

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986

Part III: Subjectification

Lecture 23, 13 May 1986

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq

Translated by Melissa McMahon; time stamp and additional revisions, Charles J. Stivale

Part 1

So, this is the program I would like to follow. I would like today's session to be devoted to this conception of subjectification according to Foucault, which is to say the nature of what we have characterized as the third axis, and for that I really needed Félix Guattari to agree to come and for me to be able to ask him things about that, because we are at a point where Foucault's thought is connected with all sorts of currents that, on the one hand, were part of the causality—the multiple causalities—of May '68, but that, far from being stifled afterwards, underwent, I think, even in latent forms sometimes, extremely important developments. Hence the presence of Guattari, to whom I would like to ask some questions based on his own conceptions, his differences from Foucault, his similarities, all of that. So today, if possible, we will finish subjectification.

For May 20, I am setting the strictest possible program. On May 20, I will continue on my own account and, I hope, will draw some conclusions in relation to this whole set of ideas, the three axes and the unity of Foucault's oeuvre. On May 27, I would like, thanks to one of you, to spend a session placing Foucault in relation to some great modern creators, writers among others, literary writers, but also other kinds. When I say "one of you," I mean that one of you has suggested playing us some excerpts from [Pierre] Boulez's *Pli selon pli*, and we will see in relation to that whether there is anything to say about this title, *Pli selon pli*, and perhaps we will attach some importance to it, once we learn that Boulez had had a specific relationship with [Henri] Michaux, a musical relationship with Michaux. What is the relationship between *Pli selon pli* and Michaux's very beautiful text, *La vie dans les plis*? We will see this whole matter of the fold, also taking into consideration—I am getting ahead of our program—a very interesting remark made to me, namely: is this relationship we are seeing now between the outside and the fold that constitutes subjectivity, this line of the outside that folds to constitute a very special kind of interiority, is it a necessary, inevitable movement? Can we not conceive of other movements? Isn't it all a bit suffocating? Isn't there something suffocating in all of that, one of you asked, and I am inclined to agree: yes, there is no doubt something a little suffocating in that. Would other forms of line be less suffocating? I don't know. So, all of these things. And finally, we will have a final session on the 34th, I mean [*Laughter*] the 2nd... the 3rd, I don't know, in June, a last session in June for your own questions, or your own objections, etcetera, on the whole of our work this year. Is that clear? Any problems? Good.

So, today, before asking the questions I want to ask, I will start by recapitulating, so we are very clear about where we are.

A student: Tuesday, it's Tuesday in June...?

Deleuze: The 2nd.

The student: Pardon, the 3rd, Tuesday June 3rd...

Deleuze: The third, the third, and then afterwards, filled with thoughts, we will part ways. *Voilà!* What work there is to be done between now and the 3rd.

So, we have seen how a third axis developed in Foucault's thought, which is to say an axis beyond relationships of power and forms of knowledge. Or, if you prefer: beyond the constraining rules of power and the instituted codes of knowledge. And what is it? Well, beyond relationships of power and forms of knowledge, there was the relationship with the outside, a notion that seemed to us both very attractive and mysterious. The relationship with the outside that [Maurice] Blanchot already described as also being the absolute non-relationship or the absolute of the relationship. And the question was: what can we do to stop this line of the outside—which Foucault acknowledges comes from Blanchot—this idea of a line of the outside beyond knowledge and power, from simply being death, the void, or the unbreathable? How could this absolute outside not be the death of Blanchot's "one dies" [*on meurt*], the void or the unbreathable?

And the answer that presented itself to us—but maybe this is the suffocating answer, we don't know yet—was that the line of the outside had to fold. This was the only way, it seemed, for it to detach itself from the void and from death. By folding, it would form a relatively sheltered region, allowing us to live, and to live, no doubt, in a way... in what way? Can we say "authentic"? Is this a word Foucault would accept? We'll see, we'll set that aside. The line of the outside would be, in folding, as Michaux says, like the eye of the cyclone, a calm. In *Mercier et Camier*, a novel by [Samuel] Beckett, one asks the other: So, how are you? And the other replies: I'm fed up, but not to the point of bursting. And the other says: I'm well, but not as well as I was before I came down the stairs. And the first one continues and says: I am like a cork on the stormy sea.¹ "Like a cork on the stormy sea," isn't that the process by which the line—to speak like Foucault—constitutes an inside of the outside, is on the inside of the outside, the passenger *par excellence*. The passenger *par excellence* is the one located on the inside of the outside.² That's what the fold of the line of the outside is.

Michaux has some admirable ways of putting it when he explains why and how he gave up drugs.³ The real problem, he says, is that with the infinite speeds that traverse us, how do we constitute a slow being? We could say that that is the problem of subjectification. It is no longer a matter of straddling electrons. How do we straddle electrons? We have to be able to constitute, with infinite speeds, the slow being that we are or that we must be. Folding the outside, folding the line of the outside, that's what subjectification is according to Foucault. Which is to say, constituting an inside of the outside, constituting oneself as the passenger *par excellence*, placing

oneself on the inside of the outside—you can see that it is not at all about a personal sort of interiority. Placing oneself on the inside of the outside... [*Interruption of the recording*] [10:54]

Part 2

... and it's not about saying that, there are as many modes of subjectification as there are... because the folds don't always occur at the same place, it's not always the same part of ourselves. And while the Greeks may have invented the fold of the outside, invented the inside of the outside, we have to say that what the fold isolates for the Greeks is the body and its pleasures. That's the first aspect of the fold. And it is obvious that in Christianity, it won't be that, it will be something else. It is obvious that, currently, the problem of subjectification... is that where it occurs? There are texts by Foucault that say: if we can draw a lesson from the Greeks, it is.... perhaps it was necessary to return to the body, in a certain way, and at the same time, you can never return, it can't be a return to the body in the same way as the Greeks, but a return to the body as distinct from the flesh of Christianity. Fine.

First aspect of the fold, then: the part of ourselves that is surrounded by the fold. Second aspect: the rule according to which the fold is made. Is it a so-called natural rule? Is it a so-called divine rule? Is it a so-called moral rule? Is it an esthetic rule? There are all sorts of problems there as well. Third fold or third aspect of the fold, I don't mind: what is the relationship of the true with myself and myself with the true? Which is not the same thing as "what is the truth?" The fold determines a relationship of the true with the subject, a subjectification of the true. But there as well, you can sense that the subjectification of the true doesn't happen in at all the same way in Plato, in Descartes, or in Kant. And finally: what is the life in the folds entitled to look forward to [*attendre*]? As Blanchot said: the interiority of anticipation.⁴ That's the fourth fold, which determines what we look forward to. What we as subjects, or rather we as subjectified, are entitled to look forward to. In some cases it will be immortality, in others it will be memory, becoming memorable, in others it will be salvation, beauty, freedom, etc.

That's the first point. We mustn't forget these four folds. I would say, staying with Foucault, that the question of subjectification for Foucault will always be to ask someone — and even in the one era there will be many competing modes of subjectification — "What are you as a subject?" Which means, strangely: What folds do you surround yourself with? What are your folds? How are you folded? Second point: how does this fold of the line of the outside come about? How does Foucault conceive of it in concrete terms, and why does he tell us that the Greeks were the first? As we have seen, to go back over the answer given by Foucault, it's that for Foucault, the subject is never first, the subject is always derivative, it is the result of an operation, the operation by which the line of the outside folds. That's another way in which Foucault's thought differs a great deal from others that on the face of it might seem close to it.

But he tells us that the Greeks are the first. Why? Because the Greeks were the ones who were in a position to fold the relationship of forces onto itself, to fold force onto itself. The relationship of force, the relationship of forces, is the relationship of one force with another force. It is the

relationship of a force with a force that it affects or that affects it. But there is something special about the Greeks' diagram of power—what is their relationship of power or relationship of forces? They invented the relationship of forces as a rivalry between free agents. Rivalry between free agents on the level... Well, if we take all of the institutions: on the political level, on the judicial level, on the level of war, on the level of love. They invented this extraordinary form of relationship of forces or power: the rivalry between free agents. And it is because they invented this new relationship of forces that they are able to fold force onto itself. Why? Because of the following idea: if it is a free man who governs free men, this man must be able to govern himself. Which does not mean that governing oneself comes first in relationship to governing the other. On the contrary, governing oneself is derived from governing the other. When you have a situation where the free man governs the free man, the regulatory principle of such a government is necessarily a government of the self, in the following form: for a free man to be able to govern other free men, the free man has to be able to govern himself.

This "government of the self" is thus the folding of force onto itself that follows from the specifically Greek relationship of forces: rivalry between free men. What derives from the specifically Greek relationship of forces—rivalry between free men—is the Greek form of subjectification—being able to govern oneself—which is to say that force folds onto itself. There is no longer a force that affects other forces or that is affected by other forces. Well yes, that exists, but the regulatory principle is only that force affects itself, the self affecting itself, which is precisely subjectification. Subjectification is the self affecting itself or, if you prefer, the process, the movement, the operation by which force bends onto itself to become the regulatory principle of the relationship of forces. Only the one who knows how to govern himself will be able to govern others. This auto-government of the self, which is obviously of a different nature to the government of others, it's what? It's what we said was... It is not a constraining rule, as in a relationship of power, it is an optional rule. Governing oneself is the optional rule of the free man in so far as its condition is—what? The fold, the fold of force, the operation by which force folds onto itself, and in so doing affects itself. So, I can say: the relationship to the self, the relationship to the self, which is really the third axis.

You can see that we're making a lot of progress in our analysis of the third axis in Foucault, because at the beginning we started from this: the third axis is the relationship with the outside, it's the line of the outside. But now we can see that while that is indeed the start of the third axis, the whole movement of the third axis is the movement by which the line of the outside folds, and in folding constitutes an interiority of anticipation or exception, which is to say the subjectivity of the free man under the condition of the fold. I would like something to be very clear, but I suppose we have already seen: it's the domain of optional rules, which we found again, when we had already found them in relation to statements and the theory of statements in Foucault. Because of that I can say that the relationship to the self derives from the relationship of power; it presupposes it, it derives from the relationship of forces, but it derives from them in the literal sense, which is to say it becomes increasingly autonomous from them, increasingly independent, under the optional rule, which is to say under the condition of the fold. So it is, *a fortiori*, independent of knowledge in all its forms, both subjective awareness and empirical knowledge

[*et de la conscience, et de la connaissance*]. Foucault will describe it as Greek subjectivity organizing itself, under the optional rule, as esthetic existence. Esthetic existence.

This level is very important, because he encounters a lot of ideas that I would say seem, or sometimes seem, close to—but are they close? Are they far away? You must already sense that the way the problem of art is posed here, for those who know a little about it, seems at first glance to be very close to the Frankfurt School, to [Theodor] Adorno, to Ernst Bloch... We will see this, but very quickly because otherwise it would take too long. And then in interviews very close to his death, Foucault even finds common ground—whereas this is rare—finds common ground with Sartre. I will read it very quickly. It's in [Paul] Rabinow and [Hubert L.] Dreyfus, page 331:⁵ “*What strikes me is the fact that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to individuals, or to life. That art is something which is specialized, or which is done by experts who are artists. But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should a painting or a house⁶ be an art object, but not our life?*”

It's a very brief passage, but a very complicated one, very ambiguous as well because obviously it's a reference, an allusion, to the Frankfurt School. They're the ones who struggled with this, and we will see why they struggled with this idea. Salvation is sought through art: there is no longer any other form of salvation. There is no salvation, there is no longer any other salvation we can expect, except through art. But what is the power of art? If we are seeking salvation through art, art needs to abandon, leave behind, go beyond its specific existence as a work of art. It has to go beyond the work of art itself.

A student: [*Inaudible comment*]

Deleuze: No, that's not Kierkegaard, no. If you mix Kierkegaard into all this, we're lost. No, that's... that's Adorno's problem, that's the problem of the Frankfurt School. The double aspect of art: art as manifested or borne by the work of art, but then if art is to have an effect, it really has to leave behind the work of art, to affect something else besides the work of art. It is a sort of antinomy of art.

But why did the Frankfurt School pose this problem? It's almost that for art to be realized, it has to stop being a quality of the work of art, since the work of art is the form of art in so far as art is not realized anywhere else but in the work. So how can the work of art go beyond the work itself? And you can see what Foucault means when he says: the subjectification of the Greeks constituted existence as esthetic existence. That means, therefore, that art was a quality of existence and not simply of the work of art. So that was subjectification, but for art to become the operation of subjectification, it can't just be about constituting specific objects called “works of art” anymore, it needs to become the movement of subjectification in general. But this is not the case with the work of art.

It goes on. Right afterwards: “make life or existence an esthetic existence.” This is what they ask Foucault: “*Of course, that kind of project is very common in places like Berkeley where people think that everything from the way they eat breakfast, to the way they have sex, to the way they*

spend their day, should itself be perfected". There was also this theme, sometimes, in the drug scene: making existence an art.

Foucault: "*But I am afraid in most of those cases, most of the people think if they do what they do, if they live as they live, the reason is that they know the truth about desire, life, nature, body, and so on.*" What makes him say that? In other words, they draw on a knowledge. He is saying to us that just as the operation of subjectification derives from relationships of power—it makes itself independent, it becomes autonomous with this problem; perhaps it can only become autonomous if art takes on a new sense which isn't reduced to the production of works of art, but which becomes a genuine production of existence—in the same way subjectification, the production of existence, derives and makes itself independent of forms of knowledge. And then the interviewer continues. The key question: "*But if one is to create oneself without recourse to knowledge or universal rules, how does your view differ from Sartrean existentialism?*"

I was saying just before that the first part of Foucault's text comes very close to the Frankfurt School, and here they say to him: ah, but you are also very close existentialism. There's nothing wrong with that. And Foucault's response is extraordinarily vague: "*In Sartre, there is a tension between a certain conception of the subject and a morality of authenticity. And I always wonder whether this morality of authenticity doesn't actually go against what is said in 'The transcendence of the ego.' The theme of authenticity refers, explicitly or not, to a mode of being of the subject defined by its adequation to itself.*"⁷ This is curious to me, and quite severe. I don't see what Foucault is alluding to. He is basically saying—and this might not be wrong, I don't know—that Sartre's mode of subjectification implies, and presupposes, if not a process of knowledge, then at least a process of awareness, of self-awareness, to which it remains completely subordinate, whereas the relationship to self as Foucault understands it must be independent from both forms of knowledge, including of consciousness, and relationships of power. They derive from them. They derive from them, but they become independent of them. So it's in relation to that that I keep on saying: subjectification, whatever its relationships with the two other axes, subjectification grasped as fold of the outside or the folding of force on itself, subjectification is really a third independent axis. Hence my third remark, but it is a third independent axis...

If I add this... This is where we find ourselves faced with a sort of big bubbling pot of ideas, a great ferment of thought that was essential, for example, in producing May '68. If I was trying to define what was behind the convergence of number of lines of thought, modes of thought that were very, very different to each other, I would say that it's the idea that the perfect circle, the perfect circle of the old dialectic, was broken, shattered. And what was the old circle of the old dialectic? Well, it was the circle of knowledge-power-self. Knowledge, power and the self. And the dialectic of knowledge as it appeared in Hegel was supposed to produce a subject-object that were adequate to each other, the adequation of the subject and object. That was the ultimate product of the dialectic of knowledge. And similarly, although in a completely different way, the dialectic of power conceived as praxis in Marx. [Pause]

But in several ways in this area of the dialectic, cracks in the knowledge-power-self ring kept appearing, first of all in a very discreet way, then in a more complex way. I'll just mention the important dates, the important moments here. [Georg] Lukacs—perhaps he is the first—began to introduce a necessity for the self to refer to a subjectification, a movement of subjectification that is irreducible to the movement of knowledge and of power as praxis. And already at that moment, there is a sort of esthetic dimension that appears, because subjectification doesn't refer to art in an irreducible way, and in what form? But then, how was art supposed to stop being art?

I think the second stage was bizarrely—or not bizarrely actually—found in Italian Marxism. We will see in just a moment. In a certain way with [Antonio] Gramsci, then with [Mario] Tronti, it's as though the dialectic seized up. There as well it was necessary to introduce a dimension of subjectification that was irreducible to the movement of the dialectic or that the dialectic was not able to produce without the help of something else.

The third moment, not coming afterwards for that matter, it's one contemporary part: the Frankfurt School. In Adorno, in particular, the failure of the dialectic of knowledge will appear under dramatic conditions. The dialectic of knowledge, instead of producing the rational totality, produces what Adorno calls totalitarian rationality,⁸ and the issue then fully emerges: that nothing can be set in motion again without modes of subjectification that the dialectic cannot account for. What will these modes of subjectification be? It will be Ernst Bloch's utopia, for example, his concrete or positive utopia.

So everywhere, even from the point of view of the dialectic, the need is emerging to find a relatively autonomous process of subjectification that only derives from the dialectic on the condition of assuming autonomy and independence. So, it is really an autonomous axis that reacts and challenges the whole dialectical movement. That was much less of an obstacle for other currents of thought, like Foucault's or others who, because they didn't go via the requirements of the dialectic of knowledge or of power-praxis, posed the problem in such a way that the failure of the dialectic wasn't a drama for them—on the contrary—but rather the continuation and perseverance of a movement which precisely went via other processes than the dialectical process. All right. All of that is very muddy but just grant me that the dialectical circle breaks apart precisely on the level of subjectification, the production of subjectivity, for example the dialectic of knowledge being unable to produce subjectivity.

Between the three axes—power, knowledge, and subjectification or self—what is going to happen? All sorts of reactions will happen, which again we saw last time. What are these reactions? The Greeks were the first to constitute the subject, they constituted the inside of the outside, they constituted the subject under the optional rule of the free man: to govern oneself, to affect oneself, auto-affectation or the affect of self by self. That's what the Greeks did. But once they did that, firstly power never stops wanting to re-conquer, recapture, this subjectivity, or this operation of subjectification, and subjugate it, which is to say it wants to subject the subjectification to itself. And then knowledge, for its part, wants to occupy this new form, the form of subject. Subjectification will cease to be the operation of the free man under the optional

rule that makes existence esthetic and come under the reign of the constraining laws of power or under the forms of knowledge. Subjectification will be reappropriated by power and knowledge.

And I'll repeat: this is what Foucault is analyzing when he says: "what is the formation of pastoral power with Christianity and what does it consist in?", when he takes up Nietzsche's great question, "what is the power of a priest?" And he answers that it is the pastor who invented a type of individuating power, which is to say—page 305 in the quoted interviews by Dreyfus and Rabinow, he gives a large number of the features of pastoral power, and among these features, the third feature is this: "*It is a form of power which does not look after just the whole community, but each individual in particular, during his entire life.*" And the fourth feature: this form of power, pastoral power "*cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, without making them reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it.*"⁹ In other words, when subjectification occurs, when it has derived from the relationships of power and become autonomous, power never stops trying to reappropriate it, to make it its own object, which is to say invent rules of individuation.

And the individuating rules of power, which is to say the rules that individuate the subject of power, first of all present themselves in pastoral power, and then—here we are making the connection with *Discipline and Punish*—towards the 18th century, the secular state takes over from pastoral power, which is becoming increasingly weak, and commandeers the individuating methods by which power is exercised over subjectivity. And at the same time, the procedures for knowing subjectivity will grow—I am covering this very quickly, we saw this is last time—which is to say that although subjectification has detached itself from relationships of power and forms of knowledge, now new relationships of power—they have to be new—new relationships of power and new forms of knowledge reappropriate it. But conversely, as I was saying, conversely, what can we expect of subjectification itself? Well, that it will reemerge, it will reemerge in other forms that escape, in turn, the new relationships of power, just as they escape the new forms of knowledge. Power had to vary to be able to capture the subject that had acquired its autonomy, but now subjectification will vary in turn, escaping in turn the new forms of power and knowledge.

What does that mean in concrete terms? Well yeah, fine... As a result, what kind of relationships will there always be between the three axes—power, knowledge and self, or subjectification? Relationships of struggle, opposition, and also of compromise, as Foucault says. All sorts of compromises will be established, and sometimes oppositions. But just as new relationships of power never stop emerging, and new forms of knowledge never stop emerging, new modes of subjectification never stop emerging as well, which are sometimes able to oppose the relationships of power and become independent of them, and sometimes enter into compromises with them.

Let's take the example of Christianity, very quickly. Christianity, then, let's say—I am really simplifying things—let's say it invents this new type of power, pastoral power, which captures subjectivity in its relationships, it searches the depths of the soul. Won't new forms of

subjectification appear, forms of subjectification that we have to call Christian no less than pastoral power, which will constantly challenge pastoral power and which, in turn, will derive from pastoral power, and in such a way that they become autonomous and independent? You can use this schema to follow the whole history of Christianity. Still speaking very broadly, at the same time that Christianity penetrates all of the relationships of power of the Christianized Roman Empire, it gives rise to new processes of subjectification, new movements of subjectification that escape and resist the power of the Church. Christianity becomes imperial and at the same time there is the great movement of withdrawal, of derivation, of the Christianity of the anchorites. The subjectification of the desert, the Christianity of Syria and Egypt, this whole movement of the anchorites and not just the anchorites but also communities who already questioned the whole of pastoral power and Christianity. As Foucault says, it is not a question of reducing Christianity to a code or to the reformation of a code that takes possession of subjectification and makes it the object of a new knowledge or subjects it to a new power. We have to see that Christianity also, at the same time, provides and reproduces modes of subjectification which are opposed to the power of the Church, which challenge the new forms of knowledge, and which either enter into compromises or form a radical struggle against the power of the Church.

Needless to say, going from original subjectification to original subjectification in Christianity, you end up at a fundamental nexus that will be called the Reformation, and the Reformation will be very typically a movement of Christian subjectification that is formed against the power of the Church, as though every time power and knowledge reappropriate modes of subjectification, new modes of subjectification form, again challenging power and knowledge, the forms of power and the forms of knowledge. So, there are indeed three axes that never stop either opposing each other or compromising with each other. It is a very, very complex situation.

Hence, hence... I am saying, there are just two problems to note. No, there are three problems but, precisely in order to go quickly, we'll set two of them aside, it is in fact logical to... but it is also logical to signal them now. Three historical problems, the first two of which we will leave aside for today, and we will position them, that way we won't be surprised when we find them again. The first one, Foucault seems to say—he doesn't even feel the need to say it, once again, I have pointed this out several times—that it is the Greeks who invented this process of the fold that constitutes subjectification, and he gives the reason why it was the Greeks. If there had not been a relationship of forces between free men, force would not have folded onto itself, which is to say there would never have been the idea that one had to know how to govern oneself in order to govern others. There would not have been the opposite idea either, but there wouldn't have been this idea. That's a Greek idea. And, once again, it is the Greek idea under the optional form of the free man, which is irreducible to power and to knowledge.

So, if the production of the self begins with the Greeks, this is the way Foucault accepts the question of why philosophy started in Greece. But you can see how enormous the difference is from Heidegger's answer. On the other hand, it is quite close to a Nietzschean-style answer—not close to Nietzsche's answer, but to a Nietzschean-style answer. What did the Greeks do? They folded force onto itself.

But even so, as I was saying, we have to wonder a little: in all of the Eastern formations, all of the non-European formations—and there are a lot—is there a production of the self in them or not? Obviously, you can't refer to translations. When translations on the subject of Eastern wisdom suggest an abundance of self, we can say to ourselves: well, obviously the self existed, but in what form? I mean: did, in the East, using the overly metaphorical vocabulary we have at this point, did the line of the outside fold or is Eastern wisdom of a completely different nature? Not at all about folding the line of the outside, but in a certain way riding it, living in the unlivable, reaching—just being silly now—reaching the void, knowing how to breathe in the unbreathable, and not fold. Knowing how to breathe in the unbreathable... You need techniques, right? Are techniques of the East techniques of the self or techniques of life in the void?

So, I am just posing that as a question. I am simply saying that just because a given form of Oriental thought talks about the self doesn't mean that we should be immediately convinced that this self must be understood as a process of subjectification and that -- no, it would be very complicated, but on the other hand, it is possible; I leave the question completely open -- But in Foucault's terms, we couldn't say yes, there is a self in the Eastern techniques, a self which corresponds to what we call the self, unless we discovered exercises which effectively consisted in folding force in such a way that an interiority, an interiority of anticipation, is formed. So, it's not clear—is it another relationship? We could say, at this point, that this line, the line of the outside, is everywhere, in all the formations, but this particular adventure of the line of the outside of being folded in such a way that it produces, that it performs, a subjectification, that's a problem.

The second problem is: how do we name this fold or these four folds? How do we name them and how do we explain that they bring something completely unexpected to Foucault's work, which is only found in Foucault's last books, namely positing and considering a lengthy period of time? I am bringing this problem together, which I have pointed out several times. It is, in effect, very curious: all of Foucault's oeuvre has always involved short periods of time. That is very important historically; the source of all of that is, once again, [Fernand] Braudel, whereas I mentioned before you find the distinction and the historical importance of a tripartite—at least tripartite—distinction between short, medium, and long time periods, and how the historian, according to Braudel, should work with these three types of period, which don't affect the same layers. But Foucault, throughout his oeuvre, focused on short periods of time or at most medium, I mean no longer than two and a half centuries. And now, with *The Use of Pleasure*, he sets himself the task of considering a very long period of time, since, strictly speaking, it goes from the Greeks—even leaving out what comes before the Greeks or what there is alongside it, namely the East—from the Greeks to us... [*Interruption of the recording*] [57:22]

Part 3

... the productions of subjectification going neither via knowledge nor via power. So, I could say: why? Why does he use a long period of time in this case? Why does subjectification imply a long period of time? It's not that it doesn't vary, we know in advance that it constantly varies.

Perhaps there are two answers, and I will have almost finished what I had to say to get now to my problem. Perhaps there are two answers.

The first is negative and the second, positive; everything will be fine. If subjectification implies this very unusual phenomenon in Foucault's work of a long period of time, it is for a simple reason, it seems to me. It is because in the domain of power we very quickly forget powers that are no longer exercised. The old powers are consigned to oblivion, a radical oblivion, we no longer have any use for them. We no longer have any use for the old powers. I mean, for example, the idea of restoring the monarchy in France, we have no use for such a thing. I mean, it doesn't work. We forget the old powers straight away. The people forget the old powers. As soon as a power is no longer exercised, it is forgotten, it is forgotten in a flash. Knowledges that are of no more use, that are out of date, they are also forgotten, following a different rhythm. Who remembers, apart from historians—which is to say deviants—who remembers the old knowledges that are no longer of any use? Well, yes, on guided tours: "that's the way they made flour..." Heritage things, okay. It doesn't thrill the masses.

Whereas when it comes to subjectification, something very curious happens. The oldest subjectifications—which is to say ways of constituting oneself as a subject, the way that you, me, constitute ourselves as subjects—they might be completely unsuited to the environment, but they continue to work on us. They continue to work on us in an extraordinary way. There is no such thing as an archaism in the area of subjectification. The most old-fashioned subjectification, the least contemporary, suddenly emerges in one of our gestures, and each of us is constantly taking ourselves for a Greek or an early Christian.

What is going on? What is going on in the head of a fundamentalist Catholic? I don't mean what is going on in the head of a fundamentalist Muslim, because this would be a problem that I would simple like to pose, which I am not claiming to be able to resolve today, because there is no doubt that... This also can help you to understand the problem, perhaps. We can currently conceive of Islam as a process of subjectification of a whole part of the world, which already has a whole history and which can't be reduced to either the corresponding relationships of power—even though there are all sorts of compromises with the relationships of power—nor with modes of knowledge, which is to say that not all subjectifications are in the esthetic mode, and that there are terrible subjectifications and ones that have an impact on power struggles.

But in any case, I have the impression that we use the most antiquated subjectifications. If you take some people, sometimes... I say to you: what is the charm of this place? It's still... I am not a living proof of the charm of this place, but when I myself go -- I am opening an aside here to help you understand on the level of practical everyday life -- when I go to make... The charm that saves Paris VIII, to the best of my knowledge, is that in the end there has been a sort of loyalty to the order of rupture, that, despite everything, despite everything that has happened, we have not fundamentally gone back to what I would call the 19th century. I swear to you that when that happens to me, and it doesn't happen to me very often, to go to another university to participate in a thesis...

A student: You'd be better off not to!

Deleuze: Precisely! [*Laughter*] I'd be better off... because I am saying bad things about my colleagues. So, when I go to another university to pass a thesis, I have the impression that—a living impression, it's not a metaphor in my head, I have an impression in the way that a fish gauges salt levels, it's a matter of the lungs—I have the impression of being transported to the 19th century. It is odd: they have resubjectified themselves in the mode of the 19th century! They have performed a very, very odd resubjectification, with these rhetorical flourishes where I say to myself: what on earth are they talking about? It's a language that had disappeared, not even my own teachers used this language. It is a language from before, a language much closer to Victor Cousin. [*Laughter*] It is very strange. In a domestic quarrel—domestic quarrels are fantastic—you see these resubjectifications... you need a Petit Larousse to flip through at the same time and say: aha! You want to say to people: what are you playing at? Which means: what are you resubjectifying yourself in relation to, what is it? Where did you get that subject from? These archaic subjectifications are very strange.

So, in the domain of subjectifications, I'm saying, we might as well... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] [Michelangelo] Antonioni put it wonderfully; he said: we are sick from Eros and we are sick from Eros because Eros is sick¹⁰. That connects with the *History of Sexuality*, Eros and the self. It's the same, we saw the connection last time, the connection between subjectification and sexuality, but what did Antonioni mean? Eros is sick, but why? He says in the text: yes, the old knowledges, we chuck them out, the old powers, we no longer remember them, but the old manners [*laughter*], the old modes—meaning modes of subjectification—those, we don't let go of.

So, this would be the negative reason why we are obliged to use longer time periods when it comes to subjectifications. But what would be the positive reason? No doubt it would be that the real name of subjectification is memory. The real name of the fold is memory. As Raymond Roussel's text and Foucault's text led us to: folding oneself, constituting folds in such a way as to discover absolute memory. All right, we will leave that to one side.

And the third problem... So, we are leaving the first two problems to one side, but we are grouping them together because they are our three remaining problems. In the end, the fundamental concern for us should be the variety of modes of subjectification, the variety of modes of subjectification which, with each historical formation, with each social formation, enter into a relationship with the existing relationships of power and the existing forms of knowledge, either forming compromises or opposing them. Because here we have the solution to something we've been carrying along with us. You remember that, as long as Foucault hadn't spoken about it, as long as he hadn't discovered this process of subjectification, we were at the stage of saying: where do the points of resistance in the relationships of power come from? Where do the points of resistance come from?

And the *Will to Knowledge* was only able to tell us that they are counterpoints [*vis-à-vis*], they are counterpoints to the relationships and yet they are not simply their negatives. And this page of Foucault's that I have cited at length expressed a sort of unease, his momentary inability to give a status to the phenomenon of resistance in a social field. Now, obviously, he seems to

suggest a reason. I am deliberately saying “he seems to suggest,” because in *The Use of Pleasure* his problem is the Greeks, but he is in a position to suggest a reason, namely that it is modes of subjectification that scatter the points of resistance in a social formation.

As a result... so there we are, if we find ourselves in a period... I was saying: in what sense do Foucault’s interviews form an integral part of his oeuvre? It’s that his work seems to be historical—whether it’s the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century, the Greeks even, with *The Use of Pleasure*—but the interviews show us the dotted line that reveals it has always been us, now, that Foucault is interested in, and that is why he gives interviews with the publication of each book. The interviews have the job, if there was any need—but who can read *Discipline and Punish* and not understand, not feel, that what interests Foucault is the problem of punishment today, and not in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, and who can read the *Will to Knowledge* and not understand that what interests Foucault is sexuality today, with all of the reservations he had about Reichian-style attempts at sexual liberation, but what direction would he follow, etc.?

It is really today, the here-and-now, and at this point we can say that we face three questions. The three questions are universal, but they don’t have a universal answer. For those of you who are philosophers, which is to say who remember the three great Kantian questions, I am referring to them. They obviously echo the Kantian questions, but they aren’t reducible to them. The three great questions of Foucault are: What can I do? What do I know? What am I?

What does that mean? This is what he calls the object of the three ontologies, but without there being any universal answer, since the answer is eminently variable with each social formation. And he will give Kant credit for perhaps being one of the first philosophers not to pose the question “I think therefore I am” in the form of the universal, but: what am I today, a man of a given period? What can I do? -- the problem of the relationships of power. What do I know? -- the problem of the forms of knowledge at a given period. What am I? -- the problem of the process of subjectification?

Hence the problems. I say “first problem,” but it’s not in order, they all go around each other. The relationships of power in a given period, for example. So, to talk about today: what relationships of power do we live in and are we caught up in today? But also: what are the new resistances, if there are any? Or: can we identify new forms of struggle? What are these new forms of struggle? Furthermore: what compromises are there between the resistances and the relationships of power?

Second sort of problem: what are the new forms of knowledge at a given time? There as well the transformations happen at top speed. In the broad sense of the word “knowledge,” it is quite obvious that the modern—I would even say recent—transformations in advertising are part of the transformations of knowledge and enter into combinations with new relationships of power. What is happening today? What is happening today in that area and in others? And conversely, what are the new challenges to knowledge? The new critique of knowledge? And, as Foucault has formulated in a very rigorous way: is there, in this regard, a new role or not of the intellectual, or what we call an intellectual? Has the intellectual itself even changed in nature and does it have a new role, both in the critique of the forms of knowledge and the resistance to the

relationships of power. Can we distinguish—just as we distinguish variations everywhere—can we distinguish variations in the intellectual and its role? Foucault has contributed to this problem in a very interesting way, by trying to form the notion of the “specific intellectual” who would be the modern figure of the intellectual. We will see that.

And finally, the third problem: what are the new modes of subjectification? What are the new modes of subjectification? Which also amounts to saying: what do the four folds become? Perhaps there are others. And it also means: how do they allow themselves to become subjected to the relationships of power? How do they resist the relationships of power? How can we evaluate them?

I was saying just before that Islam is a process of subjectification. For part of the world there is no doubt that the policy of John-Paul II, for example, is an attempt to reconstitute a Christian subjectification, which, in his mind, could form a counterpart to Islamic subjectification. It's complicated, all of that. So, I'll just mention some things at random, indiscriminately. Subjectification is not necessarily individual. There are collective subjectifications, that goes without saying. I mentioned the Christian communities before the Reformation and during the Reformation. Subjectification is just as much collective as individual. What has become of the communal subjectifications since '68? Well, the sexual liberation movements, which Foucault always had great reservations about—what failed in them? What didn't work?

But we mustn't go too far. You have to understand, a subjectification is a very delicate thing. I'll take feminine subjectification, the subjectification of women. The fact that women constitute a self for themselves, a collective and individual self—what does that mean? There was the MLF of course.¹¹ There was the MLF, but we could say that the MLF confronted relationships of power and then, depending on your opinion of the MLF, you could say that it became reappropriated by the relationships of power, or that it developed compromises, or that it held its own, it was able to derive its autonomy and maintain it in relationship to the mov...

But a process of subjectification never happens alone, it implies groups, specific groups, but it also happens through fluid groups that are veritable generations. It seems—these are such platitudes, really—the way a girl subjectivates herself today, which is to say constitutes herself as a self, is so different from the way even girls who were described as progressive subjectivated themselves, constituted themselves as a self, before '68. That seems the most striking thing for me, among girls, since '68, the formation of a... I'm talking about it because that seems to me to be the only completely successful subjectification. To speak in phenomenological terms: their way of being in the world has completely changed, it seems to me, and that is really a relationship of subjectification. Their relationship with men has changed so much. All right.

Now, the MLF was certainly necessary for all of that, but it happened so much above and below the MLF that most of these girls who have collectively created their new subjectification didn't go through the MLF, often they haven't even heard of it. And that doesn't mean that things like the pill, abortion, etcetera, didn't play a big part in that, but that's where relationships of knowledge or relationships of power intervene in modes of subjectification, and it's always like that. And that's why... I'll mention some examples which don't seem to have been as successful:

the drug communities and the hopes that some had for them for a brief moment. The phenomena of subjectification in these communities, with ruptures there as well—so delicate are these problems of subjectification—with the danger of real resurgences in the drug communities, real paranoid resurgences, to use the technical term, where instead of new procedures of subjectification, there was a resurrection of authoritarian phenomena, imperialist phenomena, fascist phenomena, you name it.

What can we say about gangs? This is by way of saying that subjectification is also not necessarily very good. It is never very good; there are always good things, bad things. As Nietzsche says: there is always good and bad. What we need are instruments that are sensitive enough to weigh up the good and the bad. The case of gangs, then, that also varies a lot. Are the gangs in Bogotá, the gangs of kids in Bogotá, and the gangs of hoods in our Western societies the same thing? There is no doubt that the gang can only be thought of as, not the model, but a vehicle of a movement of subjectification. The gang is the very epitome of collective subjectification. And that doesn't mean it doesn't confront these relationships of power. It confronts relationships of power, it confronts knowledges. Hence the question, how does one subjectify oneself? As I was saying: what is happening with Islam? Some of you belong to this nation. What is happening in Brazil? Brazil, just like Islam, represents a sort of alarming, astonishing movement of collective subjectification. In Brazil there also seems to be some very interesting things happening in this regard.

So, we are connecting with Foucault around these three problems, and you can sense that these are the three problems that were expressed in 1968. But to claim that '68 was a failure already seems stupid if you grasp these three problems, because these are the only three problems in the world today and they have continued. If we had to define '68, I would say that, in France, it was the time and place where there was not an answer but a raising of awareness of these three problems and their irreducibility to each other.

To summarize: what are the new struggles in relation to the new forms of power that come about? Second problem, which is a minor one, I think, but an interesting one: is there a new role of the intellectual in these struggles and in relationship to the new knowledges, or the old knowledges? Third problem: how and in what respect do the new modes of subjectification, which have their own specific rule, enter into a relationship with a new struggle, to the point where we could put forward the formula: all transformations of social relationships imply new modes of subjectification. So much so that we find Foucault's three axes again, with always the possibility that these three problems might not be specific to Foucault, because Guattari for example — this is why I asked him to come—posed them I think, in any case the first and the third one, well before '68. Others too, *Socialisme ou Barbarie*,¹² for their part, posed them in different terms, in completely different terms, because they were coming from the dialectic. That's where I would really like us to go with these struggles and modes of subjectification.

A student: Can I ask a question?

Deleuze: Yes...?

The student: [*semi-audible: Can we think the other way around, ways of de-subjectification when the folds have become unbearable...*]

Deleuze: Perhaps... perhaps... Listen, if you have understood what I am saying, I am explaining that it is very difficult to know whether there is resistance, whether there is compromise, where there is a fold, whether there is an unfolding... All I want is for you to have a sense, for now, of a series of problems, in any case, that can't be resolved... Perhaps you are right, perhaps.

I myself would like to hear Felix's response, first of all—which doesn't mean others can't contribute—to this way of posing the problem. Does he see himself as part of this because, once again, I think this is much more an area where Foucault connects up with '68, or pre-'68 or the problems of '68, rather than it being Foucault's own contribution. Foucault's own contribution is his specific distribution of the three axes, but this encounter with the problems of subjectification and the problems of new struggles, that is really a broader set of problems of which Foucault is a part... You've understood?

Guattari:¹³ My impression is that Foucault's path developed as a sort of tactic of orientation, in a situation that was in the throes of transformation, or you could even say in the throes of degradation. In relation to the essential point of, let's say, the status of ideologies and the function of ideological practices, etc., fine [...] and, let's say, what was currently called the place of subjective problems in action. At that particular moment, for Foucault, I think, there were always other points, in Foucault's work, other parallel perspectives, [...] thirty years ago, but in France, there was also the work of [Louis] Althusser, there was an entirely, excuse my bias, conservative attempt to reformulate the problems of ideology, the problems of the subjective factors, so to speak, schematically. Thus, the matter of social issues is perhaps...

Deleuze: That was an element, it seems to me — excuse me for... — of the people who, in order to rethink these problems, had to start or start again from the dialectic. They weren't able to pose the question except on the level of ideology, by saying: we have to bring a creative subjective factor into ideology.

Guattari: So, instead of that, Foucault didn't approach the problem, or at least [...], from the angle of the workers' movement, he approached it from the perspective of the great subjective formations, like that of psychiatry, the system of penitential culture, and so on. He took current concrete subjective entities in order to try and trace their genealogy, and then took the folds, the stratification of folds that led to a given current situation, the situation — I don't know what the importance is of... still, there's the encounter that exists, still, in the perspective of, let's say, actualization. In Foucault's work, [...] So that is already a first break away from the classic way of approaching these questions, in the traditional workers' movement, in the movements that were marked by Stalinism. These different points of subjectification were assigned to something that was called — I don't if it's still call this; I believe there must be another word for it now — mass organizations. Youth issues, women's issues, and so on, each time there was a mass organization that in theory was autonomous but, in fact, was completely subordinate to the instrument of social practice constituted by the party, the party of a workers' state, its officials, its apparatus of members, etc. You know the pattern.

So that meant that any transformation that could appear in new subjective domains, for example, in the student milieus, etc. there always were, well, [...], there were receptive surfaces to record them on, the mass organizations, the organization of the student movement, of French women, but in any case, that couldn't alter the collective practice as a whole in any way, since it was under the supervision, under the hegemony, of certain political definitions, organizational definitions, of the party in its monolithic structure which, the party, influenced the grand norms of subjectification and organization, not only for the party but the working class, which is to say there is a definition of subjectivity as a whole, and I would say even further: not only for the working class but for the relationships between the working class and the bourgeoisie. In the end it was a sort of definition of subjectification as a whole at a given moment: not only what working class morality was supposed to be but bourgeois morality as well in a certain way. In this regard, it is very interesting to see that one of the first movements I was involved with was a movement that challenged psychiatry [...]. That was before '58, psychiatric hospitals were called into question, what happened there, and so on, but there was... wasn't [*indistinct name*] supposed to be here, because he can clarify...

Deleuze: That will be essential, because... yes

Guattari: So, there was a movement of contesting psychiatric hospitals, it was a matter of carrying on the first psychiatric revolutions and breaking the [...], developing a conception of psychiatry that was more open to the city, creating facilities outside of hospitals, introducing techniques of psychotherapy or even psychoanalysis. As part of that—I don't remember what the combination of circumstances was—I was led to suggest that rather than have this debate take place between psychiatrists, progressive psychiatrists for the most part and in some cases members of the Communist party, we try to develop the debate directly among psychiatric nurses. There wasn't yet any question at that time of envisaging a movement with the psychiatrists themselves, that was still a long way off.

But then what was extraordinary was that this movement, first of all, spread like a sort of wildfire, it took off all at once. In a few weeks, in a few months, there were dozens of nurses groups that started discussions, making use of an already-existing structure which had been put in place by the [...] Communist party in the context [...], in the context of a utilization, a sort of [...], of Freinet techniques which were more or less used in pedagogical domains and they trained, they had made a section to train psychiatric nurses. So that served as a framework, very quickly there was a sort of proto-'68, a mini-'68 in the domain of mental health, in the domain of psychiatric nurses. And immediately—this was still '57—there was an outcry, not only from the CGT, but also from the CFDT,¹⁴ [...] saying: What's this? You're collaborating [...], it's outrageous. In the first place, nurses don't have to meet outside of the union organization, and secondly, in order to talk about workplace problems, that's completely out of the question, in a way that's like collaborating with the government... That was the first time I was personally accused of being some sort of Gaullist agent... [...] And it was immediately broken up. The leaders of the movement were kicked out of the CGT, etc. [...]

All that by way of saying that this working-class morality, this control of subjectification, concerned not only the Communist party, not only the workers unions, not only the so-called “mass movements,” which is to say the dissident subjectifications that regularly got themselves kicked out, [...] it didn’t matter, it was part of its metabolism... It also concerned every move of the intellectuals and even the bourgeoisie and bosses who were trying to lead working class subjectivity astray. In other words, what was interesting was that the Communist party could be very opportunistic, very open in relation to intellectuals, to members of the bourgeoisie who stayed in their place, in particular in relation to Catholic circles; there was already the great fraternity which was [...] by [Roger] Garaudy¹⁵ in that period, [...] but when psychiatrists, intellectuals or whoever paved the way for this sort of territorial debate—what happens as a mode of subjectification in one profession or another?—that was immediately denounced, it was a great perversion that was attacked using accusations of participationism,¹⁶ the Gaullists, the people who wanted workers to share [...] in other words, they wanted to manage subjectivity, whereas it had to be completely protected by the dichotomy of class oppositions. So, I am saying all of that because, in the end...

Deleuze: Can I ask you a question at this point? Because it seems to me that you are showing the emergence of new struggles, the emergence of a new type of struggle, and the constitution of new subjectifications is absolutely complementary to that. So, in relation to that you were led, I believe—I don’t remember when, before ‘68—you proposed I think the notion of transversality as a way of referring to the new types of struggle, or a certain new type of struggle, which was then taken up by Foucault in another context, to refer, in his case as well, to new types of struggle. And you were saying that these struggles are transversal as opposed to the centralized struggles led by the PC.¹⁷ And then, afterwards or at the same time, but a little afterwards I think, the notion of transversality had, it seems to me, great effect. Transversal struggle was a theme that was taken up everywhere. What did transversal struggles consist in, as a new type of struggle today, in opposition to the old, centralized union-based or PC-type struggle? And then a little afterwards I think there was the development of the theme of alternatives, of alternative networks. That also interests me because it is an example of “derived” forms: “alternative” is really something that is derived. An alternative psychiatry for example derives from a certain state of psychiatry and assumes its full autonomy. It both forms both a new type of struggle and leads to the emergence of, it feeds, a new type of subjectification.

So, at this point, would you be able to say a little about how you understand this transversality, these alternative networks? And if we always come back to the psychiatric example and if you have chosen it—rightly in my view—as a point of departure, it’s not just because of your own personal taste, it’s because it is in the very chronology of events, that was one of the first sites where everything was stirred up. What I would like then, if it suits you: the transversal, alternative networks and their relationship with the new subjectification... What was the new psychiatric subjectification, which is to say the subjectification of mad people, who constituted themselves in a certain way?

Guattari: Well, just some [...], because it’s...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes...

Guattari: We need to say that this emergence of a set of themes related to modes of subjectification and social networks [...] happened both in an explosive way, as ultra new, and at the same time spread in a sort of transversal way—hence the expression “transversality”—moving across a certain number of themes, or more than themes: words, passwords, signs of recognition. At that period there was—well, we had organized ourselves around a research group, we had created a federation of research groups¹⁸ at [...]. It was the theme of institutional analysis, the idea of always questioning the processes of subjectification that had to be carried out in any situation, whether a pedagogical situation, psychotherapeutic situation, cultural activities, urban planning, etcetera. And the idea that kept coming up was that what had to be challenged was not just the modes of relationship that a teacher, a psychiatrist, an urban planner, etcetera, had with their object, there was the problem of the different relationships, let’s say the “polyphony” of possible entry points [...] to an object like that, so already the insistence on the role of users, giving a voice to children, to [...] and so on, and there was another theme that seems interesting to connect now to everything you have said [...], there was also the idea of a need for research on research or more precisely that the act of teaching involved a certain reflection [*repli*].

So, you have to realize that—at the time we talked about institutional transference, we had imported a whole series of categories from psychoanalysis—and there was the idea that we couldn’t successfully carry out the objective project, let’s say in the pedagogical “outside,” in the psychiatric “outside,” in the urban planning “outside,” etcetera. without there being a very artificially staged or arranged “inside” which was the fact that we would talk amongst ourselves about what happens, and so on, things that were developed much more after ‘68, but which we had started to explore under the general theme of institutional analysis. And it was in that context that I was led to develop a series of notions around transference in particular with the categories of transversality, which is to say, how could something other than messages, how could something other than denotation or signification operate independently of circumscribed meanings or denoted registers, but which were, let’s say, subjective formations which could turn around, very quickly turn around, quite different situations to create an atmosphere. A positive atmosphere [...] or an atmosphere of inhibition or anxiety, something like that. So those were already the initial stages of what I later called the existential function, the pragmatics of subjective existence precisely as it can function outside the manufacture of ideologies and relationships of forces.

Deleuze: So, can I say, as a first approximation, that a transversal relationship could be defined as one that by nature unites terms, which is to say heterogeneous agents, whose functions are heterogeneous. Which is to say its direction is transversal, whereas the more traditional kind of struggles before this time always carved up [*taillaient*] homogenous systems,

Guattari: In principle.

Deleuze: ... systems that are so homogenous that, even if you were talking about a general strike, it covers all of the heterogeneous professional sectors, but grasps them in a homogenous system:

all the laborers, all the workers, it was a homogenous system. What I want to say though is that “systematics”—if we want to refine our vocabulary—systematics, of which the Hegelian dialectic—I’m leaving it open for Marx, because the case of Marx is much more complicated—is the finest expression, has always operated with homogenous systems. And a tendency to global, maximum homogenization, not only in the Hegelian dialectic, but in the case of other methods, as we have seen, I have talked about it this year: linguistics, which has always considered the condition of its scientific status to be its carving up, the fact of carving up a homogenous system, a homogenous linguistic corpus. We can say it is the old schema of pyramidal struggles, literally, it is the shape of democratic centralism: a base, intellectuals, a summit—the party, which is the vanguard. It is the method of a system of homogenization.

What Felix, I think, and others after him, called transversal struggles—which Foucault takes up on page 320 of Rabinow and Dreyfus,¹⁹ these are transversal struggles but very curiously in his case he only understands them, in the context, as happening in several heterogeneous countries. But I think we have to generalize Foucault’s remark and say that transversal struggles are ones that unite heterogeneous agents as such, for example...

Guattari: Not only as such, but ones that work their own heterogeneity...

Deleuze: That’s right...

Guattari: ... not just a de facto heterogeneity, but a “processual” heterogeneity, if we can say that... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:43:52]

Part 4

[Deleuze]: ... the junction of homogenous systems. It always works from one homogenous system to another, between the two. It always works, in fact, between homogenous systems, on the same level or on different levels, but there must constantly be a set of systems, each one of which is homogenous, but heterogeneous in relation to each other, systems in disequilibrium. And if we wanted to give it a rigorous terminological sense, we would call that—to use to a fashionable term but not I think understood in this exact sense—systemics, as opposed to systematics. Systemics, as opposed to systematics, would be the study of systems in disequilibrium. It would be the study of transversal relationships between systems, which is to say it would be the study of relationships that go from heterogeneous term to heterogeneous term, as such.

So much so that, when I say Foucault—but to the best of my knowledge neither Felix nor I had any need to cry over the death of the dialectic, lots of others discovered that the dialectic didn’t apply here, on this level we are calling systemic, that it was systematic, it presupposed a homogenous set of knowledge. And, in a certain way, Foucault didn’t go through this stage, and nor did Felix because, obviously, I think we belonged much more to a domain that was already completely systemic and not at all systematic, where the units were really always heterogeneous in relation to each other and the relationships were transversal from one unit to another.

To make it more concrete, I'll go back to the psychiatric example from Félix. What was important in a transversal struggle was obviously not to generate, as the old methods of the unions or Communist party would still have wanted, a movement of psychiatrists, a movement of nurses and even ultimately a movement of patients, a movement of sick people, and then, as required, reunite the three movements in a still-homogenous and dialectisable system which would be the homogenous system of everything to do with psychiatry. A transversal system is on the contrary about taking heterogeneous agents in their heterogeneity... So, I take a [...] [*sound of Deleuze's hand banging on the table*] and then a doctor [*bang*] and then one mustn't be able to let go of the other, it's like that [*bang, bang, bang*], it won't at that moment be the formation of a homogenous system, it is at the point of disequilibrium between the two systems. The psychiatrist still has to go along with it of course, there are lots of psychiatrists...

Guattari: The system can split apart, that's part of...

Deleuze: ... and the system splits apart and all the more so for the fact that, in the end, these encounters can only happen in a system that is systemic, which is to say in a new type of clinic already. And then an architect arrives and says: are you crazy? How are you going to create a new nurse-patient relationship if you have corridors like that and rooms like that and windows like this? And then, as an architect, etcetera. And then you have the mad person's parent, who says: you're going to give him back to me this evening, right? [*Laughter*] But what happens in the evening when I pick him up? And then I don't have anyone to take him back the next day. Suddenly another problem: how do we take them on outings? And then you find out that there's the problem of how welcome they are, how welcome they are in the neighboring village, when the schizophrenics go on an outing. The great comedy of psychiatry is schizophrenics on an outing, they put them in a coach [...] and twelve schizophrenics who turn up at a café, they don't go unnoticed. It is high Beckett, it is tremendous, but there as well, there are all sorts of nuances between being welcoming and being hostile.

So, you can see what we will call a systemic approach, which has these heterogeneous terms confront each other without first forming homogenous systems that are ever more homogenizable as a pre-condition. We never reach a pyramid of pyramids that is "things to do with psychiatry." We will always stay at the base or on the sides of the pyramid by creating a collision between a nurse, a psychiatrist, the parent of a mad person etcetera, etcetera. That's a transversal relationship.

Guattari: So...

Deleuze: Yes...?

A student: [*Inaudible question*]

Deleuze: Yes, ask the question quickly, even if it means elaborating on it later...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: How did he confront it? He was obliged to confront it, obviously he was obliged to confront it...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: No! Not really...

The student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, I understand, but I think Felix will respond on that point.

Guattari: I think we have to try to re-situate these questions necessarily outside of the perspective, which was that, as I was saying, of a completely transitory period, where there was a breakdown of the ways of seeing things of that time. We also have to reframe them in relation to the current situation of subjectification which is this irresistible rise of a glacialization of archaic subjectivities—to use terms I have put forward—which I have put under the general heading of the “years of winter,” which is the fact that something didn’t work and, on the contrary, has made way for this extremely reactionary rise, not only in economic ideologies, such as [...], but also in the deep subjectivity of very large sectors of the population, which results in Lepenism, the rise of racism, etc.²⁰ I think we have to situate your problems in relation to this occurrence [...] of the period we are in.

And it is in that sense that I would like, for my own part, to try to reframe what the projects of that era were—Foucault’s, those of a certain number of... Which is to say that what interests me, what I would like to do, if I can, is to try to reformulate the problem of these archaic forms and why they work so well and unfortunately work increasingly well and in a way that’s increasingly dangerous. It’s that all of these approaches are not completely separate from the transformational perspectives in the area of the relationships of forces, and in the area of a clarification of knowledge, in the area of a critical analysis of knowledges. There were some intertwinings, I think, which weren’t themselves transversalities, but on the contrary led, at the same time as there was progress in this attempt to think effervescent subjectifications, there were systems of [...] which on the contrary resulted in very retrograde influences, very reactionary and conservative and not only on the global level where we see it now, but also on a completely microsocial level. This is what happened at the heart of the homosexual movement, the feminist movement, etcetera. We saw a very active, very virulent creation of groupuscules, which meant that what had been a very generous, very open, very free movement like the movement of ‘68, ended up in organizations that in a sense were ultra-conservative, like the Gauche Prolétarienne,²¹ the Maoist movement with all [...], etcetera. But the problem that I would like to try to throw back to Gilles is: how did we get to that point, and how was it that, in a certain way, the worm was already in the fruit of that particular time? That’s what leads me to try to look deeper into the problem...

Deleuze: Would you accept just the following correction? “How did we get to that point?” but also: “How, at the same time, did the genuine process of subjectification make some astonishing leaps independently of those failures?”

Guattari: Well, that’s easy, relatively speaking, I mean it’s easy to agree on that point, to describe [...]

Deleuze: Yes, but it is very important for us, I think, to clearly state that, in my opinion in any case, that May '68 wasn't in any way a failure.

Guattari: Yes, agreed, but that's been said time and time again. We can say it again. What I would to make is a more particular point about the themes already indicated regarding the three dimensions, knowledge, power, and subjectification. Foucault still conceives the problem of subjectification in terms of "large folds"—large folds that occupy small, medium, even long historical periods, and large folds that are established on very large layers, large eras of subjectification. In this way, in a certain sense, we haven't completely broken away from other traditional methods—social-democratic, Stalinian or even Christian—the idea of wanting to transform subjectification through broad masses. This work of subjectification through large groups is what we are seeing with the production of mass-media subjectification, the one that is produced with collective [...], except that in that case it is completely serial, completely universalizing. There we are still within a globalist perspective and [...].

The problem it brings out—but in a certain obscurity and I think it is this obscurity we need to look into—is that the folds in question, these productions of subjectivity, happen on all levels. They happen just as much on intrapersonal levels: transformations of vision, perception—the transformation of vision of someone like [Antonin] Artaud or Beckett, who see and feel literature, writing, theatre, cinema in another way. It is a transformation that we can call completely singular, completely individual. There are transformations that happen on other levels, there's an interesting transformation for example which we can date—each time we can give a proper name, it isn't completely by accident that we can assign a proper name, even though the proper name might go beyond the individual in question—which was the revolution introduced by Célestin Freinet in the pedagogical relationship, which was first expressed not at all in a critique of pedagogical theories, but in his own inability, the impossibility of performing his job as a school teacher, which led him to introduce relationships... to create another pedagogical space in a country classroom, and from there all sorts of things grew: theories, practices, technologies like a printing press at the school, a cooperative, or pedagogical movements which was more or less supposed to tear up [...]. Another type of rupture, which is both individual and group-based, is that of Fernand Deligny, which is introduced not through ideology, but through his sensibility -- [...] – who will be considered as being a writer or poet, who can't bear the profession given to him, which is to say his professional role in a psychiatric hospital, and then in relationships, afterwards, with children [...], delinquents, the intellectually disabled, etc. Based on that, another type of vision develops, another mode of reference for those problems, and another arrangement of actors, with all the subsequent dialectical repercussions that might result and which obviously are without importance.

What I mean, what is interesting to see, is: what are the operators of these folds, what are these crystals of foldings? What are these points of bifurcation, to use the terminology that you indicated and used? Why is it that at a given moment it won't fold in the same direction anymore? These are the operators that I think we have to think about: what is an operator of subjectification? Because, otherwise... What is an operator of a fold? What is a folding? What is a fold going to [...]? So if you like, I will take two examples to try to come back to this question,

which is always in the background, of the ever-possible resurgence of archaic forms, which means that when a fold, when an operator like that is powerful enough to completely change the coordinates of subjectification of a whole domain, as long it works, it has all sorts of consequences, it can infect the whole planet, like in '68: there was a certain fold of expression that took over Japan, the United States, everywhere. And then if that breaks up, then, on the contrary, there is a resurgence of old modes of subjectification that take back the power and reinstate themselves all the more violently for the fact that it was impossible for the new process of subjectification to find its own duration, to find its own memory, its own basis of memory [*mémoire d'être*], its own resurrection in territories of subjectification.

I am going to take two examples to show the very specific features of these operators. I'm going back before '68 to '65, '66, '67. In the student movement, there was, as you know, a whole upheaval linked to the fallout from the Algerian war, the fact that nobody had reacted in an intelligent way to the Algerian war, which is to say the Communist party and the socialists had, in the end, participated in this colonial war. The first subjective responses were completely singular, completely non-discursive. There were the revolts of people who refused to go, revolts in the trains, in the train stations, there were desertions, people who hid or worked with the FLN,²² etc.

That created a sort of diffuse nucleus, which crystallized in different forms, in particular in the student movement. A first level of subjectification, which was a rupture difficult to explain, because even someone like [...] who was classified as someone very much on the left, etcetera, denounced these revolts. And helping the FLN was, at that time, very poorly regarded by the people who were able to articulate a position on the subject. More or less in the same way that all the people who were in a position to say something at the time of the Paris Commune, you could say that there were practically no intellectuals at that time, no one, no artists, bar a few exceptions like [Gustave] Courbet, who were able to realize the transformation of subjectification that happened in the Paris Commune. It took decades for people to start to rethink what happened during the Paris Commune. Well, it was the same with the Algerian war, and even with '68.

I would like to focus on a very tiny operator, microscopic—neglected for that matter, I think, by historians today—which was very important. You'll see why I've chosen it. In the student movement before '68, there was the union of Communist students who were dissidents, influenced by currents from Italy, and there were also a certain number of currents from Christian sources, leftist, etcetera, which influenced this movement, which thus developed some alternative ideologies. But the decisive operator was what happened at the heart of the *Mutuelle Nationale des Étudiants de France*,²³ because in that case it was not just about challenging attitudes and ideas, but about little administrative territories, part of the state apparatus, namely student social security.

It was in those sectors that students were in a completely different position to that of other students, completely dependent on the professors, the university, etc., means of survival, they found themselves in the position of managing significant sums of money. Money [...] for

different types of accident, contingencies, of the French system of [...]. But these students set about trying to transform a few little things, microscopic things, such as a university psychological support center, where they introduced psychotherapeutic methods, they referred to psychoanalysis, they examined problems of knowledge, the transformation of the teaching relationship, problems of sexuality in the student environment, etcetera. And based on that there was a crystallization of what I call operators of subjectification, which infected and animated everything that happened later in the UNEF,²⁴ and in the whole of the student movement. And in '68 we find these operators in full effect, in particular the people at the Strasbourg [...], because one of the Strasbourg groups²⁵ simply dissolved its student social security fund branch and used the funds, embezzled the funds, to produce leaflets which were, as you know, the whole Situationist literature which then had significant reverberations.

There needed to be a minimum operator, a small territory where the usual relationships could be rearranged, a liberated territory, a little territory of reappropriation so that, in one stroke, the fold is formed. It was at that time for that matter that a whole series of people made contact with the student movements, non-student people: psychiatrists, people like me, people like [...] and a whole possibility of the proliferation of problematics appeared. What is very interesting to see is that it wasn't an ideology that developed in this student fund, in [...], it was a series of possibilities that was simply a rupture; this margin, this proliferation so that something could be said, but what could be said wasn't yet known.

So, second remark, an operator to be discovered, the vacuoles, the funds, the student movements, etcetera. Alongside all that, what happened at Nanterre. The group that later called itself the Movement of 22 March at Nanterre wasn't at all a [...] group, wasn't at all a group with a defined ideological position. On the contrary, the university of Nanterre was a rather marginal, poor place, nothing was happening there, except people getting bored shitless in a new type of town planning, a miserable new type of architecture. It was in that context that a number of crystallizations of currents were created, spectacular ruptures were introduced, and it created this sort of field effect, this repercussion effect, which was one of the fundamental catalysts of May '68.

What I want to say, by underlining these two examples which seem a bit incomprehensible, is that it is precisely because they were incomprehensible, precisely because they could not be directly interpreted within the political coordinates of the time, the union coordinates, the coordinates of the groupuscule, that they created this effect of a rupture, which led to de Gaulle himself saying: really, after all I've done? At a moment when Gaullism had triumphed on all the other levels, he says: what on earth is this mess, what is this absolutely unclassifiable thing, this sort of monstrosity that has fallen across my path and tarnished my representation of French subjectivity, the thing I've fought for decades?

What I want to draw your attention to is that this practice of the fold doesn't imply an extravagant rupture in relation to discursive statements or the reference points of struggles, but implies enough substance for a practice of subjectification to affirm itself as such, to be self-referential, to break away in such a way that it can serve either as a focal point in relation to

opposing forces, forces of repression, etc., or as a catalyst for saying that something has happened. This type of rupture is distinctive not only because it is a rupture, but because it is affirmed as a rupture, because it is a fold to the nth degree, a fold of a fold. It is an affirmation of the rupture as such, not a simple statement of marginality, a reference point for people who are looking for their collective identity, saying we're more or less dependent or independent, but it affirms itself as something that places itself outside of the usual games of manufacturing meaning and manufacturing systems of reference and relationships of forces.

Maybe that's where we can make the connection to other types of practices that are no longer social practices but are for example poetic, or esthetic practices, like the rupture of the analyst who introduces a certain radically different way of constructing sentences, of constructing meaning. A certain type of rupture which, as long as it affirms itself in its singularity, can become a process of singularization, and it is this process of singularization, this mode of existentialization, this way of constructing existence in another mode, which itself involves [...], which itself can be transmitted at the speed of light, at the speed of the media, at the speed of affects, which is to say not the speed of the comprehension of a problem or the speed of the transmission of relationships of forces. So that is what I wanted to say; I hope it wasn't too dense, but I think that Gilles will be...

Deleuze: Yes, I'd like to...

Guattari: I'd like to finish if you don't mind. What seems important to me here in relation to Foucault is that Foucault still left the spheres of knowledge and power too autonomous in relation to these spheres of subjectification. These problems of subjectification are still too connected to problems of forces. It is still forces, relationships of forces that are being folded, but at this level of subjectification it is no longer about forces, or even relationships of forces, we are no longer in the same logic of discursive systems which articulate territories that are distinct from one another. We are entering what Gilles, at another time, called a logic of sense, which we reworked as a logic of the body without organs. We are entering a logic of affect that doesn't recognize distinctions between subjective entities in relation to each other. A becoming-feminine like that of the feminist movements isn't opposed to a becoming-homosexual or a becoming-masculine or a becoming-child or a becoming-invisible or a becoming-plant. It's an intensity, a flash of existential intensity that is affirmed in completely different subjectivities. You can be caught up in a becoming-feminine and be heterosexual. You can undertake a becoming-plant or a becoming-schizo and be in other respects a man of action connected to such or such a union structure where there are relationships of forces. It's this transition to this other logic that matters. I don't think the fold establishes itself between fields of forces; it is introduced as a structure of folding, as a process-based structure that creates another type of self-reference, and that's what seems important to me, and it's at that point that we see that, to the extent that this type of reversal takes place, something comes along, another mode of subjectification is established with all of its consequences and then, if not, it gives way to other modes of subjectification that themselves only connect with logics of knowledge and logics of the relationship of forces.

Deleuze: I would like, if you don't mind, to draw out three things straight away in what you have said because they fit quite well with... The three things concern three features that don't exhaust this production of subjectivity or this process of subjectification. It's precisely because it doesn't depend on power or knowledge, because it has this autonomy, this derived character, that it necessarily mobilizes, would not be possible without, a new field of perception and a new field of affect. Of perception and affect. That's a theme that is widely shared... You find the call for a new perception very well expressed in [Herbert] Marcuse, for example, but you also find it in the drug communities that essentially championed a new form of perception. Now I'm not saying that was... we are maintaining the principle that there can be failures in these operations of subjectification. What interests me, independently of the successes or failures, are the themes, the sort of grand claims.

As Felix said, the claim to a new way of perceiving, a new field of perception and a new field of affect is fundamental. And it is all the more fundamental, once again, for the fact that subjectification doesn't follow from a dialectic of knowledge. So, you can only sustain your autonomy through new perceptions, new affects. For example, in the text by Marcuse that goes the furthest in this direction, he says: go ahead! He doesn't say: what is this new perception? It's a small volume called *An Essay on Liberation*.²⁶ But I think that, in some cases, we've gone further in the analysis of these new ways of perceiving.

The second point that Felix brought out, and which I think is essential, is that not only do all processes of subjectification bring new fields of perception and affect with them, but they themselves constitute an opening of potentiality, which is to say they respond to the theme, not especially of spontaneity, but creativity. The determination of something new—and it is almost a principle of all creativity that something new is posited before we know what it will be, so much so that subjectification is the same as the question: how do we get to these constitutions of possible creativity, of potential creativity? I call potential creativity this positing of a new thing before we know what it is, what is new.

That would be the second point and the third point is that an identity can only be assigned in a process of subjectification if it is already reappropriated by the forms of power and knowledge. There are texts by Adorno that head in this direction: what corresponds to a process of subjectification is non-identity, the non-identical. And what is the non-identical, in a certain way? It is very close to what we were talking about in the beginning, and it comes back to the problem of perception. Making art, but also, I'm not saying just that, outside of art. Making art outside of art: there as well I maintain that it can contain the most mediocre, the most worthless or the most important, that's why there is never... You know we're not saying that subjectification will save you from power, because there are subjectifications where it would be better to immediately commit suicide than enter those particular subjectifications. There is no value judgment in these axes, there are subjectifications that are shameful, there are ways of making art outside of art that are shameful. I'll give some very quick examples: the way American gangs—group subjectivity, group subjectification—paint the subway isn't the same thing as the stencil painting we see kids doing today, where the heart contracts as much for art as for the outside of art.

But the example of Dadaism is very important because that was, I think, one of the first great modern attempts to make art outside of art, and then after, as Felix suggested, we find exactly the same pattern: the power of this subjectification is taken back over by Surrealism, which reinstates the relationship of power, and appeals again to new forms of knowledge, after the sort of explosion or opening of Dada, which opened up a potentiality, a creation of potentiality.

So, I really think that the three features of what Felix said, the three features he drew out, was the circumscription of a new field of perception and a new field of affect, the opening of potentialities—which has always been the aim, I think, of modern philosophy, as opposed to classical philosophy. For me the difference between modern philosophy and classical philosophy is that instead searching for, and most often finding, the eternal in one way or another, doing modern philosophy is thinking about what something new is; what is creativity? It's not a recent thing, it's the problem of the whole of the end of the nineteenth century, it's Bergson's problem, it's the problem of art and the philosophy of art at that time, it's Whitehead's problem, who is one of the greatest Anglo-American philosophers of the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. What is something new?

And so, this problem we have identified among all the philosophers, in all the streams of thought that lead to '68 and run through it and then continue after '68, namely this problem of art having a status that has to involve a sort of expropriation, if you like, concerning existence itself, in such a way that art is not reserved to the work of art.

But there again, even on the level of perception, you have fields of perception that really you'd be better off not sticking your nose into, or better off not touching, not only because they are dangerous—take the great texts of Michaux, which for me are marvelous texts in relation to this problem of subjectification. Michaux's texts "Why I am giving up drugs", in *Miserable Miracle*; "Why I am giving up the rule, drugs".²⁷ And Michaux's two answers, which are very simple, but wonderfully explained, are: because it is too dangerous—but if that's all it was it would be nothing because it's too banal. But how do you find the same problem that opens up perception, because for Michaux drugs are above all the opening of a new perceptual field, and at that time there was an opposition between opening up a new perceptual field through drugs and the contrary movement towards sexuality, which is to say towards affect. There were movements of liberation of perception, as distinct from movements of liberation of affect. But they were processes of subjectification that could coincide or compete with each other.

So, we move on to the last point. In effect, we are positing the principle—and I think Felix has often mentioned it—that all social transformation implies or expects, expects or invokes—even though it may or may not come about—a subjectification, a mode of subjectification or modes of subjectification. And modes of subjectification aren't based on government regulations, on requirements of power, or on the organization of knowledge. They come about in another way, which in fact is a sort of creativity, something new. So, we could take the Arab world in its history over the last 50 years. Once again, there are bad subjectifications as well, catastrophic ones—you say to yourself: oh God, anything but that subjectification. That's not the question. There are some that seem wonderful and then to each of us, that changes. There's certainly one

in the Arab world, but in America as well. We all know for example that at the time of the New Deal, there was a vast operation of subjectification that dramatically transformed American society. And Felix alluded to Brazil—where some of you are also very aware of what is happening—as appealing to very unusual modes of subjectification in relation to power and in relation to technical knowledge... Yes?

Guattari: A few sweeping remarks. [...] How can subjectivities, archaic folds of subjectivity, assume, resume, acquire the efficiency they may not have even had in the past? It's a question that was already raised at the dawn of Leninism with the famous National Question. The national questions were something that haunted the later rise to power of Stalinism: the subjectivity of the workers movement, but we could also capitalist subjectivity because at that level it is all part of the same group of things. What resisted the different modes of imperialist or imperialist-type subjectifications—the imperialism of [...] Eastern countries, or general mass-media subjectivities around Western power—was the resurgence of questions that progressivist rationality thought were definitively out of the frame, these were the national questions which started to animate not only the USSR but different workers movements everywhere. At the moment when the forms of internationalist struggle were able establish themselves, there was a resurgence of national questions, or particularist questions, even corporatist questions, which we could say marked a brutal reterritorialization of subjectivity that prevented and prohibited the programs, the political programs, perspectives, etcetera. I think it is against the background of these questions that the problem of subjective identities, national identities, professional identities, corporatist identities, etcetera, is posed.

What seems interesting to me is that we have two main scenarios. We have a scenario where, to use Gilles' expression, there is a compromise between forms of subjectification, and this compromise is managed to benefit the interests of, let's say, the modernization of the country. We could characterize this compromise as being that of the Popular Front.²⁸ There is, I think, a sort of subjective complex of the Popular Front that consists not only in acknowledging differences in subjective polarity between the classes, not only acknowledging a form of power as a crystallizing instance, one that determines practices of powers that are both union-based and representative on the parliamentary level, and then a whole system of power alternating between the right and the left, etc., not only acknowledging this but even choosing it, electing it. It's quite characteristic that a part of the New Deal subjectivity, the subjectivities—because there are several types of New Deal—are close to this Popular Front-type subjectivity. It favors a very relatively autonomous expression of the working classes, of the popular classes, on the condition that there are exchanges, a whole series of subjective services provided [*prestations subjectives*], in relationship to the elites, in relationship to the capitalist aristocracy.

So, there is a formula of the status quo. When this formula of the status quo doesn't work, it must be made to work. In this sense we could consider that fascist countries, because they refused this type of status quo, created an imbalance that brought about the great war of subjectification that was the last world war, which was a much more a war between subjective models than a war between models of economic interest, if you look at it closely. Some countries that didn't take this Popular Front-style turn, like Spain, lagged behind significantly when it came to being able

to integrate the working classes into Spanish capitalism. If there was this significant lag of Spanish capitalism, it's precisely because there wasn't this management of relationships of subjectification of the Popular Front type in France or another country.

We see a new formula appear which is no longer the formula of a compromise between the models of subjectification, the New Deal-type formula: increasing working-class consumption will lead to a general revival of economic circuits and above all a global capacity of social groups to function not in order to overcome crises, but through crises, because of crises; it is crisis that is the very motor that inaugurates a certain mode of subjectification. You find this model pushed to its extreme precisely in the Italian formulas, the Italian formula of contestation, which is to say the fact that marginal entities themselves, the status of a certain number of non-guaranteed social strata, are part of the very motor of social structuration.

The other scenario, which appears, in my opinion, in Japan, is one that is no longer about compromise, but about integration. It isn't about making the autonomous subjectivity of the popular stratum or working-class stratum coexist with the aristocratic stratum, it is about completely integrating them, creating something like a fusion, like a real nuclear fusion. What I think characterizes the mode of subjectification of the Japanese miracle is that the popular strata and capitalist strata both become continuations of each other—there is no rupture, no visible class divide, no completely distinct social spaces, first of all because the territory doesn't really lend itself to it, there is not much possibility of creating residential zones that are completely autonomous from working class zones—and on top of that the modes of subjectification, the modes of work, are relatively homogenous in relation to each other wherever you are placed in the hierarchical system, and the hierarchies are as interiorized on the level of the most disadvantaged strata as on the level of the ruling strata. That leads to something very paradoxical, which is that, far from producing a purely modernist subjectivity—which exists, since there is a subjective vector of integration at the heart of the enterprise, taking on the most modern technologies at the techno-scientific level... [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:30:42]

Part 5

[Guattari]: ... you find a certain mode of operation of archaic Japanese subjectivity, which are the same instruments that are used to produce the most, let's say, modernist subjectivity, or postmodernist, if you will, it's the same thing in this instance. So, this is the most efficient formula of integration and, in a sense, the most dangerous, because it is also the most de-singularizing. It singularizes processes in the economic domain, in the technological domain, but it also produces a general serialization of Japanese subjectivity. I give that example as one of the focal points today, and also one of the myths, of the new forms of subjectification.

Another focal point that I would like to contrast to this is Brazil, because there, on the contrary, a form of subjectification seems to be developing that is no longer of the let's say populist form, the Popular Front form—which is to say relatively complementary provisions of services [*prestations*] between poles of subjectification—but a form of segmentarity that seems very mysterious to me, namely that Brazil is both I think the sixth or seventh ranked industrial power today and is a growing power that will certainly become stronger in the years to come, but at the

same time it is a country with a population of 120 million, of which perhaps between 80 and 100 million do not participate in the monetary economy because they are in a state of absolute poverty. So we are no longer in a Popular Front economy, an economy of the reciprocal provision of services. It is as though there was an uneven, heterogeneous development of hyper-capitalist subjectivity that coexists with an extremely strong subjectivity of poverty. You also find a phenomenon that's a bit similar in the United States with the ghettos, etcetera. But there...

Deleuze: ...which are themselves, as you say, phenomena of a completely different subjectification, where there is a subjectification of this whole group of people who are outside of the market, who don't participate in the market...

Guattari: So, I would just like to make two comments about Brazil, which I think are very worthy of reflection. Two points. The fact that alongside this heterogeneity of subjective poles is another type of general service provision, that of the media, because all of the players, including the very poorest ones, the ones dying in the favelas, have television. The television-based systems of subjectification reach all participants. So, it is not as though there is a reserve, like a native reservation, of people left in the middle of nowhere while they build an industrial bastion, no! There is an aim to create a great Brazil, a grand subjective market, via the intermediary of this instrument that isn't an instrument of monetary exchange, which doesn't go through the monetary system—because once again, more than half of Brazilians barely participate in the monetary economy, given the insane inflation rates they've experienced — but through the semiotics of mass media.

Second comment: archaic forms, obviously [...] processes of subjective territorialization, obviously exist, among the blacks, in the north of Brazil, in Bahia etc., they can be seen among the Indians—which is completely natural because it's understandable that these groups latch onto, reconstitute, a subjectivity for themselves with whatever is on hand, with what they have brought over from the old African religions, things like that—but what is much more interesting is that these same archaic forms are active in Brazilian subjectivity as a whole. Which is to say that there is a double movement of subjectification. On the one hand, the capitalist media reaches all 120 million Brazilians, but as a trend alongside, the religions, religions like Candomblé, African religions [...] affect the whole of the dominant subjectification.

There is a production of subjectivity in this case which seems to me to be completely different in nature to the state of subjectivity in the other scenarios, which developed in entities which could be more or less defined, a social class or a group, or, for example, the subjectivity of Bretons in France, etc. In this case, it is something that maintains transversal relationships. I am not making any value judgments—well, I do make one in relation to Japan, because we can wonder whether this process of integration won't end up in a nuclear explosion; it's hard to see how it can continue indefinitely, and there are also a few areas of absolute marginality like in [...], where that will be quite marginal. Whereas in Brazil there is another mode of development which ultimately, in my opinion, will quite profoundly challenge the modes of subjectification on the planet today; it will end up challenging them in as intense a way as the Japanese model. I think

we need to think about these two types of production of subjectivity, which are developing before our eyes.

Deleuze: Yes, that gives us the idea that not only is there historical variation, in effect, there is constant, constant geographical variation in modes of subjectification. It's good because you have quickly analyzed more than two of them. There was, first of all, I've forgotten what it was...

Guattari: Italy.

Deleuze: Italy. You talked about Italy... Oh yes, Spain. Spain, Japan, Brazil. So... you agree, right? You agree. He even says that is the reason he went. [*Laughter*] All right. What I take from this, and what was the aim of this session, if you like, is to become aware of the way in which in each case, the ways... these are really complicated problems: the problem of subjectification, including and above all collective subjectification, insofar as it differs in nature, or is naturally distinct, from both relationships of power and forms of knowledge.

And—this is the second point—how there is obviously a constant reaction of modes of subjectification with forms of knowledge and relationships of power. But I genuinely think that by the end of the three final books, including *The Confessions of the Flesh*, Foucault was living and had lived this problem as the one that had become fundamental for him, once we say, based on what he wished, that he worked out how to break through the line constituted by power. He worked out how to call relationships of power into question without always staying on the side of these relationships of power. So, how he discovered this third axis, and his problem obviously became how to reorganize everything in the previous two axes, knowledge and power, as a function of the axis of subjectification and vice versa. And, if we can allow ourselves to predict how he would have continued his work, I think that this aspect would have become increasingly important for him, including... his whole thought on art and on literature was taking on a new meaning through that, because we constantly encountered the problem of new perceptions, new affects, and the problem of art in relation to this or the creation of potentialities.

And, if you like, what really created the impasse of the *Will to Knowledge*, it was as though Foucault had said to himself: in the end there is no place in my system, in my thought, for the creation of the new, except in the form of transformations whose origins are unknown. And it was when he felt caught in this impasse that he broke up, that he precisely broke up, as if starting again from zero with his series of three books, there, beginning with the *Use of Pleasure*. In discovering subjectification, he discovered something like a source of points of resistance, a source for opening up potentialities in a social field, to the point where, at that moment, a battle developed between the three axes.

So next time, if it suits you, I will ask someone else, I will ask Éric [*Alliez*], who will talk a little bit about Italy and the Italians, who we have referred to a lot, and then we will move towards a more general and more abstract reflection on the three axes, but today I am very happy that we have seen it in a concrete way. *Voilà!* [*End of the recording*] [2 :40 :12]

Notes

¹ Samuel Beckett, *Mercier et Camier* (Paris : Les Editions de Minuit, 1970), pp. 121-122. The novel was originally written in French, and Beckett's English version was considerably reworked. It does not contain this exchange, which in the French reads in full: "*Comment te sens-tu? dit Camier. J'oublie toujours de te demander. Je me sentais bien en descendant l'escalier. Maintenant ça va moins bien. Gonflé, si tu veux, mais pas à bloc. Et toi? Un bouchon, dit Camier, au milieu de l'Océan déchaîné.*" ("How are you feeling, says Camier, 'I always forget to ask you.' 'I felt well when I came down the stairs. Now I'm not feeling as good. Fed up, if you like, but not to the point of bursting. And you?' 'A cork,' says Camier, 'in the middle of the stormy sea.'").

² See *Madness & Civilization*, p. 11.

³ Cf. Michaux's autobiographical essay "L'infini turbulent" (1957; "The Turbulent Infinity," also translated as "Infinite Turbulence"): "*Même dans les mouvements prodigieux comme on en perçoit souvent tout à coup comme sous l'effet d'une démultiplication inopinée, ou d'une réaction en chaîne, des mouvements en soudaine expansion, en ombelles, en éventail de fusées, ces mouvements si rapides, si extraordinairement accélérés qu'il soient, doivent périodiquement s'interrompre, cesser, stopper complètement, pour repartir soudain sur leur lancée retrouvée, pour s'arrêter à nouveau au repos parfait, pour reprendre de même leur élan à la vitesse maxima*" ("Even in the prodigious movements as one often suddenly sees as though under the effect of an unexpected amplification or chain reaction, movements in sudden expansion, spiking out, a fan of rockets, these movements that are so quick, so extraordinarily accelerated that they must be periodically interrupted, stop, halt completely, and then suddenly start again with rediscovered momentum, and stop again in perfect repose, in order to again resume their impetus at maximum speed.") (*Oeuvres Complètes*, Tome II, p. 811).

⁴ "Interiorité d'attente," in *L'Entretien infini*, Gallimard, 1969, p. 292. English translation: "interiority of anticipation" in *Infinite Conversation*, trans. Susan Hanson, University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 196.

⁵ "À propos de la généalogie de l'éthique: un aperçu du travail en cours" translated from the English by G. Barbedette, in Michel Foucault, Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: un parcours philosophique* (Gallimard, 1984), pp. 322-346. Reproduced in Michel Foucault: *Dits et Écrits*, Tome IV, text no. 326. Foucault modified the text of the French edition. Original interview in English: "On the Genealogy of Ethics: A overview of a work in progress," in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 229-252. The quotes Deleuze gives here from this interview are on pages 236-237.

⁶ In the English (p. 236): "the lamp or the house."

⁷ This quote is actually from the version of this same interview that Foucault himself modified for its publication in French (in the Dreyfus-Rabinow book on Foucault), appearing as text number 344 in Foucault's *Dits et écrits* (the quote is on p. 617).

⁸ The term Deleuze uses is *ratio totalitaire*. It isn't clear which term exactly this corresponds to in Adorno's work. It appears in a post-face by Hans-Günter Holl to the French translation of Adorno's *Negative Dialectics*.

⁹ "Le sujet et le pouvoir," in *Dits et écrits* Tome IV, text no. 306. French translation by F. Durand-Bogaert of "The Subject and Power," afterword by Michel Foucault in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p. 214.

¹⁰ From statement made by Michelangelo Antonioni at the press conference following the May 1960 Cannes Film Festival premiere of *L'avventura*. "L'avventura: Cannes Statement," English translation in *Film Culture*, Spring 1962. Deleuze cites this Antonioni statement in *Foucault*, p. 107.

¹¹ Mouvement de la Libération des Femmes/French women's liberation movement.

¹² "Socialism or Barbarism": a post-WWII radical libertarian socialist group.

¹³ Guattari's voice is much fainter than Deleuze's and has other noises over the top of it, hence the larger number of places where what he says is inaudible/undecipherable (marked with a [...]).

¹⁴ CGT – *Confédération Générale du Travail*/General Labor Confederation; CFDT – *Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail*/French Democratic Labor Confederation, both trade union associations.

¹⁵ Garaudy, a decorated fighter in the resistance, was an ardent Catholic and also remained a Communist until 1970, occupying a position in the Party's executive committee for 28 years. He was ousted by the Party in 1970 for criticizing the Party for its position on the student movements. He was also an elected member of the National Assembly, both as député and later as senator. He converted from Catholicism to Islam in 1982, supported the Palestinian cause, and eventually was convicted by a French tribunal for statements supporting Holocaust denial.

¹⁶ "Participationnisme," political platform supporting the idea of employee profit-sharing, associated with de Gaulle.

¹⁷ PC – *Parti communiste*/French Communist Party.

¹⁸ *Fédération des Groupes d'Études et de Recherches Institutionnelles* (FGERI)—Federation of Groups for Institutional Study & Research.

¹⁹ Foucault's Afterword: "The Subject and Power" in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 211 ("They are 'transversal' struggles; that is, they are not limited to one country.").

²⁰ See Guattari's book of essays and interviews *Les Années d'hiver, 1980-1985* [The Winter Years] (Paris: Barrault, 1986), many texts from which appear in two volumes, *Chaosophy*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e) 2009) and *Soft Subversions*, ed. Sylvère Lotringer (New York: Semiotext(e), 2009).

²¹ "Proletarian Left" - French Maoist political party.

²² *Front de Libération Nationale*/National Liberation Front.

²³ *Mutuelle Nationale des Étudiants de France* (MNEF)/national social security fund of French students.

²⁴ *Union nationale des étudiants de France* (UNEF)/French students' union.

²⁵ AFGES - *Association Fédérative Générale des Étudiants de Strasbourg* (AFGES)/Strasbourg student association.

²⁶ Herbert Marcuse, *An Essay on Liberty* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

²⁷ On Michaux's views on drugs and "speeds," Deleuze and Guattari refer to his *Miserable Miracle: Mescaline*, in *A Thousand Plateaus* 543, footnotes 70 & 73.

²⁸ The Front Populaire was a coalition of left-wing parties that governed France from 1936-1938.