Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Part 1

... a point that we have been pursuing for a long time, I would dream of a session, full of... in which we would hang out just relaxing since, since… here's exactly the point we've reached. We have, something that fills me with great satisfaction, we have distinguished 21 types of signs, 21, 3 x 7, since I remind you that we have established seven columns each of which presented at least three signs, so here we are with our 21 signs.[1] Obviously, we could go on for a long time because they all combine with each other, ok. The columns correspond to types of images; what fills the columns corresponds to the signs corresponding to these images. So, I'm not starting this graph over unless it's necessary, but I don't think it is.

But I'm reminding you that all of this, [*Deleuze moves towards the board and draws*] all these columns with their signs corresponded to the movement-image or, since it had seemed to us to be like the front and back sides of a same type of image, the light-image. [*Pause*] There you go. [*Pause*] For the moment, I can conceive of a film as an aggregate of movement-images or an aggregate of light-images. And it is in the name of this that we distinguished a certain number of types of images. I remind you that: when were movement-images, and from what point of view, were movement-images specified? Because here, we are going to fall back into this problem, so I indeed must remind you: when is the movement-image specified in such and such a type of image [*Deleuze taps on the board*] which directs my seven columns? Well, we had seen the answer: the movement-image or the light-image is specified according to one type of image or another when it is related to what was called a "center of indetermination" or rather to what Bergson called a "center of indetermination". How could one introduce centers of indetermination into movement-images?

Our answer was very simple; you remember, it was the Bergsonian response because what we call the center of indetermination is only a gap between a movement received and a movement executed. So, it suffices to give oneself intervals between movements or gaps between movements so that the movement-image may be specified in types of images, three main types: perception-image, affection-image, action-image. Why then did this give us, why didn't this give us just three columns, but seven columns? We have seen this: it's because different aspects intervened, for example, two types of action-images or transitions from the affection-image to the action-image, etc. At the end, that gave us seven columns in all. I reminded you: perception-

image, affection-image, passage to action-image, namely impulse-image, action-image first form, action-image second form, transformation of forms, finally, mental image.

So, if I can define at that level, while I'm there, if I can define a film as an aggregate of movement-images, I can also -- or light-images -- I can also define it as a distribution of the three main image types and their complements, that is, I can define it as a distribution of the seven main image types or the three main image types, that is, as a distribution of affection-images, action-images, perception-images. Why are the two definitions equivalent? Once again, perception-image, action-image, affection-image, I discover them when it is sufficient, when I relate movement-images to gaps or intervals. [*Pause*]

If I suppose a large number of centers of indetermination, that is, of deviations or intervals, if I suppose a large number of centers of indetermination themselves in movement, I am saying that I would have a perfect match between my two definitions: an aggregate of movement-images, on one hand; on the other hand, an aggregate of perception-images, action-images, affection-images. For my two definitions to be absolutely equivalent, it's enough for me to obtain any number of centers of indeterminacy whatever and to set them in movement in relation to one another. Otherwise, my two definitions only tend to equal each other insofar as, in fact, in a film, I never have more than a finite number of centers of indetermination. At that point, I would say that, following two aspects, following one or the other of the aspects that a film can privilege, this is an aggregate of movement-images or light-images, or it's a distribution of the three major types of images, or the seven types of images. That's the point I've reached. [*Pause*] All this, I assume that this is very clear, very clear.

So, my first question today, as you are concerned, it's good, myself, I don't know, what… I don't want… It is always artificial, to say that today, it's you who will react. It's not true, you'll react when you feel like it. I mean, what mattered to me in all that was not so much, it was really this classification of images and signs, of the reasons why we felt Peirce's [images and signs] seemed to suit us only on certain very local points, why we felt the need to attempt another one [classification].

So, in this respect, by returning to all kinds of things that we saw last year, I think I have fulfilled the first part of my task this year. To do that, that my first -- so almost, I would dream that, but not insisting on it, if there are seven [columns], I would like there to be so many more, that there might be 36 columns, that signs might proliferate, all that -- so my first request is: does anyone today want to react on this point? And, in particular, I know that there is [Georges] Comtesse who has something to say about the montage of attraction, what we had seen in the column of figures, that is, of transformations from one mode of action to another. Yes, you, you ...

A student: Yes, regarding the, the, the, the signs of Thirdness of the mental image, when you had spoken of the Thirdness the first time, you had spoken of a Firstness of Thirdness, a Secondness of the Thirdness, a Thirdness of the Thirdness. Should we not, at the level of signs, reconsider these three types of columns? I was thinking, for example, for Firstness of Thirdness, of the gesture. Insofar as gestures have, I believe, two dimensions, which are, on one hand, an affective dimension, insofar as the gesture can be a face, or on the other hand, they have a relational dimension, insofar as gestures are always in a certain relation, what gesture are we capable of in

a certain relation? I thought, for example -- for cinema, it's a little more difficult -- but for literature, of [Witold] Gombrowicz, for example, where in this regard, all his work is a little bit given to certain reports, husband-wife, father-daughter, etc., whom he apprehends, what gestures are they capable of? And these gestures seem to us to be part of both the relation and the affect. This would be for the Firstness of Thirdness.

For Secondness of Thirdness, I was thinking of something like what one might call an investigation [*enquête*]. This would be for the small form. When you were talking about the small form, we go from one index to another according to a line of the universe, that is, according to a kind of line of propagation. But, at the same time, and here one could think of the detective film and even more of film noir, there is this idea that, at the same time, we are following along the thread, and at the same time, this thread, this thread investigates, this thread creates an investigation, that is, that little by little, this thread bends back on itself, and the indices that are woven in a certain way, and there would also be a certain relationship, there are also two dimensions, a dimension, on the one hand, of indices where one goes from one to the other, and also a dimension of relationships between the two.

And then, perhaps a Thirdness of Thirdness which would perhaps be the relationship between the two. That is, given certain relationships, what would be the relationship, on one hand, between gestures and between indices? And there, for cinema once again, I believe that films noirs, certain films noirs, are very special in this respect, especially films noirs in which there is a femme fatale, insofar as, once again, the femme fatale, where we believe we know what gesture she is capable of given the supposed relationships she may have with the different protagonists. And at the same time, there are the indices, and these two planes which are by right separate, and, at the same time, that are directed, and which operate with each other. And the fact of linking one with the other, that creates a Thirdness of the Thirdness. So, there would be a gestural aspect, there would be a vectorial aspect which would be Secondness of Thirdness insofar as it would be a calculation of resultant, and perhaps a relationship between the two.

Another student: I would say that -- you are right about the femme fatale -- there is the opposite of the disabled woman. I'm thinking of "The Hustler" [1961] by Robert Rossen where Paul Newman who plays on handicaps, on brokenness, on... on... breaking, breaking people's reason for living, a therapy of a collective sort which results in the film noir not being as one-sided as you think. The femme fatale is not only Marlene Dietrich; she is often scary, Marlene Dietrich....

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, I'll tell you, in my opinion, it's not at all that you're wrong, but what you say is based on a completely different principle than the one I proposed. So, that interests me because you, perhaps you have the sense of offering a complement. In my opinion, you choose a completely different type of principle of classification. So, I'm going back to your starting point: it's quite true that in Thirdness, there are one, two, three, but the "one" of Thirdness has absolutely nothing to do with the "one" of Firstness, you see; the second of Thirdness has absolutely nothing to do with the second of Secondness. This is why I insist on the irreducibility of each type of image. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] For me, there will never be anything that could go through Firstness, then Secondness, then Thirdness, especially not. Otherwise, from my point of view, my whole classification at that time would no longer worth anything; I'd have to create another one.

You are asking me, in fact, it's a very interesting question: aren't there things, let's take the example of a gesture, does a gesture not pass through a Firstness, a Secondness, a Thirdness? My answer would be no. It would be no. A gesture can relate to all of this, but a gesture by itself belongs to Secondness. And it can have any relationship you want. This is why I insisted, for example, on Thirdness. If I come back to this example, I was trying to say, if we define Thirdness via the mental, above all, do not believe that there is Thirdness as soon as there is thought because Thirdness, as it defines the mental, must define a certain autonomy of the mental, which refers to a very special state of thought. Otherwise, when someone wants, in an action film... You could also tell me: action passes through feelings; Firstness, it passes by itself, Secondness, then it implies thought: Thirdness.

I would never say that -- again, I'm differentiating between our two points of view; I'm not saying at all that I'm right -- I absolutely wouldn't say that. Because someone who wants, someone who acts, has a goal, chooses means, of course, and that involves thought, but for me, that implies thought at the level of simple development and establishment of dueling. If I am looking for an autonomy of thought as such, at that point, then I come across the relation, with it being up to me henceforth to say: finally, an average relationship is not a relation. Pay attention: the "relation" designates something very special. You cannot call any "relation" whatever a relationship. And all the relationships, including relationships of thought, which you can discover at the level of action, are not yet relations. Relations are something very, very special. So, I could never, in my classification, give myself a term that would pass transversely from one slot to another, never.

So, if I tried to reflect on what you said, if we gave ourselves such a principle of classification, then we would start from unity, we would go from one slot to another, in my opinion, this not possible. In my opinion, this is only possible if you have first defined some slots, so there we would agree. And if you select any terms whatever when showing [this], but it will never be a gesture that will pass, this will be an aggregate. It will be an aggregate which will have a particular affective aspect, a particular active aspect, a particular perceptual aspect, etc. In any case, if you went in the direction you say, for example, in fact, I see, you could very well do something: the gesture, well, you would leave, in fact, there are affective gestures. And yes, but again, I would break your unity; I would say, there are affective gestures, there are gestures, fine, and where would I put -- or there is a famous theory in Brecht of the social gesture, of the *gestus*, of the social *gestus* -- then where would I put it? Would it correspond to... oh, I don't know. But I think that would be a completely different mode of classification. And I don't know if it's possible. So, we would have to reflect on this a lot. I don't know if it's possible without first assuming... for me, my classification, it's completely static, and it is deliberately static...

The first student: My idea was not so much to make elements that would travel from one to another, but really to try to understand: to be inside Thirdness. Because it was not a question of a particular gesture, but rather, given certain faces, given certain relationships, what gestures are they capable of? So, I was really trying to limit myself to the interior of Thirdness.

Deleuze: There are no, there are no gestures within Thirdness.

The student: When you were talking about the Marx Brothers as an example of this Thirdness,

when you were talking about Harpo, evidently, he was nonetheless the representative of affects within this Thirdness, since you took him as the Firstness of Thirdness.[2]

Deleuze: But that is not how he belonged to Thirdness. This is not how he belonged to Thirdness. And nor is that not how he had a Firstness of Thirdness. It's by analogy. I was saying, look at the group of the three Marx Brothers; in fact, one, two, three, what does that mean exactly? But if Harpo belonged to Thirdness, it is not insofar as he had gestures or represented affects; it is quite another thing. It is insofar as he provided the object corresponding to a word or insofar as he held a gestural discourse that could be translated into a proposition. There, I had something which belonged to Thirdness in an irreducible way which made me say: Harpo is perhaps the Firstness of Thirdness, but he's a Firstness which only belongs to Thirdness, which has nothing to do with the Firstness of Firstness. And if Chico was Secondness, it is because he spoke the word, of which Harpo was going to provide the object, and because he translated the gestural discourse into a proposition. It is therefore between the two of them that there was a relationship system. In one sense, it was the word-thing relation, in the other sense, it was the proposition-gesture relation.

You see, that's why I was trying to insist greatly on: above all, don't call just any type of relationship a relation. The relation is, is something very, very special, very specific, which will define the mental image, and at that point, which escapes the character. From the point of view of cinema -- the Hitchcock case, if I went over it in detail, would be very clear -- from the point of view of cinema, only the camera can grasp relations. This is why Hitchcock needs and urges the actor to be and remain neutral. It is not the actor who can exhibit relations; there is only the movement of the camera, in the frame. This is why [in] the great couple of the Hitchcock technique -- the frame as frame conceived as a tapestry frame and the movement of the camera within the limits of the frame – [it's] very important that the limits of the camera be mobile within the limits of the frame in Hitchcock.

The student: You are thinking of "North by Northwest" [1959] there.

Deleuze: No, I'm thinking of the whole, really. This is what clearly shows that the relation completely escapes the act... it is, it is, it is really the chain assumed by the plot of the action, it is autonomous. And he's the first, that's what I was trying to say about Hitchcock, he's the first to have had the idea that the action was nothing more than a weft and that the warp had to be cleared. Hence a conception of the original frame, hence all that, all that that entails technically. Yes, did you want to say something?

Another student: What other definition of light-image…

Deleuze: What?

The student: What other definition of light-image, if we start, if we are already in an image [*Deleuze:* Yes], what does that mean for you, light-image, a special sense…?

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, but that all the same, I've gone over that; you weren't there at the beginning, I spent quite a few hours on that, the light-image based on texts by Bergson.[3] But

we will find that again, we will perhaps even find it a little bit today. I was referring to, if you will, exactly, what is the physical term? [*Pause, Deleuze is looking for a term*] Diffusion, a phenomenon of diffusion, namely the propagation of light when it is supposed to encounter no, no instance capable of reflecting it, refracting it, etc., that is, the pure state of diffusion of light.

A student: The mind… [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: The mind… [*The student continues*] No, no, no, no.

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Purer lights, you have to understand, I don't know, I don't really know what you mean, but... purer lights, that begins... Such a problem can only begin to be posed if we relate light to something capable of reflecting or refracting it. At that moment, yes, you can speak of more or less pure light, that is, more or less bright light, etc., because it has become visible. I remind you that light in its state, in a supposedly ideal state of diffusion, that is, not colliding with any opacity, light in itself, light in itself, is the invisible. Light only becomes visible as reflected, refracted light, whatever you want, that is, when it collides with an opacity.

With this, I am only repeating the, almost a basic principle of the Goethean theory of light and colors, when Goethe very violently opposes [Isaac] Newton on the following point exactly: Newton, in Newton's analysis, you see, light is a substance, a divisible substance which contains colors.[4] I'm summarizing a lot, right, I'm simplifying a lot. So, the decomposition… the color is going to be simply, the decomposition, the colors will be the decomposition of light. Goethe's idea is: not at all, not at all... There is a... there is a very mysterious sentence in a letter from Hegel to Goethe. Hegel writes to Goethe this very modern sentence: "We have in common that we are both enemies of metaphysics", about the theory of colors.

What does Hegel mean? He means: Newton is a metaphysician. He treats light as a substance, and colors are the modes of this substance. Light breaks down into colors. For Goethe, not at all. Light is the invisible, and Bergson's text, which however did not allude to Goethe, from whom we started entirely at the beginning of the year, this admirable text, right, this light which propagates everywhere does not reveal itself anywhere, it is the invisible.[5] The question which is no longer that of metaphysics and which prepares, according to Hegel, a new mode of thought, is: on what condition, on what condition is there anything visible? Goethe's answer, which suits Hegel, is: the visible arises when light encounters the opaque. [*Pause*] The maximum opacity is black; the minimum opacity is white. White is already an opacity... [*Interruption of the recording*]

… In translation into the terms light-opaque, it means -- and this is not contradictory -- it means that the two conditions of the visible, the two conditions of what appears -- it is in this sense that this is a phenomenology -- the two conditions of what appears, that is -- that is, the two conditions of the visible – these are invisible light and the opacity which opposes light, and it is in this struggle between the two terms that the colors are produced, that is, that colors appear. And colors -- [*A student wants to ask a question*] sorry, I'm just finishing -- colors are, literally, no longer modes of light as in Newton's work, they are degrees of shadow. Even white is a

shadow. Admirable definition of white that Goethe offers, and which is so, so beautiful because there, all that... metaphysics, poetry, etc., is the fortuitously dark brilliance, the fortuitously obvious brilliance, the fortuitously [*The voice of a student who wants to speak is audible*] obscure brilliance of light as such. [*Pause*] So that was it... Yes?

Another student: So, light passes beside…

Deleuze: It passes beside what?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Why? Why? I do not see why? The invisible light has exactly the same status as the movement without interval… What?

The student: Because the sun determines the surface of the globe…

Deleuze: But the sun, but the sun... the sun already assumes a whole system of the world in which light has become visible. That's a whole other problem there. If you tell me, this invisible light, "does it exist?", I would ask, in my opinion, the question is meaningless. If I had to answer it, I would say: yes, it exists. In what capacity does it exist? It does not exist as pure light, it does not exist in a pure state since the whole reality of the world is to be, as people like Goethe will say, this combat of light and darkness, these battles between light and opacity. But the sun is already part of a world where light has become visible. So, you want to tell me: "What is it? But, but it is, it is, it is worse than metaphysics!" No. See in what way this is not metaphysics. Metaphysics is always defined, obviously wrongly, but we accept this definition, you find it in everyone, from Hegel to Nietzsche to Heidegger; when they, they want to define metaphysics, it is the distinction between essence and appearance. Whenever you make a distinction between appearance and essence, according to these authors, you are a metaphysician. This is how Nietzsche will define metaphysics, but long before, this is how Hegel had already defined it.

When they say: we are the enemy of metaphysics, they can only say it starting from Kant. And a declaration of war on metaphysics, that is, a philosophy that would no longer be metaphysics, begins with Kant. Why? Because in Kant, there is no longer either essence or appearance. I'm exaggerating, anyway; in some ways, they're still there. But in other respects, they're not anymore. Why? Because appearance is replaced -- and this is a transformation, an infinitely important conceptual displacement -- appearance is replaced by appearing [*l'apparition*]. You immediately see the immediate difference, what, you feel it: when I say "appearance", it means that there is something behind, and what is behind the appearance, it is the essence.

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: What are you saying there? Are you saying what you think, yourself, or are you saying… is this how you think, yourself?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Essence, there is no need to argue here, do you understand? Essence, all that, these are very fixed terms. That's what the thing is, then that's all. There I mean, that is not among the words to which one can give a… one can develop, because it is not simple, this definition. It is not simple, but the essence can mean only that: what the thing is. Henceforth, you see that, in fact, that is enough to distinguish it from the event. The event is what happens to the thing, it is not what the thing is. What the thing is, is the essence. Good. So, in fact, it differs from appearance. It differs from the way the thing appears.

But I am saying with Kant, what is the revolution, the Kantian revolution? It means that, once again, appearance tends to lose all meaning. Phenomena are not appearances. What appears is not an appearance. It is an appearing. You will tell me: fine, [that's] a question of words. Not at all. Not at all. Because an appearing refers to what? An appearing refers to the conditions of its own appearance. The appearing refers to conditions that cause it to appear. The fundamental couple is no longer essence-appearance which was in a state of duality; there was the world of essences and the world of appearances, at least in traditional Platonism. Everything has changed here; you have a couple in complementarity, and no longer in duality, appearing-conditions of appearance. At that moment, there begins what has been called phenomenology. Phenomenology, that is, the study of the conditions of appearance, will replace metaphysics which was the study of essences. As a result, phenomenology begins explicitly with Kant, continues with Hegel, takes on a new dimension with Husserl, but what all phenomenologists have in common is this rallying point: essence-appearance are a false, are false notions. What counts is the pair in complementarity of appearing-conditions of appearance.

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: It's the substitution of the question, "what are the conditions of what appears?", for the metaphysical question, "what is essence and what is appearance?" [*Pause*] Yes?

A woman student: To return to light…

Deleuze: Yes.

The student: Before Kant, I am thinking of Vermeer, there may have been a system of physics and thought which established an accord between colors and shadow and which in particular considered that colors are, in fact, degrees in a kind of opacity, which would correspond to degrees in the determination, and there would indeed be a close accord between the colors and the shadow, but it is an accord that occurs without the slightest struggle. This is a harmony: when light falls on the thing, it caresses it, and color emerges and manifests itself. So, there is not necessarily an opposition...

Deleuze: Quite correct.

The student: … light-shadow…

Deleuze: The Romantics will take that up -- you're completely right -- simply for them, there will be two aspects: there will be both a battle and a harmony. Besides, I do believe that in the Middle

Ages too, there is a battle, at least in Jacob Böhme's work, but there is a battle and a harmony. There is the battle which is anger, what they call anger, and there is a harmony which they will call love, and it is, for example, the two powers, the two powers of [Friedrich] Schelling. But the Romantics will absolutely need to go through... -- if you will, in their work, besides, we'll try to see it better later -- battle is the condition of manifestation, the condition of appearing of love or harmony. If nature did not go through a kind of stubbornness in which it opposes the spirit, there would be no reconciliation of nature and spirit. It is the beautiful romantic vision, really, in its pure state.

So, see, I come back to the light. I take: colors are not appearances; they are apparitions. What appears is the color. I bring out Goethe's schema here.[6] What appears is color, color is an appearing. So, it's not a mode of substance, not at all. Like any appearing, it refers to conditions. Under what conditions does color appear? Color appears because it constitutes the visible. The visible is color. I am not explaining why; you have to let yourself go, it's all so beautiful, it's so beautiful. The visible is color. It's not nothing at the time it was said, all that is... anyway, good.

The visible is color; as such, it refers to two conditions: light and opacity that it encounters. Why? Because light precisely is the invisible. It is the invisible in its perfect diffusion; in its diffusion throughout the universe, it is the invisible. When does it begin to become visible, really? When it collides with the opaque which reflects or refracts it. [*Pause*] In other words, colors are degrees of shadow, and white is the minimum degree of shadow, the fortuitously obscure brilliance of pure transparency. That, that is the thesis; it is really one of the most beautiful expressions in the world to define white, the fortuitously obscure brilliance of pure transparency. Good. This is the minimum degree of shadow. Black is the maximum degree of shadow. Colors are the degrees of shadow between white and black. Good.

Notice that he creates a phenomenology of colors; it is a phenomenology of colors, hence Hegel's congratulations in the form: you and I, we understood each other. [*Pause*] And he casts Newton into metaphysics, which is not without mischief since Newton is the metaphysician; they [*Hegel and Goethe*] judge that they are not metaphysicians. They have a reason to think this. But then, I'll end this remark by saying I said exactly the same thing about the movement-image. The movement-image is completely invisible too, [*Pause*] as long as what? Well, as long as there are no conditions that make it visible. And what are these conditions? We have seen this: it is the interval or the gap. It is only when there are intervals of movement that movement becomes visible.

In what way is it the same answer, since light-image and movement-image are the front and reverse sides? It's the same answer, it's completely the same answer. Why? Because we have seen that the interval between a movement received and a movement executed, on one hand, and on the other hand, a black screen [*Pause*] without which the photo would remain transparent, that is, without which light would remain invisible, they're the same thing. The black screen is the gap as well. In terms of dynamics, I would speak of intervals between movements; in terms of optics, I would speak of black screen or opacity. [*Pause*] So, in that regard, it's... Yeah?

A student: In the [*a few indistinct words*] you were speaking of the movement-image, and you introduced the impulse-image, the affection-image and the action-image. I wonder what relationship we can see between the universal movement-image and the world of light.

Deleuze: Yeah. I have a series of worlds. In fact, it's... You know, it's a bit like in, for those who have read some works, as in neo-Platonism, in fact, where, where there is a whole series of worlds there which, which come down from a thing. If I tried to translate my entire graph into worlds, I would say there, [*Deleuze goes to the board*] I obviously have the universe-world. I have the universe.

Another student [*He just enters, apologizes to Deleuze*]: … I mean that in the previous class, I had an urgent task.

Deleuze: Yes, obviously.

The student: [*He continues his explanation very quietly*]

Deleuze: Yes, oh well, yes, certainly, certainly, obviously.

The same student: For me, it is said that light is a line, I'm attracted by light; I don't understand anything more. [*Laughter; noises from the students*]

Deleuze: Obviously, that's an extremely strong remark because you won't be able to say something deeper, so there you have manage to get out of it. It's very fine to say, it's not bad as an objection: to say, but in fact what, what does all this mean? Might as well get out of it [*Laughter*] since we are in the light. What you don't know is that you are a black screen, you [*Laughter*] and that, otherwise you wouldn't be in the light.

The student: I am the black screen and white/sleepless nights.

Deleuze: No, no, there, you've said everything. [*Laughter*] That could only get worse.

The same student: I have a class.

Deleuze: Ah, really! [*Laughter*]

The same student: See you later, ok?

Deleuze: Goodbye! … Yeah, obviously he doesn't know, how does one know this sad news: what I am? That's it -- We would arrive at cogitos, very interesting cogitos -- what am I? What am I? Perhaps at the level of Thirdness, I could say "I think", but for the moment, there, I cannot say that. At the extreme, I can say, I am an interval between two movements. Notice, these are very flattering definitions, all that; being an interval between movements is great, isn't it? Well yes, we are all intervals between movements. So obviously, we believe that we are something else. People say: "me, me", but not at all, a small interval between movements. It comes, it goes, an interval, that's it. Or else, or else, and then at the same time, if there isn't one without the other,

what am I? I am a black screen. I reflect light on holidays, [*Laughter*] I reflect it, but on the other hand, I refract it, there is always something that gets into me. So that, that gives birth to monsters. The monsters that animate me are the phenomena of refraction, light. So sometimes if it's not going well, I've refracted too much, I didn't reflect sufficiently, really, [*Deleuze laughs along with the students*] and you are nothing else, really.

But life is beautiful with that, it's much more beautiful than being someone, you realize, right? It's more beautiful than me = me. So, the cogito can only be stated like this: me = black screen, me =…, and otherwise, no light. So, he [*referring to the student who has just left*], in fact, he arrives, and he says, but the light, but him too, he is there, and he does not know it. And yet, he knows at certain times that he is a black screen, right, when things are not going well. But we are even more so when things are going well, much more.

Well then, yes then I mean, if we said, it would be very interesting, we would convert our classification into a classification of worlds. So there, I would say, I have the universe, and I could say -- we'll see if we can refine it -- I could say, it's the great invisible and immobile universe. What is immobile? It is movement. What is invisible? It is the light. So, if you ask "why?", I'd say, well then listen, it's fine; you will never tell me that, for you, it suits you.

Having said this, I'll start over, image-perception. [*Deleuze indicates the steps of the classification on the board*] I have worlds, I would say: I have worlds. From there onward, inside the graph, I only have some visible and mobile since, in fact, inside the graph, movement-image is related to intervals, and the light-image is related to black screens. So, at the level of the perception-image, the universe that has become visible is divided into three universes, from the crudest to the most beautiful: the solid universe, the liquid universe, the gaseous universe. Needless to say, the list is not closed off; there are many others -- I'm speaking in an old-fashioned way, I'm speaking popularization, but anyway you could complete it yourself -- it's all the states of physical matter. And we saw that there was a perception that, by right in any case, that there was a solid perception, a liquid perception, a gaseous perception, and that it was not at all the same forms of perception.

If I move on to the universe… [*Deleuze corrects himself*] to affection, this time, what do I have? I no longer have worlds that refer to states of matter, matter that has become visible and mobile. I have spaces. Spaces were born -- here we would have to show why -- and these spaces are the most, the most, the most ... yes, it's normal, spaces appear, they're what we called any-spaces-whatever. These are any-spaces-whatever. The impulse-drive, that is, between affection and action, these are spaces that are precisely charged with affects. The impulse-image, in fact, was originary worlds. So, then in what way is the originary world, are the originary worlds worlds? Are they close to the grand universe, light and movement? Yes and no. They are nonetheless already very far from it because if you remember, the originary world, as opposed to the any-space-whatever, it was inseparable just as I defined it. I was trying to show that it was inseparable from a derived milieu, from a given milieu. So, it is very far. It simply plays the role of what is new in it; it plays the role of the "depthless" [*sans fond*]. It is the "depthless" of an actual milieu, that is, it is not at all a world preceding us, the originary world; it is a world that precedes the differentiation of before and after. It is not an animal world as opposed to the cultural world of man. It is a world that precedes the differentiation of man and of animal, etc.

So, it has its place, yes, it is the originary world.

On the action level, we saw that it was something else again. This time, it is the milieus, the milieus determined historically, and socially, and geographically. At the level of the mental image, yes, it's milieus, and then we also said another... it's the lines of the universe for the other form of action-image. It is therefore the large encompassing milieus, the large real encompassing milieus, and it is also the lines of the universe. [*Pause*]

At the level of the mental, I would have -- and this indeed constitutes a very special sphere, a very special framework -- I would have the world of relations, the noetic, noetic world, that is, of thought, of the mind. But so, to try to answer your question: yes, there would be forms of worlds which would correspond to each one, but in my opinion, none could be said closer than the others. If, perhaps, but in any case, none would be confused with the great initial universe since all these worlds interior to the classification refer to intervals between movements, assume intervals, and assume screens, black screens, surfaces receptive to light…You'll allow me a second, yes?

A student: The multiplicity… [*Inaudible comments, but concerning the multiplicity and centers of indetermination*]

Deleuze: The center of indetermination, I'll tell you, in a way, I don't need to postulate it, because if we reflect on the notion... when I say "a" center of indetermination, I can only say that: "one". To say "the" center of indetermination, it seems to me, would already be contradictory, because if I say "the", center of indetermination can only refer to an indefinite article, otherwise the center is determined. I can even speak of the center of the universe, but precisely it is not a center of indetermination. So, if I give myself the concept -- here I am thinking at the level of the pure concept -- if I give myself the concept "center of indetermination", it requires an indefinite article. So, does that mean that it requires and implies a multiplicity? In my opinion, multiplicity is necessary, since I can say: there is a center of indetermination each time there is an interval between movement, each time there is a black screen that reflects light. So why do I give myself this "each time"? Because I have absolutely no reason to locate in one point the black screen or the interval which can strictly occur at any point in my universe of movement-images… [*Interruption of the recording*] [58:26]

Part 2[7]

… And furthermore, if I localized it in a point, I would discover a center of determination. And it was not at all a question of words, to speak of a center of determination or of indetermination. "Indetermination" meant: a particular center is nothing other than an interval between two movements, that is, literally, a nothing, or an opacity, that is, another nothing. Literally, I can say: it is nowhere, it is nowhere, and indeed, the universe of the movement-image or of the light-image in its pure state has no location. There is no localization since, once again, it is the world of a supposedly diffused light in its pure state. It is a diffused light, therefore invisible. It is through this that it is a universe without possible localization. It would be very consistent with a kind of Pascalian universe, without center and without periphery.

A woman student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Oh no, that was a problem, it was a problem with Anne [Querrien].[8] Are they equal or not, that, I almost demand that we wait. In my opinion, they are not. They are not, why? Because – that was at the beginning of the year – we had seen in what sense the plane of the movement-image was or was not, in fact, constituted by blocks of space-time. If it is constituted by blocks of space-time, in fact, time is introduced into the interval. Myself, I think that, in fact, time is there; moreover, we'll see why, but almost that, that's what we have left to do, yes.

The woman student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: I don't know if I can introduce the angle. In a state of pure diffusion, you have no angle. [*Pause*] How would you get an angle in a diffusion? You have no figures; yes, you have luminous figures, but we come back to the problem. At that point, you have to define the angle. There, it would be a funny way; perhaps it's possible, but from a purely luminous point of view, that is, without any reference to a solid figure, since we have no solid figure.

The student: And polarization of light?

Deleuze: What?

The student: The polarization of light?

Deleuze: But doesn't the polarization of light imply, can it take place in the state of free diffusion? I do not think so. I don't see what polarized light in the state of free diffusion means. As you want, you might succeed there if you want, but anyway, good.

So, I would like [Georges] Comtesse, if you don't mind, Comtesse, if I understand correctly, it's, you remember, we saw at one point, we had: action-image first type, action-image second type, and then we needed to do a column on the transformations from one form to another of the action-image. And this column, we said that the signs of this type of image, a transformative or deformative image, we called these "figures". And I had taken an example of a figure as a type of image in what Eisenstein himself calls "attractions," and to which he gives great importance.

Georges Comtesse: I would like to intervene precisely on the apparently mysterious concept of "montage of attraction" in Eisenstein, because if he calls it "free montage libre of attraction", and that he conceives it as early as 1923,[9] for Eisenstein, this was first and foremost a figural cinematographic process, [*Deleuze coughs very violently near the microphone*] and it is the procedure first of a new theater, a new theater which would enter – and this is its very original idea – which would enter into conflict with the representative, narrative, expressive, triangular, intriguing, uscopic bourgeois theater, etc. So, putting on an attraction is not at all putting on an attractive show, but first of all, of capturing the listener or the spectator by arousing in him what Eisenstein calls a "shock emotion" which has, he says, "a final thematic effect", that is, the production of an affect concept.

However, we can say that to capture, to attract in this way, that is, to set up an attraction, is not a

goal for Eisenstein. This means that it is never made a goal of provoked emotional abduction, for example, by a scene. It is therefore not a contagion of repressed, revived, displaced affect on a stage for a spectator, for example, of the "catharsis" type, we see, because, for Eisenstein, setting up an attraction or capturing a shock emotion first and foremost assumes – it is on this point that he certainly continues to insist – so setting up an attraction, that assumes beforehand a capture of forces. It assumes the capture, he says, of erotic forces or aggressive forces in conflict. The attraction is therefore not set up with a view to capturing, but it originates in the very intensification of the forces to be captured and which the attraction precisely transmits. The more the force intensifies, the more there is attraction, that is, the more the spectator is completely stripped of himself, thrown out of himself. It is literally affected by the transmission of the captured forces which undoes this affection, the precision of the traditional scopic recording machine. What attracts, in other words, in attraction are the forces that bourgeois theater holds or maintains reserved, suppressed in the suspended violence of its performance. For example, Eisenstein speaks of the force of magical charm, of personal charm, he says, that is, of erotic activity.

He also speaks, another form of capturing, of the force of a sadistic desire, a desire that is satisfied in a scene of medieval torture, for example, where, he says, it is difficult to set the limit where the religious emotion becomes sadistic satisfaction. He also speaks of the viewer who is deposed, affected by the very intensification of the forces because, he says – this is a quotation – an eye is extirpated, an arm or a leg amputated before him [the viewer], in which he hears through a telephone call the story of a horrible event that is happening about fifteen kilometers away, and where a drunkard feeling his imminent end seeks refuge in madness.

Deleuze: I even believe that he explicitly refers to the Grand Guignol at that point, in the text you are reading.

Comtesse: It's a text from [19]23.

Deleuze: That's right, that's right, that's right.

Comtesse: So, to capture forces or events is to set up the attraction starting from this capture and, says Eisenstein, that there is already no longer any theater. In other words, whereas the theater, even new, shows the reaction to forces or events, the cinematograph reveals the action of forces and events. The cinematograph does not proceed like aesthetic, commercial, neurotic, perverse, decadent, or pornographic bourgeois art. [*Laughter*] These blemishes are content to express the forces, or to reproduce them from the discrete violence -- and there, this is something else that intervenes with Eisenstein -- discrete violence of a silent attraction which is no longer montage at that time, a monstrous, ferocious and abject barbarism. For example, Eisenstein talks about German cinema of the [19]20s and '26, and he says that this cinema, it is saturated, he says, with mysticism, decadence, lugubrious fantasies. It only heralds, he says, an ominous hope peopled with sinister shadows and crimes. He speaks in this connection of Caligula as a barbaric carnival of silent hysteria, artificial acts and gestures, and jerky scenes of monstrous chimeras.[10]

Deleuze: As what you're saying moves me forward, I'm just adding a very, very simple parenthesis. It's because, in fact, one of the great reasons for this opposition of Eisenstein to

expressionism is obviously that Eisenstein refuses with all his strength the opaque, opacity, darkness, being a force by itself. So, in this sense, he will be radically opposed to the expressionist conception of light, and that's it, the text you are quoting, it has this aspect. He doesn't want, he especially doesn't want that, he especially doesn't want that because he is a dialectician and, by that very fact, he believes in dialectical progress. He absolutely does not want to confuse dialectics with a kind of idealism in which darkness and light would confront one another. For him, there is no conflict of darkness and light, in… yes. Well, I just wanted to add that.

Comtesse: In fact, maybe it's not so much that, maybe not so much a dialectical conception opposed to dark forces that he would reject, but rather, what I'm saying now, that it's rather another… Of course, we very often have the idea in Eisenstein's work that he's a dialectical thinker who identifies himself as such through a lot of debates and conflicts at the time, with [Dziga] Vertov and his friends, well, that's possible. But there is another thought in Eisenstein's works, another line, and it is not the line of the dialectization of something, of a rejection of forces. On the contrary, it is a very strange, genealogical line of forces. There you are.

I would say this: for Eisenstein, the hidden forces that attraction intensifies, therefore the montage of attraction, that remains the forces of an enigmatic, silent, passionate attraction which precisely provokes the montage of attraction itself as a way, this montage, to think the enigmatic attraction. The power of this silent, vertiginous attraction – as Eisenstein himself says -- is mighty; it is repeated in the series of women as in the series of men, and which also devours the two series. It is the strangeness of thought because it is a vertiginous attraction to which one reacts with aggressive provocation, conceited arrogance, with disgust and fury, with rigid reserve or icy contraction. This is an attraction which, by its disturbing or paralyzing tension, cuts off all sexual relationship, a virginal attraction which remakes the separation through the distance of love, as a distance hollowed out in relationship to the emptied or discarded attraction. What Eisenstein's thought seeks is the relationship between the vertiginous attraction and what it repeats or what provokes it, in other words, the genealogy of the forces of vertiginous, enigmatic, silent attraction.

This is what makes him think, as he says, the attraction in its relationship with what he calls – it is a quotation – "the ecstasy of suffering". What Eisenstein thinks is therefore not time as the line of caesura or of the void of the vertiginous attraction, not even, one could say, the ecstasy of suffering but, as he says, the instant which produces ecstasy and, with it, the assemblage of pure inconsistency, the instant, says Eisenstein, where the water – this is a quote – becomes other, smoke, ice, where cast iron becomes steel. In other words, the ecstasy of suffering, that the vertiginous attraction repeats, comes from the imperceptible process of the instant as an instant of solidification of a fluid or of glaciation, from the instant of a hardening of a material in fusion or metallurgical mutation.

Emerging from the catastrophic or disastrous instant of ecstasy therefore becomes the question of Eisenstein's cinematic thought. In fact, we can say that if the spectacular, plastic or figural attraction has a relationship with the vertiginous attraction of cut or impasse, the attraction of cut itself has a relationship with the abolition of the instant which precipitates ecstasy, which condemns to pathos, to the pathetic of the pure present as the temporalization of endless

repetition, henceforth, in the attraction of the abolished instant. There we are.

Deleuze: Good, good, good, good, good. Listen, I find that what you've said, I don't know in your mind how… yes, once again, I would say, it doesn't contradict what I said. That completes it, you identify another aspect. I'll try to say very quickly why that does not oppose, and very little... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... but this is not so much a matter of dialectics, it is not dialectics that is at stake here. But the very examples that you give, you know as much as I do, they obviously refer, we can say that, it's dialectical if we take dialectics lightly, if we say that, for them, it wasn't… But "dialectic" in that era, I don't think it was a way, like that, abstract, right? It was really a way of thinking, of feeling, anyway, it was… When they considered themselves dialecticians, I don't think it was to please Lenin or Stalin, right? They had a way of living.

And the examples that you gave of ecstasy itself are well known, because from the beginning, these are examples that have been invented, created, set in motion, put into circulation by dialectics. Namely, this is the problem of the qualitative leap, and you know it well, and when Eisenstein calls "ecstasy" both the qualitative leap and the leap outside us, he has perfectly present in mind this... It's, I don't know if I talked about it, at the other times, it's when one tries to define the dialectic by a certain number of laws, it's one of the three basic laws of dialectics. One of the three basic laws of dialectics is: how is quantity transformed into quality? That is, how does one pass from one quality to another in a discontinuous leap underpinned by a continuous quantitative process? You take water, you have your water, it's a quality; you cause it to lower [in temperature] in a continuous way along a quantitative scale, and all of a sudden, it becomes ice, fine. That's what has, it's one of the themes, it's one of the themes, how can I put it, father, or it's one of the matrices of the dialectic. The dialecticians started -- this is not their only problem -- I believe they started with three problems, but as it's stated, there are three great laws of dialectics.

But therefore, the ecstatic, what you have very well defined as the ecstatic, according to Eisenstein's expression, has as its background this great problem of the qualitative leap, of qualitative discontinuity related to a quantitative continuity. And through this, it seems to me that he is extremely dialectical if one does not simply call dialectic a way of thinking abstractly. For him, what fascinates him is that here, getting out of that, well yes, we don't stop. This is ecstasy for him. Well, ecstasy is the leap from one quality to another. And why is this not theory? It is, it means: at what point, for example, at what point, at what moment will the peasants and the workers be fed up? Well, that's a revolutionary problem; every revolutionary leader has gone through this problem. Or else, when is anger going to become a weaponized explosion? Fine. Anger accumulates, it accumulates, it accumulates, following a quantitative process. There is more and more discontent; there is more and more discontent. And then, a qualitative leap, we find ourselves faced with a new quality, we say, ah that, they're no longer malcontents, they're revolutionaries. Good. This is the leap in quantity, it's the leap from quality to another quality. That's what ecstasy is, or that's what Eisenstein calls the pathetic, pathos. And any dialectics is the pathos of the dialectic.[11]

I was telling you, if I had to speak to you about it vaguely since I was telling you: one of the first

paradoxes of the dialectic is, how does it happen, but how does it happen – Kierkegaard will take it up in a brilliant page, but this is located with the Greeks – how does it happen, I'm losing my hair one by one and then – one by one, a quantitative process – and then there's a moment when I'm told, "you're bald". How to understand that, see? "You are bald" is a new quality. Hairy, bald, these are two qualities. But I pass from one to the other by a continuous quantitative process, but why at a particular moment? Why at a particular moment rather than another does water become ice? Why at a particular moment? Why do kinds of discontent suddenly become revolutionary action? Why, what happened there? The peasants yesterday were unhappy; today they are not unhappy, they took up arms, oh, a qualitative leap.

So, it's there where I'm saying that, in my opinion, what Comtesse has just said is not in opposition, it seems to me, but sketches another, another side. I mean, when I linked attraction to the figure, what did I mean? It meant that practically, Comtesse is absolutely right to recall that attractions were born in a perspective of theater and theater staging, as Eisenstein conceived it and which was a theater itself, which he called a "theater of agitation". What were always, there it seems to me, always, Eisenstein's two basic concepts? Eisenstein's two basic concepts, and it does not surprise me that from his point of view, Comtesse was as if constrained, it seems to me, as if to better emphasize what he had to say about ecstasy, to retain only one of the two, and not both.

Eisenstein's two basic concepts are the organic and the pathetic. And for him, dialectics is the relationship and the development of the relationship between the organic and the pathetic. But in my opinion, it might be a difference -- here I don't know what Comtesse thinks about it – I am formal: it seems obvious to me that the pathetic presupposes an organic basis in Eisenstein, and that's it, that's what all the extremely violent polemics between Eisenstein and Vertov, for example, will be about. And it is about this that Eisenstein opens himself up to a very, very violent, very violent so-called revolutionary critique. When Vertov says it's bourgeois cinema, when Vertov says: but Eisenstein is lagging behind American cinema, etc., with Eisenstein reproaching him on no less, no less fundamental points.

This is because, in fact, what is the organic, for Eisenstein? The organic is, if I may say so, it's his figure, it's the spiral, it is what he calls a spiral of growth, it is the spiral as in the expression of plant growth, for example, good, and Eisenstein invokes all that. In other words, it is the great encompassing representation. [*Pause*] It's the milieu, I would say; it is the great encompassing situation, the sea and the squadron in "[The Battleship] Potemkin", the sea, the squadron and the mists, and the mists which let one ship appear, hide another, etc. You have a kind of large, large all-encompassing situation. This is what he will call the organic, and you see, in fact, this is a real organization.[12]

And in my opinion, I am indeed saying in my opinion, Eisenstein starts off, and fundamentally needs to start off from the organic. And in that respect – and in that respect – he is like American cinema, hence his complacency regarding American cinema, hence his homages to American cinema. This is because, as we have seen, cinema, American action cinema, also started from a great encompassing spiral environment, which defined the great situation, even in Westerns, even… etc. Simply, at this level, I am indeed saying, we have seen it -- here I am grouping things together on Eisenstein, if you will -- we have seen it, if you will, each time you have to correct

this that we have just said, it is a resemblance which seems to me indisputable between Eisenstein and American cinema.

That doesn't prevent Eisenstein from standing apart from this; he senses the danger, and he says, ah yes, but me, be careful, I link the spiral of growth to a cause. The Americans take it for granted. I link it to its cause. And it is in this way that, once again, he considers himself a dialectician. He will link the spiral of growth, the great situation, the encompassing, the great encompasser, he will link it to a cause. You remember, this is what we saw, his attack on [D.W.] Griffith. It is not enough to show us that there are the poor and the rich in society; we must be shown why. It is only at this level that he can make his demarcation from American cinema. It is only then that he can say: I am really a dialectician. Why? Because how one becomes two must be shown. And in fact, it's another of the great laws of dialectics: how does one become two? I would say, it is a law of dialectics just as the qualitative leap, the qualitative jump, the passage from one quality to another was a law of dialectics. Moreover, already understand in advance that the law of the qualitative leap in dialectics presupposes the law of "one" which becomes two. I would say the "one" which becomes two is the first dialectical law.

So, the "one" which becomes two means linking the spiral to its cause, the spiral of growth to its cause. What is the cause? There I believe, I believe that Eisenstein believed in it, and that after all, he was not wrong. This cause, he says, well, it is something which is of the order of the golden ratio, that is, something which is of the order of the golden section and which, in fact, will organize the spiral, which will determine the turns. You will ask me: what is the golden section? It does not matter, it is a certain proportion, it is a certain proportion that has been sought in all the great works of art, and Eisenstein, who is perfectly aware of the research in these directions, which occurs in the field of sculpture, when they try to show that Michelangelo, for example, always created caesuras – see, by caesuras, that means places of articulation, the hip of a statue, the bend of the knees, etc., -- he always used the golden section to determine the moments of articulation of the large form, it's perfect. So, he says – sorry, you'll intervene later because otherwise I'm going to get lost, ok? – what he's saying is, see, the Americans establish their spiral, their large form, their large spiral form, they establish it empirically, with ready-made dualities. I, being a dialectician, am going to establish it in a completely different way, by linking the spirals to a cause, and this cause is going to give me the articulations of the spiral.

Hence, all his problems -- which are not at all, it seems to me, problems originating from outside -- concerning the "Battleship Potemkin", on and, at the same time, in a single image, and in the relationship of one image to another, the search for proportions, but arithmetic proportions, for example, arithmetic proportion of earth and sky. You will tell me, the great authors of cinema have always looked for this stuff, sometimes empirically, sometimes in other ways. I mean, sometimes in other ways, imagine that the video image today allows, it allows determinations of this type, entirely different from those that are still recent. But Eisenstein... [John] Ford, to me, I think he already proceeds from empirical laws, right? For example, when you consider precisely what Eisenstein liked so much, certain skies by Ford, one-third earth, two-thirds sky, right, it's not by chance. And there, you recognize Ford's signature, fine, the treatment of the sky, the treatment… the limits -- I spoke about that last year --[13] the limits between elements, the limit that separates water and earth, all that is the subject of... But that also applies within the same image; it's not just about framing an image. These stories of the golden section and arithmetic

proportion also apply to the relationships between different images, that is, at the level of montage and no longer simply of framing.

So, in all of this, you will have a true organic image. And he explains that in a particular kind of image, there must be a particular proportion of sky and water, and that there must be a relationship between this image and an image which is, if need be, shortly afterward, and where there will be a particular proportion of heaven and earth. Well, all that is, that's what he calls the rhythm. And it's no coincidence that, at the same time, after all, the French too, the French school never stopped speaking about rhythm for our joy, and that's what causes problems. They obviously did not mean the same thing by "rhythm", but that was ok, they still had common conceptions. In [Abel] Gance's work too, in Gance too, you have calculations of the golden section type. It's obvious, all that, fine.[14]

I would therefore say that Eisenstein's first aspect is this organic that he manages to distinguish from the American method precisely because he brings back the great spiral, the great form, to a cause, to a cause which determines the articulation and caesura. Good. And these caesuras are fundamental, both from the point of view of the framing -- once again, the framing is the place of the caesuras – and from the point of view of montage, that is, of the relationship between images. But so, you see, if he considers, rightly or wrongly, that his determination of the causes, that his rhythmic research has allowed him caesuras, what the hell is he going to do with the caesuras on his spiral? What will he insert into the great moments of caesura? Exactly what Comtesse just said. He will insert privileged moments taken as such.

I choose the caesura, "Ivan the Terrible", the great organic representation of "Ivan the Terrible". He knows in advance what he wants -- it's his business -- he wants to show that Ivan the Terrible goes through two great moments of doubt, two great moments of doubt which will not have the same meaning, which will not be repetition at all, which will not be repetitions. They will be very different doubts, of which the second presupposes the first. These moments of doubt, he is not going to insert them just in any manner. He will insert these privileged moments at so-called places of caesura.

From that point on, the organic is finished. The organic has fulfilled its role, we have already overflowed into the other dimension, because what will he now call the "pathetic", which is the complement of the organic according to him? But, in my opinion, the pathetic always presupposes, presupposes the organic, presupposes the organic basis. Well then, the pathetic will appear as soon as the caesuras are installed [*Pause*] as a vectorial relationship from one caesura to another, from one privileged moment to another privileged moment, that is, normally as a qualitative leap, as a qualitative leap from one quality to another. [*Pause*]

So there, in fact, will arise as the last problem… Well, if you like, that's the two lines: the organic spiral and the pathetic. And he has just told us: the organic linked to a cause gives us a real law of growth, and he adds: but be careful, don't confuse -- I don't know the Russian terms, obviously, but in the French translation -- do not confuse growth with development. The organic gives us the law of growth, but only the pathetic, that is, the qualitative leap, or what he sometimes calls "ecstasy" -- ecstasy in the etymological sense of the word, ex-stasis, which means coming out of oneself, ecstasy is going out of oneself -- going out of oneself, but in

Eisenstein, that means absolutely nothing else, right? As a result, religious ecstasy will be a case of ecstasy like the others; why? Because ecstasy is a way of getting out of oneself or of thinking about getting out of oneself. But as soon as one leaves oneself or as soon as there is a leap from one quality to another, there is the pathetic or ecstasy.

So, fine, at this level, I am asking, what is it, really, the innovation? What is it? What is Eisenstein doing? [He's] someone who doesn't look like the others, without necessarily being better; I don't know about that, it's not my concern. It's that, in my opinion, you see, with this construction, I would say Eisenstein's cinema is organico-pathetic. With that, I am not moving forward; I'm taking up his very terms: organico-pathetic, that is, it combines all the aspects of the dialectic. [*Pause*] But [*Pause*]… So, I was just saying, if you remember my story about forms of action, the two forms of action, I had a form of action S-A-S', situation-action-modified situation. Grant me that this is the spiral, it's the spiral with… Yes, what would you like to say?

A student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: What?

The student: [*Inaudible comments; his question concerns the spiral*]

Deleuze: Excuse me, speak slowly, I don't understand what you are saying.

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Who? [*Several students try to provide the name*] Who lost? [*Claire Parnet's voice is heard attempting to interpret what the student is saying*]

Deleuze: And what is the relationship with what I am now saying?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: No, I'm talking about Eisenstein, right?

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: What do you… what do you have in mind? [*Deleuze says this as if to himself, voice extremely low*]

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: The what? The true values of humanity? You mean that the spiral does not take account of the true values of humanity?

The student: Yes, I believe… [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: Okay, yeah, but I can't understand well. You're telling me: well then, even Eisenstein,

he may use a spiral construction, but that doesn't convey the true values of humanity. Fine, that means that this is not the cinema that suits you, yes. If you are thinking of a cinema… he [Eisenstein] thinks that it conveyed the true values of humanity, but it's him you're upsetting, it's not me. [*Laughter*] I really don't know what to answer. Does, does a spiral representation convey the true values of humanity or not? I confess that I remain, I remain puzzled. I don't know, I don't know. Perhaps if we add the pathetic to this. Well anyway, he thought...

So, you understand, he's going to graft… I was just saying: you have this great spiral form, whether it conveys values or not, right? You have, on the other hand, what seemed to me the small form that proceeds in just the opposite way, A-S-A. We go from one action to another action through a revealed situation. We no longer go from a situation to a modified situation through an action. This time we go from A to A'. Well, all I was saying is that Eisenstein's complex, the pathetic grafted onto the organic, allows him perpetually to graft one of the forms of action onto another and to pass from one to the other.

So that's what matters to me, and as a result, when I was trying to show that the attraction for... -- there I don't want to go back, because, moreover, Comtesse was even more thorough than me -- when I attributed to the attraction a figurative value, I didn't simply mean that it was a figure in the sense of a metaphor. I meant that it ensured the perpetual conversion of one form of action into the other. And in fact, all that I would add, I would introduce a nuance to what Comtesse said. Personally, I would insist greatly on the texts; I agree in advance with him that the texts are quite variable, right? I would greatly insist on Eisenstein's text in which he distinguishes the pathetic and attraction, in which he says: attraction is a case of the pathetic. But the pathetic doesn't necessarily need attraction. It's when a situation does not in itself contain a pathetic moment that it is necessary to slide some attraction into it. And I insist on that, but I would very much agree that it is a secondary distinction. In any event, the pathetic… the attraction is part of the pathetic. But if it is part of the pathetic, that's because, for Eisenstein, it is a perfected means by which one will place the small form into the large form and vice versa.

Once again, in those cases, what do I call small form and large form? What I call small form is the passage, it is the qualitative leap, the leap from A to A', and what I call large form is the organic, the spiral, the passage from S to S', from a situation to a modified situation. And he is perpetually going to need a transition from one form to another because he needs to show that against – there, I just have my idea on that, it's counter to [Alexander] Dovzhenko there, since they're all settling scores – I believe that what he reproaches Dovzhenko for is creating a marvelous cinema, a brilliant but static cinema, a cinema of the whole, the whole present in the part, if you will, and that, for Dovzhenko, the transition from the situation to the modified situation happens by itself. This is what many Soviet critics reproached Dovzhenko at the time. They said, well hey, we feel no presence of counter-revolutionary forces in Dovzhenko. [*Laughter*] It's like a development of nature; it's as if, in Dovzhenko, it seems like it's melons and pumpkins that become revolutionary, that become revolutionary on their own. It is nature that becomes revolutionary, and in fact, in some respects, he's not wrong. If you take, I don't know the title, it doesn't matter, one of his great films, well one of those we know well in Europe, "The Earth" [1930], the Kulak has a kind of very, very striking absence. There is no effective struggle against the Kulak; it's, there is a passage from S to S' like that, like that, in a kind of magnificent, brilliant lyrical development.

And Eisenstein does not want any of that. Eisenstein says: you won't be able to go from S to S' – and once again, I'm not saying that Dovzhenko was wrong, what does that mean? When you create a success in cinema like Dovzhenko's, there is nothing more to say, right? -- but, but, Eisenstein will say: Dovzhenko is very good; in any case, he's my son, so it could only be good, right? But he didn't see -- that's why he considers himself the head of the school; only Vertov absolutely resists him; only Vertov says to him, screw you, really -- but, understand why: he tells us, Eisenstein tells us, you will never pass from S to S' through a dialectic which would be that of nature, of the melon and the pumpkin. You can only pass from S to S' by a completely different path which involves qualitative leaps. From grief to anger, from anger to taking up arms, these are the qualitative leaps which are those of revolutionary consciousness.

So, it is necessary at all costs that, for Eisenstein -- this is not a story of... he holds to this as in his very heart -- it is necessary at all costs that he connects the qualitative leaps into the great spiral form, see? On the spiral, on the great spiral, he must be able to determine moments, caesuras, points of articulation, privileged instants, such that one jumps from one privileged instant to another. And then, he can to some extent tell himself, I'm the winner because [Vsevelod] Pudovkin, he, Pudovkin, if I take the three great Soviets, once again Pudovkin, he's the grand master of the qualitative leap, of the evolution of consciousness, of the evolution of consciousness with a continuity of the situation and qualitative leaps of consciousness. That's Pudovkin's very problem. Dovzhenko's problem is really a presence -- but since cinema has never succeeded to this extent, it seems to me -- a presence of the whole in a kind of isolated scene. That proceeds a bit like icons. If you think, for example, of the images of misery, he will draw the large situation as through a series of icons, of static, almost immobile scenes, and starting from there, the whole, being present in the part, will act to bring about a modification of the parts. So, I would say, Dovzhenko, that's the other aspect of Pudovkin, you see; it is the dialectical law of the whole and the part, and no longer the law of the qualitative leap.

Eisenstein says: both are necessary. Both are necessary, but from that, he doesn't form a kind of vague reorganization. His own style will allow him, his own invention will allow him to unite the two, namely, to graft the pathetic onto the organic. It's going to be an organico-pathetic cinema.[15] So, in this respect… and I believe in this respect that the attractions serve him fundamentally. And this time, under… That's why if Comtesse wanted to tell me that I only held on to a very particular aspect of the attractions, then I believe he's completely right. What I retained, in fact, from the attractions for my account, is when, these are the cases where Eisenstein involves either a set of theatrical representations, or a series of sculptural representations.

I had forgotten to say in which place this even culminates, because it is a film of pure attraction. As soon as he was… still he was quite closely watched, and his conception of whole, what I just mentioned, was not self-evident, eh? Eisenstein does not, you all know this, he was not regarded favorably; everyone was being scrutinized anyway, all of them. But when he leaves, finally when he goes, when he goes to Mexico, he conceives a film of attraction, a real film of attraction which will be "Que Viva Mexico!" [1930; 1979]. And precisely, this will turn out badly; he will never be able to develop it because there, it is the Americans who abandon him, fine. And what is "Que Viva Mexico!" made of? It is precisely in Mexico that he will discover something, which will confirm him, which will confirm him intensely. It is that the great situation of life and death

can only be adequately represented, that is, cinematographically, in a satisfactory way through series of plastic representations of the monuments type, therefore sculptural in that case, skeletons, sugar skeletons, skeletons, etc., all these prodigious images that anyone who has seen this film will recall, right, the skeleton masks, etc., and also through theatrical representations, but it's an entire people who create this theater, namely, the great ball of the dead, or else the corrida, [*Pause*] and with constant crisscrossing between plastic representation and theatrical representation. For example, where it peaks is in things that become almost surreal but which, in my opinion, are more beautiful than… the image of the crucified bull, the image of the crucified bull which is one of the greatest images that exists. Good.[16]

But if you remember "Que Viva Mexico!", it's obvious that the attractions, the film in my opinion being -- if you want in my opinion -- composed solely of attractions, it's an attraction-film, as in the pure state. It is in fact made, I would say, of auto-theatrical, and auto-plastic, auto-sculptural representations with…, where there is all the plasticity and all the theatricality of death that will be staged. [*Pause*] And there then, we see this aspect that I had retained, of attraction as either theatrical representation or plastic representation.

But otherwise, I have the impression that, in fact, Comtesse's intervention seems very useful to me because he insisted on another aspect, but to my knowledge, I do not see any opposition between… Me, I continue to believe that, what I would say to Comtesse, is that it seems surprising to me that you take no account of the organic, that you seem to see in it, a kind of... unless for others, on other points about Eisenstein, you reintroduce the organic. Do you consider that important or not?

Comtesse: The organic and the pathetic effectively are differentiated from attraction, and, and, and from the…

Deleuze: Ah so you, you make of, you make of attraction something other than the organic and the pathetic.

Comtesse: Of course.

Deleuze: Well, myself, I consider it to be an aspect of the pathetic.

Comtesse: That's not wrong. That is, there is an aspect of Eisenstein in which ecstasy, for example, is indeed the good one; ecstasy is always framed in the dialectic. You, you are saying ecstasy, which is framed in the dialectic, it is the good, it's the rupture, it is the leap. Okay, fine. Only, Eisenstein attacks in his... So, for him, Eisenstein, this is an aspect, it seems to me, when he says to Jean Mitry, when he went to Paris after doing the…, when he says to Jean Mitry that, in fact, ecstasy can only be the ecstasy of suffering, that is, by that he does not mean that, for example, someone would suffer, that is, would no longer be in pain, that there would no longer be the cultural pain that would convert everything [*unclear word*]. Okay, well, someone who would be like that, let's assume that. Well, suppose someone is ill, well then, someone who would be in pain and in difficulty, it does not mean ecstasy, that he would come out of it, that is, come out of this suffering. On the contrary, it is precisely, ecstasy is what causes this suffering to exist. That is, the filmmaker who saw very well that there is there… who indirectly extended, of

course, Eisenstein, that is certainly Werner Schroeter who, for his part, only makes films of ecstasy.

Deleuze: Pardon me for interrupting you there because there is nonetheless a play on words here, at least for me, there is a bit of a play on words in what you are saying. You say: it is not coming out of suffering that defines ecstasy, but it is suffering itself that is ecstasy. Obviously, you are completely right, but because suffering precisely "exiting from". It is ecstasy only because suffering itself is the exit, but there is no ecstasy without an exit from something.

Comtesse: And at the same time, and at the same time, it's an exit, suffering is both an exit from ecstasy and, at the same time, its effusion.

Deleuze [*sounding doubtful*]: It's obvious, it's obvious that if I have a headache, I leave myself, I leave myself, suffering is the exit of self, well yes.

Comtesse: Agreed, but the headache is a pain, it's not yet suffering.

Deleuze [*increasingly doubtful*]: Yes, yes, yes, yes, [*Laughter*] but really, listen, ok? There I find that you're…

Comtesse: It's necessary to distinguish that against cultivated people…

Deleuze [*groaning in frustration*]: That's, I don't understand if it's [*indistinct word because of laughter*] … because as for the story of suffering, it's very true what you are saying, but you also know as well as I do, this is pure Hegel, that is, – and Eisenstein read Hegel; he's very learned, Eisenstein, right? He's without doubt one of the most learned -- this is pure Hegel.

Comtesse: Except he thinks of the instant…

Deleuze: The exit from self is inseparable, this as well you know quite well, Hegel thinks of the instant, he doesn't think it, but that doesn't matter.

Comtesse: Absolutely not… [*The comments henceforth are inaudible since Deleuze no longer wishes to continue, and Comtesse's attempts to intervene irritate Deleuze more and more*]

Deleuze: Oh, listen… [*Pause*] Awww, fine, we're stopping because there, I know what you're up to… [*Comtesse attempts to interrupt*] I am saying we're stopping because this discussion has no interest at all. [*Pause*]

Comtesse: It's not the same thought; there is the heterogeneity of the thought of the instant; it is obvious, in Hegel, in Kierkegaard, and in Eisenstein. [*Deleuze can be heard grumbling*] For example, someone who saw that very well, it's in *Glas*,[17] [Jacques] Derrida, who saw it very well...

Deleuze: Listen, we're stopping on this point.

Comtesse: … the heterogeneity, well, it's in the instant. What I wanted to say is, for example, in the film that you quoted earlier, "Que Viva Mexico!", when he makes the film, Eisenstein says, "I emerge from ecstasy and in the emergence of ecstasy, I can think the unity of life and death which is my film", that is, I can think the cycle. So, there is something there that is at once a cinematic thought linked to the question of ecstasy, which is precisely what I wanted to say in my intervention.

Deleuze: Good, good, good. Well then, you see. You see, you see, notice that we have two things left to do now. Since I can no longer add columns, this is done; it was a lot of fun. [*Laughter*] We are faced with two questions. A first question is that, as one of you already pointed out to me the last time, I had no right to cross it out, since my last image was the mental image, I was saying: in a certain way, it closes off the set of movement-images. And we had seen in what sense it closed off the set of movement-images; it framed the perception-images, the affection-images, the action-images… [*Interruption in the recording*] [2:00:02]

Part 3

… So, I could say, beyond Thirdness as Peirce said, there is nothing. It was a kind of closure of the movement-image, and I maintain it. But, but, but, but! We had a premonition -- and I'll remind you of this since it's going to concern, it's going to define one of our problems; we only have two left -- we had a premonition: perhaps the mental image ensured a kind of closure of all the other movement-images only because it broke the whole system, and that it broke the whole system on which the perception-images, the affection-images, the action-images depended, that is, it broke the whole sensory-motor system. In fact, my three types of images, which were going to reconstitute everything from the movement-image, created -- perception-image, affection-image, action-image -- constituted a sensorimotor scheme.

And it is true that the mental image, the Thirdness, closes off the set of movement-images, but at what price? Once again, the doubt that we felt, this was at a very heavy price. It is that at the same time, it cracks the sensorimotor system, that is, the system of the movement-image. So obviously, if that's the price he accepts for closing this, that means he puts it there, he closes it off, okay, but from another perspective, he blows it up. What does that mean? On one condition, on condition that this explosion precipitates us into another type of image, which will no longer be a movement-image, even if it moves on the i... [*Interruption of the recording*]

… But on the other hand, another problem: it is that I had made my table of signs something like this, [*Deleuze writes on the board*] I had all my slots, and then up top: movement-image/light-image. But also, down below, I could – yes there, I reversed it, I should have a figure like that, it would be more harmonious -- at the same time, what do I have down below? There. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] Since I have spoken… what is the set of movement-images in a film? Or what is the distribution of perception-images, affection-images and action-images in a film? As we have seen, I tried to show how these two definitions were the same, and under what conditions. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] We could call that montage-images, or montage of images. The set of movement-images, or the collection of images -- perceptions, affections, actions – that's the montage. Good.

Movement-images are subjected to montage, what does that mean, even if the shots are long? We can then cite, within the frame, some great authors of the movement-image; of course, we can already cite authors who use very long shots. We can almost, and even we will already speak of a montage *within the shot,* a montage that is realized in a long shot. But in any case, there is montage. Why? Whether the shots are short or long, there is montage. Why, in relation to the movement-image, is there necessarily montage even if the shots are very long? Because it's the only way to infer a time-image from the movement-image. [*Pause*] And it's the only way to infer, from a figure of light -- we've seen, movement-image and figure of light, these are the same --, it's the only way to infer from a figure of light, what? A figure of thought. [*Pause*]

Why? In fact, if you proceed with movement-images, whatever the length of the shots, and whatever it is that moves, sometimes it is the camera that moves, sometimes it is what is in the image that moves, it is not necessarily the camera that moves. You have great cinema of movement-images with a fixed camera, to name but a few cases: in many films by [Marcel] L'Herbier or even in Charlot's work, in [Charles] Chaplin's work. Good, so there is no need for the camera itself to be in motion for there to be a movement-image, right? But I am saying, if you proceed with the movement-image, well obviously [*Deleuze writes on the board*], you can only obtain the time-image starting from movement, and you cannot, starting from… and you can only obtain figures of thought starting from light. In other words, montage, it is through montage that you will necessarily obtain indirect images of time, and necessarily indirect figures of thought. [*Deleuze writes on the board*] As a result, here, below, I would say montage-image, with two points, what we could call "chronosigns", indirect images of time, and what we could call "noosigns -- that's the Greek word for thought, that's basically it, right? -- "noosigns" to designate indirect figures of thought.

So there, it's already going to be complicated because, see, I'm indeed saying, in the perspective of the aggregate of movement-images, time is absolutely essential, but you can only obtain indirect images of time from the movement-image, and indirect figures of thought from the light-image. On the contrary, I jump to the other, to my first, to my other problem. Let us suppose that something in the mental image there, in the last, in my last slot, [*Deleuze points to the graph*] caused the system of movement-images to crack, then there, perhaps I would risk obtaining direct time-images and direct thought figures. But at this level, I would only ever have indirect figures of time, in fact, concluded from movement, and indirect figures of thought, concluded from light.

And it is in this respect that I would like to say that -- we can't take any more of this, right? -- I would like to give you or offer you some work here. Because I will start with the second problem. What are indirect images? I'm grouping together all the questions corresponding to this problem: what are the images of time, concluded indirectly from movement? What are the indirect images of time, starting from movement? [*Pause*] What are the indirect figures of thought, starting from light? [*Pause*] I need to say a little more, so you'll have some work to do.

I notice -- and I will come back to this the next time -- that, very broadly, we know that since antiquity, there are two kinds of indirect apprehension of time. So, I'm leaving aside, you see, I'm leaving aside the direct apprehensions of time. When, when did the idea of a direct apprehension of time begin? That would be a problem for the arts, for philosophy, for all of us,

right? But perhaps quite late, finally, it is a very delicate kind of research; it also depends on the definitions given. Good.

I'm saying, there are immediately two great indirect figures of time, two great indirect images of time, in which time is concluded, from what? Well, time: first figure, time is concluded from movement. [*Pause*] And when time is concluded from movement, you will say a very simple thing: time is the number of movement, it is the measure of movement, with already a little something more disturbing because there are others who will say, who will slip in, and who will say: yes, yes, yes, it would be better to add, "it is the interval of movement". We are retaining everything. There you have a first indirect image of time. See that I'm saying "indirect" since it is concluded from movement. I'm saying: time is measure -- I'm not saying that all of that is equivalent -- time is measure, or number, or the interval of movement.

I know in whose work to look for all this. I vaguely see that it is in Plato, in a very beautiful text: the *Timaeus*.[18] It is in Aristotle, in *Physics*. And yet Aristotle does not at all say the same thing as Plato; so that's, I'm making big groupings here. In a way also, "the interval of movement" is a formula that the Stoics propose. Good. So that means that it is not equivalent. The Stoics are not Aristotle; Aristotle is not Plato. But after all, I'm grouping all that together.

And then there are others, from the highest antiquity -- not the highest but from a certain antiquity -- there are others who say no, no, no, time cannot be that. Time cannot be the number of movement. And no doubt they have serious reasons for saying so. [*Pause*] Fine. What are the serious reasons they have for saying so? It's, it's that for them -- I'm not seeking their theoretical reasons -- time does not refer to the world. Time does not refer to the world. They think, rightly or wrongly, that time does not refer to the world, it refers to the soul, that time is the business of the soul, and not of the world.

Note that, by dint of simplifying, on this point, we suddenly remember that if Plato spoke to us about the world, he also spoke to us about the soul of the world which contains the world. So, those who defined or a certain number of those who defined time by the number of movement, already referred to the soul and not only to the world since there was a soul of the world. It's not meant to make things easier for us. So, we leave that aside. We just think that a number of authors thought that time was, in its most intimate essence, related to what? To the soul, from what point of view? Well, to the soul because it is what drops [*choit*], it is what falls [*tombe*], or it is what descends [*échoit*]. At that moment, whatever chooses is what creates things. But in any case, the soul is what time depends on.

And this time, it is therefore no longer the great circular movement of the world, it is the movement of a fall, in the sense that I'm saying, well, in the sense that I'm saying, "light is falling". Light is falling, right? Or else the soul falls into a body. [*Pause*] Sometimes there is an idea of falling [*chute*], sometimes there is no idea of falling, right? It's already odd, it's going to be a strange area to manage in all this. Because when I say light falls, there is no idea of a fall; there is indeed the idea of a high and a low, but there is not the idea of a fall. It is by falling that it illuminates me, as the other would say. Sometimes there is an idea of falling. [*Pause*] And that's the fall of the soul into the body, well, that fundamental relationship. So, notice that the movement has changed, it's a falling movement, and no longer a movement of circulation. And

time will be experienced in this fall of light or in this descent of the soul. [*Pause*]

And here, we know that we must search in the works of, in the works of what will have been called -- but this is a serious conversion -- of what is called neo-Platonism, in the works of Plotinus. And it is not by chance that Plotinus makes the great conversion, that is, makes time pass onto the side of the soul, and at the same time pushes a philosophy of pure light as far as possible. [*Pause*]

And then, I therefore have two indirect images of time -- still leaving in suspense "but then what would direct images of time be?" -- I have two indirect images of time: the image resulting from movement, the image resulting from light or from the soul. It's not the same movement. It's movement in both cases. In one case, it is the vertical movement of descent or falling, [*Pause*] or of rising -- why not the soul, it can rise; if it falls, it can rise again --; in the other case, it is the circular movement in the model and astronomy. Good. Here are the two indirect images of time. Obviously, our problem will be to situate them in our categories of images.

And the figures of thought? [*Pause*] I'm just saying: the figures of thought, that impresses me greatly, the indirect figures of thought, those which are inferred from light, from the light-image, they also have two forms, and sometimes the indirect figure of thought is combat, it is struggle. And to think is to fight, it's to fight with what? It is the struggle with the shadow. [*Pause*] It's the struggle with darkness. It's the struggle of the spirit with darkness. To struggle against darkness is what it means to "think". [*Pause*] Fine. Why not? And it's a struggle that sometimes summons ghosts, all that. It's a terrible struggle, right? And that is the business of the thinker.

Or else I was saying: the soul is not only what risks falling into darkness. There is also another idea, there is another idea than the fall of light. Light is not only what falls, but also what settles [*se pose*]. "And a circle of light settled upon my head", right? The light settles. What does it mean? This means that it descends into a soul, [*Pause*] or that it chooses the soul, [*Pause*] or that a risen, or fallen, fate descends to the soul or that the soul itself chooses. And what is this second figure of thought? It is the choice, or the alternative, or the bet. From this second point of view, to think is to bet. This is no longer the fighter; he's a kind of player, but what does he play? To think is to bet, that is, to think is to dispose of an alternative. It is reaching a choice. What choice, my God? What do we have to choose, as poor as we are? Good.

So, I am saying that there are two indirect figures of thought: thought figured as combat and struggle with darkness, and it will be figured in this way indirectly; why? As a function of the relationships of light and black, the struggle with darkness. It is the relationships of light and black which in all the arts, and in the concepts themselves, in the concepts of philosophy -- consider a great author like Schelling -- it is the relationships of light and of darkness which will induce the figure of thought, "combat with the shadow". So, it is indeed an indirect figure of thought. The fighter, the wrestler.

And then, and then, the choice. This time, it's -- you guessed it already -- it's the relationship of light to white [*Pause*] that's going to induce [*Pause*] a figure of thought, which is no longer the fight, but which is the alternative or the choice. [*Pause*] In fact, notice that black will surely matter too. To choose, there is an alternative. But understand already that it is extremely different

to speak of a fight of light and black, or to speak of a *choice* between black and white. At the casino, it is a choice between red and black. It's the same. To think is to bet. There, the relationship is no longer of struggle or combat, the relationship is of alternative, of bet, of choice.

A student: [*Inaudible question, no doubt about the terms "combat" and "choice" used by Deleuze*]

Deleuze: In the terminology? No, not at all, not at all, not at all. I'm speaking… I'm speaking of that in…

The student: [*Inaudible comments*]

Deleuze: I'm not speaking... I don't use the words "combat" and "choice" in any technical sense. I am talking about combat insofar as there is an opposition between light and opacity, and that both fight, either so that opacity wins and triumphs over light, or for light to dissipate the opacity. And I'm using the word "choice" in the simplest sense of: you have to choose between coming and, between coming to school or taking a walk or... you have to choose between... I'm not inserting any technical sense. Except that just as I indicated the authors, I'm indicating here, for the figures of thought, I have just indicated Schelling, I could have indicated all of Romanticism, right? All German Romanticism in particular, but not only. And for thought that no longer consists of a fight but of a choice, I would invoke, obviously, [Blaise] Pascal who is undoubtedly the one who has gone the furthest along this path; [Soren] Kierkegaard, the one who went most deeply in this direction, with Pascal. And then others, others, more recent, more modern. Good.

And understand, I mean, that's why I'm interested in saying, "I'm not using those words in any technical sense", it's a way of living thought very differently. You don't do it on purpose. If for you, thought is a struggle, I mean, here we are at the level of metaphors, but there are... or else you find other ones -- I'm not saying that that exhausts all the metaphors – or else in a certain way, there might be one that suits you. When you are working, when you really start to think, either you have the impression of betting at a divine table...

Claire Parnet: "after a sleepless night"…

Deleuze: I expected you to... [*Parnet repeats*: "after a sleepless night"] you would finish my sentence... "After a sleepless night"? [*Deleuze laughs*] "Oh divine table", right?, "where the dice fall and fall again on the table of the earth", right? This is signed Nietzsche, you have recognized it; this is, this is Nietzsche. Good.

Or else you have the feeling of a fight with darkness. [*Deleuze imitates someone trying to extract the idea by taking the expression literally*] How to extract the idea, how to tear the idea that I feel, I have it, I have it, I have it there, I have it there. It's not that one is more painful than the other; I only have it, it is in darkness. And then you feel there with your hands, you wade in there, you have to pull it out of the darkness, but the darkness grabs it, and you give yourself up to your ghosts.

But the other one, you must not believe that he is laughing, the other, during this time.

[*Laughter*] I mean, he doesn't bet like that, by making a red move and a black move. No. He will find himself in a situation that is perhaps even more terrible. The bettor, it's going to be abominable. Notice that Pascal does not pass for a model of gaiety. [*Laughter*]. Well then, it's these four things, you understand, where I'm still located... and here, I mean, as a conclusion of my classification of movement-images and their signs, I necessarily had to collide with this: movement-images and light-images give us indirect images of time and indirect figures of thought. And there, we have just specified them in four forms. And that's what you must study.

Between now and next week, I sincerely ask you, because it's easy to find, at least read the famous text from Pascal's *Thoughts,* "the Bet". And re-read it if, as I hope, you have already read it; re-read it. It is a ten-page text, but essential. "The Bet" by Pascal in *Thoughts*. [*End of the recording*] [149:46]

Notes

[1] While this total does not correspond exactly to the list developed by Deleuze (see the appendix to session 12), Ronald Bogue does provide a list of signs of the movement-image corresponding to this number; see *Deleuze on Cinema* (New York & London: Routledge, 2003), p.70. Besides the glossary of signs in *The Movement-Image*, pp. 217-218, see the recap of signs in chapter 2 of *The Time-Image*, pp. 32-33, and the brief glossary on p. 334.

[2] Deleuze made this analysis of the Marx Brothers during session 21 of the Cinema seminar 1, June 1, 1982.

[3] Deleuze is no doubt referring to session 3 of the current seminar, November 30, 1982.

[4] On this subject, see also session 6 of the seminar on Painting, May 19, 1981; Deleuze returns to this in several seminars: session 15 on Spinoza, March 31, 1981; session 4 on Foucault, November 12, 1985; Session 11 on Leibniz and the Baroque, March 3, 1987.

[5] This text is *Matter and Memory* by Bergson; see session 1 of the current seminar, November 2, 1982.

[6] On Goethe and his *The Theory of Colors*, see session 2 of this seminar, November 23, 1982, and also *The Movement-Image*, pp. 49-55, 93-95.

[7] On the Paris 8 and WebDeleuze sites, this part erroneously repeats segment 2 of session 3, November 30, 1982; we provide the full text of the recording for the first time.

[8] This is the discussion that took place during session 3 of this seminar mentioned above, that of November 30, 1982.

[9] Comtesse cites an article by Eisenstein, "Le montage des attractions au cinéma", actually from 1924; this is among the Eisenstein essays in the collection *Au-delà des étoiles* (Paris: 10/18, 1974), pp. 127-144.

[10] Many of the references that Comtesse makes in this intervention, e.g., to Caligula and the quote "ecstasy of suffering" further on, are not found in the essay introduced at the start and to which supposedly he is referring.

[11] On the pathetic in Eisenstein, see *The Movement-Image,* pp. 180-183.

[12] Deleuze situates this analysis by Eisenstein, and the organic-pathetic distinction as well as the dialectic, in Eisenstein's text, La Non-indifférente *Nature* I (Paris: 10/18, 1975); *Non-Indifferent Nature,* trans. Herbert Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); see *The Movement-Image,* pp. 33-36, and p. 222 note 3.

[13] See session 7 of the seminar on Cinema seminar 1, January 19, 1982.

[14] On Gance and rhythm, and on the French school in this regard, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 41-49.

[15] On this cinema, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 32-40, and *The Time-Image*, pp. 157-161, p. 319 note 37.

[16] See the previous session (12) for Deleuze's analysis "Que Viva Mexico!"

[17] Jacques Derrida, *Glas* (Paris: Galilée, 1974) ; *Glas,* trans. John P. Leavey, Jr. & Richard Rand (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1986); *Clang*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and David Wills (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2021).

[18] See also session 13 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque for a long development of the *Timaeus*, March 17, 1987.