Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: The Movement-Image

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Part 1

… Okay, moving on. You might recall that we started our analysis of the second — I say "second," but this isn't in any particular order — the second type of movement-image, which we had called the affection-image. We wrapped up with the perception-image, then we had moved on to the affection-image.

And last time—to recap the little progress we managed to make—we said: well, it's still not clear how, but we felt like the affection-image was the close-up [*gros plan*], and the close-up is the face, which, again, implies that close-ups aren't close-ups "of" the face. Again, it was a bit muddled—it was murky because we weren't in a position to explain it yet—the affection-image is the close-up, and the close-up is the face. And we started simply by parsing out two poles, two poles for the close-up as well as for the face.

These two poles were material traits on the one hand, which we called — for the sake of convenience, looking for a way to group these phenomena together — material traits of faciality [*traits matériels de visagéité*], capable of forming intensive series: various levels of horror, for example, different levels of horror. These traits of faciality capable of forming intensive series can be associated with different organs. For example, an eye trait, a nose trait, a mouth trait can constitute an intensive series or gradient, an intensive series tending towards both growth and decline.

But if that's one side of the face, the face's other pole was the qualitative unity of a reflective surface. The qualitative unity of—so, an intensive series of traits of faciality and the qualitative unity of a reflective surface; and, since both are perfectly complementary, these poles are living dimensions of the face, "living" implying a polar tension, a dynamic whereby traits of faciality always threaten to get away, run off, escape the face's qualitative organization. It's what's known as a tic. A tic, a facial tic, is precisely the movement whereby a trait of faciality escapes the reflective and radiating organization of the face; all of a sudden something slips, the mouth goes off, an eye darts away, swivels, trying to escape its qualitative organization. And at the other pole of this tension, [there is] the face's constant effort, as a reflective surface, to retrieve the traits of faciality that, like birds, are always trying to get away, to flee. In other words, the

face is in and of itself an animal. So, those were our two poles. I said the first thing we had to do in our analysis was try to establish the identity between the face and affection, since we perpetually cycle through three terms that will go around, sort of forming a moving circle: face, affect, close-up.

Well, our first challenge, which I dipped into last time, was: "How do we make the identity of the face and affect more palpable?" While affects travel along the body—obviously, it goes through the whole body, so it concerns the whole body! And yet there's an identity linking affects with the face. This first issue was based on the Bergsonian understanding of "affect." Using Bergson's wonderful definition of affect, as "a [kind of] motor tendency in a sensory nerve"—I claimed we found the face's two poles, and that we could establish a sort of substantial community between affect and the face.

And then I went in a completely different direction. I suggested that we look at a rather unusual text from another era, the 17th century, Descartes's *The Passions of the Soul.* Let's press on a bit further—we've forgotten why this is even relevant; in the end it will be clear why we're using this text. But the *Passions of the Soul* is a very strange, beautiful work. So if this entices some of you into reading it, all the better. Descartes offers—as the title suggests—his theory of the passions, that is, of affect.

And so, he distinguishes three sorts of corporeal movement—but don't take my word for it, see for yourself; go read his *Passions*—he distinguishes three sorts of internal corporeal movement. I'm glossing over a lot of Descartes — this is a bare bones account — the way he sees things is that the blood running through the body has very subtle components. He called these tiny blood components "animal spirits." Very fine particles in the blood—by circulating in the blood, they can move the brain in a purely material way, in particular, a part of the brain Descartes called the "pineal gland," which is the seat — with all the ambiguity this entails — the seat of the soul's union with the body. Well, this is all important to help you to understand [Descartes's] schema.

And so, objects outside us make impressions, impressions on our body that move our animal spirits, which our blood carries to hit the brain and orient the pineal gland in a certain direction. Depending on the pineal gland's orientation after being hit by our animal spirits, the soul represents this or that object.

[*Pause*] See, it's very straightforward. The first movements Descartes distinguishes are invisible movements within the body, movements whereby particles in the blood hit the brain [*Pause*] and then cause the soul to represent some object or other. That's fine by me, because it's one possible account for what we might call a perception-image: the soul represents a given object as dictated by the animal spirits hitting the brain, the pineal gland in particular.

Then the second kind of movement, also inside the body. He tells us—it's a wonderful text, especially since it's so well-written, you'll see—he says, concerning… it's a schema very in line with medical knowledge of the time, but Descartes is still innovating, he invents a lot of things;

The Passions of the Soul is enormously inventive—he says, well, the second sort of movement is that not all animal spirits go to the brain; a small number of them, a few of them, go through the nerves into our muscles. And depending on the nature of the object represented by the soul, the body will have a corresponding motor response. That's the second kind of movement.

It's not perception-movement, so what is it? It's action-movement. [*Pause*] Say, for example, that I see something terrifying. This is Descartes's own example. What does that entail? It means that an object mobilizes my animal spirits in such a way that my pineal gland picks up, in this case, distress, very distressing movements, [and so] the soul depicts the terrifying object. That's the perception-image.

But at the same time, some of the animal spirits rush into the motor nerves in my legs, and then? Countless things might happen. Maybe there are so, so many rushing to my legs that they get gridlocked. I'm so afraid that I'm paralyzed. Or maybe it's not that, maybe… I'm so afraid, that without a second thought, as they say, I make a run for it, my legs whisk me away. This is the second type of movement. It's what I referred to as the action-image.

[*Pause*] And then Descartes tells us that there is a third type of movement. Of course, this one depends—just like the others—depends on how animal spirits act upon the brain and nerves and muscles, and so on. But how is it different from the others? It's that, while it does happen inside of the body, it becomes visible. It becomes visible at the body's surface. And he says it's a type of movement that isn't reducible to either perception or to action. He says that the the first type of movement can be said to precede the affect — the sight of the terrifying object. The second type of movement can be said to follow the affect — I see something terrifying, I'm scared, I run, I flee. [*Pause*] But the third type, the only one grasped as it appears, as it becomes visible—we ought to say that this third type of movement accompanies, that it is consubstantial with affection, with passion, with affect.

And when Descartes tries to explain that there is a difference in kind between this movement and the two before it, [*Pause*] he lists them, because he's reluctant to define them. What will we call these movements? Expressive movements. They're expressive movements. They're in article — *Passions of the Soul* is divided into articles — he discusses them in Article 112. [*Deleuze flips through his book*] He calls these third sort of movements expressive movements; he calls them signs. He ends Article 112 with: "The most important such signs are expressions of eye and face" — "the expressions of eye and face, changes in color, trembling, listlessness, fainting, laughter," [*Laughter*] "laughter, tears, groans, and sighs."[1]

It's hardly an exhaustive list, but it comes down to the way they're brought together, how they're combined — it's a great list: "expressions of eye and face, changes in color, trembling, listlessness, fainting, laughter, tears, groans, and sighs." It's really tricky because with the whole sequence — fainting and sighing are very different things, you know? Every actor ought to read *The Passions of the Soul*. Here, I'll just read a bit more, to whet your appetite.

From the article on sighing [Article 135]: "The cause of sighing is not [sic] different from that of tears" — Don't mix them up, right? It's by no means the same affect. "The cause of sighs is very different from that of tears, even though they are alike in involving sadness: we are moved to weep when our lungs are full of blood" — which he explain previously — "we are moved to weep when our lungs are full of blood, but we are moved to sigh when our lungs are almost empty, and some imagined hope or joy widens the orifice of the venous artery that sadness had narrowed. Then the little remnant of blood in the lungs suddenly drops down into the left-hand side of the heart through this artery, having been driven there by the desire to attain this joy. At the same time, this desire agitates all the muscles of the diaphragm and chest, so that air comes rapidly through the mouth into the lungs to fill the place vacated by the blood. And it is this that we call 'sighing.'" What a great book.

Anyway, he goes on like that in *The Passions of the Soul*, analyzing this third type of movement, and then what happens? Yes, it turns out that, if it's true that this third type of movement is distinct from the other two because it's inseparable from a sort of expression on the body's "surface," it's the face that collects these expressions, and which moreover possesses an additional ability to feign them, to feign them for the sake of being deceptive.

[*Pause*] In this way, Descartes will develop — I'll… I'm just wrapping this up, and you'll see what makes this text so important — Descartes then develops a theory of passions starting from — How do I put this? — starting from the ground floor, and this ground floor will be the most fundamental, original passion. The ground floor of what? Ultimately, the ground floor of expressive movement. We just saw a list of expressive movements, and the first affection will be the starting point for all expressive movement, i.e., the one that causes the least movement, that displays the least amount of expressive movement. And this strange passion, this original passion, is what Descartes calls "admiration."[2] Why's that? Because admiration — he's using it here in a way we really could have used last time — is both "admiration" [in the normal sense of the word,] as well as something more basic, [when] something keeps one's attention. Admiration is a state of the soul; Descartes isn't using "admiration" in the full scope of the word. He loosely defines it as "the state of a soul whose attention is fixed upon an object." In other words, it's when the soul is led to think about something. "About something" — what does that mean? About something where the soul doesn't yet know whether this something is good or not, whether it's something helpful or unhelpful.

You can see precisely why admiration is presented as the primary passion, since it's still uncertain in admiration: "Is this thing good for me, or not?" Thus, admiration is simply the fact that an object has intrigued me, that it stands out in my field of perception [*mon plan perceptif*]; it's the affect corresponding to the act of fixating on said object, where I wonder, "What's going to happen?" "Is it something good or not?" And that's what makes it the first passion. Descartes puts it beautifully: "It's the least expressive passion." The eyes widen a little, the mouth parts slightly. He has a long passage on admiration. But it's like…it's really the foundation for all expressive movement.

And what's built atop this foundation? Expressive movements develop along two lines depending on the response given to the question posed by admiration, "Is the object good, or is it bad?" "Is this good, or is this bad?" After this question gets resolves, you get the sequence of love and the sequence of hate — the sequence of love if the object is good, and the sequence of hate if the object is bad. So, you see, in the order of passions, admiration is the starting point for all expressive movement. Second, desire — attraction towards good impulses, repulsion from bad impulses. Thus, desire is like the basis for differentiating between love sequences on the one hand, hate sequences on the other. Right, where does that leave us? The point is that this is our second demonstration of a fundamental affinity between affects and the face. That's the first payoff; it was worth the detour because it's another piece of evidence.

The second result is that it demonstrates the two poles of the face. Why's that? Because Descartes offers "admiration" as foundational for a series, the series of desire, the double series of desire, love and hate. We have every reason to — and we're not twisting Descartes's words, since he himself points to admiration as the base level of expressive movement — we tend to have two poles: the pole of desire, with its intensive series, and the pole of admiration, which refers to the other aspect of the face, i.e., the face as reflective unity.

[*Pause*] Or, if you prefer, to loop back to where we left off last time, [the second] pole of the face is the face insofar as it feels. And what does it mean "to feel," at this juncture? Feeling means moving along the gradient of an intensive series that mobilizes traits of faciality, [*Pause*] and the other pole of the face [is] no longer that of the feeling face but rather the face that's thinking "about" something. Last time I pointed out the ambiguity surrounding the English word, "wonder." It was the same in French in the 17th century with the word, "admiration." In Descartes's case, it doesn't only refer to admiration in the strict sense; it also means the act of thinking about something—the face thinking about something.

So, we're back to our two poles, if it seems like I'm now trying to — again, we've managed to find evidence of an affect/face consubstantiality — it bears reiterating the poles of this "face/affect" because, uh… For the perception-image, it was completely different. Here, with the affection-image I mean, we constantly find ourselves with explanations for things that, in a way, are self-explanatory. Because, I mean, is there anything self-explanatory? I'm getting ahead of myself, right. What is self-explanatory about the face? It's that the face is full to the brim with functions that we attribute to it. We give it two main functions: individuation and socialization, [*Pause*] individual characteristics and social roles. Supposedly, that covers it. Anyway, I'm just going over what we have left to cover.

The close-up comes in the moment the face gives up — I didn't say "loses" — gives up its power of individuation and renounces its social role. If there is anyone in cinema who recognized this, talked about it, showcased it, built his entire career around it, it's Bergman. When the face loses its function of individuation and gives up its social role, that's when the face kicks off— then the face starts to develop. And this development is what the close-up is all about. This is

what Bergman's talking about. In order to get at what that means in simple terms, we might need to take a few round-about detours. So, I was getting ahead of myself.

For now, I'll stick with what I called the two poles of the face/affect. What does that actually mean? All it means is that the face needs to give up its individualizing appearance and its social appearance in order to bring out what it *is*—in order to bring out the [union between] face/affect. [*Pause*] If the face is pure affect—we haven't gotten to this point yet, but we'll get there—but if the face is pure affect, it's obvious that it has nothing to do with someone's individuality, nor with their social role.

But for now, let's circle back to the double series we were discussing, since they correspond to different poles. The face has two poles; you can describe them in different ways, but now we know that they all amount to the same. I can say that the face is, on the one hand, a teeming swarm of micro-movements and, on the other hand, a reflective surface of inscription, a surface for the inscription of said micro-movements. The second way of putting it—and I think our discussion last time adequately established why these were equivalent—the second is to say that the face is a disorderly set of traits of faciality [*visagéité*], material traits of faciality, while at the same time being a formal, faceifying [*visagéifiant*] contour.[3]

Third, I could say that the face is [on the one hand] intensity, or an intensive series to which other traits of faciality can always be added [*Pause*] and, on the other hand, that it's a qualitative unity, a pure quality. I'm getting ahead of myself again, but we'll see if any of that bears out.

The fourth way of putting it would be: on the one hand, the face is desire, i.e., passional affect and, on the other hand, the face is admiration [*Pause*] [i.e.] intellectual affect.

[*Pause*] Fifth, I could say that from one angle, the face is a feeling face, while from another angle, the face is a face that's thinking *about*… dot dot dot.

Well, things shift right away. Everything surrounding our attempt to establish the face-affect relationship. Now we're shifting, we're pivoting. What we'll try to do is establish or evaluate the relationships between this "face-affect"—since we've obtained a particular arrangement, the "face-affect"—We'll take a look at what relationship there might be between the face-affect and the close-up. If there does turn out to be a meaningful relationship between them, that will put us in a position to confirm that close-ups are affective images or are the epitome of affective images. [*Pause*] And then, they'll have to be analyzed, just as one might do with philosophical authors [*recording suddenly cuts out*] […] of cinema.

And when it comes to the close-up, a few names are mainstays in the conversation. I wanted to go through two issues of a… from the journal, *Cinématographe*, which devoted — I should read their dates — two issues specifically dedicated to the subject of the close-up: February 1977 and March 1977. As is to be expected, the pieces cover the major examples—I think they're well-chosen—the pieces are on Griffith, Eisenstein, Bergman, and Sternberg. Well, you could always

say that there are more; clearly, it's not an exhaustive list, but… for our purposes: how much use will we be able to make of the claims in [these issues], which are often pretty solid — how much will we…? We'll see as we go.

Actually, my first observation is [that] there is a running theme; there is a common thread starting with Eisenstein: that Eisenstein's close-ups and Griffith's close-ups, as close-ups of the face, represent two "polar" understandings of the face. Is that what Eisenstein says, exactly? That's not exactly what he said. As we'll see. But there are — we're very tempted to say — I mean there's a constant theme in film studies, that the close-ups have two extremes, with Griffith on one end and Eisenstein on the other. What a lucky coincidence for us! It's a good sign that a completely different analysis landed on the face having two planes [*plans*], the two poles of the face. So, we weren't sure we wanted to… well… Let's just take a look at Griffith and Eisenstein.

And really, this is only at a glance—as always, you should comb out the subtleties and nuances for yourselves. It can't possibly be this straightforward. But on the surface, it's true. Yes, close-ups in Griffith are of "contour" faces, [*Pause*] surprised or admiring faces, or faces that are thinking about something, demonstrating a strong qualitative unity. Even Griffith's process in many of the close-ups I cited, laid out very clearly in *Cinématographe* — not only does he frame the close-up face with a mask, the so-called iris shot ensures precisely this sort of "contour" face, thinking about something.

And we saw the use of thinking faces, along with even the possibility of turning it around—since we haven't lost track of our side problem: why is it that we sometimes get close-ups of objects, and not just faces? We have an answer, and later on it probably won't present us with any difficulty whatsoever; it won't even be a problem. But indeed, we can already say — though this isn't our answer to the question, "Why are there close-ups of objects?" This isn't our response — but one piece of our response might have to do with when we're shown a close-up face, followed by what [the face] is thinking about. When Griffith famously shows us a woman's face and then shows us what [the face] is thinking about: her husband.

And it can go the other way: we're given a close-up of something, followed by the face thinking about this something, the face this object will spur into thought. A close-up of the knife, then the wide eyes thinking about it, about using it to kill, to kill or… See, they form a set, face-contour. The Griffith close-up is defined by the "contour" face, the face thinking about something, bearing a clear qualitative unity. There's a coherent, stark, qualitative unity with this contour-face, the face thinking about something, the face admiring us, exhibiting a qualitative unity. In short, they're connected, but it isn't clear how I can move from the idea of the face thinking about something to the idea that, at bottom, it [the face] is a qualitative unity, that it expresses a pure quality. That will present a challenge. That's fine then, suddenly we're back in the thick of it.

But we still have to recognize the fact that that's how it actually works: that a face that's thinking about something expresses a [pure] quality. It isn't obvious. Why? How can we say this? Why is

this so? I have no idea why. But it's a fact. I mean, I don't know yet. But it's a fact. That's how it goes with Griffith's close-ups. And probably it's the fact that it's often the face of a woman, for example, thinking about something; it's a reflexive face. It's not enough that it simply thinks about something; it both thinks about something and expresses a pure quality. It varies quite a bit in Griffith, but for the most part, we might call it — this is how I see it, at least — whiteness.

Then, yeah, right away we might be misled into thinking, "Oh, white? Virginal, pure" — sure, maybe in that case, it's a bad idea, that white is, you know, virginal, but ultimately we shouldn't approach quality at the level of symbolism. These faces aren't white; they're much more subtle. What does is it mean to say that it expresses something on the order of white? It's like an obsession in Griffith: a woman's face and the snow and frost and ice, a woman running on a glacier. And so, with faces in Griffith — the Griffith-style face, I mean — the face-outline isn't thinking about something. The close-up doesn't offer us a face thinking about something without also showing a quality that's often on the order of white—frost, snow, or even an ice floe. A famous example: the close-up of Lillian Gish — since we really ought to name the actresses in these close-ups — the close-up of Lillian Gish where her eyelashes are frozen.[4] Right, I'm dwelling on this in order to demonstrate our problem, but it helps us make some headway: we still can't explain it, but we acknowledge the fact that there's a strange connection between this face-contour — admiring face, thinking about something — and the expression of a pure quality, white in this case.

[*Pause*] Let's take it a little further. It's as though the act of thinking about something was somehow related to a shared quality — drawing out[5] a shared quality — what is it that shares this pure quality, and what does it share it with? Let's say it's the quality shared by the face itself insofar as it's thinking about something. The quality held in common by both the face insofar as it's thinking about something and by the something it's thinking about. In that case, the close-up would be the face insofar as it draws out a pure quality — what I'm calling a pure quality is the shared quality once it spills over the face and the thing it's thinking about — beyond the face, the face having expressed a pure quality. Why would it be beyond the face? It wouldn't be *beyond*; it's just as much *within* [the face], since it's the quality that the face has in common with what it's thinking about.

Hang on, that doesn't sound right. Is Lillian Gish, close up with her eyelashes frozen, thinking about frost, about snow? Perhaps, but how so? *That* isn't what she's thinking about. Where does that leave us, then? The point is that we're starting to problematize the link between them. It's a start, if you will, a start; we've cast out our line. On one hand, I have the "contour" face, which entails an admiration-face, a "thinking about" face, [*Pause*] a face expressing a quality — a quality that, in a way, spills over — It expresses a quality that spills out, perhaps because this quality is one shared by both the face and what it's thinking about.

Along this same vein, I'm suddenly reminded of a film that I don't remember all too clearly; I'd have to watch it again. However, I do remember the book that — the novel it's based on; it's a film by Ken Russell, but I can't even remember the title [of the film]. It's… It's… [*Deleuze*

hesitates] It's based off the novel by [D.H.] Lawrence, *Women in Love*. [*Claire Parnet chimes in with the English title*]. What was that? *Love*? Was it called *Love*? [*Parnet says, "Men in love." Another student suggests, "Women in Love"*] It's in *Love* where I remember — I vaguely remember a close-up of a face where Griffith outdoes himself. I mean, well, the two women in the novel, Lawrence's two women… there are wonderful descriptions of one of their faces and the ice — it's Lawrence at his best—where he suggests, he suggests — it's very elegant, it's… he gives the impression that this woman is suffering from a fundamental sort of frigidity, and it's so well done, so well done. So, anyway. There's that; we have a theme. There's this whole scene that plays out in the snow, where this young woman's lover dies — if I remember correctly, he dies.

And in Ken Russell's film, I… I remember… I don't know, I forget, but I remember… I thought it was an even better film because, for once, we get a film that doesn't ruin Lawrence, that doesn't butcher it—what a treat.

But as I remember it, even the colors—this was in color. The film was filled with intriguing shades of white, of white-green—you couldn't miss it—the quality shared by the heroine's face and the frozen landscape. It was very subtle—it wasn't because her face was frozen, no, not at all. It was the play of light, etc., which made the light really focus on her face, the tint of the light when she's lying on the ice, that incredible light all along the ice, and so on. I'd almost claim that Ken Russell's goes the furthest in this first direction, with this first [aspect]. So that's the first aspect. I just want to emphasize that it's amazing how well things have tracked with our analysis. One of these days our luck will run out; it can' t forever. [*Laughter*]

All I'm saying is that — we've taken a step forward by moving from the face thinking about something to one expressing a quality. Again, we don't understand how, but we acknowledge the fact that it happens. When something comes across as a conceptual fact in philosophy, where two concepts are joined together, and you still don't have a clue why that's the case, that's a good thing. You say to yourself — you can tell yourself, "Hey, I'm onto something." You know you're onto something; you'll then have to go find an explanation, but it's the fact itself that one concept brought you to the other. It's not about an association of ideas. In philosophy, it's a matter of associating between concepts in a way that… it's very distinctive.

But anyway, let's move on to the other pole. What about an Eisenstein close-up? You're tempted to say, oh well, it's fine, let's keep it simple — we can fix it later — let's simplify. You're tempted to say, well, yeah, obviously, [Eisenstein's] represents the face's other pole: the face *qua* trait of faciality. The face *qua* intensive series. The face *qua* desire. Well, he might not have been the very first — it doesn't really matter who was first — but if there's anyone who knew what material to spin traits of faciality from, breaking free from the general qualitative organization of the face, Eisenstein immediately springs to mind. In other contexts, you might also think of Stroheim, but that's neither here nor there. We'll see why Eisenstein might have taken this understanding of the face to a level previously unheard of.

Meaning what, exactly? A trait of faciality, see, that's the other pole of the face. There's a well-known example from *The General Line* that's often cited and often discussed. It's the face of a priest, a very handsome priest. We get a medium shot of it; it gets closer, and he has a very handsome face, a holy man's face. Then it closes in, right, this is one example from *The General Line* of a close-up face. And you only see one eye — It's a fine, noble face, very handsome, a lovely priest — but one eye is full of cunning, ohh, cunning! You've never seen such a sneaky eye. Really, it's something that… you see it all the time. It's what they call a facial flaw, right? [*Laughter*] Someone—you see someone from far off, and you think they're good, they're pretty. Really—they have a very nice face—and then you get closer, and it's as though there's some trait of faciality, which you couldn't see from far away, that unravels it, and the face falls apart. And you think, oh no! You know, it often happens when somebody gives you the impression that they're kind, right? [*Laughter*] You think they're kind, so you get closer, thinking, "Finally, a good man—finally, a good person! Let's take a look; this isn't something you see every day." And then you get closer and think, well, there's something about their mouth… something about it is an obvious red flag. [*Laughter*]

That's Eisenstein; this is his specialty. There's a whole science behind it, you know? It happens in painting, which has its own demands, but it's in cinema too. It's no small feat, highlighting a trait of faciality such that it breaks off, and this is one of the close-up's main functions in Eisenstein: the trait of faciality breaking free from the glowing face's dominating organization, i.e., from the "contour" face—the dynamic material trait sliding off.

Okay, but then, if that's all there was to it, if that's all it was, I mean, you can find that in Stroheim; you see it in a lot of filmmakers, and Stroheim does it just as well. But with Stroheim it's never — no, I shouldn't say — but Eisenstein is unique because it's one thing if the faces are already repulsive from far away. It's a lot more complicated when the face, from a medium shot, isn't all that bad. It's all in the approach, when all of a sudden you discover a winged trait, the trait that breaks away, the trait that takes off.

But what is it that sets Eisenstein apart; what makes him so unique? I was using a single close-up as an example, but I was just trying to home in on this escape of traits of faciality, in an intensive series; that's what he does. So then, what does he get from making intensive series of traits of faciality that break away? A series of close-ups. Right, a series of close-ups, a series of close-ups, all of different faces. Isn't that what's different [about Eisenstein]? Each time a trait of faciality emerges, an intensive series of material traits of faciality forms from one close-up to the next, where each trait escapes the face it belongs to, where each one escapes its face in order to form an autonomous intensive series.

[*Pause*] And this is what Eisenstein himself, in his commentary, calls the rising line: building up an intensive rising line, made up of these "traits of faciality" close-ups. And Eisenstein talks about the rising line of grief in *Potemkin.* But we should also talk about the rising line of the bourgeoisie in *October*, or the rising line of the kulaks in *The General Line*. Rising lines, with traits of faciality or corporeality, shot close-up — it's everywhere, it's everywhere.

[*Pause*] But why is this important? Because I think it's clear — if we come back to the difference between close-ups in Griffith and Eisenstein — it's rather clear that you can actually find both aspects in both directors. At a more complex level of analysis, we started with the idea that Griffith's close-ups represented one pole of the face, while Eisenstein's were the face's other pole. Immediately, you all might have objected that — we should bring it up — you can find both poles of the face in both of them. For example, you constantly see rising lines in Griffith. In what way? Typically, it's a young woman who just learned of the death of her mother or child. But very often, there's an intensive series of a face feeling deeper and deeper levels of emotion. You could also call that a "rising line of grief." At the same time… So, in Griffith, you have intensive faces as well as reflexive faces.

At the same time, it's no secret that Eisenstein has a close-up of one of the finest reflective, "contour" faces, a face that's thinking of something, thinking about something sublime or grandiose, or about death. There are some famous close-ups of Anastasia in *Ivan the Terrible*, where the young girl absolutely appears as a "contour" face, as a face thinking about something profound. Or in *Alexander Nevsky*, where the hero himself is meditative and pensive. He's thinking about something. He's always thinking about something. And the close-ups in *Alexander Nevsky* clearly correspond to the contour, reflective, admirative side of the face, the face thinking about something sublime. Thus, you can find intensive close-ups in Griffith, and you can find reflective, qualitative close-ups in Eisenstein. Then what difference is there between them? That doesn't prevent us—that doesn't prevent us from claiming that one pole corresponds to Griffith and the other to Eisenstein. I'll try to explain why.

And here, there's something I found really interesting at the end of the essay on Eisenstein in *Cinematographe*. [*Deleuze flips through the journal*] It's, no — in the Griffith essay — the Eisenstein essay, too. Yeah. It's in the essay on Griffith, not on Eisenstein. The author works out the idea that there's a sort of binary structure, as he puts it, in Griffith's films—at work in a lot of films—and that this binary structure shows up, among other things, as a sort of binary between the epic and the lyrical, or to make it even simpler, the collective and the individual. And he pulls examples from *Birth of a Nation*, where you can clearly see this alternation or binary between the collective and the individual, the epic and the lyrical — a wide shot of the battle, or a wide shot of the soldiers about to emerge from the trenches. That's what you'd call an epic shot, and then the lyrical is a close-up face, or several close-ups of different faces in sequence. Well, at any rate, you get a good example of intensive close-ups in Griffith with the sequence of close-ups of soldiers' faces coming out of the trenches in *Birth of a Nation*.

But there's something that stands out. Owing to its very binary nature, there is an alternation. You get a wide shot, and then a close-up of the face, Face A, then another wide or medium shot, then a different face, and so on. It goes back and forth in this binary between the collective and the individual. I'd claim that it's still a structure that forces close-ups of the face into a certain regime of individuation since they're distinct from wide shots corresponding to the collective. As

a result, you sort of still oscillate between the crowd and the individual, with the crowd reflected in the medium shot and the individual, drawn out of the crowd, reflected in the close-up.

Alright, what does Eisenstein do? In his case, I think, we find something truly innovative. What does he do? For example, in *Potemkin*, he has sequences of close-ups, each of a different face, but that's not it. What's important is that in each face what sticks out is a trait of faciality that becomes independent of the face and, by breaking free from the face, is immediately tied to the trait of faciality in the subsequent shot. What did Eisenstein achieve by doing this? He discovered an absolutely new understanding of crowds; [*Pause*] in other words, he was able to completely overcome any crowd-individual dualism. [*Pause*] He discovered a new entity. [*Pause*] He completely superseded the binary between the crowd, or collectivity, and the individual pulled from the crowd. The close-ups of individuals — precisely because they're close-ups that include traits of faciality escaping the face's organization — thus form an intensive scale, composing a distinct intensive scale and thereby completely overcoming any collective-individual dualism.

In other words — what I'm calling the crowd is something divisible, and what I'm calling the individual is indivisible [*Pause*] — Eisenstein discovered something that he needed from film, something neither indivisible nor divisible, something we'll need a new word for — since we'll run into this problem again later, there's no rush [*Pause*] — something along the lines of an intensive set [*des ensembles intensifs*], not extensive sets like crowds or individuals. [*Pause*] So, you see, when I said that Griffith also has intensive series, sure, but it's… it's — you might be able to find counter examples — but in general, his shots are usually either an intensive series affecting one single face, an intensive rising line of grief, of despair, of… [*Electronic noise and recording cuts out*]

Part 2

… whereas with Eisenstein, the binary structure, or what the essay's author is calling Griffith's binary structure, has totally disappeared. There we have a pure intensive series, hence my general claim that, of course, both poles of the face are present in Griffith's close-ups just as they're present in Eisenstein's close-ups. But that doesn't change the fact that, on the one hand, the "contour" face is predominant in Griffith, and the "trait of faciality" or "intensive series" face is predominant in Eisenstein.

However, on the other hand, what is it that's so innovative about Griffith's approach? It's what I was trying to describe earlier, unsuccessfully, what I was trying to describe earlier — I'm coming back to it because it'll have so much bearing on the rest of our analysis. It's that Griffith's major discovery might be — there isn't a formula, this isn't a recipe, it's just something he pulled off — by using close-ups of thinking faces, thinking about something, or "contour" faces, he pushed the face into an expression of pure quality — that's his main thing — that I can see in the relationship we still find mysterious, between the face and the sea, the face and the ice, the face and the whiteness.

Conversely, on Eisenstein's side, *his* stroke of genius was having taken the face so far in the other direction: the traits of faciality that he was able to draw out from direct, unbroken intensive series — whereas we just saw that the intensive series you might find in Griffith were broken up, repeatedly interrupted by wide shots, by the binary — drawing an unbroken intensive series which thereby overcomes any dualism between collective and individual. And what exactly does that suggest? See, I'm a bit stuck because we desperately need an answer, and we need it now! We can't stop; everything was going fine because before, the pole of the face as thinking face made me, I was led to believe, I thought I had no choice but to set it aside in favor of something else — what, exactly? The qualitative face, the face expressing a pure quality, even if it was the pure quality shared by the face thinking and the thing it's thinking about. With the face of intensive series, of intensive series of material traits, it should also force us to go beyond it, to move towards something.

What does it do? An intensive series of traits of faciality escaping several distinct faces, each breaking away from its original face. What will that accomplish? What does that give us? What effect—what effect will it have on us? What affect? Earlier, it was quality-as-pure affect. Now what is it that's produced by Eisenstein's intensive series? Literally, it produces what we might call, I think, a sort of potentialization, a potentialization. Now the result is a potency [*puissance*], a potentiality.

What do I mean by that? I'm talking about something so straightforward that I feel it can't be put any other way. Again, we don't understand why. We still don't understand why, but that gives us something to do later on. We don't understand why, and yet we know that's how it is—why? Indeed, how are you affected by the build-up—for example, the build-up in *Potemkin,* the montage of close-ups, the sailors' traits of faciality, and so on? You go, "Oh, the anger is rising; the tension is building." What is the anger building up to? What is the anger rising toward? Up to the moment when the officers are sent overboard, are thrown into the sea, when the nurse's eyeglass breaks, etc. What's going on, in other words? The "rising anger" is a potentialization of space. You potentialize the entire space. You make something possible in this space. What sort of possibility? A revolutionary explosion.

[*Pause*] It can also go in the other direction. The potentialization can be more along the lines of "Shut it down!" "The revolution is over," etc. At any rate, these intensive series will potentialize space. In other words, with the first pole of the face — actually, now I'm more confident about it, since we've confirmed it, but there's always room to ask, why are they linked? — If we just recall the fact that there is a double link, a link between the thinking face and the extraction of a pure quality and a link between the feeling face (i.e., the face that goes through intensive series) and the potentialization of space, [*Pause*] shouldn't that be the case with every close-up? Every time there's a close-up of the face, don't we wind up with a double operation that sometimes privileges one aspect and sometimes privileges the other — but in the end, they might both always be there: the extraction of a pure quality shared by… Shared by what? Let's keep it simple and not get ahead of ourselves — shared by several different things.

The extraction of a pure quality common to multiple things; it's pure precisely because it's held in common. This isn't something abstract; it's a quality. For example, something like white— white, or black, or what have you — and on the flip side, the function of the close-up would always involve some sort of potentialization of space, such that something becomes possible, or everything becomes possible, or nothing is possible. So on and so forth, potentializing space. And so obviously the pressing question — but we're getting a bit ahead of ourselves, so we'll back up — what is it, at the end of the day? I mean, consider the big names in cinema we still haven't covered. Can't we already find this double operation — using close-ups to draw out pure qualities and potentialize space? But it doesn't stop there; couldn't you find filmmakers who say as much when they describe their films?

Let's go ahead and jump to Sternberg before we even get into any sort of detailed analysis. If there's anyone who tied close-ups to whiteness, and if Sternberg's close-ups are synonymous with "white on white" in the same way that painting — around the same time, after all — developed white-on-white structures… [*the recording cuts out*]

… characters, and that goes for all of Sternberg's white spaces. One of the characters says, "It's a place where everything seems possible," and so this kind of whitening of space, under very specific conditions, is accompanied by a very unique potentialization of space; it's very uniquely Sternberg. That is, you can pick out different ways of potentializing, as well as different ways of extracting qualities, and it changes from one director to the next. Anyway.

But the pressing question — the one that got us ahead of ourselves — the pressing question is: but then, if that's what the close-up entails, wouldn't it be impossible to not use close-ups? Wouldn't it be impossible for cinema to obtain potentializations of space and extractions of pure quality without including a close-up of the face? Yeah, that's troublesome; it might give us a good opportunity to come back to certain aspects of what's generally known as experimental film.

And at the end of the day, what do we find there if not potentialized spaces, potentialized empty spaces, and pure qualities? Then obviously, that's not very, it isn't very… it explains why many of us, as unknowledgeable as we sometimes are, why we find this kind of cinema so frustrating or boring. For one example, because I'll use it again, that certainly *isn't* boring: Marguerite Duras's *Agatha*. There are no close-ups. What happens as a result? What is that connected to? But I could have just as well used an American director; they do it, too. One filmmaker who I think really stands out in this regard is Agnes Varda — drawing out pure qualities. I'm jumping around a lot, just to keep our analysis moving along.

From the beginning, as far back as her first film, Agnes Varda talks about the role and significance of white and black, and the distinction between black and white in her films. And well, yeah, white corresponds to women, and black corresponds to men. That's important, right. But she's not working with symbolism; she doesn't mean that "woman is white, and man is

black." That's not what she means. What she means, what the film is invested in — and I suppose her other films are interested in something very similar to this — is extracting a pure quality.

Coming back to *Agatha* — what do we see? Well, there's something strange going on in *Agatha*. We see an empty room, or one filled by two ghosts, or almost ghosts, two ghosts in a narrowing, empty room. The voice recounts what happened in the past; in other words, this is the room afterwards, the room after humanity, the room after the brother and sister, the room after the couple. And the camera pans out to what's outside the room, and what's outside the room is the beach, the uncovered shoreline, the beach at low tide. So that, rather, we saw, we saw with… well, that's space from before humanity. It's the world of Cézanne, where humans are absent, the deserted beach. And the film more or less ends when the camera meets up with the windows. The film is about the time of the empty room, see. Can't we already sense that there's a very unusual sort of potentialization of space, brought about by the voice recounting past events? Right, but then it gets complicated.

Let's keep it as simple as possible. There is a well-known independent American[6] film, a film by one of the greatest, Michael Snow, called *Wavelength*. This famous film — we'll come back, but I want to lay out a few themes for you to think about for the next 15 days of… — it's a well-known film, it zooms in, it consists of one long zoom. The camera is set on an empty room, and the duration of the film is the time it takes it to get through this empty room; starting with the back wall until it reaches the front, where the camera frames an engraving depicting, uh, the sea! Odd, but I feel like there's a certain analogy to be drawn between that and Marguerite Duras.

What's happening between the two of them? There's an astonishing potentialization of space that sets off events; events will emerge from where and when we are there and then, along the camera's path across the room from one wall to the other. And the film comes to an end once the camera closes in on the sea engraving. Then, *fin*, the room is gone, the space has used up all its potential. At the same time, this is accompanied by an extraction of quality since, at every stage, as the camera moves from wall to wall, at every stage there is an extremely subtle play of color: the extraction of quality, the potentialization of space. Alright. So maybe these things are a fundamental part of cinema.

We're just saying, I'm just saying, well, let's consider where things stand in our analysis, then we'll come back to them afterward. It turns out that quite a few directors have used close-ups — and I'll leave it at that — for the sake of these two operations, these two basic operations, and we still don't even know what about them makes them essentially cinematic, or what makes them possible in film. Notably, I think, if cinema becomes more and more self-aware about these operations, which go beyond mere technique — they involve certain techniques, but it's infinitely more than just technique — then cinema will become capable, I think — even if this isn't its ultimate goal — of approaching certain literary masterpieces in a whole new way. That is, the relationship between literature and cinema is on the verge of fundamentally transforming. Okay, anyway… the relationship between literature and cinema itself might change.

But whatever, anyway, all I'm saying is that it turns out that what I just described as being so modern—the extraction of pure quality and the potentialization of space—apparently you could say these have been around since the very beginning. And I can't even say that they've only been obtained through the use of close-ups. What I can say, at any rate, is that *some* directors have often done it using the close-up. That *some* directors, like Griffith and Eisenstein, have used close-ups to achieve it.

As a result, you can see where I'm headed in our analysis of Griffith and Eisenstein; it amounts to saying that we should still be cautious because, here too, a lot of people have written on this already. Eisenstein has written some wonderful stuff on close-ups in Griffith and in his own films, but obviously he plays a bit coy; he doesn't exactly play fair. It's sneaky because… as he is wont to remind us, he is a dialectician, i.e., he's a good Marxist, he approaches things dialectically. So, it wouldn't be a stretch for him to claim that Griffith somehow represents the first step of a dialectic, while he himself went further, dialectically, since he employed a dialectical method. But that's not what he does! Because he specifically says — I'm looking at what Eisenstein wrote about Griffith's close-ups compared to his own — he says two things; he says that Griffith is a genius, but he's missing something. Because in Griffith's case, the close-up is subjective; close-ups are only subjective. They're only associative.

I'm paraphrasing what Eisenstein wrote. He says that they're subjective, right, because [Griffith's] close-ups come down to the conditions of visibility. With the Americans — he covers a lot, and some of his formulations are astounding — he says that with Americans, close-ups are all about the subjective conditions of visibility, i.e., the subjective [conditions] of the audience. They bring the audience up close to something, whereas, he says, it's different with us Russians, because we Russians use dialectical methods.

We've gone a step further because *we* understand that close-ups ought to be about the *objective* apprehension of what's been seen. We've passed from subjectivity on to objectivity. And then he adds — which amounts to the same — that Griffith's close-ups are only associative, i.e., that they're anticipatory. You see, he's talking about the face thinking about something, [where] I go from the former to the latter. There's an association between the face and what it's thinking about, whereas *my* close-ups, Eisenstein says, are dialectical rather than associative.

And what does Eisenstein mean by "dialectical"? He means the production of a new quality — he's read his Lenin — producing a new quality via juxtaposition or fusion, producing a new quality via juxtaposition or fusion. And he says, that's how my close-ups work: they produce a new quality via juxtaposition or fusion. You know what he has in mind—the juxtaposition of different faces in *Battleship Potemkin*, the faces of sailors, the building anger, the mounting grief, etc. Well, here we're dealing with a sort of dialectical union, dialectical fusion, that produces a new quality. And this last point is what interests us.

But we saw, in fact, that this [the supposed difference between Eisenstein and Griffith] is way off. That hasn't been the real difference between them; it was… there isn't… it doesn't seem right to say that one is an *improvement*. Eisenstein's understanding of the close-up didn't strike me as all that dialectical; it isn't dialectical at all. It's intensive and is all the better for it. It's about setting up a series of intensities. — But really, Eisenstein's last comment here should help us pin down what we're getting at. Because Eisenstein's last comment is about a fusion where things culminate, crossing a threshold, a qualitative fusion. All the traits of faciality that, intensity by intensity, along an intensive gradient, produce a new quality.

What I *can* say, for the moment, is that first aspect of the face, à la Griffith, has the face thinking about something. And inasmuch as it's thinking about something, it expresses a pure quality, a pure quality held in common by a number of different things. I know that much at least, for the time being. With the second aspect, on Eisenstein's side, we have traits of faciality. [The face] enters into an intensive series; this time it's an intensive series that moves from one quality to another. The operation surrounding this quality, an operation that we might call that of pure quality, is the extraction of a quality shared by different things. The other operation, what I called potentialization — it might be clearer now what that means, thanks to Eisenstein's last comment — the potentialization of space, which moves from one quality to the next via an intensive series.

[*Pause*] In the same way — it's about time for a break — let's look for another pair, along those same lines. Here, see, that puts us in a tough spot; I mean, it's not… we're not going to solve it today; we'll have to keep it in mind for when we get back. Again, we won't see each other for the next two times, 15 days.

Well, well, so, what we're left with is what to do with these operations. But right now, what I'm interested in — I can't deal with it right now, since what I'm interested in right now is… I'm only concerned with them insofar as they're related to close-ups.

So, before we leave, we'll have to think of another pair. What we've just done — in a very traditional way —f or Griffith and Eisenstein, I'd like to [*Recording cuts out and when it returns, the tape jumps backward 30 seconds*] two other levels, with Expressionism on the one hand and Sternberg on the other, in order to make some sense of the question of Expressionism, and, in particular, to put some distance between it and Sternberg, since he had absolutely nothing to do with Expressionism. That will give us a pair like what we had with Griffith and Eisenstein. And lastly, our third pair will be: Dreyer-Bergman. I'm not saying this is an exhaustive list; there is some innovation with close-ups in more recent directors, but I think these innovations—I'm more asking than telling you how it is — these innovations are closely tied to either the extraction of shared qualities or the potentialization of spaces. That's all I can think of for the moment — all I can think of that would be philosophically significant and important for our endeavor this year. But we're not ready, we aren't yet in a position to work through it. So, what we'll do is go back and catch our breath after a short break — we'll come back and take a closer

look at what we might learn or stand to gain from juxtaposing expressionism and Josef von Sternberg.

Break time? You're tired, well either I'm stopping — *I'd* like to, at least… I need to talk to this Japanese guy… [*Student noises*] [*A student says something to Deleuze; he responds*] I'm so tired… [*Pause*] [*Recording stops*]

… Yes, another reminder for those interested—theoretically, this is the last week for you to hand in your forms. What's that? [*A student says something inaudible*] Yeah, sure, either way; you have to turn them in to me. Otherwise…

Well, then, let's try to see whether this new parallel [aspect] offers any… It shouldn't just confirm what we've done so far; it ought to help us move forward, since there's still more to do in our analysis. There's still more left to do because our problem is twofold. You'll recall that Expressionism already came up in a totally different context, regarding the movement-image, regarding the movement-image's general characteristics. We've already touched on it. We were struck by the fact that so many have struggled to write on Expressionism; think the movement is so complex that… in the end, they can barely muster up a single defining characteristic.

And then, we naively — but only apparently naively — we felt like it wasn't all that complicated, that Expressionism as a movement was extremely — I'm not being abstract — it was a lively, vibrant movement, but it was extremely consistent, and it was very single-minded in pursuing its goal. As for its goal, we tried to sum up what it meant for something to be expressionist. We concluded that it was the perpetual tension between something coming apart and something coming together. That wasn't enough, because that doesn't *only* apply to expressionists. But let's define the movement of something coming apart as life itself, insofar as this life is no longer organic. In other words, we've come upon the non-organic life of things [*Pause*] and [the movement of] something coming together is the life of the mind. The life of the mind, insofar as this life turns out to be non-psychological.

And we said — I'm just jogging your memory, since this was something we came up with in the first quarter — we said, well yeah, Expressionism comprises these two basic rhythms; you know you're dealing with an expressionist when you find these two basic rhythms: the non-organic life of things pitted against the non-psychological life of the mind. Hence the expressionist line, a broken line consisting precisely in breaking up organic outlines, breaking up the organic line, breaking up organic lines in order to bring out the non-organic life of things. And it's true that both sides, their fundamental complementarity — the non-psychological life of the mind and the non-organic life of things — they do have something in common: they shatter outlines [*contours*]. Outlines break down; there are no more outlines. There are no more outlines, be they organic outlines [*Pause*] or psychological profiles.

[Pause] It's about the tension between both sides — something coming apart and something coming together — where what came together, again, was the mind inasmuch as it attains a non-

psychological life, and what came apart was life inasmuch as it goes beyond the organic and plunges into matter's non-organic vitality. As a result, the basic form of Expressionism is: the awakening of the mind in the heart of the swamp, the non-organic life of the swamp — the mind's elevation above and beyond all psychology. Well, if that's how it is — but this is what we were working on earlier, we're done, so I won't dwell on it — there's something still relevant for our conversation today: what about this complementarity?

This complementary is fundamentally one between light and darkness. The mind's non-psychological life is light, and the non-organic life of things is darkness, shadow. Organic outlines form in the dark, just as psychological profiles dissolve in the light. And what is it that comes out of this confrontation between light and dark? Can we just say that it's the expressionist face? For now, let's say that it will shape *the visible*. The visible is the primary object of Expressionism — so we're back to film. In expressionist film, [the visible] is understood as resulting from the battle or tension between light and dark, and it does so—we can tease this out—under four main aspects.

[*Pause*] In the most basic aspect, light and darkness are the conditions of the visible. Light itself is invisible, darkness itself is invisible, but as complements, they are both conditions for what *is* visible. In "The Graveyard by the Sea," a poem by Paul Valéry, there is the following line — it's addressed to his soul, the poet calls on his own soul: "Look at yourself!" "Look at yourself!" The poet is telling his own soul, "Look at yourself" —and my own soul, it's implied — "Look at yourself… But to give light implies no less a somber moiety of shade." It's lovely. It's a lovely line. Two great lines. "Look at yourself! But to give light" — that's interesting. It's a question of "giving light" and not bringing something *to* light. "But to give light implies no less a somber moiety of shade." In a way, this turns out to be a purely expressionist statement. Two moieties, two halve that act as the conditions of the visible. An old philosophical text, "Parmenides" — the poem, "Parmenides," also develops this point. Valéry was well aware of all this, so who knows, it might be that this sort of contrast between day and night, not *in* the world but as a condition *for* the world…

I'm claiming that this is what expressionist film is about. How so, in what way? Whenever — and this happens a lot — they divide the screen in two; they split the screen in two, into two halves. "To give light implies no less a somber moiety of shade." Sometimes it's diagonally, or quasi-diagonally; one side or half of the screen is bright, and the other side is dark. I think this stark contrast between both halves forms the condition for the visible — or, if you prefer, the absolute contrast between spiritual life and non-organic life. [*Pause*] And this sort of contrast shows up all over the place in expressionist film. When I called it "the condition"… Let's go a bit further.

The second aspect. Now we come to the conditional, the conditioned. What is the conditional? The conditional is born from both halves uniting, the shade and the shining, the bleak and the bright. Once both conditions mix together, the conditional, i.e., the visible, can emerge.

According to our second aspect, the conditional appears. In what form? It appears as the mix of both conditions, but as an alternating mix.

What do I mean by "alternating"? It's what you find in some of expressionist film's well-known shots: bars or stripes, where the shot is barred or striped. [*Pause*] In other words, bands of light, a dark gap, bands of light, a dark gap, and so on—the whole shot is crisscrossed with rays of light and zones of darkness. See, I'm calling it an alternating series since we no longer have two opposite sides splitting the screen in half. In this case, you get bands of light where the only darkness left is in the form of the recesses between two bands. It was a staple in expressionist composition.

And I think — with all the same nuance, with Griffith and Eisenstein — I'd claim that, historically, the greatest film in this regard, regarding these striations, was [*The Cabinet of Dr*] *Caligari.* But I think that was only part of it since, like elsewhere— there's so much going on with Lang, but it was a trend in Lang's work, Fritz Lang. It's complicated in *Caligari*, because the use of striation is also tied to the painted scenery. Obviously with Lang, on the contrary, it's bound up with a whole architectural understanding — which comes as no surprise — an architectural understanding of space, where ridges, let's say, ridges are highlighted by a beam of light. You could call those "banded images." Ultimately, you know, with this system of ridges, with light accentuating the relief and shadows accentuating the depressions… you get this really interesting, striated space that forms a sort of veil, a striated veil.

[*Pause*] But let's go even further. Let's get further into the conditional, the conditioned. Off the bat, when you alternate between dark and light, you get what I'd call the first visible. You get a second visible when this alternating sequence comes to an end. Then there's no longer a light part and a dark part — where one part is light and one part is dark — rather, each part is itself a mix of dark and light, over and over again. We're dealing with two different kinds of mixture.

[*Pause*] But that's yet another tendency in Expressionism. I'm always surprised, for example, even good authors writing on Expressionism seem to think about these two tendencies as mutually exclusive, where one is impressionist — that it isn't really expressionist, and so on. It seems obvious to me that it's inherent to the very logic of Expressionism, that it's part of the Expressionist project. So, then, what about the third level, the third aspect? It's everything afforded by chiaroscuro [*Pause*] forming a very different approach to the veil. It's no longer a veil made up of ridges, but one of smoke and fumes. And that brings us a lot closer to what we tend to see — with all the same qualifiers, I'm only talking about broad, general tendencies — that's more of what we tend to see in Wegener, in *The Golem*, and then it's perfected with Murnau; [*Pause*] it gets perfected in one film in particular, *Faust*. Anyway.

Our fourth aspect. These two directions: either striation, stripes, or else the development of chiaroscuro — rest assured, in both cases, Expressionism follows the same theme: breaking up outlines, liberating things and souls, liberating things from their organic outline, liberating souls from their psychological outline. In a way, as different as they are, they come down to one final

aspect found throughout Expressionism: violence… I don't know what to call it, the violent way the projector hits the darkness — and what appears once the projector violently hits the darkness? A face emerges. Everything else remains in shadow.

Now everything circles back; this last aspect comes back to our first. The face emerges, luminous and surrounding by a sort of halo. The *halo* is what I'm calling our fourth aspect, *h-a-l-o*, a sort of halo or phosphorescence surrounding the head, produced by the projector shining into the darkness, such as we see — among the most iconic frames in cinematic history — such as we see in *The Golem* (and other scenes like it), in *The Golem*, where the demon's face appears, where the demon [Astaroth] appears like a dead god and then transforms into a Chinese mask, while everything else lies in darkness. And obviously there was sort of a competition going on here, since he knew that Murnau's *Faust* had a demon appear under similar conditions, in analogous circumstances.

At some point these things aren't commensurate… We're in a world so foreign to Griffith that we don't have any easy analogies at our disposal — Griffith's close-ups, which use a mask to darken everything but the face, strictly speaking, have nothing in common with the method of using the projector to bring out the face-as-spiritual-life, i.e., as non-psychological. Spiritual life, which doesn't necessarily mean that it's good; for Expressionism, demons are no less spiritual than the purest soul. It's just that the demon is the spirit [*esprit*] more likely tied to the non-organic life of things, to the swamp, in a way very different from the holy spirit. At any rate, spirituality — demons are spiritual, spirituality is demonic. Not all spirituality, but some of it is. Anyway. See, then, the fourth concept comes down to a sort of confrontation between light and dark, and the expressionist face has gone through all four aspects.

Indeed, in the expressionist face you get — taking them one by one, which is my way of working through the logic here — [1] the face split into bright and shadowy halves, [2] the face lit from below, striated by its valleys and peaks, [3] the face in chiaroscuro, put entirely in chiaroscuro, which is sometimes extremely subtle — Murnau's masterful handiwork in *Faust* comes to mind, for one — and lastly, [4] the face drawn out, summoned by a violent light, where everything else lies in darkness.

Well, I mean, it's well known that Expressionism — as we saw in our first term — operated precisely in an intensive register of luminosity, and here I'm picking back up on that same idea: Expressionism has an intensive way of treating the face; it's the intensive side of the face, with different intensities of darkness and light, except that this first pole — and this should no longer surprise us — this first pole of the face, which is Expressionism's domain, will start to join back up with the second pole. And indeed, when it comes to our last aspect, where the projector violently plucks the face out of the darkness, out of the night, it's similar to the intensive series wrought by the other side or pole, the reflexive face—the infinitely pensive face of the demon. Thus, as things unfold with expressionist faces, you get the exact same privilege as the intensive series of faciality, but it culminates in recapturing, in approximating the other pole of the face in its own way.

But here's where I come in with a scholastic intervention, to help us get… if there's anyone who had no stake in expressionism — my god — who wasn't a bit, who wasn't the least bit expressionist — if there's anyone who wasn't expressionist, it's Sternberg. And when you hear some film historians mention Expressionism in Sternberg at all, it seems — it really feels like they're playing fast and loose with the word, "expressionism," or don't mean it in a serious way, at least. Why do I say that Sternberg was about as far as you could get from being expressionist? Because never before has film so confidently made it clear that light was its sole concern, despite appearances — it was solely concerned with light, and nothing but light — light was so paramount to it that it only encountered darkness when light had an inherent need for it. From top to bottom, darkness only shows up in his style of film when light has come to an end, or when everything has come to an end. Light was so integral that the mere notion that the visible implied a contrast between light and dark was unthinkable; the visible could only come from light and the reproduction of light. This is what the face — and by extension, the close-up — was all about; bringing the face into a close-up meant first and foremost illuminating it. If he sometimes decided to darken parts of the face, it was because the face didn't cut it—it was so poor that it couldn't manage to light up on its own. So, when things become awkward or start deteriorating between him and Marlene Dietrich, he shrouds her in darkness. [*Laughter*] But when he loves her, the darkness recedes. Everything was over and done with by the time the darkness settles in.

It's a peculiar idea. What did it mean, and what was he trying to do? It's because light is *invisible*. The rest makes more sense if we understand that light is what is invisible. What about Sternberg's close-ups? Let's start with some examples. If we want to start with one of his most famous films, obviously I'm going to draw on the most suitable ones for our purposes: *The Scarlet Empress.* In *The Scarlet Empress*, look, I'll give an overview of the film's close-ups. First, an extraordinary close-up when the future empress is still a naïve young girl. It's quite intriguing. What's so intriguing about such a young, naïve girl? It's because Marlene Dietrich, under Sternberg's demanding requirements, portrays a naïve girl in an interesting way; she … [*Recording cuts out*] … the Russians that come looking for her. She's never seen a Russian; they have odd manners, and she plays it very well. It's really the face of someone who's afraid of screwing something up. Her eyes are bright, she looks at everything, and she lays it on thick: she bats her eyes, looking up and down. It comes across as, just, perfect. It's a face that's both amused—she finds everything so funny, she's thinking, "What on earth is up with this guy? Oh, I've never seen a wagon like that!" Everything's a discovery; it's an extraordinarily liquid face, culminating in the opening shot of *The Scarlet Empress*, which is wonderful: she says goodbye to everyone, and her mother tells her to go to bed. And nevertheless, she's intrigued; there's this Russian colonel[7] — this huge, unmannered giant wearing a strange suit. It's all so fascinating, the little girl is so fascinated. Then she opens the door, she leaves the room, but she leaves by slowing backing out, staring. And the door closes on her face.

The scene goes like: white wall, white wall, white door in the middle of closing, the white end of the hallway, a white "awe-struck" sort of face. Okay. Here you have a sort of study of white-on-

white. You actually have four whites, four whites in this first close-up. I'd say this is a quintessential example of a "contour" face, of a face thinking about…one that never stops thinking about… "Hey, what a funny suit! Wow, that colonel is handsome, all things considered, despite being loud, rude…" She's thinking… She's thinking… She's constantly thinking. You see it on her face, since she does everything that she can to show us that she's got a lot on her mind. Well.

White on white on white on white on white — What's going on with this close-up? You already see where Sternberg is headed. He's working towards making the face into an exploration of white space. It's not that the face is *in* the whiteness. Not at all. What he needs — he'll need to take it far enough so that the face becomes an exploration of whiteness. So, if the face turns into an exploration of whiteness, and whiteness isn't just one of the face's qualities, that might give us some traction for the task at hand. But we're getting ahead of ourselves.

From there, she gets to Russia. For her extended education. A long time being educated by the czarina, and it's tough. The czar is strange, right, and there are all these close-ups of his face, wonderful close-ups of his face. What's more, she's always dressed in white; it's incredible, as per usual with Sternberg. And then, and then, and then… she's obviously in love with the colonel, but she discovers — this is my second point, my second point of reference — she discovers, no thanks to the treacherous old czarina, who tells her, "Go down and let in the man at the door," ostensibly the old czarina's lover.

So, she goes down; it's a menial task, but she can't do anything about it—then it dawns on her. She sees that it's the colonel; the man coming up to see the old czarina is the colonel. And she's deeply shaken, since she was ready to fall in love with the colonel. Try… Don't quote me on this — correct me if I'm wrong — it's a film worth watching again and again, but anyway, mistakes aside, I *think* this is the only time where there's any shadow on Marlene's face.

And it's deep in shadow. She's no longer thinking; she's jealous. There's indignation, jealousy — she's moving through an intensive series. And I believe that in the blink of an eye, Sternberg switches to the other pole, which he holds in utter disdain, and he makes a sort of homage to the intensive face. Well, she doesn't know anymore; she just doesn't know anymore. She snaps out of it—she snaps right back out of it, and as soon as she comes to, she goes back to white, turns back into pure light. Bear in mind, again, that pure light doesn't necessarily mean "good." Then as she's collecting herself, she's mulling over horrendous things, she's thinking about something despicable, i.e., her husband's murder. As Agnes Varda says, white doesn't necessarily mean happiness. Whiteness can mean death, the dissolution of all existence, just as easily as it can mean love. So, it's not about the symbolism of shades or colors. That's not at all what's going on. It's about extracting qualities. As we'll see, all of this still comes back to our problem at hand.

But anyway, well, she's extremely white again; she's wearing her white guard uniform that suits her so well. White on white on white, thus begins — I'm exaggerating, it was already there, already fully present in her wedding with the czar — the outstanding trope found in all Sternberg

films: veils, different kinds of veils. It's about putting a white veil over a white space. There's so much to say about Sternberg's veils and veiling. But above all, anecdotes aside, I think we ought to appreciate just how much of an expert he was on the matter. I don't just mean that he had good taste, that he had great taste in veils; it's that he knew a lot about them professionally since, as he himself explains, when he first got to America he started out in a haberdashery and then later in a lace factory. And he knew all the different kinds of lacework: tulle, chiffon, muslin, lace, every single kind of lacework… He knew it all, and not just in an abstract way. He had an intimate, loving knowledge of it. It was how he saw the world. He looked at the world through a veil.

But note the extent to which this veil is no longer expressionist. The expressionist veil — formed by grids, by indentations or ridges, or by chiaroscuro — is far removed from Sternberg's veils, which were the only ones that could rightfully be called "veils," strictly speaking, since they were crafted by someone who knew their way around textiles. Veils made by someone who knows what they're doing, veils ranging from fishing lines — in many of his films, fishing line serves as a crude veil — to lace, or to incrusted voile. Anyway. The face should be sandwiched between white space and the veil.

That's what light goes through. And what about darkness? Darkness only comes in when everything's over and done with. Yes, only then does darkness fall, when everything's already happened. It's all over with, everything happened between the white space and the veil, a veil that — we still haven't looked at it very closely — a veil that doubles the white space. And between the two, there is the face. And what's left of the face? Ultimately, the face ought to be no more than an incrustation on the veil, or if you prefer, either something incrusted on the veil or else a shape sketched out onto white space.

And indeed, the wedding scene between the future empress and the future czar not only involves several kinds of veil; it culminates with her having a child. Once she's become a young mother, we get some very interesting images. There's one I'll mention here because I found it so mysterious; I'll try to describe it from memory. We get a series of images, close-ups: a veil, a veil of lilies, Marlene's face pressed against a pillow — well, it's not exactly a close-up, but it's close enough — where you get these whites working in concert, the white veil, the white pillow, the white drapes, the white face… all of it.

And there are multiple quasi-close-ups like these. There's one that I think is exactly… there's one that ends on an image that I think looks exactly like what you can now get with video relatively easily, an image where you get the feeling that… if you didn't know any better, you might say, "Oh, this was done in video," where the face really turns into an inlay, even more so because of the actual incrusted veils we're shown. He shows us voile curtains with incrustations, and then the face completely, eerily, progressively — see, he's still using series — the face becomes a part of the veil's incrustation. Well, so far, so good.

But this brings me back to my question, or rather, we're reaching an end; we can't go further. The question I have in mind is: if everything happens in whiteness, and if we're dealing with light the entire time, it's hard to imagine anything more starkly anti-expressionist. [*Electronic noise drowns out the recordings at Paris 8 and WebDeleuze; the following text is provided on both sites, but the source is not listed*]

With the illumination of the contour-face, the face thinking about something, the question is: how do we describe a space that belongs to the close-up, one I might define as triple-layered but flattened out, with no depth — a triple-layered, laminated, depthless [space]? White walls, or white drapes, the veil, with the close-up face sandwiched in between — what's my point? You can already tell what's bothering me: how to tie this problem back to a problem of space. So, my question is: Won't we again wind up with the same twofold movement of releasing qualities in film, and a bizarre potentialization of space? In other words, what's going on with white space in Sternberg? How should we characterize it? Granted the fact that I only gave one example.

So, that's where we are now. In three weeks, we'll pick back up on how this space is formed, and on white space in Sternberg. Give it some thought. Oh. [*End of recording*]

Notes

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[1] René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, in the version by Jonathan Bennett presented at www.earlymoderntexts.com, 2017.

[2] Bennett is likely right that "admiration" is a poor translation, but Deleuze makes it clear that Descartes is using the word in an idiosyncratic way.

[3] *Contour* shows up here both as "outline" and as "contour." I've left "contour" in quotes when it modifies the word, "face." Deleuze distinguishes between a "contour" face and an "intensive series" face.

[4] Here and above, Deleuze is describing the famous climax of Griffith's *Way Down East.*

[5] *Extraction* will sometimes be translated by phrases like "drawing out," "plucking out," "bringing forth."

[6] TN: Canadian.

[7] Deleuze repeatedly calls him a "colonel," but judging from the events of the film, he must have Count Alexei in mind.