

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

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Part 1

You see... I began this year in a state of illness, and I'm ending it in illness, so I actually wanted not to have to come here this week, but then I said to myself that it's not possible because I won't have another week to apologize for not coming. So it was a kind of reflex of politeness that made me come. Anyway, today I'm going to take things very easy... I mean very slowly, and then not many, okay? And then, afterwards I'll probably leave things like this. And the reason for all this, I'm sure, is because... it's because I did a course on Pascal, which I didn't want to do, and that I was putting off doing, and I said to myself, but yes! Yes! it's a blow that... it's a blow coming down from heaven, you know.

So, in the end what did we do this year? Well, we agreed from the beginning that in a certain way it would consist in a sort of vast resumption of what we had done the year before. But I tried to explain the necessity of this return. And here, what I would like to do in this last session, is simply to devote myself to a certain number of Bergsonian schemas, some of which served us at the beginning while others, namely three others, are new and will help us resume our programme from the point we've now reached. So today what we have to do concerns a certain number of Bergsonian schemas, obviously from the point of view of the question: what is useful to us in all this? As for other points of view... regarding other points of view we will exercise due caution by not speaking of them.

Well, what we did – and we managed this fairly quickly, which made me very happy – was to make a much richer classification of images and signs than we did last year. And that was at the beginning of this year, and I would say that now it seems much more complete, more satisfying as far as I'm concerned, and it began from a very simple principle – I'm not going to go over it again, don't worry – we started from a plane that we called the plane of movement-images or light-images. On this plane, we assigned centers of indetermination. These centers of indetermination were strictly speaking defined by a gap, which I'll indicate by these small dots, there. The plane of movement-images or light-images in relation to the centers of indetermination gave us three types of images, since the centers of indetermination had three aspects: a perception-image, we agree on that; an action-image... perception expressing what the center of indetermination retained from the world of movement-images acting upon it; action-images indicating how the center of indetermination reacted to the images that exerted their influence on it. ¹

And then, between the two – since what defined the center of indetermination was precisely a gap between perception and action – between the two was something about which I said: notice how in a way this is something that comes to occupy – these were just words – it comes to occupy the gap and yet it doesn't fill it, and this was the affection-image. And if you

remember, we were content with this alone, and for a long time we constructed our table of images and signs according to this first schema.

Then our table of images and signs – I'm not going to go over all this again – but here you had the matter-image which was either movement or light and which gave us the perception-image, the affection-image, the action-image and so on, and their related signs when they appear, in each case. And from the point of view of the composition of all these images, they gave us an indirect image of time, and from the point of view of the genesis of all these images, they gave us one or more indirect figures of thought. So they formed a large block.

Why not stop there? Because we've always considered the matter-image to be a very particular type of cut. It was a perspective, it was a mobile cut or a temporal perspective, or if you prefer, it was a modulation. And indeed, a movement-image, a cinematographic image, is a modulation as opposed to a photograph which, however artistic it may be, is much more... is much more like a mold. Modulation, mobile cut, temporal perspective, this plane of movement-images was simply that. And if it gave us an image of time, it was an indirect image of time, and if it gave us figures of thought, they were indirect figures of thought since they were always constructed or inferred from the movement-images. Fine.

And all this finally corresponds to the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, which you've now had all year to read! And you remember that in this first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, it's not as clear as I make it because Bergson's case was obviously different... But one could say that this first chapter consists in distinguishing three meanings of subjectivity conceived as centers of indetermination. If I define a "subject" as a center of indetermination in a world of movement-images, thus receiving the influence of movement-images and reacting in the form action-images, I can say that the first chapter of *Matter and Memory* shows us three aspects of subjectivity: a perception aspect, an action aspect, and an affection aspect.

But, you will notice that, as has been noted – and this is the real reason I'm so pleased, as I hope we all are – to the best of my knowledge, there has never been a more materialist text than this first chapter of *Matter and Memory*, and it is fitting that an author so reputed... so reputed for his pure spiritualism, should in the first chapter of a key book which is his masterpiece, should drop right in this first chapter a materialist manifesto such as we have never seen, such as we've never seen even among the most materialist thinkers. Once again, in his view there is no problem... both perception and action... and affection, what do they all require? A gap, a gap between a received excitation and an executed movement. And what is this gap? He tells us: *this gap is the brain*. You can't get more materialistic than that.

But why... obviously there's more than just this first chapter. In fact, we will learn that there is a fourth aspect of subjectivity conceived as a center of indetermination. And so we will discover that this fourth aspect is only comprehensible in relation to a dimension other than that of the movement-image plane and that, nevertheless, it is not immediately apparent. In fact, if I always give myself my center of indetermination, that is, the existence of gaps between perceptions, sorry, I mean between the actions undergone and the reactions executed, the gap between excitation and response, I was saying, well, affection, in a certain way, comes to occupy this gap yet it does not fill it.

And yet on the other hand, there is something that comes to fill this gap. Between a perception, that is to say an excitation received by the center of indetermination on one of its sides, and a movement executed in response by the center of indetermination on another of its

sides, there is a gap. That's it, and it's this very gap that measures the novelty of the performed action in relation to the received excitation. It is because in a certain way, *I have time*; on the contrary, there is an immediate sequence between the actions received and the actions performed. For example, say I kick the chair; if I am reasonably fit, the chair moves, it reacts immediately. You will tell me that there are mechanisms in matter that are precisely mechanisms of delayed reaction. This doesn't change anything because they can only work through linkages that function immediately, or else what we have are mechanisms of the "imitation of cerebral mechanisms" type.

So what is this? What is it that comes? Something comes to fill the gap. Bergson's celebrated answer is that, in fact we have recollections, and that all that had been said before about perception, action, affection, did not account for this new dimension: the fact that we have recollections. And we experience these recollections, at least the most common type, in the form of what Bergson himself calls – I remind you that the expression "movement-image" with a small hyphen was not actually present in Bergson; the thing was there, but not the small hyphen, although it's nothing to boast about, it's not such a major invention – on the other hand, what you do have fully in Bergson, is the strange expression "recollection-image" with a hyphen. We have, we, the centers of indetermination, what we have are not just perceptions, actions, and affections, or if you prefer, perception-images, action-images and affection-images; we are not defined solely by these three types of image which express the action upon us of movement-images, or which express what we are on the plane of movement-images. We also have recollection-images, and if we have these recollection-images it is of course because they are useful to us.

In what way are they useful? Well, they serve to compensate for our superiority-inferiority. Our superiority over things consists in the fact that our actions are not immediately linked with reactions, with the... with the excitations received. In a way, this is what he calls: "having the choice". We have a certain amount of time to react, or if we don't have this time, it's panic stations, it's the affection-image. But normally we have a bit of time. We see the lion a little bit before it attacks us. So that's our superiority.

And there is equally an aspect of inferiority, namely that my action is no longer simply a consequence... it's no longer, given my nature, a simple consequence of the received excitation. It is no longer determined, it no longer has ways in which it can be determined. I am in a position to choose. Okay, a lion approaches... well, if it doesn't get too close, I can choose. Will I stay put and play dead? – Here I'm not choosing a heroic Tarzan-type reaction – but I can choose to stay put and play dead, or I can choose to leave on tiptoe or to run away? I have a choice. Mind you, if I'm a chicken, I don't have a choice. It doesn't have sufficient brainpower, there isn't enough of a gap. Nothing can prevent a chicken from being a chicken, that is to say, that's what it is. But we who are not chickens. What will make one of us play dead, another approach the lion by, for example, by singing it a lullaby... preferably a holy one. I would say right away, someone who sings a holy lullaby brings to mind something: he brings to mind the martyrs. He thinks that maybe it will work. And then the one who plays dead recalls through the ages, he recalls a completely different memory. For example, I think I would play dead. Unless I was once again inspired by Pascal, but it would go wrong again.

So, I remember seeing – but, everybody has seen something similar – a duck that was attacked by cows once, in a meadow. And the cows went into this very, very masterful position which comes from their heroic days that you would sometimes witness on a meadow

when a cat struck across the meadow. They arrange themselves in a circle, and then they pin down... the cows pin down the victim very quickly. And then I don't know why, they obviously didn't like this duck much, and they knocked it down. And the duck played dead. Often animals will adopt this behavior of playing dead that spares their lives. It's not that the other animal believes them to be dead, in my view; the cow doesn't believe the duck is dead, but it's, I don't know, it's, it's the... So, they played with the duck like it was a ball, and then they left it alone. If it had run, they would have crushed it, anyway.

So, I remember all that. Now you might be very afraid, that is, that the affection, the affection-image in this case is fear, but this is what I'm saying: it fills the gap, it fills the cerebral gap, this fear that goes up to your brain, and yet it doesn't occupy it, no sorry, I mean it occupies it, but it doesn't fill it. So, what is it that fills it? It's recollection-images or rather it's recollections that come – let's speak more precisely, and this will justify Bergson's little hyphen in speaking about recollection-images – it's recollections that according to a given situation come to be actualized in images. These are therefore recollection-images that will guide us to choose the best course of action according to the excitation received. Okay?

Bergson's question is simple. First, how can we represent this? Well, according to him... You will ask me, what proves that the recollection-image cannot... that we cannot account for it if we remain on the plane of the movement-image? Why wouldn't the recollection-image be a fourth type of movement-image? Perhaps it could be. We should look at that. I would say that it's possible that we're not yet in a position to know, because in order to know if the recollection-image can be considered a fourth type of movement-image, we should already have asked –and known how to answer – the question as to where it arises from? Where does the recollection-image come from? Because previously we had at least shown where perception-images came from, or where action-images came from, or where affection-images came from, given this gap, that is, given the centers of indetermination. And from this point of view, we had the impression that nothing else could arise. But it was only an impression. Nevertheless, to give a figure to our impression, which is yet to be justified, we will say, well, there you see, we have to add to our movement-image plane a kind of... well what is it? ²

Why a cone? Because it must have a point that coincides with its insertion... it must have a point that coincides with its insertion on the plane of the movement-image. It must culminate in S, S designating the center of indetermination. And why does it flare out like that? It's the whole set of recollection-images – I'm talking about recollection-images, right? – It's the whole set of recollection-images that form this conical figure. But why? According to whether I consider them more or less close to the point of their insertion, that is, according to whether I consider them more or less close, close to a present urgency. If there is no present urgency, my recollection-images result to be quite dilated. For example, I am in a state of reverie, and my reverie consists in a state of very dilated recollection-images. But I am in a state of reverie when I am in a present situation in which there's no urgency. On the contrary, if the present situation is urgent, the recollection-images are more dense... and more and more contracted. Good.

So, you understand, this first... this first Bergsonian schema where he adds to the plane of movement-images... he adds this very unusual dimension to the plane of movement-images, giving it a conical figure, since it will be the whole set of recollections insofar as they are actualized at the point S, in recollection-images that come to fill the gap that defined this point S. So, there you have it, and this is the famous metaphor of the cone.

So what is the brain? From here on, everything will receive a double determination. What is the brain? It depends, since I have added a dimension to my diagram of the plane of matter. From the point of view of the matter plane, the brain is, strictly speaking, the gap between a received excitation and a performed action. From the point of view of the cone, the brain is the process of actualization of recollection in the form of recollection-images. The process of actualization of recollections in the form of recollection-images. But we have not forgotten that our plane of matter was completely mobile. We have not forgotten this mobility, and this mobility we could present as follows: plane of matter, M', M''.

So that in order to have... and each time, the movement-images change. You remember, there was S', S'', so that the real figure... but Bergson renounces it, because he wants his schemas to be clear, whereas we on the contrary... A schema has two roles, to make what is said comprehensible, in which case it is insufficient, and to be sufficient in which case it makes what is said incomprehensible. If we take the second method, I would say that this cone never ceases to shift its vertex according to the infinite succession of planes of matter. Do you understand? It shouldn't be too clear, but clear enough.

You see that although Bergson – we don't yet know why – will make spiritualism triumph, he will also be able to say: but you see what concerns me isn't a struggle between spiritualism and materialism, that's not what it is. It's that *everything is matter* from the perspective of M or S and so on, whereas *everything is spirit* from the perspective of the cone. But there is a common point which will obviously be the insertion of spirit into matter. Insertion of spirit into matter, this is what belongs both to the cone and to the plane of matter, and this is the point S. Translated in terms of matter, it is the brain; translated in terms of spirit, it is memory. There is only one thing that matter cannot explain according to Bergson – but the question is not whether he is right or wrong, but to explain why this is. *There's only one thing that matter can't explain, and that is memory*. Which leads us to the idea that *memory is duration* or that *duration is memory*. So that's the first thing. There are more than... three. Okay? Okay. You'll tell me – and here we have to proceed in order – you'll certainly tell me: but in the end why wouldn't the cone be a material cone? In which case it would be an excrescence of matter. We've already seen other examples of bridging gaps in matter; why shouldn't we put cones in matter?

Well, it all depends on the answer to the questions: where does a recollection-image come from? And what might it consist of? Where can it come from, what could it consist of? Many people – and here I mean what we generally used to call psychologists – think that this isn't such a problem and that we can simply say, okay it's simple: recollection-images are in the brain. Of course, they don't express it as simply as that, it's a bit more complicated. But remember how Bergson laughs at this, and he has the right to do so, since he has already explained to us from the beginning that *the brain itself is an image*. Now the rule of images is that an image does not contain other images. An image presents, presents what appears in it. That's all. Of course, there is sometimes an image in the image, but it's not at all an image that would be as though it were in a box. There isn't a box that would contain recollections. Anyway, I'll pass on that. The question is: where does a recollection-image come from?

Hence the second... the second schema which, to my knowledge, is one of the most brilliant things, one of the most brilliant aspects in all of Bergsonism as well as being the most unusual. For this is what he says: he appeals to us, in the form of "listen, think a little". In the recollection-image I reproduce, and I could say, the recollection-image is the reproduction of

a former present. I can say: *the recollection-image is the reproduction of a former present in an actual present* or better, it is the *representation* of the former present in the actual present.

Well yes, and we live with that, and we say to ourselves, after all, it's enough. So how can the former present be represented in the actual present? Here we can imagine many things. But our initial tendency, especially if we are psychologists, is always to think of the past in relation to the actual present. That is, we think of the past in terms of the actual present in relation to which it is past. Every past is past in relation to an actual present. All past is past... – you understand, you have to really get this – I mean: I remember what I did yesterday; well, it's the representation of a former present in relation to the actual present. I represent what I did yesterday; I think my past in terms of the present in relation to which it is past. And indeed, every past is past in relation to an actual present.

But also... but on the other hand, *any past is past beginning from a present that it was*. So it's weird how no one had thought about this. And you have many things of this nature so that doing philosophy is a question of making these simple discoveries. One morning, you say to yourself, but that doesn't work because people are always talking about or thinking about the past in relation to the present, the actual present which makes it the past. But in the end *the past is also past in relation to the former present that it was*. Okay. And you will ask me, what comes after that? Well, maybe this will change everything. Aahh...

There is a new present that I call the actual present, but in the end what makes it possible? I mean, why does the present pass and keep on passing? This is a question, it's what we'll call a metaphysical question. Metaphysical questions are very concrete. They consist in asking very simple things. They consist in playing the idiot and asking: "but why does the present pass?" So if someone says to me: well, that's the very definition of the present, I answer: ah no, no, no, no. I want... I want an answer, I want to know what the present is. I want an answer, so I go back to Kierkegaard, I want a first-hand answer. I don't want a derivative answer; I don't want an answer made of generalities. I will not leave you alone until you tell me why the present passes.

Here we could give all kinds of answers; this is the difference, if you like, between psychology and metaphysics. Metaphysics does not look for laws. It seeks singular reasons. If someone says to me, it is the law of the present, and then, and then if they say to me: I define the present through the very idea that it passes, I say, well okay but no! It doesn't suit me, and so then I grab hold of the guy and I don't let him go. I tell him, no, no, tell me why. You see, I'm thinking of Shestov's fine text on Job and God.³ Job is the one who expected an answer from God at first hand. And he did not let go of God. He said to him, ah no, no, I will not leave you until you tell me why. Why do you afflict me with misfortunes when I am a righteous man, when I am man of virtue etc.? You afflict me with boils, plague, you make me lose my wealth, my herds and so on. Why? So then there are the devotees who come and say: well, this is God's justice, these are the laws and so on. But Job isn't having it. He says, I want a direct answer.

So let's do the same thing! We want a direct answer: why does the present pass? Can we answer, if we want a first-hand answer, can we be satisfied with the following answer: it is because a new present has just arrived? Oh no, oh no, oh no, that's obviously not sufficient, because it tells us absolutely nothing new. "Because a new present has just arrived" simply consists in telling us again that the present passes. But we want to know the reason why it passes. If someone answers us, it is because a new present has just arrived... it's even worse.

This is so unsatisfactory that the question should be reversed: why did a new present arrive? A new present may have arrived because the former present passes. I always demand a first-hand reason.

So, if the present passes, it can't happen afterwards. If the present passes, it can only happen at the same time as the present. It's... it's obvious; it's pure childishness. It's kindergarten, you know, meaning it's philosophy. If the present passes, it can only happen at the same time that it is present. Note well. It passes at the same time that it is present. In other words, *it constitutes itself as past at the same time as it appears as present*. In my view, you will never finish meditating on this proposition which, according to Bergson, you cannot escape. So here we have the first-hand answer approaching, although we sense that it is not yet a direct answer. The present must constitute itself as past at the same time as it gives itself as the present. It cannot constitute itself as past once it is past, this is clear. It must therefore constitute itself as past the moment it is present. In other words, we have no choice, there must be strict contemporaneity between a present and the past that it was. No, sorry. Ouch, I got it all backwards, it's just the opposite. There must be strict contemporaneity between the past and the present that it was.

There is no contemporaneity between the past and the present in relation to which it is past. In this case there is a *dis*-temporaneity. Between the past and the present in relation to which it is past, there is a difference in time, since the past was not present in relation to the present that it was... no, I mean in relation to the present in terms of it is past, it was only present in the form of the former present. It was before the actual present. But if I think of the past in relation to the present that it was, I must say that both are strictly contemporary. It is at the same time that the present gives itself as present and constitutes itself as past. In other words, there is contemporaneity between the past and the present that it was.

Aah, what an adventure! There is contemporaneity between... it is not difficult... Hence Bergson's second splendid diagram... The line is supposed to be straight... that's it. I can speak of a mobile present on this line, the present that passes. I would say that at each moment of this present, at each moment of this present, so I can subdivide it infinitely, at each moment of this present... [*Tape interrupted*] [46:42]

Part 2

... towards the future, another which falls back into the past, or which falls into the past. In other words, the present exists only in a redoubled form. The nature of the present is duplication. Here the idea starts to get extremely interesting and significant... and at each moment, the present redoubles into the present that it is, and the past that it was.⁴

In other words, there is a recollection of the present that is already there. There is a recollection of the present that doesn't wait for a new present for it to be already there. There is a radical coexistence between... once again, the present that presents itself and the past that was this present. You will say to me: but if the present is constantly redoubled, if it is constantly duplicated, how is it that this is not visible to us? The answer is very simple: What use would it be to us? Only that which is useful for something, as we have seen, only that which serves to orient our actions will become a recollection-image. Only that past, only that recollection becomes a recollection-image. This amounts to saying that there is no recollection-image except in relation to a new present. But the recollection of the present

itself, that is, this coexistence of the past with the present that it was, this redoubling of the present, what use would it be to us? And what's more, it would disturb us enormously.

The whole line of action leads us to follow this path, and to neutralize, to repress this other one... except in certain cases, according to Bergson, cases that, according to him, could not be understood before him. It was necessary to discover this nature of the "redoubling of the present" in order to understand experiences that were considered strange and that were known about in psychiatry or in psychology, that had in fact been known throughout history, namely what was referred to as paramnesia, paramnesia or... the feeling of the already lived, paramnesia or the feeling of the already lived. And what is this feeling of the already lived or of paramnesia? It is an experience that sometimes happens, of having, strictly speaking, already lived a scene that is in the process of happening, that presents itself, and this experience is very particular since it is not a feeling of resemblance. It is not the feeling of having lived something similar, which would appeal to a memory; it is the feeling of having lived it down to the last detail. On the other hand, and this is very paradoxical, it is not a localizable feeling, that is, one that can be dated. We have lived it in some any-past-whatever, and not a week ago, or at most in a cyclical past, down to the smallest details.

For psychiatry as well as for psychology, the explanation of paramnesia has always been extremely complex. Bergson, on the other hand, makes it extremely simple, and it goes without saying that he was thinking of paramnesia from the beginning of his conception of the redoubling of the present. Suppose that following a failure of life... suppose there is a failure of life, of the vital impetus (*élan vital*) – the vital impetus which is what drives us on the line of action and what makes us repress what is not useful to us. What is useful to us are recollections in relation to actual presents. But a recollection in relation to the present that it was, the past in relation to the present that it was is not useful to us. What would we do with it? The present is there, that's enough, if we have to deal with two of them, we repress one.

But suppose that there is a failure of the mechanism of adaptation to life. Here is where the following paradox will arise: since there is contemporaneity – here I'm speaking slowly so that you understand, so that you follow what I'm saying well – once we've established that there is contemporaneity or redoubling... of the past and of the present that it has been, suppose certain cases where instead of perceiving my present, I perceive the past that it already is. And if there is contemporaneity of the past and the present, here I begin to perceive the scene not as present, I start to perceive it as past, that is, I perceive, instead of perceiving things here... I perceive them there. I perceive the actual present as past, not in relation to a new present. I perceive the actual present *as past in itself*.

But then in these experiences, I perpetually live the redoubling of the present and the past in two instances, perpetual redoubling in two instances, redoubling of the present in two instances, one of which is constituted by the present that passes, and the other by a past that makes all presents pass. Hence, the present literally falls into the past. So, if I perceive the moment... But it is at the moment when it is present that it falls into the past. If I perceive the moment when it falls into the past, the aspect in which it falls into the past, I obviously perceive the actual present as past.

That's it. I would say of any present – then this would be the second figure, which does not appear in Bergson, but I make it for my own amusement... they must be exactly equal, the two – quite simply, this time. What is this? This is the present that is; this is the contemporary past... the same thing as actual present and as though already past. The redoubling of the

present – understand what I'm getting at here, the redoubling of the present, if this story is true, becomes something very odd... for if the present redoubles at every moment, for my part I would call this redoubling – it's more for my own projects... it's... if the year had been longer, this is what we would have begun to address – well, we would have called it, I would have used an expression dear to Félix Guattari that he uses, I believe, in another context. I would have said that it's exactly what Guattari calls a *crystal of time*, a crystal of time – that is to say, when a present "grasps in itself" the past that it has been. This kind of doubling of time in the doubling of the present will constitute a crystal of time. And there will be many little crystals of time of this nature.⁵

So Guattari is quite right in saying: Well, in the end, the crystals of time are refrains, little songs... yes. They are these perpetual operations by which a present redoubles. And so what happens when I apprehend this redoubling of the present in a crystal of time? What happens is that I live... literally, as a spectator of myself. On the one hand, I am being acted upon, and on the other hand I am watching myself act. See how far we are from the current formula of "I act" which was that of the plane of matter with S. I act, that is, I react, by having the choice, to the excitations I receive. Here, it is no longer a question of this. In this case the recollection of the present, or the contemporary past of the present that it was, is no longer a question of acting. It is a question of being in the situation of the redoubling that corresponds to this redoubling of the present, that is, at the same time as I am acted upon, I look at myself acting. And this is exactly the function of the crystal of time, as when I had my eye there, what is there in the crystal? It's the same thing as there is outside; it's the same thing, but outside the crystal, it's the present, whereas inside the crystal, it's the past itself.

And then it is no longer a recollection-image. It's really what we should call a pure recollection... a pure recollection, a recollection of the present as such. Or it might go back a long way, it's not just a recollection of the present as such, it can go back a long way; as long as it always obeys the following rule: it will be a past that will not be grasped in relation to the present in which it passed, but in relation to the present that it was. That is the crystalline formula.

Bizarre! Bizarre! That's why I would say: well, yes, yes, if we were doing our cinema work, I would say, well yes, there are crystal images in cinema; there are... and there, for those who... There are the images – I think we talked about them last year – of Ophüls⁶, he always makes pure crystals of time. Ah, things are always grasped from elsewhere, in what are veritable crystals. The images are grasped in crystals. Then in another manner, because he doesn't conceive... you would have to see all the different styles of crystal. Crystal, crystal, it's such a beautiful thing, so... Ah, that's it! What I wanted to say was... yes, yes, yes, Fellini also created the most beautiful crystal images, which are no more beautiful than those of Ophüls, but which form different types of crystals; they are not the same kind of crystals. Okay. I say to myself now all of a sudden, I should have been in better shape, it seems to me, I don't know, do you understand something, or not? Yes... is this okay? Are you okay with that? Fine.

Well then, you understand that, if you're ok with all this, you have here what I could call our first "direct" figure of time. I have a direct time-image, it is the redoubling of the past, no, I mean of the present, that is, the coexistence of the past with the present that it has been, or the grasping of the past in the crystal. In some sense it's like the crystal ball, what you see in a crystal ball, if you... if you put a little bit of effort into it. That's what you're supposed to see

when you go to your psychic... No, it's her who sees. It's a function of the psychic, well, and then what? It's one of the functions of clairvoyance... but then, another effort.

At that moment – it will be difficult for me to stop – I said, it is not only the coincidence of the actual present and the past that it already is. In the crystal, we can go back provided that we always grasp the past, once again, no in relation to the present according to which it is past, that is to say the actual present, but in relation to the present that it has been. Right. So, what does this mean? Well, if I go back... We're going to perish... It's hot, isn't it? We can't take it anymore! It's curious, isn't it? It must be connected because as far as I'm concerned, it's not going well... but the more unbearable it becomes, the better I feel. All you healthy specimens, you're all going to fall like flies, it will be amazing!

[A student talks to Deleuze]

What is it? No, we can't open the windows, otherwise it's me who's going to fall! What was I going to say? Ah, yes, that's it. I would expressly say that my schema will not coincide completely... if it resembles a schema made by Bergson, it's only in the interests of simplification. I wouldn't dare to correct Bergson. The heat – I am not following him exactly... but those who want to compare, will make their adjustments and understand why. But what is this? I would say that ultimately it is my crystal of time... here is the present, and there... is the past that coexists with it, that is, the past that coexists with the present that it was. There is doubling or redoubling. You see?

So let's take our scene here, our scene. You are here, in this state of discomfort, here I am overwhelmed by my illness, and here we all are united by the same courage. You have, say, the line T. What we see is this, this actual present. What we have every interest in hiding from ourselves is that – well, "every interest" – is that this present is already past. This present is so already past that it coexists with the past that was this present. And there, there is redoubling, and if at the closest point to the scene – because we are united by the same attention in an extreme effort that doesn't permit any stray thought to flit through your mind – if one of you has a second of inattention, it will remind him of something. It's not paramnesia; it reminds him of something, a memory, a memory that traverses him, a time when things had been so bad. Or even, someone suddenly stands up, anecdotally like Kierkegaard, flaps his arms, collapses, faints, and says: "This is unbearable!" because it reminds him, it reminds him of an extremely painful memory, namely a room, a police station where he was locked up with fifty other people, everyone suffocating. That's actually what happened... the same or another. I'm getting exhausted looking for convincing examples; there's no need, right? We could have...

One could say that these circuits are more or less wide. There I have aligned... I have begun from the strict redoubling of the present and the past... no, from the past and the present that it was. And yet, I remain in this perspective – what am I doing here? I am developing the crystal – and every time, I can have a circuit, of which the present that passes is part. And each time I think of this or that – for example, one might say it looks like a police station, one might say it looks like a hospital room, it looks like when I embarked as an emigrant for America – well, there you have it, each time... it's not going to simplify things much but... It's not just metaphors or comparisons, it's a deeper and deeper aspect of reality that is revealed to me, circuits of thought that penetrate more and more in time while deeper and deeper aspects of reality are revealed to us.

You see there how I emerged from the bosom of the crystal of time, and this is the development of the crystal. The crystal of time gave me for the first time a direct image of time in the form of the redoubling of the present. Here, I have for the first time a direct figure of thought, in the form of the complementarity of different levels of thought... For I could not return. Each time, as Bergson says, and he says it wonderfully, I am forced to make a new circuit. And it would be foolish to believe that these are metaphors. They are not metaphors. Each time, a deeper and deeper aspect of reality emerges.

Well, then, I'm trying to say, well, if on condition – but since this is a concluding lesson, obviously, it looks like I'm applying things, but I beg you, don't think I'm applying things – If I wanted to say this in terms of cinema, what would it consist in? In both of the first two cases, we really have images of the crystals of time. You want me to mention an example that has really struck me, that seemed to me quite admirable, that was broadcast on TV not long ago. What is it called again? *Amar...*

Claire Parnet: *Amarcord*.⁷

Deleuze: *Amarcord! Amarcord, Amarcord, Amarcord...* There is an image that I think is quite sublime, it is the kids, the high school students... there is the big hotel that has just closed, it is winter, the winter that is returning. The high school students arrive there in a very melancholic mood, the season is over, it is the end of the holidays. In my memory, there is snow – but you forget so quickly that I think I have already forgotten – It seems that the snow starts to fall, and then you see them all there, in this cottony atmosphere. And then, each one – they are completely isolated from one another, there are five or six of them, each in their complete isolation at a precise distance from the others – you see how Fellini must have calculated all this, you see what a great filmmaker he is, and he had to calculate the... he had to block the scene so that they would be neither too close nor too far from one another – and literally, each of them performs his routine. There is one boy, the chubby one who is everyone's favorite, the clown who pretends... who bends his arm and pretends to play the violin, swaying on the spot, if I remember correctly. Then there's the big lanky boy with dark circles around his eyes, who walks in what is a shy dancer's step, he doesn't dare to dance, so he walks, but it's a kind of rhythmic step, straight ahead, like that, with his collar up, and he walks horizontally, while another turns in circles. And then there is one who does I don't know what... there must be five of them in all. And all this is so scientific... it is not enough to describe it to convey the scene, it is necessary to know that these completely isolated characters at the same time form a group, a group in which they become inseparable, there is a kind of identity between their inseparability and their separation. It's a fantastic thing.⁸

And here what we have is so much the identity of the present with its own past, it is so much what I would call a crystal-image where a past – since it is, let's suppose, Fellini's childhood – a past – this what Fellini does all the time... he grasps a past not in function, not simply in terms of the present in relation to which it is past, but in terms of the present that it was. So, he doesn't give us the old present. He gives us... but neither does he give us the recollection in relation to a new present. It's what I call a crystal of time, meaning that he gives us the past in relation to the present that this past once was. Do you understand? Hence the very strange, life in this image, as though we were seeing the thing through a crystal ball. Yes well, now it is much clearer, I can't say it better than that, anyway, we have to move along.

So here, I would say, there are certain images, certain images of Rossellini, which are typically part of this schema. And I even think that Rossellini was the one who made the most

sense of out of this. It's that each time, and it's in this sense that he is really able to reach direct thought-images, it's not only the crystals of time, it's not that the crystals of time are insufficient, the crystals of time form a whole... you have all these masterpieces, Ophüls who does everything in terms of crystals of time... and then Fellini, and yet they in no way resemble one another. But they have, they have some, I don't know, they have, they have a specific aim, I don't know. Yes, but with Rossellini, what is going on? Constantly a thought is given the opportunity to constitute new circuits in function of the new aspects of the reality to be discovered.

So, I would say, here, I return to a typical case of Fellini [*Deleuze means Rossellini here*]. I think it's *Europe 51*⁹, the bourgeoisie, the Italian bourgeoisie and the factory. It's the present, and suddenly the revelation, the vision. You will see. At first glance, it looks like a crystal ball, but no. It's not enough to say it. Assuming she feels it, and she certainly does, the Italian bourgeois woman in *Europe 51* – no, it may not be in this – she suddenly says, "I thought I was seeing convicts" or "I thought I was seeing condemned men..." She sees the workers entering the factory and she says: "I thought I was seeing convicts"¹⁰ Perception of the factory, another circuit. She couldn't place us there, not even a little bit. "I thought I was seeing convicts"... but that changes everything. It's another circuit of thought, a deeper aspect of reality. Yes, factories are prisons, yes, factories are prisons, and not metaphorically. I wouldn't say that factories are *like* prisons. I would say, they may not be prisons, they're not prisons, okay, but in another way, they *are* prisons. And yes, they *are* prisons.

One could conceive a third aspect, and this is what will happen, and it is so much part of Rossellini's technique, that this is what happens in his admirable *Stromboli*. In the admirable *Stromboli*,¹¹ all the circuits of thought of the heroine will correspond to more and more profound aspects of the reality of the island, of the unbearable reality of the island, from the moment of the tuna fishing scene, and the death of the tuna, because to what does the woman's horrified reaction correspond in terms of her circuits of thought: "No. Don't make me touch it". And this happens on the shores of the island, and it will end in the volcanic explosion and in the great cry of the heroine: "My God, what beauty, I'm finished". "What beauty, I'm finished". Something unbearable, which brings together the extremities of thought before everything collapses, to which corresponds the revelation this time of the whole island seen from above, with the fire of the volcano and the blackened island on the black sea, and here, you have exactly, it seems to me, this system. So, this time, we should speak of "circuits of thought" and no longer of "crystals of time", and in the circuits of thought what corresponds, the correlate of each circuit of thought, is an aspect of reality.¹²

Ahhh, so – we're almost done, oh joy – so let's go back to the cone, let's try to translate... See? It went very well in the end. My figure 1 of the redoubling of the crystal has passed into figure 2, of the circuit, and now it remains to make figure 2, figure 2 of the circuit pass into a last figure: figure 3. Which is obviously that of the cone. If I take my lines 1, 2, 3, 4... how do I find them on the cone? I make as many sections that will not be sections of recollection-images, but which will be sections that we might call regions of the past or of thought, regions of the past or of thought. And there, in each region, I will have – it will be obvious to anyone – all of thought and all of the past. These are not images, they are not recollection-images, it's not psychology. They are regions of being. They are regions of being and of thought. You see why it all links up.

Here I had the deepest aspects, deeper and deeper aspects of reality, and there the deepest circuits of thought. Well, each one, each one of these cuts, is a region of thought-being, of

being-thought. Simply, depending on the region on which you settle, as he says, one or other aspect predominates. Here, he uses some odd terms, but I don't have time to quote from the texts – anyway one or other aspect predominates. So, let's say that there are an infinite number of cuts since they don't actually exist. You have to make them. Each time, you have to make them in the cone. All this is very mobile; you have to put it in motion. Just like the circuits, they do not pre-exist. You had to wait for Fellini's bourgeois woman... no, sorry I mean Rossellini's bourgeois woman, for these circuits to be discovered. You had to wait for the heroine of *Stromboli* and so on. So, let's suppose that I have a circuit where what dominates is the factory. I'm taking a stupid example, since, in fact, it's not a question of... I'm taking a detail. I would say the world viewed as work. And here we have a circuit where what dominates is prison. And there I have another a circuit where what dominates is cataclysm.

Bergson will go so far as to say that in each region, in each region of the cut, there are "shining points".¹³ This is what we would call singularities. Well, what does thinking mean? To think means at the same time to trace in being and in thought. Once again, each section corresponds to an aspect of being as well as a circuit of thought. When you think... What does it mean to think? For Bergson, it is quite simple: it is to place oneself in one of these regions. But here's the thing: you always run the risk of being wrong. You always run the risk, it is always a risk. You start from the point S, which is the insertion in the matter-image. You have to make a leap when you think; you don't know what you are going to think, you don't know what you are looking for. Thinking – and here Bergson employs the expression "place ourselves from the outset"...¹⁴ This is rather like what others would call "leaping", placing ourselves from the outset in a particular region, but in what region? In the region that contains, I wouldn't even say the answer I'm looking for, but which already contains the question that I'm not yet able to formulate. And I think that when, for me, I feel something is wrong, either in the world or in myself, and I make the leap, I place myself from the outset in a region, but what is this region supposed to reveal to me? Both an aspect of being that was hidden to me and a circuit of thought that I did not yet possess. So that I have to leap into a region, and I always risk either misjudging my leap, or placing myself in the wrong region. If I place myself in the wrong region, I can think whatever I want for as long as I want but what I think will be of no interest at all. It will include neither the question nor the answer to the question. So, this art of thinking is a very...

You understand that the cone, presented in its complete form, with the point of insertion in the plane of matter... I have given the continuation of figure 2, exactly in the same way as figure 2 gave the continuation of figure 1, the crystals of time. That is to say, the direct figures of thought, or my direct images, my direct thought-images. The direct time-images, on which I would have liked to work at the end of this year, would have been the crystals of time, the... the circuits of thought and – and how can I say this? – the regions, the ontological noetic regions, that is to say, the regions of being and thought which explain, and which should explain, what still remained a problem in figure 2, that is to say, this complementarity between circuits of thought that are more and more vast, and aspects of reality that are more and more profound.

God, God, what beauty, I'm finished. Well, that's it. So have a very good vacation. [*End of the recording*] [1:30:49]

Notes

¹ This discussion, including the discussion of conics, is a summary of the first four or five sessions, without the detailed references to Pierce that those sessions include.

² See the diagram of the cone, which Deleuze calls "Bergson's second great diagram", in *The Time-image*, note 22, p. 294.

³ Leon Shestov, *Sur la balance de Job. Pérégrinations à travers les âmes*, 1929, Paris: Plon, 1958. For a partial English translation see: http://shestov.phonoarchive.org/ijb/jb_0.html

⁴ See the diagram of this line, which Deleuze calls "the third diagram [of Bergson]", in *The Time-Image*, note 24, p. 295.

⁵ See *The Time-Image*, note 25, p. 295. Here Deleuze quotes Guattari, mentioning that this term comes from *L'inconscient machinique* (Paris: Editions Recherche, 1979). Guattari, in fact, does not use the exact expression "crystal of time" in this volume, even if the idea seems implicit from some of his other crystalline formulations, notably in the following passage on the refrain in Proust: "All the forms of refrain act upon one another, but it is in its final state, that which is the vehicle of the most diagrammatic abstract machinism, which is the most 'connected' to all the other components, that it attains an interactive mode of efficiency. Thus, it is necessary that this final threshold be crossed so that, retroactively, the others can be crossed as well. The little facsimile phrase, the incubated refrain, the love potion, the compulsive catchphrase, the overactive refrain, etc., are thus traversed by the same machinism, by the same machinic phylum. Things will go the same with the other machinic 'concentrates', in other registers, such as the madeleine of Combray, the three steeples of Martinville, the goodnight kiss, the magic lamp, etc. Blocks of childhood, involuntary remembrances, crystals of perceptive intensity, faces, and landscapes only find their status in the *Recherche* only to the extent that they are already engaged in the metabolic process of the refrain considered in its terminal stage". See F. Guattari, *The Machinic Unconscious*, (Trans. Taylor Adkins), Los Angeles: Semiotexte, 2011, p. 280.

However, in a 1985 interview on music for France Culture with the composer and musicologist David Jisse, later published in the review *Chimères*, Guattari does employ the expression directly: "In my opinion, Proust is one of the greatest theorists of music. Because we can see that what is activated, implemented, through Vinteuil's little phrase is a kind of crystal that is not only a musical crystal, it is a *crystal of time*. It is something that will reverberate in his relationship to visual art, his relationship to space, when he will circulate with the steeples of Martinville, etc., which will take relative positions. It is something that will modify his relationship to sexuality, his social relationship in the life of salons, etc. It is thus as if this kind of crystal, in my own language *hyper-deterritorialized*, were something that escapes the usual framings, the usual modes of location. It's as if it takes control of the way in which the universes of reference are organized in relation to one another." See <https://www.cairn.info/revue-chimeres-2013-1-page-13.htm#no1>.

⁶ Max Ophüls (1902-1957) was a German-American film director whose career began in Germany before he fled first to France and then Hollywood where he oscillated between melodramas and film noir, producing such classics as *Letter from an Unknown Woman* (1948), *Caught* (1949) and *The Reckless Moment* (1949) before he returned to Europe where he made a trilogy of masterpieces, *La Ronde* (1950), *Le Plaisir* (1952) and *Madame de...* (1953). His last completed film was the experimental and controversial *Lola Montes* (1955).

⁷ *Amarcord* (1973) is a film by Federico Fellini, a semi-autobiographical evocation of childhood and youth in fascist Italy. Set in the 1930s in the Emilian village of Borgo San Giuliani, it follows the adventures of a daydreaming adolescent boy growing up under Mussolini among a community of oddball characters who retreat into fantasy rather than mount a resistance to fascism. The scene Deleuze describes here can also be found in *The Time-image*, p. 92.

⁸ The scene in question is not quite as Deleuze describes it. There is no snow but only a thick blanket of fog and a strong wind (a typical feature of Fellini's films) that stirs up the dead leaves. Though following different rhythms and gestural patterns, most of the schoolboys seem to be plunged in a romantic reverie, imagining they are dancing with a partner.

⁹ *Europa 51* (1952) is a film by Roberto Rossellini, the second in a trilogy of films he made with Ingrid Bergman. Starring Bergman, Alexander Knox and Giulietta Masina, it tells the story of a bourgeois woman who, following her son's suicide, decides she must discover more about the lives of the oppressed classes and embarks on a project of helping others less fortunate which increasingly brings her into conflict with her own high-society milieu, to the point that her husband eventually has her committed to a mental institution. The film contains a famous scene where the Bergman character, having agreed to substitute for a friend, experiences the intolerable harshness and relentless rhythms of factory labour.

¹⁰ This example is also found in *The Time-image*, p. 46.

¹¹ *Stromboli* (1948) is a film by Roberto Rossellini, the first of a series of films he made with Ingrid Bergman. It tells the story of Karin, a displaced nurse, who at the end of the war, decides to marry an Italian prisoner of war she has fallen in love with and return with him to his native island of Stromboli. While he settles back into life as a fisherman, she finds it impossible to adapt to the harsh life of the island, the superstitions of the pious

population and the subordinate role set out for its women. Her rebellion leads her to try to escape the island village but she is forced to confront the power of its volcano.

¹² The *Stromboli* example can also be found in *The Time-Image*, pp. 46-47

¹³ “There are always some dominant memories, shining points round which the others form a vague nebulousness. These shining points are multiplied in the degree in which our memory expands. The process of localizing a recollection in the past, for instance, cannot at all consist, as has been said, in plunging into the mass of our memories as into a bag, to draw out memories, closer and closer to each other, between which the memory to be localized may find its place.” See H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory* op. cit. p. 171.

¹⁴ “We are driven to argue as though it was given to us after the manner of a memory, as an internal state, a mere modification of our personality; and our eyes are closed to the primordial and fundamental act of perception, the act, constituting pure perception, whereby we place ourselves from the outset in the very heart of things. And thus the same error, which manifests itself in psychology by a radical incapacity to explain the mechanism of memory, will in metaphysics profoundly influence the idealistic and realistic conceptions of matter.” See H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, op. cit. p. 67 (translation modified).