

**Gilles Deleuze**

**Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984**

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### **Part 1**

Would you mind closing the door? Our question is: how did this emergence of a time-image function or occur – could you close it? – how did the emergence of a time-image arise? Or, what amounts to the same thing: how did the subordination of time to movement become reversed?

And we dwelt for a long, long time on what we could roughly call ancient philosophy in order to show how, of course, it's true, they had an image of time such that time depended on movement. But at the same time there were so many anomalies of movement that the more these anomalies of movement were taken into consideration, the more time tended to reverse its dependence, and instead of depending on movement, it was now movement that depended on time. And this was sensed, this was experienced... was experienced by ancient thinkers either in the form of crisis or in the form of fear.

So, since we dwelt on this point for a very long time because it was something that interested me, and then we finished it up before the holidays. Regarding this point, are there any... meaning on all these points, do you have any remarks, or is everything fine? Did you have... by "is everything fine", I mean have you forgotten everything, or do you remember it all, though in the end it makes no difference. So, everything is fine.

And then I'll skip over a lot of things, since otherwise this would never end, and I had said, it seems to me that the very act – but an act infinitely prepared by what precedes it, as we have seen – the very act of the reversal of the movement-time relation, occurs with Kant. It is Kant who draws the conclusions of all that preceded, concerning these anomalies: he gathers together all the anomalies to perform the reversal.

I remind you, in fact, that my whole idea from before will founder if you don't take this into account: yes, in antiquity, in all sorts of different ways, time depends on movement, but this can be firstly the extensive movement of the world, and then it can be the intensive movement of the soul. But even insofar as it depends on movement, where time depends on movement, where the time-image is drawn from movement, even in this measure, the thinkers of antiquity are the first to notice anomalies of movement and, in terms of these anomalies, they risk getting into this sort of seesaw game where, regarding the anomalies, it is time that will subordinate movement instead of remaining subordinate to it.

So, when I say that Kant, in a way, draws the consequences of all the cosmological and psychological anomalies – movement of the world, movement of the soul – he draws the consequences of all the psychological and cosmological anomalies in order, in a way, to perform this very reversal – to perform it, in any case, in philosophy – this reversal of movement in relation to time. It is now time that will, in a sense, be primary in relation to movement. This is more important than if there were no more movement; that's why we sometimes express ourselves as if there were no longer any movement and then there was time. It sometimes happens that, indeed, movement has assumed no more than a secondary value; other times this is not the case. On the contrary, it may have retained its full value, but it just happens to be subordinate to time, instead of the other way around. So, all the time you have to consider all the various nuances.

Now, today I would like us to see, so as to finish with this whole philosophical part, to see precisely how Kant operates. And as always with Kant – I arrived here pretty exhausted today, not at all because it's the beginning of the university term – it's that every time I have to speak about Kant – and this has already happened to me, but not to this extent – I say, oh well, it's this is all done and dusted as far as I'm concerned, I mean I really know him well. And then I plunge back into the texts, and again there are knots that even I can't unravel. Last night I thought I had it all worked out, but then this morning I realised that it wasn't the case at all.

So, I'm going to go very slowly, and you mustn't blame me because... you mustn't blame me because I feel how odd all this is. Every time, every time, it has this effect on me. I say to myself, I can grasp it, and then nothing, I don't grasp anything, and it's difficult, because... I say to myself, the only way when you take one of Kant's texts, you're confronted with a very difficult language, a language that's extremely rigorous, very hard, difficult to read – it's not, it's not like Descartes, which appears to be very easy to read – but this difficulty is already evident in his style. When you read it, if you manage to extract something from it, you say to yourself: But what he says is so simple. There are, as it were, three stages: you read a page and you think, where is the subject? where is the verb? And so on – of course, it's translated from German, and you think, well – if you take the German text, it's difficult.

Second impression, by dint of work, you extract propositions, and you say to yourself: ah but yes, but what he's saying is completely obvious. But you're already caught up in the cogs and you'll see that these pseudo-commonplaces lead to things that pose such problems that, in the end you almost want to use a language that is other than philosophical, you almost want to use poetic language, to try to... And after all, that's what he did himself, when you consider his last work – which he wrote when he was very old, extremely old, when others would have long since finished writing – his last work, that is, his third Critique, the *Critique of Judgment*, reaches an intensely poetic level of expression.

So then, what I would like to do is to follow my path, and then even... don't worry if there are moments of great confusion, you just tell me, right? And we'll try to sort it out. The first point, it seems to me, is that when you look at the *Critique of Pure Reason*, we see him formally affirming that time depends on movement... no sorry, I mean that movement depends on time, and not at all the other way around. And this is even the element of what he calls, or one of the main elements of what he himself calls a revolution in philosophy. It is movement, well, it is movement that depends on time, but the way he demonstrates this, at the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason* seems to be like child's play. And it is indeed... only what does it hold in store for us? It is. How does he proceed?

It seems to me that he proceeds like this. I multiply – so that's my first point – I multiply the subdivisions.

a) He tells us roughly: *Extensive movement* – that is, local movement of the kind that is defined by a change of position, change of position of a moving body – *extensive movement presupposes time*. Why? Because it necessarily takes place across different space-times. In other words, extensive movement assumes different times. Extensive movement is that which occurs in different times. In other words, extensive movement refers to the notion of *succession*.

Now what is succession? Succession is the relationship between different *parts* of time. Succession is the relationship between different parts of time. All this is elementary. I'm already able to draw the conclusion that I can consider time from the point of view of the relationship between its parts. This is a first aspect of time.

So, if extensive movement refers to succession, that is, to the relation of parts of time, I see that it also refers to time in its first aspect. Which means what? The first aspect of time is *the relation between its parts*. This means that time is composed of infinite times. Time is composed of infinite times, okay. There are therefore parts of time and the relation between these parts is succession. Time is composed of times. Notice already that, if I think about what I'm saying, it would be enough for me to conclude that *time is not a concept*. Why? Because a concept is not composed of something that is homogeneous to it. A concept is divided into other concepts according to differences that are called "specific". For example, mammals are divided into lions, oxen, etc. But time is different, it is divided into times, it is divided into parts of time. Kant will insist enormously on this: *spatio-temporal differences are irreducible to specific or conceptual differences*. I retain only this aspect for the moment. Extensive movement presupposes time from the point of view of the relation between the parts of time, the relation between the parts of time being succession. The conclusion to this point, however small, is already formidable. *I cannot define time by succession*.

Succession is a *mode* of time. What mode of time is it? Succession is *the mode of the relationship between the parts of time*. From this point on, you understand – we become suspicious – we say to ourselves, well, from such simple things, he's already entitled to conclude that time cannot be defined by succession, since succession only defines the relationship between the parts of time. In what, in what... we must expect the worst here; well, we must expect the worst, and this is quite difficult because many people have defined time by the order of succession.

Here Kant forbids himself from defining time by succession. And see what he suggests to us: it is because we have defined... among other things, it is because we have defined time by succession that we have made it dependent on movement. If we had realized that time cannot be defined by succession, because succession defines only the relation between the parts of time, then we would not have been able to make time itself dependent on movement. We would have realized that, on the contrary, *it is only extensive movement which occurs according to a principle of succession*, that is, according to the relation between successive parts of time – it is the parts of time which are successive. This is the first point. Are you okay with this so far? You tell me as we go along because it's... [*Deleuze doesn't finish the sentence*]

b) Second aspect, same thing for intensive movement. What is intensive movement? Extensive movement is that which occurs across different times, following the rule of succession. What is intensive movement? It's what occurs *all at once*. What is all at once has a name, we call it *simultaneous* as opposed to *successive*. The successive is what occurs at different times; the simultaneous is what occurs all at once. In what way is intensive quantity at the same time? In two ways, I think, and we've looked at this, so I'm not going back to it. I'll just mention them but only to remind you. First, because its multiplicity is a *virtual multiplicity*, its plurality is not successive. The plurality contained in thirty degrees is not successive. When you say that it is thirty degrees, the thirty degrees are given all at once. And the second reason, I would say, is that different degrees of intensity can fill one and the same space-time. I mean, fifteen degrees of heat doesn't fill the room any less than thirty degrees of heat; so even if this seems quite basic, it's still very important.

In terms of these two aspects, intensive quantity can be defined as that which *fills* a time. In other words, I have a second aspect of time. Succession allowed me... [*Tape interrupted*] [20:56]

... he used simultaneity to define space. He said that time is the order of successions, whereas space is the order of simultaneities. Kant says no. Simultaneity belongs to time, as does succession. Simultaneity is all at once, and the "all at once" belongs no less to time than the "at different times". Again, this all quite basic. It's child's play.

But this is a second aspect of time. Succession is the determination of a relationship between the parts of time; simultaneity is the determination of an eventual *content* of time. That which fills a time, that which *is* all at once. I no longer consider time in terms of its series, I consider time in terms of its content. The series is the relationship between the parts, whereas I envisage it in its content, that is, in what comes to fill a length of time. And I must also say that I cannot define time by succession, since succession only concerns the series of time, that is, the relation between its parts. And equally I must consider simultaneity itself as a second mode of time, no longer time considered in terms of the relation between its parts, but time considered in relation to the content that comes to fill it. In other words, I can define time itself neither in terms of intensive quantity, nor in terms of intensive movement, nor in terms of extensive movement.

I can already guess... I can already guess what the consequences will be; we're not done exhausting them. Why is that? Because, in the end, there will be no world, there will be no soul. You remember how the soul was the substance from which intensive movement derived. While the world was the substance from which extensive movement derived. There will be no more soul or world, except, perhaps, in a radically new sense. What will there be, for the moment? Well, we don't even have time for the moment; we don't even have time! All I can say is that time does not depend on movement. So, then, what is time? Is it succession? No, it is not succession, since succession is only the determination of the relationship between its parts; it is only the series of time. Is it simultaneity? No, it is not simultaneity; simultaneity, the "all at once", is only the determination of the content of time.

So what is time? What else is there but succession and simultaneity? There is permanence. And indeed, permanence is what is at all times. Succession is the rule of what occupies different times; simultaneity is the rule of what is at the same time; permanence is the rule of what is at all times. Of that which occupies all time, we say that it is permanent, that it lasts.

Indeed, in a certain way, time is permanence. It is neither the successive, nor the simultaneous, neither succession, nor simultaneity. It is permanence.

What does this mean? Time as something permanent, yes, yes, but at the same time, what exists in time does not cease to change. What exists in time does not cease to change, either according to the relations of succession, of extensive movement, or according to the movement of intensive quantity. That which exists in time does not cease to change, both from the point of view of content and from the point of view of the parts of time. Hence Kant's definition: yes, time is the form of what changes, but the form of what changes does not change. *The immutable form of that which changes*. This is what time will be.

At the same time, I have already gone too far. The immutable form of that which changes, but why? Why would this be a definition of time? "Immutable form of that which changes": see that, at least, has an advantage: at least in appearance, I no longer define it either by succession or by simultaneity. I have discovered a third aspect of time: permanence, the immutable form of what changes.

Well, does this help me make progress? Why is time, as a form of what changes, necessarily an immutable form? Because if the form of what changes itself changes, *it would have to change in another time*. There would be a nesting of times. This is difficult. Of course, the form of what changes cannot itself change. It would have to change in another form that would not itself change.

Well, let's accept all that, I mean, it's beyond discussion, it's already so difficult to understand that we have no desire to discuss it. But at the same time, what does it mean to speak about the immutable form of what changes? Would this be the definition of time? No, no, because permanence is in time. I mean, the immutable form of what changes, maybe that's what time is, but *I can never actually perceive this form*. I cannot perceive it, hence Kant's formula: at the same time as he defines time as the immutable form of that which changes, he tells us that *time cannot be perceived in itself*.

What is, in fact, the permanent? The permanent is what *in* time is the correlate of time itself. It is *the correlate of time as it appears in time*. Permanence is the permanence of something in time. What is this permanent something? This something permanent, you must understand, is *in* time. I could say, and I will be able to say that it is what passes through successive states or it's what possesses simultaneous states; it's this *something in time*, that I call permanent, whose states will be said to be successive or simultaneous. For example, I say of the table that it is white and rectangular; this is a simultaneous attribution. I say of the table, that it blackens, this would be a successive attribution: from white, it becomes black. The permanent is the subject, the table. The permanent is in time. It is the perceived representative. It is, in time, the perceived representative of time that itself cannot be perceived.

And again, with this table I have taken a spatial example, that is, one that is only indirectly relevant to time. Let's take a directly temporal example. This is no longer the thing, but the Self. I would say that the Self has such and such a state, in a given time: this is intensity, the intensity of its sensation. I would also say that the Self passes from one state to another state: this is its succession. And I would say, finally, that there is a permanence of the Self through these states. The Self is in time. The temporal Self is the correlate in time of the form of time, which is imperceptible in itself. Good. First point completed. [*Tape interrupted*] [34:20]

## Part 2

... I would just like you to be able to sense that the image of a time that no longer depends on anything other than itself is beginning to emerge. It is movement that is in time, it is not time that stems from movement. What does this mean? Well, it means something fantastic in terms of time.

So let me move on to my second point. As far as time is concerned, this means that *there is no originary time*. This is why... all this is already so difficult that I'm not going to complicate things by giving you details... I'm just proposing a schema, okay. I know it's not perfect... That's why I'm saying this without being too specific, without developing anything. All the interpretations of Kantianism that restore an originary time to Kantianism seem to me... they seem to me to be quite regrettable, especially the phenomenological interpretation that reconstitutes an originary time in Kantianism. This seems terrible to me because I would say that Kant's most profound novelty is to tell us that *there is only derived time*, that is to say that there is actually no derived time since there is no originary time. And I would rather say, *there is only ordinary time*. There is only ordinary time, this is the scary message. Scary, we'll see why it's all scary. Kant's more or less frightening message is that there is no time but ordinary time. Why does this sound – if we're paying attention – why does this affirmation that there is only ordinary time sound so odd?

Again, when we think of the philosophers of antiquity, we see there is an originary time for them. Why? So there is also a derived time. There is an originary time for them precisely because time depends on movement. And oddly enough, it is precisely because time depends on movement that there will be an originary time. Indeed, how will originary time be defined? It will be defined according to the privileged positions through which the world passes and according to the privileged instants through which the soul passes. The originary time of the Ancients is either the time of the Platonic planetarium, as we have seen, meaning it is privileged because it is defined by the privileged positions of the Cosmos, which is why it's cyclical. Or it is the time of the soul, which is originary because it is defined by the instants, the *nûn* as we saw before the holidays, those instants which do not presuppose time and which are privileged instants through which the soul passes. In other words, originary time is necessarily a time that measures the movement of the Cosmos, the extensive movement of the Cosmos or that measures the intensive movement of the soul. It is a time that is defined by reference either to the privileged positions of a moving body, or to the privileged instants of a soul.

We've just seen how Kant suppressed all that. Here, time has swallowed up succession. It has swallowed up simultaneity. And it has swallowed up permanence. It has done all that. It can no longer be related either to privileged positions in space or to privileged instants in the soul. It is literally *the time of the any-instant-whatever* or *the any-position-whatever* of the moving body. Why? I can say the any-position-whatever of the moving body since, in this case, it is extensive movement that depends on time. It is a time made up of any-positions-whatever and any-instants-whatever. It is ordinary time. There will no longer be any way to mark privileged instants or privileged positions.

In other words, it is *the time of everyday banality*. For Kant, there is no other time than the time of everyday banality. So, once again, to speak of an originary time in Kant seems to me to take away with one hand everything given to him with the other, that is, to make him a disciple of Plato and Plotinus. If I had, in this sense, to identify Kant's novelty, I could say

that he is the first to substitute the couple originary time-derived time with the single idea of a time of everyday banality: all time is ordinary. Now, we're a long way from having finished exploring something of this nature.

That's why, and in this sense that I want to bring in – I already tried to do this some years ago but I wanted to come back to it because we can never be done with it... well, me at least – this is where we have to bring in something, a kind of poetic formula that would be the equivalent of what Kant tells us.<sup>1</sup> And the poetic formula, I see it in *Hamlet*, when Shakespeare makes Hamlet say: “The time is out of joint.” It's out of joint. Or, what is exactly the same, the formula we encountered on another occasion this year, Borges' formula: “the labyrinth that consists of a single straight line that is invisible and endless.”<sup>2</sup>

Okay, and what today we tend to consider – because we're at risk of not understanding anything – what we consider to be a childish representation of time, namely a straight line, is on the contrary the most paradoxical, and it's Kant who comes up with this idea. At the beginning of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he tells us that we “represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time.”<sup>3</sup> It is he who gives us the image of time as the straight line of a linear time.

You will say, Well, so what? You might even think that this shows that Kant is, as we say, outdated, since we can say that nonetheless all the efforts of the philosophies of time have been precisely to break with this elementary representation of time. But thinking in this way we understand nothing. We understand nothing because, as we shall see, Kant is the first to break with this representation of time that he gives us at the beginning... he's a man who didn't wait for others to catch up. I mean afterwards we can work in more and more advanced directions, but what we must see first is that in the unilinear representation of time, there is something absolutely new and that this novelty can never be denied. It is a novelty that is dated and signed, I mean, signed by Kant in such and such a year, and regarding this point, we can of course go elsewhere, we can go in other directions, we can sense say that we need to go further, but it will all be beginning from this point.

It is only in a superficial sense that one would criticize the unilinear representation because from a certain point of view it cannot be criticized. From what point of view is it uncriticizable? It is uncriticizable from the only point of view that counts for Kant, namely, to indicate to us that time cannot be understood in terms of privileged positions or privileged instants. Time can only be understood in terms of any-positions-whatever of the moving body and in terms of any-instants-whatever of the soul. In other words, we no longer have the time of the rural world or of the monastery.

What do I call the time of the rural world? It's the time that gives rhythm to work and to the days; it's the great periodicity that implies that time is understood in relation to privileged positions through which a moving body – in this case the earth – passes, the cycle of the seasons, and so on. So, I would say regarding the time of the rural world, that yes, this is the originary time. It is the originary time, in the sense that it derives from the movement of the world. The movement of the world passes from one privileged position to another.

Monastic time, the time of the monastery, no longer concerns the hours of the working day, even though they worked hard in Christian monasteries. This time, it is a question of the hours of the soul, it is the hours of the soul that are punctuated by prayers. Indeed, one must

not confuse the hours of the soul with the instants of nature. They are not at all the same thing. There is a whole monastic time which is not the same thing as rural time, but here it would be necessary... I'll leave this whole aspect aside. But we should see what monastic time consists in. Why do we need to see this? Because in a way, monasteries are the places that have harvested the intensive conception of the intensive movement of the soul. If agricultural work is par excellence what harvests the extensive movement of the world, it is the monastery that gathers up the intensive movement of the soul and that opposes the privileged instants, or that at least distinguishes, the privileged instants of prayer and the privileged positions of work.

Now for Kant, there are no longer any monasteries, nor rural world. This is true. Where do you imagine the time of everyday banality first arose? Outside the monasteries and the countryside, it could only arise in the towns and cities. I really believe – I say this without any irony, in any case it's not funny – he is the first philosopher of the cities, the first philosopher of the cities. He took his little walk in Königsberg, he took his little walk in the countryside there, every morning, but actually every time he speaks about nature, he's really speaking as someone from the city, as someone who comes from the city, he's the philosopher of ordinary time.

So now you'll tell me that his bringing us everyday banality is not such a... The question is not whether it is of this or that value, it is that it is a conception of time that has no equivalent. It tore time away from the monasteries, just as it tore time away from the rural world. You will tell me that he did not do this alone. Of course, he didn't do it alone, but it's not by chance, it's not by chance that he was a Lutheran. And no doubt, the thought of Martin Luther is complicated. But, if we have to broadly define a Reformation movement, regardless of all the differences involved – I'm really just giving a general overview here – what would be a key point that appears in Luther, that appears very clearly and that is developed with Calvin, taking on an inordinate importance in the movements that follow. What would this be? The assertion that there is only one time, ordinary time, and that it is in this time that we win our salvation. The destruction of all ordinary time. The time is out of joint, time is no more than a straight line where you can distinguish neither privileged positions nor privileged instants. You will win your salvation according to the laws of daily life. You will not take refuge in a monastery which is fundamentally a place of cheating. And you will not work the earth, although of course, you have to work the earth, but that's not what counts, it's not that. You will go into business.

As Max Weber admirably shows, the profession of faith, in terms of the Reformation, is identified... I mean that the two meanings of the word "profession" become intimately related: the profession of faith and the temporal professions. So much so that, with regard to Kant, we must take up again all of Max Weber's theses on the importance of Protestantism in the formation of a capitalist time – because here again I'm only trying to open up pathways... the more pathways we can open up, the better – if you think about what capitalist time is, it's precisely a time that is no longer either monastic or rural. It's obvious that it will necessarily be a time of the future. And how is it defined? In exactly the same manner: there are no privileged positions, there are no privileged instants. Marx will make his analysis, will make in his... in his own way, his splendid analysis of this time in saying that capitalism discovered abstract time.

And what does abstract time mean? It obviously means time related to the any-instant-whatever and no longer to the privileged instant. He discovered abstract time at the same time



as he discovered the time of mechanical work, as opposed to agricultural work, which proceeds by privileged positions, privileged instants. This is the secular and urban time of which we will say that *time is money*. And time is money, if this formula has a meaning – and it already appears... Max Weber already provides all kinds of references, it already appears in the milieu of the Reformation – “time is money” means, very precisely, time taken at any of its moments. Money is the course of time, that is, the increase of money is the passage from one any-instant-whatever to another any-instant-whatever. Money is time, time is money.<sup>4</sup> So here we have the discovery of an abstract time. You will tell me that an abstract time is not a good thing. But you have to understand. Here again, abstract – I think I've already said it regarding something else – abstract means two things. Taken at face value, it's the opposite of concrete, okay. But it turns out that this abstract is the concrete of the city, of capitalism, of the Reformation, etc. I'm not mixing up the abstract with the concrete. I'm not mixing everything up, I'm merely indicating different openings. This is what the time is out of joint, or off its hinges, means. Again, remember, the hinges, what are they? It's exactly what allows a door to turn.

What does the door of the world turn around? It turns around an axis, the axis of the world, and as it turns around the axis, it passes through privileged positions of the moving body. This is time, from the time when it was on its hinges. Hamlet tells us that the time is out of joint, that is to say, time is no more than an infinite straight line. Once again, it has become the time of ordinary life. Does this mean that ordinary life was something discovered? That before there was no ordinary life. There already was such a thing, and these are things that have been covered quite well. From time immemorial, there has been capitalism, okay. Of course, there has always been capitalism, already, in the Greek city, already in the countryside with the land tax. There has always been capitalism but we've looked at all this and I don't need to go back over it.

I could come back to this from another point of view, but we don't have time. I've said from the beginning: beware, the Ancients had already encountered this, that the movement on which time depended encountered so many anomalies that time shook off its subordination and became independent, that is, it became ordinary time. Yes, but for them, these anomalies were precisely what had to be restrained each time, even if it meant running up against another anomaly. One just had to deal with them and get out somehow. But to take them as a model would be to establish ordinary time as the one and only time! Time is a labyrinth, yes, but a labyrinth that consists of a single straight infinite line. The time is out of joint. That is, it has become a straight line. There is no longer a door of time. There is no longer any ordinary time. So, nor is there any longer a derived time. But how terrible this is!

Is everything okay? No questions? I would like you to feel this... If there was something I had to reproduce, it would in some sense be the way that Kant, completely unshakeable, traces his path. It begins – it really should be set to music, that – with his little remarks on succession, simultaneity, permanence, and then all of a sudden, there's this kind of tremendous cymbal crash. There is nothing but ordinary time. You have never had anything but ordinary time. And how is all this related to civilization? We're a long way from Luther, somehow. Kant is a Lutheran. This all comes from Luther. It is not by chance that he remains a Lutheran, very, very... profoundly Lutheran. Still, it's very odd. So here we are with this thread. This time, the immutable form of what changes, that's it, that's what ordinary time is. And at the same time, it cannot be perceived in itself. It cannot be perceived in itself. What is this unconscious of thought, this straight line of time?

Now you will tell me that it can be perceived in itself. No! I can always perceive a spatial representation of the straight line. I take up the text I quoted earlier: We "represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time ". No problem. But he adds: "with the one exception that the parts of the former are simultaneous" – the parts of the line in space – "with the sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those of the latter" – meaning time – "always exist successively." It's a straight line, fine, but we've seen that this is normal, it's not that he defines time by succession. We have seen that the relations between parts of time was what defined succession. So, if time is a straight line, it is a very special line since the parts of this line will not be simultaneous, they will be successive.

What is this time? What is this unilinear time that defines ordinary life? All I can say at this point is: goodbye to the previous conceptions of truth – in order to bring together a little of what we have been doing this year. Understand, once again, that the conceptions of truth that, for the sake of convenience, I call classical, presented us with a truth that was essentially still to be discovered. What was the task of philosophy? It was to discover the truth. And what did this imply? The idea of a pre-existing truth, with philosophy defined as the search for this truth. So, it's not enough to say, well, we don't believe in this anymore. Since when? Now we could say, since Nietzsche. No! Do we have to go back to Hegel, or to Kant? Perhaps. If there's something new in Nietzsche – and I would say there is something new – it's not simply in terms of no longer believing in truth, although Nietzsche is right to say that he's the first to question truth. He is right, yet at the same time it's much more complicated, so we'll let it lie.

But philosophy as a search for truth implies a pre-existence of the true in relation to the search. It's a matter of discovering the truth. Well yes, there was a truth to be discovered, it's a truth that is in me. For you, it must be obvious now, it is a truth that is in me. A privileged proposition .... It's not a truth that ignores movement, as they say, it's not an eternity-type truth, not necessarily, but it's a truth that refers to the privileged positions of a moving body, and to the privileged instants of a soul.

Now if there is only ordinary time, you see that *there is no truth to be discovered*. That seems obvious to me, it's obvious. If there is a radical change in the status of truth, it's here: if there are no longer any privileged positions, nor privileged instants. That's why it's terrible, if you reintroduce Kant once again, and I'll specify for those who are familiar with him, there's an admirable – it goes without saying that it can still be admirable – there's an admirable commentary on Kant by Heidegger, where everything rests on the idea that in Kant there is an originary time and that it's even Kant who would be the inventor of an originary time.

I don't want to play the clown; I understand that even in Heidegger, "originary time" has a meaning that is itself new. This does not prevent him from distinguishing between an originary time with privileged points... and a derived time. Now, in whatever sense we take this, it is this very distinction that, in my view, Kant abolishes. So that if we reintroduce it, in one way or another, in whatever way we reintroduce it, it is, it seems to me, the novelty of Kant that crumbles. So, I always come back to this... [*Tape interrupted*] [1:06:56]

... the immutable form of that which changes, but as such, we cannot perceive it. And why does it seem to us that this is a kind of nihilism? Everything collapses. But why? Everything falls apart in term of the three aspects. I return to my three aspects of time: succession, simultaneity, permanence.

From the point of view of succession, what do I have? If I ask now, what do these three aspects tell me about time? Succession tells me this: a straight line whose parts are successive, which is to say that they are undone as they are made. This would be the first aspect.

Regarding the second aspect, or the second mode of time, the simultaneous or the point of view of content. This is the production of intensive quantities, but there is no longer a privileged instant. Therefore, I cannot define intensive quantity as it should be defined, which is to say as that whose magnitude is apprehended by its distance from zero, since if there is no privileged instant, every instant equals zero. This time, from this second point of view, from the point of view of content, time is no longer a set of parts that unravel as they are made, it is an instant that empties as it fills.

Suffice it to say that from the third point of view, from the point of view of permanence, it's a permanence that never ceases undoing itself and emptying itself. I am devoured, I in time, I am devoured by time that I don't even perceive in itself. I am eaten up by something that I don't perceive. You understand, even if you think of Bergson, it all depends on this. I mean, Bergson will be opposed to Kant: ah, yes, he will be violently opposed to Kant, but all this is just a starting point, it's inevitable. It's inevitable. In a certain sense, there's no opposition, everyone goes through this, all the philosophers that follow Kant will go through it. They won't go back on the achievements of Kant. And all of this is what Kant achieved.

So, how is he going to deal with all of this? How will he deal with it? He'll tell us... That's where we'll see the equivocation. He will tell us, be careful, there's a synthesis of time. Time, the immutable form of what changes, very good. We have seen this, it's something we have already developed. So there is a synthesis, there is a synthesis of time, but *we must not confuse the synthesis of time with time itself*. Obviously, you can see right away, it seems to me that Heidegger, when he reintroduces an originary time, it's because he regards the synthesis of time as being itself an originary time. But this isn't the case, at least it seems to me that it's not true. Why isn't it true? Because, in fact, *the synthesis of time does not concern time as such*; it concerns only the *modes* of time. That is to say, it concerns: the successive, that is to say, the relations between the parts of time; the simultaneous, that is to say, the eventual content of time; the permanent, that which carries the simultaneities and successions.

That's what the synthesis concerns. It does not concern time itself, and it absolutely cannot be – it's very odd, well... – it seems clear to me that it cannot be concerned with time itself, but only with the modes of time, which is to say, succession, simultaneity, permanence. It can only be concerned with... well, if you have understood, we're talking about the straight-line labyrinth and there is no synthesis that can address it as time.

On the other hand, however, there is a synthesis that can be exercised upon the modes of time and if salvation exists, it will be here. Our salvation will lie here, and what does it consist in? Here I'll go quite quickly because I don't have much time. Yes, this synthesis will have three aspects, one that corresponds to succession, one corresponding to simultaneity, and one that corresponds to permanence. So I would say: first aspect, not a synthesis of time but synthesis of the succession of the parts of time. This must not be confused with a mode of time, with a property of time.

Now, what does this synthesis consist in? It consists in this, that the intelligence performs certain operations, or consciousness; let's say, to establish a term, the "I". We will see why I introduce this term. The "I", consciousness that says "I", what does it do? It makes a synthesis but what does that mean? Well, time under the aspect of succession, that is, of the relation of its parts, gives me parts that are undone at the same time as they are made, since they are successive. What consciousness or the "I" can do is to determine a present. I apprehend a present. You'll tell me, but it's not, it's not within my possibilities to apprehend a present. But it is! It's within your possibility; we never stop living in this way. The act of consciousness is the apprehension of a present, the fixing of a present. Why? Well, because we have at our disposal a wide variety of possibilities.

I, for example, my present, let's take our respective situations. I'm here, I'm giving the lecture, you are there listening. Third case, one of you intervenes. When I arrive here, I have, let's say, a present lasting two hours. I mean, I don't have the impression of the time passing. It's as if I've fixed this, and my whole act of consciousness consists in fixing this kind of time lapse, a two-hour present, that is to say that these two hours constitute the present. You who are there listening... that's why, for me, they go by very quickly...but for you, they don't pass quickly at all, except for the times when things work well enough for you to be able to enter into my present. When that happens, everything is great, you live the same time as I do.

That's why I can't get bored. That's why, in general, the one who speaks is never bored, or else it's a disaster if he's bored. They have to change jobs at all costs. They're not bored because all this, all this time constitutes a present. You, your presents, let's say, as long as you haven't let go of your present, they are a kind of duration of understanding: for example, ten minutes of attention before you let go. Five minutes of distraction where you're thinking of something else, you think of something else, you think: "Oh, this is going to last a long time? well... You have also determined a present. The one who intervenes, they too have determined, at least confusedly... what they have to say, why they want to intervene, the motives for making the intervention also determine a present. These are very different presents.

Just as, if you like, every organism – it's been said a thousand times – every animal organism has its mode of presentification, that is to say, it has its minimum of present time, which passes more or less quickly. It is obvious that the present of a fly is not the same as the present of an elephant and so on. It also depends on the perceptual horizon, it can depend on a thousand factors. And if you're looking for an equivalent in space, for example, I say: this table is – I don't know, I may be wrong, but it doesn't matter – it's one meter long. You see.

I apprehend a certain space or I apprehend a certain time. That's what I call fixing a present. I apprehend the length of the table, that is to say, I understand it, I apprehend it, I grasp it as a whole, just as I grasp in a single present a certain passage of time. This doesn't pertain to time itself. It pertains to a synthesis that is exercised over the parts of time. My mind has this power to fix a present. You see how it is a variable present. I fix and keep fixing variable presents. This is what Kant will call: *synthesis of apprehension*, the first aspect of synthesis.

This isn't sufficient because I can vary it. All of a sudden, I say to myself, well, I'm going to take half the table as a unit of measurement, or a quarter of the table, twenty centimeters for example, I'll take that as a unit of measurement. At that moment, it's the twenty centimeters that I apprehend as one thing, as a present. In any case, I operate apprehensions, simple apprehensions, the fixing of a present in time. But this wouldn't work if I didn't also dispose

of another power as a mind, as an "I". Through apprehension, I determine a part of time, a variable part of time. It is also necessary that there's something other than apprehension, namely *reproduction* by which... I apprehend... no, not I apprehend, I no longer apprehend, I reproduce the parts of the past. In other words, I retain the recollection of it. If I arrived at the next part having forgotten the previous one, I would be in the case we saw earlier, namely that of parts that come undone in the same moment as they are made. Whereas here, firstly by apprehension, I determine a variable present, and secondly by reproduction, I reproduce the former presents in the actual present.

And finally, the third aspect of the synthesis, what Kant calls *recognition*. Because what I apprehend and reproduce, I relate to a supposedly permanent term. This is the table. Oh yes, it's the table! Oh yes, it's you! I *recognize*. To recognize is to relate the apprehended present and the reproduced former presents to the permanence of something. I say, "Hello Peter", I recognize him. And Kant will develop his famous theory of synthesis with these three aspects: apprehension, reproduction, recognition. Only, once again, understand what I'm saying here: in my view, this synthesis is not at all about time itself, it concerns only the parts of time. In other words, it is a successive synthesis of succession.

The same thing, there will be a synthesis which will be exercised on, not time itself, but on the content of time. You see that the first synthesis – apprehension-reproduction-recognition – the first synthesis is of great interest, it enables us to escape the exhausting regime of parts of time that are undone at the same time as they are made. Now I need another synthesis to escape the other danger, that is, the instant that empties itself at the same time that it fills. This will be another synthesis, this time an intensive synthesis which I'll just mention very quickly, where Kant employs a discovery of the 17th or 18th century, that is, infinitesimal calculus, to arrive at the idea – I'm going very, very fast here – to arrive at the idea of an intensive quantity. He interprets, which for mathematicians is very strange, but in that epoch it was understandable.

Already Leibniz was against this. He was a better mathematician than Kant, right? He makes a connection between differentials, between differential relations and intensive quantities, and this is a very intelligent move, it seems to me very intelligent, but here I'm speaking for those who know a little bit of mathematics. He brings them together, obviously, though it would take a lot of explanation to say why. Because the great achievement of, or one of the great achievements of differential calculus at its origin, is the discovery that there are relative zeros which are not absolute zeros. That is to say that zero over zero is a formula that concerns difference. And this is even what constitutes a differential ratio. A differential ratio equals zero over zero. Why, why, why? Shall I tell you... or shall I not? It's going to complicate things. Maybe it's not worth it, maybe it's not worth it. Who cares, let's forget it.

I mean, just remember this: it is that, what he will try to show us is that intensive quantities are subject to a synthesis which ensures that, however close they are to zero, there is always an infinity of degrees that separate them from zero, so that in the end, nothing can make us arrive at the conclusion that there is an empty space or an empty time. There is no empty time or, at least, no time can be proved to be empty. No time can be proved to be empty because, however small the intensity, even if it is below our threshold of perception – this synthesis of intensity is one that has much more to do with the unconscious than with consciousness –, even if it lies below our threshold of perception, there is such an infinite number of degrees below the threshold of our perception that we cannot conclude from the fact that *we see*

nothing in space and time... we cannot conclude from this that there *is* nothing in space and time. Okay. Fine.

You see that this question of synthesis, the synthesis made by the "I", in one case it concerns the relations of time and in another case the content of time. Well, but once again, it doesn't concern time itself. What does this mean? Well, this is why it cannot in any way restore an originary time. But then, what will happen? Synthesis is an activity or, as he says in his language, it is a *spontaneity*. It is exercised on the parts of time and on the content of time. It is the act of the "I".

On the other hand, what is there *in* time? What is in time is "me", the self. Myself follows/is in time [*Moi suis/suit dans le temps*], I am in time<sup>5</sup>. How is it that I am in time? I am in time in the triple form of a permanence, of something permanent that passes from one state to another and has simultaneous states, or if you prefer, in the form of a permanence of something that experiences a sensation – intensive quantity – that passes from one sensation to another – relation of one time to another time – and finally that poses itself in time as permanent, according to the three aspects we saw previously. So, I, as myself, am in time, and "I", understand well: Myself is/follows in time and "I" make a synthesis of the relationships of time and of what is in time. Good. Do you want a rest? Because the next part's going to be hard. But at least it will be short... So, let's have a little break. [*Tape interrupted*] [1:31:49]

### Part 3

... a very interesting question, just now, which I will try to answer. But once again, if you're interested in reading Kant, you should do so; don't let yourself be swayed. Be incorruptible, okay? Put some originary time back into Kant, do all that, you're free to do so.

This is the problem we are in, and this is our last problem, regarding this question of the formidable independence of time. Once again, I repeat: Myself is/follows in time. I would say as well, that I *appear*, that I, as me, as myself, appears, in time – being and appearing, "Me" in the language of Kant – "Me" is a phenomenon in time, an appearance in time.

"I" is an act that performs a synthesis not of time itself, but of what is *in* time and of the *parts* of time. If you bear this in mind... you might say why does it matter. Well yes! I would say, you must understand, me, well, every one of us is in time, and in time, we experience intensive sensations, we pass from one sensation to another, and, as long as we live, we remain, we endure. That is the "me", myself... And on the other hand, how can we deny that our acts of consciousness perform a synthesis of what appears in time and of the parts of time, syntheses of content and of the parts of time? And what performs this synthesis is the "I" of consciousness. Okay.

Hold on to these two things, these two things which it seems to me we have now made very clear. But you can't escape, you can't escape. It's not: "I" cannot say "me", it's: "Me" that cannot say "I". Me cannot say I. Because in fact, "me" is my existence as I appear in time and endure in time. "I" is the act of synthesis that operates on the parts of time and the content of time. "Me" cannot say "I", yes, and yet in a certain way, it must say it. "Me" is separate from "I", and yet "me" and "I" have an internal relation.

By what are they separated? You can already anticipate it: *it is the pure form of time that separates "I" and "me"*. It's literally like a kind of crack in the cogito: *the straight line of time separates the "I" and the "me"*, this is even its function. The straight line of time separates the "I" and the "me". In what way? In such a way that, if I look for a poetic equivalent, I can only say one thing: "I is another", "I is another", implying other than me. I am separated from myself by the thread of time. "I" is another. I cannot say "I am me", because "I" can only be thought of as other than myself. "I" can only think... or rather "Me" can only think "I" as another.

"I is an other", after all, you will tell me, let's be serious, everyone knows that this is a famous formula of Rimbaud's. "I is an other", says Rimbaud. Well, what does he mean? He says it in two places, I remind you, for those who want to look at the text. He says it in two very beautiful letters, in the same year, in the same month, which makes us suspect that he was writing the same letter to different correspondents, but it was worth it. He wrote it to George Izambard in May 1871 – there I put 1971 – in May 1871<sup>6</sup> and he wrote it to Paul Demeny, D-e-m-e-n-y, also in May '71... "I is an other". On one hand, you understand that saying "I am another" would be a platitude... I am always other than I am. To try to say what he means, he says: "I is an other". He intentionally creates a grammatically incorrect formula. Fine.

So, okay. You'll tell me, that was already enough with Hamlet... well, why? Because – I'm reading a text by Kant: "I cannot" – I'm reading it slowly – "I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being," – allow me, for those who know a little bit about Kant, by self-active being he means the "I" – "I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought..." "I cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being, rather I merely represent the spontaneity of my thought, i.e. of the determining, and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable" – sensibly and not intellectually – "and my existence always remains only sensibly determinable." In other words, I cannot determine my existence as that of a spontaneous being, but I cannot help representing spontaneity to myself.<sup>7</sup>

In what way? "This spontaneity is the reason I call myself an intelligence." In other words, I cannot determine my existence as that of an "I" because I am a "me" in time. But I necessarily represent the spontaneity of "I" as an other that is over me or in me. "Me" cannot determine my existence as that of an "I" but "me" necessarily represents the "I" to myself as an other, as an "I". What I mean is that here it seems to me that literally... and I quote from the current edition... in this text of Kant, and I'm referring to the first edition,<sup>8</sup> I don't see any difference between this text of Kant and the formula "I is an other". Why? Or rather I do see one.

If you refer to Rimbaud's text, the text is splendid, both texts are splendid. But we notice something very, very comical, that Rimbaud – who had nonetheless attended his classes, he had attended high school from time to time, he didn't go much, but he did a little bit – well, he's an Aristotelian. He's Aristotelian. He's a pure Aristotelian. The whole context of these two letters of Rimbaud is a purely Aristotelian one. For he tells us, in the first case that "I is another. So what if a piece of wood discovers it is a violin" And in the other letter he varied this, you will appreciate the variation when he says: "I is another. If the brass wakes as a bugle..."<sup>9</sup>

Now why do I say, he's an Aristotelian? Because you see that the opposition he establishes, the distinction, rather, that he establishes, is between matter and form. "I" is another because "I" is a mold that organizes a particular matter, just as the form of the violin organizes the matter wood, and as the form of the bugle organizes the matter brass. I'm not forcing the text by saying it's a purely Aristotelian text. It's a text that develops the idea of a molding, a molding of a matter. The "I" is the molding of a matter. "I is an other."

In relation to this, I wouldn't say that... in a way what I'm saying doesn't make any sense... but somehow Kant is something else entirely, because if we were to lend him the formula "I is another", you might feel that we're only beginning to sense what it means. It means: The me who is/follows and who appears in time cannot determine my existence as that of an "I", but instead I must represent the "I" as another. And through this "I" that I represent to myself as another, I am or I discover myself, I call myself an intelligence. *Intelligence is the other in me*. However, Kant is not at all Aristotelian, because here the "I" is the act of synthesis that concerns the whole of the possible content of time and the relations of time. In other words, it is no longer the moulding of a matter, it is an infinite modulation of phenomena, *the infinite modulation of what appears*. That's well put what I just said, that's good. No, I'm so unhappy with all this that when I say that's good...

You see, it's quite different. It's a bit like in music, if we go from partitioned forms, partitioned musical forms, to what is precisely called infinite modulation, continuous modulation – and I hope the musicians here won't contradict me on this, otherwise I'll collapse – I mean, it's the passage from an Aristotelian music to a music that, of course, existed already as early as the time of Bach, but which will flourish with pre-Romanticism and Romanticism, where the genres of infinite modulation begin to dominate.

So, the "I" in Kant, the synthesis, is precisely what will perform the infinite modulation of everything that appears in time. At that moment, me, myself, who appears in time, cannot say "I"; on the other hand, I can and I must represent this "I" as an other who says... who says something in me. And what is it that separates me, once again, what separates "me" from "I"? The thread of time.

Let's take this up again through another phrase, and then you'll understand everything: I'm asking what is the difference – of course, for those who don't have a background in philosophy this will all be very painful, but we'll finish today, and then, who knows, it might say something to you – what is the difference between the cogito in Descartes, the "I think" – the sacred formula of philosophers – between the "I think" in Descartes and the "I think" in Kant? It is not difficult; well, it is not that it's difficult, it is very difficult... Descartes says this: "I think, therefore I am," and it doesn't stop there. "I think, therefore I am," comma, "I am a thing that thinks." "I think, therefore I am, I am a thing that thinks".

If you did a bit of Descartes when you passed your high school exams, you will remember that he has very strong doubts, he doubts everything, but that doesn't mean he doubts in the sense of, maybe the table doesn't exist, he's not stupid, right? That's something Descartes' doubt never meant. He has no doubt at all about the existence of the table, but only about the certainty of the knowledge he has of the table. *The doubt concerns the knowledge of the thing, not the thing itself*. It is a search for certainty, not a search for existence. So he doubts, he doubts everything. He doubts things, that is, the knowledge of things. He doubts mathematical knowledge, he doubts all knowledge. And he says: but at the moment I doubt, there is one thing I cannot doubt. It's that I, who doubt, think. And the famous cogito appears.



Why? Because I can doubt all the knowledge I want except one, namely the knowledge that I doubt. And the knowledge that I doubt is precisely...that to doubt is to think. So, there's one thing I can't deny, I can deny everything, everything I want, but there's one thing I can't deny, and that is that, by doubting, I think, or by denying, I think. Hence the formula "I think, therefore I am, I am a thing that thinks".

In such a formula of the Cartesian cogito, you see, there is "I" think. I would say the "I", the "I think", is what we call a determination. Indeed, the "I think" determines me. "I think" equals determination. The "I am" itself is an indeterminate existence. I say I am, but I don't say what I am at all. "I am" equals indeterminate existence. I am a thing that thinks, well, that's simple. The determination "I think" has determined the indeterminate existence "I am". The determination "I think" has determined the indeterminate existence "I am" so that I say, "I am a thing that thinks" and in so doing I present a determined existence. Determined by what? By the determination. So there is a unity of the determined. So, I am a thing that thinks. there is a unity of determination, of the indeterminate and the determined. That's why, according to Descartes, this is the foundation of all knowledge.

So here's what Kant tells us. Descartes went too fast, he was in too much of a hurry. And Kant offers us his own cogito, and you'll see how strange it looks. [*Tape interrupted*]  
[1:53:00]

... In other words, "I" determines the relationships of time and the content of time. "I" performs the synthesis. Thus, "I think" is a determination. It is quite true, says Kant, that "I think" implies "I am". To think, one must exist, so "I think" implies "I am". Only the "I am" by itself is an indeterminate existence. "I am" is a purely indeterminate existence. You see, Descartes would not say otherwise.

But Descartes added... Descartes, he immediately added that the "I think" gives a determination to the indeterminate existence, so I can say, I am a thing that thinks. "I am" constitutes an indeterminate existence, but as I think, as "I think" gives a determination to "I am", in the form: "I am a thing that thinks", I am determined by thinking. My existence is determined by the "I think". I am a thing that thinks.

Kant says: not at all, it's not the case. For it may be very true that "I think" is a determination. It may also be very true that this determination implies an indeterminate existence, "I am". But nothing as yet tells us *in what form this indeterminate existence will be determinable*. He wants four terms, – that's what the creation of concepts involves – he wants four terms: whereas Descartes was satisfied with only three terms. Descartes played with determination, indeterminate existence and the determined, the resulting determined. Kant demands four terms: determination, the indeterminate, the determinable, the determinate.

No doubt, "I think" implies "I am", but this still does not tell us in what form my existing "I am" is determinable. The "I think" is a determination that is exercised on the parts and on the content of time. It implies an "I am", indeterminate existence. But in what form is my indeterminate existence determinable by the "I think"? This is what Descartes failed to ask. If you understand this, you've understood everything. Everything becomes clear beginning from Kant because the answer is self-evident. In what form is my indeterminate existence determinable by the "I think"? Kant's answer is: *in the form of time*.

But in the form of time, I am not an "I". I am a "me", a self that appears in time, that undergoes changes. I am, as he says, a receptive being in time. So that as for "me", I cannot say "I". I am separated from the "I" by the form of time. And that's why it's a catastrophe when one tries to relate the synthesis to time itself because at that point one removes everything that's new in Kant. "A stream not very deep... death", ah Mallarmé!<sup>10</sup> Another poem. A stream not very deep... death, that's it, this is Kant, *a stream not very deep... time*. A stream not very deep... time, this would be the thread of time that separates the "me" in time from the "I". So that this me cannot say "I", but I have to represent the "I" as another who exercises its synthesis upon me.

Ah, that's perfect, what I just said is exactly the right formula. Yes, I won't be able to find it again... this me cannot say "I", but I have to represent the "I" as another who exercises its synthesis upon me. This is Kant, practically word for word. "I" is another. If you remove this aspect, everything in Kant is ruined. The cogito is, to the letter, fissured by the thread of time. *"Me" is separated from "I" by time.*

So, it would be enough to... this is where the new independence of time appears as something fundamental. I would say, there are three forms, there are three increasingly profound levels of the independence of time. First level, the discovery of an ordinary time that rejects in advance any distinction between an originary time and a derived time. Secondly, second level: the arising of a pure form of time that separates the "me" and the "I" and makes the "I" an other.

And the third level is what we still have to look at, but we will not look for it in Kantianism, although it is present there, namely... What emerges from this in terms of the transformation of the problem of truth? What comes out of it? Because once again, truth sheds its old model by which it referred to privileged positions and privileged instants. In other words, *truth can no longer be discovered*. Well, if it can no longer be discovered, what happens? It can only appear as the formation of something new, that is, the production of the new, what the English or Americans would later call "emergence" or "creativity," a kind of radical transformation.

And indeed, creativity or emergence will be the possibility of the productions of an ordinary time. The production of the new will be the correlate... the production of the new will be the correlate of ordinary time in the same way that the discovery of the true was the correlate of originary time for the Ancients. And I would say that all of modern philosophy, from Kant on, will ask the question... whether in Germany or in England, America or France, everyone will ask the question, how, in relation to ordinary time, is the production of something new possible?

Georges Comtesse: Can I ask a question about... [*indistinct word*]?

Deleuze: Yes?

Comtesse: [*Inaudible words*] ... the analysis that you made with respect to Kant by saying that there could be an originary time and the instants, the instants analyzed as any-instants-whatever, so there are no longer any privileged moments but in the demonstration that you made both in Descartes and in Kant, even if Kant's cogito can be said to be cracked, the mere fact that someone says or imagines they can say, or ask themselves... [*indistinct words*] I think, and even from there, let's suppose, to say or affirm the being of the subject is to say,

no, the being of the subject, the attribution of derived being is not immediate, I think, in the procedure of the cogito. However, to maintain that time, although... [*indistinct word*] to say that time is linked precisely to being, to an "I", isn't this being of the "I" precisely a privileged position?

Deleuze: Mmmm... mmm...

Comtesse: That is to say, another privileged position that is no longer the same simply as the privileged position of a moving body, of a rigid body in space, or of an intensive state of the soul... [*indistinct words*]?

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes... If you say...

Comtesse: ... and by the reintroduction, then, of a certain limit of modern philosophy that begins with Descartes, the reintroduction of another privileged condition in the form of the being of the subject, whatever the problem of the attribution of the being of the subject which is a remnant of time, a thing in the sense of a soul, a "me", etc.

Deleuze: If I'm not distorting what you're telling me... what you're saying only applies to Kant, right? I mean, you're telling me: in Kant, there is the permanence of a center. He restores a privileged instance in the form of a center which is the subject, since in fact, when he presents what he calls the revolution he performs, he says: well, for me, things revolve around the subject. Things revolve around the subject, right? So of course, this subject is another. "I" is another. But that doesn't prevent there being a center, there is a center. Kant's philosophy remains a so-called transcendental philosophy involving a so-called transcendental subject, and we will see what sense transcendental will take here, since it is precisely, other than me, in a sense that it is not the subject, you and me. And Comtesse says: that doesn't prevent there being a center. But this center... if you will, what you're saying is very complicated, because okay, there's a center, but it so happens that this center is always thought of as being an other. So, if you like, there is a center, but as for me, I am perpetually decentered with respect to this center.

So, I would say that what you're telling me seems to me completely valid for Kant, but we cannot extend it to others, because, from Kant on, you will find all manner of efforts to suppress the subject, all the efforts you can think of to arrive at a kind of acentric world where there is no longer any center, or where there is a possibility that there is no longer a center.

Student: [*Inaudible*]

Deleuze: At this point – this is a very good question – if I remove the center, does time cease to be ordinary? I would say, yes that's a great question because it leaves things open. My answer would be, in any case, even if time at that moment ceases to be that of daily banality, it is not a return to originary time. We will therefore have new figures of time. But what you will not find, I believe, what will have disappeared forever, at least in a rigorous sense, is the idea of privileged positions and privileged instants. Of course, we will still be able to use the expression "privileged instants" in an aesthetic sense, but not at all in the sense of privileged instants of the soul or privileged positions in astronomy. But your question is excellent: if we arrive at acentric worlds, doesn't the ordinary thread, doesn't time in turn cease to be ordinary time? One could almost say that this is the point we've got to. At that point, the

problem bounces back, the problem bounces back, but there will be no return to the past. There will be no going back.

So, we're almost there. In order to fix the point where we have arrived today, we can say we've now finished examining the philosophical aspect of this question of the time-movement reversal, that is to say how philosophy attained a kind of independence or autonomy of time in relation to movement.

So, in what sense have we arrived? Well, instead of an image... instead of an indirect image of time, we will find ourselves confronted, in a very different way – so I'll take up your question – in a very different way, we will find ourselves confronted with direct time-images. But what are direct time-images? What are they? Because before it seemed to us that time could only be derived from movement-images. If we now say that there must be, and we must attain direct time-images, in what form will arrive at them? What are they? What will they consist in, these direct time-images which no longer derive from movement, since it is, on the contrary, movement which now depends on these direct time-images? You where we are...

Think about it, if there are points that you still find too difficult, we can come back to them next time if you want. [*End of the recording*] [2:09:43]

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See the seminar on Kant that took place in March and April 1978 on time out of joint. See also Session 1, March 14, 1978. See also session 5, December 13, 1983.

<sup>2</sup> Jorge Luis Borges, "Death and the Compass" in *Collected Fictions* (trans. Andrew Hurley) London: Penguin, p. 156. See also Session 3, November 29, 1983.

<sup>3</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood), Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998, p.180.

<sup>4</sup> In this regard, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, Weber quotes extensively from a sermon by Benjamin Franklin, : "Remember, that *time is money*. He that can earn ten shillings a day by his labor, and goes abroad, or sits idle, one half of that day, though he spends but sixpence during his diversion or idleness, ought not to reckon that the only expense; he has really spent, or rather thrown away, five shillings besides. Remember, that credit is money. If a man lets his money lie in my hands after it is due, he gives me the interest, or so much as I can make of it during that time. This amounts to a considerable sum where a man has good and large credit, and makes good use of it. Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on." See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism and Other Writings* (eds. Trans. Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells), London: Penguin, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> Here Deleuze appears to introduce a slightly Derridean grammatical glitch in his reasoning by playing on the double sense of *suis/suit* (the equivalence of the 1st person of the verb to be – *suis* – with the 1st and 3<sup>rd</sup> person of the verb to follow – *suis/suit*) in relation to "me" when he says *Moi suit dans le temps* instead of the more commonplace *Moi, je suis dans le temps*, as if to say that the consciousness of "me" as a self in time is also something that "follows" from the I's synthesis of apprehension, reproduction and recognition. We have chosen to translate *moi*, which in French also conveys the idea of the "self" by alternating between "me" and "myself".

<sup>6</sup> The appearance of the formula in the two letters is as follows. First to Georges Izambard (his teacher), Rimbaud writes: "The problem is to attain the unknown by disorganizing *all the senses*. The suffering is immense, but you have to be strong, and to have been born a poet. And I have realized that I am a poet. It's not my doing at all. It's wrong to say: I think. Better to say: I am thought. Pardon the pun. *I* is an *other*. So what if a piece of wood discovers it's a violin, and the hell with those who can't realize, who quibble over something they know nothing at all about!"; Then to Paul Demeny (poet and publisher): "For *I* is an *other*. If brass wakes as a bugle, it is not its fault at all. That is quite clear to me: I am a spectator at the flowering of my thought: I watch it, I listen to it: I draw a bow across a string: a symphony stirs in the depths, or surges onto the stage.": See Arthur Rimbaud, *Complete Works*, (Trans. Paul Schmidt) New York: Harper Collins, p. 113-115.

<sup>7</sup> See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit. p. 260.

<sup>8</sup> Here Deleuze makes reference to a French edition of *Critique de la raison pure*, published by PUF.

<sup>9</sup> See note 5

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<sup>10</sup> “Amazing only as naively agreed/ His lips not drinking there or ceasing breath/A stream not very deep and slandered death.” See the poem “Tomb of Paul Verlaine,” 1897 (trans. Hubert Creekmore) in Stéphane Mallarmé, *Selected Poetry and Prose* (ed. Mary Ann Caws) New York: New Directions, 1982.