

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Part 1

... and at that time, I had given a reason; I no longer remember it at all, and I remember it even less because it seems obvious to me now that there is an intermediary. Does anyone by any chance remember why I didn't want it at that time? [*Pause*]

A woman student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: That perhaps there wouldn't be one? Ah well, fine, so there is one. [*Laughter*] [*Pause, noise of chairs*]

So, I renew my call: is there no one here, are there no longer any students who aren't needing to receive the UV [*academic credit*], who haven't prepared a form? There's no one, right? Because I have to go and return them later, and in order to deal with all these details, face all these matters, I will have to take a break. So, let's start.

A student: [*Inaudible comments, but he answers Deleuze's earlier question*]

Deleuze: Ah, that's it; there is an intermediary in relation to that, that's it. Well, yes, it's true, isn't it? It is simply the mental image; I will need three examples of it, so suddenly, it's not, there is not an aspect of the mental image which would be an intermediary. We are going to add an intermediary, so one more column. Alright, that's fine. And it was obvious that something was needed; it was obvious, and you will see why. Good. [*Pause; Deleuze goes to the board*]

So there, everyone can read, I assume. I've returned to where we were before the break [*the February winter break*]. See, I have my two types of action-image with the signs that correspond to them. I remind those who were here last year, or even those who were not here, that this would require some rather long analyses on what topic? There is also a topic that we have already discovered, but that at the level of action, of the action-image, we discover it at its own level, namely the problem of spaces. It is obvious that space, the type of space which corresponds to the first form of action-image, namely that which goes from the situation to the action, from the synsign to the binomial, implies a certain type of space, but the other [type of action-image]

which proceeds via the index, which goes from the situation to the partially unveiled action, you already feel immediately that it is a kind of space which is discovered piece by piece, and which is constructed, which not only is discovered, but is constructed piece by piece, and that the problem of this second type of space is going to be the connection of the pieces, how do I connect one piece to another piece of space. Good. [Pause]

I am saying this because it's at the level of each of our types of image that we encounter problems of space. If you remember for the affection-image, we had come up against the theme of any-space-whatever. And there would be all kinds of resonances because I had two types of any-space-whatever: empty space and disconnected space, space whose parts are in any connection whatever. Note that here [*Deleuze points to the board*], if I look for the space that corresponds to the first type of action-image, I would say that it is a large ambient space. It's the ambience or, if you prefer, it's a breath-space [*espace-souffle*], and that I had developed last year; I'm not returning to this point. It is a great breath-space, the breath-ambience; it is a space of respiration, the situation, the ambience which will arouse the action and the action which will modify the situation, it really proceeds like diastole-systole. It's a respiratory space, it's a space, there.¹

That's why I don't believe in the possibility of opposing spaces like a film critic called [Henri] Agel;² I do not believe in the possibility of simply opposing spaces of expansion and spaces of contraction. It seems obvious to me that contraction and dilation are the two moments of the great breath-space, of the space of respiration. Good. [Pause]

But I would ask, what is the outer limit of the breath-space? It is empty space, and in fact, breathing occurs in a vacuum, contraction, dilation. So, any-space-whatever... if you like, the limit of this concrete space, breath-space would be any-space-whatever in the form of empty space. The other type of space is a space of progression [*cheminement*]; it is generated by progression, by connecting one piece with another. And what connects one piece of space with another? It is precisely... [*Deleuze taps the chalk against the blackboard*] a vector. And henceforth, how is this space constructed? It is not a breath-space; it's a space, literally -- last year, I tried to develop this theme -- it's a line-space [*espace ligne*] or fiber of the universe, a space of progression. It is a line of the universe. The line of the universe is made by what? By the vectors that connect one piece to another piece. [Pause] Fine. All that is fine; generally, it's fine. And if I seek what is the limit of this space, I would say the limit of this space is any-space-whatever under its other aspect, namely the connective space [*espace à connexion*] whose pieces refer to any connections whatever, that is, to a disconnected space. [Pause]

So, what I was saying last year -- here, I want to say this for both groups, for those who were here so you can make the connections and for those who weren't here so you can see that all this is a program -- I was saying, I was looking in the area, for the famous spaces, that is, mathematical spaces. About mathematical spaces, I would say generally, very generally, how is a Euclidean space defined? It is above all an ambience-space. What does this mean, concretely, mathematically, geometrically, an ambience-space? That means a space where figures can undergo certain displacements, certain transformations while remaining constant. It is the type of an ambience-space. And I would say, figures are, literally, immersed in Euclidean space or, if you prefer, I would say that figures are impressions [*empreintes*] in Euclidean space.

However little you might know about mathematics, I had tried to talk a bit about it last year.³ Riemannian space, in the geometry of [Bernhard] Riemann, how does Riemannian space appear? At its simplest, really to say some things about... really at its simplest, Riemannian space looks exactly like this [*Deleuze turns to the board*]: an infinitesimal element, an infinitesimal element is grasped in its relationship with its immediate neighborhood. The element and its immediate neighborhood allow the definition of a piece of space. However little there... to say, there is no need to have done a word of mathematics to understand what I am saying here. Even... even if there are mathematicians here, I think they will not prove me wrong; they'll just say that all I'm doing is just literature, but that's not wrong. It is not mathematically wrong. This is how Riemann proceeds.

Fine, so the infinitesimal element joined to its neighborhood and related to it with its immediate neighborhood makes it possible to define a piece of space. But between the two pieces, no connection is possible; it is a disconnected space, [*Pause*] unless one can establish for each piece of space a tangent vector, and one can, under certain conditions fixed by Riemannian geometry. You determine a vector tangent to the piece of space you have just constructed... [*Interruption of the recording*] [11:04]

... small points in the space of progression. [*Pause*] And I was saying, well, an entirely different example to confirm that, well, yes, in the great histories of Chinese and Japanese painting – that's why I had made my little [*inaudible word*] to be used by the Japanese – the two great principles of painting, I believe that they're the only ones, you remember, we saw that last year,⁴ it's what is presented as the breath-space under the form, what sign, what sign? It is only a sign; it is almost a signature. You know, in the sense, in the Renaissance -- in Western Renaissance theories, there's a whole very special notion, a particular type of sign that we call the signature, things have signatures, but it doesn't matter – the signature of this breath-space in Chinese painting is what they call the "single stroke". The single stroke is a very, very complicated thing. Well, we're just looking at that; for those who are interested, you'll see, there's a good French book on it by François Cheng, published by Éditions du Seuil, *Le Vide et le Plein*, with texts and lots of quotations.⁵

And then, there is another principle, and I already insist that this does not define, is it another space or not? No. These principles are combined, but can they be separated? Yes, they can be separated, that's how they are separated. And this other principle is what they call – oh, it's difficult, I don't have the word for it – skeleton [*ossature*], it's the skeleton, or the joint [*jointure*], the joint.⁶ The joint is really the line of the universe, [*Pause*] and it is well known, the Japanese fragmented space, the fragmented aspect. What is known? There is in *Critique*, in the last issue of *Critique*,⁷ there is an issue on Japan which seems very interesting to me in which there are a lot of things about Japanese space. [*Deleuze goes to the board*]

So, there is a first point which interested me a lot, it is when they say that almost at the level of the postal code – the postal code, it is the opposite of ours; I think it's true, all that, but it's probably true since that works fine; [*Laughter*] later, I'm going to say later what I expect from our Japanese friends who are here – You understand, ourselves, we start... it's pitiful [*Laughter*; *Deleuze writes on the blackboard the model of an address*] Monsieur the individual, the street, the district, the city, the department, the country, and finally the world, right? There's a famous

letter from Joyce like that, right? Good. The Japanese decided it would be the other way around. [A Japanese student, possibly Hidenobu Suzuki responds: That's right] That's right? They start with the city, and then the big block, and then the neighborhood, and then an area, an area where the person they are looking for is. Really, this is breath-space. That's the single stroke.

But in another way as well, if we bring in other givens, you have a space of progression where each time there is a horizon, you have a piece of space, and then how it will connect with another piece? There has to be a line of the universe [Pause] in order to go from one place to another. There, you have another type of space, a space of progression [Deleuze is inaudible as someone coughs] ... and the joint, what is it? [Deleuze goes to the board, points to the drawing] Here, it was finally the big space where things reveal themselves by appearing; there, [Deleuze indicates another element on the board] it is a space piece by piece, a space of progression where things reveal themselves while disappearing. It is well known that in Chinese paintings, one aspect of this painting is to grasp the disappearance of the thing, what they call drawing a line, and you feel that here, we are in the second type of action-image.⁸ Earlier, the postal code was typically the first type, the great synsign, the single stroke, or the great circle, the great respiratory circle. It's -- I don't know what I wanted to say anymore -- it's the single stroke.

In the other case, it is a space of progression. To connect spaces, two pieces, it takes vectors at a tangent to each piece. [Pause] And there, things are in fact grasped in their disappearance. You never stop leaving them. As stated in a text quoted by François Cheng, the important thing in the tower is the base that you cannot see and the top that is lost in the clouds. And we see very clearly, the thing only reveals itself in its disappearance. [Pause] Okay. Here then, [Deleuze indicates the drawing] the line will no longer be the single stroke; this is what they will call the "wrinkled stroke" [*le trait ridé*] since, in François Cheng's translation, there is what he calls the wrinkled stroke. See, the wrinkle here [Deleuze points to the drawing] is useful to me because it is indeed a kind of representation of vectors, vectors adjoining each piece of space. [Pause]

So, last year – I'm not going back to it, but at the same time, I'm extending too much, but I'm really interested in this – I said last year, take... yes, it's not difficult. Imagine you want to paint a pike, and you are a Japanese painter; you want to paint a pike. Well, painting a pike, I don't know, a pike, well, I think it's one of the most beautiful fish. So, you have to paint it in two ways at the same time. It is like a part of the cosmic breath; a pike is a degree of cosmic respiration. [Pause] In a sense, it's an impression [*empreinte*]; [Pause] in a sense, there's a single stroke of the pike. [Pause] It's the being-in-the-world of the pike; it's the appearing [*l'apparaître*] of the pike, and if you miss the pike's appearing, however beautiful your drawing, you've really got nothing.

But there is something else as well. How do you expect to paint the pike without establishing a line of the universe that will connect it, reconnect it to – I'm speaking nonsense -- the stone at the bottom of the water that it brushes against in passing, [Pause] and also the tall grass on the shore where it hides, where it hides? The pike, [Deleuze draws on the board] flat stones at the bottom, tall grasses on the edge, these lines of the universe. There, it's a wrinkled line, [Deleuze indicates the drawing] and it's the pike's "not-stopping-to-disappear" [*ne-pas-cesser-de-disparaître*]. [Pause]

Last year, I was saying – I'm going back to this because now I grasp it a lot more; I would still like to move forward – if you take, from the two Japanese filmmakers who are the most, who are the most familiar to us, or who we believe, rightly or wrongly, possibly wrongly, are closest to us, [Akira] Kurosawa and [Kenji] Mizoguchi, Kurosawa, it's obvious to me that it's a breath-space above all; it is the respiration-space, and furthermore, I can give you Kurosawa's signature: it's the single stroke. [*Deleuze draws on the board*] Kurosawa's signature, and maybe that means something in Japanese; here, that would be, that would be too much. [*Pause; Deleuze draws on the board*] Imagine that thick, very thick, here. [*Pause*] There you go. That's Kurosawa's signature. -- [*Deleuze speaks to a Japanese student*] Doesn't that mean anything? [*Laughter*] No? In my opinion, it should mean "mountain forest". Doesn't that mean "mountain forest"? No? [*Inaudible answer*] But in Chinese, maybe, right? [*Laughter*] No? Alright, that's failed.

In fact, I am saying that because... and that's it, among Kurosawa's splendid images, it starts in order, a vertical descent from top to bottom of the screen, something, anything that descends, a powerful descent from top to bottom, sometimes does... For example, the messenger who descends from the very top of the screen, who descends all the way to the bottom. And this movement is crossed [*Deleuze draws on the board*] by a lateral movement from right to left, and a lateral movement from left to right.

Hence the rain in Kurosawa's work. He is one of the greatest filmmakers of rain, and there too, there's no confusion; Kurosawa's rain is not the rain of Antonioni. And we can see very well what Kurosawa's rain is. Kurosawa's rain is what serves as the great vertical movement. This is the single stroke component. If you take "The Seven Samurai" [1954], what do you see? A curtain of rain, [*Deleuze draws on the board*] and the brigands who are trapped in the village, with the two exits closed, and who do not stop acting in the rain... That's Kurosawa's signature. [*Pause*] Fine.

Because he has a great idea, which is what makes Kurosawa a metaphysician. How does he manage to give this scope to the ambience-space, to the respiration-space? It's because he's a guy who believes. If we are looking for metaphysics – here, I am digressing into metaphysics and cinema – obviously, what we could call the presence of a metaphysics in cinema is not the metaphysical depth of the thought of a filmmaker. Why? Because if you want to have metaphysical depth, suppose he could, well, he would do metaphysics; he wouldn't make movies, that's obvious. On the other hand, there can be a presence of metaphysics in cinema, but if you translate it in terms of metaphysics, it's not worth much, and at the same time, it's truly metaphysics.

What is Kurosawa's idea? It's... It seems to me very simple, very simple, but very beautiful. It is the idea that action presupposes a question, action presupposes a hidden question. [*Pause*] So if you don't find the question or you don't know the question, don't even bother to act. You will tell me, I don't know, what does that mean? Once again, attempt to live things. Understand? It's a way of life, that. Myself, I don't know, if there are many people who act, even at the level of daily life, and maybe it's Japanese: not to act without having considered the question fully. That's why Kurosawa's films are often divided into two parts: a long part, considering the question

fully, a second part where the action happens, and there's no question of acting if you did not consider the question fully.

But, if someone asks me, "what time is it?", you ask us, "what time is it?", if there's no answer, [Laughter] either I don't have a watch, or else someone answer, "It's time". I imagine someone Japanese, no, to consider the question fully, [Laughter] -- for you, it's not true -- let's imagine a Japanese person like that, to consider the question fully, it means say what? That means knowing the givens [données], but what are the givens? This is how [Deleuze goes to the board], let's widen the space to find out: the givens are not the givens of the action as in American action cinema, for example. The givens are the givens of a problem or question that is enveloped by the situation. Every situation envelops a question that must be discerned. So American cinema, if you will, was S-A-S, in fact, situation-action, but Kurosawa is also the S-A-S pattern. But in what way does he add a dimension? He brings it to metaphysics, that is, this kind of great respiration-space because, instead of the givens being the givens of the situation, the givens are the givens of an implied problem, enveloped in the situation.⁹

There is a film by Kurosawa which is also one of his masterpieces, which in French is translated as "Vivre" ["To Live", 1952; "Ikiru"], which is exactly that: a guy who is condemned, who is condemned, knows that he is going to die, for him, it's... his question is how, how to spend the last moments that remain to me and then what to do. There will be a whole first part which will be research into the givens of the question. It is not just by asking a question that I've ascertained the givens of the question; what are the givens of the question? For him, does it mean having as much fun as possible in the months he has left? Or else, does it mean something quite different, to do something useful? And what does it mean to do something useful for someone who is going to die in a few months? That's it, the set of givens that are no longer the givens of the situation, which are the givens of a question hidden in the situation. There is something very, very curious here, and "To Live" is... I don't have time to discuss "To Live", but it seems to me a very, very extraordinary film in this respect because... well, well, no matter.

I'm moving on to another case. See, basically, I tried to say a bit on how Kurosawa's was this type of large respiration-space under the sign of the single stroke. In Mizoguchi, you can clearly see how this proceeds, including in the sequence shots, that is, I don't want to say that it proceeds through fragmented shots. On the contrary, he's not... He's a great author of sequence shots. And that's not what matters; there is sometimes fragmentation, there is a very frequent fragmentation in Mizoguchi's work. But even when it's by sequence shots, it's because he grasps the line of the universe. And the sequence shot in his work is the connection of the pieces with extremely skillful reframing in a sequence shot, and this time, it's the operation of reframing which works exactly like the linkage of vectors. And the vectors connected to each other constitute a line of the universe.

But I would say that there is also metaphysics; he's a metaphysician because... I just tried to state the idea, what is Kurosawa's idea? So, well, that's a metaphysical idea in cinema. There we are, that's it, I think it's truly a metaphysical idea. Someone who says to you, yes, you believe that the givens are exactly the givens of the situation? But not at all. The givens, that means something quite different. The givens, once again, are the givens of a question that you don't know in

advance and that is buried in a situation. And if you haven't reached the question, well, you can only do stupid things, ultimately.

Mizoguchi has another idea, also metaphysical, but metaphysics is practice. He is known for his love for prostitutes, Mizoguchi. He loved them very much in his life, he adored them. Hey, fine. *[Pause]* Why? All life, life is metaphysics as well, right? I do think he had an idea: it is that the lines of the universe are something very precious because, for him, it was the essence of space. Once again, a space, his space is not a respiration-space; it is a progression-space; it is a line of the universe-space, with connection of vectors. But such a space, it must be traced, a line of the universe; that's not easy, for everyone to find their own, just as Kurosawa would tell us that everyone finds the question that is buried in the situations in which they put themselves, or even where they find themselves caught, the obsessive question that we did not know. Anyway, these are methods; I mean, all that, it's philosophy.

Well, there is no contradiction there; Mizoguchi tells us something else. He would tell us, but just like the pike traces its line of the universe, you will tell me, oh, there is a species of pike, ah yes, a species, okay; it's not certain that the Japanese recognize the validity, the individual difference between species, not certain. And from the pike to the flat stone in the bottom that it grazes, and to the tall grass where it hides, are these specific characteristics of the pike? No, it's a line of the universe. I can say at most that it is the world of the pike, but a vectorized world, not a world of ambience. It's also a world of ambience, fine, and so Mizoguchi would tell us, let everyone make their own line of the universe. That's metaphysics as well.

What would that mean? Well, we're all pike! Let everyone discover, for example, what he's going to slide on, what he's going to bury himself in to hide himself, let everyone find his wrinkled stroke, his wrinkled strokes, let everyone find their way of disappearing, fine, *[Pause]* yes, their lines of the universe. There is no reason for two lines of the universe to be strictly similar. Only, there you go, Mizoguchi's metaphysical development, one indeed has to understand metaphysics; he has a firm grasp not only on personal life, but on social life, all that. Rightly or wrongly, it's because his excessive love of women resulted in Mizoguchi thinking that a line of the universe passes through women, at least as men are concerned, and that in a certain way, it is women who hold the lines of the universe. "Who hold", what does that mean? Not that they command them, no, but in any case, there is no line of the universe at the level of the man that does not pass through women. And socially as well as in Mizoguchi's historical films and in his modern films, what fascinates Mizoguchi? The situation of women's oppression. *[Pause]* So here, this is Mizoguchi as sociologist. But Mizoguchi as sociologist and Mizoguchi as metaphysician are the same. The banal comment, "women are in a situation of oppression" only gains interest for Mizoguchi and for us if you complete it with the metaphysical proposition "lines of the universe [passing] through women". Because if women are in a social situation of oppression and reduction to zero, it is all the lines of the universe that are threatened.

And the most solid lines of the universe, the most obvious according to Mizoguchi, are those that bind the man and woman lovers in an authentic love, and it's the lines of the universe that, or that's what binds the mother and her son, that will trace a line of the universe. But there we have it, because women are the object of this oppression, or else the lines of the universe will only be lines of flight that lead to death, the great love of the lovers of the "The Woman in the Rumor"

(1954), for example, in the film "The Woman in the Rumor", or much worse still in a sense -- because there is nonetheless a line of the universe that the crucified lovers trace before being caught and condemned -- or much worse still, a line of the universe will be completely severed as between mother and daughter, mother and son in the splendid image [in "The Life of O'Haru" (1952)] where the young prince is surrounded by his dignitaries, and his mother tries to reach him, she is perpetually rejected. There is a famous long sequence shot by Mizoguchi where we see, literally, this kind of dotted line of the universe that is broken, shattered. It is a completely different world; this is the world of the wrinkled stroke, of the line of the universe obtained by progression, by vectorization, with dangers that behave, just as there was a danger with Kurosawa, a masterly danger, that of ignoring the givens of the question, and it was "Throne of Blood" (1957), that is, it was Macbeth. At that moment, the respiration-space yielded a kind of cobweb which was locked around him. He didn't understand anything about the givens of the question. He had assessed the situation based on the givens. He had assessed the givens of the question, and he did not know that the givens of the question are nothing, that if one does not discern the givens of the question hidden in the situation, one is defeated in advance. At that moment, it's the spider-space, and you're caught in this space like a fly, really. Fine.

Well, the Mizoguchi's danger is how to draw the lines of the universe in a world where women are slaves. So, these are their very own problems, and I mean that throughout their cinema, they never stop reworking exactly, if you like, exactly as a philosopher reworks his problems and his questions. He gives them a philosophical development; here, there are properly speaking metaphysical questions which receive a development through images. As a result, in fact, if you try to translate them into metaphysical answers or discourse, it's zero, and you'll say that Kurosawa's thought doesn't go far. But obviously, no, it's not his thought that is meant to go far, otherwise once again, he would be doing philosophy. What is meant to go far are the images because what is meant to go far are the questions that he asked, and that he asked in and through images. And commenting on cinema is like commenting on a text of another nature; it is knowing how to discern these questions. Fine.

So, all that I have just said for the moment, you see, is that kind of relationship between these two types [of space]. But you immediately feel the point we are reaching: it is that these two completely different spaces -- the space of the synsign or of the single stroke, and the space of the vector... of the synsign or of the impression, if you will, and of the single stroke, and the space of the vector or of the wrinkled stroke, the respiration-space and the progression-space -- these are the two forms of the action-image. Good. These are the two forms of the action-image. But I would say, fine, well then, you already have to admire that there are vocations. There are vocations, in what sense? In the sense that you have filmmakers who are obviously committed to one or the other of these two forms.¹⁰ I have just given an example, yet with exceptions, yes; I have just given an example: the greater part of Mizoguchi's work [*Deleuze indicates what he had drawn on the board*] seems to me to belong to the second type of space; the greater part of Kurosawa's work seems to me to belong to the first type of space.

Last year, I chose an example, I believe. I was saying that, well yes, among the Russians, rather among the Soviets, in Soviet cinema, the Pudovkin space is of the second type, in a completely different way than... It's a progressive space, with connection of the pieces of space or with, finally, pieces of space coinciding with moments of consciousness. It is a vectorized space; it is a

vector space with Pudovkin, and with Dovzhenko, it is a large space in orientation, it is an impression-space [*espace-empreinte*]. So clearly, there is, in this sense, and it seems to me legitimate to speak of a particular tendency or school, in cinema as elsewhere. I don't mean at all that Dovzhenko's space is the same as Mizoguchi's. He goes in the directions [*someone coughs*] that we know. It's the same structure of space between [them], going very far, very broadly. I mean, these are authors who are dedicated, who have a predilection for a particular [form] or another.¹¹

But there you are, [*Deleuze laughs*] but there you are, I was already saying this last year, you have strange authors – but who are no better than the others; you mustn't believe that... -- who either are straddling – because categories are always, there are always passages; all that is divided, but it's not "either, or" -- either they are straddling, or else, that is, they seem to be indifferent; one must believe that their problem is elsewhere. They will sometimes create for you a film [*Deleuze taps on the board*] in the first manner action-image, sometimes a film in the second manner action-image. In my opinion, [*Deleuze laughs*] the film can be brilliant, yet it will be so for other reasons. It is because their problem is not fundamentally space; so, they can handle very different spaces, but they remain quite exterior to... it's because their problem, their real problem is elsewhere.

But there are other cases than indifferent authors who pass very easily from one form to another. There are those who invent, which now create a transforming form [*forme à transformation*], or what is perhaps not the same thing, a deforming form, the transformable or deformable form. What does that mean, a transformable or deformable form?¹² This is a form in which a constant passage occurs from the first formula to the second formula, and from the second formula to the first formula. It is obvious that this space of transformations or deformations will be a space, even original, which will perpetually ensure the conversion of the first space into the second, and the second space into the first. They are “conversion spaces”. And that's why conversion spaces, between the respiration-space or the progression-space, and that's why, thank God, I'm adding a column [*to the diagram drawn on the board*]. -- You see, I don't want to go too far – I'm adding a column having as title, ... or first-form action or second-form action, which will have as its main title, “transformation” or “conversion”, from one form to another.¹³ [*Pause*]

This column will contain what I can call spaces of transformation or deformation, rather the transforming or deforming spaces. And for this column, we will need signs, and if I am already announcing why I place it here so that you understand better, it should not be surprising that in the spaces in which it doesn't stop converting one into two and two into one, there is the emergence of a third, that is, there is already the emergence of what one can call a Thirdness. As a result, this column will be the passage from action, from the action-image, that is, from Secondness, to the mental image, which we have not yet seen, that is, Thirdness.

So, my conversion spaces which come after, right, [*Deleuze indicates the diagram*] which come here, here I'm marking, if you like, a transformation or passage from one form to another, from form one to form two, above, and I need signs in reserve [*pour escompte*]. I'm just saying that these signs will be the emergence of the birth of Thirdness such that this column -- I haven't drawn it but you understand very well -- this column will be the transition from the action-image Secondness to Thirdness, the mental image. [*Pause*] Do you understand? It's clear, right?

So, I mean, so, I mean there, to finish up these, these groupings, let's search right away: well yes, what will that mean? So, how would a transforming space be original in itself while ensuring a perpetual conversion from one to the other? Last year, I gave an example: why did [Sergei] Eisenstein, rightly or wrongly... And he is wrong; sometimes he thinks he is the master; he ultimately thinks himself the best of all Soviet filmmakers, because, in a certain way, he thinks that, very naturally, he creates the synthesis, [Pause] that he brings together both the properties of [Vsevolod] Pudovkin space and the properties of [Alexander] Dovzhenko space. Dovzhenko came later; well, no matter. But when Dovzhenko emerges as an event, Eisenstein can tell himself, yes, he was one of my sons. [Pause] With [Dziga] Vertov, it's a bloody settling of scores, precisely because Vertov won't stop saying about Eisenstein: but don't you see that this is syncretism, a mixture, a mixture? Fine. That's because there are all kinds of nuances between a powerful synthesis and a mixture.

But in what way is... What is it? How does Eisenstein manage to unite the two spaces? [Pause] He never hid his predilection for the large form, that is, [Deleuze taps very hard on the board] the great synsign, the impression, the respiration-space, where we go from situation to action. There are all kinds of texts, even very concrete texts. There is a text, I remember, there is an interview with a secondary Soviet filmmaker called Mikhail Romm,¹⁴ -- I don't know, R-O-M-M -- which is -- go look in *Cahiers du cinema* that is going to publish this interview with Romm -- which is very interesting, interesting because Romm goes to see Eisenstein, and Romm wanted to adapt a short story by Maupassant, and the short story is made up of two parts. There's one part -- it's [the story] "Boule de suif" -- there's a part that describes Rouen occupied by the Germans, and another part that is the story of a stagecoach or everything that happens in the stagecoach. Eisenstein says to him, that's all very nice, but which part do you choose? What Eisenstein was doing was almost a challenge, he was the master, and Romm is a generation below. "Which part do you choose?" [Romm] says, "obviously, the stagecoach," and Eisenstein says, "oh well, look, I can't do much for you, because obviously I would have chosen the other one, the large part. You're choosing the small story; I'd choose the large story." The conversation begins like this, it goes forth like this, that is, for all appearances, Eisenstein did not harm himself regarding the action-situation, but notice already that Vertov, if we try to imagine that he's standing there in the corner, saying, "No, but, what is he doing, Eisenstein?", that he's a bourgeois who is only re-adapting American cinema, and he is completely Americanized, he is rotten, this Eisenstein, and this is, this is, at the time, this settling of scores between Eisenstein and Vertov is very, very violent. He [Vertov] says, that's not dialectics. What does that mean, action-situation? No, right?

Eisenstein's supposed answer. You see here, Vertov is outside the frame, and he just spoke in voiceover [Laughter], "Can't you see? This is a bourgeois formulation, that's an American formulation, it's American cinema". What will Eisenstein answer, deeply stung, right? He's going to insult Vertov, but that's not our problem. To defend himself, he will say, "not at all, not at all! That's not what I'm doing since" -- we saw this, we saw it before the break [*the February 1, 1983 session*], "since I'm dialectizing this form. In fact, instead of subjecting it to alternate montage, to parallel montage," as we saw concerning the history film, "I'm subjecting it to a dialectical law." What does that mean? It means that, in fact, the large form, [Deleuze writes on the board] the kind of universe-circle which defines the great synsign in the American image, well, that's how it is, [Deleuze writes] it is diametrically divided, as we have seen, hence the

alternate montage: there is the world of the poor and there is the world of the rich, and that's how it is.

To mix everything up, I would say that this intersects well with Kurosawa's works; it's the same. As we saw, he's a great humanist; the Americans are also great humanists. [D.W.] Griffith's work is from a great humanist, except when it concerns Blacks, [*Laughter*] and otherwise, that's no humanism. Kurosawa is a great humanist because there's the world of hell and the world of the rich, there's the world of the poor people and the world of the rich.¹⁵ And like the theme in "To Live", no, not "To Live", in what is translated precisely a "Between Heaven and Hell" ["High and Low/Heaven and Hell" (1963)], which literally in Japanese, I believe, is "the high and the low"...

Hideobu Suzuki [*beside the microphone*]: No, it's heaven and hell.

Deleuze: No? Is it also "heaven and hell"? Well, heaven and hell, it's the world of the rich and the world of the poor. And the question in this film by Kurosawa is: is there no way for the rich to understand the poor and for the poor to understand something about the rich? I'm not saying [that] this is the question because Kurosawa's question is much deeper, but it's one of the themes that comes up in the film. It is a theme that is typically humanist, liberal humanist, similarly for Griffith; well, there are the rich and there are the poor.¹⁶

Alternate montage, you remember what Eisenstein said: American-style alternate montage presupposes a whole conception of society, and he [*in the supposed interview with Vertov*], he says, "not at all, not at all. I'm not remaining within the American image because I'm operating through a law of growth, a law of development, a dialectical law, the law of the One which becomes Two, that is, which shows why there are rich people and why there are poor [people]."¹⁷ So, he will say, "I am a dialectician", and that changes everything; it changes everything, especially in terms of montage. It's called alternate montage.

So, he thinks it's possible to keep [*Deleuze taps on the board*] the great space of the synsign by dialectizing, that is, by subjecting it to a law of production... [*Interruption of the recording*]

[*Return to Vertov's voice*] "...dialectic, whether there is dialectic, whether there is dialectic or not, you're associating with humanism, you're associating with humanism, so that's it". Eisenstein is more and more annoyed here because, obviously, no, he gets out of this by saying, "but, the dialectic is that of man and nature united". In other words, there is no dialectic of nature.¹⁸ Vertov doubles over in laughter because if there is no dialectic of nature, there is no dialectic at all according to him, and moreover, everything is based on a dialectic of matter. An annoyed Eisenstein retaliates, and here, the riposte becomes beautiful, it seems to me: "The time has not yet come, the time has not yet come to assign 'eye' " -- the eye of matter -- "We still have to make a cinema-fist [*ciné 'coup de poing'*], a cinema-fist [*Pause*] that strikes man and deals with a nature united to man". Alright, that's getting complicated.¹⁹

Let's get back to Eisenstein. What is his law of development? He explains it to us precisely; suddenly, it explains very well the title he gives to his project, his great historical project, *The Non-indifferent Nature*.²⁰ See what that indeed means, non-indifferent nature. It is not at all as

has been said simply, it seems to me, in these histories of cinema, that Eisenstein was acutely aware that nature or the landscape participates in a cinematographic image and participates in the action. It is much more, it is much more important than that. It is the assertion that the dialectic [Pause] cannot be a dialectic of nature separated from man, that therefore there is no dialectical materialism. This question has never stopped... Once again, I believe I've already told you about it, [the question] being taken up around Sartre. In Sartre's era, all this discussion was remade, reconstituted, is there a dialectic of nature or is there a dialectic of man in situation in the world? Sartre stated very strongly, there is no dialectic of matter, and it is not by chance that Sartre called himself a humanist. [Pause] But, in that respect, Sartre was very Eisensteinian about this problem. Good.

But his law, his law of production, of this space, what does that mean? He states it in *Non-Indifferent Nature*. It's going to be the spiral, good.²¹ That is typically the spiral; we saw it, [Deleuze writes on the board] we saw it last year, we saw it again this year, I believe: it's typically respiration-space, it is large space, it is the synsign. The spiral is the equivalent of the single stroke. [Pause] Good. However, Eisenstein always tells us, be careful, do not confuse it with American cinema, whatever my complacency with American cinema may be. And in fact, Eisenstein has a great deal of admiration for American cinema, and he says, for me, if I distinguish myself from it, once again, it is at a level which is really not at all abstract, namely, I've submitted the large space to a law, a law of production and a law of growth.

What is this law of production of the spiral? It obeys a law borrowed from – this is dear to Eisenstein; he is so curious; this seems so idealistic, he's strange, Eisenstein – in the “golden section” or “golden ratio”, well, let's say, whatever, a certain proportion, to a certain proportion, to a certain geometric proportion, the golden section.²² Hold on to this, you will see; that is very important in the teaching of painting, all that. And here we have Eisenstein who takes up this story of the golden section and the organization of images according to the golden section.

But the golden section, as he shows very well, allows him to assign caesuras to the twists of the spiral, [Deleuze writes on the board] [Pause] – here is the spiral – related to the laws of the golden section, that is, to the law of proportion. Then, he is able to assign remarkable points, privileged points on the spiral. [Pause] And he goes so far as to say -- and this is scientific determination, while the Americans have remained purely empirical -- and here he chants his verse: "Thanks to Marxism and in dialectics, I reach a scientific level". Well, you see, he submits the spiral, and then as required, he's going to slip out of the simple duality, the world of the rich and the world of the poor -- it's at least going to bring him that – this is going to engender the law of the spiral according to the proportional rules of the golden section.

Just remember, no matter, even if you don't understand, you will understand about Eisenstein – but yes, there is nothing to understand – that the golden section allows him to assign caesuras, [65: 00] points as remarkable points. From one remarkable point to another, there will unfold a leap or a qualitative leap, [Pause] a qualitative change sustained by a quantitative continuity, and there too, he can say “I am a dialectician”. This is the famous second law of dialectics, how quantity turns into quality. Well, there is a quantitative continuity, and at some critical point, the quantitative change morphs into a new quality. I'm losing my hair one by one -- it's an example taken from Eisenstein, that's why I'm quoting it, an old example from the Greeks because this has

been a problem for philosophy from the beginning -- I am losing my hair one by one, and there is a moment when someone says, "you are bald". I am losing my hair one by one, quantitative continuity, but there is a moment when I am told, "ah, but you are bald", a new quality. So, it is the qualitative leap underpinned by a quantitative continuity.

So, you see, what is Eisenstein's transforming space? I would say, the spiral and its engendering are completely [*Deleuze taps on the board*] the first form action-image. This is the respiration-space... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1 :06 :54]

Part 2

... This is the great spiral. This is the respiratory spiral. This is the single stroke. What is Eisenstein's originality from this point of view? Not to present it as a fact of the universe but to subject it to a law of production, a law of dialectical production. So, he already gains his full originality.

Second point but be careful: this law of dialectical production allows him at the same time to graft onto this first form the second form. Because what will the second form be? As the law of production of the spiral, namely the golden ratio, allows him to assign remarkable points on the spiral, there will be vectors which will jump -- and he himself uses the word "vector" -- there will be vectors that will jump from one remarkable point to another remarkable point, and we will be completely in the second form, the space of indices, the space of indices and vectors. One moment, with ellipse, jump to another moment: change of quality. These are Eisenstein's famous qualitative changes, jumps, qualitative leaps. He will have grafted form two onto form one, and he will have really grafted it in a completely coherent way.

So, needless to say that, always here, you understand the opposition here. A guy like Vertov can't stand such a thing. He finds, well, that it's the worst thing that could happen, that it's a betrayal, really. I don't know if he would have had Eisenstein shot if he had been able to, but for him, this is to deny completely every innovation that Soviet cinema was to bring forth. It was simply offering a dialectical version of American cinema. For Eisenstein, on the contrary, this meant making true dialectical cinema, whereas Vertov, according to Eisenstein, will only create mannerism; with its dialectic of matter, it will be mannerism, it will be Marxism at the level of electrons. But here, there is something in which... it's no longer even a question of saying which one is right; it's a question of seeing where something irreducible passes from one to the other.

So, here, this is a relatively clear example. I mean, you see, we have passed... I am saying, Eisenstein's space is a transforming space. Why? Because he operates a conversion from the large form one to the small form two, and vice versa. He operates a transformation of the S-A-S space into the A-S-A space, of the respiration-space into the progression-space, [*Pause*] the qualitative leap being the progression of which we only grasp, here, two privileged moments, it's the vector. But then, then it's a graft. That's all there would be! That's all there would be! Is that all there would be? That's not all there is!

I mean, you will tell me, well, if it stopped there, I would say: this is still a synthesis of two spaces. He synthesized the two forms of action-images. That would already be beautiful, that

would already be very beautiful. But he doesn't just do that. There's something that seems to me, it's really difficult, I don't know, very difficult where we'd have to place... Here's what he's telling us... I'm returning to the topic of montage. He told us a first thing, Eisenstein, he told us: be careful, I don't conceive of montage like the Americans since, since Griffith, the Americans conceive of montage as parallel montage. But if they conceive of montage as parallel montage, it is because they have a liberal humanist conception of society. There are the rich, there are the poor, and then there you go. That, as we have seen, is very interesting.

But there is a second point, and whatever people say, in my opinion, he never abandoned it. Eisenstein says: I am bringing something radically new to montage. It's not only subjecting it to a cause, subjecting the so-called parallel phenomena to a cause, which would already be a great difference. There is a second point; it's this, he says: I am the inventor of a very special montage that I call the "montage of attraction". And montage of attraction is one of his notions... When we look at Eisenstein's texts, we come out of them feeling completely dazed, we feel that there is a great idea in there; to summarize this seems to me abominably difficult. In the histories of cinema, I don't see... in any case, in the ones that I know, I don't see, I don't see that they get this story straight. Surely there are people who have written about it, but I don't know. So, myself, I would like to say, because I greatly need it here, I would like to choose two very simple examples because I am struck by "montage of attraction" in Eisenstein, that "attraction" has indeed two meanings.²³

We will see little by little what montage of attraction is for him: it is the second original aspect of his montage. In my opinion, it is attraction in the sense of the park, in the sense of a music hall, in the sense of a circus, and he says it all the time, that he claims a link to the circus, he claims a link the theater of agitation. Even more, what he calls "montage of attraction", he began to create it in theater productions. It means inserting an attraction, a number, really. There is an attraction suddenly that arrives to cut the action. [*Pause*] And you can conceive of a film almost like a sequence of attractions, I don't know. So there it is: let's say, following Eisenstein, I call first, it seems to me -- all that is "it seems to me" because, for once, these texts appear very, very difficult -- I would say the first meaning of "attraction" for Eisenstein is a scene in the sense of a music-hall scene, a circus scene or act, which comes to interrupt the action, which occurs in the action-image to interrupt, apparently, the action, to suspend it.

But for montage of attraction, attraction has another meaning according to Eisenstein's text. And he gives both meanings, it's not his job, he's not interested in looking for the relationship between the two. He speaks at one point of an "attractional calculation", at least according to the French translation. Attractional calculation: there then is attraction in the sense of a law of attraction. It's no longer, it's no longer the circus, it's [Isaac] Newton. Images attract each other. There would be laws of attraction between images just as there are laws of attraction between bodies. To my knowledge, there is not the slightest analysis in Eisenstein to link these two possible meanings of the word "attraction". Why is there the same word? Basically, it's because "attraction" is what is supposed to attract the public. That does not prevent there from being a "circus" meaning and a scientific meaning. I claim a unity of both meanings.

For Eisenstein, the montage of so-called "attraction" is both. It is therefore, on the one hand, a scene which is valid for itself, a scene which is valid for itself, and which interrupts the action of

the action-image, and secondly it is an image in an attractional relationship with other pictures. And any attraction in the sense of Eisenstein has to -- let's go one step further before we take a break since I have to go to the secretariat for this UV [*academic credit*] bullshit stuff, all that -- so let's start from scratch; I can't because the texts themselves, Eisenstein's texts, we'll see at the end if this works. I am saying, let's consider some examples right away.

I see two obvious cases of attraction in Eisenstein, even if it does not correspond to what he says; I mean, you trust me for a little while, and then we'll see if this lands us on our feet, or on the feet of the text, of Eisenstein's text. I obviously see two types of images that can be called "attraction" in his work. Sometimes these are images, scenes, which one could call..., or representations, these are called representations to indicate that they apparently interrupt the course of the action-image, they are theatrical representations, [*Pause*] sometimes they are plastic representations. There you go.

An example of theatrical performance: in "Ivan the Terrible", second part, [*Pause*] Tsar Ivan has just had the boyars beheaded, and the surviving boyars engage in a veritable comedic sketch in which they portray their beheaded companions as angels being tortured by demons, [*Pause*] and angels who are obviously protected by heaven and who are tormented by demons. A very strange little scene, very beautiful, where in my memory, there are three, the three boyars, there are three angels, the three, like that, there are demons dancing, all that... It's a veritable theatrical representation of an action that has just happened, namely the beheading of the boyars, and which allows the surviving boyars, as it were, to mime what has just happened to reinforce their hatred against Ivan the Terrible. There you are, a little representation, it's an attraction that comes, like that, in the midst of the action-image.

Second example, even more beautiful and more terrible: this time, it is on Ivan's side. Ivan decided that it was necessary to finish with the boyars, that it was necessary for him to do this, there, always following the law, he made a qualitative leap, that is, what for him was sacred until then, namely his aunt, although the leader of the boyars, his aunt who was sacred to him through family ties, finished all that; we'll see what we'll see! So, he made a qualitative leap, a new situation and, as his aunt wants to put a weakling son in his place on the throne, her own weakling son, hers, the aunt's, he has decided to assassinate the weakling son and put an end to the aunt. And in fact, the aunt will go mad, well, in an admirable scene. But he invites the weakling son to a big lunch-dinner-gala, [*Pause*] and we know that at the end of the dinner, the son will be taken care of, will be murdered. Right in the middle of this action-situation structure, he inserts a splendid, splendid theatrical performance which is the spectacle that he, Ivan the Terrible -- see how, all the same, he melts this into the action, but no one is fooled; it's an attraction -- [*Pause*] the spectacle of the dancers. And at that moment appear the big red scenes, the big red-colored scenes, with all kinds of red, different reds, from saturated to washed out, from saturated to washed out, there is everything that you want there, all those reds from the great stage in which there are all sorts of gesticulating, leaping clowns, etc. It's another theatrical performance. I am saying, here are two cases in "Ivan le Terrible" of theatrical representation which seem to interrupt the course of the action-image, of the action-form. You see why this interests me, because we are in the process of discovering the third, we are on the way to the third.

The second example, I was saying, there are not only theatrical performances; there are plastic representations. And it would be fascinating [84:00] to inquire into which case Eisenstein chooses a theatrical representation and in which case he chooses a plastic representation because, at least, once to my knowledge, he posed the problem: how to choose, when you want to create an attraction? Is he the only one who created attractions? Already you should feel that it is perhaps not just him, that there are perhaps others but that it is no longer visible, or else others who, then, have adopted the theme of attractions in Eisenstein, but in a completely different way. This is going to launch us into a very curious story, it seems to me.

What is a plastic representation? At its simplest, this time, it's a series of statues, of sculptures, I mean, some series of statues which prolong an action-image by dragging it out of its natural course, acting like a detour. Instead of an action-image continuing, we see it linked with a series of plastic representations. The plastic representation can be reduced to an image. In this case, one hardly sees it, it hardly distracts. But we notice something unusual when it includes -- and in my opinion, it always includes at least virtually -- several successive images. [*Pause*] Example: in "October" [1928], frequently, a character at one point in the action is as if replaced by a statue. Very often we understand right away, it's almost an association of ideas. Kerensky who takes himself for Napoleon: a bust of Napoleon is projected. Up to that point, it's nothing. If that's all there were, we could not speak about an attraction.

It gets more complicated when, for example, at one point in the action, a counterrevolutionary invokes the fatherland and religion, always [*word not clear*], he invokes the fatherland and religion, and at that moment, a series of statues of gods gets linked to the image. I don't remember very well, but let's say there are -- I'm saying anything but it's possible -- in any case I'm sure there are Buddhas; let's say there is one or more crucifixes, or even fetish gods from Africa, well, all that, fine. There is a series of plastic representations of gods that is inserted. I would say: it's a beautiful case of performances, this time no longer theatrical, grant me that, this is different; these are sculptural representations. I prefer "plastic representation" because it is broader. Fine.

I'm choosing another film: [*Pause*] it's "The General Line" [1929], the famous story in which psychoanalysis has wreaked disasters, havoc. The creamer [*l'écrémeuse*], the creamer... You know, the problem is: there is the creamer that has arrived in the village, it is the innovation of the Soviet revolution; these guys are there standing around: is it going to produce cream or not? A creamer produces cream, I don't know. Is the machine going to work? And there's the wait for the first drop. And then there's the first drop that falls, [*Pause*] the drop that falls, and then there's going to be the stream of... what comes out of the creamer? Milk? Anyway, you see, it's milk. What comes out of the creamer? Milk, the stream of milk, the ever more powerful stream of milk. Here we are. We're within the perspective of an action-image.

Eisenstein explicitly poses the question: in order to introduce the pathetic -- I didn't say it but it doesn't matter, "the pathetic" is the name that Eisenstein gives to the second form, the name of the first being for him "the organic", organic and pathetic, and we have seen that he linked the organic to the pathetic -- "How to obtain the pathetic?" he says, in "The Battleship [Potemkin]" there the pages are very beautiful, very concrete, he says, you understand in "The Battleship Potemkin", I had no problem because the subject itself was pathetic. So, introducing pathos into

the organic representation was not difficult. The subject was so pathetic, namely: are the sailors going to shoot? Will the squadron fire? That's pathetic, that's pathetic; no problem. Everyone feels it as pathetic unless they don't have a revolutionary heart. But here, all the same, will the drop fall from the creamer? [*Laughter*] He says, even though we are revolutionary – the pages by Eisenstein are very beautiful – it's still not pathetic. So, what could I do -- he says it himself – to patheticize [*pathétiser*]? That is very interesting. Notice what he is telling us in "The Battleship Potemkin". I could be satisfied with what I -- here I am speaking on my own behalf – so far, I have just related to you: the great spiral, the assignment of remarkable points, the qualitative leap from one remarkable point to another.

But in other cases, that's not possible. To create a montage of attraction -- that's where this connects to us, via attraction – to create montage of attraction then, how does he render this wait for the first drop pathetic? He says, I had a solution: to have a kind of peasant dance to break out as soon as it starts to flow. What does that mean? To insert a theatrical performance, to create a theatrical attraction. [*Pause*] So that's good, because he says, it's all about taste. If I was asked, what is taste in cinema? Well, that's also the taste of an author in cinema. And he tells himself, no, this is going to be grotesque. He tells himself two things. He tells himself, my peasant dance around the creamer, no; everyone, that's going to make everyone laugh, so that won't work, that won't work. He saw them there, holding hands around the creamer because of the milk... He told himself, no, there's something that shocks me; he tells himself, that's not going to work, no way. In other cases, yes, we could do that, but he feels that here, no, here, that's not possible. He excludes the possibility of theatricalizing, of introducing an attraction, that I've called "theatrical representation", into the action-image. And then, he tells himself, another reason: shortly before, during general struggle, I used theatrical performances, so I can't do it twice. In fact, when the peasants, under the leadership of the pope, in the pre-revolutionary period, followed the pope's procession to demand that the rain fall, that was already a theatrical attraction, so I cannot toss two of them in.

I have my other recourse: I'm going to create a plastic representation, and he provides details of the plastic representation; this time, it's not a series of statues, not a series of sculptures. The stream of milk flowing from the creamer will be diverted. There will be a series of plastic images of extraordinary beauty: first, a jet of water and more and more powerful jets of water which, according to him, should awaken the metaphor [*Pause*] of rivers of milk, with milk. And the jets of water are in turn replaced by, literally, bursts of fire. So, streams of milk; jets of water; bursts of fire. There, you have a plastic line, you have a series of plastic representations which constitute the attraction. I've just said: this is of the metaphor type. Here we are in the process of grasping something, I'm summarizing the point we've reached.

Here we have my question: attractions are theatrical or plastic representations that seem to interrupt the action-image. In fact, you already have the outcome. These are thirds that allow an increasingly perfect conversion from one form of action to another. [*Pause*] These thirds, henceforth -- and then we will have to justify it, all that -- what are these thirds? We will call them "figures", in the sense of "rhetorical figures". But these are not words, these are images. We will call "figure" a certain type of image which plays the role of attraction. For now, this is vague. You will have to work this through. But I mean: I already know what I am going to call the sign of these transforming forms, the signs of these transforming forms or these deforming

forms which constitute the third column. I will call them “figures”. And I am saying: Eisenstein’s theatrical representations, Eisenstein’s plastic representations function like so many figures. By this very fact, the figures are thirds, third images which ensure the conversion from one form of action to the other.

Suddenly, that reminds me of something. The need arises for a double detour: if these are figures, you have to compare that with a conception of figures in the sense of "rhetorical figures". And above all, and above all, on the other hand, you have to compare that with a philosophical text which seems fundamental to me, a text by Kant in which Kant asks more or less exactly: "how to conceive the relationship no longer between two concepts, but between three concepts?" Or rather, I'm wrong to say three... "no longer between two representations, but between three representations". The relationship between two representations is quite easy to conceive, but is there an expression to designate the relationship between three representations? He calls it “symbol”. We won't call that symbol because we need the word symbol for something else, as I've already said. We will call that "figure", we have the right, we have the right.

So, we are faced with three tasks: to perceive more clearly here these third images from Eisenstein which he calls attractions; to confront -- second task -- to confront the figures of discourse; third task: to confront the relationship of the three representations in Kant. You'll take a break, and I will go complete my tasks. [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:38:49]

... [*Noises from the students*] Are you listening to me? [*Pause*] Hey! [*Laughter; one hears Deleuze make a rather painful whine*] I have no interest in knowing who that is because if I could learn it, I'd kill him. No, but what is... Well, you are evil [*maléfique*], you really are doing that on purpose, it's... [*Pause*] it's something, right? [*Pause; it's entirely unclear from the context to what or to whom Deleuze is reacting*]

I am summarizing because, as we have more for the next time, you just have to see the point we've reached, otherwise you'll have the impression that this is going from bad to worse. We've reached the following point: there would be, providing us with this unexpected third column, there would be specific transformative or deformative forms which would ensure the conversion of one type of action-image into another type of action-image. Initially, these conversions, these transformations seemed relatively simple to us. These were Eisenstein's first theses. In a second moment, they seemed to create a more complex problem for us since I am saying, there was born confusedly in us the impression that to operate such transformations, an image had to function as a third.

You remember that there were always two action-images: action-situation or situation-action. So it seemed to us -- this was within a kind of fog, and that it was well confirmed by this bizarre notion that Eisenstein introduced of "attraction" -- and that attractions were either theatrical or plastic representations functioning as thirds, and therefore, ensuring or being able to ensure -- but we are far from having shown all that -- being able to ensure the conversion of one type of action-image into another type of image-action. That's where we've reached.

However, we saw concretely what, it seemed to us, Eisenstein called "attractions", and that, nonetheless, it was strange, especially with the importance he attaches to it. And once again, to

me it seems completely wrong to claim that at a certain moment, Eisenstein would have renounced these "attractional" images which he made an essential aspect of montage in his works. Do you understand why this is linked to montage? To throw some series of statues, plastic representations or theatrical scenes into the course of an action, this montage, it's the business of montage in its purest form. Here, we're touching on something that is specific to montage. That's the point we've reached.

I am saying: to try to understand this whole story a little bit, we need to look elsewhere. For the moment, we're no longer speaking about Eisenstein; we'll come back to him, I promise you. But we are thinking for ourselves, at the point we've reached, we say, good, I would like you to understand, when you are doing research, this is how you have to do it, and that's no doubt what you do: you attack through one point and then the truth comes to you from a completely different point. So, we are temporarily forgetting Eisenstein. And I tell myself: just like in physics, there is a very famous problem which is the problem of the three bodies which is different from the problem of the two bodies: why, on the level of the images, would there not be the problem of three images which would be quite different from the problem of two images? If I call it the problem of two images, it is the problem of the action-image. And wouldn't there be the problem of three images? And it's here that I say: we don't care about cinema more than anything else. So finally, we saw that even filmmakers interest us because, in their own way, they are also [philosophers]; in their own way, they ask questions, they are not philosophers, but they ask philosophical questions... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... it is in the *Critique of Judgment* or the *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* that is Kant's greatest and most difficult book. But also, according to the method that I invite you to follow and given that many of you are not trained philosophers, I am not asking you to read the *Critique of Judgment*. That would be admirable, but it's not nothing, it's... -- I'm asking you to read it casually, then even if you don't understand anything, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter -- paragraph 59 of the *Critique of Judgment* which is entitled "On beauty as a symbol of morality", where Kant develops his conception of what he calls "symbol". There we are. So, we take this text by separating it, by separating it, and we are going to learn, I believe, some very beautiful things. Will they suit us or not? So, you see, we are starting again from zero on Kant.

And it seems to me that in one part of the text, Kant tells us this: [*Pause*] there are two possible ways to present a concept... not to present, no, because I'm going to need the word "present" for other things. We must carefully situate our vocabulary. There are two ways to "expose" a concept. Even Kant has a marvelous word which is "hypotyposis". An exposition is a hypotyposis, but for a question, that would take us too far, but, say, there are two ways of exposing a concept. You can expose a concept by providing the intuition that directly corresponds to it in terms of content. There we are: this will be the exposition of the concept; you provide an intuition that corresponds directly to the concept in terms of content. What does that mean? It means a very simple thing. You say the word "lion", and someone says to you, "what are you saying there, what is 'lion'?" and I make a gesture, and a lion is pushed into the room. I created an exposition of the concept, right? Okay. It seems like nothing, an exposition of the concept.

What does "intuition" mean? I have provided an intuition that corresponds directly to the

concept. Here, you have to situate the words because this is very interesting, this Kantian terminology. What Kant calls "intuition" is any presentation, it is any presence or any presentation of a "something = x", it will be an intuition. Everything that comes up is an intuition. He has the right to call it "intuition", and he has good reason since "intuition" means "direct grasp", that is, implies "the immediate". What is immediate is pure presence, so any presentation is intuition. We, we add: we will call intuition or presentation, we will say that it is an image. Why? Well, we've justified it at great length: since the image is for us "the appearance" [*l'apparaître*], from the beginning of all our stories, since we left Bergson, it's an image, there we are.

What is a concept? A concept is not a presentation, so here is another very famous word. Why is a concept not a presentation? This is because a concept does indeed have an object, but it does not immediately relate to the object. The image of the lion relates immediately to its object, it is the "appearance" of the lion, it is therefore an intuition. But the concept of "lion", when I say: the lion is a roaring mammal whose male has a mane and whose... – anyway, imagine a more naturalistic definition of the lion, ok? -- who has so many teeth, etc., this is a representation that relates to its object through other representations. It is a representation that relates mediately to its object, and not immediately. And Kant will call "concept" any representation that relates to its object through other representations. In this sense, I am saying: the concept is not a presentation, it is not a presentation of its object; the concept is a "re-presentation". The prefix "re-" here indicates the operation of mediation by which the concept relates to its object only through the intermediary of other representations. See? Okay?

So, I am saying: the concept is the object of a "direct exposition" insofar as I can provide the image that corresponds directly to it in terms of content. Is this still OK? Is this OK? I choosing my example again... no, I'm choosing an example more... The triangle, the concept of triangle: three straight lines enclosing a space. It is indeed a concept, that is, a re-presentation. In fact, it is a re-presentation since it only has an object through the intermediary of other representations: straight, three, to close, to enclose. It is a representation since it is a notion that refers to other notions, three straight lines enclosing a space. I show you a triangle, no, I exhibit a triangle, no, I expose a triangle, whatever... I expose a triangle, I draw it on the board. You will tell me that I am repeating myself, even -- you will perhaps tell me that it is too easy, even -- because we are already going to have a hell of a problem.

I draw a triangle on the board, and you immediately see that there are indeed three straight lines enclosing a space. So, I directly provided the image of the concept. I have provided you with an image corresponding directly to the concept of a triangle. Okay? But finally admire, admire, admire, I beg you, because it is not self-evident, how is this possible? "Image" and "concept" are two completely heterogeneous terms since there, it is a representation which refers to other representations, three straight lines enclosing a space; the other is a pure presentation given in intuition, immediately given in intuition. And you say "ah yes! It's a triangle." Easy. What is it in you that makes you say: "ah yes! Is it a triangle?" [*Pause*] You could spend your life asking yourself that, it's as good as any other question, it's your business, to each his own questions.

Kant did not spend his life there because he answered it quite quickly in a previous book, in another book called *Critique of Pure Reason*. But finally, he attached a lot of importance to this

question which, before him, did not exist, it is curious. Once he has made it emerge -- it's just that this story is curious -- well, his answer is going to be this: for an image to correspond to a concept, to correspond directly to a concept, what is needed? For a pure presentation to *fill* -- one could say it as well in Husserlian terms -- for a pure presentation to come *fill* a representation, this unheard-of operation implies what Kant himself calls "a hidden art", a hidden art which is what? He will give it a name: this implies a "schema", what he calls a "schema". [Pause]

A schema, s-c-h-e-m-a -- I do believe that he creates the word which will then have an adventure; he takes it from the Greek, but he creates it, I believe -- a schema, well, what is it? We immediately understand for a triangle. What makes a particular triangle, an image, correspond to the concept of a triangle? Answer -- I was hoping ten voices would give it to me -- answer: a rule of construction. I need to have a rule of construction in space and time that allows me to produce here and now the image that corresponds to the concept. And in fact, three straight lines enclosing a space, this conceptual definition which gives me the concept of a triangle, does not give me any means of constructing a triangle in space. I am told: a triangle is three straight lines enclosing a space, fine, okay, but how to do it? You all know, if you remember your grade school, that there is a rule of construction allowing you to construct triangles on a plane, a method of construction which involves an instrument, the compass, and the ruler. There is a rule for construction of the triangle. We will call that "schema": the rule of construction which makes an image correspond to the concept.

You will tell me: you gave yourself an easy case since the example was mathematical and these were mathematical concepts. There are also, but Kant is not interested in it, there are also empirical schemas. The concept of a triangle... The same for a circle: what is the concept of a circle? [Pause] The concept of circle is the locus of points equidistant from a common point called a center. You're clever with that, you have no way to produce a circle with that! You can examine all the aspects of this mediate representation which defines the circle, and that gives you no means of making a circle. Generally, in geometry, this is how we even define definitions and postulates. The definitions state the concepts, the postulates are schemas, that is, rules of construction. [Pause] To produce a circle in experience, that is, a circle that is a presentation, an image corresponding to the concept of a circle, you need a rule of construction. There you are, that's the point he reaches.

I am saying: for empirical concepts, it is the same. You have a lion concept, let's suppose, or a mammal concept. You have images of mammals, you see a cow passing in a meadow, and you say, "hey, a mammal!", right? Okay, what makes the presentation, cow in her meadow, match the concept, mammal? [Pause] In my opinion, these too are schemas. This time, the schemas, as we are no longer in the domain of mathematics which proceeds by construction of figures, by construction of the image, we are in a domain which proceeds by what we will call "re-cognition" of the image. They are not the same schemas, but they are schemas. Let's say there is a bearing [*allure*]; what will we call a schema? It's not a picture. We often do experiments like that for fun: you have, you see, the concept of a lion, a particular image of a lion, you make it for yourself.

And then there's something else: try to do -- in the old psychology, we did, that was exciting, that, very interesting, we did "thought intentions", what we called "directions of thought",

schemas -- So this consists in making an attempt: you put yourself in a very special mental attitude, and you try to focus on a word, not at the level of a particular image, not at the level of the concept. What does that produce? At the level of a kind of "region". So, I would say: what is the schema of the eagle? The schema of the eagle, the schema of the lion, let us compare, to try to understand what a schema is. The schema of the lion, so for me, everyone's can vary, this answers the question: what does everyone place under a word? It's not the concept, it's not the image either. So, for me, if someone says "lion" to me, I ask for something that... which is neither what I understand... What I understand is the concept; what I see, what I remember, what I see through the visual eye or the mind's eye, is a lion. But what, if I dare say, what "I intend" [*j'intentionne*], what I focus on, what I recognize, which is going to be the schema, for me, what is the eagle? For me, it is a spatio-temporal dynamism. It is not a form, it is not in the realm of form. It is like an act by which the lion is produced or affirmed as a lion.

For example, I don't see... I'm sitting there quietly, and then something crosses the wall and "zebra" -- zebra, that's not the right word -- and creates stripes in space, and I have the confused impression that it's a clawed paw that clobbers me. But with everything in dynamic movement, I can't even say: it's a paw, it's not a "something". It is "a something" only in the sense that, I would say that there is a lion which is over there, there is a lion which is over there. It's a lion's gesture. Lion is the best form, or the only form by which such a gesture can be performed. But what I am focusing on is the pure act. A lion's pace, a lion's bearing, that will be the schema.

We can do exercises, exercises as attempts to think in terms of schemas. So, for example, were I to throw out an abstract term, you have both the concept and the intuition, for example: justice, proletariat, and so on. You would have to focus on something in your thoughts. See, if I say eagle, it will be quite another thing. What I see is a "something" coming from above; for me, an eagle is not something that is on the ground and then takes flight. That exists, something which is on the ground, and which takes flight: it is the nocturnal bird, in my mind. Schemas are debated, when they're not mathematical schemes; they're debated. But for me, the nocturnal bird is... it only has the form it has because that form is the best possible for realizing this movement. But this pure movement is the dynamism of the nocturnal raptor. But the diurnal raptor comes from up above, it comes from up above, legs forward, onto the little sheep. [*Laughter*] There are other raptors. There are raptors who don't do that, who aren't caught up in that schema, in that movement. There are striking raptors, the most beautiful ones, perhaps even more beautiful than eagles, those that capture their prey, another bird in full flight: that is another schema.

I would say: in any case, schemas are spatio-temporal dynamisms that you can try to think of in the purest possible state. It's a limit. You will never be able to think of them in their pure state, because you will always insert a bit of concept and a bit of image into them. But you can try as much as possible to think of them. Notice that we can distinguish two kinds of concepts: a priori concepts, to speak like Kant, namely mathematical concepts, and I would say that their schema is their rule of production in space and over time; and the empirical concepts, on the other hand, like the lion, the eagle, etc., and their schema is the spatio-temporal dynamism which corresponds to them... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:09:39]

Part 3

... And if you recognize a lion in experience and if you distinguish it from a cow, even from a distance, it is via this vague thing [*je-ne-sais-quoi*], this spatio-temporal dynamism. From a distance, you say: oh, you can't see if it has horns, or you tell yourself, this animal is odd; it has horns, but it looks like a lion, right? It walks like a lion. A lion with horns could occur. If you believe, if you think in terms of images, you're screwed; you tell yourself, it has horns, I can go over there. But not at all, if it's a lion, it's a lion, right? [*Laughter*] You need the schema, you need the schema. If you haven't been able to manage the schema, you're lost, right?

Notice, that's how life is. Beware of people! Ah people, they look very nice like that. [*Laughter*] And it's true what I'm saying. It is true, it is profoundly true. See, that's scientific psychology. They seem nice, people. Well, I'll tell you, you stick to the image. It's a question of image, and it's true, they are very nice about image. They have a good image. Oh, how sweet he looks; I know some people like that. I know some, I know some. How sweet he looks or how sweet she looks. He looks sweet. [*Pause*] I'm saying, it's true, it's true, from the point of view of the image: the outline of the face, the expression, all that. And then, suddenly, he or she stands up. You say to yourself, this is weird, that doesn't coincide, that's not right. What is happening, what, what is this gesture? He or she made a gesture like a raptor. Wow. Ouch, ouch, ouch, you tell yourself, this is something else. There are kinds of sweetness, the great Nietzsche already said so, right: there are kinds of sweetness, there are kinds of shyness that hide an unbridled will to power, appalling wills to power, but catastrophic, which will smash everything, everything! [*Pause*]

So, what have you grasped? When you grasp, casually, something that seems insoluble to you in someone, you have grasped the schema. And I'm not saying the schema gives you the truth. Maybe there was a lot of truth to the image, maybe this someone is trying so hard to be sweet that maybe he'll make it. We do not know, but beware. You watch people eat, and that's good schematism because eating is a dynamism, it's a spatio-temporal dynamism. And you'll see how often it belies people at rest, the way they eat. So, these are schema-image relations. That's all very complicated. But you see, at last I'm developing it, I'm developing it. You see what I mean, it's very simple; in all cases, we could say: what makes an image correspond directly to a concept, that is, to the concept which corresponds to it as regards the content, is a "schema".

There we are, I've finished with the first characteristic of Kantian thought, namely: what is the direct exposition of a concept? The direct exposition of the concept is the exposition of the image which corresponds to the concept through the intermediary of a schema, and which corresponds to it as regards the content, namely the image and the concept which, thanks to the schema, have the same content. This triangle that I drew thanks to the schema is, in fact, three straight lines enclosing a space.

There we are. I have little time left -- you must be exhausted -- to say that, according to Kant, concepts have another possible presentation. And this other presentation, he will call it an "indirect presentation". And if there is an indirect presentation, it is no doubt because it is possible, but it is also because it is necessary in certain cases. So, to guide us, let's start with the necessary. Why "necessary" in some cases? Well, for the moment, you see, I only considered "image", "schema", and "concept".

According to Kant, the image refers to the image -- ah, no, it doesn't matter... no, that's not right,

I take that back; that's useless -- but there is still something else, there are special concepts. And why are they special? Because there is no object in experience that can correspond to them. And nonetheless, nothing can prevent me from forming them. You will tell me: oh, come on! Nothing can prevent me from forming them, and yet nothing in experience corresponds to such concepts. [Pause]

Generally, these concepts are distinguished by their purity. And they have a name to distinguish them from concepts that have an object in experience. We have just seen concepts which had their object in experience through schemas. Well, these concepts which have no object in experience, Kant gives them the splendid name, borrowed from Plato, of "Idea" with a capital "I". An "Idea" according to Kant, he adopts Plato's word, and he gives it another meaning, although it partly coincides with what Plato meant: an Idea is the concept of something that goes beyond all experience possible or a something which is not an object of possible experience. You'll tell me, I can very well keep myself from doing so! Well, no, according to Kant, there, that can be debated. Can I prevent myself from forming such a concept? There are people who think so. For example, there are certain schools of English logic which think that one can, and that moreover, one must. Kant thinks that we cannot. The discussion is pointless, let's delete it.

But it's clear that when I say -- or it seems clear that -- when I say "God", this is about an Idea, however strongly that I experience God. Because even mystical experience would not be an answer to that. God is the concept whose object is beyond all possible experience. Infinity is the concept whose object is beyond all possible experience. I have at the extreme an experience of the indefinite, not an experience of the infinite. Infinity cannot be produced in experience. What can be produced in experience thanks to schemas is the indefiniteness of number. What is the schema of number? How about we do some school exercises? In the Middle Ages, that's what they did, you know? That's what they did. In Germany, they do that too. The teacher has a big stick, and then he dictates who must answer. That's a good method.

The schema of number, the concept of number, then, [Pause] the schema of number, after all... I don't want to tell you everything, but the schema of number is $n + 1$. No, it's not a definition, it is not the concept of number; $n + 1$, [it's] the schema of number since it is the rule according to which I can always add to the previous number the unit which is not considered as a number. Good, so $n + 1$ is the schema of number, it is numeration. I can produce an indefinite series in experience. But the infinite is a concept which has no object in experience. It's an Idea. So, let's search! Kant would add: "duty". Kant wrote a splendid book; he wrote three great books: *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Reason* -- about knowledge [i.e., the first] -- *Critique of Practical Reason* about morality, *Critique of Judgment* about aesthetics and life. With that, he could die, he had talked about everything. [Laughter]

Well then, duty. Do you know a man, in experience, who acted out of pure duty? I leave aside what Kant calls "duty" since he gives it an extremely rigorous definition. No, all the examples that history gives us, that is, the experience of man, of course, there are men who acted out of duty, no, who acted taking duty into account, and who acted in accordance with duty, men who act in accordance with duty, oh, there are some. Good. But men who act "out of" duty, with duty as their sole motive, that... that is, that excludes love, that excludes interest, that excludes any desire, such as the desire for glory, the expression of, etc. Maybe you won't find any. It will be

said that duty is an Idea: it has no object in experience. Or, if you prefer, its object goes beyond experience. It is a moral Idea.

The other cases, God, etc., were Ideas rather of knowing reason [*raison connaisante*]. Well, fine, there are many other things in this case that I can continue: all moral Ideas are Ideas. All moral concepts are Ideas. Innocence. Innocence. Is there anyone who is purely innocent? Yes, it can be said, but after all, it is doubtful! Pure innocence, there we have an Idea. Hey, it's also a moral idea. So already, all Christians pass through this, right? They are not innocent, right? [*Laughter*] For Christians, everyone else is not innocent either! [*Laughter*] The others for themselves, innocent, either they will not have this notion, or else if they have it, they will agree that there is no one innocent, right, otherwise they wouldn't do atonement ceremonies and all that, right? Finally, innocence, well it's an Idea. There we are.

Here I have concepts which I call Ideas that cannot have a direct presentation in experience. That is, no image corresponds to them in terms of content. Admire, however, that I know perfectly well what I mean when I say "innocence"! For an English logician, I cannot know what I mean; it is a meaningless word. Well, for certain English logicians. Like God, like... etc... We're moving forward, right?

And yet, there needs to be a presentation of such concepts which we call Ideas. See that these concepts, unlike my first class of concepts which were objects of a representation which was... no, which could have a direct presentation through the schemas, there, these Ideas or these concepts cannot have a direct presentation. They have no schemas. There is no rule of production or re-cognition that allows me to produce or recognize infinity, God, innocence, if they occur in nature. And in fact, admire that the son of God was not recognized. [*Pause*] All in all, all this works very well, it's very clear, right?

And suppose someone completely innocent was innocent. Dostoyevsky's *The Idiot* considers that, pure innocence, but it is not by chance that in Dostoyevsky, you will find a very deep theory of the Idea, with a capital "i". I am not saying that he is a Platonist, nor that he is Kantian, but I am saying that, as if by chance, there is a whole theory of the Idea in Dostoyevsky, a theory which is developed in one of his novels, which is called *The Adolescent* [1875]. Well, Dostoyevsky's idiot, this innocent, purely innocent being, he would pass it by or would say rather, he's a bit simple, that one. From the point of view of experience and direct presentation, he will look like an idiot. [*Pause*] It's crazy what passes us by. But it is not our fault since there is no schema of production... neither of recognition nor of production. It's not our fault at all. There was no schema of Jesus, it's his fault! Understand? We couldn't help it. There is no schema of the innocent, there is no schema of duty. These are concepts which can present their object only indirectly.

What does it mean to represent their object indirectly? If the schema is the process by which the concept directly presents its object, we will call "symbol", according to Kant, the process by which a concept, necessarily or not, presents its object indirectly. [*Pause*] I am saying what Kant calls "symbol", for my own reasons I call it "figure". For reasons that are my own, I have already spoken to you about it with regard to Peirce, since for my part, I reserve "symbol" for something quite different. But that doesn't matter, it's a pure question of terminology. So, but for the

moment, I respect Kant's text, and I'm saying "symbol". "Symbol", indirect presentation of a concept which, if necessary, could be, see, there are two cases: either the concept is an Idea, and it can only be presented indirectly, that is, symbolically, or else the concept is a concept, and it has a direct presentation, but it can also have an indirect presentation. [Pause]

So, let's think about a "symbol". Kant [Deleuze laughs], he is, he is wonderful because, the examples he gives... it's like that, we are, we are a bit flabbergasted, really. We tell ourselves, oh well: we have to search very far! In this text, he gives an example. He says: I compare the despotic state to a hand-mill. Maybe you feel the attraction coming -- I'm not mixing things; I would like for you to create these encounters yourselves, it is not mixtures that we're creating. Perhaps, you feel Eisenstein's attraction beginning to arise. – [Kant] says, it so happens they look alike, right? And there's a resemblance, we will see, "the despotic state is a hand-mill". On the contrary, the constitutional state resembles an organism. This is the only example that he [Kant] will give in this whole admirable paragraph, in these four, five admirable pages on the symbol.

So, we are still saying, good, the "hand-mill" is the symbol of the despotic state. Fortunately, if we have read everything, if we... we will have seen, but we will have seen, it is not certain, long before, a passage in which he does not yet speak of the symbol, since he has not discerned a notion of it, but where he says: "The white lily, the whiteness of the lily, signifies innocence" ... [End of the recording in mid-sentence]

[With this break, coming no doubt close to the session's end, Deleuze does not entirely complete his thought. By referring to the following session, one sees that Deleuze wishes here to emphasize the connection between three terms in Kant, the schema, the symbol, and a third term that Deleuze fully only in the next session.]

Notes

¹ Deleuze develops this concept at length in *The Movement-Image*; see pp. 141-147 and especially pp. 186-196, where he also talks about Kurosawa and Mizoguchi.

² Deleuze quotes Henri Agel's *L'Espace cinématographique* (1977) in *The Movement-Image*, p. 236, footnote 5.

³ See the session 16 of Cinema 1 seminar, April 27, 1982; see also *The Movement-Image*, pp. 186-187.

⁴ See the session 16 of the Cinema 1 seminar, April 27, 1982.

⁵ *The precise reference is François Cheng, Vide et plein: Le langage pictural chinois [Empty and Full: Chinese Pictorial Language] (Paris: Seuil, 1979), Chinese Poetic Writing, transl. Donald Riggs and Jerome Seaton (New York: New York Review of Books, 2017); see The Movement-Image, pp. 187-188.*

⁶ See *The Movement-Image*, p. 187.

⁷ *Critique* 418, January 1983.

⁸ On the Chinese and Japanese references to these spaces, see *The Movement-Image*, p. 187.

⁹ On the respiration-space and aspects discussed here, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 188-192.

¹⁰ On these forms and commitments, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 178-179.

¹¹ On these two Soviet filmmakers, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 179-180.

¹² On these forms, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 178-180.

¹³ On these forms, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 181-183.

¹⁴ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 178-180.

¹⁵ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁶ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 148-150.

¹⁷ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 37-38.

¹⁸ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 83-84 ad 180-181.

¹⁹ On the “ciné-fist” versus “ciné-œil », see *The Movement-Image*, p. 223, note 11.

²⁰ Eisenstein, *Non-Indifferent Nature* (1945-47; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); see also *The Movement-Image*, pp. 39-40 and 180-183.

²¹ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 33-38.

²² See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 33-34.

²³ See *The Movement-Image*, pp. 35-38, 181-183.