

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

Deleuze: So I would prefer, yes... things regarding the gallop, you must have plenty of examples... There's someone who just told me she had some. Where is she? Where is she? Ah! I would prefer, if you don't mind, as I have another text, I have a text on the gallop too... that we keep it for when we come back, okay?

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: You won't forget the idea, will you? Or is it very brief... your idea?

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: You don't like to speak in public? Wonderful! You know, I don't think anyone does, aside from a few crazy people who speak all the time. You are perfectly normal. Because public speaking can only be justified by serious professional reasons related to the salary system, otherwise... So, you can give me a little note! Do you like writing notes?

Student: Yes, if you like...

Deleuze: Yes!

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: To the link between refrain and polyphony? Yes, yes. So, does it bother you to voice it orally? Because you don't like talking, right?

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: So, you're going to give me a little note on that.

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*] ... but in public I don't know...

Deleuze: Ah, orally, just for my ears! Ah, right! I didn't understand... I said to myself, what does she want? I didn't understand, I said to myself, so what does she want? No, listen, if you don't mind... Is it easier for you to write it?

Student: I don't express myself well in French so...

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes... I don't care if it's just a draft.

Student: I prefer to do it orally.

Deleuze: Oh well! Listen, we can sort this out when we come back next term. But you mustn't forget your idea. So, you'll tell me orally...

Student: Okay.

Deleuze: And then I'll respond to you. Well, okay. So, Éric, tell me, does that suit you? How do we go about this? Is it you who's going to begin, or shall I? I'd rather say what I have to say... and then you can add some things on Saint Augustine, okay? Is that okay? So, we need to go quite fast.

Here we have, very precisely, three points, three points to look at, not in total, three points to look at to begin with, that is to say to finish with this business of time and the movement of the soul. I want to clearly distinguish them because it is our only chance to get through this. The first point regards the question we looked at last time concerning *nûn*... *nûn*, which like all words, all Greek words obviously poses enormous translation problems... Like all Greek words, it is very, very difficult. Those who have studied Latin will recognize that in Latin they have the same root in the form *nunc* which is taken from... which is formed from... *nûn*, which is to say the *now*. So, while the Latins say *nunc*, the Greeks say *nûn*. This is the now, but the now in what sense? Because there are many other words that we can use to say the now...

So... So, we had an idea... though it doesn't apply to all the senses of the word. So, what would *nûn* be in a certain sense? It would be... Let's try to translate it like this: the *instant*, but not just any instant. Literally not just any instant. So, what is the instant of which we would say that it is not just any instant? We would call such an instant *a privileged instant*. So *Nûn*, in a certain sense... one of its meanings would be the privileged instant. The privileged instant... but what do we mean by privileged? In what way is it privileged? We don't really need to spend much time on this question. Why not? Because we already know the answer. We have seen how the Greeks defined extensive movement, local movement, transport from one place to another, in terms of privileged positions, whether these were cardinal points or zodiacal signs, or whether they were privileged points on planes that are parallel, perpendicular, or oblique to each other and which constitute the planetarium.

So extensive movement is marked by privileged points, privileged positions of the moving body. And we have seen how this was the way extensive movement constituted its own order in philosophy, which considered movement as world movement, and which, from that point on, would derive time from movement in the form: time is the number or the measure of the world's movement. So, there are privileged positions.

So, in the same way, there are also privileged positions in the intensive movement of the soul. We call these privileged positions the *nûn*. Okay. I insist on this: even if I translate *nûn* as privileged *moment*, I don't consider it in terms of time – or even privileged *instant* – I don't mean time. Here I use *instant* in the sense of *instance*, *instare*: that which stands or keeps within itself. And that's what we say, but then where do these *nûn* come from, since they don't presuppose time?

Our answer was very simple: all powers – since what the Neoplatonists offer us is a dialectic of powers – I won't come back to that – all powers coexist, in various capacities, according to the degree of power under consideration. In various capacities, they are all caught up inside each other. The late Neoplatonists will employ a splendid term to describe this: *complicatio*.

All degrees of power become *complicated* within each other. And this co-presence of all the degrees of power belongs to eternity, that is, to the *aîon*. You notice how I don't include time in this.

Ah, but, but, but... we have seen that all these degrees of power, all these powers, the degrees of power, what are they? To remind you, it's important, they are very strictly defined. Otherwise, you would be doing Nietzsche. You must avoid all these dangers. You must not *Nietzschify* the Neoplatonists. Alas! they had nothing to... – not alas, by the way – they had nothing to do with him, did they? What we can call degree of power in terms of Neoplatonism is always the One, with a capital O, right? The One to such and such a power, One to the power of N, One to the power of n, One to the power of n-1, to the power of n-2, to the power of n-3. This is what constitutes the serial dialectic of the Neoplatonists.

So, if all the degrees of power... none of this is worth... I mean, everything I say would be ridiculous, or completely arbitrary, if you didn't attach the definitions I propose. Even if you do attach the definitions I propose, at that point, let's say it's still debatable, it's arguable, right? Why not... if you want to. But you mustn't neglect the definitions, otherwise it loses all meaning.

Well, I would say that this co-presence of all degrees of power in the *aîon* does not exclude that they distinguish themselves from one another. I don't say that they are distinct. I say that *they distinguish themselves*. There is a “self-distinction” that is one with an internal distinction. They are not distinct in the sense that the parts of an extensive quantity are distinct. The parts of an extensive quantity distinguish themselves, to continue in Latin for the joy of it: *partes extra partes*, each part being external to another part. This is not the case with degrees of power. If they distinguish themselves, they distinguish themselves only from within, and internal distinction consists in a *self-distinction*, in a *being in the process of self-distinction*.

In this respect, for those who would be interested in this point, there is a good article by Marie-Claire Galpérine on time in Damascius¹ where she insists on this ‘being in the process of self-distinction’ – the Greeks having the form to indicate this, they have a pronominal form which is called the reflexive – which you can find in *Les études philosophiques*, an obscure but scholarly review, *Les études philosophiques*², July 1980, and which is one of the rare recent texts published in France on Damascius. Oh! Oh...

So please grant me this internal distinction, however mysterious it may be. These degrees of power are distinguished, yes, but they are distinguished from within. You see that this is way to resolve things, and Plotinus will say the same thing as regards souls. Souls distinguish themselves from the universal soul and from each other, yes, but through a very particular kind of distinction, which is not an external distinction. They communicate from within, and are perpetually caught up in the act of *differentiating themselves*, in a kind of process of self-differentiation, the self-differentiation of the soul, the self-differentiation which marks distinction, meaning internal distinction.

So, I would say that *nûn* consists in the act, in the power-act, the power-act by which a degree of power, and in particular the soul – since it is in terms of the soul that everything is decided – above all the soul, distinguishes itself. Distinguishes itself from what? Well, it distinguishes itself from both the higher and lower degrees, and from the higher and lower powers. So, we will say that the *nûn* is the power-act by which the soul distinguishes itself in a mode... under

a mode of intrinsic distinction, under a pronominal mode... by which it distinguishes itself from superior unities and inferior unities. You see that this does not involve time, it only involves the series of... that are included in the *aïon*, ah... if you can understand this, that the *nûn* is fundamentally the act of self-distinction oneself, *the process* of self-distinction, and it is by this self-distinction that the *nûn* engenders time. Hence the thesis becomes extremely simple, it becomes irrefutable. Time will be the measure of intensive quantity, the measure of the intensive movement of the soul.

Well, but how? How, merely by way of the fact that it is a process of *self-distinction*, does the *nûn* constitute time? I'm going to simplify my schema, which was not very successful last time, so I'm going to focus only on a little part of the schema. So here... I give myself three points: A, B, C. In fact, these are three powers. So, it's 1 to a power, 1 to another power, 1 to a third power. It descends. Then there's B. Let's say this is the soul. You remember the schema. As I said, what does the *nûn* of the soul consist of? That is to say, in what does this self-distinction of the soul consist? I don't ask what the soul's *distinction* consists in? There is no distinction of the soul, there is only a self-distinction of the soul. So, what does the self-distinction of the soul consist in? It consists, as we have seen, in this, which will give us a nice little drawing. I stop for a moment. [Pause]

And now I continue... The two are not symmetrical, let's see. Well, this is a very nice figure – it's not one they made, it's just one I made for you, only for you – it will become very pretty if I add a fourth term, D, as a still lower power. For if I add a fourth term, what does the *nûn* of C consist in? The *nûn* of C consists in this... See how pretty it is, because they all nest together. See, it's like a series of rings encircling each other... No... can't you feel... the way our souls blossom from there. It's, it's a mystical figure, you know? You have to live it. If you live it, you will save your soul, but if you don't live it, it's the fall. Think about it.

So, well... that's what self-distinction is all about! And what does this consist in? Each *nûn* is an act of self-distinction, it is the self-distinction of the corresponding power, it is the self-distinction of the considered degree of power. And what does this self-distinction consist in? On the one hand, it leans – everything is in the pronominal – it leans towards an outside, that is to say, the outside, which is to say what lies below. It leans towards what lies below. It leans... be careful, eh? That's why, unfortunately, a drawing can't really render this. It's a vector. That's why I put in a little arrow. So, my soul leans towards what is below. In Plotinus, it's... *pros allo*. It is the *leaning towards something else*. It *pours itself out*, it gives of itself, and yet remains within itself. It is *nûn*, and it remains in its *nûn*. It leans, and it is... it is enough for it to lean, that in a certain way from this very inclination, this bending towards, it causes the lower degree to proceed. This, as we have already seen, is the the procession, or the project.

But at the same time, it stays within itself, and it holds itself back. Yes, because if it fell into the lower degree, you see... It holds back. It doesn't even have to hold back. By leaning *pros allo*, by leaning towards the other, it stays within itself. Ahhh, so that, if it leans, and if something proceeds from this leaning, it must also be said that it returns to itself at the same time as it leans, at the same time as it makes something proceed from itself, a procession. At the same time that it makes what proceed? You see, it's *the procession of the degrees of power*... At the same time that it makes something proceed from itself, it returns to itself. It returns to itself, but you will say to me: But this is not what this schema shows. Ha ha. Of course not! But it does! Because by coming back to itself... returning to itself is necessarily to return to that from which it itself proceeds, namely, the higher degree from which it proceeds.

To return to oneself is to return within oneself to that from which one proceeds... and this is the movement of conversion.

And the unity of this procession and conversion will be *contemplation*. Everything is contemplation. We are all contemplation, since contemplation is the contemplation of what comes after, below, meaning procession. The soul leans out. And this is the contemplation of itself, the return to itself, the folding back upon itself, and it is the contemplation of what it proceeds from, that is to say the return within itself to what it proceeds from. Everything is contemplation.

So now we're making headway. If the *nûn* is the power-act of self-distinction, you see in what sense this must be... It is that each *nûn* is like the self-distinction of a procession and a conversion, of an impetus and a return, an inclination and a reflection... an expectation and recollection. In other words, each *nûn*, in the movement of self-distinction, necessarily distinguishes something that functions as a pure future and something that functions as a pure past. *The nûn is the matrix of time*. Ah...

And it is not the least of the Neoplatonist paradoxes that allows them to arrive at this notion. It seems to them... Yet Plotinus does not analyze it. He is a kind of great philosopher-poet. He is a philosopher-poet-teacher. It's rare to have all three together. I do not want to say that he says it formally, but his texts completely insist upon this idea. It is very odd. For him it is always syntheses that define souls. And you see that it is indeed the idea of self-differentiation, of the process of self-differentiation. The soul is defined by a synthetic act – Third *Ennead*, *Ennead* Three: here we have the whole theme of the synthetic act of the soul. And never will it be said, even by Kant, never will it be said so powerfully, as with this idea of the synthetic act of mind and soul.

The *nûn* is really a synthesis. But it is *the synthesis that divides*. Indeed, the synthetic act is the process of self-distinction, and this process of self-distinction performs the distinction perpetually being made between a past and a future. What is a synthesis that divides? That's a very odd idea. It has a name, after all it's not... it's not impossible, it has a name. In logic and in the theory of the syllogism, it's called *disjunctive synthesis*.

And the theory of syllogism – I'll have to cover this one year or another – the theory of syllogism distinguishes – and this will be very important, even in Kant's case – three main types of syllogisms: one of which is called "categorical", of the type "All men are mortal"; another is called "hypothetical", of the type "If it's day, there must be light"; and the third, which is said to be "disjunctive", of the type "A living being is either immortal or mortal". So, to simplify a lot we could say that...we could say that Aristotle is the great theorist of the categorical syllogism. Simplifying less we could say that the whole theory of Aristotelian substance is subordinated to the categorical syllogism, although Aristotle also theorizes other syllogisms. But precisely speaking, it's not by chance that the fundamental category in Aristotle's theory of substance is the one to which the categorical syllogism corresponds. The Stoics were the ones who concocted a great theory of the hypothetical syllogism, thanks to a theory of events that is very particular to them. And because the boxes of thought have always been filled since the dawn of time, well, there remained the disjunctive syllogism, the great theory of disjunctive syllogism elaborated by the Neoplatonists.

You will ask me about Plato... what did he contribute? Well, he was the first one. It was not clear. For him the idea of synthesis was not yet free from the idea of analysis. Plato is

undoubtedly the greatest theoretician of analysis. So here, it would be like... it becomes so schematic that it's too beautiful – no, actually it's too bad – Plato, the great theorist of analysis, Aristotle, the great theorist of the categorical synthesis; the Stoics with hypothetical synthesis, ahh... The Neoplatonists, disjunctive synthesis. Now everything is clear, it's all wrapped up, okay. Well, it's pretty pathetic! But okay...

You see in what sense I can say that the *nûn* is constitutive – in its synthetic power-act, procession-conversion – that the *nûn* is constitutive of an originary time: the pure future of procession, the *leaning towards*, and the pure past of conversion. In fact, where does the privilege of the past that I mentioned last time derive from? My schema captures it very well. The privilege of the past comes from this: nothing would work, nothing of the whole would function if the conversion did not go beyond the procession, in the sense that it goes back not to the term from which the procession began *but always to the higher term*. So, the real matrix of time is conversion, you see? I mean, it's... Fine. That's the first point.

So, when I talk about "pure past" and "pure future", you have to understand what I mean. I mean that this should not be confused with "that which contains an element that would be past". I can say what is past; I can say what is future, what is to come, but *on what condition* can I say what is past or what is to come? I can only say it if I have a *form* of the past and a *form* of the future. This is what I was trying to explain last time. There are presents that are passing – we don't know that yet, but I'm getting ahead of myself – there are former presents, but you have to understand. It's amazing that I can grasp them as though they were the past. If I didn't have a form of past, I wouldn't be able to grasp what is passing as past, or I wouldn't be able to grasp what is past as past.

I must have a *form of the idea of the past*. What is not yet, I grasp as future, yes, I seize as future what is not yet. But only on one condition, that I have a *form of future* into which I pour what is not yet. But this form of pure past, this form of pure past, is what I was trying to get at when I said last time that I grasp my former present as past, but I would never be able to grasp my former present as past if I did not have at my disposal a *past that had never been present*. It's obvious. In other words, *what is past can never account for the form of the past in which I grasp it*.

This is the synthesis of the *nûn*, as a disjunctive synthesis and as constitutive of an originary time. The originary time is the time that never ceases to distinguish itself with each *nûn*, following each *nûn*, as pure past and pure future. This is the originary time... a past that has never been present, a future that will never be present. I need this in order to be able to grasp the coming present as future, and the former present as past. So, now I can say: the *nûn* is *the constitution of an originary time*. And if someone says to me that it was Kant who said that, I would answer: Oh no, no, no, no. But Heidegger says that Kant said that, and I say: No, no. But it is Heidegger who says that Kant said that, so it's not our fault. And with great respect, we have to say: Well, no, it's not Kant who said this. Kant may have said it again, he may have completely changed the meaning of what he was repeating... [Tape interrupted] [40:49]

Well, why do we need a second point? Why doesn't it end there? Ah... That's the good thing, because I keep telling you, right? You, you can stop wherever you want, right? If you've had enough, you can stop there, I tell you that's fine. That's enough. That's enough, I don't need to... very well. I think it's quite legitimate. Just a little. You take a part. Ah... Preferably the part you understand, but the perverse thing is that, in general, you tend to choose the part you don't understand.

Why doesn't it end there? Well, because there's this business that we're trying to hide. I don't know if you sense this, that we're trying to hide it because we are so afraid of it. It's a fear that penetrates us, an abominable fear, and this fear, we hardly dare name it. It's that right from the beginning, what has worried us is this business of *zero*. There is a zero, at the very bottom, there. Perhaps, at the limit, perhaps this zero is a limit? But it's there. There is a zero at the very bottom of the series. And that's why, like it or not, we are always led to stall before facing that zero. What is it doing there, and what will happen because of it?

That's my second point, it's the return of the zero. We allowed ourselves that, okay, we allowed it to ourselves, but what are we going to do with it, or rather what is it going to do to us, once we have allowed it to ourselves? So, you're going to say to me, ah but why did you allow it to yourself? We couldn't do otherwise. We didn't allow it to ourselves. Nothing would hold if we didn't allow it to ourselves. And why would nothing hold if we didn't allow it to ourselves? But because it was as important as... as at the other end of the series, what we called 1 to the power of N, that is, the 1 beyond the One. The 1 deeper than the One, the bottomless, groundless depth, the source of light. [*Sound of someone arriving*] You are late... [*Laughter*] Ah... [*Noise of the door*]

We had to allow ourselves this. Why? Do you remember what intensive movement or intensive quantity is? It is a multiplicity grasped as One. That suits us. It's a multiplicity grasped as One, as opposed to extensive quantity where multiplicity is grasped as everything, and not as One. That is to say, it is a multiplicity grasped as a degree of power, as One under a given power. Now, this multiplicity which cannot be grasped as One, cannot be grasped as One because of its indecomposable distance from zero, its indecomposable distance from zero. So, we cannot escape the zero. This is the whole intensive quantity, and the whole intensive movement that occurs between one and zero, as opposed to extensive quantity, which would be one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, small n. The intensive quantity requires a binarity of the type one-zero, given that the One will pass through all the powers. But each time, the multiplicity of the intensive quantity understood as One – but understood as One in terms of what? In terms of the *nûn* – each time, this multiplicity can only be evaluated by the distance of its degree of power from zero.

So, zero is something I couldn't avoid. And consumed by the idea that I couldn't avoid it, once again, we've bought ourselves time. We haven't lost sight of it, but we've gained time before facing this zero... but what does this zero mean? And I said last time, understand that, the more we go down the series of powers, the more the virtual multiplicity contained in each degree of power, or in each unity... the more this virtual multiplicity tends to become actual. That is to say, the more the process of self-distinction – that is to say, the internal distinction – the more this internal distinction tends to appear as an external distinction, one that is wholly made and no longer in the process of being made – an extrinsic distinction according to which the terms become external to one another – the more I descend the scale, the more the internal distinctions give way to distinctions which tend to be external. I'm translating here, I can translate because we've been working on this for a long time: the more the figures of light give way – imagine, it's very gradual, it's even rather like a dream – the more the figures of light give way to rigid figures. The rigid figure is the regime of extrinsic distinction. There is the blackboard, there the wall, there the chair. These are extrinsic distinctions where I count: one, two, three, four, five.

Could I do this for souls? No, oh no, oh no! The souls were caught up in *the movement of self-distinction*. I couldn't say one, two, three, four. Fine, but the more I tend towards my

zero, the more rigid geometrical figures will replace figures of light. The more rigid the figures, the more limits will be formed, that is to say, it is the whole internal distinction that now vacillates in favor of another regime of distinction. It is, if you like, the reign... what takes shape, and what I see through the figures of light, what I see through a figure of light, are these rigid forms. So, I might as well say: the more the ideal fall tends to become a real fall. And that's what the zero meant. The zero meant – the zero was an abominable snigger – it meant, you think you're falling ideally like sunlight, but you don't know that you're already trapped in a real fall.

Indeed, what was the ideal fall? The ideal fall was the indecomposable distance from one degree of power to zero. Light falls. Light falls but it doesn't mean that I have to pick it up from the ground. It means that it stays up. The fall of light is the prototype of the ideal fall. It was the procession-conversion. There was no real fall at all, since at the same time as the procession was occurring, conversion prevented it from becoming a real fall... and gathered it up at the same time as it was taking place. The conversion did not come *after* the procession. It has to be simultaneous. So, well, the closer we get to zero, well, the more all this is threatened. What emerges, through the figures of light, are the rigid figures I bump into and which cause me pain. It is the order of bodies, it is the real fall of my soul in a body. That's what it is.

But you will say to me, if you've been following me, you will say: well, let's accept even that. But why this reign? At most, what we can see is that the reign of extrinsic distinctions or of rigid geometric figures... at most we see that this is the reign of matter and space. Space will be the form of exteriority. The form of external distinctions. It is in terms of space that I can say that the table is not the chair. Space is the receptacle of bodies, *partes extra partes*, in the exteriority of their parts.

So, I can say, okay, this is all fine, matter as it fills space, as it expands or not even expands, because it doesn't expand. It is the soul which expands by *proceeding*. I would say of matter that it extends in space. To say it again in Latin, where the distinction is quite clear, it's not *extensio* – *extensio* would be procession, the soul that assumes an *extensio* in its leaning – it's rather *extensum*, that is to say the *extended*, in the past participle. So, let's leave that aside for a moment... But in what way is it zero? They go quickly at this point, don't they? They go quickly because I think that all the Greeks already understood it, but we have to pretend that we are not Greeks, so... Why do they call this "zero" when it's still something? They might be a bad thing, these rigid figures, but in the end, they are something. This matter is something. How can it be assimilated to degree zero?

Well yes, listen well: it is enough to make a small conversion. When they say something is degree zero, it's zero, it's non-being, what do they mean by this? In my view this is not well expressed, it's not well explained in the manuals. They say that matter for the Greeks is equivalent to non-being. But it's not that at all. Matter is something, it is clearly something. Rigid bodies are clearly something. Rigid bodies constitute something from the point of view of matter and space. If they can be said to be zero, it is therefore from a completely different point of view. But from what point of view? Our answer would be: *from the point of view of time*. Unless you temporalize them, you cannot see why matter and rigid bodies equate to zero. Why would extrinsic distinction be zero? You have to place it in time.

What does this mean? It means that the temporality proper to matter and to rigid bodies is *the present that passes*, the present that passes. There is the table. I look away, there is the wall, the table, the wall. I know that outside... though I would need time to go there... is a small

garden. It is delightful, and then you have the dangerous boulevard, and so on. But here, we are sheltered by the rigid figure of this classroom. And if I go out... Ah well, okay, the present passes. What does this mean, the present that passes? What passes from this point of view, what is no longer, is zero, what is not yet from the point of view of time. What is no longer is zero. What is not yet is zero. What is, is zero. Why is that? Because it is the limit between a "not yet" and a "no longer". This is what St. Augustine will say in wonderful terms.

But these two times, the past and the future, you shouldn't confuse them with the pure past and the pure future as we have just seen. They mean what is past and what is to come. But these two times, what is past and what is to come, how do they come about, since what is past is no longer, and what is to come is not yet? The present itself, if it were always present without being lost in the past, would no longer be time, it would be eternity. So if, in order to be time, the present must lose itself in the past, how can we affirm that it "is", it too, since *the only reason for its being is to be no more*? In fact, if we have the right to say that time "is", it is because it is moving towards non-being... [Tape interrupted] [59:50]

Part 2

... Well, whatever, fine. But what is this present that is passing? The limit of a "not yet" and a "no longer", what would this be? As he just said, it moves towards non-being. It is a *vanishing*. It is a vanishing. It is a limit of time, a limit between "what is past" and "what is to come". It is a limit as close to zero as one can imagine. You will say to me, well, we should not introduce differentials. Why shouldn't we introduce differentials in the case of the Greeks? Is it because they ignore differentials, these so-called vanishing quantities? No, they don't ignore them, it's just that what they do doesn't resemble so-called infinitesimal calculus. It resembles something that clearly exists for them and that in terms of our geometries we would call the "method of exhaustion", which includes a whole theory of limits and of the approach of a limit. So, I could say that it is indeed a pure vanishing.

But I mean, what is this pure vanishing present, the pure limit between what is not yet and what is no longer, so in this sense, pure non-being? *It too is an instant*. It is an instant. It is an instant, only this instant is not the *nûn*. This instant is not a *nûn*, obviously. The *nûn* was the privileged instant and there I tried to comment on what "privileged" meant. I would say: it is the instant that is the present which passes. So, what is this pure vanishing? It is the *any-instant-whatever*. It is the any-instant-whatever. That which is zero is any-instant-whatever.

So now I have two instants. How come? Where did this instant come from, this business of zero? We have seen that we cannot escape it. The simple but global answer would be: okay, the *nûn* performs a synthesis. And within the synthesis that it performs, it distinguishes a pure past and a pure future, through which it founds an ordinary time. But at the same time, it must be reflected in an instant of a completely different nature. And this is the bad reflection. This instant of a completely different nature is the any-instant-whatever, the passing present, non-being or a pure vanishing.

And you understand why it must be reflected before? Because it is upon this present that passes that the synthesis will be exerted. The synthesis of the *nûn* as a privileged instant will be exerted on the instant that passes as an any-instant-whatever. Or at least if it happened this way, we would be saved, and if we are saved, it is because it happens in this way. This is

the only way to conjure up the zero; the zero is real. It's the only way to conjure up the zero, which is to say *the rush towards nothingness of the any-instant-whatever*. The zero is exactly this: the rush towards nothingness of the any-instant-whatever. The rush to zero, the rush to zero, the rush to nothingness of the any-instant-whatever, is what we will call the *derived time*, the passing present, the pure vanishing. Well, there are two cases. Let's look at the first one, which is the hardest: the synthesis of the *nûn* is exerted on the passing present. I am saved, saved, saved. It's not easy, is it? You can't just lead any kind of life to achieve that, it doesn't happen in your head. It's achieved through an exemplary life, a truly Neoplatonic life which is the life of contemplation.

So then, why am I saved? I'm saved because, if you think about it... Oh no! Oh, is that noise from next door? Well, we have to do worse! Yes, it really bothers me... It's like... Why are we saved? I don't know anymore. I mean, it goes without saying. We are saved because the instant that passes, if it succeeds in being submitted to the synthesis of the *nûn*, at that moment, the former presents, the present instants that are now past are no longer nothing, they are no longer "no longer anything". They fill the pure past for a certain length of time. Namely, they fill the pure past in as much as I have recollections, and the moments to come fill the pure future in as much as I have expectations. So, the passing present receives a measure – that is, the originary time receives a measure – of the derived time... No, shit! Rhaaa [*Deleuze growling*] I mean, the derived time receives a measure of the originary time, so that I can say two things: *the originary time is at the same time the number of the intensive movement and the measure of the derived time*. And I could speak, at that moment, of a more or less derived time, a derived time that would be more or less long, depending on whether I will be able, through the *nûn*, to encompass more or less of the former present – of the present that has passed – and to anticipate more or less of the future – of the present that is not yet here. So, I will be saved. I will have submitted the derived present to the order of originary time.

Or else, and then, or else... or else, it is the real fall: the *nûn* is released. It remains with its pure past and future, but its pure past and future remain empty. It falls into its double. It is reflected in the any-instant-whatever, in the pure vanishing. And in this pure vanishing reflects, undoes itself. And so I run from object to object, forgetting the preceding object, unable to foresee the next. I run, I run, but like the passing present, I run to the grave, I run towards non-being. Lost.

Triumph of derived time. The derived time has shaken its model. It has freed itself from the yoke of the *nûn*. It has freed itself... but at what price? To drag us to death. We run, we become agitated. We become agitated in the vanishing. We keep on vanishing from object to object. And some will call it the *dissipation* of the soul³, others will call it the *distension* of the soul⁴, others will call it the *diversion* of the soul⁵. They will describe it very differently, but it will always be under the sign of one and the same fear, the fear linked to time of which Paul Claudel spoke.⁶ And the fear linked to time of which Claudel spoke, is the revelation of the creature's nothingness. And this fear will increase as we pass from Neoplatonism to Christianity and will take on enormous proportions. And the fear of time is very precisely the anxiety that derived time will withdraw from the order of originary time Or, if you prefer, the fear and panic that the any-instant-whatever may destitute the privileged instant, destitute the *nûn*.

I am sure that you have understood from the depths of your soul. Anyway, if you haven't understood from the depths of your soul, there's point in me repeating it because it can only

be understood from the depths of your soul. Okay. And if you haven't understood from the depths of your soul, it's because you're more taken by other philosophies, so it doesn't matter to you or to me anyway.

But one last confirmation and I'll be done. I make a third point only to... It would be good then – if what I'm saying is somewhat true – to find a word in the terminology that distinguishes itself from *nûn*. If *nûn* is the privileged moment, how can we speak about the Greeks' any-instant-whatever? It's funny; they have a word. They have a word – but again, that doesn't mean we can translate it as "any-instant-whatever", because that would be only one of its meanings. And it's a very beautiful word, very difficult to pronounce. So, I'm telling you this because you'll have to practice it. And then to translate it – because like *nûn* it has all sorts of meanings – you can always translate it as "now" but... Ah! And what's more it's such a long word... This is the word of loss; the word of salvation is *nûn*, and the word of loss is – with a grave here – *exaiphnès*, *exaiphnès* [ἐξαίφνης]. And what does *exaiphnès* mean, according to the Greek dictionary? It means *suddenly*, *the sudden*. It's both an adverb and a noun, it means sudden, suddenly.

But then Plato... Plato wrote a sublime text that he called *Parmenides*.⁷ And *Parmenides* is a text that will be seminal for the Neoplatonists, a text of reference, to the point that the great texts of the disciples of... the greatest texts – the ones that were preserved, in any case – of the disciples of Plotinus, Plotinus's own disciples, are titled and presented as commentaries on *Parmenides*. We still have two magnificent commentaries on *Parmenides*, which modern commentators have generally done no more than reiterate – which doesn't take that much effort, but they haven't always admitted it – it's a commentary on *Parmenides* made by Proclus and another commentary on *Parmenides* made by Damascius under the title *Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles*.⁸

Now, *Parmenides*, if you come to read it one day, or even if you just take a look at how it's constructed, you'll see that it's a pretty crazy book, since it develops a whole set of paradoxes – it is the great development of Platonic paradoxes – and he employs a very strange method. It concerns the One. What is the One? He proceeds by way of hypotheses.

First hypothesis – I'm not going to mention all of them because there are many, too many to recount... so I'll tell you only the first three because these are the ones that interest me in order to wrap up this point. If the One is *not*, in the sense of being "superior to being", if the One is more than being, what must we conclude from this? You see immediately, if the One is superior to being, the first thing we must conclude is that it is *not*. But then what does it mean that the One is *not*? It corresponds – you imagine how happy the Neoplatonists were at this! – it corresponds to One to the power of N. All sorts of delightful paradoxes will arise from this.

Second hypothesis: If the One *is*, what is the result? You can see it immediately: If the One *is*, the first consequence is that it is two, and this is annoying for the One. If the One *is*, it is necessarily *two* since when I say, "The One is one" and when I say, "The One is", I say two things. And it is not in the same way that it is *one* and that it *is*. So, if I say "the One is", I say that it is two. If it is *two*, I'm still not out of the woods because it's going to leap out, well. In any case, it's going to be bad, it's bad news. [*Laughter*]

Third hypothesis: If the One is less than being, if the One is inferior to being, then what happens is even worse. And then, there are four other hypotheses, that is to say, in all, there

are seven hypotheses. We'll remain with the first three. I would say that the second one launches – and I think this is the launching of a notion in philosophy, that it's here that it becomes a philosophical concept – it launches the idea of *nûn*... *nûn* being precisely the synthesis. You see why it is the second hypothesis, the synthesis of being and the One which in itself generates time. So, I believe – except that we should examine whether the *nûn* had already appeared in the Presocratics, but I'd be surprised... I'd swear it doesn't, in any case, it might have appeared as a word, in the sense of an ordinary word – but it's Plato who makes *nûn* into a philosophical concept. Fine.

But the third hypothesis gives us... and this is probably also Plato's doing, because I don't think it's Heraclitus. I mean, what is there in Heraclitus? We no longer know since almost nothing has survived, but still we sense a little... there are ways we can navigate through this, you understand, because when Plato borrows a notion from his predecessors – it's not that the Greeks had no sense of citation, though they don't explicitly cite – but he assumes a certain tone which is not the same as when he forges a notion himself. He assumes a certain tone, which is always a critical tone, which is like winking to the reader to guide them by referring to an already well-known theory.

In the third hypothesis, he launches the concept of *exaiφnès*, which is not at all like *nûn*, and which is explicitly defined as a vanishing, as a vanishing, and as any-instant-whatever in its becoming. You see how different this is, it's not the synthetic axis that will constitute time. It's the instant in its becoming. So, I'm not going to develop this at all, since it would take us far from our current research. I am not saying that these two notions in Plato coincide with what we have drawn from them. Please don't mix them up. I will just say that Plato already proposes a distinction between the two notions, and that this distinction, although very different from the one we claim to discover in the texts of the Neoplatonists, this distinction will be very interesting for the future of Neoplatonism.

So, I've answered the question: in what way does the regime of geometric distinctions equate to zero? And in precisely what way do we risk our salvation? And here I would like to – because they are pervaded by these things, not necessarily by Neoplatonism, but by a certain conception that is very... well, it's closer to the order of procession-conversion – I would like to end by reading, precisely... My point is always to try to make you understand that it is completely normal to treat the world of rigid distinctions as a kind of nothingness or as a kind of introduction to nothingness, *provided we interpret it no longer in terms of space but in terms of time*. See, that was my whole point: the world of rigid figures, if you don't interpret it... if you don't keep it within strictly spatial terms and if you introduce time, if you interpret it in terms of time, it will lead you directly to pure nothingness.

And here I take a Russian novelist named Saltykov⁹ from the late 19th century, S-a-l-t-y-k-o-v. And I'll just read you something about the state of an alcoholic, as only Russians know how to describe it... no, yes... that would be a good subject for a thesis, I say, if any of you want to do a thesis on this, the difference between the Russian alcoholic and the American alcoholic in the two literatures, they, they're not at all the same at all, you know, not the same at all, given that they both drink a lot, right? They're not like the French. I'm not even talking about the Japanese with their sake, because that's a disaster. So then, you could do a thesis, comparative world literature, the alcoholic in comparative world literature. But in any case, the Russian alcoholic would have a special place.

So here we have the poor alcoholic Saltykov, and what does he say?¹⁰ Listen carefully: “His feeble imagination tried to create images” – he was nostalgic for the *nûn*, he wanted to lean towards the outside – “his blunted memory attempted to pierce the mists of the past” – he tried to repeat the conversion, to bring the *nûn* back to himself – “but the images were broken and meaningless, and the past remained dim and formless. There was no recollection, either bitter or sweet, as though an impervious wall” – rigid figure – “as though an impervious wall separated the past from the present. Stepan” – the character is called Stepan – “was completely filled by the present, which seemed like a prison cell” – it is not the present of the privileged moment, it is not the present of the *nûn* – “in which he would be locked up for eternity without consciousness of time or space. His mind took in nothing but the room, the stove, the three windows in the front wall” – again, rigid bodies – “the room, the stove, the three windows in the front wall, the squeaking wooden bed with its mattress worn thin, and the table with the bottle...” – so he is in the element of the rigid figure. What could be more geometric than all these figures? – “As the contents of the bottle decreased and his head grew hotter and hotter, even this boresome sense of the present gradually faded...” [*Tape interrupted*] [1:26:50]

... geometric form dissolves, but it is only to the benefit of the figures of light. They fall into the blackness, they fall into the zero. “Finally, the darkness itself vanished and its place was taken by a phosphorescent sheen” – this is nothingness – “It was an endless void” – well, he says it, so much the better, he really says it, yes, he says it. You see? – “It was an endless void with not a color or a sound, but radiant with sinister splendor...” – one might as well say, with no recollection, no expectation – “Before his eyes the stove...” – Ah, here we have a return to a rigid figure – “Before his eyes the stove. His thought was so filled with this image...” – and of course he clings to it... the any-object-whatever, he clings to the any-object-whatever, and the any-object-whatever is the object that presents itself at the any-instant-whatever – “Objects of immediate perception filled his mind so completely that it was closed to other impressions...” Then the window took the place... You see, here we have the succession of presents passing: after the stove, the window... Then the window took the place of the stove, the window, the window, the window! He needed nothing. – I don’t need anything, I don’t need anything... – “He filled his pipe and lighted it. It dropped from his nerveless fingers. His tongue mumbled something, but seemingly by force of habit only. He sat in silence and stared at one point. He felt an intense craving to start drinking again, to raise the temperature of his body... to grasp a *nûn*, but alas, all the *nûn* were...” – The end of the sentence is something I’ve added ... Forgive me, I couldn’t help myself. But, on the other hand, everything else is actually in the text and shows this passage from the geometric object to nothingness, from the point of view of time. Fine.

So, do you understand all this? We’ve almost, we’ve finished a large part. And I would like to continue, just before we take a little rest, I would like to continue because I know – I’m not being vain when I say this – I know the Neoplatonists quite well but I know Saint Augustine very, very badly.

Now there’s Éric, who works a lot on this and who knows Saint Augustine very well. So, my question to Éric is: Éric, just as you did a marvelous study regarding the history of Aristotle’s great crisis – regarding the time of chrematistics as opposed to the time of the economy – I would like you to follow up... In your view does Saint Augustine fit into this schema to some extent? Is it, in your opinion, a quite different case? Or could we at least agree on a middle position, that he renews the scheme in the direction of Christianity, but that he keeps something essential? This is what I would like you to tell us.

Éric Alliez: Yes, I have devoted myself, to be brief...I can make a kind of comparative outline of a certain number of the major positions shared between Plotinus and Augustine [*inaudible words*] a certain number of... [*inaudible words*] that you have made.¹¹

Deleuze: You were stupid to stop the recorder, right? [*Deleuze addresses someone near him, but not Hidenobu Suzuki, to whom we owe all the recordings we use here, because he continues with the recording despite the very low sound*] You stop your recorders because it's not me talking but maybe it's because they can't pick him up... if you can speak as loud as you can, huh?

Éric: Yes, and I want to show... because in fact it's very interesting how [*Inaudible remarks*] in my reading of Saint Augustine and Plotinus' *Ennead* [*Inaudible remarks*] I have the impression that...

Deleuze: I see someone smoking, am I right?

Éric: I'll put it out right away. [*Laughter*]

Deleuze: The person speaking has the right to smoke. But no one else! We're going to stop soon so you'll be able to go and smoke outside, in two minutes, in... [*Alliez suggests pausing right now*] No, no, no! because we will lose the focus... There's... There's just...

Éric: I have the impression that... [*inaudible words*] is absolutely heterogeneous, and at the same time, that a certain number of propositions can more or be superposed from Plotinus onto Augustine. So, I think that one of the great commonplaces in the history of philosophy... is indeed the supposed Neoplatonism of Augustine. What I would also like to show is that through a shift that seems to me to be completely irresistible, that is to say, the schema gives me, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the same... [*inaudible words*] I believe that in the end Augustine is irreducible to the Neoplatonists, and indeed Augustine announces something completely different in terms of a new subjectivation of time.

So, in terms of this kind of very, very schematic outline, well, I'll start with a quotation from Plotinus, and I think it's a kind of treatise that has been spoken about at length in the third *Ennead* [*inaudible words*], and Plotinus writes that it suffices to say that movement could cease to occur only at certain intervals in time. Now this is precisely where Augustine begins from in book 11 of the *Confessions* in his critique of Aristotle, and he will obviously develop this hypothesis, referring to cultural tradition. But this reversal is important in relation to Aristotle, since in Plotinus as in Augustine we come to measure the movement of a body by means of time. This is practically stated in book 11 of the *Confessions*, the references to which I will give later. Okay.

So, that would be the first point, still being very schematic, and this quotation that I think you already gave [*inaudible words*] from Plotinus¹², where we find: "But an all too meddling nature, that wanted to be in charge of itself, to belong to itself, and chose to seek for more than its present state, put itself in motion, and time put itself, too, in motion" – time too, that is, "time reposing in being", which we find in an obviously completely Christianized form in Augustine with the famous thesis of [*Inaudible remarks*]... thus time reposing in being set itself in motion and moved towards an ever renewing future. So, the first thing that we might notice is that in Augustine too we have an approach to time that is defined firstly by the

future in terms of the quest for love. He too is cynical as Plotinus is in a phrase that I believe, comes from the sixth *Ennead*, concerning what is missing, and so we find my first remark in the third *Ennead*. On the other hand, Augustine is no longer on the side of this ideal fall... [inaudible words] on the side of the real fall. For Augustine, on the contrary, here again, it's not exactly a quotation I'm going to give you, but it's practically word for word: Once Adam set love of self against love of God, human beings lost their stability in temporal duration". Stability in time, well, that's... [inaudible word] Well, that brings us to my second point.

Deleuze: If you allow me to interrupt you very quickly, because this is a point where you are fundamentally right. For Christianity, there is no longer an ideal fall. The ideal fall is a very, very Christian concept, I mean very anti-Christian, which Christianity cannot support because it negates the creation. It is the negation of the creation, so if there is a point where, indeed, Neoplatonism will have no possible equivalent, it is in this admirable idea of the ideal fall. There, I am completely in agreement.

Éric: [Inaudible remarks, probably on the distinction that Deleuze has just mentioned] What is also important in this citation I have just given you... [Inaudible remarks] is that I believe it offers a spiritualization of movement... [Inaudible remarks with the sound of an airplane] So, in this ideal, the life of the soul in its distension occupies time. To say that time and the life of the soul confronting each other in the movement in which the soul passes from one [inaudible words] doesn't permit us to say something, and we understand why... [inaudible words]

Deleuze: That's the synthesis, right? It's the synthesis, it's the synthetic affinity.

Éric: And if, considering that the anterior and posterior are in life and in the movement of the sky, one says that this is time because time is something to do with movement. If one refuses also to see in it something of a movement that is more real, which itself contains elements of the anterior and posterior... we commit a great absurdity by granting to an inanimate movement – meaning the anterior and posterior – the movement of the world, and consequently, time. Especially if we deny to this movement the image proper to the inanimate movement from which anterior and posterior derive, because the movement is spontaneous. It produces each of its own acts one after the other, generating a passage from one to the other...

Deleuze: You mean to say it's the movement of the soul that comes first because it is what constitutes the posterior and anterior...

Éric: There is a deterritorialization of movement, and again, I don't think... I think it's a rather different shift... Anyway, I don't think you find the same movement in Augustine. I think it's quite a different problem to... [inaudible words] Yes, the third point, well, I apologize because I'm giving these points a little... [inaudible word]

Deleuze: No, it's good, it's good, it's good. It's good to have a bit of disorder.

Éric: The third point is... I think that the Neoplatonic origin is unquestionable... a definition of eternity as substance and no longer as attribute. I think that here Augustine's references to Neoplatonism are clearly explicit, whereas, in general, he tends to blur the Neoplatonic origin of concepts.

The fourth point is obviously – and here I must be completely impartial – the relationship between *distentio* and the famous Neoplatonic... I think that... [inaudible name] in his commentary on book 11 of the *Confessions* [inaudible words] makes a very big mistake in attributing to Augustinism the fact of referring *distentio* in the end to the triple presence. I think that here, the Neoplatonic and Augustinian origin is questionable, and that, I think [inaudible words]. So, there, effectively... then, regarding this, the same shift between ideal fall and real fall, insofar as the *distentio*, is also, and perhaps first of all... [inaudible words] The real fall, that is to say that...

Deleuze: Absolutely!

Éric: Obviously, the *distentio* makes the fall the permission...

Deleuze: Because, do you agree that the ideal fall would be called *extensio*?

Éric: Absolutely.

Deleuze: There is an *extensio* of the soul, and this is the ideal fall. Whereas the real fall is the *distentio*.

Éric: It is very interesting... [inaudible words] to consider this ambiguity for Christianity, to imagine the ideal fall contains this very, very important distinction... [inaudible words] between what he calls *expectatio futurum* and *extensio ad superiora*. Schematically speaking, the *distentio* is the quest [inaudible words] for the future.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes...

Éric: The perpetual movement... the desperate attempt [inaudible words]. Now at the end of Book 11, referring to a certain number of passages [inaudible words], Augustine thus marks this distinction between *expectatio futurum*, that is to say the movement of perpetual quest towards the future, which is determined, moreover, by self-love, and on the other hand, *extensio ad superiora*, that is to say, a movement of a pure horizontal and vertical nature which, in a certain way, is inspired by the movement of Neoplatonic conversion, and indeed, the term there is *extensio*. So, of course, I don't want to say that this is the ideal fall and the real fall, but I think that if we want to try to find a comparable movement...

Deleuze: A remnant, a residue of this notion, yeah, yeah...

Éric: ... The distinction... I mean, the idea of... that you mentioned seems interesting to me... [inaudible words] So there you have an outline that's really quite pathetic because it's completely mangled.

Deleuze: No, there are four points of comparison, yes, four points, all at once, yes.

Éric: On the other hand, there is a gap that seems to me to be quite [inaudible words], which is effectively a gap between the ideal fall and the real fall. One would be tempted to draw a parallel between, on one hand, the time of the soul... in the third *Ennead*... and on the other a relative time that he discusses in the sixth *Ennead*. So, in this passage in the sixth *Ennead*, Plotinus writes what is for me one of the most [inaudible word] texts. And this is where Plotinus appears to say something which is very complicated because in the *Ennead*...

[*inaudible words*]. So [*inaudible words*] space and time are on the same plane if we consider beings in their manifestations as... [*inaudible words*]

So, it is possible that place and time are types of relation, place because it is the container of the body, and time because it is the measure of movement, that is to say, the interval between its beginning and its end. So here, indeed, we have the impression that the movement of this relative time, is in a certain way, a derived time. Here we go back to a problematic which is, nevertheless... But obviously, if we go back to the origin of beings, [*inaudible words*] we realize that this is not yet spatial, but it is already temporal. But obviously, it is not the same time because in the soul, as Plotinus says especially in the fourth *Ennead*, the anterior and posterior exist in another way than they do in temporal things. And of course, this time of the soul which is the true time, therefore not relative time, but an image... [*inaudible word*]

Well, on the one hand, in Plotinus, there is this movement between a time of the soul and this relative time, this time of the sensible, let's say, of phenomena, phenomenal time. Now, in Augustine, we could say that more or less the same thing occurs, since, finally, there is a rather surprising parallel between Book 11 of the *Confessions* and Book 11 of *The City of God*.¹³ Regarding Book 11 of the *Confessions*, therefore in the *Confessions*, I developed very briefly, four examples, the time [*inaudible words*] of the soul, time therefore as *distentio* in the triple present. Augustine says there is no past, there is no future, there is only a past present, and a present... [*inaudible words*].

On the other hand, in book 11, chapter 11 of *The City of God*... book 11, chapter 4, we have: "For if eternity and time are rightly distinguished by this, that time does not exist without some movement and transition, while in eternity there is no change, who does not see that there could have been no time had not some creature been made, which by some motion could give birth to change—the various parts of which motion and change, as they cannot be simultaneous, succeed one another—and thus, in these shorter or longer intervals of duration, time would begin? Since then, God, in whose eternity is no change at all, is the Creator and Ordainer of time, I do not see how He can be said to have created the world after spaces of time had elapsed, unless it be said that prior to the world there was some creature by whose movement time could pass."¹⁴

So here too, in a very, very different way, we see a return [*inaudible words*], that is to say this kind of presence [*inaudible words*] is what seems to me completely different. This time is far from being a derived time – as in the case of Plotinus in the sixth *Ennead* – and to a certain extent [*inaudible words*] it is what Augustine calls creaturely time, time as a creature. So there is a very odd tension [*inaudible words*] between, on the one hand, a creaturely time and, on the other hand, this time defined by the *distentio* of the soul, here *distentio* [*inaudible words*]. So I think that the relationship to Aristotle is quite different. Well, I think this is completely in line with what you showed [*inaudible words*], that is to say that in any case – and here I speak in both cases– it's again a question of time as an image [*inaudible word*], that time passes in a way [*inaudible word*]. I believe that there is a shift [*inaudible words*] between Augustine and Plotinus. Well, on that note, I note the parallel between two Books 11: Book 11 of *the City of God* and Book 11 of the *Confessions* and I..

Deleuze: You tell me when I can intervene.

Éric: Of course.

Deleuze: No, no, I mean when you've finished a point so that I can... Only when you've finished your point, I don't want to cut you off at all.

Éric: Well, I just wanted to say that ambivalence also appears both in *The City of God* and within the *Confessions*. In both cases you have a double approach.

Deleuze: Here's my concern, Éric. Once again, you know Saint Augustine better than I do. I have the feeling that there are all the shifts you want, that there is nonetheless a distinction between originary time and derived time in Saint Augustine, and that there is not simply... And that derived time is the present that passes. The originary time is the reflected present, reflected in the form of the present of the present, the present of the past, the present of the future, since this is what will allow us to say that one time is slower than another. Whereas the present of the present... the present of the present, of the past, of the future, the tripled present, is actually an originary synthesis, and the passing present is no more than a derived time that will receive its measure from the originary time. So, the point where I would agree with you in advance is that Augustine probably does not conceive the synthesis of originary time in the same way as do Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. But there are these two aspects of time: originary time and derived time. You would agree, I think...

Éric: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Ah, well, okay... okay, okay... yes, yes, so it's me who hasn't quite understood then... [*Tape interrupted*] [1:52:48]

Part 3

Deleuze: So, yes?

Éric: Simply... he raises the problem...

Deleuze: He is much more afraid than the others. I mean Christianity, for the reason you said, because there is no more ideal fall, all falls are real, the fear of time, which is the sign, which is the signature that we are no more than nothingness, as Claudel says, when he ends on the fear of time, which means that we as creatures are no more than nothingness, that we are nothingness in the bosom of God. So, they have a fear of time that the Greeks had no reason to have. It is necessary to reverse the commonplace assumption. The commonplace assumption would consist in saying that the Christians discovered time, while the Greeks ignored time because they only believed in cycles etc. All this is nonsense! It's not that at all. Moreover, it seems to me that the Greeks are much less afraid of time than the Christians. It's true that the Christians discover time, if you call discovering time discovering it in fear and trembling; they are the ones who experience fear and trembling with regard to time. As for the others, it is not that they ignore time, neither historical time, nor physical time, nor cosmological time and so on. They're perfectly aware of all that, but for them, it is a question of situations, which are crises much more than fears! There are great crises where they will all die, they know, the crisis of the city, crisis of history, crisis of everything! Would you agree with that?

Éric: Yes, you're very much in line with what Kant... says about Augustine [*Inaudible remarks*].

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah!

Éric: ... to set out to conquer time only after having proved the transcendent position of the soul in relation to time.

Deleuze: Yes, yes! but this transcendent position is an act of synthesis constitutive of an originary time.

Éric: Exactly! To conclude, I'd like to point out what is a bit of an enigma, the anomaly that Augustine expresses in relation to this schema, which is that in Plotinus, the dimensionality, the vectorization of time, is very clearly marked by past, present and future. We can find a certain number of examples of this in the *Enneads*. What seems to me important here, following an argument Merleau-Ponty¹⁵ makes which seems to me very, very convincing – and curiously, he also quotes Augustine at one point, who completely misses this movement – In any case, his demonstration remains... and I believe that this movement, this movement of dimensionality, of past, present, future, always refers back in a certain way to a circular type of movement. So the image of circular time has been found in more than one... [Inaudible remarks] It has been found many times since then, and it's more... [Inaudible remarks] So, it's in the second *Ennead* and in the sixth *Ennead*, I think, that we find the finest explorations of this. The universal soul circulates around God; it surrounds him with its love, it slides as much as it can around him, not being able to direct itself towards him, so it moves around him. And then time is like a line that seems to go on and on, although it depends on a central point around which it turns. Wherever this line advances, it retains the image of this point which itself does not move and around which it wraps itself in circular motion... On the other hand, in Augustine, what is quite surprising is that the dimensionality of time is completely reversed, that is to say that time comes from the future to go towards the past, and you find this both in the *Confessions* and in *The City of God*.

Deleuze: That's important! A primacy of the future? Yes! Because indeed it is not the same future. It's not the future of a procession, it's not the future of a "leaning towards the outside"... Yeah, yeah!

Éric: Hence the importance of this...

Deleuze: Hence the importance of the theory of the future? That would be the real novelty of Saint Augustine, to break with the theory of contingent futures of the Ancients, to make a new theory of futures, which would fit – for those who remember then, at that time, in what we did in the first quarter, when we encountered the problem of contingent futures – the naval battle which will take place tomorrow or which will not take place tomorrow¹⁶... Fine. As for me, in all of what you said, there is only one point where I can't follow you, where all the fibers of my being protest. Only certain texts prove you right, it's a question of evaluating these texts. You will find all the texts you want where you may be right to speak of a circular time in Plotinus, but I believe that these are secondary texts which are homages to Plato, and I don't believe in them at all. I don't think there's anything circular about it, because there can't be a circular time of the soul, no. What there can be is *metempsychosis*. But this is a very, very important point. The idea of the reincarnation of souls and that of the eternal return, which is to say of circularity, are two absolutely different ideas that people tend to confuse, as you do when you go too fast.

There is for the Neoplatonists an idea they cling to which is called *palingenesis*¹⁷, that we could call circulation, metempsychosis, change of lives, of the soul etc. But what is very striking that this is an idea which has completely different origins from the astronomical eternal return, that is to say of the rotatory movement... it's completely different.

But Éric is indeed right in saying that this poses a problem of interpretation, a very delicate one, because in Plotinus you will find all the texts, all the circular metaphors you like. But in my view, these are absolutely nothing but metaphors and tributes to Plato and to Plato's circular movement. It's his way of recuperating Plato, saying: yes, yes, I'm a Platonist, but I don't think that in his own thought he includes anything like a circular movement. And for a simple reason, which is that the movement of powers cannot in any way be circular. Conversion is not circulation. There is not... if you like, there is not and there cannot be at the same time circularity and procession-conversion. It's too... circularity is a physical or cosmological movement. I don't believe that a movement of the soul can be circular in nature. And again, for a simple reason, which is that... even from the point of view of metempsychosis, what is the problem? It is not to ensure the birth wheel – or simply the *wheel*, as we say, though it is wrong to talk about a wheel – it is to get out of the birth wheel. That is to say, that it is not circular. *Palingenesis* is fundamentally linked to the idea of an exit, which is to say, it can't be a circle because one does not come out of a circle; a circle is by definition closed. The reason I insist on this is that both historically, mythically, and in every sense, the two notions, the notion of rebirth of the soul and the notion of astronomical eternal return are completely different and have completely different origins. However, this doesn't mean that you aren't absolutely right about the terminology Plotinus uses. He pays his homage to Plato, but unlike you I don't see it as anything other than a homage.

Éric: [*Sound extremely low*] No, I mean that this is something that also bothers me because it's true that, in a way, I come back to this definition that at the beginning of my work I had completely rejected, so it's really a common place, between Greek circular time and Christian linear time...

Deleuze: Yes, you mustn't, you mustn't do that.

Éric: For the Greeks, there is clearly an overlap of a certain number of texts [*Inaudible remarks*] involving conceptions of linear time and that conversely in Augustine we can find what are almost cyclical conceptions, so it plays both ways...

Deleuze: What's more, the Christians took over all the cyclical conceptions that you can think of.

Éric: [*Inaudible words*] What made me reintroduce these texts of Plotinus a little bit is that, at first, I had indeed taken them as metaphors, but it's this opposition that seems to me to have occurred between past, present, future and the future

Deleuze: That's the very important point, a synthesis of ordinary time that would be organized according to the future. So, I'm not surprised that you invoke Merleau-Ponty, because Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were very keen on a synthesis of time that would be determined by the future, that would be determined according to the future, because they reproached Husserl and Heidegger for not having understood this question of the primacy of the future. There would indeed be a French Augustinism... of the French existentialists which would be very good, which would be, ... perfect, perfect, perfect.

Éric: [*Inaudible words*] the famous book by Husserl...

Deleuze: If Sartre had known that...

Éric: [*Inaudible words*] *Lessons on the consciousness of time*¹⁸ opens with a tribute to Augustine.

Deleuze: Merleau-Ponty?

Éric: No, Husserl!

Deleuze: Ah, I don't remember, the *Lessons on Time*, you say?

Eric: Yes! It starts with a tribute to Augustine; I don't remember the exact phrase.

Deleuze: Ah yes, the *Lessons on the Intimate Consciousness of Time*, yes, yes, yes, yes... yes but Husserl's a "theologian so he knew... he knew Augustine very well, yes, he knew them all. He's a father of the church, Husserl... Besides, all his disciples... Is that it? Are you done?

Éric: Yes, but I just wanted to add...

Deleuze: That's really good.

Éric: [*Inaudible words*] In conclusion, what is quite funny is this ambivalence, therefore, of the compression of time in Augustine, it is these consequences in terms of the problem of usury since, in fact, we can play certain texts of Augustine against Augustine himself, because the great argument for justifying the [*inaudible word*] of God is that we cannot sell time, time belongs only to God. Here, in fact, Augustine's texts on time, which is God's creature, are explicitly deployed. But what is very curious is that in the 11th and 12th centuries, certain "Augustinians" would take issue with this, by playing, on the contrary, on the idea of time in the *Confessions*, that is to say, by setting Augustine against himself...

Deleuze: Oh yes! So... in what century was that?

Éric: [*Lost words, covered by Deleuze's voice*]

Deleuze: Saint Augustine, which century is it?...

Éric: Saint Augustine? Fifth...

Deleuze: Fifth! He comes before Damascius. That's funny. And the Augustinians you say, when was that?

Éric: The Augustinians I'm talking about were from the 12th century.

Deleuze: Twelfth, yeah, yeah!

Éric: And the famous condemnation of... [*inaudible words*] in 1255 will try to put the brakes on by saying, by forbidding...¹⁹

Deleuze: Eric, I love you when you pronounce this famous sentence... [*Deleuze chortles*] followed by a completely unknown name! [*General laughter, including Deleuze*]

Eric: In fact, there are three books.

Deleuze: There are what?

Éric: There are three books by Pierre Duhem...²⁰

Deleuze: You see how culture corrupts! [*Laughter*] Duhem wrote three books on this famous condemnation. [*Deleuze continues laughing*]

Éric: [*Inaudible, interspersed with laughter*]

Deleuze: Well, well, well. Well, listen, that's perfect, because that gives us a complete framework. So yes, I'm running late. We'll pause for five minutes and then we'll start again, but don't take long. I'll tell you what, yes... a little pause. What time is it, exactly? [*Tape interrupted*] [2:06:46]

... Deleuze: Well, I think we're on vacation until the 27th... Ah, no! Sorry, until the 17th... until the 17th, right?

Various students: Yes, that's right...

Deleuze: Until the 17th, until the 17th of April, the 17th of April is a Monday

A student: No, it's a Tuesday...

Deleuze: No, a Monday... So, we're on vacation until the morning of the 17th...

Student: Until Tuesday morning.

Deleuze: So that's until Monday the 16th? Are we on vacation until then or until the 17th?

Hidenobu Suzuki: No, no, no. We start again on the 16th.

Deleuze: Well, that's what I said.

Deleuze: So then, I'm running a bit late. I'll conclude: Here are exactly the conclusions we are able to draw for the moment. I see three groups of conclusions... we have considered three images that we can call *indirect images of time*, three kinds of indirect images of time.

First image of time: *time as a measure of extensive motion*, in Plato and Aristotle. Such a time refers to the idea of privileged positions through which a moving body passes.

The second study we made: time as the second form of time as an indirect image. This time, it is *time as a number of the intensive movement of the soul*, in Plotinus, the Neoplatonists and briefly in Saint Augustine. This second conception implies the position on the intensive movement of privileged instants, the *nûn*.

Third order of research, which at first glance had nothing to do with all of this, and not even at a second glance: since cinema presented itself as the movement-image, the corresponding image of time was obtained by montage, thus as an indirect image of time. This indirect image of time had two aspects, as if by chance: time as deriving from the movement of the world or extensive movement, movement in space, and this was the great cinema of movement; on the other hand, time as deriving, also through montage, from a supposed movement of the soul, and here we had the great cinema of light, even if light was conceived in a very different way by German Expressionism and by the French school. But time as arising from a movement of the soul with the problem of the fall, and so on. I'm not saying that the soul... that Murnau is a Neoplatonist. I'm just saying that cinema on its own account has managed to recreate problems that philosophy had traversed in its own way but hadn't managed to resolve.

Second set of results – that was our first set of research – second set: everywhere we noticed ... what, what made this position difficult, to conclude the time of movement, that is to say, to draw from extensive or intensive movement, an image of time which could only be an indirect image? What were the difficulties in this? Well, the difficulties lay in this: in all domains... [*Tape interrupted*] [2:12:56]

... anomaly of extensive movement in all domains. Astronomical aberration, that is to say aberration in the movement of the planets; physical anomaly as one approaches the earth: Aristotle's sublunary world... political anomaly with the crisis of the Greek city; economic anomaly shown in exemplary style by Aristotle, as forms develop that can already be called forms of a pre-capitalism. In this first direction, what we have is a crisis of time as an indirect image of movement, of extensive movement. It is fundamentally a crisis, the fundamental concept here is that of crisis.

In the second direction, time as an indirect image of the intensive movement of the soul, here too a formidable anomaly develops, namely the real fall and the derived time, that time which runs to nothingness. Hence what we have this time is fear and not crisis, it will be the sign of fear, fear of derived time gaining its independence, that is to say, ceasing to submit to the demands of originary time.

In a whole other domain, that of cinema, the movement-image has never been separable from anomalies of movement, anomalies that are intrinsically cinematographic. Of these anomalies, false continuity would be an example though only one example among a thousand others. When do anomalies in movement culminate in the cinema? We gave our response in the first term: it is when a failure of the sensory-motor schema occurs, that is to say, when the situation no longer naturally continues in action, in normal action, when there is a deliberate failure, a questioning of the sensory-motor schema. At this point, it becomes very difficult, in terms of all these anomalies of movement, to maintain time as a simple indirect image of movement. Here time tends to become independent, to shake off its dependence on movement.

Third result, third group of results: from here on, in the three fields under consideration we are faced with a choice. Either to try to save the primacy of movement over time, the only question being, at what cost? Or else, to not only accept, but to desire this liberation of time from movement, which will mean: autonomy of derived time, collapse of the idea of an originary time. There is only derived time, so that derived time is no longer derived time.

We are embarking on an adventure where we will have to capture a direct image of time, a direct time-itself or if you prefer time itself, *a little bit of time in its pure state!* It is movement that will depend on time and no longer time that will result from movement, and this was the second term of the alternative. In the first term of the alternative, we try to save what can be saved and to maintain derived time according to the demands of the synthesis of originary time, but at what price?

First possibility: maintaining a rural life, time, maintaining a rural life. The time of daily life, derived time is the time of daily life, of every-day banality, this is what derived time is. Well, it is necessary to maintain this time of daily life it in spite of everything, and to find conditions where it will take on a rhythm, whatever aberrations there are, where it will take on the rhythm of the cardinal points or the seasons. In the sublunary world one needs to place oneself in the best conditions to receive the effects of the most perfect extensive movement. And so it is to save a rural community, because it is the peasants who are close to... etc., who are close to works and days. *Works and Days* is the title of a book by Hesiod²¹, whose theme is conformity with nature. Conformity with nature means, maintaining derived time, under the requirements of an originary time which itself refers to the great rhythms of nature, to the great rhythms of the world and of nature. In terms of the Greek city, this represents the rural reaction; it represents someone like Aristophanes, in his hatred of Socrates, in the hope of saving the Greek city by constituting agricultural communities. It represents the whole reaction against an imperialist and commercial Athens. From then on, it is an anti-democratic movement but a very strange one; it is against Athenian democracy but also against Athenian imperialism and the commercial politics of Athens. It tries to reconstitute the city on the basis of agricultural communities. It's already in ruins, it's already in ruins by the time of Plato and Aristotle, sorry, I meant Aristophanes, so let's not talk about it anymore.

Or else save the harmony of the soul. If one saves the harmony of the soul... You see how it's no longer conformity, it's no longer in accord with nature, it's the harmony of the soul, accordance with the world, these two profoundly Greek ideas, accordance with the world, harmony of the soul. The harmony of the soul is much closer to the Neoplatonists. Plotinus says: "Like a taut string, like the taut string of a lyre communicates itself to strings that were previously still"²². Is that what Plotinus says? The harmony of the soul was already one of Plato's great themes in *Phaedo*²³: how can we save the harmony of the soul, which will allow us to maintain derived time under the direction of originary time, which originary time will measure the intensive movement of the soul? This will not be done without prayers; it is no longer a question of works and days. It's a question of matins and prayers – is that what they call them: matins, vespers and prayers? In other words, it is no longer rural life, it is monastic life. And monastic life had... and the question of monastic life played a fundamental... a fundamental role between the third century... the Neoplatonists themselves were not exempt from such a movement; there are entire chapters, there is a whole essay by Plotinus on prayer, in an absolutely unchristian sense, but about prayer nonetheless – this is when the Greeks introduce a notion of prayer that is completely different from the old prayers to the gods of polytheism. There is what we call a *monasticism*, a Neoplatonic monasticism.

How is it achieved? Maintaining an activity down here on earth, of course, while giving oneself the conditions to save the harmony of the soul, that is to say to save time as number of the intensive movement of the soul. The monastic life is the other... is another term of the alternative, *salvation*. Only, as we know well from history, both rural and monastic life generated the enemy they were supposed to fight, which was also generated by other means. Both the monasteries and the rural agglomerations engendered the city to the point where, in

a way, agriculture became the invention of the town and not of the peasantry. Agriculture will only progress by mixing seeds, by forming stocks, which was precisely what occurred in urban agglomerations, constituting large markets. What rural life claimed to ward off on the one hand, it produced on the other: daily life, the daily banality of urban time. And monastic life... everyone knows how the monasteries were one of the other sources of the town – the town and city arose from all kinds of sources – and monasteries are the source of numerous cities, the city being constituted around the monastery. Here too, in an extremely moving vision of history, the monastery gives rise to the enemy it hoped to ward off.

What does this mean, the time of the city? Daily banality ceases to be punctuated by the seasons and ceases to be harmonized by the monastery. There was daily banality in the work of the peasant, and in the prayer of the monk; daily banality was constant. But there it was attuned to the rhythm of the seasons, attuned to the rhythms of nature, or harmonized with prayers and cults. The city is the unleashing, and that's why to be a philosopher one can only be a philosopher of the city, now. This is why philosophers always get lost in the big forests. What do I mean by that? The city is unleashing of daily banality, which is to say, derived time that has lost all dependence, as much in relation to the extensive movement of the world as to the intensive movement of the soul. The city is worldless and soulless! That's the city.

Derived time rises, asserts itself for its own sake, breaks all its moorings. It becomes the only time that exists; there is only one time, there is no more originary time. Time is out of joint, off its hinges.²⁴ What were these hinges of time? They were either the privileged positions through which the moving body passed, namely the cardinal points, or the privileged instants through which the soul passed. *Time is out of joint*, this means there is no more originary time. There is only a derived time. From here on, derived time is no longer a derived time, once again it is the only time that exists. The time of daily banality, there is no other time than that of daily banality.

Who is it that becomes aware of this? The one who becomes aware of this, the ones who become aware of this, are those of the Reformation movement, as Max Weber showed quite definitively despite the criticisms that were made of him, criticisms that never focused on the essential of Weber's text, the spirit of Protestantism and capitalism.²⁵ It is with the Reformation that the question of faith, and the question of daily activity, of the activity of daily banality, of temporal activity, as Luther says, temporal activity, that is to say, everyday banality, merge to the point that the word *profession*... profession takes on the two meanings we now recognize: profession of faith and professional activity, and a union is established, one that for both Greeks and Catholics would be a monstrous union of temporal activity, which is no longer subject to a model, whether this model be that of rhythmic attunement or that of harmony.

And Luther will not go very far in this sense, for reasons I do not have time to develop, but on the other hand, Calvin and the Methodists will go very far in this sense. And we will find a phenomenon analogous to that which Éric analyzed in Aristotle²⁶ namely, this time of daily banality, which gains complete independence and which makes... which reveal itself to be a generator of something, a generator of money. Time is the form in which money produces money, usury, credit, and usury and credit, please God.

What should we conclude from this? We will have to conclude simply that the anomalies in both extensive and intensive movement became such that time could no longer remain subordinated to movement. No longer able to remain subordinated to movement, derived time was unleashed. Derived time thus unleashed, time could no longer have a model; it was time

itself that would become the model of all things and this model would take on another meaning.

So, the consequences are the following. First: derived time would overthrow ordinary time, the only time would become the time of the any-instant-whatever, first consequence. So that it is movement that would be related to time, that is, to the any-instant-whatever, and no longer time to movement, that is, to the privileged instant. You see, the two formulas are not symmetrical: when time is related to movement, this implies that it is related to the privileged position of the moving body. On the contrary, when movement is related to time, it implies that it is related to derived time, that is, it is related to the any-instant-whatever, which will be the basis of the scientific revolution between the 15th and 17th centuries.

Second consequence: it is the whole notion of truth that vacillates – because I'm not planning to come back to this, it's up to you to connect it up with what we did in the first term – this time of nothingness, this time that rushes towards nothingness, this time of the any-instant-whatever, this derived time is precisely *the power of the false*. The models of truth were the two models that subjected time, either to extensive movement or to intensive movement, so here we have a crisis of the very concept of truth!

Final consequence: The daily banality of urban life will become the key problem. All the powers of the false are unleashed. Rural society disintegrates, our monasteries collapse. We are in a new element of thought, of the free philosophy which gives itself the task of thinking this extraordinary spurt of linear time, related to any-instant-whatever, the time of daily banality, the time of the city, urban time. For all these reasons, philosophy will find itself confronted with the necessity of constructing direct time-images.

And for all these reasons, cinema, in a completely different way, will find itself with its own problems, will find itself confronted with the necessity when the sensory-motor chains that maintained time's subordination to movement have collapsed, when all sorts of false continuities have multiplied, when all these marvels of cinema arise. That is to say, after the war, cinema will find itself faced with the task of constructing direct time-images on its own behalf. We are at this point: who is the one, the philosopher who first constructed the direct time-image? It is Kant that I would have liked to work on today, I will do this, very quickly, after the holidays, and to finish the year we will return to direct time-images in cinema. I wish you a very good vacation! [*End of the recording*] [2:38:00]

Notes

¹ See Marie-Claire Galpérine, "Le Temps intégral selon Damascius" in "Les études philosophiques", No. 3, July-September 1980, PUF.

² "Les études philosophiques" is a quarterly journal of philosophy and history of philosophy founded in 1926 by Gaston Berger and published by PUF (Presses Universitaires de France).

³ Here, judging from the context, Deleuze is most probably referring to Leibniz's reflections on the dangers to the soul of being confronted with an excess of objective reality, when he writes: "When our soul is brought to a crossroads of thinking it is always inclined to that side where the greater objective reality is presented; but this event can be harmful to its perfection and happiness if those realities are very many and very small. This can be called dissipation of the soul, which happens when we are stupefied and is similar to a body's motion that is lost because of a blow to the mass, where the impetus is dispersed through innumerable parts of the body. And so we must fortify ourselves against this dissipation of the soul with the most constant attention to our goal, to certain general rules of truths, and to the laws of living once prescribed and made familiar to us by repeated use of thinking and acting." See Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, *Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe*, Series VI, Volume 4, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften p. 2724 (trans. Lloyd Strickland).

⁴ Saint Augustine (354-430) ponders the idea of time as a *distension* of the soul (or mind) – which in some English editions is translated simply as “extension” or “extendedness” – in chapter 25 of “Time and Eternity”, the 11th Book of the *Confessions*. “It may happen that a short line, if pronounced slowly, takes longer to read aloud than a longer line taken faster. The same principle applies to a poem or a foot or a syllable. That is why I have come to think that time is simply a distension. But of what is it a distension? I do not know, but it would be surprising if it is not that of the mind itself.” See Saint Augustine, *Confessions*, (Trans. Henry Chadwick), Oxford, New York: Oxford UP, 1991.

⁵ On Pascal's idea of "diversion" see Seminar Cinema 2.22.

⁶ See Claudel's *L'art poétique* (Paris: Mercure de France, 1907), discussed by Deleuze in the previous seminar.

⁷ *Parmenides* is often considered one of the most enigmatic among Plato's dialogues. It is set in Athens during a supposed meeting between Parmenides and Zeno of Elea, the two great philosophers of the Eleatic school, and a young Socrates. The occasion of the meeting was the reading by Zeno of his treatise defending Parmenidean monism against the partisans of plurality.

⁸ See Damascius, *Problems and Solutions Concerning First Principles*, (ed. Sarah Ahbel-Rappe) Oxford: OUP, 2010.

⁹ Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin (1826-1889) is one of the most controversial writers of his day. Described by his contemporaries as a “writer of sarcasm and corrosive analysis”, he was uncompromising in his biting satirical attacks on society and the state. His most famous works include the family chronicle novel *The Golovlyov Family* (1880) and the political novel *The History of a Town* (1870).

¹⁰ See Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, *The Golovlyov Family*, The Overlook Press, 2013.

¹¹ As certain passages in this intervention are inaudible, for a fuller account of Alliez's remarks on Augustine see Chapter 3, “The Time of Novitas: Saint Augustine”, pp. 77 -136 in Éric Alliez, *Capital Times - Tales from the Conquest of Time*, trans. George Van Der Abeele (Minneapolis, London: Minnesota UP, 1996).

¹² See Plotinus *Ennead* III, 7. 11 p. 347.

¹³ *The City of God* was written about 413–426 CE in response to pagan claims that the sack of Rome by barbarians in 410 was one of the consequences of the abolition of pagan worship by Christian emperors. Augustine responded by asserting that Christianity saved the city from complete destruction and that Rome's fall was the result of internal moral decay. He outlined his vision of two societies, that of the elect (“the City of God”) and that of the damned (“the City of Man”). These two cities are symbolic embodiments of the two spiritual powers – faith and unbelief – that have contended with each other since the fall of the angels. They are inextricably intermingled on this earth and will remain so until time's end. The City of God is divided into 22 books: the first 10 refute the claims to divine power of various pagan communities while the last 12 retell the biblical story of humankind from Genesis to the Last Judgment.

¹⁴ See Augustine, *The City of God*, Book 11, Chapter 4.

¹⁵ Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) was a French philosopher and public intellectual and the leading proponent of existentialism and phenomenology in post-war France. Best known for his work on embodiment, perception, and ontology, he also made important contributions to the philosophy of art, history, language, nature and politics. Associated in his early years with the existentialist movement through his friendship with Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, Merleau-Ponty played a central role in the dissemination of phenomenology, which he sought to integrate with Gestalt psychology, psychoanalysis, Marxism and Saussurian linguistics.

¹⁶ The theory of contingent futures (or future contingents) is developed by Aristotle in Chapter 9 of *On Interpretation*. The passage to which Deleuze alludes here is the following: “A sea-fight must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions, the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.”

¹⁷ The term *palingenesis* comes from Ancient Greek *παλιγγενεσία* (*rebirth*) – formed from *πάλιν* (*again*) and *γένεσις* (*birth*).

¹⁸ See Edmund Husserl, *Leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps* (Paris: PUF, 1964).

¹⁹ The condemnation Alliez refers to here is the condemnation that took place in 1210, 1270 and 1277, by the University of Paris, of Aristotle's treatises on physics.

²⁰ Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) was a French physicist, historian and philosopher of science. As a physicist, he championed energetics, holding generalized thermodynamics as foundational for physical theory. In philosophy of science, he is best known for his work on the relation between theory and experiment, arguing that hypotheses are not straightforwardly refuted by experiment. Moreover, he wrote groundbreaking work in Medieval science defending an idea of continuity between medieval and early modern science. See *Études sur Léonard da Vinci* (Paris: A. Hermann, 1906-1913).

²¹ *Works and Days* is a didactic poem written by the ancient Greek poet Hesiod around 700 BC. It is composed in dactylic hexameter. At its center is a farmer's almanac in which Hesiod instructs his brother Perses in the agricultural arts. In the poem, Hesiod also offers his brother extensive moralizing advice on how he should live his life.

²² This appears to be Deleuze's own paraphrase of the following passage from *Ennead* IV: "As in the case of a single string that is tensed; for when it has been touched at the lower end, it vibrates at the upper end, too. And often when one string is touched another experience a sort of sense-perception of that due to their being in concord and being tuned to a single scale. But if in one lyre a vibration can be transmitted from another, to the extent that they are in sympathy, so, too, in the universe is there a single harmony, even if it be composed of opposites; yet it is composed of things that are all the same and akin, even when they are opposites."

²³ *Phaedo* is one of the best-known dialogues of Plato's middle period, along with the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. The philosophical subject of the dialogue is the immortality of the soul. It is set in the last hours prior to the death of Socrates. In the dialogue, Socrates discusses the nature of after-life on his last day before being executed by drinking hemlock.

²⁴ On this subject, see Deleuze's reflections on *Hamlet* in Seminar 12 of February 28, 1984.

²⁵ Max Weber (1864-1920) is one of the most important social theorists of the twentieth century, along with Karl Marx and Emil Durkheim. Weber's wide-ranging contributions gave critical impetus to the birth of new academic disciplines such as sociology as well as to the significant reorientation in law, economics, political science and religious studies. Among his most famous books are *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-05), *Economy and Society* (1922) and *General Economic History* (1923).

²⁶ See session 11 of February 7, 1984.