices*]

Eric: Nobody is taking responsibility in this classroom!

Guattari: Philippe! Listen to me a second!

Deleuze: Philippe, don't touch her! Don't touch her!

A woman student: He has to calm down!

Guattari: He is calm. He has the same right to be as sane as you.

The first student: The problem is that this is nonetheless an interesting place to be. Even if it gets upset, even when it's upset, there is an effect created, and here we produce a perfect outcome. It really is an extraordinary example.

Another student: It's making a straight line on the circle. [*Reference to Deleuze's two schema's earlier*]

The first student: Before, we were discussing it but now we're no longer doing so. We're just suffering it. What's at stake is something completely different. It's not a question of analysis. It's about what we're living, you understand? It's an unimaginable mode; I mean that there isn't a problem of exclusion. We can't exclude anyone.

Guattari: Giovanni Jervis talks about these things on the radio all the time. They discuss boring stuff like the situation in Italy, and then there's someone talking about an amazing thing, like all these marvelous things that Éric mentions even if they're seemingly off topic. So, you're saying we're condemned to cut off any intervention like that, just to have a bit of logical coherence. Jervis has spoken about this problem. What is this "tolerance" of ours towards certain forms of discourse, where we can spend an entire lesson arguing with someone? It's possible, it can be done... it would be great to be able to spend a couple of hours talking to Eric and his woman friend who must be dying of anguish right now. Fine.

But since our goal is to speak with a certain logical coherence about a series of connected ideas, we can't accept it. We are prisoners of a certain representation of "spontaneism", of a certain freedom of expression, a kind of absence of constraints that comes back to assault us... as though we were walking towards the riot police carrying bunches of flowers as they attack us. It's completely stupid when you think about it...

A student: We've had it up to here with therapy!

Guattari: Therapy? It's not a question of therapy. If we say: "One day we're going to clear things up with our friend here, what happened with Deleuze? What occurred? Why did she talk about stolen texts?" Yes, okay, fine. We'll come to an agreement there. But if we accept that anyone can walk in here and throw boiling oil on us, pile on a load of crap with all that stuff, we can't function at all anymore anywhere, we're prisoners. Unlike Philippe, I don't think we can find a solution by crucifying ourselves with violence. But we have to confront the problem. We are ourselves... we secrete this reaction. We lay ourselves open to this reaction.

The first student: Does one have to say about what you just said that...

Eric (*interrupting, screaming throughout his interventions*): You're making an analysis of the institution. You're describing how it functions. And on that point, we'd do better to reread... uh, [Bronislaw] Malinowski...

Guattari: Malinowski or [Vladimir] Mayakovsky?

Eric: You embody the institution as a professor!

A student: [*Inaudible comment due to the screaming*]

Eric: Deleuze.... [*To the student*] That's not the question... I'm trying to say something, idiot! There's always... I'm speaking to her... there's always a difference between what I say and what I live. And at Vincennes, there is always a difference between what we say and what we live.

Guattari: Eric, Eric!

Eric: And this is what I call contradiction!

Guattari: Eric, do you want Deleuze to leave Vincennes for good?

Eric: No!

Guattari: That's what you want!

Eric: No it's not!

Guattari: So why are you behaving constantly like an idiot?

Eric: [*Indistinct comment at start*] ... I'm saying that you embody the institution!

Guattari: You're going to succeed. That's what's going to happen. Is that what you want?

Eric: No, I have nothing to do with this business.

Guattari: Yes, you do, because you're creating a shit storm (*tu fous de la merde*).

Eric: No, I'm not! [*Tape interrupted*] [2:59:15]

... Guattari: So can we continue now?

The first student: Yes, well, but I can't accept this. I mean, I can't accept that we go on analyzing a model in this way. We can't build a discourse on this model, saying: "Let's analyze it and see what we find," all that. No, ... [*He tries to speak while Guattari answers*]

Guattari: Then we won't do anything. There'll be nothing to do either next week or the following week. So it's now that we must decide. [*Silence, pause*]

The first student: I mean that...

Guattari: I'm not talking about Deleuze. He can say what he wants, but I can't go on like this.

The first student: It's not possible! Anyway, the proof is right there, that there are lines everywhere, everyone's always arguing all the time, no one is getting along, we can't understand anything about anything. And that explains everything.

Another student: That's not true! I understand perfectly well.

The first student: No, we don't understand anything...

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): I don't give a shit about what he says. That doesn't interest me at all, at all, at all. And you know why? It's because [*indistinct words*] I am quite pleased, but all the [*indistinct words*] in this matter doesn't interest me.



A student: If we raise the question of exclusion, we have to understand how it happens, if there are any rules.

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): There are no rules. That's why we're all here...

The first student: There aren't any. That's just the point. There aren't. And if there aren't, what are we supposed to do? And here I'm following all the lines. We'll never get out of it.

A woman student: No, no, I don't see that.

Another student (*Robert Albouker*): Of course we will. We do it every morning, that functions every day, every single goddamned day, like fools, at work, at school. It works. And we even have to smile about it.

Another student: Oh, no, no, no...

The preceding student (*Robert Albouker*): What do you mean "no"? Look at me, I'm here!

The first student: At the Elysée asylum, that works as well...

The second student (*Philippe*): I propose we vote... Does the course continue as is, that is, next week or does it not continue? We have to take responsibility and decide once and for all whether to exclude this girl who's been disrupting the lesson and who will continue to do so every Tuesday until we're left with nothing, we have to accept our responsibility!

A woman student (*whose voice and protests are audible in the preceding student's statement*): No, that's not true! [*Pause, diverse voices, all indistinct*]

The first student: We have Deleuze here, and this question concerns Deleuze and her before it concerns us, that is, there's something going on there [*he makes a gesture linking Deleuze and a woman student*]. It's not at all... I mean, even if we vote, Deleuze can always say, "No, she 's here, she makes it impossible for me," I don't know. [*Deleuze sits listening in silence*] If he can work it out with her, I don't know... it's something between Deleuze and her.

The second student (*Philippe*): No, it's not just between Deleuze and her. It concerns all of us and her.

The first student: Not at all! Not at all!

Guattari: We're reaching a level of idiocy now that's unbelievable! [*Diverse voices, brouhaha*] We've descended to the state of stupid cattle, [*Pause, reactions*] stupid cattle pulling wagons into the camps. [*Pause*]

Deleuze: I would just like to say a couple of things now... I awake from my catatonic state, and I would say...

A woman student: But Guattari already...

Several students: Shut up!

Deleuze: [3:02:17] I'm asking two questions. Firstly, what are we doing here? We are quite modest.

So what are we doing here that is of so bizarre in nature that it triggers a certain type of aggression? [Pause] We've seen a lot of examples. Today's is one that seems particularly painful. Second question: what is it that makes us – and maybe with some reasons, though I won't say these are good reasons – what it is that makes us so defenseless when confronted with these acts of aggression? In a sense, it can be useful to learn something from the outside. What we're doing here must not disturb anywhere; I don't know, I'm not saying “anyone”. But suddenly we are disarmed in the sense that it becomes very easy for a single person to create havoc in the classroom, considering that the balance of power normally favors the individual, unless he or she happens to be in a classroom with a whole army, a security team available.

Personally speaking, I feel a bit lost today. And it interests me so little that I can say my only strength – and here I'm not speaking on behalf of the rest of the class – my only strength is an extreme obstinacy. Three Tuesdays would be sufficient to accomplish a very simple thing: completely destroy the work we've done. I'll come back every Tuesday. I don't give a shit; I don't give a shit. [*Je m'en fous*]

There are two elements that come together in this affair. This girl arrives. She has a certain relationship with all of us in that she prevents us from doing what we're trying to do. And as you said, she obviously has a certain rapport with me. Of which I understand nothing. I only know -- and this is no secret because the same problem has occurred in other situations -- I get calls at night when I would normally be sleeping. Silence on the other end of the line, or insults or obscenities... Usually very confused. They always mistake me for someone else.

It's very similar in a way. In the case of the phone calls, as Félix says, what should we do when people like that are so obstinate? They call you ten, twenty times in a row. I pick up the phone, and I hear noises. What should we do? One day, we might even find someone on our doorstep, standing there saying “I want to see you!” What do we do then. Call the police? Don't call the police? What do you do after three months of this? It's strange how it always happens to the same people. Lacan is lucky in this sense. He would have resolved the problem in two seconds.

But in my view, it's a kind of strength, nothing exceptional, but it's a strength that we are so, so... even if now we might be forced to change tack... though not much. What is it that makes us so defenseless faced with someone who comes in here saying: “You stole that from me!”? The same way I'm defenseless when they call me up at night. What is it that produces this? I would almost say, at the risk of sounding vain, I would almost say that it's the novelty... a certain novelty in what we're doing. It's a certain novelty in what we're doing here that permits someone to turn up...

I think of a recent book that I find quite repellent where they refer to us as “the current trend”. The current trend... That's a bit exaggerated because -- and I stress that Lacan has nothing to do with it -- but it's a bunch of Lacanians, Lacanian Marxists, as Eric would say, who speak of us as “the current trend.” But to be frank... if there is an organized “current trend”, it's not us. We are nothing. We just work in our little corner.

Once again, what can we summon by way of response if they want to prevent us from working? I'd like to imagine some responses we could give. I would say it's partly the nature of what we are doing here that renders us so defenseless, and yet at the same time, I consider this a means of defense. Therefore, I'm not going to leave. I was wrong to say that I would leave... I'm not going. I'll just wait until you leave. That's all. And then if this goes on much longer, and you stay, then probably I will end up leaving. There we are. [Pause] But I think the only way to resist is to stay on the defensive when facing cases like this. Perhaps we ought to find a better solution, we might find a better solution, but for the moment I can't think of one. So, now I slide back into my catatonic state...

A student: I think she left! [*Pause*]

Another student: Actually, she left ten minutes before all this [*unclear word; then to Deleuze*] You hadn't seen her face before? [*Pause, Deleuze makes no response*] What makes you think you didn't start all this? I'm not accusing you.

Deleuze: Ah yes!

The student: I'm not accusing you, ok? [*Pause*]

Deleuze: I'm afraid of myself!

Another student: I've never saw her face at all... [*Pause, several comments from other students*]

Deleuze: Oh yes, she was here last year. [*Pause*] Has she gone? [*Deleuze stands up*]

Another student: Well, yes she has.

Deleuze: Really? [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze slowly takes off the hat and coat he has worn throughout the discussion, that he no doubt put on when he was planning to leave; noises of chairs while he prepares*] ... [*Tape interrupted*] [3:10:02]

... Deleuze: One can always speak through dualisms. In the end, it's the easiest, the most convenient way. Once again, the base 2 binary system is the most convenient. Parenthetically, that's what computer scientists are always telling us. Computer scientists, who always work through binarisms, say they do it because, from the computer's point of view, it's the easiest method. For a computer, we know, base 2 is the easiest way. [*Pause*] So much the better, we say, since considering what we have done up to now, in the way we've considered the question, we've learned something.

When we spoke about the face, we thought we'd discovered that binarisms, the establishing of dichotomies and binary rapports, the whole aggregate of dualisms, had served us well for reasons that were far from mere convenience. They were connected to the exercise of a certain type of power, and there were forms of power that couldn't tolerate the polyvocality of bodies and had to produce face, and that in producing face, established major binarisms, given that the face is caught up in binary relationships. And beginning from this, the signifying elements were distributed according to a series of dichotomies.

We also saw how an exercise of power is something that completely defines the dominant language and that profoundly defines the way that language and words are used. As a result, it's not a question of saying: "I will invent a language without dualisms." There's only one thing at stake here: not only are dualisms convenient but language itself as a form of expression of a particular power *imposes* dualisms. As a result, our only response, both in speaking and writing, is to continually open a kind of passage *between* dualisms. And each time we make a dualism collapse – a dualism is like a piece of furniture, it's something that is always being moved around... – we're inevitably going to run into another one and so we'll have to open up a new passage in that dualism. And each time we'll try to do so.

As a result, of course I am saying there are two forms of delirium on each side. It goes without saying that we will try to open up a passageway between these two forms, we will try to arrive at something that will obviously no longer deserve to be called either reason or delirium, nor one type of delusion or another. However, we're not going to be able to open this passageway using a

predetermined method and every time we will have to regain the multiplicities, passing by way of these dualisms.

So as I can only respond like that, I am saying, let's try to look for the dimensions, the coordinates of the first system that we call *significance* and which, based on the coordinates contained therein, will be located both at the level of a delirium and of a social formation, a system, for example, a system of deception.

So the first coordinate -- I number them because there are many and this will help us to orient ourselves -- the first coordinate, to return to my example of signs, which in the meantime has become more complex as we have added others, is a system in which a sign refers to other signs *ad infinitum*. There's a whole network of signs that are completely heterogeneous. [Pause] Everything is captured.

What does it mean when we say that a sign refers to another sign? After all this emotion, we have to let loose... The sign refers to another sign. It means at least that some things can no longer happen. When a sign refers to another sign of which I know nothing in advance, a kind of atmosphere has already been born, an *atmospherization*, as I said before. What do we understand here? The sign refers to another sign. I should say that in our method we should never practice free association of ideas. What we have to do is produce redundancy. We have to make resonate not words but bits of phrases [Pause] until a kind of jump occurs. The sign refers to another sign. We feel that we're not going to get anything worthwhile out of that. We can say, yes it's true but it leaves us in an impasse... No matter what sign refers to no matter what sign. This is the system of significance. Nothing to be gleaned there, we're saying.

Then suddenly a glimmer of light appears. If the sign refers to another sign, it means at least that it doesn't refer to something else. And what would this something else be? I can conceive... maybe it will help us get out of these dualisms. I can conceive of a sign that refers to something other than another sign. A sign can refer to a state of things. An extremely variable state of things. For example, smoke is a sign of fire. Of course, fire could be just another sign, and then we fall back into the same trap. But fire can also be considered a state of things.

"A sign refers to a state of things" is a very different proposition to "a sign refers to another sign." A painting, a corporeal painting on the body of a member of a tribe, appears to refer to a very particular state of things. It's a code that refers to a territoriality. Are all states of things of this nature? Animals, it's well known that animals emit signs. For example, excrement, which equates to states of things, is often used by animals as signs. Signs of what? Signs of the limits of their territory. The sign may therefore refer to a state of things that, generally speaking -- I don't have time right now to ask whether or not every state of things is a territoriality -- but I'll just say that a sign can refer to a state of things that can, generally speaking, be reduced to a territoriality. [Pause]

But I see something else. The sign may also no longer refer to a state of things that it designates. It may refer to a signified, as they say, to something that it signifies and which is not of the same nature as a state of things. So, while I say that the sign refers to a state of things, that is to a territoriality, generally what the sign signifies is not a state of things but rather a concept. The sign signifies a concept. We're not demanding... We're not looking for anything extraordinary here. So, it signifies a concept. We can in some way say that it no longer *refers* to a territoriality, but that it *leads* to a kind of reterritorialization, a reterritorialization that is in this case spiritual or mental. [Pause]

So there we have it. We've opened our passage. What is the sign that refers to another sign, *ad infinitum*, a sign that refers to a sign that refers to a sign that refers to a sign... to the point that in

the end one can no longer even call it a sign, but rather an infinite or unlimited realm of signifi-ance, an infinite or unlimited realm of signifi-ance which is precisely the state of a sign that refers to any sign whatsoever? So I can say that the sign that refers to another sign, insofar as it refers to another sign, is a deterritorialized sign [*Pause*]. No longer referring to a state of things and not yet referring to a signified, it is caught up in the moment of its own deterritorialization.

Suddenly we can say, at the risk of including everything in what we're discussing, there's a famous author, Peirce, who proposed a terminology that had a certain success: *index*, *icon*, *symbol*. We don't really care what he meant by this. That's not our business. We just imagine that we might be able to make use of these terms. We will say that the *index* is the sign insofar as it refers to a territoriality whereas the *icon* is the sign insofar as it leads to a reterritorialization, and the *symbol* is the sign insofar as it is deterritorialized, that is, the sign that refers to another sign.

But how can there be a network in which any sign can refer to any other sign? Once again, at this level there are no longer different states of things. Or, as is often said, there are no longer referents. Nor are there signifieds. Quite simply, the sign becomes a signifier when it refers to another sign *ad infinitum*. This status of the sign is rather bizarre. What is implied by this network of signs become signifiers? It becomes signifiers precisely by the fact that they refer to another sign *ad infinitum*.

In what conditions does such a network become possible? There isn't yet a given signified, rather this network of signs is established on a sort of *continuum*, a sliding continuum, a slippery continuum. Which means that all possible contents, all signifieds are fused in a kind of atmospheric continuum... [*Tape interrupted*] [3:24:10]

A kind of amorphous, slippery, revolting continuum... like quicksand. A point, a sign... takes up another sign. Everything occurs as though the continuum had slid. As a result, these signs don't even require the links of free association. Free association is a complete idiocy. There's no need. They are drawn towards one another by the slow sliding of the continuum. Once again, there is nothing that associates the dog and the mask. [*Reference to the example given toward the beginning of the session*] There is just a movement of muddy terrain, of sticky terrain. It's not surprising. Both paranoid delusion and the despotic formation are traversed by terror. [*Pause*] And that's the first characteristic. I have to go faster.

Second characteristic... The first, as we said, is simply the reference from sign to sign that implies a deterritorialization of the sign and supposes an amorphous, sliding continuum. Second characteristic: the circularity of the system. Indeed one of the most well-known and celebrated representatives of the signifying system, Lacan, says, for example, of the signifying sign that it is "at the risk of a circular return". Why "at the risk of a circular return"? You see the signifying chain that is constituted on the amorphous network. -- He doesn't present its constitution in this way, but it's of no importance -- "at the risk of a circular return", in fact, redundancy already belongs to the system, signifying redundancy, each sign passing into another sign. The dog has become this. It has become. What does it mean that it has become another thing? It means that a slow slippage of the terrain has occurred, causing it to pass into something else. It's not a happy world. Nor will this be a happy world. [*Deleuze indicates the second schéma*] To find gay, happy worlds we'll have to go off on a tangent... "At the risk of circular return", the sign that passes into another sign, that will pass again on its own account... This impression of eternal return forms part of this sticky atmosphere, the impression of the already lived. A sad impression... [*Tape interrupted*] [3:27:36]

... When Nietzsche has this impression he leaps with joy, but not for long. He's dragged under by the quicksand. He trips up in his dance. If nothing else, he was happy for an instant. That's already something.

Therefore, what we have is a kind of redundancy - not only of the sign with another sign but of the sign with itself. The sign doesn't enter into relation with another sign in the sliding continuum without entering into relation with itself as that which will always make its return. This is what it is to feel the sign of the despot. The whole of the despot is already there. But we haven't seen it yet. So that's the second characteristic. Sorry if I have to rush on, but otherwise we'll never get finished.

Third dimension. If I keep to my schema and let it guide me... I can say that I've roughly accounted for the circularity of the system. But why are there several circles? Why all these spires of the spiral? Why these distinct circles? This is very important for us. Why? Because from one circle to another – and you see how the signs are distributed on these distinct circles... Once more I go back to the example we encountered in the last lesson. With the atmosphere there was that day in this room, the signs weren't at all on the same circle. We could always say that I was the one who brought it in with me, but I wouldn't be happy with that, since it implies an operation of redoubling that would put us in mind of certain notions...

A student: But wasn't it more like the second figure?

Deleuze: You think so?

The student: Yes. [*Pause, laughter; Deleuze pauses to consider this*]

Deleuze: The various signs didn't arise on the same spires or the same circles... The dog, I repeat, was part of the outermost circle. To be specific, insofar as it was a sign pertaining to this formation, it was a deterritorialized dog. It didn't have its territoriality here. It was a deterritorialized dog. Friendly enough but deterritorialized all the same... [*Tape interrupted*] [3:30:42]

... In this system of signifi-ance [*Deleuze indicates the first schema*], one never ceases... you see how I'm still developing my first point, even if we're at the third. I'm still developing the first point. Because the sign refers to any other sign, one never ceases to jump from one circle to another. An example is the girl [*He refers to the woman who caused the preceding lengthy discussion*] She obviously had an account to settle with me. There... a whole private scene was in play, although I had never done anything to her. And she for her part had a public intervention to make. She was making a jump. I think that's why Félix said – for which someone accused him of being a psychiatrist – that's why Felix said: She feels anguished. She too... She makes us feel anguished, but she feels it too. She was jumping from one circle to another.

It's strange... Because in the system – we still haven't spoken about the despot, but you can feel he's always there in the background. In what form? There are his two eyes – in the system you have regulated jumps, ones that are tolerated and others that are forbidden. Regulated jumps are when one can pass, I suppose, from a certain private event to a certain social situation. In other cases, this kind of jump is not permitted. Think for example of the time when military men who were officers didn't have the right to divorce. What does that mean? If I take a circle which I nominate completely at random, considering I have no particular reason for it to be here or there. It varies... it can be extremely variable. Everything depends on the point of reference. If you take the family home as the center of signifi-ance, the private circle will be the closest to the hearth. If you take the State apparatus as your center the private circle will be very extrinsic. So we have to put everything into play. To respond to your question, it explodes in every direction.

So, anyway, I named it very randomly. Let's imagine that *this* is the circle of private signs, and *this* is the circle of public signs. Private event: divorce. The jump is forbidden. The officer is stripped of his rank. It's a jump you can't make. You cannot be both an officer and divorced. Of course, things have changed since then... But in what way have they changed? Which jumps are still not tolerated?

Which ones?

What is it that the Greeks call *hybris*? [*Deleuze writes it on the board*] You recall that in Greek tragedy, you have two elements: firstly, there's the theme of the gods who give a *lot* to each, who assign lots, as in a lottery; and then you have the man of *hybris*, who is someone who jumps too far and who overleaps his lot. He has literally jumped too far when prey to a demon. In general, the Greek hero is possessed by *hybris*, a word usually translated as "outrageousness". Having failed to measure his jump, he attempts a forbidden jump.

Then there are jumps that are well regulated, for example, when a boy from good family goes to study at the *Polytechnique*... this is allowed... There's a whole system of regulations. One particular example is found in very ancient despotic formations in South America, where passages between private and public signs are strictly regulated, for example between the event of a woman who betrays her husband and the right the husband has to withdraw to the outskirts of the village to pray for a calamity to descend upon the whole village, until such time as purification rites have been performed. Here we have a typical regulation of the jump: a woman betrays her husband and the husband rebounds on a given circle of signifiacance to which he has the right. On another circle, he moves to the outskirts of the village and prays to the gods to wipe out all the villagers. So you sense all this... It's again the sliding continuum that permits him to do so.

But at the same time, there are forbidden jumps, the ones we're not supposed to make. This is why I say our schema works by means of a multiplicity of circles. But there's no need to say where this multiplicity of circles derives from. It's simple... We have the answer in our last two points. The multiplicity of my circles derives from the following: the sign that refers to another sign, whether on the same circle or on another, is the deterritorialized state of the sign. And I will try to explain to you why this is. It's the sign in its deterritorialization. Otherwise, it refers to something other than a sign.

However, deterritorialization is never a state. It's a movement. Now, in function of their origin, in function of the territoriality from which they derive... signs do not have the same speed, nor the same nature of deterritorialization. As a result, it's inevitable that there isn't a single circle but rather spires of a spiral. These spires or different circles are distinguished according to their speed and to the nature of deterritorialization of the signs that are assigned to each circle or spire. It seems complicated, but actually it's quite simple. One has to just let oneself go.

Good. Here we already have three coordinates. First coordinate: the sign referring to another sign *ad infinitum*. This is the sign's signifiacance and state of deterritorialization. Second coordinate: the system is circular, and necessarily so. Third coordinate: it involves a plurality of distinct circles or spires of a spiral, with both regulated jumps from one circle to the other and also forbidden jumps between circles. In a certain sense, Oedipus, the despot... it sometimes happens that the despot himself makes the forbidden jump. And in *Oedipus*, there's a famous line, when Oedipus asks in relation to his own case: "Which demon has leapt the longest leap?" That is to say, which demon led me to make the forbidden jump? A jump in the sense of... [*Deleuze makes a jumping gesture with his hands, but does not finish the sentence*]

Fourth coordinate: it's not enough that we have several circles. Each time we add a dimension. In the second coordinate, we obtained the idea of the circle, and in the third, the plurality of circles. But we don't yet have a sufficient number of dimensions. Fourth coordinate or dimension: we need something that assures the expansion of the circles, that assures their perpetual expansion. What prevents the signifying regime from dying of a sort of *entropy*, as physicists would say? What prevents the entropy of the system from growing to the point that everything is annulled in the indeterminate and anonymous continuum? This continuum is very dangerous because it is at the

same time the quicksand that carries the sign to another sign and also what rises up and risks drowning everything in an atmospheric continuity where one can no longer distinguish anything. At which point the whole system would suffocate.

Therefore, something is required to continually recharge the circles. To recharge the signs on every circle. Something is required to be able to assure the circles' expansion. What assures it, therefore, is the fact that all at once, in another dimension that I can't even represent, every sign, or group of signs -- it hardly matters -- will be made to correspond to a signified. We are no longer in the domain of signifiante, we are in the domain of what we could call *interpretation*. To interpret means to make a sign or a group of signs, presumed to be signifiers, refer to a signified.

It's not the same situation we had in the first dimension where the only signified was the amorphous anonymous, atmospheric continuum itself. Now, on the contrary, the continuum is cut, in such a way as to make every group of signs correspond to a signified. Here we no longer have the figure of the despot but that of his accomplice, the interpreter, the diviner. The diviner will interpret the signs which is to say he will make them correspond to a given signified.

Fine, but how does that suffice to recharge the system as a whole? I'm going even faster now! It's not a modern discovery to say that no interpretation ever arrives at an ultimate *interpreted*. What the diviners interpret are always other interpretations. The diviner emits signs... but what do they interpret? The signs of the goddess *ad infinitum*. In other words, if someone asked us what is the ultimate signified, we would have to respond: the signifier. And I'm not the one making this up. All the champions of the signifier agree on this point. Which is the best interpretation? They also say it or perform it: it's silence.

This is what psychoanalysts have discovered: no longer to interpret but to keep silent. And it's this silence of the analyst that gives the patient something to interpret. Each time the interpretation, since it can do no more than replace another interpretation, recharges the signifier and refuels the sign with signifiante... And so here we have a first way to defeat the entropy of the system. It's the diviner, which is to say the man with the delusion of interpretation, who has the task of recharging the entropy of the system with signifiante.

As a result, at the extreme, parenthetically, what we have is a way to distinguish paranoia and interpretation. Though they are in the same group, they are not the same thing. This means that since the signified continuously refers to the signifier, and is in the last instance, the signifier itself, the interpretation that assigns the signified to a group of signs always recharges signifiante. Thus the machine of signifiante will constantly be recharged from within.

So we can say that the two maladies, because that's what they are, the two maladies of humanity are finally signifiante and interpretation. [*End of the tape*] [3:45:20]

[*Let us note that this discussion on the same day continues into session 9*]