Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Transcription: La voix de Deleuze, Meropi Morfouli (Part 1), Anna Mrozek (Part 2), and Meropi Morfouli (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation, Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

… But, I am pointing out, if there are some who come now into the midst of… I'm telling them very sincerely, it's too late, right? You can no longer add a course at the midpoint where we are. So, as much as I'm always happy to welcome new auditors, it's also too late now, I think, for them, because we sense that there are more people than... Well, anyway… And then, above all, I'm thinking of your well-being. [*Laughter*]

So, well, let's see, we're continuing this story where we were the last time, about something at once very, very well known in the cinema, which seems to have marked a great era and then to have been relatively abandoned, in any case, which belongs to the great name of [Sergei] Eisenstein. And that was… and why, why we needed to talk about that, I will recall later. But these were what Eisenstein called attractions, "images of attraction," or since it was directly related to this problem of the "montage of attraction"; certain images arose posing problems and solutions of montage, certain images arose and presented themselves as "attractions". And I was saying, when you look closely at Eisenstein's texts, it's already important to see that "attraction" has two meanings, for him. It is indeed attractions in the "circus" or "performance" sense. Suddenly, he inserts an image which constitutes a veritable performance in a sequence, an attraction. But it seems to me, when he speaks of an "attractional calculus", this is also an "attraction" in the sense of Newtonian force, that is, this time, a force of attraction between images. So, all this to say, the problem is still more complicated than it appears. It's not just about sticking attractions in. But what is it then? Well, I was saying, let's try to understand, because the texts literally seem almost -- to me, they seem to me, as far as I'm concerned -- almost incomprehensible, the texts.[1]

I was saying, ultimately, what do these attractions consist of? And I proposed a reduction to two main types of images since, I remind you, what has interested us from the beginning is this pursuit of a classification of images and corresponding signs. On one hand, these are theatrical representations. Well, in an incidental way then, that may perhaps help us to understand the problem of cinema-theatre relations, at least from a restricted, very particular point of view, namely in what way and when does the cinema needs to use theatrical type images, and to constitute theatrical performances or scenographies on its own? So, I am saying, on one hand, these are theatrical representations, but on the other hand, they are also sculptural or plastic representations. [*Pause*]

And the last time, we ended on this as I was saying: well fine, but that reminds me of something, that reminds me of something in philosophy. It reminds me of a very beautiful text by Kant. This didn't mean that Eisenstein had read Kant, although I suppose he had read him, but it wasn't Kant that inspired him, but it doesn't matter if we…, this can inspire us to understand better. And this text by Kant, I'm not addressing it -- I had tried to comment on it almost literally – I'll address it in spirit. It consists in telling us: there is a certain relationship between three terms that I, Kant, I am specifying here, this "I, Kant" [*moi, Kant*] -- because we are not going to talk like that -- but that "I, Kant", I will call "symbolism". I emphasize this since, for us, the symbol is something completely different, but that does not matter, it's of no importance. Or what Kant, on his own account, calls a symbolic relationship involves three terms.

So, as you remember, he opposes the symbol to the "schema". The schematic relationship involves only two terms. The symbolic relationship engages three terms. Example: the despotic State, an example that Kant gives -- I'm revising it a bit since I commented on it the last time as faithfully as I could; I'm introducing a kind of..., I'm revising it a bit for our particular purposes today, but I'm remaining faithful to the letter of the text -- [*Pause*] the despotic State, let's say it's an "Idea", the Idea of State, the Despotic State Idea. How will this be translated? I mean, what is its object in the experience? Its object in the experience, let us suppose it is [*Pause*] an organization, an organization. What would it be called? A mechanical organization of work, fine, a hard, a hard and mechanical organization of work. I have two terms: the despotic State, the object it manifests in experience -- I'm not saying that's the only object -- one of the objects it manifests in experience is this mechanical organization of work.

A third term introduced by Kant: the hand-mill. Imagine, well, because these are images that we saw in cinema, that, imagine a millstone that men turn. Sometimes it's donkeys that make it turn; in a kind of quasi-slavery organization, well, there are men turning the millstone. Yes, it's very simple, all that. I have three terms: the despotic State as an Idea, the object which presents it in experience, the enslaved mechanical labor of men, and then the hand-mill. What is that here, the hand-mill? What is its purpose? [*Pause*] As Kant will say, it's a matter of a "symbol" of the despotic State. [*Pause*] That is, given two terms -- despotic State, enslaved mechanical labor -- given two terms, a third term is introduced which will substituted for one of the two in order to "reflect" the other. Good. [*Pause*]

So, we can tell ourselves, once Kant has given us such a strict example, we are looking for another example close by. The despotic State, yes, it's not just... it has other objects, an object that presents the despotic State, it could be a shooting of demonstrators. I have two terms, one of which is the direct presentation of the other. The shooting of demonstrators will directly present the despotic State in one of its aspects. I'll introduce a third term. [*Pause*] It will be a slaughterhouse. Everyone has recognized a famous scene from, a famous sequence by Eisenstein, and the case precisely of an indisputable example of montage of attraction.[2] Into his sequence of demonstrators being shot, Eisenstein introduces images of the slaughterhouse. I would say this is exactly the same. What does the attraction consist of? Of a third term which replaces one of the other two and to enter into a relation of reflection with the other. The slaughterhouse will be, in Kantian terms, the "symbol" of the tsarist State. In our own language, once again, since we reserve the word "symbol" for something else, we say that it is a "figure".

It's a figure. Some images are therefore figures.

What are we particularly interested in here? Don't you see something dawning? We are within the framework of the action-image. We have seen that the law of the action-image -- and there, we referred to another philosopher, namely [C.S.] Peirce -- the image, the law of the action-image, is the duel, it is the duo, it is duality. It is the “two”, situation-action or, conversely, action-situation, and the duel was always present in what we’ve called action-images, and it was present at a thousand levels. [*Deleuze seems to be moving towards the blackboard*] But this is very odd. Within the framework of the action-image -- I will try to explain myself better on this -- within the framework of the action-image, we see the birth and the introduction of a third party, of a third. It is as if the action-image with Eisenstein's attractions tended to go beyond themselves towards a new type of image.

Well, then, here we really sense the transition from action-images, governed by the law of the duel, to another type of image, governed by the law of the third. Here it is in the form of figures that a third party enters into the image for the first time. So, what does that mean? Why were we considering the action-image? I’ll return to the examples I gave the last time [*Pause*] in Eisenstein’s case. In the action-image, what situation do you normally have? Do you remember? What we called action-image small 1, or large form, action-image small 1 or large form, is a situation which is given, which is given in a set of images, and which will give rise to an action. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] This is the first form of the action-image, image-action small 1 or which we called, for reasons I won't come back to, that we called the large form. And then, at that point, from my perspective of the theory of signs, that great situation determining action, giving rise to the action, we called it a "synsign", and the action, which was always a duel, we called it a "binomial".

In the other case, we had image-action small 2, or small form. In the small form, on the contrary, we went from the action to the situation. We therefore had an action as a function of which an aspect or an element of the situation was revealed. This was the opposite path. We went from the action to the situation in the form: the action will reveal an aspect of the situation. A blind action will reveal an obscure situation. There we had other signs, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] since the action as it revealed the situation, we called it an "index", and the situation as it was enveloped in the action, as it was developed by the action, it was called – [*Pause; Deleuze seems to have some difficulty with the board*] I no longer have my graph -- a "vector". [*Laughter*] Well, fine, well, that went well up to here.

What happens in the case of montage of attraction? I’m considering a first example: theatrical representation, and I tell myself, hey, that's obvious. The theatrical representation is inserted, it will be inserted in this case, in the large form. [*Pause*] You’ll immediately understand. Consider the example I cited the last time in "Ivan the Terrible" [1944]. Ivan is in such a state that, once again, he has really decided to settle scores, including with his own family, no longer with the boyars, but with his own family. And so, the situation has changed. And he is going to give a big, a kind of big dinner, a kind of big dinner to which he invites, to which he invites anyone who, anyone who, in whatever manner, seeks the throne, seeks to replace him. Normally,… and we know that the divorce project he has decided on is to assassinate his potential successor. We have a situation, here we have a situation-action pattern. The situation is going to be the big dinner,

and at the end of the big dinner, we know that the potential successor will be assassinated. We move from situation to action.

Here is where Eisenstein introduces, as an element of the dinner, a kind of theatrical performance, fully justified since it is supposed to be the performance that Ivan offers to his guests, a theatrical performance, for those recalling these images of which I speak, a magnificent theatrical performance predominantly in red, since it is the Eisenstein color, predominantly in red in which grimacing clowns make prodigious leaps, etc. Fine. And we get sense of an infernal scene with all these reds, all these... Previously, he had, in the same theatrical mode, a scene of heavenliness [*angélisme*]. He calculates, he calculates its effects very well; this is an attractional calculation. He throws in a large theatrical scene, a large theatrical scene of the infernal type which I cannot say mimics the assassination to come, but it is in a relationship – there, one would have to study the images closely – it is in a relationship of prefiguration with what is going to happen, namely the murder which is going to follow. [*Pause; Deleuze writes on the board*] Instead of a simple action-image of the dualism type, the S-A duel type, from situation to action, I go from the situation into a large theatrical performance that fills the situation, therefore a representation which presents itself as fictitious. There are clowns, terrible red clowns dancing and jumping.

So, the situation is linked directly to an attraction, a theatrical performance. This theatrical representation prefigures what would normally have been the action directly related to the situation. You see, this detour is taken. Instead of having S-A, we have S-A' which prefigures A, the murder. In other words, the theatrical performance is the index to the action to come. Instead of a situation-action linkage, we have a linkage of situation-theatrical representation sequence of an action, an action to come. [*Pause*] Okay, be patient.

In the other case, I'm saying the other case, it seems to me the case of sculptural or plastic representations, what are we going to have? Normally, from the point of view of the action-image, we should have an action that reveals a situation. There, on the contrary... I'm returning to the example I gave, the famous, the famous, the famous creamer [*écremeuse*] in "The General Line" [1929]. The creamer is in action, and it reveals a situation. It is in action in the sense that people are waiting for what will come out of it, and it reveals a general situation of the village, a general situation which is what? "Good god, is this going to work? Will the creamer work and thereby change the whole situation of the village?" [*Pause*] So here, if we remain with that, this is simply the A-S pattern of the action-image, from A to S. But that's not how it proceeds, that is, the image of the first drop of milk and the stream of milk in the creamer, through the creamer, is going to be shifted, I was saying, via plastic representations, this time not theatrical representations, but plastic representations. In some cases, which is not the case with "The General Line", these are -- and this is a process very often with, which appears very often in Eisenstein's works -- these are sculptures. But if I said: sculptural or plastic representation, that was to indicate that there can be other representations than simply sculptural.

And in fact, in the case of "The General Line", what will the shift yield? Jets of water and then better still, bursts of fire. This time, what do I have? A, the action, [*Deleuze taps the board*] the creamer moving into action is no longer directly linked to the situation. So, here as well, just as I put the dotted line there, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] here I put the dotted line to indicate that it

will only be linked to the situation indirectly. And [*Pause*] it is connected to attractions -- the jets of water, the bursts of fire -- which form a large situation S' and which, at the limit, form a situation so large that they summon, they summon the entire universe. And this large situation, this large fictitious situation, this large plastic representation will this time encompass [*Deleuze taps the board*] the real situation S, the village, the situation of the village. [*Pause*]

Eisenstein always limited himself -- he was wary, he had to be wary -- he always limited himself, he imposed a great discipline on the level of his... he felt that, in his story of attraction-images, that would not necessarily please the heads of Soviet cinema, so he was wary. The only time he let himself go was obviously in "Que Viva Mexico" [1932] in which there, being abroad, he was going to integrate so much, and then with the subject lending itself to this, everything lending itself to this, the film's conception lending itself to this, he goes on to do something fantastic in this regard, the very great, it seems to me, the masterpiece, the masterpiece of what he invented, the film that we can call a "film of attraction", in which the theme being death, or one of the themes being death, as an obsessive theme of Mexico, the idea of death -- here I'm finding an almost Kantian vocabulary -- the idea of death will not cease being represented sometimes by large theatrical performances which are perfectly justified since it is the great feast of the dead in Mexico City, sometimes by plastic representations, the sculptures which are no less justified since he finds them in Mexico, not all of them, the crucifixions, and which will culminate with the plastic, plastic sculptural image of the crucified bull, the plastic image of the crucified bull which is both, which refers, which winks at the theatrical performance, since there is bullfighting, of "Que Viva Mexico", and which has equal merit as a plastic sculptural representation.

Well, all that, you see what I'm getting at. This is exactly... well, if you return to, it's, if... I would add, if you will, despotic State, tsarist State, shooting... [*Deleuze writes on the board, then corrects himself*] No, sorry! Tsarist State, shooting, slaughterhouse. You have this triadic circulation which will define "the figure". And in this sense, I am absolutely not interested in knowing what the relations are between cinema and language, a poisoned problem. I can already conclude, whatever may be the relationships between cinema and language, there are properly cinematographic figures, that is, there are cinematographic images that must be called "figures". And what I found important, if you remember our topic from the last time, was to show that the images that we call figures, or that we must call figures, are images which, in the action-image, ensure the passage and the perpetual conversion from one form to another, that is, from the large form to the small form, from the first case of action-image to the second case of action-image. I therefore think that these examples confirm this, such that the figure will always be the process of a transformation of forms.

So, I tell myself, fine, that... to take a risk on that, well, in a certain way, you had to be Eisenstein, okay. But finally, this story of the montage of attraction, once again, it fascinates me, because it's funny, I don't understand Eisenstein's texts, so we don't have time to go into them in depth... I don't understand them well. At the limit, if I dared, I would say, well, that he speaks very poorly about his topic. That's not what he's saying, there... And then, at the same time, I mean, we have no right to say that, and then on top of that, the commentators, I've closely read the commentators, or anyhow, I've read some on the montage of attraction. There, what they're saying does not seem good to me either. So, myself, well, I feel a little lost, and I tell myself,

well yes, but all that doesn’t matter, it doesn't matter, it doesn't matter because what interests me is: have I, in fact, justified the idea that figures are a particular type of image? And is this limited to Eisenstein? And I tell myself, no. If we looked carefully, wouldn't we find some figures in many of the great authors of cinema, if needed, not necessarily the same as in Eisenstein’s works? So that will restart our problem all over.

But there is something that struck me, as… that has surely struck everyone, in the so-called New Wave cinema. It was these funny episodes that were presented, it was especially, especially in Truffaut and especially in Godard. I have the feeling that Truffaut abandoned the method rather quickly, I believe; still, I'm not sure about that. As for Godard, he always kept it. I am referring to these passages which seem to cut the flow of a sometimes-uncertain action, and which have delighted all those who love this cinema. In "Shoot the Piano Player" [1960], which seems to me one of the most beautiful films by Truffaut, there is a moment that strikes me greatly. It star... at first, it starts, you remember, with a man running, obviously being chased by two others. He runs, he runs with all his might, and then he bumps into a guy, it's night, he bumps into a guy who has a bouquet of flowers. And then, there's a sudden change, he starts walking with the guy carrying his bouquet of flowers -- we hear the sound very poorly, on purpose -- and what I vaguely remember is that the guy there, he launches into a speech in which he’s taking the flowers to his wife because he had a fight with his wife, and it's not all that easy, that he's going reconcile with her, but he's not sure, is she going to take the flowers, isn't she going to take them, all that. No logical link. So, it unfolds like that, apparently, it unfolds like that. And then the guy being pursued, who was earlier so anxious to move quickly in order to shake off these pursuers, starts walking at exactly the same pace and discusses the matter. He says: ah, yes, women are complicated, all that. Yes, ah the flowers, oh, sometimes they think that’s great, but sometimes it's ok. We barely understand everything they say to each other, we understand that it's about a story like this... And then they leave each other, and without transition, the other starts running like crazy again.

I tell myself, all that's strange, but I tell myself at the point we’ve reached, wouldn't it be -- of course, in a completely different form, I don't pretend to reduce it, we'll see -- wouldn't that be a sort of "montage of attraction"? Good, but then in what form, in what other form? All that, but doesn't it fit with what we're talking about right now? And then with Godard’s work, that explodes, it explodes and with very precise processes, very famous, very varied, very, very varied processes; just like with Eisenstein, it's extremely varied, all that. That was the subject of a kind of intuitive sense, a sense of rhythm, but there is a rhythmicity in the introduction of these images, enormous, immense, really.

But for Godard, what does that yield? Well, from the serious to the comical, it seems to me that produces three, there -- I haven't really thought about it, I'm quoting as I go along -- that produces the famous interviews, the famous improvised interviews, or more or less guided ones. The interview with [Jean-Pierre] Melville, in -- I don't know any more -- in, [*A student gives him the title*] in "Breathless" [1959], the interview with Brice Parrain in, I no longer know what...

Claire Parnet: In "My Life to Live” [1962] and with [Francis] Jeanson in "La Chinoise" [1967].

Deleuze: …in "My Life to Live" and with Jeanson in "La Chinoise". Good, all that, these

interviews, good, everyone knows them, remembers them at least. At the other pole, the most comical, there is the famous passage by Godard. I immediately remember two in "Pierrot le Fou" [1965], the passage with the Queen of Lebanon, I am the Queen of Lebanon. … Yes?

Claire Parnet: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: She's what?

Claire Parnet: She's a princess. [*The reference is to Aïcha Abadie, a Lebanese princess*]

Deleuze: Well, she is the Queen of Lebanon, ex-Queen of Lebanon, yes, yes, yes, the ex-Queen of Lebanon, maybe, well anyway, it doesn't matter. And then the big sketch by [Raymond] Devos. Here too, I tell myself with all the more reason, this Devos sketch, "do you love me?"[3] Is it like that? It's, you could say, it's both; it's an attraction, it's typically an attraction here. Devos creates attractions. But also, we cannot say that it has nothing to do with the film. That is, Devos creates an attraction, but Godard makes an attractional calculation, that is, that this sequence will be in a certain relationship with the film as a whole and with certain precise images of the film.

A third method by Godard: the way in which the characters put themselves on stage or in a theatre. [*Pause*] Good. For example, in "2 or 3 Things I Know about Her" [1967], there is the woman shoe seller. She suddenly stops, she faces the screen, and she says something like: "I got up at half past eight in the morning, I have eyes, I have green eyes". Fine, someone else will make a slightly longer speech, but it comes to the same thing. What is that as well? These are attractions. You will tell me, this is still not a Devos sketch; no, it's not, but it can nevertheless have an equal intensity.

I am saying, in these stories that we can consider later, sense that it's obviously, we are, with the examples that I draw from Godard, we are in a completely different type of image than what we have seen so far. So, we can hardly develop it. But we can say when we discover, and if we manage to discover, new types of images, won't we see that the montage of attractions, attractions such as those Eisenstein invented, that they have a long history, and continue in other forms in these other types of images?

Alright, let's leave that aside. I am just saying for the moment, I am calling "figure", in the strict sense, images which, within the framework of the action-image, ensure a transformation from one form to another or are introduced, or introduce, indirectly between the situation and the action, the action and the situation, and therefore make it possible to convert a situation-action form into another action-situation form and vice versa. That's why I had reasons, for my own pleasure, to create a new column under the term "figure". But then, to be sure of ourselves and then as much to take advantage of this in order to, to learn something, to renew some... [*Deleuze sighs*] as much, as much to strengthen, as much to strengthen this idea, and then in that way, we will have, we will have finished with this point.

I've said there's no question of considering cinema-language relationships because it's such a dubious question, such a, well... that it's not worth going over something like that. But, but, but, that does not prevent us from using what we can. And "figure" is indeed a classical term in the

sense of “rhetorical figure”, or more precisely in the sense of “figure of discourse”. So, I would like purely, formally, to see if..., purely formally -- that is, independently of any background based on a comparative study of cinematic image-language -- purely, formally, I would like to consider a little the great figures called "figures of discourse" to see if that can confirm us in our analysis of these special images that we propose to call "figures".

I’m selecting the book, which I hope, which I hope some of you know, the classic book by [Pierre] Fontanier, F-O-N-T-A-N-I-E-R, author from the early 19th century, who created the great synthesis of figures of discourse, and his book, or rather his two books together, have been republished in paperback by Flammarion [edited] by Gérard Genette [1977]. And *Figures of Speech*, it's a book, oh, it's complicated because all these stories of, these figures of speech, it's, it's not nothing, right? But then, well, there are some..., I'll teach you something as much as I can. There we are.

It seems to me, reading the book that Fontanier -- I'm making this parenthesis, you'll see why, we're going to need this, but for five minutes, I’m considering this book for itself -- Fontanier tries to make a synthesis such that he finally divides the figures of speech, that is, the figures in which words intervene, not images, the figures in which words intervene; well, he distinguishes four kinds of figures of speech. So, if he's right -- but he's obviously right, this is the best classification that’s been done; the proof is that we're going to need this [*Laughter*] – it’s that, the first figure, the first kind of figure, he calls them "tropes". He calls them tropes properly stated, trope, T-R-O-P-E, that's the ordinary word to indicate... we say, a metaphor is a trope. What are tropes properly speaking? It's very simple, very rigorous. It's when a word, one word -- it can be several, but that's not what counts, you'll see why, what matters is that it can only be one word -- a single word taken in a figurative sense [*Pause*] replaces another word taken in its literal sense. You see? It's easy. A single word taken in a figurative sense replaces another word taken in its literal sense. I am not following the book because I’m drawing what I need from it. So here, only for, we don't know, it may be useful to some of you, and I'm just specifying in some cases. You find here, in this first category of figure, you find the three famous figures that we always talk about: metaphors, metonymies, and synecdoches, synecdoches, S-Y-N-E-C-D-O-C-H-E-S, synecdoches. Yes, because I'm tired of writing on the board, so I’m spelling it… [*Interruption of the recording*]

... between the two words, the substituted word and the words which are substituted, it is a relationship of resemblance, you have a metaphor. [*Pause*] I see a wonderfully beautiful woman getting up, or I see her in the morning, and I say, "Heavens, it's the dawn that's rising." [*Laughter*] Well, it's a metaphor; it's not the best. [*Laughter*] You know, figures of speech are never very great, right?

So, then what is a metonymy?... What?

A woman student: A metonymy? [*She’d like more detail about the term*]

Deleuze: Ah, I’ll spell it, like, like on the phone: M like Maurice, [*Laughter*] E-T-O-N like Nicole, Y like Yvonne, M like Marcel, I-E-S, metonymies. A metonymy, in very broad terms -- I'm simplifying because otherwise it would take us hours -- is when the figurative word, that is,

the word taken in its figurative sense, replaces the literal word under a relation, I would say, of causality -- no longer of resemblance as in the metaphor -- under a relation of causality in the broadest sense that you want.

Here's an example taken from Fontanier: "I say about a writer..." [*Deleuze laughs*] -- it's true that there are people who talk like that -- "I say about a writer, he's an excellent pen [*plume*]". [*Laughter, Deleuze laughs*] Understand, I made a metonymy. [*Deleuze laughs again*] You didn't know it, but I made a metonymy because I designated something by, or someone by the *means*. I substituted the means for the person. By saying "he is an excellent pen", I meant "he is an excellent writer", the pen being only his means. I substituted the word "pen" [*literally, "quill"*] for the word "writer", I took the word "pen" in a "figurative" sense, and I made a metonymy of the means, okay?

So, we could create games like that; I would say to you: give me an example of metonymy of the cause? But myself, I have to look at my notes, since I'm so little... Fine. [*Pause*] I tell my son -- don't take it personally -- I tell my son, "Oh, my son, you will be" -- or to my daughter --, "oh my daughter, you will be my loss [*ma perte*]", [*Laughter*] "Oh, my daughter, you will be my loss". I hope for many of you, no one has used this sentence. There too, I'm making a metonymy. Because I want to say, "you will be *the cause* of my loss". [*Pause*] "Oh, you, my sorrow", "Oh, you, my sorrow", "Oh, you, my joy", yes well, we change, [*Laughter*] "Oh, you, my joy", that means, you are the cause, you are the perpetual and renewed cause of my joy. I'm making a metonymy. Fine, you understand.

Synecdoche, [*Deleuze laughs*] is something else again. This time, it's when the substitution of the figurative word occurs under a relation which is no longer of resemblance like metaphor, which is no longer of causality like metonymy, but which is from part to the whole, there also, in the most general sense of part to the whole, in the most general sense that you want. I am saying, for example, "there are a hundred heads in this room". The head, which is only one part of yourself, designates the whole person. It is a synecdoche, synecdoche. Okay? It can be very broad. "See my iron, I will stab you" -- of course, I have a sword -- "see my iron, I will stab you." Well, it's a synecdoche. The material part of the sword, the material of the sword is given for the whole sword. Right? [*Very long pause*]

That's it, these are tropes, you see. Tropes, first type, tropes properly speaking: a single word, taken in a figurative sense, replaces, in a stateable relation, a word in its literal sense. But what is interesting for... that was very well known, very well known before Fontanier. And Fontanier says, there is a second category that we are going to call: "tropes improperly speaking", improper tropes -- I would like you to understand that we have not left our subject; we are fully within it -- improper tropes. And he says, the difference is this: this time, there is the figurative. The substitution is made by words taken in their figurative senses. You see, this is what there is in common between the first and the second category; in both cases, the substitution of one word for another, constituting the figure, occurs through words taken in a figurative sense. But in the first category, it was a single word, taken in a figurative sense; "You see my iron" is "You see my sword", iron-sword, a single word. In the second category, the improper tropes, Fontanier tells us: here, it is very different because they bring there the element [*instance*] which is

substituted; the element which is substituted, the substitutive element, this is no longer a word. The figurative is no longer a word, it is a set of words or a proposition. [*Pause*]

And he analyzes -- he analyzes quite a few -- he analyzes three cases, which interest me a lot, you'll see, I don't have time to..., and he calls it, he's very subtle: personification, allegory, subjectivation. Here are three processes, three cases of these improper tropes. [*Pause*] Of course, they can involve proper tropes, but you'll see that stands out. I am giving an example of personification because I am not going to comment, I will just indicate that there are several figures, an example of personification. I tell you, for example, “Listen to justice, listen to the voice of justice”, [*Pause*] “Listen to justice”. Fine, there you can clearly see that the substitutive is necessarily a proposition. “Listen to justice”. The figure is formed by a verb plus a word, there is neither metaphor, nor is there a trope of a single word. You have to take the aggregate, “Listen to justice” for there to be a figure. So, it's a very different case.

In the cases of subjectivations which are of the same type, he proposes, “Your arms are fighting for freedom”; Fontanier offers the example “Your arms are fighting for freedom”. You will notice that in this case, it is a complex example because there is a proper trope, "your arms", which is a metonymy. But there, an improper trope is added, “Your arms fight for freedom”, or there, a second figure which is constituted by the proposition. So, you see there is a big difference between the two.

He does not stop there, and he adds a third category of figures, figures in which, this time, there is indeed a substitution. There is indeed a substitution of one word for another, but the two words are taken in their literal sense. -- I’m telling you all this because it is not clear in the book. I mean, he doesn't give..., it’s in very different chapters that he gives these definitions. I find it to be a complicated book, composed in complicated fashion, so it is for those interested in this kind of subject; I’m speaking so clearly as a means to help you, but the book is very thick. It's very beautiful indeed, it's a very beautiful book. -- Well, you see the difference there, huge. There is substitution in the two preceding cases; there necessarily were terms intervening in a figurative sense. Not here at all. There is a figure although the terms considered are taken in their literal sense.

And what does he give as an example? So, he obviously gives examples which will only be partially useful for us; this is where we are going to need to force this somewhat, but precisely. He gives an example, for example, inversion, he says. Inversion is a figure; it is relative to a language. What is inversion in one language may very well not be inversion in another language. For example, I say “beautiful, beautiful is this day”, “beautiful is this day”, you see, I’ve inverted this. I put the attribute instead of the subject and the subject instead of the attribute. I created an inversion. There are languages where this is, on the contrary, the normal fashion, so the inversion would be something else, for example, in Latin, in German. You see.

Or else he says, repetition. Here too, there is therefore a lot of... repetition, no, in "Beautiful is this day", there is no word that is taken in a figurative sense. That’s all fine, then. There is indeed a figure of speech, but the words are preserved in their literal sense, they simply undergo certain transformations, certain displacements, a transformation by inversion, or else, he says, a repetition, good, or else a synonymy, when you give synonyms. [*Pause*] Or, for example, I say,

“I saw with my own eyes”, “I saw with my own eyes”, so a figurative sense, there is a figure of speech. Pleonasms are like this, etc., but they can obtain, and they can produce particularly elaborate effects in speech. [*Pause*] Okay, here's a third kind of figure. These are figures in which the words, therefore, undergo substitutions in their literal sense. I substitute the subject for the attribute, the attribute for the subject. You see? A third type of figure.

And finally, a fourth type of figure, which he calls figures of thought. That, obviously, that will be of great interest to us for our work, the figures of thought. And what are figures of thought? Well, this time, these are figures which operate many substitutions in speech and which produce effects in the speech, but which occur as, he says, as -- so it's complex, but one sees very well what he means -- as if independently of words and propositions. That is, the words and propositions could be quite different, yet the figure would remain. In the other three cases, the figures are linked to the use of specific words, either taken in a figurative sense or taken in their literal sense. In this fourth case, that's not it. The figure operates independently of the words; that does not mean wordlessly, but it does mean that the words and the propositions can be arbitrary and that the figure subsists independently of the determination of the words and the propositions in which it acts.

What is he referring to? Suppose in a speech, it happens all the time, I make an objection to myself. There! That’s a figure of speech. For me, it happens to me all the time, anyway, to anticipate an objection, right? We are so afraid of an objection, it is better to anticipate it than to wait for it to happen. [*Laughter*] “Oh! But you are going to tell me…”, which implies, and I would answer, etc. I'm creating a figure of speech there. It can start from any proposition and as a function of any word that I can make this figure of speech. Or else, he [Fontanier] invents a term which is interesting: “a sustainment” [*sustentation*], a sustainment is when I let my sentence drag out and then suddenly burst. So, we ask ourselves, but what is he trying to say? Suddenly a shock-word bursts out. All that, the rhetoricians, the rhetoricians know this well, he cites a lovely example in [Pierre] Corneille’s “Cinna”… [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:05:21]

Part 2

“Do you remember that, Cinna? »… « Do you remember, Cinna, so much time and so much glory cannot soon leave your memory. But what one could never imagine, Cinna, you remember...”[4] What is he saying to Cinna here? He seems quite kind, he’s appealing to memory. I’ll start again: “Do you remember Cinna, so much time and so much glory cannot soon leave your memory. But what one could never imagine, Cinna, you remember... and want to kill me.” Cinna didn't expect that, [*Laughter*] he gets pale; this is a sustainment, unleashing the shock-word when it’s least expected. This can be done in any proposition, with any words at all. Fine.

There we have the four figures distinguished by Fontanier. I think that's a very, very good classification. So, I ask myself, in which case are we? We are in a very specific case; we are not dealing with words, we are dealing with images. We are not interested in the eventual relationships between images and words. So, I’ll summarize; I list the figures such as I’m able to according to our previous analyses.

I’ve said regarding a first kind of figures that they were sculptural or plastic representations

which are introduced between an action and a situation. [*Pause*] The example I gave from "October" [1917]; with the counterrevolutionaries invoking religion, Eisenstein causes an image to follow, a series of images in which there are fetishes, Buddhas, Hindu gods there. [*Pause*] Or else the example: the jets of water and the bursts of fire that come in after the stream of milk. I'm saying, here we have figures which correspond typically, in terms of images, which correspond to the first type. [*Pause*] These are really "tropes" properly stated.

You will notice, in fact, that generally there is a series of images, but each image is valid in itself, and there may be only one, for example, still remaining in "October", the bust of Napoleon, which occurs when Kerensky, and which indicates that Kerensky thinks he is Napoleon. Here it's only one image. Sometimes there are three of them, the three lions of "[The Battleship] Potemkin" [1925], the famous three lions of "Potemkin". They are generally metaphors; it is not excluded that they may be other figures. These are figures of the first type. These are, and this corresponds to what I called, sculptural and plastic representations. So, for me, in my classification of images, the first kind of figure will be the sculptural and plastic representations that correspond, if you will, to Fontanier's first category.

A second category, which interests me enormously: the theatrical performance, which cannot fit into a single image, nor even into a series of independent images. It implies, except in extraordinary cases, it implies a sequence. I am saying: except in extraordinary cases because if it did not imply a sequence, it would imply what we would call a shot-sequence, even if extraordinarily contracted. In Godard, for example, that exists, but no matter, right? Let's stick to the simplest cases. It involves a sequence; it develops in a sequence and, indeed, the theatrical representation must be adequate to the entirety of the situation. I would say that it is a figure that corresponds to the second category, and see the list that Fontanier himself gave of the second category: allegory, etc. I would therefore say that my second category of figures is the "theatrical" representations which slide in or arise, and which form a sequence in the succession of cinematographic images. I don't claim to exhaust theater-cinema relationships through this, that should really go without saying.

Good, and then here, for the moment we are blocked. But then I tell myself, all the same, Fontanier pushes us, isn't there another type of figure? There is something from the beginning of cinema that has played a huge role, and which has its source in burlesque, it is the phenomena of inversion. [*Pause*] The phenomena of inversion, well, in the most obvious, crudest form, the man-woman transvestite, the man dressed as a woman. I tell myself that's curious because it's figures. Why not after all? You see that I take "inversion" in a much more extended sense than Fontanier. I speak of real inversion; it is not a question of putting into a proposition the subject in place of the attribute and the attribute in place of the subject. It is about making an inversion between two images, neither of which is taken in a figurative sense. My two previous images, the plastic and theatrical figures, were taken in a figurative sense; they were taken in a figurative sense.

Here, in the inversions about which I'm speaking, the image is literal; a man disguised as a woman, well, so these things run throughout the cinema, and then man-woman is the inversion that immediately comes to mind because it's is the one that satisfies us the most or makes us laugh the most, as you will, but there are plenty of them, plenty of inversions. To believe that

perhaps unlike language, cinema has mechanisms of inversion that bite into reality itself, and not the order of words. Some very powerful reversal mechanisms, what could it be, and again, where the image is taken literally? And I am saying: this is everywhere in cinema. But just as we were looking for an author for the previous figures, an author who responds to his genius, Eisenstein, it would be good for us if we had vaguely, even vaguely the idea of an author within cinema who brought the figures of inversion the farthest, the farthest that's ever been done, who that is, … whose problem or one of the problems it is, a guy who's haunted by that. And here again, we will not be in a hurry to make interpretations of the "homosexuality or not homosexuality" type, etc.; this isn't, this isn't really our problem. Our problem is a problem of image.

Well, I indeed seem to see one, but who has nothing to do with Eisenstein. This is another area, a new type of figure. It's [Howard] Hawks, it's Hawks. If you take the common theme within all of Hawks' work – Hawks doesn't care about genre; he's one of those men of cinema ready for anything, a Western, a comedy, at a pinch an historical film, well, he does everything, you have to believe that his signature is elsewhere -- Hawks' signature, how do you recognize it? It can be recognized by mechanisms of inversion which constitute so many figures, but literal figures this time. In the scenario, there must always be a moment when the man is surprised insofar as he has been forced to put on a woman's garment, and he is in relation to a woman who is virilized to the extreme, a male-female inversion, consistent in Hawks' work.

But as he is a great author, he is not satisfied with it; that's too easy, that. Where this gets more interesting is when the reversals are less, are less expected. So, there is another famous inversion in Hawks: old man-child or adult-child. This found its most, I don't know, your choice, the most beautiful expression or the most striking – in any case, the most striking, right? -- in "Gentlemen Prefer Blondes" [1953] where there is the eight-year-old child-monster, and who talks and stands and behaves like a man of forty, and who does an unbelievable sketch with Marilyn Monroe, for those who remember the film, and then the old man who behaves like a child. And there's the big scene opposing the old man to Marilyn Monroe mounted on the kid's shoulders and answering with the kid's voice, but suddenly being herself a giantess -- well, a very, very beautiful scene – in which the whole inversion plays out which is a real figure and where the inversion between the monstrous child and the doddering old man plays out. Hawks likes that a lot. And he creates inversions even more clever; I believe there is a perpetual theme, a love-money inversion in his works that is very odd. The inversion, since this is sound, talking cinema, the inversion also intervenes in Hawks' work, it seems to me, at the level of noble language-slang, in which all of a sudden, the young girl from an excellent family begins to speak slang, a curious inversion of high and low language.

And then, the most famous of Hawks' inversions, the one that appears above all in his Westerns, what is it? It's an inversion, we've often said it, hence so much the better, it's the inversion of the outside and the inside, and that belongs to a very special space. And here, I am very attached to it because if I had to comment on Hawks, but we don't have time, it is thanks to this conception of space and these inversions of the outside and the inside, that Hawks for his account goes from one form of action to the other form and from the other form to the first, and never ceases transforming the form. What does that mean, an inversion of inside and outside? That means, it's his, it seems to me, it's his great difference with [John] Ford's structure: instead of there being an encompasser [*engloblant*], a large outside that encompasses the hearth, in such a way that the

hearth is the refuge and that from the encompasser, one awaits either help or threats, a great circle, Hawks makes space undergo a very, very curious transformation, a topological transformation, I would almost say.

And the outside and the inside no longer exist such that the outside encompasses the inside, in the conditions I have just said, in the manner of Ford, but the outside and the inside are side by side. In other words, it is no longer the outside which is external to the inside, it is the outside and the inside which are external to each other. How does he manage to do that, because it's quite lovely when he manages to do that? Technically, I think he succeeds for a simple reason, that his American nature serves him well: he is a pure functionalist. He retains only functions; there are no organs in his work, there are only functions; that is what will allow him functional inversions. As the functions are detached from their organ, or from their subjects, or from their objects, as it is a play of pure functions, he can create functional inversions. The outside is next to the inside, the outside and the inside are exterior to each other, and the inside will take the place of the outside, and the outside will take the place of the inside.[5]

There's a Hawks Western that I admire because it's all about a prisoner in his cell.[6] But the prisoner will never be seen; I exaggerate, we see him once. Why does Hawks care so little about this, why? Obviously, he does it on purpose. This is a very beautiful image-cinema, and as such, it should be commented on as much as a beautiful page, because that must be done. Everything is focused on this guy in his cell, and we don't see him. Why? Because the only thing that matters is the prison function. No need to show who; no need to show who, there is someone inside; ultimately, it doesn't change anything. Hawks' churches are functions, the churches; you will never see a worshiper there. So, it's very curious: this functional game, which is very, very different then because for Ford, the functions must always be attached to organs, to organisms. But it's this functionalist abstraction that will allow him [Hawks] all the inversions, because with another guy, you know, another author, it's not enough to tell yourself: I'm going to create inversions; that fails if you don't not provide the means, and the means are not obvious. He was able to give himself the means because I think it was his problem, obtaining inversions, that was the only thing that amused him. Fine, very good.

So, and you will see in many of Hawks' films, in fact, that the inversion of outside and inside is immediately translated into what form? Everything that is dangerous and unexpected comes from within; and from the outside, as we said -- we have often analyzed this very curious form of space in Hawks -- and from the outside, it is the planned action, the customary action. There is an image that I like in "Eldorado" [1966], in which there is the sheriff, [Robert] Mitchum, he is perfect in this scene, there is Mitchum who is very dirty, and he is forced to take a bath, so he takes his bath there in his Western-style tub. And then at that moment, it doesn't stop, everyone enters the room where he's taking his bath, to bring him soap. At the tenth time, he's fed up, he's fed up, but this is very odd because everyone enters the room where the sheriff is taking his bath, on the other hand, the street is deserted. [*Laughter*] So Mitchum says, "fine", he looks disgusted, completely sickened, and he says "this is not a public square!". It's not a public square, look, it's not a public square. This is a platitude, at the level of the dialogue, it's no longer a platitude at the level, I believe, of Hawks' work. You understand, it ceases to be a platitude when it comes to illustrate, in fact, a whole body of work which has precisely set itself the goal of inverting the values of the interior and the values of the exterior, the masculine values and the feminine

values, the values of love and the values of money, the values of high language and the values of low language. And that's his personal thing. I would say that this is a third type of figure; let us call them, for want of a better term, “figures of inversion”.

But there would be other cases. I think that, for example, last year, we analyzed something very important in certain authors, which was the role and the introduction of a power of "repetition" in the cinematographic image, in very different authors like [Luis] Buñuel or [Alain] Robbe-Grillet whom we had spoken very little about. But here, in this regard, I am not saying that it would be reduced to that.[7] We could reintroduce these images of repetition in this third type of figure, but in any case, the figures of inversion, etc., which are literal mechanisms of the image, i.e., the image is not taken in a figurative sense.

And then suspense, the fourth type, what to do with it? What to do with it? We have nothing to do with it, we have nothing to do with it. Why? These are figures of thought, my fourth category, they are figures of thought. Since they are figures of thought, we will not be able to understand them until much later. Why? Because for the moment, the three figures that we are retaining are already figures of thought, but through action-images, or through movement-images. I would say that the first three types of figures are already figures of thought, so they prepare us for figures of thought, but they are indirect figures of thought. If there are, as we foresee, direct figures of thought, they can only arise for us at the level of the analysis of another type of image. So, my column of figures, which comes after the two columns reserved for action-images, I can put above it: figures or transformations of the forms of actions. In developing this, I had a column first form of action, a column second form of action; I am therefore making a new column, transformations-figures or transformations of forms of action.

And I have three signs, fortunately, [*Pause*] three signs as usual: two signs of composition that indicate the transition from one form of action to another. These two signs of composition, I call them: theatrical representations, on the one hand; on the other hand, sculptural or plastic representations. [*Pause*] And then I have a genetic sign since it operates this time without any, without any figurative value of the image, that it operates in the image itself, in its grip, in its direction, in its literal content, and these are figures of inversion, etc. [*Pause*]

I notice that the figure caused us to make a fundamental progress because, on one hand, it allowed us to break down our two forms of action-images, and to pass from one to the other. But on the other hand, the figure was already introducing us to a new type of image since it was preparing us for the idea of a form of image that fundamentally included a third, and not remaining content with the law of the duel specific to the action-image. [*Pause*] Just as the impulse-image was a transition from the affection-image to the action-image, the figures are now for us a transition from the action-image, to what? We know this; in the last column of our first stage of classifications: the mental image. [*Pause*]

-- What time is it? [*Several responses*: 11:30] So that's perfect; we have a chance of finishing a portion today. -- So, the mental image, I’ll continue it before reminding you that we have, as it were, in fact finished a long part of this classificatory table. The mental image is again, the title up top, but there, I developed it in the course of the first semester, I believe, in any case, and I believe, I believe, I believe to have developed it regarding [Alfred] Hitchcock. No, right? Did I

talk at length about Hitchcock? Tell me yes; it's the same either way. [*Laughter*] So do you remember? You remember, right? But all of a sudden, I'm wondering if I did it; I think so, right?

Hidenobu Suzuki: It was during last year.

Deleuze: I spoke about Hitchcock last year? I had no ideas about Hitchcock last year.

Hidenobu Suzuki: At the end, completely at the end of the year.[8]

Deluze: Ah! Oh, it doesn't matter, we are not going, we are not going to emphasize it. There we are, it's not difficult. I'm saying, the mental image, what is it? Beyond the action-image, what is it? -- We saw it, but yes, I did a whole class on relations, and didn't I talk about Hitchcock at that time? You weren't listening! [*Laughter*] Well, well, that obviously changes everything, but we're still going to move very quickly. Oh, really, I could have sworn… Didn't I give you the signs of the mental image? [*Various answers*: No, no] But that's a huge disappointment! -- Listen, there you go. I'm saying basically, the mental image, what is it? How does that involve… Thinking, understand, here I would like to say some very, very simple things. – Place yourself there. – About thought, let's not exaggerate, it was everywhere in all the images we've seen so far... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... and you remember, we defined it, here I did that at least, a pure immediate consciousness present in all consciousness which is neither immediate nor given -- No... well, you'll correct this yourself -- pure immediate consciousness present in all consciousness, that's what affect was. So, there was some thought. In the impulse-image, that goes without saying. In the action-image, there is plenty of thought! The understanding of the situation by the character, the elaboration of the action, the choice of means, etc., thinking just does not stop. [*Pause*] In figures, as we have just seen, all figures are figures of thought, even indirectly. So, first question: why the hell make a little extra slot for the mental image since thought was already involved everywhere? Our answer, we have it all the same: by virtue of what we said in the first semester, namely that there is something very special which is the relation. Why? Because the relation, which is the highest paradox of philosophy, what is a relation?

Well, about the relation, I can say it's an object of thought. And in what sense is the relation an object of thought? In a somewhat paradoxical sense, because it is an object of thought precisely because it exists outside of thought. I would not say of a concept that it is an object of thought. I can say now, even about the relation, that it is the object of *the* thought. A concept, an idea, they are not objects of the thought unless you give them an existence outside of thought. If you don't give them an existence outside of thought, a concept, an idea, they are means of thought and not objects of thought. An object of thought can only be something that exists outside of thought. An idea is an object of thought if you accept or concede to the idea an existence outside of thought, well, what Plato did, what many people did. They think ideas have an existence outside of thought. Notice that, at this point, that means that the idea is a relation, it doesn't matter why, but there, it would be easy to show philosophically that the relation is the object of thought because it is the object that exists independently of thought.

But if it exists independently of thought, why call it "object of thought"? Exactly for the same

reasons that you call “object of perception” the object of perception. The object of perception exists independently of perception but can only be grasped through by perception. I call "object of thought" an object which exists independently of thought, but which nevertheless can only be grasped through thought. What is that? It is a relation; only relations are objects of thought, only relations are objects of thought. If there is a mental image, it will be the image of a relation or several relations. But you will ask me: but the relations, were they there all the time in the other images? No, they weren't there, or they were there as enveloped. Of course, there were relations that arose, for example, a particular character was the brother of another particular character, it's a relation. They were completely enveloped in the demands of perception-images, affection-images, action-images. Relations do not stand on their own. [*Pause*]

I call “mental image” an image which takes as its object the relation insofar as it stands on its own. Can such a cinema exist? You see the mental image; it's not the image of someone who would take on the profound airs of the thinker because filming that, a thinker, that can surely be done, maybe it's what Godard tries to do in his interviews, maybe he hasn't done it well yet, maybe, well, whatever. But that's not what "mental image" means. It's the simplest aspect of thought, but it's complicated.[9]

Are there images of relations? Can we build a cinema in which images of relations would predominate? So, if I am told, once again, relations are already in action, of course! In an action, you have an end, means, an agent; that implies a whole package of relations, that, relations of means to the end, relations of the end to the agent, relations of the agent to the means, there are plenty of relations. Relations don't stand on their own. They are not valid independently of their terms; they are enveloped in their terms.

And when did philosophy discover the relation and make it its highest object, to the point that to do philosophy is to ask oneself, what is a relation? – It's not true, what I'm saying, but [*some unclear words*] [*Laughter*] -- It made it [the relation] its highest object when it realized that relations themselves were external to their terms, that is, did not depend on their terms. If I say, it's very simple, if I say, “Pierre is taller than Paul”, I'm not saying the same thing as “the sky is blue”. I mean, "greater than Paul" is not an attribute that is contained in the subject "Peter." [*Pause*] This is the famous distinction between judgment of relation and judgment of attribution, this distinction resting on the awareness of this: that relations are irreducible to their terms. Any relation is exterior to its terms. Peter looks like Paul; this is neither the attribute of Peter, nor the attribute of Paul; it's in between. What is an "in-between"? Who owns an “in-between”? No one. So be it. Philosophy will state what its foundation is to the relation since the foundation of the relation cannot be located in any of the terms it unites. This mystery is truly unfathomable. [*Pause*]

I am saying, here we have the mental image; I have just founded its necessity. But is it possible? Is it possible to construct a mental image? In any case, I would say, there are mental images, and the images of relations are mental images. You can tell me, there is no image of relations. I would tell you, okay, fine; at that moment, there is no mental image. But suppose there are mental images. So, let's look for it; as always, what would it be? See, we have given ourselves the conditions, we cannot confuse them with actions, nor with affections; we can assign them a very precise character: the relation. And the relation is a fascinating thing, it's not nothing. Again,

it's an abyss.

What is this thing that comes between two things, unites them, does not allow itself to be reduced to either one or the other, and can disappear as it came? Peter and Paul look alike; I turn my head, and they no longer look alike. [*Pause*] Do you realize? Mr. and Mrs. Smith are married; I turn my head, they are no longer married and never have been. Do you recognize a Hitchcock movie? Well, whatever. Yes, the relation, the mental image, that's going to be this. It is no longer a question of affection, perception, action; it's about relations. Well then, I think what there is in Hitchcock's work is that he's been the object of so many excellent reviews, all excellent ones, that one no longer knows how to manage, but that's not difficult because everything is good. Everything is good, except that it's not worth getting... Basically, there are two kinds of comments: those who see in him a very profound metaphysician, a Catholic Platonist – this is in the very beautiful book by [Eric] Rohmer-[Claude] Chabrol[10] -- or else a psychologist of the depths, it's [Jean] Douchet,[11] and then there are those who are fed up with metaphysics and who say: oh listen, do… give us a break, he's an entertainer, he's a prodigious entertainer.

Personally, I believe that neither one nor the other is thinking of a particular thing: this thing is that the theory of relations as it has always been constituted in philosophy and in logic, is both stupendously entertaining -- that is, it produces Lewis Carroll -- and at the same time, it has a bottomless depth. So, there's no point in fighting, it's whatever you want, Hitchcock. Although Hitchcock is not a theorist of relations, he is not a philosopher; I am saying that he's the one who invents the image of relations, and he thereby introduces a new image to cinema which was necessarily only prepared by the other images. It [the theory] existed, it pre-existed in others' work, well yes. We have already seen in Eisenstein, it pre-existed, but the direct image of relations, it's a gimmick [*truc*], and it's not surprising. It's English; the theory of relations, it is the gimmick of the English and the Americans, it is their business. They're the ones who found it to annoy Westerners, to annoy the French and the Germans, [*Laughter*] and to show them, the French and the Germans, that they didn't understand anything. They emerged, then, and suddenly, it exploded everywhere, it animated their literature, it animated their logic starting with [Bertrand] Russell. There is only one logic of relations, and that animated their philosophy and their metaphysics when they agreed to create one, more and more rarely, but anyway, it doesn't matter. So, fine.[12]

Understand, for them, things are bundles of relations, so there's no point in worrying, ok? And for their novelists, it's the same; the characters are bundles of relations. They only see in-betweens, they never see one term or another. They only see in-betweens and not at all relative to the two terms; they see the in-between for itself, in itself. And that's their business; they tell each other, our business is describing relations. Very interesting, that. The relation lives for itself, it lives, and it dies for itself. It's a kind of thinking that we don't have, or when we have it, it feels like our head is a bit out of whack. I mean, what is one nation's madness may be another's blandest common sense. Our own crazy ideas, they're English platitude, but conversely, right, as a kind of revenge.

But anyway, what do they do with their relations? Well, I'd like you to understand that it's a bit like a tapestry, and that's Hitchcock's thing: it's a bit like a tapestry. In a tapestry, you have posts

[*montants*] which allow you to constitute what will be called “warp thread” [*chaîne*], see? Let's say in the simplest case, a vertical warp that goes from one post to another, and then you have the shuttle that goes over it, under it. The shuttle is mobile; the warp thread is motionless, and the posts define the frame. Well, for Hitchcock, that's it, it's tapestry. In his work, action exists, the action, but everyone knows the action is a joke [*pour rigoler*] with him. The action is reduced to the state of the shuttle. It is reduced to the state of the shuttle. What interests him is the warp thread, that's why his conception of framing is a tapestry maker’s. There is going to be a chain of relations, the shuttle or thread of the action passing over, under, over, under that chain.[13]

What is the "thread of relations" [*trame des relations*], and how will it be able to show a relation?[14] All the same, here too it's like what I told you about Hawks: to be a great author -- and that doesn't apply only to the cinema, but to everything, it seems to me what I'm saying -- to be a great author, you have to have a desire that comes from you don't know where, on one hand, and on the other hand, you have to work, work, work to have the means to embody this desire that comes from you don't know where. You must have an idea about which you don't have to be held accountable and build the means for this idea. So, I was saying earlier in the Hawks case, well, what interests him, that's it, these are inversions. And if I say that this hides in his work a latent homosexuality, I do not see what I’ve contributed, especially since it is not obvious. It's not about demanding accountability. It's a question of saying, if needs be, well fine, that idea has no interest for me; it interests Hawks; at that point, he is not one of your authors. Fine. Based on that, when you have an idea like that -- and each of you ought to be like that in your work, you have what are called themes, these are your own themes -- you really don't have to ask why you have this theme rather than another, because you are wasting your time. What matters is the time you will devote to building your means in relation to this theme.

I assume Hitchcock to be a guy who, even without realizing it, was always fascinated, even at school, what he remembered, or in his reading, maybe he remembered, above all, that relations were funny things. And they amused him; he told himself how funny a relation is. If you don't tell yourself about something, about a phenomenon, how strange, how funny it is, you will never find your topics for work. For Hitchcock, he tells himself: a relation is very, very strange, and above all, we mustn't confuse the relation with something that wouldn't be a relation.

Let's take an example, then, a classic one: someone is near a corpse, he holds the bloody knife in his hand. So, he holds the bloody knife; it’s one of two things: either because he's the assassin, or because this is a poor guy who was passing by, who took the knife and who will find himself in a very, very unfortunate situation. In the second case, if he's going to find himself in a very, very unfortunate situation, it's for a simple reason: it's because he's going to be taken for the culprit. Do I have a relation here? The obvious answer is no, no relation, or at least in the ordinary state, these are relations enveloped in action, but there’s no relation for itself.

I would simply say: an innocent man is taken for the culprit. An innocent man is taken for the culprit. Why isn't it a relationship? We have our criterion. We have seen that; we have our very firm criterion. This is because in "an innocent man is taken for the culprit", you have, if needs be, 2 times 2. 2 times 2 never constituted a relation. Let's wait and see; you already know what constitutes a relation. But 2 times 2 does not constitute a relation. You have 1 times 2 which is the assassin and the knife; another time, you have two: the innocent man and the knife; you have

2 times 2 in a form that is just a little strange, because there is a term that intervenes in both pairs. In other words, you have 2 times 2; you are fully within the action-image, of which the duel, of which the binary form, was the very form. You just have two binary relationships. You have two binary relationships, that of the assassin and the knife, that of the innocent man and the knife. Understand, you have nothing, no relation. "An innocent man is taken for the culprit" does not imply any relation for itself. [*Pause*]

On the other hand, here is a strange proposition, but why is it strange? If not because it aims to make us understand the oddity of a relation: "a guilty person commits a crime for an innocent person", [*Pause*] a guilty person commits a crime for an innocent person, in parentheses, who, therefore, ceases to be innocent, whether he likes it or not. You recognize a proposition by Hitchcock. In Hitchcock's work, you don't have innocent people being taken for the guilty; you have something else. You have crimes that a guilty person commits for an innocent person who, henceforth, ceases to be innocent. I would say, it is exactly in this way that, for his own purposes, it can be at this level that Hitchcock tries to make us understand the specificity of a relation. So, there will be a relation between the innocent and the guilty, a terrible, terrifying relation, [*Pause*] such that the relation will be able to develop its independent life and lead the two characters to the end, no doubt all the way to what he himself calls "vertigo". [*Pause*]

I would say, if I tried to sum up very quickly Hitchcock's image, that action is nothing more than a chain... a thread [*trame*], sorry, which refers to the chain of relations; Hitchcock's image is an image that shows viewers relations even before the characters have become aware of those relationships... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:57:10]

Part 3

… Hitchcock elevates cinema in that way, without pretense, in his fashion, with his particular humor. He acts like all the previous ones, really, like all great authors, he invents types of images. But I really believe that with Hitchcock, there is a release of what we can call "the pure mental image", the image of relation. Action, then, is completely subordinate to the fabric of relations. I'm always returning to tapestry metaphors. There is a fabric… a Hitchcock film is made up of a fabric of relations that the spectator will discover before the characters, the action of the characters being only the shuttle or thread that passes above, below, etc. And the relation par excellence for Hitchcock can be, in fact, as Rohmer and Chabrol put it very well there, it's a matter of crime and transgression [*faute*].

In fact, think that Christianity, when we talk about Hitchcock's Christianity and Catholicism, that was the first great theory of relations, indeed. And it is no accident that English logic knew the logic of the Middle Ages so well. And in the logic of the Middle Ages where there are already quite wonderful theories of relations, very, very, very beautiful, extremely advanced theories of relations, the best examples that they take are obviously theological, of the type: what is the relationship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit? Theology has been useful to philosophy, why? Because precisely, there is a relation between theology and pure logic which will only be destroyed very late -- I don't even know when one could assign the rupture of the relationship -- very late, in my opinion, they continue until the 18th, until the 17th century, but I don't know, I haven't thought about that at all – [theories] which [are] very, very advanced, right? Good.

And the transgression? Why is it the relation? Why is it almost the relation par excellence? With all these stories of original sin, of Adam who transgressed for all of us who, therefore, have ceased to be innocent, it matters little if he is guilty or innocent, but guilty or innocent, this is a case, this is an extraordinary example to cause us to understand this play [*jeu*] of the relation. The relation is independent of these terms. The relation is independent of these terms such that there are no innocent people taken as culprits at all. There are culprits who have committed the action, the harmful action *for* the innocent ones, and it is a relation that will be called either exchange, or gift, or return [*rendu*].

In Hitchcock's work, no crime is committed; the crime is *given* to someone, to an innocent, or else it is *exchanged* for the crime that is required of the innocent, or else we *return* it back to someone. And it's this..., Whereas in action cinema, crimes are committed, and that's enough, from that point on, they have their problems. But in Hitchcock's work, for whom all action is framed in a system of relations, one cannot commit a crime, one can only ever return it, only give it: "I give you my crime". Hitchcock's famous film, "The Wrong Man"[1957]: I give you my crime. I exchange my crime: "Strangers on a Train" [1951]; I return my crime, there, alas, I no longer know the name, but I swear to you that it exists, "I return my crime". It's "Sabotage" [1936], it's the one where a... where the hero brought about the death of the woman's little brother, the woman that he has... It's "Sabotage", it's based on a novel by [Joseph] Conrad [*The Secret Agent*]. So, it's the relation-image that triumphs.

So, I would like, if that's it, you may remember, because we had seen that, I was saying, well, philosophically, the relation has two figures. There are two figures of relations, and I won't go back over that because we had analyzed it well. -- Is it noon or one o'clock?

A student: Noon.

Deleuze: Aaaahhh, but I'm going to finish soon because we've had enough. So, I have to finish this. [*Pause*] I was saying, yes, this is the last effort I'm making for you, because afterwards, all will be fine. There are two kinds of relations, and precisely there is a great, great philosopher whose name was [David] Hume, Hume, H-U-M-E, 18th century, Scottish, [*Laughter*] a great philosopher who distinguished between two kinds of relations. And some he called "natural relations", and the others he called "philosophical relations", and for reasons of modesty, we've preferred to call them "abstract relations", and what difference is there?[15]

I recall very quickly the difference: the "natural relation" is [*Pause*] the rule by which we pass easily, comfortably, naturally from a given image to an image that was not given. [*Pause*] Example: I see Pierre's portrait, I think of Pierre, I pass from a given image, Pierre's portrait, saying: "hey, where is he?", fine. You see, this is a mode, an easy passage. Immediately Hume's comment: it wears out quickly, it wears out pretty quickly. Natural relations can be continued ad infinitum by right. So, Pierre, I go from Pierre's photo to Pierre. Pierre, the idea of Pierre, reminds me of Pierre's family that I knew well; Pierre's family made me think of the countryside in which I spent my holidays when I was a child; and then I stop, right? I mean, and Hume puts a lot of emphasis on this in some very beautiful pages, on the easy transition that goes from one idea to another in natural relations, but that wears out very quickly.

The “abstract relation” is something else. We will call an "abstract relation" no longer the passage from a given idea to an ungiven idea following a natural and easy path, but will call an abstract relation any pattern [*motif*], any circumstance -- and what is important is that I don't presuppose "relation" in my definition of relation, which is already very difficult -- "abstract relation": any circumstance in which I see fit to compare two ideas, [*Pause*] even if they are not bound by a natural relation. [*Pause*] And in fact, it happens to me all the time. Not all the time, it happens to me all the time when I think. Example -- I’m speaking nonsense here, I’m saying... because I don't have an example, I would like a more striking example for you, but anyway, that doesn't matter, I’m comparing -- well, the idea of ellipse awakens in me the idea of parabola. These are two geometric figures that really don't look alike, don't look alike; there is no natural relation between an ellipse image and a parabola image. There is a philosophical relation. Why? Because there is a circumstance for which I see fit to compare them, namely: they are conic sections. You understand? Good, very good. That’s what “abstract relations” are. So, I’m saying, okay then, it's very simple, you see, since we're filling up our [graph]..., there I had to go very quickly. I feel like I've said all of that before.

A student: Yes.

Deleuze: I’ve indeed spoken about relations, right?

The student: Yes, yes, yes.

Deleuze: So, I come back to Hitchcock, if it is true that I had not discussed him. It's quite simple. I’m saying there, in my slot, you see? [*Deleuze points to the board*] Here I am connecting my little slot. Following our principle, my little slot, it is divided like this [*Deleuze writes on the board*]: a general title, it therefore comes after the transformations, after the two action-images, after the transformations that we’ve seen, the figures. Here, “mental image” is Thirdness. You remember, for those... You remember, this is Peirce's Thirdness, namely the relation, it’s necessarily in three since [the relation] is exterior to these terms, of which we have at least two terms and the relation is reducible to neither of two nor to the totality of two. So, the relation is always a third. It’s the image of Thirdness, it’s the mental image.

So, what is expected of us, about that, I’m saying as an example... The person who really seems to me to have introduced the mental image into cinema is Hitchcock. Well, just as I would have said mechanisms of inversion, that's really a Hawks thing, but as we would do as well for literature or philosophy, if I say "cogito", what do you want, we can always find precedents for the “cogito”, we still had to wait for Descartes to find this way of thinking and to constitute this concept. Well yes, that's how it is. Well then, three signs are needed for it to go well. We need signs of composition, "mental image", and I have as a reference point that there are two kinds of relations, "natural relation", "abstract relation".

Well, what's happening in Hitchcock’s works? Why does he tell us all the time: you know, suspense is the true emotion, it can only come from very ordinary objects? He hates the "terror movies" thing. Above all, beings or objects must not be extraordinary. He says it very well about "The Birds" (1963). Everything would fail if I had looked for extraordinary birds; you need

absolutely ordinary birds, seagulls and crows, otherwise everything is screwed up for him. A fan of terror cinema would say something completely different, but because he would be inventing a completely different image, a completely different type of image. And for him, the ordinary is necessary, why? Because he operates by natural series, and Hitchcock's series correspond exactly to what I called "natural relations".

Let's quote one of his series: [*Pause*] wine-cellar-dinner, wine-cellar-dinner. Really a natural relation, right? You see the cellar, you see the cellar is given, you see the door to the cellar, you think of bottles of wine, and you say: "they're going to be for dinner". You have a natural series or a natural three-term wine-cellar-diner relation. Fine. The terms of a natural relation, I would call them, as signs, "marks". [*Deleuze writes on the board*] Wine, cellar and dinner are three marks constituting a series, constituting a natural relation. And I would say of a natural relation that it is a linkage of marks.

Suppose the following situation: something, a something = x, suddenly makes an object or term of the natural relation jump where it was normally caught, i.e., something makes a term jump from its customary series. This is why the objects have to be ordinary. If these are extraordinary objects, it is not surprising, they are already customary extra-series [*hors-série*]. He needs ordinary things so badly. Obviously! He needs completely customary marks, and based on that, he will proceed so that an object emerges from his customary series, but really jumps, squirts out from its series. I would say: this is a "relation-image". There we are. But still it was necessary to find this means.

I am in the process of answering the question: and how did he manage to produce "relation-images", and how will that be translated? I'm giving some examples that everyone knows. A series of mills, in a land of mills, that's customary! These are marks. I'm watching. Better and literally, I jump in the air. There is a windmill whose blades turn in the opposite direction of the wind. [*Laughter*] What is that? Okay, first example: an object from the customary series has squirted out of its series. It is a very strong relation-image. At that point, you become aware of what the utterly intense natural relation is. Personally, I don't see any guy who constructed, who proceeded like that. We could perhaps find isolated examples, but this is new, it's absolutely new cinema.

A second example: you are at a dinner party, [*Pause*] and there are bottles, a customary series in which you say, "my host has chosen some wine for me". The valet enters and exhibits a kind of panic when he sees one of the bottles. Big drops of sweat, all you want, it's about... you say: "hey! This bottle is out of place, but how can a bottle be out of place? How can a bottle of wine be out of place at a dinner party where wine is served?" That makes one think: everyone recognized the story of "Notorious" [1946]. He is one of the spies, but he's working as a valet...

Claire Parnet [*and others*]: [*Various mix of comments, but they object to what Deleuze is saying*]

Deleuze: He's not working?

Parnet [*and others*]: [*Deleuze is corrected*]

Deleuze: Ah, fine, ah, fine. Ok, well, that changes nothing. [*Laughter*] Fine, he's not a valet… But he exhibits, he exhibits emotion. There we are, there as well, the bottle has moved outside its series, its customary series.

So, it can be more complicated; yes, we wonder: is that going to move outside or not? There is a famous example, a Hitchcock, one of the first Hitchcocks, ["Blackmail", 1929] in which there is a master-chan... no, I don't know. Someone walks into a café that sells cigars, or into a grocery store, I don't know what... that sells cigars, and he asks for a cigar. He licks it, he looks at it, he rolls it, he looks at the people nearby, a young couple who have reason to be interested in, who find this guy strange, all that... he approaches, he asks for a light, he seems strange, but among cigar aficionados, there have been worse. [*Laughter*] I mean, there's a natural relation, a natural series there, constituted by the whole ritual of buying a cigar. The choice, the kind of feel, touch, this tactile relation with the cigar, a relationship -- I don't know how to say it -- "a gustatory relationship" with the cigar, lighting the cigar, we haven't finished with it, that may be the natural series. Or would it be something else? Isn't this guy who gets so comfortable in the shop already pointing something out, that is, he's doesn't at all belong to an ordinary series, "customer demanding cigar"? Wouldn't that be something else?

Last example. I'm on my little boat near the sea, well, not near the sea, on the sea... anyway, not far from the shore. [*Laughter*] And I'm vaguely watching the sky, and I see a seagull there on the horizon. A customary series there: seagull, small boat, -- here, I'm not customary, me, in the little boat -- but that's how things are, everything is fine, I tell myself, everything is fine. And then this idiot bird rushes forth and attacks. So there, it leaves its customary series, a seagull would never do that. It leaves its specific series. Fine. When the object leaves its customary series and thus releases the natural relation in its pure state to the extent and at the same time that it denies it, since we have spoken of marks, we will speak of "demarks", [*Deleuze writes on the board*] the object or term has been marked off from the natural relation or customary series. It is a demark which is also a sign. I am saying, the two signs of composition of the mental image are marks and demarks. And both of them refer, [*Pause*] both refer [*Deleuze goes to the board*] to the natural relation, to the natural relation as the object of the mental image… [*Interruption of the recording*]

… in a pure state. But there is also something else in Hitchcock's works, it is also with objects. It is also with objects because the relation is complex. There are literally objects that are as if polyvalent. [*Pause*] Even, well even more, let's take two examples: an object like the key, a key. I'll choose the example of a film: "Dial M for Murder" [1954]. There is a key that plays a big role. Why does a key play a big role? It's because a key that's found in the purse of a woman who's supposed to be guilty of a crime, in conditions that... I... [*some words unclear*], a key that's found in a woman's bag should fit the lock of her apartment. Moreover, if she had really committed the crime [*Pause*] -- no that's not quite it, I…

A woman student: There's an exchange.

Deleuze: Yeah, if there is an exchange, yes, it's complex, whereas... Well, you see what I mean. [*Laughter*] The key should fit in the door. It just so happens that it doesn't fit, it leaps out of its series. What is this key? There is no longer a natural relation. The natural relation was that of this

key in this woman's bag with this lock. There, it is a key which comes from where? And then where is the key that fits the lock? I would say, that case of the key in the movie “Dial M for Murder” [1954] is a demark. It jumps out of its series.

Let's move on to another Hitchcockian key. In "Notorious" [1946], the heroine, in some very, very, very moving conditions, took the key to the cellar from her husband's keychain. Because, in fact, you remember the pressing question: if the bottle of wine leapt so violently out of its natural series, why are all the demarks – ah, I forgot a famous demark, but you're going to complete it yourself: the crop-duster when there is no field to dust in "North by Northwest" [1959]. That's a fundamental Hitchcock demark, good. -- But there, then, what's wrong with this bottle? What is special about it that makes it not fit into the natural series? The only possible answer is that you have to go into the cellar and have a look and compare this bottle to others, or this kind of bottle, since he remembered the brand, the year, when she had held it. Well, there you have it, the key, in "Notorious", the woman grabs it, she is already risking a lot. She takes it from her husband’s keychain who is never separated from it. She has it in her hand, she's got it in her little clenched fist. Good. And she's going to pass it on to someone. This someone is both her lover and her co-agent, since she is a secret agent, and his co-agent. Her husband is both her husband and a dangerous German spy. Oof, yeah. She holds the key in her hand, she is going to pass it to the guy, the husband is not far away. I’m saying: the key carries a system of relations, this time abstract.

If I consider the set of characters, I may see fit to compare them as a function of their affective state, as a function of their active state, as a function of something else entirely, I guess. From the point of view of affections, the key refers, on one hand, to the relationship of this woman with the husband, but it also refers to the relationship of this woman as a secret agent with the spy that the husband is. On the other hand, it also refers to the relationship with the lover, so much so that he, having given the key, she will be forced to kiss him to make the husband believe that they’re having a love affair rather than confess that she entrusted him with the key. So, there is a relationship with the man as a lover, there is a relationship with the man as co-secret agent, there is a relationship with their common mission which is to find out what makes the bottle strange.

I'm saying that unlike the key in “Dial M for Murder”, how is this key defined? It is an object carrying a multiplicity of abstract relations. The object itself is like a bundle of abstract relations. Of the same type, I am saying hastily, the handcuffs which occur so often in Hitchcock’s works, and which sometimes connect two lovers, are obviously objects carrying at least two abstract relations, their situation of being pursued and arrested, because that a crime has been committed, but also their prior affective situation which unites them. If it is true that the first seagull, which strikes the poor heroine on her little boat, refers to natural relations, is a demark, the set of seagulls, the infinite set of ordinary birds, which will prepare their collective attack, suspend their collective attack, make the collective attack, and finally leave a truce that does not bode well, the set of birds there is not a demark at all, but it is the set abstract relations.

Relations which, you will tell me, all types together this time, all ordinary types together, crows, seagulls, etc., abstract relations, of what nature? We can say anything, starting with the inverse relationship of man with nature; in another respect, the relationships reflected of man to man. In the very beautiful scene of the "The Birds" [1963], where there is the village which takes a poor

woman to task by saying: it's your fault, it's your fault, that is, that's so much the story of the Jew that Hitchcock obviously thought about it. So, what is this other aspect? I would call "symbol", and that's why I held onto the word -- I could have used the word before, since here I needed it for that -- I would call "symbol" any object or any element bearer of abstract relations. [*Pause*] As a result, the three signs of the mental image would be at this level: mark and demark as signs of composition, and symbol as genetic sign since I believe that these, under natural relations, but there, no matter, under natural relations, there are always deeper abstract relations.

Good, but then? See what we could say at the end of all this. I'll leave you because it's all very tiring. We still have, we have reached an end since, I mean, we've worked on the first stage since the beginning of the year. Because here, I have plenty to add. [*Laughter*] But I finished a great segment. And those that... And what I should add now, it won't have to go through this graph anymore; another graph will be needed. Why? Because in a way, I can say, at first sight, could we go further than the mental image? No. I mean, the mental image completes, accomplishes, it really accomplishes the system of perception-images, affection-images, action-images. It completes, it accomplishes the system in what sense? It is that under the actions, behind the affections, with the perceptions, [*Pause*] it stretches a web of relationships.

The set of images that we have seen from the beginning is as if framed by the relation-image or by the mental image. That doesn't prevent a film from being great and perfect without involving images of relations, that doesn't prevent it. It's from a very theoretical point of view that we say, well, if there are mental images, in fact, they can only present themselves as the completion of all what? Of all classic cinema. Classic cinema, classic cinema, what does classic cinema mean? In the sense that we can give to the content of this notion, we would call classic cinema, in all its grandeur, the set of movement-images as it has presented itself to us [*Pause*] under the triple aspect -- I pass over the secondary aspects -- under the triple aspect of perception-images, affection-images and action-images.

If I call "classic cinema" -- it is my right -- the cinema of the movement-image, that is, the system of perception-images, affection-images and action-images, I can say that the mental image pushes to its limit, that is, that it closes the system. As a result, in a way, I could say, well yes, Hitchcock is the end of cinema, is the end of classic cinema. It's easy to say, it's always rather shocking expressions because it's not true, but in a certain way, he pushes the three main types of images, or he pushes the movement-image, all the way to a frame which is that of the mental image. He frames it with relations, he submits movement to the relation. In this way, he discovers the mental image, and he makes the mental image the frame of all images. By making of the mental image the frame of all images, he brought a sort of ultimate perfection to classic cinema.

And it would be, and it would be good like that, and that's why Hitchcock never wanted and never claimed to put anything about cinema into question. He always claimed to be part of a kind of tradition which was for him the great tradition. It's very interesting, Hitchcock did not want to be revolutionary. He was not; certainly, he was not. He was inventing a prodigious type of image, it was..., good. It took its place in this long history of the movement-image. And everything would have happened like this if, if, if, if... if there hadn't been a little something, but which will greatly disappoint us since it will force us to continue, to continue, and then to start over when

we thought it was all done.

The question is exactly this: wasn't it in the mental image [*Pause*] that Hitchcock was sensing very, very confusedly, but independently of Hitchcock, that there something working already, and who, instead of accomplishing the system of the preceding images, was going to properly speaking screw it up, make it tip over, burst it? As a result, we would find ourselves faced not with an accomplishment and completion of cinema with the mental image, but we would find ourselves faced with a mutation, and at the extreme, almost a restart from zero. At the point we thought we were done, well, that was just the start.

So obviously, this is not joyful. All we know for the moment is that we have acquired our classification from the set of -- there are surely others -- from the set of movement-images. Next time, we'll do it like this, if you don't mind: I would like for us to do, not a recap, we'll talk about... I would like for you to give me, now that we have an idea of the whole, that we review certain things more precisely, and that, above all, we see what we have not seen, namely, in this history of movement-images, there is a whole problem which is that of montage. So, to take a look at that, good. But to discuss aspects of this graph, and then to begin the task that remains for us, there you are, because we will need a graph, but a differently organized one, but just as long, as long as the other one for what remains. [*End of recording*] [2:37:52]

Here is the summary of the table up to the end of this session:

PERCEPTION-IMAGE (the thing) – Dicisign and Reume (signs of composition), Gramme (Engramme) (sign of genesis)

AFFECTION-IMAGE (quality or potency [*puissance*]) – Icon (Icon of outline, Icon of feature, sings of composition), Qualisign (Qualisign of deconnection, Qualisign of emptiness, signs of genesis)

IMPULSE-IMAGE (energy) – Fetish (sign of composition), Symptom (sign of genesis)

ACTION-IMAGE (the force or act) Great form (S-A-S' structure) – Synsign (or Encompasser) and Binomial (signs of composition), Impression (sign of genesis)

ACTION-IMAGE Small form (A-S-A' structure) – Index (Index of lack, Index of equivocity or distance) (signs of composition), Vector (or line of the universe) (sign of genesis)

TRANSFORMING IMAGE (the reflection) – Figure (three kinds: scenographic of plastic image, inverted image, discursive image)

MENTAL IMAGE (the relation) – Mark (and Demark) (natural relationship, signs of composition), Symbol (abstract relationship, sign of genesis)

Notes

[1] On the montage of attraction, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 36-39, 181-183.

[2] This is Eisenstein's "Strike" (1925).

[3] This is the refrain Devos repeats in the scene with Jean-Paul Belmondo.

[4] *Cinna,* Act V, sc. 1, l. 1473-75.

[5] On Hawks' functionalism and on "Rio Bravo", see *The Movement-Image,* pp. 164-167

[6] The reference is no doubt "Rio Bravo" (1959).

[7] See session 20 of Cinema seminar I, May 25, 1982.

[8] Indeed, see session 21 of Cinema seminar 1, 1 June 1982.

[9] See the discussion of the relation and its links to cinema in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 198-205.

[10] *Hitchcock* (1957; London: Ungar Publishing, 1972).

[11] *Alfred Hitchcock* (Paris : Cahiers de l'Herne, 1967).

[12] On the logic of the relationship, see session 5 of Cinema seminar 2, December 14, 1982.

[13] On the screen in particular and the mental image in Hitchcock in general, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 200-205.

[14] In *The Movement-Image*, Deleuze seems to distinguish the "chain of relations [*chaîne des relations*] which constitutes the mental image" from or "in opposition to the thread [*trame*] of actions, perceptions and affections" (p. 200). However, in the session, Deleuze instead seems to mix the terms of this supposed opposition, hence the "thread of relations" which is rendered here as expressed in the session.

[15] See session 5 of the current seminar, December 14, 1982, where Deleuze talks at length about Hume.