

## **Gilles Deleuze**

### **Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983**

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#### **Part 1**

Yes, all this is very tricky. So... so you see, you see where we are. We spent some time defining or trying to define indirect images of time. And then we said that indirect images of time, the images of time that we had managed to define, and that included all kinds of figures, all kinds of different cases, were also accompanied by what this time should be called figures of thought. And so what we are embarking on now is this question of the figures of thought. So you see that by the end of the year we should ideally have time to finish with the figures of thought, to confront them with the images of time, and finally to move on to the principle of a time and a form of thought that would be as though direct. I hope we won't have time because I've never finished a course in my life, so there's no reason why...

But today, then, I would really like to try to speak a little about what, in my view, this problem of the figures of thought consists in, because in a certain sense it is one that can be presented as the key problem of philosophy. And it's not that I'm forgetting other matters, because I would say that the figures of thought, even if they are fundamentally presented by philosophy, also form part of everything to do with art, and also cinema, since for myself, as for all of us, considering all we've covered on this subject, the great film directors are not just like painters or architects, they are also like thinkers. And of course, I hope that whatever we obtain through philosophy, we won't be satisfied in simply applying it to art or to cinema, but that it will furnish us with some striking encounters, both expected and unexpected.

That's why today I would say, well, let's see where this leads us, but let's begin with the following question: how can the figures of thought be presented in terms of an entire history which is that of philosophy? Now I'm not going to go through the whole of this history, I'll simply try to retain what interests me in this respect. Which means that today we'll be doing more philosophy than anything else, okay. The time has come. And I would say that it's immediately clear that this question of figures of thought is one that concerns something very concrete. It's obviously very different from what it is to consider a thinker. So then my question is: how does one consider a thinker? How does one think about the thinker? The thinker is nobody, but how would you consider them, how do you consider them?

To give some random examples, I would say that you could regard them as a fearless fighter, a supreme fighter. Or you might consider them a sublime worker. You could think of them as a compulsive gambler. I don't know what that means exactly. But if it means something, it's certainly not a question of metaphors. To speak is to speak literally. I'm speaking literally if I say "the thinker is a supreme fighter", or if I say "the thinker is an indefatigable worker", or if I say "the thinker is a compulsive gambler", and thank God, the list is far from closed, eh? So

you might say: when I think, what am I? In what do I recognize myself? If you don't recognize yourself in any of these first three categories, it's because there are others. Because after all, what are we talking about here?

This is the story I want to tell. It is that the figure of thought, what I call figure of thought, is *thought itself insofar as it is capable of thinking the real or the existent*: at that moment, it draws a figure. So I'm not at all using "figure" in the sense Hegel uses it when he speaks about the "figures of dialectics". For me, thought produces a figure when it manages to think the real or the existent. But why is there a problem here? The problem, and I would like to say this quickly – I wish I had a watch, to make sure I don't go on too long – when we ask what it is that thought thinks, why is this problematic? I would say that the problem is actually quite simple: what thought thinks, by virtue of the very fact that it is thought, is the *possible*. *The possible is the immediate modality of thought*. What you think insofar as you think it, you posit as possible. So where does the drama begin? It is that thought in itself – I say, in itself – has no way of distinguishing between the possible and the real. What thought thinks, it posits as possible, that's all. Why is it that thought *qua* thought has no way of distinguishing between the possible and the real, or the possible and the existent? It's obvious if you think about it.

Consider any concept or representation, it could be either an ox or a chimera or a triangle. This representation or concept is what thought thinks. It doesn't matter whether the object of the concept or representation exists or not: nothing changes. Everything may change for us but nothing changes for thought, that is, nothing is changed in the representation. This is what Kant had already said in a famous page of *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>1</sup>: you represent 100 francs to yourself – for reasons of nationality he said 100 thalers – you represent 100 francs to yourself: whether or not these 100 francs exist, and more crucially, whether you have them or not, is very important for you. But from the point of view of representation it's clear that nothing changes. You make yourself a concept of the chimera, a fabulous animal. Whether chimeras exist or not changes a lot; yet it doesn't change anything from the point of view of the concept, from the point of view of the representation. Which is what we have always translated in philosophy, by saying that *the existent is external to its representation*. The existent is the position of the object outside the concept.

So, whether the thing exists or not, nothing is changed in the concept. "The thing exists" means that it is posited outside the concept or the representation. "The thing does not exist" means that it is not posited... it is posited only through the concept and the representation. But the concept and the representation change nothing in terms of whether the thing exists or not. You have a concept of a triangle: that doesn't tell you anything about whether triangles exist in nature. Are there triangles in nature? That's another question, it doesn't regard the concept. The concept remains the same, whether there are or not. Do you understand?

So, I can translate this by saying: understand that *thought directly thinks the possible*, that is to say, *the essence*. Indeed, the essence is what a thing is, independently of the question of our knowing whether or not it exists. The chimera is this or that, independently of the question of knowing whether or not there are chimeras. So thought thinks the essence, that is to say the possible, and as the existent is the position of the thing outside of the concept or the representation, thought has no way, or seems to have no way of thinking the existent or the real, since nothing changes in its concept, except that the object, the thing, either exists or does not exist. Do you understand? I mean, here I'm mainly addressing the non-trained philosophers among you, since for the others it goes without saying, at least I hope so. But it's

very important to understand this; and this is why there's a problem in thought. And I would say that the eternal problem for thought is: I – I in this case being thought – how can I manage to think the real and the existent? How can I extricate myself from my sphere of the possible? How can I think something other than the essence? So, I would almost say that it's from here, well...

Hence, it seems to me, we can distinguish two types of principles. Thought by itself thinks the possible. In the name of what? In the name of certain principles that we will call logical principles. Logical principles are principles that define what is possible and what is not... that determine what is possible and what is not possible. And these logical principles, I would say, are the principles of essences or of the possible, since they discern, they distinguish the possible from the non-possible or the impossible. In classical logic these principles are three in number. The first is the principle of identity,  $A$  is  $A$ . And then there are two smaller principles that seem to be like specifications of the great principle of identity,  $A$  is  $A$ , that is to say, the thing is what it is. The second principle is called the principle of non-contradiction.  $A$  is not non- $A$ , the thing is not what it is not. And then we have the third principle, called the principle of the excluded third or excluded middle: the thing is  $A$  or non- $A$ , or if you prefer: between  $A$  and non- $A$ , there is no middle party, hence the expression "principle of the excluded middle",  $A$  or non- $A$ .

So, this is something I already find interesting, because if we look at these three principles of pure logic, we see that one is a principle of position or affirmation ( $A$  is  $A$ ), the second is a principle of negation ( $A$  is not non- $A$ ), while the third is a principle of alternative or disjunction ( $A$  or non- $A$ ). So, I know what is impossible, that is to say, unthinkable. What is impossible or unthinkable is something that would not be what it is, so it would contradict identity; or that would be what it is not, in which case it would contradict non-contradiction, and that would be both what it is and what it is not, meaning it would contradict the excluded middle. All is well. Under these three principles, I can think essences, the world of essences or the world of the possible, but I always come back to this question: how can I think something real? To think the real, the most immediate answer is... well, we have to resort to other principles.

And these principles could be determined quite quickly. Principle of causality: everything that is real has a cause. Principle of finality: everything that exists responds to external or internal ends, etc. Well, yes, but this is just where things begin. Because in the end, what are these principles? Principle of causality, principle of finality, one would almost have to say that they are empirical principles. I would have a hard time deducing them from logical principles. And do they really allow me to think the real or the existent? I would have to be able to think these principles in themselves. Is thought capable of thinking principles as bizarre as the principles of causality and finality? It's by no means certain, and for a simple reason, which is that these two empirical principles refer to the infinite. Sure, everything has a cause, but this is itself the effect of another cause and so on ad infinitum. And in the same way finality too refers to the infinite. What does all this imply? How can I orient myself? Well, that's my first point, just to let you see the problem.

Second point: let's look for some extraordinary endeavours. That's why I'm not going to redo the whole history of philosophy. I'll do it this way, by marking the great moments. I'll start by telling you about the extraordinary endeavour – I'll be brief - the extraordinary endeavour of the philosopher Descartes during the first half of the 17th century. It is well known that Descartes, in the *Meditations*, tells us a story which is more or less the following, or which

would seem to be the following – but since we’re devoting today to the way in which one should not read texts – we’ll go along with this “seems to be”. First meditation, in his book *Meditations on First Philosophy*<sup>2</sup>, first meditation: I doubt, I doubt everything. I doubt what exists – maybe this woman doesn't exist – I doubt the truth – maybe the three angles of a triangle are not equal to the straight angle – so I doubt the real, the true, I doubt everything. Okay.

But there's at least one thing I can't doubt, and what is that? It's that I who doubt, think. Because, of course, I can doubt that I doubt, but this doesn't change anything: to doubt is to think, and to doubt that I doubt is still to think. So, I doubt everything, but still there will always be something I cannot doubt, namely that I, who doubt, think. And, that thinking, I am a thinking thing, *res cogitans*. It's a bit more complicated than that, because – as you've already understood – it's clear that Descartes doesn't say or think for a moment that he doubts the existence of things. Descartes is like everyone else; he does not doubt the existence of the table. Why not? Because that would be a perfectly stupid operation. His question does not regard the existence of things; his question regards thinking about the existence of things. The whole operation of doubt concerns the knowledge that we have of things, not the things themselves.

So what he's saying is that he has the right to doubt the knowledge that we have of the table, and that he has even more right to doubt mathematical knowledge. And he asks himself: is there a knowledge that I cannot doubt? He answers: yes. In doubting, there is a knowledge of which I cannot doubt, which is the knowledge of me as a thinking being, as a doubting, therefore thinking, being. I know myself as a thinking being, thinking of a knowledge that cannot be doubted. This is what he tells us; it's the object of the first two *Meditations*. You understand, it's an extraordinarily subtle operation, a very beautiful operation, if it speaks to you, meaning if you admire it with a philosophical love, that is, if...

So, well, what did he do? What remarkable thing did he do for philosophy with this theory? He is the first, as far as I know – we can look for precursors, we can always find precursors, but these are silly questions – he is the first to introduce into philosophy, although he doesn't put it this way, a formula to which German philosophy will give a form, which is precisely the following:  $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$ . You'll tell me,  $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$  is not such a big deal. Well, actually it is. Because I ask you to compare: " $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$ " is a formulation of the identity principle " $A = A$ " or " $A$  is  $A$ ", " $\text{self}$  is  $\text{self}$ ". You see, Descartes' " $\text{self}$  is  $\text{self}$ " is exactly: For I who doubt everything, I who doubt all knowledge, there is still a knowledge I cannot doubt, which is the knowledge of me as a thinking being. So you have your two selves. For I who doubt everything, there is one thing I cannot doubt: the knowledge of me as a thinking being, I is I,  $I = I$ .

So what was actually occurring when philosophy was pervaded by this powerful formula that would lead it to the discovery of subjectivity? There is a big difference between the principle of identity that I invoked earlier,  $A$  is  $A$ , and this hammered-out formula,  $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$ . In fact,  $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$  is not a particular case of  $A = A$ .  $A = A$  applies to everything, I think. You see, you can sense right away that  $\text{Self} = \text{Self}$  is the identity of the thinker – meaning, not you or me but the identity of the thinker as such, that is, the identity of the subject of thinking. You will say to me: what difference does this make? A huge difference. The identity  $A = A$  is the identity of the thing that is thought. But the irksome thing about this principle of identity posited as  $A = A$ , or  $A$  is  $A$ , is that it was hypothetical. It was hypothetical. You see how wonderful philosophy is? All this is not just a matter of taste... it's not... when you're taken by

something, you're taken, that's it... As I said, it was hypothetical. Obviously, because its complete formulation should have been: if there *is* A, A is A. If there is A, A is A. Okay. But maybe there is no A; maybe there is nothing. In other words, the principle of identity was a hypothetical judgment.

And indeed, as Descartes showed, I could always doubt A, not only in its existence, but even in its concept. – So there is no concept? What is a concept? – And he tells us: there is one thing I cannot doubt, I who doubt everything, I who doubt everything cannot doubt that I who doubt think, Self = Self. It's admirable that he discovered an identity which is no longer subjected to a hypothetical condition. He discovered an unconditioned identity. Self = Self is not a way... another way of saying A = A, it is a way of raising the hypothetical judgment implied by A = A to a judgment of a completely different nature, which we can call a "thetic judgment": the position or auto-position of the self, thetic or categorical judgment.

A student: [*Inaudible remark on the question of knowing if, in the "I think", there is an ontological problem in Descartes*]

Deleuze: Yes, but you're asking too much, you know? We'd need to do an entire course on Descartes. What is a problem is all sorts of... that is to say, it's a problem, but still, it's a problem... it's a problem that he was very quickly able to solve, you know. Of course, he will go through God, but if I have to... He will require God to be sure that the thinking self has an existence: yes, you're right in that, but I'm not claiming to give a detailed account here... I'm only claiming to locate one particular point. I'm just isolating... because otherwise this would be a lecture on Descartes, God forbid!

It is this kind of Cartesian revolution which is... because you understand, it involves many things, even logically: the proposition "Self = Self" is not of the type, is not of the same type as the proposition "A is A". It is, in fact, once again a thetic or categorical judgment. What Descartes did with the Cogito, the "Self = Self", was to raise the hypothetical judgment to a thetic judgment, that is, to make the principle of identity take hold of a determined portion of the existent, a determined portion of reality, the reality of the thinking being, or the reality of the thinking subject. So you see that the principle of identity, by taking the form "Self = Self" irreducible to the form "A = A", grasped hold of something real that Descartes would call the *res cogitans*, the thinking being. Okay. It was once again the auto-position of the self. The principle of identity left the logical sphere and took a first step into the real or the existent.

Well, yes, but there he is locked up, so to speak, in his citadel. Because to get out of the Cogito – and here you would be even more right – to get out of the Cogito, to get out of the thinking Self, and to be able to affirm by thinking, to be able to think, the reality of something other than the thinking subject, that is, the reality of something capable of being thought, for example, mathematics, or the reality of something not capable of being thought, but only experienced, lived, namely the sensible world, he will have to resort to a whole series of acrobatics, he will require a whole series of rationales and complications, all of which appeal to God as a guarantor. Well, there you have it.

Third point. Second overview. So, all I will retain from this first overview is that with Descartes, oddly enough, the principle of identity attains a categorical or thetic value and takes a completely new form, Self = Self, that will allow it to constitute itself as an islet of the existent, the *res cogitans*. Second sounding, second overview: Leibniz, one of the most extraordinary of all philosophers, and this follows on perfectly because he will say: okay,

Descartes obtained his little islet, but what is needed is the adequation of thought with the whole of the existent. And he recommences. Every philosopher must recommence eternally. And he recommences by telling us: the principle of identity is the principle that rules over the possible: A is A. How then to think the real? How to think the existent? He will tell us that what we require is another principle, but that at the same time this other principle must not simply be an empirical principle. We must understand its relation to the principle of identity. And why is Descartes not sufficient in his view? Descartes is not sufficient in his view because what Leibniz demands is that thought should be capable of thinking *the whole of the existent*, that it should not just have its own little subjective islet – the *res cogitans* – but that it should be able to accede to a thought of all of the existent, of existence as a whole, of the real in its totality. What a program! Hegel will remember this program. He will undertake it in a completely different way, but he will remember it.

And what will Leibniz say? He will tell us a story that seems like a fairy tale, no more than a fairytale, or pure science-fiction. He says: well, you know, it's not difficult. You indeed have – beginning from Descartes – you indeed have the certainty of the self in its auto-position, Self = Self. But what Descartes did not see is that *each Self contains the world in its totality*. It was enough to think, at that moment, that thought, as a consequence of Self = Self, doesn't simply refer only to the little islet of the *res cogitans*, but will refer to the whole of the real and the existent. If the Self understands world in its totality, each Self – which means, even my little islet – each thinking Self thinks the world in its totality. It's just that it doesn't know it. Indeed, if we only knew it?

And what does it mean to say that each Self thinks the world in its totality? It means that *each Self is a point of view on the world*. Each Self is a point of view on the world, that is to say that it expresses the whole world from its point of view. It expresses the whole world from its point of view. And what this “express” implies is that *the world does not exist outside of the points of view which express it*. The city does not exist outside of all the points of view there are on the city. What a fantastic idea. And that's what the city is, it is the whole set of points of view there are on the city. Here we have a philosophy that is already perspectivist.

Each Self contains the totality of the world, what does this mean? Well, yes: he will invent a name to designate each of these Selves... using the word "monad". *Each monad expresses the totality of the world in its existence*. You see: there is the principle of identity which governs the truths of essence, but the truths of existence refer to another domain: each Self expresses the whole world. Each Self expresses the whole world, which means that, well, one thing is obvious, which is the fact that *I express the events that happen to me*. That at least is certain. I express the events that happen to me. I express everything that happens to me, from my birth to my death. Okay. Each and every one of us. But each of us, in long chains that compose the world. Julius Caesar expresses what happens to him.

But actually, things are much more positive. If each of us expresses what happens to us – and I'll skip the reasons Leibniz gives for this – then each of us must also express everything that happens to others. That is to say: each of us expresses the world in its totality. We have no choice. If you ask me: why is this? I'll say, just bear with me... because, here too, we would need a two-hour course on Leibniz<sup>3</sup>. It's simply... it's simply that he's not stupid.  
[Interruption of the recording]

## Part 2

... a small portion of the world, that which affects me from my birth to my death, my relationships, my surroundings: this is my sphere of clear and distinct expression. In other words, he will say: I express clearly and distinctly only what happens to my body, only what affects my body. But everything else, the totality of the world since there was a world and until the end of the world – for in his view I express no less the past than the future – I also express this, but I do so obscurely, indistinctly, unconsciously.

Let's take an example, the crossing of the Rubicon. Well, the crossing of the Rubicon is something that each of us expresses. Each of us expresses it, but we do so unconsciously or indistinctly. On the other hand, there is one Self, a monad, who expresses it clearly and distinctly and this is the monad Julius Caesar. Good. You see, each Self expresses the infinity of the world. That is to say that everything that happens in the world, all the objects that make up the world, all the events that constitute the world are attributes of the Self. They are the clear and distinct attributes of this or that Self, but they are more or less clear. Indeed, Julius Caesar expresses very clearly and distinctly the crossing of the Rubicon, but the companions of Julius Caesar express it perhaps only clearly and maybe not very distinctly, if they don't understand what it concerns, and as for me, I express it... nonetheless I do express it, since I learned it at school, but I express it abstractly. But you see how each Self expresses the totality of the world, meaning it contains the totality of the world as an attribute or predicate, an attribute or predicate of the subject. So... What is he doing here?

So there you have it. If the world is contained in each Self, in each subject, if the world is contained in each subject that expresses it, then every proposition of existence has a *reason*. Every proposition of existence, everything that he himself calls "truths of existence" in distinction to "truths of essence", every truth of existence has a reason, which is what? The Self that understands it clearly and distinctly. That is to say: the Self of which it is the clear and distinct attribute. So it is that all of the existent and all of the real corresponds to a principle which is the principle of reason... the principle of sufficient reason. If identity governs essences, sufficient reason will govern existences. You will ask me: in what way does this follow, according to the distribution of two types of principles? It is that, at the same time, he discovered a relationship between the principle of reason which governs existences and the principle of identity which governs essences. Namely: *the principle of reason is simply the inverse of the principle of identity*; or rather, the principle of reason is the reciprocal of the principle of identity.

You will tell me: the reciprocal of the principle of identity? How can the formula "A is A" have a reciprocal? The reciprocal of "A is A" is "A is A". Well actually, no. Here again, Leibniz's stroke of genius was to show that the reciprocal of "A is A" was not at all "A is A". Why not? Because "A is A" hid something, namely that *the principle of identity itself was already vectorized*. Meaning that the true formula or the developed formula... if you develop the formula "A is A", you get the formula: *every analytic judgment is true*. We've never done so much philosophy. Every analytic judgment is true, what does that mean? In Logic we call "analytic judgment" – you really have to know this by heart – we call "analytic judgment" any judgment in which the attribute is included in the subject. -- [Student signals to Deleuze] No, not right now, sorry, later. – [Pause]

Good. Take the example of the triangle. A triangle has three sides. Or every body is extended. These are analytic judgments. Why? Because you can't say "triangle", you can't say "triangle", by placing something under this word, by thinking something, without having already thought "three sides". Indeed, "triangle" equals "three straight lines enclosing a

space". When you say: "the triangle has three sides", you are saying: "the triangle is a triangle". Any analytic judgment is true. And indeed, how could it be otherwise? Any analytic judgment is true, it is unlikely to be false. If there are triangles, it is true that a triangle is a triangle. In other words, the analytic judgment... or else, any body is extended. "Any body is extended" is an analytic judgment, since you can't have defined "body" without having already invoked "extended".

On the other hand, if you say: "every body is heavy", that constitutes a problem. Could you define "body" without including weight in it, yes or no? If not, that's an analytic judgment. But if you could define "body" without including "weight" in it, it wouldn't be an analytic judgment. It's a problem. But for Leibniz, there is no problem, or there will be no problem since it will be up to him to show that for him there is no problem. In any case, bear with me, "every analytic judgment is true" is simply the development of the principle of identity, "A is A". It's simply that you have vectorized the principle, since you have expressed it in terms of a subject and predicate. Meaning that an analytic judgment, which is to say a judgement where the predicate is contained in the subject, is true.

What will be the inverse, then, of the principle of identity, or rather the reciprocal of the principle of identity? The reciprocal of the principle of identity will be: *every true judgment is analytic*. But it seems this is much less certain. It was obvious that every analytic judgment was true. But the reverse case is less evident, wouldn't you say? It's not at all certain, even, at first glance, that "any true judgment is analytic". But here Leibniz performs an astonishing operation. He begins by telling us: you can't refute me, can you? You can't refute this. He has us, yes, "Any analytic judgement is true". So, we tell him... If we understand what "analytic" means, we tell him: well, yes, obviously, yes, it's true that any analytic judgment is true. Well, he says: well, now you won't be able to... if you've granted me that, you won't be able to refute me when I say that all true judgement is analytic.

Why? We have only to reassemble the parts of Leibniz's exposition: the Self doesn't content itself with being the Cartesian islet, posited in its self-certainty. The Self expresses the world, that is, it understands the world as the set of its own attributes, whether clear and distinct, or else obscure. The Self understands the whole world in accordance with its own attributes. Therefore, any true judgment, i.e., when I truthfully attribute something to a Self, such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon", it is an analytic judgment since "crossing the Rubicon" is an attribute contained in Caesar, insofar as Caesar expresses the world and expresses distinctly what happens to his body. "Crossing the Rubicon" was a predicate, an attribute of the subject Caesar. In other words, if the proposition "Caesar crossed the Rubicon", a proposition of existence, is true, *it is because it is analytic*.

Hence, not only is every analytic proposition true, but *every true proposition is analytic*. The principle of sufficient reason that governs existences, or that governs reality, is simply the reciprocal of of the principle of identity that governed essences. Only there is a small difference which will obviously result to be enormous: it is that in the case of essences, the analysis I have to make to demonstrate the identity between subject and predicate is a finite analysis, whereas the analysis that I have to make for existences in order to show the identity between subject and the predicate, that of "Caesar" and "crossing the Rubicon", is strictly speaking an infinite analysis. You recognize Leibniz as a mathematician of the infinite. But what do we mean by infinite analysis?



Well, I'll break off my overview here, with this formidable operation that will ensure that thought no longer takes hold merely of an islet of existence determined as the thinking being or thinking Self, but refers to the world in its totality, by inventing a reciprocal of the principle of identity. It doesn't matter, this is quite difficult to grasp. It doesn't matter if you haven't understood, it doesn't really matter, does it? You should just remember that this is quite a good story. Indeed, it's a crazy world, you know, a crazy world. It's the point where rationalism joins with delirium, it's rationalism's greatest moment, where rationalism become pure madness, all these monads that express the world in its totality, each one with its little portion of clarity and so on, do you realize? So, this is something that plays out not only between Caesar and each of us, but even between each of us here, each with their portion of clarity. As he says, these monads, the monads or the Selves are without doors or windows. Without doors or windows. We have neither doors nor windows, yet we have the totality of the world within us. So how do we reach an agreement? Since each of us does not express clearly and distinctly the same portion.

By making connections – because making connections is something that interests him, but what does it represent? – Think about it because it seems to be... I was saying that it's a fairy tale. But it also concerns a whole history of mathematics. How can we extend convergences, draw circles of convergence? Each of you would be the center of a circle of convergence. This is your portion of clear expression, what you clearly express of the world. Now there are some who express next to nothing. So, he will then say, suddenly he puts himself, he puts himself... it's remarkable. He will say: very well, but a microbe, yes, a microbe is a subject. Obviously, a microbe is a subject. It's just that, obviously... and it expresses the whole world. Okay, it expresses the whole world, since it's a subject. But the portion of the world that it expresses clearly and distinctly is exceptionally small, isn't it? An animal is a subject, it too expresses a portion... a cow, a cow clearly and distinctly expresses a portion of the world that fundamentally concerns it: grass. That's already something, but it also expresses the totality of cows, and insofar as it expresses the totality of cows, each cow, all cows are contained in a single cow. The totality of cows is included in each cow, it's the germinal lineage, it cannot be denied, it's the germ cells. Well, this goes a long way, because it also expresses all cowherds, including those of Ulysses, just as it expresses the cowherd who saw Caesar cross the Rubicon: all of this in a single cow.

And yet, it doesn't stretch as far as all that. The cow's clear and distinct portion of expression is that it chews its grass, fine. What about you? It depends. When you are well, when you are well, your portion of clear and distinct expression, anyway... it's not so enormous for the likes of us, because we are finite. Our portion of clear and distinct expression is not enormous. Above all, it concerns what happens to us. What happens to us, well, that's something. God, who is the monad of monads, he, he alone expresses clearly and distinctly the world in its totality. So he gives us little bits and pieces. But each of us also expresses the totality of the world. It's simply the characteristic of God is to express the totality of the world clearly and distinctly. That's fine. It's a very beautiful...

And then, you must understand, this reversal of the principle of identity... he reverses the principle of identity, which seems to be the least reversible thing in the world. He does two prodigious things: he teaches us that the principle of identity is reversible, and that when we reverse it, we obtain something very different. And by doing so, he combines, that is, he discovers the way in which the principle of sufficient reason is anchored in the principle of identity. That is to say, he goes beyond the empirical and produces the most absolute rationalism that has ever been produced, meaning that he establishes the identity – and he is

the first to do so – between the logical and the existent. He is the first to establish an identity between the logical and the existent. Until then, the logical was only the possible and not the existent. The second to do this would have to be Hegel. There will be only two who made such an attempt. And two is enough, because once it has been done twice... But it will be done twice very differently.

[*To a student*] Yes, do you want to say something? Make it short, I beg you, because there is still so much to cover.

Student: Self equals self... [*Inaudible remarks regarding a distinction between the superficial self and the deep self*]

Deleuze: For Leibniz? What?

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: You're asking me that when I never spoke of a deep or superficial Self. What?

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Ok. You're asking me: what is the difference between the deep and the superficial Self? I tell you: I didn't speak about that. You tell me... So, you're asking a question on your own part, which has nothing to do with this, with what we're talking about. If it's a question that you're asking yourself, I would say: well, I don't know, I don't know. I would say, well, if you like, what would Leibniz's answer be? He would say: there is no deep Self or superficial Self. You understand, you ask me what difference there is between the deep Self and the superficial Self? I can only answer: what tells you that this is a problem? What tells you that these two notions are well-founded? [*The student starts to answer*] Oh no, don't tell me why, because... I can think of some authors who have spoken about the deep Self and the superficial Self: Bergson, for example. But he has nothing to do with what we are talking about here. You, since you speak about it, you... So, Leibniz... Notice that, in what I have just said, Leibniz doesn't at all distinguish between a deep Self and a superficial Self. He distinguishes between a clear and distinct portion of what the Self expresses and an obscure and confused portion. But for him, this is neither deep nor superficial, it is something else. The very distinction of a deep Self and a superficial Self forms part of a set of problems – I'm not at all saying that this is a false problem – but it's part of a set of problems that has absolutely nothing to do with what we're talking about today. So, I can't answer the question, because if I did, we would have to change everything.

You understand what Leibniz did, I mean... I'll tell you: he retained the principle of identity to govern essences and the possible, while in order to govern the existent, he took that principle of identity to infinity. And that's amazing. That's amazing! I would like to convey something of my enthusiasm to you regarding this. And what mathematics it took to achieve that. You see this is why science, the relationship between science and philosophy makes it continually necessary to return to this problem, to come back to this problem again and again, because at the moment I think we are only talking nonsense. It's... it's obvious that... we shouldn't say, oh, in the 17th century they ... but it wasn't the end of it, well I don't know, that's a whole other story. But, but, but, but, but ... to carry the principle of identity to infinity, to carry it to infinity implied discovering its reciprocal, implied reversing it, which goes back to what I was saying about the infinite analysis which will govern the existent,

while the finite analysis governs essences. But what did this imply? It implied revolutions in mathematics, which Leibniz was carrying out at the same time, since he was also a great mathematician. Which is to say that he created a whole calculus of infinity. Good.

Third... third overview. And here, you understand, each time there are risks, and here it is that a philosopher, or rather, a series of philosophers are born, and I must add that they are a new breed of philosophers. Just like Leibniz, they represented... and maybe it was Leibniz that made them possible. And these philosophers – and here I'm making another overview – I would say that for us they offer a first proposition, a first kind of proposition. And they tell us: yes, Descartes did succeed in something, because he was able to raise the hypothetical judgment to the state ofthetic judgment, and he substituted "A = A" with "Self = Self". And with this, they pay homage to Descartes. But then they say: his mistake was to conceive the "Self = Self" as a substance, *res cogitans*, a thinking substance, and in fact from that point on he sequestered himself on his little islet. So, then they again take up Leibniz's attempt. And not surprisingly this will be the birth of the great German philosophy. But they won't say, as Leibniz did, for reasons that – I'll skip the reasons, because... no, I'll mention the reason very quickly... - they won't be able to, because no one after Leibniz will dare affirm that every true judgment is analytic. Why not? Because there will be a fundamental discovery, made by Kant, and Kant's fundamental discovery will be that there are of course analytic judgments, but that there are also other judgments that can only be called "synthetic".

And that when I say: a triangle has three angles, it is an analytic judgment because I cannot define "triangle" without having already said "three angles". And when I say: a triangle has three sides, it's an analytic judgment, because I can't have conceived the triangle without having already included three sides in the concept, so "A is A". But when I say: The three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, it is no longer analytic. It is a synthetic judgement because being equal to two right angles is not included in the concept of triangle; it is not an attribute of triangle. You will tell me this is where things become tricky but then does this mean they are against Leibniz? Yes and no, yes and no. Because Leibniz would say: yes, it is analytic, but yes, it is analytic! Only, at what price he would say it? Infinite analysis. It is analytic from the point of view of an infinite analysis. To which the others say: infinite analysis. That's something you can only claim by invoking a God and the comprehension of a God. They have completely dropped the idea of divine comprehension; there is no more God-like comprehension; it's over. They speak of the "Self = Self". Descartes still maintained the idea of a God, but for them... well, it's not that they are atheists, not at all, they will find their God. But they are reformists, so they will only find God from "Self = Self". They no longer wish to presuppose a God. The whole Reformation has passed through this: they are no longer Catholics, they are Reformists, so they want to start [70:00] from the "Self = Self".

Obviously, you can say: the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. But this is not analytic. Why isn't it analytic? It's because in order to prove it, what did you do, if you remember when you were a child, when you were all pupils in school? I don't dare test you by asking who remembers how you demonstrate that a triangle's angles are equal to two right angles, but first, one extends one side of the triangle [*Deleuze draws on the board*], secondly one raises a parallel to another side, extend one side of the triangle, [71:00] for example AB, I extend AB. Extend AB, raise the parallel BC prime, A... AC... no, or... well you see... I'll do it anyway, because it would be a pity if you didn't understand anything because of this. I'm making a very big triangle [*Deleuze seems to imitate the voice of a pedantic high school teacher*] to demonstrate that the three angles are equal to two right angles: what do you do? [72:00] You're going to push this side, extend it, and then you're going to raise a parallel BD,

parallel to AC, and then you've got there, there, there, there, you've got two right angles, and then you're going to demonstrate that this equals this and that equals that. There you have it. [Laughter]

Now, I ask you... it's not the triangle that does this by itself. As Hegel says in a wonderful text, the triangle is not like a flower, it is not a bud that develops its own petals... that develops its own petals. No, it was something you had to do: synthetic judgment. The fact that the three angles are equal to two right angles is not contained in the concept of a triangle: it's a synthetic judgment. Ah, well. So, in other words, what does this mean? Okay, okay, the foundation of everything is the "Self = Self", as Descartes saw very well. But Descartes did not understand what "Self = Self" meant... [Interruption of the recording] [1:13:52]

... because what "Self = Self" means is a "synthetic" identity, and not an analytic one. This is Kant. This is Kant. And from here on, everything will gather speed, because then we will have the Kantians, the Post-Kantians, that is to say, those who follow on from Kant, the great philosophers who recognized Kant as their fantastic starting point, and who will ask: in what does the synthetic identity of the Self consist? What is synthetic identity, estimating that Kant was unable to answer the question he asked himself? Of course, Kant provided his own answer, but it was an insufficient one in their view, since in fact, in order to account for synthetic identity, he invoked something else, something irreducible to thought and to the Self.

Their desire, on the contrary, is that synthetic identity be founded in the Self as such. And so they will state that synthetic identity is "Self is not the non-Self". Self is not the non-Self: this is synthetic identity. And here again, as for Leibniz, we shouldn't say that this isn't so important. It's actually a prodigious discovery. We have to consider all these formulas, if you will, in the same way you would consider the discovery of a chemical formula in a chemistry course. "Self is not the non-Self" is something astonishing, it's astonishing, because it means that the Self can only posit itself as identical to itself by opposing itself to a non-Self. So that's actually not Cartesian; that's post-Kantian philosophy. It's the "Self = Self" of Fichte. Fichte's Self = Self is: the auto-position of the Self implies opposing the Self to a non-Self, and the Self can posit itself as Self only through negation of the non-Self.

So, you see, this is in fact extremely concrete, since how is this negation of the non-Self by the Self achieved? One can conceive... Is it art that manages it? In that case, it would be a philosophy of art. But merely saying this wouldn't be the whole story, it doesn't happen by itself. And so would it be through art that thought would think the existent? Or would it be morality that achieves it? Fichte will think that it is morality that makes it possible. Schelling will think much more – and here I'm being overly schematic, but this is to give you the guidelines you were asking for – Schelling will be much more inclined to believe that art is responsible, and the splendid pages Schelling devotes to art will consist in showing how, through art, thought is able to take possession of the existent.<sup>4</sup> Whereas for Fichte, it will be the moral act.<sup>5</sup> So, here too, your own preferences must come into play; you should already be able to sense whether you feel more attracted by... well.

So, you see, now we are not far from grasping this synthetic identity of the self. What is it that they do here? Well, you see, we still have this frontier between essences and existences. We began by putting it here [Deleuze draws on the board], and then we made it pass first between logical principles and then empirical principles of the type... logical principles of the identity type, empirical principles of the causality or finality type. And then we had the

adventures of Descartes and Leibniz. With Leibniz, quite astonishingly, empirical principles were elevated above the empirical, since they became the principle of sufficient reason, which derived from the principle of identity, but which were the reversed formula of this principle of identity. And then the post-Kantians will raise the line of demarcation even higher. This time, they will say: okay, identity is empty identity, it is empty identity that allows you to think only the essence or the possible: it is analytic identity. But synthetic identity would already be the operation by which thought rises to the power of the existent and takes possession of the existent.

And what is synthetic identity? Well, *it's the principle of non-contradiction*. Simply... simply, it was sufficient to understand the principle of non-contradiction. And all the others were quite wrong. They had the truth at hand, but they didn't see it because they didn't understand anything about the principle of non-contradiction. And they didn't understand anything about the principle of non-contradiction, the post-Kantians maintained, because they thought that it was simply there, just like that, a mere double of the principle of identity, a simple consequence of the principle of identity, that "A is not non-A" was just a simple way of saying "A is A". When in fact, the real dividing line was between the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction. And it was already at the level of a principle of non-contradiction, that is to say, of synthetic identity, that thought took possession of the existent and the real, and of the real in its reality, meaning in its very development, its genesis.

And that's what I told you last time. It will arrive at a successful conclusion, it will explode, attaining its outcome, after Fichte and Schelling... arriving at its outcome in Hegel. And Hegel, once again contrary to what people say, is not at all someone who says: things contradict themselves. Once again, this is the major misinterpretation of the dialectic that I'll call "modern dialectic": never has a modern dialectician – and here I emphasize the word "modern", I'll explain why in a minute – never has a modern dialectician claimed that "things contradict themselves". On the contrary, a modern dialectician would say: things do not contradict themselves. You will tell me: but everyone since philosophy began has said that "things don't contradict themselves"! Yes. But by saying "things don't contradict themselves", the others think they are not actually saying anything about things. They think they are only saying something about the possibility of things, since if things contradicted themselves, they would be impossible.

So, when the others – meaning all those who came before Hegel, before the dialecticians, before the post-Kantians – when they said that things do not contradict themselves they were not actually saying anything about things. Hegel, and to a lesser extent Fichte and Schelling, his predecessors, is the first to think that when he says, "things do not contradict themselves", he is saying something about things. Meaning that not only is he saying something about things, but he is saying how they come into being and develop. They arise and develop by not contradicting themselves. Here too, what a masterstroke... I mean, it's a series of masterstrokes. It's strange this history of philosophy, you know? Once something's been done, you assimilate it and then you go from Leibniz to Hegel, and you put it all in order. That's actually what I'm doing today, it's... but in the end, understand... in what field... when I say this is all creation, well, obviously, it's a form of creation. Each time, they create systems of concepts... it's really... because they didn't exist before, no? And so, once again, I take up my invocation: where would you want to put the idea of truth in all this? It's not something where you're going to say that it's true or false, is it? To speak about a search for truth in philosophy, this is always what makes... I think it's the only thing that academic philosophy is capable of, but trying to speak about truth in philosophy is precisely what prevents one from

creating new concepts. What does all this have to do with truth? I hope it has nothing to do with truth, because truth has nothing to do with it.

So once again, what are they talking about? I try to summarize, because this is something I discussed in detail last time. They take the principle of non-contradiction quite literally. "A is not non-A": well, that means that A can only be posited through the negation of its opposite. It does not mean that A is its opposite, but nor does it mean that "A is A". It means "A is not non-A". But to say "A is not non-A" means that what A is can only be obtained as the result of the negation of the negation. In other words, I don't say "A is what it is not"; I say: A must pass into what it is not and deny what it is not in order to posit itself as what it is. This is genesis and development. And since it is at the same time the genesis and development of both the concept and the real, then thought and the existent are reconciled and become strictly one. And thus I would say, for example, that mind is not nature. But that would mean that mind is mind only by denying what it is not, that is, by denying nature, and it can deny nature only by passing into nature itself, since what it is implies precisely that it denies what it is not. How could it deny what it is not ... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:27:33]

### Part 3

... and deny the opposite through which it passes? This is what we will call the Hegelian dialectic which, once again, does not consist in denying the principle of non-contradiction, but in developing the principle of non-contradiction by taking it literally. So if the principle of analytic identity is, according to Hegel, the empty principle of essences with which one can only think – as he says in his language – the abstract essentiality, on the other hand the principle of non-contradiction is *the principle by which thought and the real generate and develop themselves simultaneously*, marching in step, to the point that I can say: the real is the concept and the concept is the real. What an adventure!

Could we go further? Well, yes, why not, we could... no, we can't... at no point can we go any further, but we can always go elsewhere, if we have reason to go elsewhere. Because I want to end these first overviews with a remark, and we can make a little note of it, because I am astonished to what extent people... it's odd but people don't seem to be very enthusiastic about what is nonetheless a fundamental question: what is it that distinguishes the ancient dialectic from the modern dialectic? Because in the end, we all know that the term *dialectic* was constantly used by Plato, and that Plato claims to undertake a dialectical philosophy. So does that mean he was already saying all this? No.

I'll tell you that in my view, the difference, the big difference between the ancient and modern dialectic, is that the ancient dialectic is a dialectic, a form of thought, for which, on the contrary, things are contradictory. Which is why it's so important to grasp that for Hegel they are not contradictory, quite the opposite. But the ancient dialectic pulls no punches. It says to us: look, the world is tumult and chaos, it is contradictory. Does that mean that for them the contradictory exists? The contradictory doesn't exist for anyone except perhaps for certain philosophers who might pass for humorists: a number of philosophers who have made a theory of the impossible object, or a theory of the absurd. But it's more among English thinkers that we would find these... these things. So, basically, nobody has ever said: the contradictory exists. And I've just shown how this applies particularly to Hegel.

When they tell us: the world is tumult and contradiction, the world is chaos, tumult and contradiction, it means that for them, *the world is appearance*. The world is appearance. And

you, modern men – that is to say, ancient men, eh? You will see why I say “modern men”, but let's say: and you, ancient men – your task, your real task is to get out of this chaos. Does this mean taking refuge in thought? Not at all, not at all. In Plato, not at all, in no way is it an exit. Well, it's also that, it depends, it depends on how you read the nuances. It's a question of getting out of this contradictory world which is tumult and chaos, but for... for what reason? It's a kind of combat, a kind of fight or struggle against appearances, against darkness, against chaos, against... all of this, against all the savagery of the world. And in the name of what? In order to establish – here you can choose according to the nuances – or to find, or recreate, or invent a spiritual life, a spiritual life which stands apart, and from whose point of view the tumult and chaos will only reach us in a muffled way.

Of course, we will never be able to silence it completely. But it will only reach us in a muffled way. It will be necessary to create a spiritual life that engenders its own forms which will no longer owe anything to the sensible, to the world of appearances. You can call these whatever you want: abstract forms, or purely spiritual forms. And yet, they can also be political forms: the form of the city, the form of the city to come, the form of the city of the future, the form of the radiant city. They can be artistic forms, geometrical lines or organic lines. They can be scientific forms. In any case, what will be necessary will be to struggle and break with the contradictory in order to give rise to a spiritual life capable of generating its own forms. Fine.

You see that this is very different: I would say that this is... this is the ancient dialectic. And what will be really fascinating in their thinking is this engendering of spiritual forms, and once again in all domains, whether political, artistic or mathematical. Spiritual forms that, from their point of view, will be surprisingly modern. So that I would say that – to finish with this point, as quickly as I can – in my view, there are many modern philosophers whose thinking closely resembles the ancient dialectic, and who, moreover, if we think of them, make us realise that we have lost the special vitality of this ancient dialectic – but if we consider them, we see how they restore to the ancient dialectic something of its original intensity.

And these are the ones we have been discussing in the last period, the expressionists. Expressionism. If you were to try to establish a kind of difference between German romanticism and expressionism, what would it be? It is that German romanticism is the great dialectic in the modern sense, ensuring that the genesis and the development of thought and things become one and the same genesis and development. Romantic philosophy will pass through Schelling and Hegel. Novalis and Hölderlin will have a very close relationship to Schelling and Hegel. And their thought will perpetually be that of positing things through the negation of their opposite. It will be the celebrated relationship between spirit and nature in romanticism, and the reconciliation of spirit with nature, either through moral duty, particularly in Fichte, or through artistic practice. And within romanticism you have all kinds of conflicting trends, but which continually circle around this problem.

But expressionism, which appeared much later in the 19th century, what will it do? What did its break with romanticism consist in? Attempting to reconcile spirit with nature makes you a sensualist. It's strange thinking of Hegel being labelled a sensualist. You couldn't tell, but he was a sensualist. Indeed, with your history, your whole history, in the end you remain attached, – and this is the supreme insult for a dialectician – you remain in the empirical, you flounder in the empirical, you remain attached to the sensual, to the sensible. You are prisoners of the tumult and chaos of the world. Simply, you bless it with reason. You do not

see the task of modern man. Because the modern world is tumult and chaos, the task of modern man is to get out of this tumult and chaos. How? By building a spiritual life apart – you see how this is the opposite of the modern dialectic... of the Hegelian dialectic – by building a spiritual life apart, that is, a spiritual life that owes nothing to nature, to what exists. But you must make it exist; it is up to you to make something exist that you will not borrow from the already existent. And that something can be in a new union with God, many expressionists talk about a new union with God presupposing sacrifice, involving the spirit of sacrifice, that is, the loss of individuality, the loss of the self, in order to rise up to a spiritual universe that will create its own forms.

So it is not at all a question of simply fleeing the world: it is a question of fleeing the tumult of the world in order to build a spiritual universe, which will be the spiritual universe where modern man can live, where modern man in his modernity can find rest, and which will at the same time be the form of the Radiant City and an architectural form and if necessary a political form, certainly a pictorial form and so on. And these will be the only things able to give a measure of peace to modern man, not at all an inactive peace, but an active and creative one. And expressionism will say: from now on we have only one means of expression to mark our horror of tumult and chaos, and our call for a separate spiritual universe, where the sounds of tumult and chaos would only reach us in a muffled way. You have this perpetual return – and this is not a metaphor – this splendid image of the spiritual universe where modern chaos arrives only in the form of muffled noises.

Student: Isn't it a bit like what Michel Serres calls this kind of background noise of the transcendental?

Deleuze: I don't know if Serres calls it that. Maybe, maybe, but I have some, I have, I don't know if Serres, if Serres called it... if that's what Serres called it, he would be a pure expressionist. But I don't think that... It must be something else, because I don't think he's very expressionist<sup>6</sup>.

They say that there is only one expression, it is the scream... it's the scream... the scream or cry. And expressionism has never done anything but scream. And to scream also means to repel... and the image, the image of this expressionist thought, what would it be? This time, it would be like a pyramid or a triangle whose apex would never cease rising while pushing down the base. That's the old dialectic, that's what the ancient dialectic was. And here we have an incredible renewal renovation of this ancient dialectic. Imagine a triangle that never ceases to raise its apex? Ah, this is the fabrication of life, the fabrication... what I can only call the construction of modern spiritual life, all the time repelling its base which is the tumult and chaos of the modern world. And its only means of expression is the scream, which has a double aspect: pushing down the base. I push down on the base of my foot, and at the same time from my head I try to elevate the apex of the triangle, and from my head to my feet, my feet to my head, there is the scream, the cry that is turned towards... it's even more profound than the theory of the primal scream. It's something completely different from than the primal scream, isn't it? Yes, see how the cry is turned, there, how it expresses both this effort to break free of the tumult and chaos and the opening towards a spiritual world, the mouth that cries out. Now, in the Hegelian dialectic, the cry had a great significance but one whose meaning was completely different.

Now we've already seen it – and here I come back to cinema – in comparing the expressionist cry and the Soviet cry. I mean, there are two great film directors who were



capable of harnessing the powers of the cry, and these are the expressionists, particularly Murnau... Murnau more than all others, but also Lang, Lang and Murnau. No, I'm talking about cinema - and on the other hand we have Eisenstein. Well, you know making an image of a cry is no easy matter. It arises in all the arts, it arises in painting, it arises in philosophy, it arises everywhere. As for philosophical cries, that's really something, to be able to let out a philosophical cry. It's easy to scream like a baby, really easy. Even if they make it look difficult when you see on TV people searching for their primal scream. It looks really hard, but it doesn't go very deep. It would be much better to get people to cry in another way. They have other cries to let out, yes, it's...

With Eisenstein on the other hand, the cry is that of the modern dialectic. The cry, the admirable cries of Eisenstein, think of *Battleship Potemkin* what are they? These are prodigious scries, they are qualitative leaps, real qualitative leaps; they are leaps into the opposite quality, from sadness to anger, the leap from sadness to anger. Well. Here the cry represents a fantastic qualitative leap, that is to say: it is what I referred to as raising the instant to the power two. By jumping from one instant to the other, you raise the instant, the second instant to the power two, or to the nth power. This is the dialectical cry. And the cry of the sailors of the Potemkin is the dialectical cry. Whereas if you remember in Murnau's *Faust*<sup>7</sup>, Marguerite cries out, you have the cry of Marguerite. If you think about Pabst's *Pandora's Box*, alas, Lulu doesn't cry out, as far as I can recall, but that is one of Pabst's limits. It's because Pabst wasn't capable of... he renounced the difficult task of finding the image of her cry. Life is hard, but... I don't know, maybe she does cry, I don't have a clear memory remember, but I'm fairly sure she doesn't. In any case, I'm sure that in Berg's opera<sup>8</sup>, she does cry, she screams, and she lets out a cry that is the most beautiful cry in the history of music. O at least what is one of the two most beautiful cries in the history of music.<sup>9</sup>

Actually, the other one is by the same author, Mary's cry in *Wozzeck*.<sup>10</sup> You see how the expressionist cry is completely different from the Soviet cry... the Soviet cry is the extreme result of the Hegelian Marxist dialectic, which is to say the leap from sadness to anger. Comrades, you will not shoot at us! A mouth that cries out. This is the qualitative leap. The other cry is completely different. The cry of Marguerite, the cry of Marguerite in Murnau's *Faust* which is an image of an incredible splendour. The cry of Berg's *Lulu*, which is a prodigious sonic image, which brings you to tears. That's the expressionist cry. This is Lulu who has fallen into the very depths of abjection, into tumult and chaos, and is murdered by Jack the Ripper. And her friend the Baroness... is she a Baroness?

Claire Parnet: The Countess.

Deleuze: The Countess, and her friend the Countess, just after Lulu's death cry, will sing a kind of song that ascends to the heavens, which is the song of Lulu's redemption. So, on one hand, we have the cry that is as if turned towards this tumult, this chaos from which we emerge, and which opens up towards a spiritual life capable of creating its own forms. This is what the expressionist cry consists in, and it mustn't be confused with the Soviet cry, with the dialectical cry. Because suppose you hear a cry in the street, it becomes very important for you to know whether it is a dialectical cry or an expressionist cry, in order to know what to do. Because... I leave it up to you... I don't want to force your reaction, what you do next becomes a matter for your own conscience... You might be mistaken, of course, if you behave towards a dialectical cry as if it were an expressionist cry, then woe betide. The contrary mistake is less important, in my view, and its consequences less serious.

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: What is the most urgent of these cries? Here, I think that here again there is no single answer, it depends on the situation. And yet, and yet... You see, this would be part of some practical exercises in philosophy. So, if it were possible, if there would only ten of us, we could ask ourselves questions of this nature, a kind of casuistry in philosophy, that would be nice. Well, but all that takes time, anyway, you must be exhausted, I'm not going to abuse you...

So... especially because, as you can see, we're not done with this yet. Let's say, we've just outlined a whole group. I insist on this, all the same: the move that the moderns made, that the post-Kantians made, was to raise the bar – as we might say in rather crude terms that I shouldn't really be using – to raise it very high, I mean this barrier between the real and the possible. They said: but you know, thought already begins to adequately pervade the real and the existent at the level of the principle of non-contradiction. Perhaps you didn't know this, but that's how it is. Fine. Regarding this, I hope you have managed to... So it hasn't ceased, the real hasn't ceased in its rising up towards thought, just as thought hasn't ceased in its descent into the real. Hence, we have this sort of expressionist strike back that marks a reaction against all that, which says: oh no, no, they were trying to foist upon us a thought that was mired in the real, and a real that rose up towards thought. At that point, there is no longer any real creation. You have to create, and, indeed, everything I've told you regarding the theory of the expressionist cry and spiritual life according to expressionism, is something you find explicitly in the works of the great expressionist artists, but you also find it in artists of a very different stamp who nonetheless have something in common with expressionism.

For example, in painting, this is the very theory of Kandinsky. It's Kandinsky's own theory as set down in *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*<sup>11</sup>. In *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, you find a theory which, in my opinion, is no different to an expressionist manifesto. Everything is there: to leave behind the tumult of the world, to create the spiritual universe, that the spiritual universe must generate its abstract forms and so on, that this is the task of modern man, you find all this, word for word. For me, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* is one of the greatest and most beautiful expressionist manifestos, perhaps the most beautiful, to the point that Kandinsky was already no longer an expressionist when he wrote it. But the theory remains completely expressionist, up to the invocation of a religious life and of what he calls "theosophy"<sup>12</sup>, which is really something that seems... Yes, well that's enough about that...

But why, at this point, why shouldn't there also be a new breed of philosophers? You'll say to me: why should there be? But as we gradually come to understand their underlying reasons – we see there is a principle that, until that point, has been neglected among the three logical principles. They would say: no, you see, all this business of your modern dialectic doesn't work because in the end... well, imagine someone who says: I don't care for this modern dialectic because it would really drag me into the tumult, and our modern task is to try not to get swept up in the tumult and chaos. The modern task is to elaborate the spiritual universe that will lead us out of the tumult and the chaos. This is what we just saw was the expressionist approach. So, let's say that expressionism is a fundamental critique of romanticism and the romantic dialectic. Let's suppose that the expressionists are right, let us suppose for a moment – it is not our business to... already at this point, the idea of being right makes no sense, but I'm just saying this for the sake of convenience, so we can move on – let's suppose that they are right. Wouldn't we then, wouldn't we necessarily have to be expressionists, or would there be other paths?

But after all, we have forgotten our third little purely logical principle. I was saying: here we have things that in appearance are equal: identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle. Something is A *or* not A: it's no longer the negation, it's the alternative. Ah, well, well. So here's my question: can I conceive, like the dialecticians after Kant... in the same way the post-Kantians reconcile thought and the existent at the level of the reinterpreted principle of non-contradiction – yes, I'm repeating myself because... I'm going slower because this is by way of a summary – can we conceive that... that what? That, in the same way that, yes, in the same way that the romantics and the dialecticians, that the modern romantic dialectic reconciled thought and the existent at the level of the principle of non-contradiction, even if it meant reinterpreting this principle, is it possible to conceive of a race of thinkers who would propose to reconcile thought and the existent *at the level of the excluded middle*, on condition that *they reinterpret the principle of the excluded middle*? This is less obvious, but it would be very interesting. Would we care for it more? Well, it would be up to each of you to answer, no? I don't know.

In this case what would we have? Well, just what I was saying: it would be a thought that would no longer be either contradiction or combat, neither work nor... It would be an "either/or" thought. What is an "either/or" thought? It's enough for me to call it this to imply that just as one could not reduce the principle of non-contradiction to that of identity, since this would be to forget that the principle of non-contradiction introduced something new to the concept of identity, namely two negations, the first negation being "is not", and the second negation "not-A", and that it therefore introduced the negation of the negation, it is equally true that when I say "x is A or not A", I introduce something absolutely new that is included neither in the principle of identity nor in the principle of non-contradiction. Moreover, what we have here is a prodigious operation, which I like, and which consists in the fact that in this third perspective we are able to get rid of the verb "to be". Because, after all, the principle of non-contradiction, even when understood dialectically, was always mired in the verb "to be": it substituted "is not" for "is"; it affected the verb "to be" with negation. But in the principle of the excluded middle, though we keep the verb "to be": x is A or not A, we shift, and what is it that we shift to? To the conjunction *or*.

At last, at last, something new that lets us breathe. Finally, we have conjunctions instead of the eternal verb "to be". Well, maybe there are other ways to proceed, but I ask myself: who are these people of "either/or". So, thinking would be a question of alternatives. So, the thinker is a player? But it's not enough to say that he's a player, it's frivolous, it's too easy, it's even a bit creepy to speak about thinking as if it were a game. Here too, we must speak literally: if to think is to play, and not to work, to do the work of the negative, nor to fight or... well. If to think is to play, you have to ask yourself "what is the game?", and you mustn't get it wrong. Is it chess? Is it something else? I'll tell you why it's not chess. And if it's not chess... because if it's chess we would be back to Leibniz, we would end up going back to Leibniz. I mean, I'm not going to demonstrate this because... but anyway, it can't be chess. So what is it? What game are we talking about, what kind of game? And then doesn't playing imply a kind of irresponsibility? No, there are games of unlimited liability, just as there are games of limited liability. Then there are wholly irresponsible games. That's a lot of players, so we have to know who we're talking about.

When Nietzsche regards thinking as playing, he's quite open about it. He has never understood the notion of responsibility. It's not that he's against it, he simply doesn't know what it means. That's his business. He has, as they say, a moral lack in this regard, a very curious thing, well anyway. But there are other authors on the contrary for whom the idea of

thinking as a form of play means that I am responsible for everything, I am responsible for the whole universe. So you see it's not the same thing. So what are we... how are we going to deal with this? Right now, I just want us to try to get started on this a little because... and then we will discover many things, many things that will... well. I was hoping to go further today, alas!

For me, from a philosophical point of view "either/or" evokes a trinity. From the point of view of painting too, it evokes things. After all, there are many painters who do not think of painting in terms of opposition. Of course, you have painters who do think of painting in terms of opposition: the opposition of complementaries, for example. I wouldn't say that this makes them dialecticians, but there are also painters who think about painting in a completely different way. You will find all these patterns in other fields too. You have to understand that they don't just pertain to philosophy. Philosophy works for everybody, just as painting works for everybody, and then cinema too works for everybody. There are filmmakers... there are filmmakers who, well yes, in whose work I never see oppositions. What I see all the time are *alternations*. And yet this is where it gets complicated. I'll take an immediate, simple example: there are filmmakers who create conflict or combat between white and black. They produce marvelous effects of light, which are like spiritual forms of light. We know these filmmakers, we've studied them a bit, we've talked about them a lot, they are the expressionists. Here there is a struggle, as we have seen, between light and darkness that passes through the contrast between white and black.

Let's take a filmmaker like Dreyer, or like Bresson<sup>13</sup>. I have the feeling – this will have to be justified I know, but this isn't the moment to ask me for my reasons, we'll see about that later – I have the feeling that here things occur quite differently. Of course, you can say that this black is opposed to that white. But it's by dint of saying things like this, though they're not false, that we do worse, meaning that we misinterpret and even miss things. I have the feeling, when I see Dreyer's images, that they alternate. We don't have a contrast of black and white that would express the struggle between light and darkness. What we have is an alternation, which can be relentless, of white and black, as we do in floor tiles: a white tile, a black tile. And in Bresson's work too, I can see that while we can talk about the incessant contrast between white and black, I have the impression that, here too, though it's not like floor tiles, it is again much more in the form of an alternation or even an alternative. Okay. Let's leave this as a pure question, since it will be for the next time. We'll come back to this next time.

So, I think, then... to return to philosophy, I immediately see one author. He will found my lineage, I try to identify a lineage of the "either/or", a lineage of the alternative, that is to say: I call the lineage of the alternative those for whom the relation between thought and the existent will be established at the level of the excluded middle on condition that this excluded middle is understood in a new way. Well, it begins – as far as I know, it didn't exist before, though here too we will always find precursors – it begins with Pascal, Pascal the Catholic.<sup>14</sup> And he unveils his sublime text on the wager, based on an "either/or" logic. But "either/or" what? That's another question "either/or" what? And then, I see as a second figure – and I'm so ignorant that I don't even know if the latter knew the former's work, though it must be documented somewhere – I see Kierkegaard, the reformist pastor, who, if asked to define his philosophy, and if he accepted – he wouldn't accept, obviously – but if he did accept, I don't know, either because he was distracted, or else, he was too much in love with Regine, he would say: it's the philosophy of the alternative, it's the "either/or".<sup>15</sup> And, very strangely, considering I've been wanting for a long time to pay homage to this philosopher who I

admire so much, I see a third figure, who is Sartre, who is an atheist, and who, in a certain way, if one were to ask him to define his philosophy, the innovations he brought to the table which made French existentialism possible, would say: it's not difficult, it's a philosophy of choice. It's a very strange form of thought.<sup>16</sup>

Now I'm going to tell you my position, so that I don't have to say it again next time, since I don't wish to talk about myself. For my part, I'm not able to untangle all this very well, which is why I want to talk about it, because it doesn't say anything to me, nothing at all. It tells me absolutely nothing, nothing, really nothing. All these notions mean absolutely nothing to me, and yet at the same time they fascinate me. So, mine is a kind of indifferent fascination, it's very odd. So, I can't... I hope that precisely... I want to talk to you about this now because I was thinking: maybe I'll find out why I have this double state. It's not even a double state: it fascinates me completely, and yet I don't care at all, it doesn't interest me, it's a mystery. And there the problem arises – and I'd like to leave it at that. Strangely enough, I would say it's not by chance that I made my list of filmmakers before – my two – because I believe that, if you accept that film directors, the great film directors are not uneducated, but are themselves profound thinkers, I don't think I exaggerate when I say that even without asking him, Bresson has read Pascal, and many other things, but among others, Pascal, and that, for my part, I would be ready to say that Bresson is very close to Pascal, and that it is even less of an exaggeration to claim that Dreyer knows Kierkegaard very well.

So maybe this would give us some bridges. But, I mean, just what is at stake here? Exactly: what is it at stake? What is at stake in the "either/or"? If this is where thought must join the concrete, what does this imply? In other words, to think is to choose either one alternative or another. Oh. But as soon as I hear that, I think: I need to know something more, because it's so stupid to say that to think is to choose, it doesn't mean anything! Unless we add more to this. Be careful. In what sense is "to think to choose"? In what sense?

Let's take a random example from an author who is not part of this alternative current: Proust. The narrator, when he sees the group of young girls on the beach, he's struck by all of them<sup>17</sup>, he finds them all so charming, and he daydreams, he daydreams, like a good-for-nothing, and he says to himself – he plays – he asks himself: which one will I fall for? Which one? Is it the little one with the big cheeks? Is it the tall one, the blonde one, the brunette? He's ready to be in love but he's not sure which one he'll fall in love with. To put it simply: is it Albertine, is it Andrée, or is it Gisèle – I think there's a Gisèle... yes, whatever – is it Albertine, Andrée or Gisèle? Who am I going to fall in love with? It's a wager, it's a choice. And here I feel ashamed making a comparison that may seem profane, here Pascal is religiously telling us: on what will you wager? What are you going to choose? And this is part of it, I've already told you, I've already told you how much it strikes me that each of us, once in our lives, will have this encounter. To encounter a great classical text, in my view, is something that happens only once in your life, to meet a great, very well-known classic text, very well known, and to be persuaded, to have the intimate persuasion... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:14:20]

... I haven't read, but perhaps you can correct me, I haven't read enough of Pascal's commentators, but all the commentators I've read of Pascal act as if, once again, what the wager concerns is whether God exists or does not exist? And then, as a complementary question, they draw the conclusion: to whom is the text of the wager addressed? For if it is a question of betting to know whether God exists or whether God does not exist, the wager must be addressed to a very select group of people. It is not for pure believers, nor for

resolute atheists who have already answered the question. You see: the two questions posed by most of the commentators seem to me to be complementary. If it is true that the wager concerns whether God exist or not, one must ask oneself for whom the wager is written. I look at it, and I realize with astonishment – that's why I ask you to read it – that, as far as I can see, in this text, which is short, which is a very short text, there isn't *a single line* concerning the existence or non-existence of God. That the wager is not about whether God exists or not. That's not what the choice is about.

And when I ask myself, being in love, feeling ready to fall in love – "Will I choose Albertine or Andrée?" – what does the choice concern? The choice seems, this time, to be clearly between Albertine or Andrée: it's one or the other, because there are only two; I suppose there are only two, if not it's between four, five or eight. Is it Albertine, is it Andrée? In fact, it is not between Albertine and Andrée that I choose. Once I have chosen, the future will tell me that what I have chosen is something completely different to either Albertine or Andrée. And what will I have chosen? I think... I think that I'm choosing between Albertine and Andrée, I think I'm choosing between the existence of God and his non-existence. But not at all. What I was choosing was already something else entirely: I was choosing between *the mode of existence* I would have if I loved Albertine, if I chose Albertine, and the mode of existence I would have, in my imagination, if I chose Andrée. This was not selfishness. On the contrary. I was not in any way choosing between two so-called objective terms; *I was choosing between two modes of existence of my own*. I sensed and I knew perfectly well that Albertine would not afford me the same mode of existence as Andrée.

For example, perhaps the narrator already felt, and it's obvious that he already felt it, it was enough to see Albertine's face for him to be sure that Albertine would make him jealous. But that was all he was looking for, since for him, love was nothing but this: it was not necessary in it itself, what was necessary was to be jealous. Simply that one could not be jealous without being in love, but that was his problem, it is the infamous problem of Proust, his abject problem. Okay, his abject problem is the subordination of love to jealousy; the real purpose is jealousy. He felt that Andrée would not give him the kind of existence he wanted to choose, because she was not the kind of girl who could make him jealous. Well, let's suppose, then, that in the choice there is, to sum up, I can say there is perhaps a superficial choice that masks a deeper choice.

I don't want to get ahead of myself regarding Pascal, but then for Pascal would it be the same thing? Existence or non-existence of God, that's got nothing to do with it. Nothing at all, it's not that, that's not what it concerns at all; he has no interest in that. What interests him is *the mode of existence of the one who believes in God*, and *the mode of existence of the one who does not believe in God*. And what he wants to tell us with the wager is: you have to wager between two modes of existence which are yours, and he absolutely does not want to say "does God exist or not? And here, I take you as witness, I mean, because it's important, that's why I beg you to read the text. And the challenge that I would set you is for someone to show me a single line that demonstrates this is a wager on the existence of God. It's completely obvious that the wager has nothing to do with the existence of God. How could it have... it's an obvious truth, no?"

But then – and I'll end on this to give you something to ponder for a week – but it's very important the way we commit ourselves. I've just been told: it's a matter of choosing. It's a matter of choosing. And I would really like to. No, I wouldn't like to, in fact, but in any case, I have to... There's no arguing about it, this is the question that's being imposed on me, so I

say, okay, we're not going to argue with Pascal, we're not going to argue with Sartre, we're not going to argue, we're not going to say, "Oh, no, I don't agree. We don't agree? Even if we don't agree, we have to pretend we do, since this is what is being asked of us, right? And if I I say: well, well, okay, so I choose this, it's about making a wager, so I wager. But what are they teaching me? I'll choose, I'll choose, okay. But what is it that I'm choosing between?

Well, I have a presentiment, but it is not yet an analysis. We proceed by presentiment: the choice is not between two terms, it is not between two terms that I have to choose. You see, it is really the displacement of the excluded middle. It is not between two terms that the choice is made, so what is it between? It is between two modes of existence of the person who chooses. Ouch! a choice between two modes of existence of the person who chooses. Things are getting interesting.

One last effort: if the choice is between two modes of existence of the one who chooses, one cannot stop there, we are on – what do you call it? – the opposite of an ascent, we're on a slope, but rushing down a slope at full tilt. If the choice is between two modes of existence of the one who chooses, in my view one cannot help but become aware – an abominable, awful, terrifying, vertiginous awareness – of this: that there are choices that one can only make *on the condition of saying and believing that one has no choice*. There are choices that can only be made on this condition... why?

Well, think about it, we should link up these three elements now. We have our three presentiments, okay? First: to choose is not to choose between elements; secondly, to choose therefore means to choose between two modes of existence of the person who chooses; therefore, there will be choices such that the one who makes them can only do so on the condition that he denies that he has a choice. There will be choices that can only be made on the condition of saying: oh, I have no choice. What will this imply? Probably shame, great shame. Ah, you know, I have no choice! Ah no, ah no, well no, I have no choice. For one thing we have no choice.

Hence Sartre's formula: "never were we freer". So, this interests me because, what a thought, we have there... one that poses the problem of the relationship between philosophical thought and political thought. When Sartre at the moment of the Liberation, wrote an article that had enormous impact in *Le Figaro*, a newspaper that had collaborated for a long time, and that the article began with the words: "Never were we freer than under the Occupation," of course, one can see in this a philosopher's paradox, at the limit of good taste.<sup>18</sup> What did mean by this. During that time, Sartre kept on repeating it: in any case, you did choose. In any case, you made your choice. Between Resistance or collaboration, you chose.

Only what defined the collaborator was that the choice he made was one he couldn't really make, so cynical and shameful was this choice – it's very strange, this moralism of Sartre's – he could only make it on the condition of saying "but you know, we don't have a choice!" And indeed, in a certain way – and here I am speaking before an audience that did not know the circumstances, so I will say a few words about it next time – in a certain way, the Resistance was not born all by itself, it was not born ready-made. I mean, there was no choice, there was the German occupation, there was no choice. And the first resistance fighters were told: "But the hostages are shot, the Germans shoot the hostages! You don't realize what you are doing, we have no choice! We have no choice! Okay. And yet, it's all too obvious that being a collaborator – I'm not saying being a Nazi, being a fascist or a Nazi, which would pose a whole other problem, we'll see, we're not done yet – but being a

collaborator, that is, being for the established order, whatever it may be, being for the established order is a choice, but it's a choice that I can only make on the condition that I say: I don't have a choice.

Thus, we are pervaded by very strange and inglorious choices. All the choices that we keep making over and over again every morning, telling ourselves: it's because I have no choice. So, what is choice about? It's not about choosing between terms; it's about choosing between two modes of existence. And what are these two modes of existence? Choosing consists of choosing and not choosing, since not choosing is still a choice, but not choosing is a choice that can only be made in conditions where one says, "I have no choice", and where one believes one has no choice.

So, we are in fact choosing between choice and non-choice. Non-choice is itself a choice, since it is the form of choice that we make when we believe we have no choice. So, I think that Kierkegaard, Pascal and Sartre will have to... their first task will be, urgently, to form a new concept to designate this state of choices that we never stop making, these shameful choices that make up our life, that make up what Sartre in his own heightened style called the "bastards"<sup>19</sup>. This is the concept of bastard that you have in Sartre, and it's a very interesting concept, he turned it into a philosophical concept that he sometimes he called by another name, "bad faith". Bad faith, which would designate this type of choice that I can only make by saying "I have no choice". This is what he called bad faith, but Kierkegaard for his part would give it another name, it would be a part of what he sometimes called the "aesthetic stage", other times the "demonic stage", and finally Pascal would forge an admirable concept to designate this mode of choice, he would call it "diversion"<sup>20</sup>. And it strikes me enormously how similar the two concepts of these two authors, Pascalian diversion and Sartrean bad faith, are.

So that's all for today, and it will be on this whole theme of choice and the wager that we'll start next time. [End of the recording] [2:29:40]

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* was first published in 1781. It was followed by *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) and *Critique of Judgement* (1790). In the Guyer/Wood translation, the passage Deleuze refers to here reads: "A hundred actual dollars do not contain the least bit more than a hundred possible ones. For since the latter signifies the concept and the former its object and its positing in itself, then, in case the former contained more than the latter, my concept would not express the entire object and thus would not be the suitable concept of it. But in my financial condition there is more with a hundred actual dollars than with the mere concept of them (i.e., their possibility)." Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood Book II, Ch. III (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1998), p. 567.

<sup>2</sup> See Rene Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, trans. John Cottingham (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), in particular, the Second Meditation, pp. 16-23.

<sup>3</sup> Deleuze had done a five-session seminar on Leibniz in the spring of 1980, in which he developed these ideas in detail. See also the 1986-87 twenty-session seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque.

<sup>4</sup> See for example Friedrich W.J. Schelling, *The Philosophy of Art*, trans. Douglas W. Stott (Minneapolis, Minnesota UP, 1989).

<sup>5</sup> The key tenets of Fichte's moral philosophy are laid out in J.G. Fichte, *Foundations of Natural Right*, trans. Michael Baur (Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> Michel Serres (1930-2019) was a philosopher of science who worked to poetically pluralise and problematize dogmatic accounts of science through translation between different discourses. Here the student who interrupts Deleuze is clearly referring to Serres' 1982 book *Genèse (Genesis)* in which Serres, using the frame of Balzac's short story "The Unknown Masterpiece", develops a theory of chaotic background noise from which the forms of things would emerge but which they do not completely escape. But as Deleuze correctly infers, this does not



constitute a transcendental background for Serres, as the following passage attests: “The background noise is permanent, it is the ground of the world, the backdrop of the universe, the background of being, maybe. This ruckus never stops, the pandemonium of the gray sea, the fringed tumult of things themselves in the hollow of sleep, the imperceptible stirring of detail in the quiet. Every particle is aquiver while all is asleep. All is dormant, yet all is wakeful. Noises loom up, figures, shapes against this background. They appear and withdraw, take form and dissolve, grow and disappear by melting into the background.” See Michel Serres, *Genesis*, (trans. Geneviève James and James Neilson), Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995.

<sup>7</sup> *Faust – A German Folktale* (Orig. *Faust - Eine deutsche Volkssage*, 1926) is a film by F.W. Murnau based on the Faust legend, starring Gösta Ekman as Faust, Emil Jannings as Mephisto, Camilla Horn as Gretchen/Marguerite. The film existed in numerous versions, several edited by Murnau himself, with each cut being quite different from the others.

<sup>8</sup> Composed from 1929 to 1935, Alban Berg’s three-act opera *Lulu* charts the downward spiral of its doomed protagonist from Vienna high-society mistress to street prostitute in London where she meets her end at the hands of Jack the Ripper. The libretto was adapted from Frank Wedekind’s two *Lulu* plays, *Erdgeist* (*Earth Spirit*, 1895) and *Die Büchse der Pandora* (*Pandora’s Box*, 1904). Hampered by the unfavourable cultural climate of pre-war Nazi Germany where his atonal music was equated to degenerate art, Berg was unable to complete the orchestration before his death in 1935 and the opera was premièred in Zurich in an incomplete two-act version in 1937. It was only performed in its restored three-act version, completed by Friedrich Cerha, in 1979.

<sup>9</sup> See also *L’Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze* (dir. Pierre-André Boutang, 1996), the episode “O for Opera”, where Deleuze speaks at length about Berg’s works and the question of the cry.

<sup>10</sup> *Wozzeck* is an opera in three acts by Alban Berg, who also wrote its German libretto. A dark story of madness and murder, *Wozzeck* is an adaptation of Büchner’s ground-breaking play, unfinished at the author’s death in 1837 and not performed until 1913. After seeing the play’s Vienna premiere, Berg immediately decided to base an opera on it but his progress on the work was slowed by the advent of World War I and military service. He completed the opera in 1922 and published the vocal score in 1922, presenting orchestral excerpts from the opera in concert in 1924. When Berg’s work was performed at the Berlin Staatsoper a year later, it was an immediate hit, though its success dismayed Berg, who felt that it should have been too modern for wide acceptance.

<sup>11</sup> As an example of Kandinsky’s closeness to the tenets of expressionism, which he views through a somewhat elitist lens, see for example the following passage: “The life of the spirit may be fairly represented in diagram as a large acute-angled triangle divided horizontally into unequal parts with the narrowest segment uppermost. The lower the segment the greater it is in breadth, depth, and area. The whole triangle is moving slowly, almost invisibly forwards and upwards. Where the apex was today the second segment is tomorrow; what today can be understood only by the apex and to the rest of the triangle is an incomprehensible gibberish, forms tomorrow the true thought and feeling of the second segment. At the apex of the top segment stands often one man, and only one. His joyful vision cloaks a vast sorrow. Even those who are nearest to him in sympathy do not understand him. Angrily they abuse him as charlatan or madman.” See Wassily Kandinsky, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art*, trans. Michael C.H. Sadler (The Floating Press, 2008), pp. 30-31.

<sup>12</sup> Theosophy is a religion established in the United States during the late 19th century whose principal founder was a Russian immigrant, Helena Blavatsky. Part of an occultist stream of Western esotericism that emerged in the 19th century, Theosophy drew upon both older European philosophies such as Neoplatonism and Asian religions such as Hinduism and Buddhism, preaching the existence of a single, divine Absolute of which the universe is perceived as its outward reflections. In *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* Kandinsky speaks briefly of his sympathy for Theosophical ideas. See *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

<sup>13</sup> On the role of the alternative in Bresson and Dreyer’s work, see *The Movement-Image*, *op. cit.* pp. 113-116

<sup>14</sup> On this lineage, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 114-117 (on Pascal, see pp. 114-11). See also *The Time-Image*, pp. 177-178.

<sup>15</sup> On Kierkegaard see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 116-117.

<sup>16</sup> See in this regard *The Time-Image*, pp. 176-178.

<sup>17</sup> “What I found delightful and different from everything else in the world, what had begun to endear itself to me so intensely that the sweetest joy in life was the hope of being with them again the next day, was really the whole group of girls, taken together, inseparable from those breezy afternoon hours up on the cliffs, on that stretch of grass where their faces lay, full of excitement for my imagination, Albertine, Rosemonde, Andrée making it impossible for me to know which of them made this place so precious, which of them I most longed to love.” See Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time Vol. II – In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*, trans. James Grier, (London, Penguin, 2002).

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<sup>18</sup> Sartre's article, "The Republic of Silence," in fact appeared in September 1944, not in the collaborationist newspaper *Le Figaro* but in *Les Lettres françaises*, an underground newspaper of the Resistance during the Occupation, and then decidedly left-wing following the Liberation.

<sup>19</sup> "Those who conceal from themselves this total freedom, under the guise of solemnity, or by making deterministic excuses, I will call cowards. Others, who try to prove their existence is necessary, when man's appearance on earth is merely contingent, I will call bastards." See J.P. Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven & London, Yale UP, 2007), p. 49.

<sup>20</sup> On the idea of diversion see Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Co., 2004), pp. 38-43.