

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986**

**Part III: Subjectification**

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## **Part 1**

So, today we are starting... the attempt to determine what has seemed to us to be a necessary third axis in Foucault's thought. So, it is very elegant: we spent the first term on the axis of knowledge, we spent the second one on the axis of power, and then there is this third axis, which in a way we have always been moving towards, but which is still very mysterious, and, after all, it is mysterious. And the last time I was trying to say that this third axis had no doubt been present from the beginning, intermingled with the other two, but it is only later – and in relation to problems that were pressing, from the point of view of thought, problems that were pressing or that, for Foucault, appeared increasingly urgent – that the question emerges: under what conditions can this third axis appear for itself, disentangle itself from the others? So, I think in any case, on the subject of knowledge and power, I have said everything I was able to say, everything I could say, and so, before we finish up now with... and just focus on this third axis... I'll ask if there are any questions, any points ... No? All right.

So, axis, or dimension, we can now recapitulate, or recapitulate again, from the point of view we are concerned with. I would say that the first dimension is that of exteriority and forms of exteriority. And this dimension of the forms of exteriority constitutes knowledge. I mean... we have to try to explain what that means. What is exteriority and the forms of exteriority? *The Archeology of Knowledge* no doubt goes the furthest in the analysis of the forms of exteriority. And we can see that, if we... if we survey how Foucault uses the words "exterior" or "exteriority" in his work, we can clearly see that "exteriority" has two meanings. Sometimes "exteriority" means dispersion, dissemination. And sometimes "exteriority" means gap or disjunction. Something in a state of dispersion refers to a form of exteriority, something in a state of disjunction refers to a relationship of exteriority.

And, in a certain way, Foucault never stops reiterating or affirming a sort of primacy of forms of exteriority over any form of interiority. More than that: forms of interiority are in the end pure and simple appearances, or rather – correction – sometimes appearances, sometimes conveniences, sometimes subordinate means. Forms are fundamentally forms of exteriority. This already amounts to saying that exteriority is only a dimension. Exteriority, in my opinion, to my knowledge, is always mentioned in reference to forms in Foucault. So, what can we say about language, for example? We can say that, yes, language is a form of interiority, in relative terms.

Relatively a form of interiority – in what sense? In the sense that language contains, comprises, words and sentences, but when I say that “interiority” is always subordinate – what does that mean? It means that while it is true that language is a form that contains words and sentences, it is also on the other hand a milieu for the dispersion of statements.

And, as we have seen – I won’t go back over it – words and sentences are only in a way the outer shell of statements. So, if I say that language is a form of interiority, yes, this is true, relative to words and sentences. But words and sentences, once again, are the envelope of statements, and language is not a form of interiority in relation to statements, it does not comprise, does not contain statements, but statements are distributed, dispersed in language. It’s a form of dispersion and, in this sense, a form of exteriority. The same applies, as we have seen, to light in relation to visibilities. I can say that light contains or comprises things, states of affairs, sensory qualities, but visibilities, which aren’t reducible to things or states of affairs, or sensory qualities, light doesn’t contain visibilities, visibilities are dispersed in light. That’s what a “dissemination” exteriority is, then, and I can say at the same time that in so far as it is a form it is always relative. In the end, the same thing is both a form of exteriority and a form of interiority, but it doesn’t have the same status. What appears as a form of interiority in relation to words and sentences is in fact, and on a deeper level, a form of exteriority in relation to the statements that we can draw out of words and sentences.

And I’m saying that the other sense of the word “exteriority” is gap or disjunction – what between? Well, in this case the gap or disjunction implies the relationship between the two forms of exteriority, which is to say a twofold exteriority, because not only are there two forms of exteriority – language in relation to statements and light in relation to visibilities – but a relationship of exteriority between the two forms. There is exteriority between one form and the other. Exteriority, in this case, is disjunctive exteriority, a “disjunction” exteriority. Seeing is not speaking, speaking is not seeing. Disjunction between seeing and speaking. So much so that in a certain way I can say that interiority, in so far as it exists, is always, always subordinate, always secondary in relation to forms of exteriority. And that’s why we can see Foucault as carrying out a double critique: a critique of psychological interiority, of the supposed interiority of consciousness, and a critique of physical confinement.

There’s something I have often insisted on, which I can summarize as: no, Foucault is not a thinker of confinement – why? Because both psychological interiority and physical confinement are strictly subordinate to functions of exteriority. [Maurice] Blanchot, reviewing *Madness and Civilization*, puts it very well: what is it that is confined? It’s the outside that is confined – and we are not, we are not yet capable of understanding, at this point, we are not yet capable of understanding what “it is the outside that is confined” means. We can just have a sense, we will try to become capable of understanding what that means, but what we can have a sense of for the moment is that confinement, in fact, is a secondary function. Just like psychological interiority, physical confinement is a secondary function in relation to forms of exteriority. Confinement serves the forms of exteriority. An example: the confinement of lepers serves a function of exteriority, which is to exile. The confinement of the prison, confinement in prison, serves a function of exteriority, which is to establish a grid of control [*quadriller*] over the social field. To

the point where functions like exiling or this other function – controlling the social field – can very well, in other conditions, take place independently of any confinement. Independently. A grid of control can be established independently of the prison... [*Interruption of the recording*] [12:09]

## Part 2

... And, when we are no longer dealing with forms, but with forces, which is to say the second dimension, the second axis, the axis of power, I would say that in most cases –we will need to elaborate on this “most” – Foucault uses a different word to “exteriority.” And, indeed, the word “exteriority” reaches its high point, as I was saying to you, in *The Archeology of Knowledge*, namely insofar as it supposes and presupposes forms, qualifies forms, and refers to this first axis, this first dimension called knowledge. But when it is about forces, the new word that appears is the “outside,” a word Foucault borrows from Blanchot and which, in Blanchot, is very often capitalized: the Outside. But already in the particular way Foucault uses the term, there is something very foreign to Blanchot, namely that just as exteriority determined and presented itself as the element of forms, the Outside presents itself as the element of forces. Why? What the Outside describes in the first place is the relationship of force with force. The Outside is the non-formal element of forces, it is the informal element of forces; the Outside has no form. As a result, all forces are in a relationship with other forces, which, by their nature, are always forces that come from the outside. The Outside is the relationship of force with force.

So, on that point, you realize, it doesn't matter if we come across texts where for example “exterior” is used instead of “outside.” I mean: there's a broad way of speaking and then on the contrary in certain cases, each time it is necessary, the Outside is distinguished from simple exteriority – but in certain cases, “exterior” and “outside” are synonymous. Each time you have to ask yourself: is it about forces or is it about forms? If it is about forms, the correct word is “exteriority” or “exterior,” if it is about forces, the correct word is “outside.” But why this ambiguity? Why is it, at the same time, when you're going quickly, when there is no need to make the distinction – there are all sort of cases where you don't need to make the distinction, exteriority and the Outside are from the same family after all – why can they also be synonymous? I am asking you to reflect on this theme: the Outside, for Foucault, is the relationship of force with force, which is to say the informal element of forces.

And the relationship of force with force, as we have seen, is what he calls at least once “the diagram.” And, effectively, the diagram always comes from the outside. But already in saying that we can sense, on this second level – the outside as informal element of forces – that I still only have a relative outside. I still only have an outside that's only relative – already this should suggest to us that this is not the last word, that there will be a third dimension. This outside is relative to the diagram that determines the forces of a relationship. The diagram comes from the outside. The diagram comes from the outside, which is to say the relationship of forces at a given moment comes from the outside. Yes, but comes from the outside in a relative sense. It is still an outside... how would we say it in philosophy? It is a mediated outside or, if you like, an indirect outside. And that's why, if you're going quickly, it can be considered as a synonym of exterior,

of exteriority. It is already an outside, it is more than exteriority, but it is an outside that is still indirect, mediated by the diagram, mediated by forces in relationship with each other. It's... Why? What I am saying is: all diagrams come from the outside. Yes, all diagrams come from the outside, but at the same time, there is never any first diagram. Every diagram, every relationship of forces refers to a preceding diagram. But, in so far as it comes from the outside, every diagram is, we might say, aleatory. It is an aleatory distribution of forces.

But insofar as there is no first diagram, every diagram is semi-aleatory, which is to say it depends on the previous diagram. And I was saying to you: the succession of diagrams in Foucault, I won't go back over it, is rather like what mathematicians define as a Markov chain, which is to say, semi-aleatory connections, a succession of random draws, but where each draw receives the determined conditions of the previous draw. It is aleatory, because there are random draws, but it is only semi-random, because the previous draw sets the conditions for the next draw. It's what we will call a succession of partially dependent phenomena, or semi-aleatory phenomena. It is in this sense that the outside on the level of forces is a kind of indirect outside. Forces always come from the outside, but they only give us the outside in an indirect and mediated form.

What would this third dimension be then? The third dimension is the encounter with an absolute outside. With what Blanchot himself calls an immediate outside. An outside which is no longer even mediated by forces, because it is force itself. A relationship with the outside that is absolute.

And, at the same time, relationship and absolute seem to be contradictory terms. Yes, they are contradictory, with the qualification that the relationship with the outside is also, as Blanchot says, non-relationship. It is the absolute of relationship. It is a non-relationship to the extent that non-relationship is still a relationship. What relationship? To the extent that non-relationship is the absolute of relationship. All of that seems extremely, ultimately almost a matter of words, but what is this relationship with the outside? Let's say for the moment that we only know one thing about this relationship with the outside, which is that this outside is more distant than any external world. Which is to say, this relationship is more distant than any form of exteriority. This relationship is more distant than any external milieu, any form of exteriority. It is the immediate or absolute outside. No longer mediated by forces and represented in a diagram, but the outside for itself, the outside in itself. But how does the outside have an "in itself"? This outside, which is both relationship and non-relationship, absolute and relative, is what Blanchot calls... he gives it his own name: the impossible. The impossible. Good. That's how far we have to go: to the impossible.

*L'Entretien infini*,<sup>1</sup> page 66 [Eng 46]: the "radical non-empirical experience," the "radical non-empirical experience is not at all that of a transcendent Being..." – this is Blanchot's break with Heidegger. The "radical non-empirical experience is not at all that of a transcendent Being..." – but is it a break? Doesn't Heidegger say the same thing in another way? The "radical non-empirical experience is not at all that of a transcendent Being; it is 'immediate' presence or presence as Outside." "Immediate' presence or presence as Outside" – why? Well, what do you

know, we are actually in a position to understand this a little. Presence as Outside is in effect immediate presence because it is the relationship with the absolute Outside, as distinct from the relationship that is mediated by forces. In other words, we have crossed the line, or we have reached it, because this absolute Outside is the line of the outside, it is the line of outside or the line of the outside. So. “And here is the unexpected response,” Blanchot says, “And here is the unexpected response, radical non-empirical experience is not at all that of a transcendent Being; it is ‘immediate’ presence or presence as Outside. The other response is this: impossibility, which escapes every negativity....” Impossibility is what escapes every negativity...

“Impossibility, which escapes every negativity, does not cease to exceed, in ruining it, every positivity; impossibility being that in which one is always already engaged through an experience more initial than any initiative, forestalling all beginning and excluding any movement [...] But [...] such a relation” – he means the relationship with the outside, which he talks about mysteriously because it is indeed mysterious – “But... such a relation, which is the hold over which there is no longer any hold...” – that’s pure Blanchot – “But we know, perhaps, how to name such a relation, which is the hold over which there is no longer any hold....” The relationship with the outside, which is the hold over which there is no longer any hold, we know perhaps how to name it “since it is again what we have tried to designate (confusedly) by the term: passion. So, we shall be tempted to say provisionally: impossibility is relation with the Outside; and since this relation without relation is the passion that does not allow itself to be mastered through patience, impossibility is the passion of the Outside itself.” [46 Eng]

You have to familiarize yourself with it, a text like that doesn’t really help us understand very much. But in the first place, it is a beautiful text, and then it introduces us to this idea: a relationship with the outside that is the absolute of relationship. And how does it prepare us, going back to Foucault now, how does it prepare us for this third dimension? You know my three successive dimensions: first dimension, the forms of exteriority and exteriority between the forms, that was knowledge; second dimension, the outside as informal element of forces, but this is an outside that is still relative, because it is represented in a diagram and mediated by forces in relationship with each other; and then the absolute Outside. This relationship, which is non-relationship, which is the impossible itself, but that’s how far we have to go – why? Because we no longer have the choice. That’s how far we have to go, to this impossibility itself. This third dimension is the line of the Outside. And I’m saying, in Foucault... coming back to Foucault now... there was something, we saw this last time, that prepared us for the necessity of going beyond the second axis, that of power and relationships between forces, what was it?

We’ve seen that there were points of resistance in the diagram. Points of resistance. And where did they come from? And we saw the difficulty they presented from within Foucault’s own perspective – where do these points of resistance come from? And that in the *Will to Knowledge*, he still hung on to the second axis, saying: these points of resistance are simply the counterparts of the relationships of forces. But that posed lots of problems for us: how can you say that they are simple counterparts, when the counterpart of an affecting force is the affected force? That is not resistance. Where could these resistances come from, if not from the outside? And while it is true that the forces in the diagram only refer to an outside via the intermediary of another

diagram, the preceding diagram, a mediated, indirect outside, don't the points of resistance indicate a direct outside? An immediate outside? The third axis is the line of the Outside. It is the axis of our confrontation with the absolute Outside. And it is only this Outside of which we can say: yes, this Outside is more distant than any form of exteriority or external milieu, in other words, travelling won't get you there. However far you go – far, far, far away, to the islands and to the moon – it will still be exteriority or, at most, if you ride pure forces, it will still be a relative outside.

So, where will you find this Outside which is more outside than any outside, which is more distant than any form of exteriority, any external milieu? And what is it, what is this line of the Outside? This is where I say, well, that is the necessity of a third axis. Now, you know, when you read a great philosopher, you can always stop at some point. You can always stop, and you'll have a very good reading. It is the reader's right to say: well, no, that's enough, I can only follow him to a certain point. I can only follow... What does that mean? I can only follow this to a certain point, it's like this everywhere, we see it when... You could even say it is the critic's favorite activity. Up to that point, sure... What happened there, was he hit on the head? There are two, there are two ways of reading, and this applies to literature or to... to everything, as much as philosophy. If you have a relationship... If you have a personal relationship, by personal I mean that... as a reader, if you feel that an author relates to you, then strictly speaking you are no longer in a position to be selective. You follow them, which doesn't mean swearing allegiance, it doesn't stop you from doing your own things.

But, you understand, to talk about Victor Hugo and say that such or such a period is good, another isn't, this is the perpetual contamination of the whole of literary criticism, which has always confused itself with gastronomy and recipes. Because that's what they are talking about in the end: Oh yes, Victor Hugo, there are places where it doesn't work, you know. Or else in theatre... All that. I'll talk about things closer to us: the criticisms of Godard: ah! Oh yes, up to '68 it was fine, but afterwards! They never ask themselves... you understand, the bad critics, they never ask themselves whether something is necessary for the author. Whether they had to go down that path, or whether the authors themselves had the choice. But when someone commits himself to a project that critics, by definition, have no idea about, you have to take on everything, you don't have the right to pick and choose, you have to go all the way, follow them to the end, just to see, even if just to see.

So, I am nevertheless saying: it is possible... I'm saying the opposite of what I just said. Let's imagine a reader who says: okay, Foucault, I completely understand what he is saying about knowledge. They say: up to the *Archeology*, fine. Up to the *Archeology of Knowledge*, fine, but after that, well, these things about power... And this reader, such a reader, in one sense, would not be wrong, why? He would be wrong because he is leaving out an aspect that is important and very original. He wouldn't be wrong because he could point to Foucault himself who, at the end of his work on power, said: good God, what dead end am I running into, what dead end have I got myself into? How can I break through this line? Well, you won't break through it any better by staying this side of it, will you? So, there are others who might say: ah, up to power, fine. Power as well, fine. Then... then he goes back to the subject, in his last books, he goes back to

the subject after telling us that the subject was nothing at all, worse than nothing, now he rediscovers the subject!

Such things are very tedious to hear – why? Because you wonder: what’s the point of writing and... well. But you can see how strange it is, bad forces prevent us from participating in the whole of a given experience. So, we saw the last time, this is what I tried to say, actually I’m not sure of being right... well, any other answer... he really found himself, at the end of his period of reflection power, he found himself in an impasse, which isn’t his but that of power itself, namely: how to break through the line of power? Or, which amounts to the same thing, how to reach what I am now calling... how to reach an outside that is really an Outside? As though, precisely, none of the diagrams of power had given us this outside yet. Something beyond power that would be the relationship with the outside. Because power only gave us, once again, an indirect or mediated relationship. Okay. There, that’s my first point. So today, since it is relatively difficult, I mean... I will stop at each point: is everything okay? Okay? There’s nothing to...?

I mean: the important thing is that you follow the distinction between the three axes, with the option, for you – yes, even though this is the opposite of what I just said – with the option of stopping – it’s like there are stages – at a given stage. Of saying: I’m fine with everything he says about knowledge, I’m fine with everything he says about power. Obviously... those who tell themselves that knowledge seems to me..., there’s no reason for them to come any more, because we are talking about the other axes. So much so that, to the extent that you are still here, it is because you sense the necessity of the third axis: a relationship with the outside that is defined, just for the moment, as this Outside that is more distant than any external milieu, any form of exteriority. All right. So, what can give us an idea of this line of the Outside? This is my second point. And let’s keep going because in this respect, up until now I am looking for similarities, so we can then... afterwards, I will look for the differences but, once again, I think it is a good idea to proceed very carefully. If I focus on the similarities between Foucault and Blanchot, I can just as well say: since the notion of the Outside is so marked by Blanchot, how did Blanchot give us an idea of this relationship which is a non-relationship? Of this absolute relationship, of this line of the Outside?

The most concrete idea he gave us – but I don’t think we’ll leave it at this, because that would be extremely sad, but then Blanchot is not very cheerful – is: “one dies” (*on meurt*).<sup>2</sup> One dies. The line of the Outside is “one dies”. The expression “one dies” is important. He doesn’t say: “this is the line of death.” It is: “one dies” forms the line of the Outside. And Blanchot’s most moving passages, most... developed passages in this regard are in *L’Espace littéraire*. The “one dies” is the relationship with the Outside. Why? Blanchot, there... is endeavoring to make us understand that, according to him, death is fundamentally double. There is a death that is expressed as “I die” and a death that is expressed as “one dies.” And I would say: everything we need to understand is there, the text is extremely difficult, it is pages 160–161 (p. 153–154).<sup>3</sup> I would say: the death of the “I die” is death as an indivisible instant. It’s the death that can happen to me, that will happen to me. It is, in a way, the personal death. The death of the “one dies,” is the death that is coextensive with life. A death that has always already started and which is never

done. It is coextensive with life. “The death which never happens to me...”<sup>4</sup> – but that doesn’t mean it happens to others – “The death which never happens to me, to which I can never say yes, with which there is no authentic relation possible” – this is the non-relationship with death – “not the term, but the interminable” – interminable death – “not proper but featureless death”, “it is the abyss of the present, time without a present, with which I have no relationships”<sup>5</sup> – the non-relationship again – “it is that toward which I cannot go forth, for in it *I* do not die” – in it, in this death, the death of the “one dies,” I don’t die – “I have fallen from the power to die. In it *one* dies; it does not cease, and it does not finish dying”,<sup>6</sup> who is this “one”? It is me. It is me, but it is not me as “I,” it is me as “one.” It is me taking my place in the funeral procession of the “one.”

I never stop and I’m never done with dying. I never stop... that’s Blanchot’s best formula. As “one,” I never stop and I’m never done with dying. One dies. And on page 104 (103), in a splendid passage, he explains how suicide is the vain attempt, according to him, page 104 (103), to make the double death, the death of the I and the death of the one, coincide. The “I die” and the “one dies,” which is to say to turn this death that never stops and is never done, to transform it, to turn the death coextensive with life into an indivisible moment: I kill myself. “By committing suicide, I want to kill myself at a determined moment. I link death to now: yes, now, now. But nothing better indicates the illusion, the madness of this ‘I want,’ for death is never present. There is in suicide a remarkable intention to abolish the future as the mystery of death: one wants in a sense to kill oneself so that the future might hold no secrets, but might become clear and readable, no longer the obscure reserve of indecipherable death. Suicide in this respect does not welcome death; rather, it wishes to eliminate death as future, to relieve death of that portion of the yet to-come which is, so to speak, its essence [...] One cannot ‘plan’ to kill oneself. One prepares to do so, one acts in view of the ultimate gesture which still belongs to the normal category of things to do, but this gesture does not have death in view, it does not look at death, it does not keep death before it.”

A vain attempt, once again, to merge the two deaths: the death of the I and the death of the one. The death of the “one,” the “one dies” defined as this death which doesn’t stop and is never done, which is to say the death that is coextensive with life and not the indivisible instant of death which is the death of the I. This is precisely, at the stage we are at, this is precisely what we will call the line of the Outside. And in the end, this is the form in which, in effect, the outside reaches its absolute form... I take back the word “form,” which isn’t appropriate. Why? The “one dies” is precisely what I was calling the line of the Outside before and the “ones” – quite a few now, both in Foucault and Blanchot. This a real reversal in relation to Heidegger, which is to say there is a valorization of the “one,” a real valorization of the “one,” compared to Heidegger who, in *Being and Time*, linked the “one” to so-called inauthentic existence. Here, on the contrary, there is an extraordinary valorization of the “one,” based on what?

What seems the most important thing in Blanchot to me, I was saying to you, is the way he reacts against all “personology.” And this is one of the reasons why, precisely... it is one of the greatest novelties in Blanchot. Once we understand that his era was characterized by a double personology, even when this personology was hidden, or disguised, masked. It was a masked personology. I say double personology because it was, on the one hand, linguistic and on the

other, psychoanalytic. A linguistic personology that is most perfectly expressed – we have seen this and I won't go back over it – in [Émile] Benveniste, but which runs through the whole of linguistics in the form of the theory of “shifters”.<sup>7</sup> The “I” and the “you.” Their special linguistic role as the instance that initiates the discourse, the I and you as linguistic persons and, as Benveniste says, remember there are only two persons, the I and the you, the third person, the he/it, is actually a non-person. And of course, they said: ah, but don't confuse linguistic persons with you as a person, it isn't psychology, it's linguistics, these are shifters, they are... anything you want... they are self-referential, because the “I” is the one who says “I.” Okay, understood, but that's all we are saying. It's a... how would I say it, if I dared... it is a linguistic Christianity. A linguistic personology.

And psychoanalysis? Psychoanalysis, well, there as well, there are masks. In some places, it adopted a genuine personology, with [Daniel] Lagache, in other places, with [Jacques] Lacan, it denounces personology, only to put in place, it seems to me – and I say this cautiously – specifically psychoanalytic persons, which weren't unrelated, for that matter, to the linguistic persons. But the case of Lacan is especially complicated, because if you look at his thesis, his first work, you will see that it explicitly appeals to the theme of the person, which is to say is explicitly personological. Now I don't at all want, it would be a cheap argument to hold him to his first book, but the point of departure of Lacan's thought was extremely personalistic, personological.

And what does psychoanalysis do? This is something that has always struck me, one of the points that has struck me the most, the most. It's that, independently – I'm not talking about theory here anymore, I'm talking about practice – what do they do? Whatever you say to them, whatever you say, they have to refer things back to persons. Things from the unconscious are referred back to persons – I, you. And the analytic relationship itself is a personological relationship. What does that mean? Well, if you listen to a child... we have to listen to people after all... just a bit... if you listen to kids, what do they say to you, or what do children say? How does ONE grow? How is ONE born?<sup>8</sup> What's A stomach for? All right.

What is the psychoanalytic practice? It is precisely, you're in the situation, if you like, in psychoanalysis you are in the situation of someone who comes along saying: ah yes, people. Et on se fait reprendre en disant: les gens, les gens, non mais quoi! [I can't quite work out the meaning here] My favorite text in all of psychoanalysis, is a comment of Jung's, who says: it's really bizarre... who says: Freud was bizarre – and Jung knew him well, you know – one day I told him about a dream,<sup>9</sup> there was an ossuary, Jung had dreamed about an ossuary. And the other, Freud, dissects his dream and says to him: that's a worry my poor Jung, he says that it is about the death of the mother – he didn't have to work hard for that one [*il ne s'est pas fatigué*] [*Rires*] – it is about the death of the mother and there was Jung, Jung was perfect, because he says: But, ah... an ossuary! He says, “Freud, it was an ossuary, you understand, an ossuary, it wasn't a bone. Thousands of bones!” the “on” of the bone. [*Laughter*] Freud, literally... I suppose for that matter, it can only be true – he couldn't give a damn, couldn't give a damn, an ossuary and a bone, it never made the slightest difference to him. When there is a bone, it is your

mother's, a person. When there are ten thousand bones, things become more complicated, it is something else, isn't it?

So, I am saying, with kids: how is ONE born? What do grown-ups do? But in analytic practice these terms are never heard, the "on" is never picked up on, the indefinite article, "A stomach" is never taken for what it is, which is to say an indefinite article. There is a splendid ignorance of the "on", that's where... I can think of only one text, one interesting text in this regard, which goes... It is the text by [Jean] Laplanche and [Jean-Bertrand] Pontalis, which is thus very inspired by Lacan, on "original fantasy, origin of fantasies",<sup>10</sup> which precisely uses one of Freud's great texts as an example, "A Child is being beaten." A child is being beaten or they [on] are beating a child. They are beating a child... [*Interruption of the recording*] [58:47]

### Part 3

... They explain at the end that we need to be very careful, we need to be very careful with these reductions. We need to be very careful with these reductions, but it is even better not to do it at all. It is even better not to do it, which is to say to at least entertain the hypothesis that the unconscious only knows "on," indefinite articles, third persons, which is to say non-persons, and that, when children say "what is A stomach," we need to hear "a stomach." And that, when they say "how do people grow?," that means people. And "how are children made" doesn't mean "how was I, myself, made?" – given that I know, that I spied on my mom and dad – but really, in this case, to talk like Foucault, children are engaged in biopolitics: "how is one born?"

I am saying that Blanchot, to my knowledge, is the only one, the only one to have reacted, in any case the first one to have reacted against this personology, both linguistic and psychoanalytic, and to have considered that indefinite articles – which he... he doesn't talk about that, given how similar these are – that indefinite articles aren't reducible to definite ones. In the same way that the third person, which is to say the non-person, the "it" and the "on," weren't reducible to the persons "I" and "you." And this will be the valorization of the third person as non-person, and Foucault will be able to carry on the work of Blanchot in this regard. He will carry it on with the three axes. Perhaps you remember: under the form of light, ONE sees. One sees. And one sees dispersed visibilities. And under the form of language, ONE speaks. And each subject will come to take its place in this line of the "one speaks." This place is not the same, but, in any case, there isn't a person, there is an instantiation of the "on" in relation to a given statement, in relation to a given family of statements. Even if there are proper names, proper names – why is there this arbitrary idea that proper names refer to persons? Perhaps proper names refer to something else entirely. Okay.

I just want, with that, for you to... develop a sort of criteria – without at all saying "these ones are right, the others are wrong" – between two very different forms of thought, one that tends towards a personology, however complex it may be, and those that tend towards the impersonal, what Blanchot will call the Neutral, the non-person, the "it" or the "on." So already at the begin... at the... So already, at the level of the forms of exteriority, on the level of knowledge,

you have the “one sees” and the “one speaks,” in Foucault. And on the level of power, the relationship of force with force, there as well you won’t find persons, you have the development of an “on,” the “on” of power. The thing as “one fights,” the impersonal “one” of strategy, the “one fights,” “one collides”. Force is in a relationship with force.

And now, with the third axis, there will be this “one dies,” once again this death which never stops and is never done and which isn’t reducible to my personal death, isn’t reducible to the “I die.” The “I die” is the instant where I as a person coincide with the line of the “one dies,” which is to say I take my place in the “on.” So, it’s not very cheery. So, there we have our first answer, what is the line of the Outside, beyond power? It is the line of this death, the line of this interminable death and, here – granted, the overall tone is completely different – but we find a similar answer in Foucault. The death that is coextensive with life, this is what he took from [Xavier] Bichat, the partial deaths that never stop and are never done and which lead us to say: but perhaps these points of resistance, these mysterious points of resistance... are these points of resistance not in the end perhaps all these partial deaths? Aren’t they like so many points on the line of the “one dies”? In other words, yes, there is a beyond of the line of power, yes, there is a breakthrough in relation to power, there is a line of the Outside, but this line of the Outside is the “one dies,” even deeper than the “one sees,” “one speaks” and “one fights”. So, obviously, it would be... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

There, that’s our second point. Obviously, we would be extremely happy if something came along that saved us from that, but what can happen on this line of the Outside if not something mortal? Which is to say: that brings us death, as though it were impossible to evade power except through death. Okay. And that... I mean, it would be very convenient of course if we had reason to think that the death coextensive to life doesn’t exhaust life. Even more, for everything to be, for everything to start up again – there again we don’t have a choice – the line of the Outside must be capable of certain movements that pull it back from death.

For the moment, and what I mean is... we can’t suppress that moment, I am saying: for the moment, the line of the Outside is necessary, but it is necessary in its strict identity with the line of the “one dies.” Is this line of the outside capable of movements that pull it back from death, and what are those movements? Namely, a vitalism, to go back to Foucault’s terms, is there a vitalism that can shake or escape mortalism? What he said in relation to Bichat: it is vitalism, but against a background of mortalism. Can this line of the Outside shake its affiliation with death, this death that is never done and never stops? In any case, we have to pass via this line of the Outside, it will remain the line of death, even if it manages the movement that pulls it back from death. Let’s be clear. We can’t suppress this moment we have passed through. This moment will stay, and I think perhaps that for many, for many people, the line of the Outside will always be marked by this macabre quality. To escape from power: yes, the only way to escape from power... It is like that, it is to cross, to cross the shallow stream. The shallow stream.<sup>11</sup> The shallow stream: death. Okay, okay, okay, okay.

Hence our third point today, which is: can we conceive a movement? I am saying... you see until now we have tried to isolate the line of the Outside. This absolute Outside, once again, deeper,

more distant, more distant than any external world. And we say: well, yes, that's death. So... But this line of the Outside, what can happen? It is fundamentally movement. So, is its movement exhausted in the passage from one partial death to another? Does it just form a chain of deaths? A string of deaths? What can happen on a line...? It is constantly in movement, this line of the Outside. Here we can try to use metaphor to guide us a little: it is as though it were constantly animated by peristaltic movements. Powerful and constant peristaltic movements travel along the line of the Outside. Or else there is a term used in embryology: invagination. An embryological tissue invaginates – what does that mean? It forms a hollow. [Pause; *Deleuze writing on the board*] Second stage, why not third stage? [*Deleuze writes on the board*] Okay, that's... The line I have drawn is the line of the Outside. It is just to say: peristaltic movements, invaginating movements... so many movements are possible. As though it was pervaded with movement.

So, our third point will be: if it is true that the line of the Outside is pervaded with movement, how can we present this type of movement? What is it? What is it? Well, let's start from the hypothesis – we'll go back, we have to move very slowly, the line of the Outside is the line of the distant. The Outside is the distant. It is absolute distance. Further away, more distant than any external milieu. Don't you get the sense, then, assuming these aren't just words, that if it is more distant than any external milieu, it is, by the same token, what is closest? This furthest is the closest. We have to add: this distance, in so far as it is further away than any external milieu is by that very token closer, the closest, closer than any interior milieu. If the distant is more distant than any exteriority, it is closer, it is closeness itself. And if it is closeness itself, it is closer than any interior milieu. Exteriority and interiority are challenged at the same time, as we have seen, we already saw this with the first axis, the conversion of the distant to the close. Not the other way, the conversion goes in a particular direction.

We start from the distant, and we posit it as the closest. And necessarily as the closest – why necessarily so? It is necessarily the closest because, as distant, it is more distant than any external milieu. And in so far as it is more distant than any external milieu, it is closer than any interior milieu. I can only repeat this, either it registers, registers with you, it means something to you, or else it doesn't mean anything to you. If it doesn't mean anything to you, once again, just let it go; if you have the smallest glimmer, you will need to bide your time, mull it over, in order to give it a bit more of a concrete shape.

From the distant to the close, this recurs obsessively Foucault, in *The Order of Things*, in *The Order of Things* -- but I need the reference... here we are -- and this is a formula for... that is essential for Foucault's thought: *Les Mots et les choses*, p. 350.<sup>12</sup> "It is always concerned with..." – what is this "it"? ...The analytic of finitude. Good -- "It is always concerned with showing how the Other", – capital O – "the Distant" – capital D – "is also the Near and the Same". It is always concerned with showing how the Other, the Distant, is also the Near and the Same. In other words, it is a matter of showing how the line of the Outside is inside. But just as the distant was more distant than any external milieu, the inside will be closer, more intimate than any internal milieu. In other words, the outside has to be possessed by a movement or pervaded by a movement that allows it to form an inside. Or the Other must be possessed by a movement which allows it to make the same. From the Other to the same, never the other way

around, never from the same to the Other. From the Distant to the close, never from the close to the Distant. The Distant, the absolutely Distant, precisely because it is absolute, must be closer than anything that is simply interior. What would that be?

Well, I'm moving ahead, I'm moving ahead, but I'm wrong to move ahead, it's in order to... In other words, I am saying, this will be the major point of... this is what will remain for us to understand, it's... I'm saying: the line of the Outside must be pervaded by a movement that is the fold. It must form a fold. This is invagination. It must form a fold, the fold constituting an inside that is more intimate than any interior milieu, closer than any interior milieu. It has to form this inside, this absolute proximity. The line of the Outside must fold, bend. There must be a fold in the line.<sup>13</sup>

And it is this fold that pulls the line back from death. How? Why? Well, for the moment, I'll give you... so it's simpler to follow the one after the other, so you can more easily follow the analyses to come that I'm telling you this: the line of the Outside is the "one dies" and we won't revisit that, we won't say: ah, no! We haven't discovered something that cancels that out. But we are adding to that: yes, but this line is pervaded by a peristaltic movement, an invaginating movement that forms an inside. And this inside is closer than any internal milieu just as the line of the Outside was more distant than any external milieu. In other words, what is the inside? The inside is always the inside of the outside, it is not my interiority. Foucault does not reinstate an interiority in the sense of my interiority. There is simply a movement of the Outside by which an inside of the outside is formed, only the outside has an inside and this is what Blanchot understood very well already from the... in relation to *Madness and Civilization*, when he said: what is confined is the Outside. Which is to say: only the outside has an inside. Only the outside has an inside. Only the outside has an inside. We have to keep repeating it like idiots to see if it works, to see if it says something to us. Only the outside has an inside... Fine.

In other words, the inside is the inside *of* the outside. It is not the opposite of the outside, it is the inside of the outside. It is the fold of the outside. The inside is the fold of the outside. We are onto something here, you should sense that we are onto something, because... Okay, it is the fold of the outside. What is an inside? What is an outside? Let's suppose that the outside... and in effect the line of the Outside, it should suggest something to you, it is something maritime. The outside more distant than any external milieu, what could that be if not the line of the ocean? Knowledge is of the land, and here we left land such a long time ago. Knowledge is a question of form, forms are terrestrial. But... okay. The line of the Outside is the oceanic line. What is the inside? The inside is the boat, it is the craft, the small boat. But what is the boat? The boat is a fold of the sea. The boat is the fold of the ocean. Whenever there is a boat, the ocean has made a fold. Good.

This is... This is interesting, I mean, are these things metaphors, are they...? No. *Histoire de la folie*, page 22,<sup>14</sup> *Histoire de la folie*, page 22, Foucault is telling us about the status of mad people in the Renaissance, before the classical age. He attaches a great deal of importance to the ship of fools. He says: it's not the Hôpital Général yet, they were tossed onto a boat, or they went on their own... onto a ship and then they set off... they stopped and then they set off again. The

ship of fools. And Foucault has a splendid passage about the madman thrown onto this boat, in *L'Histoire de la folie*, page 21, 22 rather, he says this, which I will read slowly: "he is put in the interior of the exterior," "he is put in the interior of the exterior, and vice versa".<sup>15</sup> -- I will set aside the "and vice versa", we will have to get around to saying something about it, because the "and vice versa" could be held against me. I'll just say that I am not able to comment on the "and vice versa" at the moment. I think that it will become... it will comment on itself all by itself, but rest assured that I am not ignoring it, I am just setting it aside. --

"The madman is put in the interior of the exterior..." -- there, when he is thrown onto his boat -- "Prisoner of the freest milieu..." -- No... I'm reading it wrongly -- "prisoner in the midst," "prisoner in the midst of what is the freest, the openest of routes: bound fast at the infinite crossroads. He is the Passenger par excellence: that is, the prisoner of the passage." He is the Passenger par excellence, the prisoner of the passage. All right. In other words, he is put in the interior of the exterior -- this is one of those texts where... that I anticipated, where there is no need to distinguish outside-inside, interior-exterior. It is one of... where the terms are equivalent. You could just as well say: he is put inside the outside. The inside is the inside of the outside. And there is no other inside than the inside of the outside, except... -- [*a cassette recorder plays suddenly, and Deleuze's voice is heard*] ... But that's from another session! [*Laughter*] That's not even from this session! Well then, it's like a reminder. That means: I was going too quickly! -- The inside is the inside of the outside and the process of forming an inside of the outside, that is, invagination, is more ordinarily called: folding. The fold. The inside is the fold of the outside. And it is the fold of the outside that constitutes an inside, an inside closer than any interior milieu, any interior life. All right, so... We're making a little progress.

My question is: is it enough for the line of the Outside to fold for it to escape death? That's a question. Perhaps -- if you attach to this fold, this folding, the importance and feeling of enormous effort necessary to obtain it. It doesn't happen by itself. The ship is the inside of the outside. This is what Blanchot understood very well in Foucault because there I think the influence goes the other way, when Blanchot, still talking about Foucault, says... there is a splendid formula... Just as what I just read is pure Foucault, here there is a formula that is pure Blanchot: "to shut up the outside, that is... that is, to constitute it as an *interiority*...", "to shut up the outside, that is, to constitute it as an *interiority* of anticipation or exception."<sup>16</sup> Which is to say, there, where the line of the Outside bends, folds, it forms an inside which is an interiority of anticipation or exception. Anticipation or exception: what does that mean? Is that what escaping death is? To escape death, the line of the Outside had to be folded, but what a labor of Hercules, to bend the line of the Outside. That's the point we've reached.

I'm saying: why we facing something here that will be a veritable knot of ideas, which we will have to work out? It is because this idea of a bending, a folding will be a sort of shared zone, a place of confrontation between -- whom? -- a certain number of authors who are important to all of us, well, important to a large number of us, namely Heidegger, who never dissociated his ontology from an ontology of what he himself calls "the fold," "the fold", Blanchot, Foucault. So here we will be in a position to grasp both their differences and their similarities. And we may as well start with a specific point, namely: what is this relationship between the outside and the

inside? What is it? I am told: the line of the Outside, in folding, forms an inside, an interiority of anticipation or exception. We have to try to find the note of originality of... I'm saying that, broadly, this could be written by Heidegger, it could be written by Blanchot, it could maybe be written by someone else we haven't talked about yet and it could be written by Foucault. If we managed to identify the personal inflection that each one gives... I take back "personal": the singular inflection that each one gives, his way of saying things... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:33:05]

#### Part 4

A student: [*Inaudible beginning*] ... I don't understand why this Outside needs a fold. And to support me in an argument which [*indistinct remarks*] ... the face which is at the same time immediate and very distant, which speaks to me, and which remains far from me. So, we've already posed the [*indistinct word*] issue as well, or the line to cross, and you were saying that we need to, I don't know how to say it, somehow capture them or to [*indistinct word*] the Outside, and to make it, in one way or another, something like an integral part of the inside, and this is done by a folding. However, I'm blocked here... so I find it difficult to [*indistinct words*] ...

Deleuze: That is a very good question. I'll answer it...

The student: I don't know why we don't jump past death directly.

Deleuze: Why not jump past death directly? Because we're staying here. [*Laughter*] Because we're staying here. ... It's possible, I suppose that often happens... Blanchot constantly says that all of that is very dangerous, that you could for example lose your mind, or lose your life. The question is this... Your question is very good. I will just try to establish again where we are now – we'll see in a moment, we won't leave it there – but for the moment I'll say, on a purely formulaic level, I'll say: we thus have the idea of an outside – once more, I'm starting again – more distant than any form of exteriority and any external world. That's one point.

Second point: we have the idea of an inside that is closer than any interior world or internal milieu. Third point: this inside, as we have described it, is the inside of the outside, it is not the opposite of the outside, it is the inside of the outside or, as Foucault says, the interior of the exterior. Right. Then you [*the questioner*] add: so, it is a very special inside that isn't reducible to any interiority of consciousness; it is a very special outside that isn't reducible to any physical exteriority. Okay. Then you add, and you say, in other words... yes, I'll keep going with my formulas, my series of formulas: so, this inside that is the inside of the outside, we are calling it the fold of the outside, the folding of the outside, the outside must form a fold. And this operation by which the outside is folded, by which the line of the Outside folds, forms an inside, an inside that is closer, etc. etc.

Then you come in and say: what necessity is there for the line of the Outside to form a fold? And I say: that's a very good question – why? Well, I see the necessity myself but it would be possible not to see it. I mean that one could, just as rightly, not see it. I'm saying that the line of the Outside must at all costs form a fold because otherwise it is unlivable. It is unlivable. It is the

line of the “one dies,” it can’t pull itself back from death... the line of the Outside can only diverge from death if it makes a fold. And it is in this fold that we can live, breath and move. Because otherwise, at the places on the line where there is no fold – there aren’t folds everywhere – where there is no fold, the line of the Outside turns us over to the unbreathable, the vacuum, death. What is there, at that moment, beyond the relationships of power, there is indeed something, it is this line of the “one dies,” where nothing breathes, lives or moves anymore. You are all the more correct since you must sense that Foucault, at the level of this third axis, will again apply his new method, namely: it is not necessary for the line of the outside to form a fold.

That’s the only place we can live... to use a terrible metaphor, the fold is like the eye of the hurricane. Fortunately, the terrible metaphor isn’t from me, but it is for... a very great poet, Michaux... so I’ll take back “terrible,” in Michaux’s text it is very beautiful. Michaux wrote a collection, and it is very odd that Foucault, who certainly would have been very familiar with Michaux, doesn’t refer to it... he wrote a great collection: *Life in the Folds*, a great collection of poems.<sup>17</sup> He explains that the fold is where we can live and breathe. So, there is no necessity, but you won’t be able to breathe if there is no fold. It is an act of prudence, if you don’t bend the line of the Outside – and it is not easy, there is precisely a whole art of prudence involved... it doesn’t necessarily happen, because, even more... I’m getting ahead on things I plan to develop later -- Foucault will... when I say, “he applies his method,” he asks himself: who invented the formation of the fold? Instead of confronting the unbreathable, the “one dies,” confronting the vacuum? And his surprising reply, but which, currently, except for those who have already read all that, cannot understand, is, I’m saying: Foucault’s answer is: it was the Greeks’ idea, it was the Greeks who folded, it was the Greeks who created the fold.<sup>18</sup>

This is a curious answer, the Greeks created the fold. You should sense always and again, on this point, the confrontation with Heidegger, Heidegger would never... say that, never... it is very very, it’s very strange, this business. But this is to say that... for Foucault... I’ll start again. He never wanted to talk about Eastern formations precisely because... because he didn’t think he was competent to do so, but I’m not competent either, so let’s go right ahead! It is... we could say: have they... have they made the fold in the East? Or else, have they invented techniques of the unbreathable, of breathing in the unbreathable? Surviving in the vacuum. They haven’t folded the line of the Outside, they’ve confronted the line of the Outside. Well, let’s imagine. Maybe someone will say to us: no, no, they have, they have created a fold, there is an Eastern fold, which is perhaps not the same as the Greek fold... these are all open questions, completely open...

But the answer to your question, for the moment, if we look at it like that, is... in my opinion, I would answer: if the line of the Outside must form a fold, it is not that it... that it does so necessarily, it is that, if we don’t manage to fold it, we die. *One* dies, really, in the sense... in the strictest sense. Blanchot... but the notion of the fold was not really familiar to Blanchot, however... what happens in Blanchot? Well, I think that, in effect, there we live in the unbreathable and... hence, Blanchot’s fascination for the madness of Hölderlin, for [Antonin] Artaud, etc... And there again, Artaud, for his part, created the fold, in a certain way. It wasn’t successful, but he made the fold, he was able to breathe, strictly speaking. You can’t breathe if

you don't create a fold. Life in the folds. Or else there's one of Boulez' works, *Pli sur pli*,<sup>19</sup> fold after fold. We should make a collection on this whole theme of the fold because these are people who aren't influenced by Heidegger, obviously. I think that it is an... it is absolutely necessary or else one can't live. It is the condition of life being able to break away from death.

All right... a little rest. A little rest. So, there are all those who, in effect... What happens, if there is no fold? It is Captain Ahab... I will try to talk about it later because there are a thousand literary connections to be made, even with authors that Foucault didn't refer to or never referred to. The Captain has the line of the Outside, that [Herman] Melville, in the great novel *Moby Dick*, presents as the line of the Outside, the terrible line of the Outside. Well, Captain Ahab confronts it, he passes to the other side, "one dies". The line of the Outside is also the whale, it's *Moby Dick*. Well then, one dies, he didn't make the fold, the ship is broken, or else there is a ship that is the inside of the outside, and it is broken... [Interruption in the recording] [1:45:04]

## Part 5

... Boulez doesn't give just any title to... to... to a musical work. *Pli sur pli* [Pli selon pli], what is that? Isn't it also a way for music to survive and under what conditions... All right. I mean, ah yes, someone pointed out to me that another great text proceeded entirely along these lines, not just *Moby Dick*, but the text by Edgar [Allan] Poe... *The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym*. And they told me... for me, it has been too long since I read the text, I don't know if I will have the time between now and next Tuesday, but those with the time from now should re-read it. They said that it is very typical that, each time, the process is: the confrontation with an outside, and this outside that folds in and, each time, there is an inside of the outside, and the inside where Pym takes shelter is always the inside of an outside. So, on every level. There are also rivers, the ship, the sea, etc... I think it can only be understood in oceanographic terms.

But, your question, it is almost ahead of where we are and... we'll see as we go, but I think it is completely justified. Once again, I would say that strictly speaking there is no necessity to the fold. If you want to survive, it's better to make one, otherwise... And otherwise, you have, as they say, zones that are too dangerous, zones... strictly speaking, zones that are too dangerous in terms of the psyche... Because either you take it as literature, or else you see in it the experience of Artaud, the experience of Melville, the experience of Hölderlin, or even Blanchot... Blanchot must have made a fold, because he lives and breathes... it's not as clear with the others. Artaud, Artaud's breathing, he had to invent a form of breathing to... to survive. All right. So... But let's keep this question open because there are lots of open questions.

So, I would just like to finish there, or almost, because... so that you are not too... I'm saying: let's try to clarify this relationship of the outside and the inside, in the conditions where the inside is just... is fundamentally the inside of the outside. Around that... there is a constellation we are quite familiar with. I mean which... whether we have read them or not, has more or less shaped all of us. And first of all, I'll cite Heidegger. And I'll say: if you take, well, we may as well take a specific text, it will be true for the whole of Heidegger's work, but what is it about in

Heidegger? First, it is about the proposition: thinking comes from the outside. Thinking always comes from the outside. The text I am referring to is: *What is Called Thinking?*<sup>20</sup> And it is a splendid text, right from the beginning. You can... read the first pages, the first twenty pages of the text, and you'll find everything we need there. It's not enough to read the first twenty pages, but you'll find everything we need there.

Thinking comes from the outside, what does that mean? That means that of course we have the internal possibility of thinking. And Heidegger almost says: traditional philosophy has always been based on us having the internal possibility of thinking. But invoking the internal possibility of the thinking being to think says nothing about what prompts us to think. And we only think if something prompts us to think. We who have the internal possibility of thinking, we only think if something prompts to think. You can see the appeal to the outside, this something can only come from the outside. You don't have to push it very far to say: and from an outside that's further away, more distant than any external world. Why? Because what prompts us to think isn't something that belongs to just any external world.

For those who know a little Heidegger, it is nothing that belongs to the domain of beings [*l'être*]. What prompts us to think is the being [*l'être*] of beings, which is to say the Outside. An Outside more distant than any external world. Otherwise, we have the possibility of thinking, but this possibility remains eternally empty. Which Heidegger expresses by saying: yes, we have the possibility of thinking, the same one that was invoked by the traditional philosophers, the same one invoked in the seventeenth century, but having the possibility doesn't mean we are capable of it. Capacity is not the same as possibility. The text is splendid: "Man can think," "Man can think in the sense that he has the possibility to do so, but this possibility doesn't yet guarantee that it is something within our power." I remember another translation that I prefer, but which doesn't change anything in the text: "this possibility does not yet guarantee that we are capable of doing so." Okay, "not capable," what does that mean? We are capable if we confront... We become capable of thinking if we confront what prompts us to think and which is more distant than any external world. But what prompts us to think, if we encounter it and confront it, here again: do we encounter it, do we confront it? Heidegger's answer is famous: it happened once, it was the Greeks. It was the Greeks who confronted this outside, which is to say who discovered being as distinct from beings.

So, if what prompts us to think is in fact encountered, then we become capable of thinking, and of thinking what? We become capable of thinking this: that we are still not thinking. What does that mean? That we don't yet think just because of the simple possibility of thinking. What does the thing that prompts us to think prompt us to think? It prompts us to think that we are still not thinking in virtue of the simple possibility we have of thinking. So much so that the "we are still not thinking" is the inside; that's what is inside our thought. That we were still not thinking is the inside of our thought. As the inside of the outside, insofar as the outside prompts us to think. Why? Because the outside doesn't give us cause to think without withdrawing in the same movement that it gives itself, a famous theme in Heidegger, so much so that the inside of this outside is the "we are still not thinking," which Heidegger expresses in one of those formulas he does so well: "Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not

thinking,” this is the splendid beginning of *What is Called Thinking?* I am trying to place the emphasis on... I would say that thought is no longer in a relationship with the thinkable. I am saying that thought is fundamentally placed in a relationship, in an essential relationship with something that is unthinkable and unthought. We are still not thinking. If you prefer, instead of the traditional possibility of thinking, which is a logical possibility, Heidegger gives us an impossibility which is – two words – onto-logical. The whole... the whole of traditional philosophy is founded on the logical possibility of thinking. See Descartes. Heidegger promotes an onto-logical impossibility of thinking.

And here is an author – very briefly – who unquestionably owes nothing to Heidegger. The connection to Heidegger goes via Blanchot: it is Artaud. And even though I say that one of the greatest contemporary texts on thought of the twentieth century is Heidegger’s *What is Called Thinking?*, one of the greatest texts is also Artaud’s: the letters to Jacques Rivière. And what does Artaud say? Thought is inseparable from a vital incapacity [*impouvoir*]. It is no longer an onto-logical impossibility, it is a vital incapacity. “It is part of thought not to be able to think, that is my drama,” says Artaud.<sup>21</sup> But what does that mean, “his drama”? It doesn’t mean his clinical case, since Artaud doesn’t experience himself that way; it doesn’t mean his psychological problem, it means that his drama is to have reached something in thought that eludes thought itself. It is not enough to have the possibility of thinking. You still need to have the vital power to think. I am saying that if we carried out a differential comparison, and the difference is fundamental, what Heidegger, who in this respect still conducts himself like a great philosophy professor, presents as an onto-logical impossibility becomes, in keeping with Artaud, a vital incapacity.

But if I’m looking for what they have in common, it is that the unthought is the inside of thought. And thought is fundamentally related, not to the thinkable, but to the unthought. And you can see how far removed this is from traditional philosophy. Traditional philosophy was not unaware of the unthought, but for traditional philosophy, the unthought is by its nature of a different nature to thought. The body, for example. The passions, for example. That which eludes thought. Here, in contrast, in these twentieth-century forms, the unthought, at a deep level, shares a nature with thought. It has the same nature as thought, it is the distant that is the closest, to the point where there is a strict identity between thought and this unthought, thought is fundamentally related to the unthought. And in *The Order of Things*, Foucault takes up this theme in its entirety, to the point where you don’t know whether, at first glance... you say to yourself: this is Heidegger, based on... certain expressions.... This is Blanchot, this is Artaud. It is Artaud when Foucault places the emphasis on the vital problem of the unthought. It is Heidegger when he places the emphasis on the onto-logical problem of the unthought. It is Blanchot when he relates it to this line of the Outside. Fine.

But then, wonder of wonders, it is Foucault. And what does it mean to say, “it is Foucault”? It means he gives it his own particular inflection as well. And that’s what I want to get to, to something that has no equivalent in Heidegger, nor in Blanchot, nor in Artaud. What is it? It’s that, for him, the relationship of the outside and the inside, the inside being always the inside of an outside, that is not what is original, but, this relationship in his work, or this relationship

between thought and the unthought... you understand: if thought amounts to saying [*Deleuze whispers, inaudible words*] if thought confronts this outside, this Outside that is more distant than any external world, if thought confronts this outside, well, from that point, the closest thing to thought, what it discovers as its interior, is the unthought. But, in Foucault, it is – it seems to me, and I think this touches on something that concerns Foucault's whole oeuvre – it is not an onto-logical impossibility, as in Heidegger, nor a vital incapacity, as in Artaud, it's the specific contribution of Foucault – it's not something he chose, we are not in the realm of... of theory, it is something that engages life, and thus thought as well – it is this sort of hallucinatory powerlessness. A hallucinatory powerlessness will be at the heart of this identity of thought and the unthought.

Why? I mean, what does it mean, in Foucault, that the inside is by nature the inside of the outside? It means an operation of doubles. The inside is the double of the outside. That is what I would say is Foucault's singular inflection. It is to have reinterpreted a general theme which he, last in line, shares with Blanchot, Artaud, Heidegger, with differences between one author and the next, the fundamental difference is I think to have taken his interpretation in the direction of a hallucinatory double, the inside as the double of the outside. It's a curious thing, what does that mean: the inside as the double of the outside? And which is, by that token, the unthought as the double of thought. And the whole end section of *The Order of Things*, even though there are often echoes of Artaud, even though there are... it's the theme of the double. It is the theme of the double that is specific to Foucault and what allows him to reinterpret what he shares with Artaud, what he shares with...

And it's on this point, which I would like you to reflect on between now and next time, because that's where we will have to... In other words, when the line of the Outside forms a fold, it produces doubles. And, mind, it is not the other who is a double of me. It is me who is a double of the other. It's not the outside that is a projection of the inside, it is the inside that is an interiorization of the outside, a fold of the outside. The double is the fold. What does that mean? What is the double as a kind of folding? It's what's called a doubling [*doublure*].<sup>22</sup> The inside is the doubling of the outside. To produce a double. To fold is to produce a double.

And suddenly, if we see that perhaps Foucault rediscovers this in his last books, we tell ourselves, my god, he has always been talking about that, in fact, this third dimension of the fold, conceived as the formation of the double and the process of doubling. To fold is to double. Why did Foucault love Roussel? Why did... even more, I have a hypothesis, my only hypothesis is that he always protected himself from Heidegger with Roussel. That's why he had a passionate relationship with Roussel. He was seeking something, you see, in this curious author, this poet who no one took seriously except a very small number of people, this disciple of Jules Verne, he was looking for something... Yes, something to shield himself from what didn't suit him in Heidegger's ontology. So, what was it that didn't suit him? That remains for us to... But, in effect, what is Roussel's whole oeuvre? It is no doubt one of the most profound reflections on the double, on doubles, and an understanding of the generation of doubles through the process of doubling. So much so that Foucault's whole oeuvre, *Raymond Roussel* being one of Foucault's first books, where we find the whole theme, already, of the fold, the double and doubling, we

have to say that, in a certain way, this is the hallucinatory double or it is, if you prefer, the powerlessness of the person hallucinating.

Hallucinatory powerlessness, this is something very different both from Artaud, and from Heidegger. And it, it fundamentally belongs to Foucault. Which is to say the question we have come to, the question... that I am posing for next time, is precisely... it is precisely... Okay, we saw the very complex relationship between the inside and the outside, in such a way that the inside is always the fold of the outside. And it so happens that this operation by which the line of the Outside folds, forms a fold, is an operation of the double or of doubling. What did Foucault find in Roussel in this regard? And then... can it explain the last books for us? I would like you to have this double concern at the same time. Yes, because I myself feel that the last books present us with something astonishing. Once again, it is... If I was trying to summarize *The Use of Pleasure*, I would say: what Foucault discovered was that the Greeks were the first case of doubling. It's that the Greeks... This is why he says: oh, the Greeks, they're not all that great. Euh... that's not it, it's... He would say... the answer is completely... We have to play the game: what does Heidegger think is completely amazing about the Greeks?

What does Foucault think is interesting about the Greeks? Well, what Foucault thinks is interesting is that they were the first to make the fold, the fold of the outside, they performed the doubling, they were the first... They themselves are the first doublings. So, he starts with Roussel, he finishes with the Greeks, but maybe it is because the Greeks inaugurated the process that Foucault began by finding it in Roussel, namely: the genius of the Greeks is to have folded force onto itself. Why were they able to do that? It's not an accident. Why did the Greeks – there you can see that the problem effectively becomes, the problem of summarizing *The Use of Pleasure* becomes very specific... The Greeks have a diagram, the Greek city, it refers to a diagram, a relationship of forces. Foucault no longer uses this language, but it's not difficult to find in the book, as we will see, the relationship of forces as presented by the Greeks described very well, in an original way. There is a Greek diagram, just as there is a disciplinary diagram, just as there is a seventeenth-century diagram and a nineteenth-century diagram, etc.

So, there is a Greek diagram. It is for us to define this Greek diagram that Foucault only defines in a very dispersed way, without attaching... without seeming to attach great importance to it. But this diagram is so original that it makes possible what was previously impossible, namely: it makes it possible for force to fold onto itself. The Greeks were the first to have folded force onto itself, which is to say to have made and have invented a force capable of acting on itself and not just on other forces. When the Greeks had this stroke of genius, they invented the fold, they invented the doubling. The Greeks are the first doubling. But, but once again, Foucault firstly discovered all of that in circumstances that were... less historical, in more poetic circumstances, he had discovered it in the whole oeuvre of Raymond Roussel, who never stopped folding sentences on sentences and visibilities on visibilities to generate the whole series of doubles.

And there were two ways and, with Roussel, what happened? There were two possibilities: either there is always... when you make folds somewhere, fold words, fold things, you can always unfold them and, at that point you go back to the unbreathable vacuum. Or else, on the contrary,

which is to say: there is a choice, in the regime of the fold of the outside itself... Either you undo the folds and you spread them apart, like a swimmer, you return the sea to itself, and you die, suicide if necessary, if necessary... Thus, the strange death of Raymond Roussel, who they found dead one morning in his room. Or else, on the contrary, you surround yourself with folds, you invent them, you stir up doubles, you surround yourself with doubles, you live in the folds, which does not at all mean under shelter, right. And at that moment, at that moment, perhaps you have, in a certain way, provisionally conquered death, perhaps you have found a way of breathing. All right.

So, it's complicated, did the Greeks find a way of breathing? Did, many centuries afterwards, Roussel find a way of breathing? No. He wanted to spread out the folds. He manufactured them, he made them and then he spread them out. There is a descendant of Roussel who owes a lot to Roussel, who always aligned himself with Roussel, who is also well known and who is among the authors that Foucault was very fond of, namely Michel Leiris. Michel Leiris goes, as Foucault says very well, goes in the opposite direction to Roussel. And he too folds words on words, fold on fold – *langage tange*. *Langage tange*. It's exactly like *les bandes du vieux pillard* and *les bandes du vieux billard*. Fold on fold. Only, while Roussel undoes and spreads out the folds to move ever, ever closer to an unbreathable vacuum, Leiris surrounds himself with folds, to form what he himself calls absolute memory. Absolute memory in the folds, that was already the Greek experiment. Or else the unbreathable vacuum and the line of the "one dies." But all of that is more the program of what is left for us.

I'll just say that I have reached the following point: in what respect was Roussel able to be a determining influence on Foucault as an author, and more than an author, namely a way of reorienting – for him, Foucault – a way of reorienting his own philosophical enterprise, Foucault's, and a way of setting himself apart from, once again, a way of setting himself apart from Heidegger, of taking a sort of path that was the path of the doubles. In any case, I think, I think, there, that it is obvious that the theme of the double has always haunted Foucault and has always, once again, been understood in a very particular way by him, namely: it is always me who is the double of an Other, with a big O. I ask you to reflect on that because it is... Today, forgive me, today I feel like what we have done is not even something to be understood. I mean: it's something to be felt or not felt. The next times, I will try to be more comprehensible, but there, it was more, you still have to... I was appealing more to your affects, so, if you didn't feel any affect, it's not bad, right, it's not... [*End of the recording*] [2:16:28]

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> *The Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).

<sup>2</sup> The French "on" is something of a third person neutral, designating "one" or "they".

<sup>3</sup> *The Space of Literature*, trans. Ann Smock (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).

<sup>4</sup> The Smock translation is: "the death which never comes to me". I prefer "the death which never happens to me" but either way, it should be consistent with Deleuze's "C'est la mort qui peut m'arriver, qui m'arrivera" just before.

<sup>5</sup> This quote doesn't follow from the previous but is a jump to an earlier para in the Blanchot text.

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<sup>6</sup> In Smock translation: “in it *they* die; they do not cease, and they do not finish dying”; we can assume a need to change this to “on” or “one”.

<sup>7</sup> On personology in Benveniste and linguistics, see sessions 3, 4, and 5 in this same seminar.

<sup>8</sup> How do things grow? How are things born? Hence, the ongoing “on” problem. Also, here Deleuze spells out the French “born”, n-a-î-t, to avoid confusion.

<sup>9</sup> This seems to be referring to the account in Jung’s *Memories, Dreams, Reflections* of Jung telling Freud about his dream of a house with skulls in the basement.

<sup>10</sup> The English title is: “Fantasy and Origins of Sexuality”, for *Fantasme originaire. Fantasmés des origines, origines du fantasme* (1964; Paris, Hachette 1985).

<sup>11</sup> “Un peu profound ruisseau calomnié la mort”, the final verse of a “Tombeau” by Stéphane Mallarmé’s, beginning “Un noir roc courroucé que le bise le roule”.

<sup>12</sup> *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, Routledge, 1989, p. 370.

<sup>13</sup> This analysis, and the analysis on which is it based, is located in Deleuze’s *Foucault*, chapter titled “Foldings, or the Inside of Thought”, pp. 96-98.

<sup>14</sup> *Madness and Civilisation*, trans. Richard Howard (London: Tavistock, 1985), p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> Here, “vice versa” is used instead of the “inversely” in the published translation. Deleuze presents this quote succinctly in *Foucault*, p. 97.

<sup>16</sup> *The Infinite Conversation*, p. 196.

<sup>17</sup> Henri Michaux, *La Vie dans les plis* (Paris: Gallimard, 1949); Deleuze returns to this work by Michaux and, of course, to the fold in *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque* (Paris: Minuit, 1988), notable p. 155, note 20.

<sup>18</sup> On the Greek’s contribution for Foucault, see *Foucault*, pp. 99-103.

<sup>19</sup> Rather, “pli selon pli”, a work by Boulez to which Deleuze refers obliquely in the French edition of *The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque*, p. 47, but fully in a note in the English translation, p. 164, note 37. The title “pli selon pli” is itself taken from the Mallarmé poem “Remémoration d’amis belges”, on which Deleuze comments extensively in the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, in sessions 9 and 11, February 3 and March 3, 1987. On this Boulez’s composition in relation to Mallarmé’s poetry, see the detailed discussion in session 25 of the Foucault seminar.

<sup>20</sup> Or *Discourse on Thinking* (1959).

<sup>21</sup> This statement is not in the correspondence with Rivière. It might be a synthesis of Artaud’s remarks to Rivière, Blanchot’s remarks on the correspondence, and maybe Artaud’s correspondence with George Soulié de Morant.

<sup>22</sup> Doublure, in tailoring, is lining, or in theatre, film, is understudy, stand-in, body double, stunt double. Both of those meanings would be pertinent resonances in this context, but undoubtedly “doublure” is intended in a more abstract way, an overlapping.