

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

Well, then. What despair this weather makes you feel! Don't you think? Doesn't it make you despair? This kind of weather really depresses me, you know, it makes me melancholic. So, anyway, let's get to work. It will be good if we can just get back to work. Who was it that... there's someone that day I was asking you for help with the refrain and the gallop – and it seems that my appeal was successful, since some of you came up with some really interesting things – there's someone who gave me some notes about rock music.

Student: That was me.

Deleuze: Oh, and you didn't put your name. But your notes are amazing! If what they say is true, it's great.¹

Student: But that's the problem, I don't know if it's true!

Deleuze: Well, the reaction I have is that it's too good to be true. Even *I* can sense that it's a bit exaggerated, that the classifications you make are necessarily somewhat forced, but they are very, very good. So, I say to myself, this is so beautiful that it must be true, and at the same time it's too good to be true. You always think both at the same time. But it's a great little text, you know? If it's true, you should write about it for a rock magazine. Don't you think?

Student: I don't know if they would publish it.

Deleuze: No? Oh, yes. Rock magazines sometimes publish some quite difficult articles, when they find the music interesting. It's a very good text, don't you think? Yes.

Student: [*Inaudible remarks*]

Deleuze: Yes, yes, but... it is quite a problem, isn't it? I mean, the problem is really that of arriving at something... One never speaks very well about what one knows thoroughly, while on the other hand, one speaks very badly about what one doesn't really know. It's all very complicated. You must always speak at the limit of what you know. You mustn't fall into what you don't know, but then again you mustn't simply recount what you do know. It's difficult. Whether you're writing or thinking or whatever, it's always on the borderline

between what you know and what you don't know. That's why these are spiritually dangerous exercises, but only spiritually, so in the end it's not so serious. Except when you break down. When you break down... there are two ways of breaking down: either you say only what you know, which is pointless because what you know is what everyone else knows, so there's no need to say it. Or else we make the radical leap into what we don't know, and that's where... It's difficult, difficult. And that's always the case, even for literature. It's a matter of one's own judgement. Caution. This is what caution is. You make a start, you take a bite of what you don't know. And at the same time, not too much, not too much. Reveal your fragile side, but with a strong side to back it up. What you have to show is the more fragile side, but if someone objects, you bring out the strong flank. That's also the position of the damned in the circles of Dante's *Inferno*.²

All this to say that it logically follows... Now, where are we... where did we get to? You remember, it was a long time ago, I don't know exactly, but the last time I was trying to say that, in fact, we should now get started on our analysis of a direct time-image. What is this direct time-image, since all this time we've been insisting that there is such a thing? Moreover, we have made some headway in the analysis of this direct time-image, but only from the point of view of philosophical concepts, through Kant, though Kant was just the beginning of a long story. And here we come back to a problem, which is: *what exactly is a direct time-image?* And by direct time-image, you recall that we meant something that, from the point of view of time, would be radically different from the indirect image of time, which was a time-image that would result from movement. I suppose all this is relatively clear.

So, I can say – because this is going to keep us occupied us now for a certain number of sessions – I can say at least, what our schema will be. Regarding this question of a direct time-image, does that mean that it is something simply given, just like that? Is it the object of an experience? No, it's obviously more complicated than that. It is direct, yes, but not under just any condition. Certain conditions must be fulfilled for us to be able to gain access to a direct time-image. What we saw last time was something that consisted in this: that if we went back to the cinematic image, we would be entitled to question the illusion that this image is in the present tense. Which is to say that there is a direct time-image in cinema. And we saw... we had just started on this idea that the cinematographic image is not necessarily in the present. It's an illusion. What's more, those who say that the cinematographic image is in the present haven't even properly analyzed the nature of movement in cinema, meaning that the whole question of anomalies in movement has completely escaped them. So, I would say that there is a direct time-image in cinema that refers to certain conditions, but what are these conditions?

So, for the sake of clarity, I can try to draw out this idea, even before... by leaving it in obscurity as it were. So, what is it that I want to try and show in this series then, in this new phase of our work? It's something that connects to the very first part of this research, the idea that the direct time-image really exists and that it appears under certain particular conditions. I would say that the direct time-image appears in particular conditions that are those of a type of image that we must qualify, that we must define and describe, and that we will call *the crystal-image*.³

So, the problem is redoubled. What is a crystal-image? Notice that in this schema, I'm almost giving you – and here I don't have to justify myself because the whole continuation of this will constitute an attempt... If I do this, it's perhaps to help you follow – since as always this promises to be quite tortuous – it's to help you follow the main idea. Notice that we

distinguish what are like two dimensions. There would be certain very specific images – which there could also be in life, I don't know – in any case, in cinema, we would have these very specific images, like this, that we could call crystal-images. And what we would see in the crystal is the direct time-image, time itself, a little time in its pure state. So, let's not confuse the two. We're not saying that the crystal-image *is* the direct time-image. We're only saying that the crystal-image is the *condition* for grasping a direct time-image in the sense that *what we see in the crystal is time itself*. Obviously, we will have to justify this.

And so our first task would be to ask: *what is a crystal-image?* What is a crystal-image? Here, a problem arises that might interest us on a completely different level, namely that to understand what a crystal-image is, we can ask ourselves – and here I want to encourage you to do your own research – but how do we conduct this research? If you have the desire, if you have the feeling or if you simply have some reason to want to construct a concept like the crystal-image, you already have some directions in which to think. Namely that the crystal denotes a certain state of matter that is a concern of physics. The discipline that deals with it is called crystallography. This is not the first time that we will be faced with the possibility or the necessity of making philosophical use of science.

But as a side problem, I would pose the question: what is a scientific use of science? And how would a philosopher dare to use science? That is to say, not simply to make a history of science, which scholars could do perfectly well if they so desired, but to make a philosophical use of science. Isn't that what we see being denounced all around us? And indeed, there are many dangers. I see two fundamental dangers in any philosophical use of science: the first danger is that the use is metaphorical, that is to say, we use scientific notions purely as metaphors. The second danger, no less great, is of scientific notions being applied to fields that are not their own. In one case, the metaphorical use, science is only used implicitly, and this allows for a complete arbitrariness. In the other case, science is used explicitly, but it's extremely painful to see an application of what makes sense only in one scientific field to other fields which are completely different. It's in this sense that we're always a little embarrassed when we're told, for example, regarding art, that such and such an approach is analogous to quantum physics. You might think it's interesting, but what is, what is... [*Tape interrupted*] [14:18]

... rigorous, so that we can make a philosophical use of scientific concepts. And what do we have to do? What do we have to do to arrive at that? I mean, if I want to constitute a philosophical concept of the crystal-image, what am I entitled to retain from crystallography, in such conditions that my reference to crystallography will not be merely metaphorical, but at the same time, will not consist in applying crystallography to a domain which is not its own? In my view this is a problem that can be found everywhere, and if we were able to solve it, I think we would have taken a big step in addressing the problem of the relationship between science and philosophy. Namely, what right does philosophy have to draw concepts from science at a given moment?

Why do I say: draw concepts from science? Because science does not operate by concepts. I have said a thousand times, and perhaps one day I will be able to say it better, *philosophy is the invention of concepts as such*. The concept is a philosophical determination; it is the determination of philosophy as such. To construct, to invent, to create a concept is to do philosophy. Philosophy has no other content and no other goal.⁴ Which implies that science does not operate by concepts. And indeed, science does not operate by concepts. By what

does it operate by? Let us say, in a very cursory manner, that it operates by *operators*.⁵ Here I'm laying a mass of problems before you.

What right do we have to draw a concept from a scientific operator or from several scientific operators? I believe that if, in speaking of the crystal-image, we manage to show in what way and under what conditions we can use crystallography to bring out what is not given in crystallography – because that is not its business – namely a *concept* of the crystal-image or a concept of crystal, we will have taken a big step. In terms of one precise example, we might extract the possible relations between science and philosophy. And when I say *crystal-image* – and this is the nature of research – I already have a vague idea in my head, that is to say, I have a hypothesis. Let's just try to specify what this hypothesis consists in, without even knowing where it's taking us, which might after all be a dead end.

How does a crystal-image differ from the image as a whole? Let's forget the word crystal, which for the moment I'm using arbitrarily. I would say that I need a word to designate a very specific type of image: this would be *those images where an exchange occurs*, images where an exchange occurs. Bachelard, in his theory of the imagination, speaks very eloquently of such images: he finds a very apt word for them, he calls them "mutual images", double images, well, mutual images, images where an exchange occurs.⁶ I'll just say, because for the moment this is what I want – I have no particular reason, we'll see if it stands up – that a mutual image where an exchange takes place, if there is an exchange, is what I would like to call crystal-image. I no doubt have the impression that an exchange takes place in a crystal, and that moreover, each time an exchange takes place, an exchange in a particular sense of the word, there is a crystalline formation. But what is this exchange?

Let's go one step further. The exchange is between what and what? I would say, still in the same confusion – this is our hypothesis – still in the same confusion, I would say, let's try to define a crystal-image. For the moment there is nothing scientific about any of this. I'm following my own little path. I'm trying to form a pre-concept, a philosophical pre-concept.

So, here's what I would say: a crystal-image would be *a consolidate of two images between which an exchange occurs*. I introduce the notion of consolidate, a consolidate of two images between which an exchange necessarily occurs. Under what conditions does an exchange necessarily occur between two images?

You see how I find myself pushed from question to question. And this is how I proceed. I don't even know what I mean. You'll tell me I'm cheating. No, I go back to the time when I didn't know what I wanted to say. And I tell you that it can only be a consolidate between an image that we'll call *actual* and an image we'll call *virtual*. You see: *actual image, virtual image*, once again we're referring to science. In optics they distinguish between the actual image and the virtual image. That comforts me a lot. I say to myself, look! crystallography and optics are sufficiently linked for there to be a crystallographic optics. Very good. And so, if I can find optical notions to define the crystal-image, that's even better! I still don't understand anything of what I'm saying. I just say, well, let's suppose, we could – I use the conditional – we could define the crystal-image as *the consolidate of an actual image and a virtual image*. What does this give me and what would be the law of exchange? The consolidate of the actual image and the virtual image would be such that *the virtual would become actual and the actual virtual*.

If this is what the adventure is about, then it's far from over. It would only be the beginning. Fortunately, the rest of the adventure should provide something a little more concrete, since for the moment we're in the dark. I'd just say: would that be enough for you? Wouldn't you be happy if we could define the crystal-image like this? And if you tell me that it doesn't work for you, we can agree that it doesn't work for you. If you say to me that we have to see, fine, we have to see. So, would it be okay for you if we started from this point, in the conditional, that the crystal-image would be a mutual image, that is to say, the consolidate of an actual image and a virtual image, in such a way that a circuit or exchange is established between the two? The crystal circuit would consist in this, *in the actual becoming virtual at the same time as the virtual becomes actual*. I would have a crystal-image which would be a circuit of actual image and virtual image.

And here in my recollections – because that's how you search for things... bits and pieces come back to you – here, I recall a strange expression of Bergson's. He talks about *coalescence* – you see, that's a scientific term too – he refers to the coalescence of an actual image and a virtual image. Bergson doesn't speak about crystal. It's odd how his metaphors are not crystalline but magnetic. Though we may have occasion to discover why these Bergsonian metaphors are magnetic. In any case, he speaks about something completely different from the crystal-image but he's really speaking about a mirror phenomenon. He speaks of the coalescence of an actual image and its mirror image, coalescence of an actual image and a virtual image.⁷ Well, wouldn't that be a definition of our crystal-image, the coalescence of an actual image and a virtual image? Let's suppose that all this can be justified, that is to say, that what I ask of you is this mode of pre-comprehension. I can't yet say to you: have you understood? What I have just said, in fact everything I have been saying since the beginning is, strictly speaking, incomprehensible, since nothing has been justified.

These are just paths of research, and in themselves paths of research are a kind of amorphous soup. Except that something must emerge from them. The hypothesis that emerges for us, you see, we've already called crystallography and optics to our aid, but in what form have we summoned them? We summoned them in a quite rudimentary form, as terms... just like that. You can sense that what we're doing here is performing a transplant. We're taking things from science that have a very rigorous scientific status, and we're grafting them onto concepts. But will they take? Will these transplants take? Such is the danger of research.

So, to sum up – and our whole idea would be to explore this path – the crystal-image would be a coalescence or a consolidate of actual images and virtual images. And this is what we would call a *seed* of time. It would not yet *be* time. But in the crystal-image thus defined, we would *see* time. In the crystal-image thus defined, the direct time-image, that is to say, the time-image for itself, would emerge, a time-image no longer depending on movement, but, on the contrary, being such that movement now depends upon it. So, if I call the crystal-image a seed of time, it is because it is not time itself, but *something in which we see time*. This is our hypothesis in a nutshell.

So, if it's a matter of making this relatively clear, you see that what I'm asking of you now is exactly what I would call pre-comprehension. That is, it must remain obscure, but obscure in such a way that you vaguely recognize something in it. Nothing more. It is not yet a concept. What I have here is a pre-concept which, as you see, occupies an intermediate point between some rather vague scientific data and certain philosophical pathways to come. So, if we want to conduct this research on the crystal-image and its manner of giving us a direct time-image, of delivering to us, of revealing to us a direct time-image that would be like what we see

inside the crystal, well, we will have to begin again from our bases, the relatively solid bases that form our starting point, where it's no longer a question of making a hypothesis but of going back to a terrain where we have acquired a number of certainties.

And what constitutes this terrain is exactly the following. Remember how the movement-image was defined? I keep coming back to this point, which I don't want to develop at all because for me it is the basis for everything that follows. The movement-image develops according to a model. This model is the sensory-motor situation or the sensory-motor schema. How do we define this sensory-motor schema, which is the real foundation of the movement-image?

First aspect: the image refers to a supposedly independent object or, what amounts to the same thing, to a supposedly real milieu. I said this last time, if you remember, we must give the maximum weight to this word "supposedly". It is not a question of knowing whether the milieu, or the object, is really independent of the image. It's a question of whether the image itself presupposes the object to be independent of it, even if this is not true, that is, even if the presupposition is not effectuated.

I would say that here the object is grasped as something really distinct from the image even if it is not really distinguished from it. It is *conceived* as really distinct, the image posits it, supposes it, as independent. And as I told you last time, this is something that can happen, for example, in cinema, whether you shoot on location or shoot on a set. There can be a set, and the set is supposed to stand for... for example, streets in a studio are supposed to stand for real streets. So, the set/location distinction is completely irrelevant in this respect. This is the first aspect of the sensory-motor schema: *the image presupposes the independence of both milieu and object.*

Second aspect: the sensory-motor schema, thus founded, presents itself as a succession of *actuals*, a series of actual terms: object, situation, action, new object, new action, new object and so on, a succession of actuals that are linked by the intermediary of actions that are themselves actual. I open the door, I enter the room, I do something, I leave the room and so on, what we have here is a chain of actual terms.

Third aspect: it is a space... the sensory-motor scheme unfolds in a space where precisely the actual terms of the type: excitation, response, new excitation, new response and so on, are linked together. Everything is actual. And indeed, in the sensory-motor image, everything is actual. It's the actual sequence of a situation and an action. What I'm saying that is this clearly implies a lived space, but what is this space? There's a term... because there's one philosopher who has exhaustively analyzed this kind of space who speaks about "hodological" spaces, with an "h", hodological, that is, a space of itineraries, of paths. He was a philosopher of German origin, who emigrated to America at the time of Hitler, named Kurt Lewin⁸, L-E-W-I-N, and he wrote a very beautiful theory of so-called hodological spaces.⁹

And these hodological spaces are structured according to goals and obstacles. Goals and obstacles, now what are they? They are a confrontation of forces, the centers of forces between which tensions are exerted. For example, we can see very well how goals and obstacles constitute a space populated by centers of forces between which tensions are exerted. For example, you have a hen there, you have grain there, so you have a first force that is exerted. The hen's tendency is to take the grain. And then you have an obstacle, an opposing force that is exerted. The hen bumps up against the fence, for example. You see, it's

a hodological space, it's not complicated. What interests me is how hodological space... I would say, you know, Lewin's hodological space, for example, is very interesting because I would say it's the lived form of Euclidean space. And this is less obvious. It's the lived form of Euclidean space, or if you prefer, Euclidean space is the abstract form of hodological spaces.

Why do I say that? Because the centers of forces from which tensions arise imply a space, already imply *a space where tensions tend to be resolved*. Euclidean space is the resolution of the tensions of hodological spaces. Indeed, there is something that appears to me to be like an insufficiency in Lewin's theory. In order to apprehend something as an obstacle that thwarts my search for a goal, one must already have an idea of how to get around it, perhaps a false idea, but one must already have an idea of how to get around the obstacle. *The organization of a space into goal-obstacle already implies a resolute vision of tensions.*

I mean... I go back to my example of the hen. In this situation, the hen has her grain there, she sees it, she's dying to get to it, okay, and then there's the fence. It turns out that the hen understands nothing, she understands nothing. She comes, she bumps into the fence, she panics, she screams, she clucks, she comes back, she bumps into the fence again. Disaster. They say hens are not intelligent. Well. But I ask: this unintelligent hen, let's not get carried away, in what sense is she unintelligent? Is it because she can't overcome the obstacle? No, it's worse than that. Before being able to overcome the obstacle... why she doesn't she know how to overcome the obstacle? It's not difficult. It's because *she doesn't grasp it as an obstacle*. She is not in a hodological space. Hodological spaces are already very elaborate spaces, spaces of a very particular kind. To seize the fence as an obstacle is to have already overcome it. It implies an organization of perceptual space.

Who is it that will grasp the fence as an obstacle? Precisely an animal that, after a more or less long period of learning, would be able to find the solution. The hen will never do that. She will never make that graceful curve that I will explain later. The hen will never do that. At a stretch, if she's lucky, she'll cluck and cluck, and then purely by chance, she'll manage to circumvent the fence. You see, you can say that this has happened by chance, precisely as a consequence of the nature of her path, which will, properly speaking, be a probabilistic path. We have to imagine that she is in a strange space. The hen would exist in a space that we shouldn't call hodological, a space of a completely different nature.

So, I'm just saying – and here I go back to this story of hodological space – the organization of a spatial field into obstacle-goal can only be done with reference to what is already a resolution of tensions, or at least a possible resolution. What shall we call this resolution of tensions, as opposed to chance? Here I would say that the tension between the attraction that the grain exerts and the repulsion that the obstacle exerts, is resolved in the case of the pure curve that circumvents the fence. And what resolves the tensions here? The best movement for the result in question. What do we mean by the best movement for the result in question? We mean the most economical movement. Any other movement would apply a longer path. In other words, let's say, the minimum movement for the maximum result.

The resolution of tensions is produced according to what science calls – I'm being very cursory here, but deliberately so, and here I can find a much more complex scientific notion – the resolution of tensions is produced according to what science refers to as the *laws of extremum*.

What are laws of extremum? The laws of extremum have long been well known in mathematics and physics, for example in optics. They are the so-called laws of minimum and maximum. For example, the deviation of light through a prism follows the laws of extremum, that is, the most direct trajectory. All this is very well known. Hodological space is a space populated by centers of force between which tensions are exerted, these tensions being resolved by laws of extremum, meaning of minimum and maximum.

I insist on this because for me this is the very criterion of the actual. The successions of actuals are made in this way. And what is Euclidean space? Euclidean space is the space in which tensions are resolved according to laws of extremum. For me this is a fine definition, I mean, it's an interesting definition of Euclidean space, a space in which the resolution of tensions that is determined in this space... a space in which tensions are determined and in which the resolution of tensions occurs according to laws of extremum. For example, what will be called "mechanism" in biology, or "dynamism" itself? What we will call mechanism in biology is, in a very precise sense, a theory that considers that everything in the organism is actual, everything is actual, that *an organism is a succession of actual terms*.

But what does it mean in concrete terms, that the organism is a succession of actual terms? It means that biological relations obey laws of extremum. That's why they are answerable to a mechanistic physics. For example, take the example of an artery and a territory to be irrigated, an organic territory to be irrigated. You will have to show why the irrigation path should be this rather than that, and you will show this by invoking laws of extremum. By showing that the irrigation path, that is, the path that goes from the artery to the territory that needs to be irrigated... that this path is of such a nature that any other path would be less economical. This is a law of the minimum. A famous English author, D'Arcy Thompson, wrote a book on the application of these laws of extremum.¹⁰ The example I just gave is a simple one, but in very complex cases, D'Arcy Thompson tries to show how biological structures can be explained by laws of extremum, minimum and maximum. So, I would say that Euclidean space is exactly like this, it's the space, or the projection of the space in which... in which tensions are resolved according to laws of extremum, that is, according to minima and maxima.

What I want to keep in mind is simply this: in the sensory-motor image, everything is a succession of actuals, and what I just tried to show is why the sensory-motor image naturally plunges into a Euclidean space. So, if you can bear with me, how are we going to define this? As a succession of actuals and resolutions of the corresponding tensions from one actual to another. There, that's all I want to say, but I will draw, or rather reiterate the conclusion of this analysis, to which I've added some things I hadn't said before. The conclusion is that regarding the movement-image, we can always decide that it is an image of time, but an indirect image of time. On the one hand, it's an indirect image of time, on the other hand, it's an image of chronological time. So, I have my grouping now, I have a more solid, more consistent grouping: *sensory-motor image, succession of actuals, Euclidean space, indirect image of time, chronological time*. Now we have to consider this... here we are no longer in the realm of hypothesis; here I am not appealing to your pre-comprehension, but to your full understanding.

Student: By focusing the movement-image on the sensory-motor idea, it seems to me that the only movement-image that is fully sensory-motor is the action-image. Already in the affection-image and in the mental-image... aren't both the affect and the relation of the mental-image already virtual and not completely actual?

Deleuze: You're taking me back in time there. I can say two things. I can say that, in principle, you're right. It's like saying that there is never a pure pole, that in fact, we always have mixtures, the movement-image and something else. But more precisely, we can still maintain that if the affection-image, the mental-image, all those things we saw in the previous years – I specify this for those who weren't here the previous years but I don't want to go back over all this, so I'm really speaking only for those who were here those other times – if you're right, this is only half the story. Because if I take the sensory-motor image, the affection-image, the mental-image, and many other images, of course, these will show something new. But this something new, in spite of everything, will function within the sensory-motor scheme.

So, if there were only the sensory-motor schema, you would not be able to account for this new element. It would be absorbed into the sensory-motor schema, that is to say, the affection, as we have seen, is what would intervene between an excitation and a reaction. So you could always say: Ah, yes, it intervenes between an excitation and a reaction, but that doesn't prevent it from also being something else. Yet what would count is only that it occurs "between", that from that point it becomes integrated within the sensory-motor schema. And you couldn't say anything else. If you can say: Ah, but in the affection-image, in the mental-image, there is something that is irreducible to the sensory-motor image, and I'm going to show you what it is... it's only because you have already positioned yourself in the domain of images that are no longer sensory-motor, but the affection-image or the mental-image were not in themselves sufficient to define. Do you understand? *The idea must come to you from elsewhere*, so that you will say: Ah, yes, already there was an overflow of affections. But if you remain in the sensory-motor image, you won't even notice this overflow of affections. You will say that affections come between an excitation and a reaction when the one does not immediately extend into the other, that is, when it is not just a simple reflex. And you won't be able to say anything else. To discover what is irreducible to the sensory-motor in affect, you must have a sensory-motor... sorry, I mean a *non-sensory-motor domain* that the affect itself is insufficient to enable you to discover.

From here I move on to the other side, which is precisely this domain of the non-sensory motor. And here again, we have some solid elements to which I would like to add, just as I did earlier, having just reconstructed my starting point. Well, yes, I say, we've just seen how the indirect image of time and Euclidean space or chronological time – it doesn't matter now, we can put it all together, I think I've justified it – depended on the sensory-motor schema or the sensory-motor situation. But we cannot deny that there are images that refer to situations which are not sensory-motor.

But what are situations that are not sensory-motor? This would be all the situations that are cut off from their motor extension, not accidentally cut off but essentially cut off from their sensory-motor extension. You see that the situation – here we really have to go slowly because all this is quite tricky – you see that the situation is actual. I still have a starting point that is actual. I insist on this point, it's an actual image. Only there is no longer a succession of actuals. This actual does not link up with another actual. I am in a situation that is cut off from any motor extension.

What would I say, for example... well, yes, nothing more can be done. Nothing more. So we've seen that it can be done in a thousand ways, there's nothing to do, nothing can be done. When we were talking about it another year – I don't know what to do, I don't know what to do – it can be embodied in all sorts of ways. It can be embodied in the dead times, in the dead

times of everyday banality. But it can also be embodied in the key moments of limit-situations. Nothing more to do, I'm done, I'm going to die. That's not a sensory-motor situation. It's curious that Bergson, the gentlest of philosophers, the one who has always been the most tender of philosophers, was forever fascinated by limit-situations which were, as he himself says, the vision of the hanged and drowned, of dying men. You know, the famous sweeping vision, where the whole past of an individual flashes before his eyes. Remember what Godard does in *Every Man for Himself*¹¹, where the character hit by a car says: I can't be dead because my life hasn't flashed before my eyes. But Godard, I think, has a very profound reason for saying this. And the profound reason, I can tell you right away, is that for a very long time, cinema in a certain way, particularly modern cinema, a cinema that was already modern, has taken as its model, if only implicitly, the vision of the dying, of the hanged and drowned. This is an actual situation, but one that is not sensory-motor... [*Tape interrupted*] [1:00:1

Part 2

... from actual image to actual image. Everything becomes blurred, good. We'll go back to this later. Everything gets fuzzy. Okay.

What can we say about such a situation that does not extend into action? We'll say that it's a situation that *merges completely with its description*. It's a pure description. That's why – I won't come back to this since it's something we attained the very first term – it's a pure description, that is, the image stands for its object. There is no longer any independence of the object in relation to the image, even supposedly. Indeed, I am no longer in the state of an actant, of taking action. I am in the state of a *seer*: I see. Strangely, this action of which I have become incapable is replaced by – false or true – a strange faculty of clairvoyance. I have the impression of *seeing* something, my whole past. In this situation, I discover myself to be more or less a seer, a visionary.

In other words, I literally find myself before an image that merges with its own object. That's why it no longer extends into action, it stands for its own object. That's what we called a description at the beginning of the year, remember? An image that stands for its own object: that's what a description is.¹² And what we proposed was a logic of descriptions. I remind you that the notion of description is very important from the point of view of logic, and I would define description as an image that stands for its own object, that is to say, that no longer presupposes the independence of its object.

You see how this is once again an actual description, it's an actual image, that's essential. The situation is indeed actual, and here again, I see no relevance in the distinction, if I think in terms of cinema, between set and exterior location. Situations that are not sensory-motor can be obtained just as well through a set as through an exterior location. In terms of the set, all the descriptions declare themselves to be descriptions; they form non-sensory-motor situations, that is to say, what before we called *pure optical and sound situations*. A pure optical and sound situation is the same thing as a description. It is a situation cut off from its sensory-motor extension. It is actual, but it no longer extends into another actual; it is cut off from its linkage with other actuals, it is cut off from its motor succession.

Now, I ask, how can a pure optical and sound situation be obtained? What creates a pure optical and sonic situation is a set that presents itself as a set, that is to say, that does not apply to an object. And we've seen this. I'll mention a few examples: we've seen it in the musical, for example, the master of which is Stanley Donen.¹³ What is very interesting about cinema is that very often the architects of pure optical and sound situations begin by giving you a sensory-motor image, that is to say, a sensory-motor situation – which they do to make you feel the difference – after which they substitute a pure optical and sound situation. In Donen's work, for example, you have city views and these images of the city refer to the city as a supposedly independent object, but then this sensory-motor image is replaced by a postcard cliché, which is a pure optical-sound image.

Another example, a Japanese director, Ichikawa¹⁴. There's a great film, a really interesting film, which I'll have the occasion to talk about later, since it's fundamental for our analysis, it will be fundamental for us in the analysis of the crystal image. It was shown with the title *An Actor's Revenge*¹⁵, and it's very, very good. In Japanese, I don't know, I think it's *The Ghost of something...* I don't know what, *Ghost of...* well, you know. He adopts a very curious procedure, a procedure where he gives us a landscape, which is a very beautiful landscape bathed in yellow mist, and then he suddenly substitutes a painted backdrop, a painted backdrop that presents itself as a painted backdrop, again with yellow mist. It reminds me of a filmmaker like Syberberg, who will also find a role for the painted backdrop. The role of the painted backdrop in cinema is very important, it is fundamental because it typically establishes pure optical and sound situations. So, whether we're talking about Syberberg or Ichikawa or whoever, there are many who do this.

I would say that this establishing can happen through the famous sets of the musicals. This is what the sets of Hollywood musicals are. They throw you into pure optical and sound situations. You see you can already extend what I'm saying, that these are situations which are actual situations, but ones which induce dreams, or something that might resemble a dream. Indeed, if I don't react, I must nonetheless do something. If there is no... Even if there is no motor extension, something has to happen. What will these pure optical-sound situations induce, since they don't extend, since they have no motor extension? This will be the problem of their functioning, because they still work. There you have my first aspect, these pure optical and sound situations that turn us into seers. But what precisely do we see? Here you see my whole idea of the crystal-image, and in the crystal-image, what we see is *time*. We're not there yet but you can sense that step by step, that's where we're heading.

Well, but then, I would say that this can be achieved just as easily on location, the establishment of pure optical and sound situations. As I said last time, here the difference between set and exterior location is not always relevant, just as we saw earlier, it's not at all relevant because, because, because, because... What is neo-realism? It's the establishment of pure optical and sound situations in exterior locations. Neorealism is not an effect of reality, not at all, not at all. It's not... nor is it a surplus reality, no. The only definition for me of the term "Italian realism" – it was they who invented it, I think, I think it was them... They had a precedent, in a completely different context – since it was the context of a set – they had the precedent of the musical. They had precursors, that's something we can always find. But it was they who invented pure optical and sound situations in exterior locations, namely: putting someone in a situation where they don't know what to do, whether the situation is banal or extraordinary. This is what marks the birth... this is the constitutive act of the new realism, this is why it upset cinema, because it produced this great rupture with the sensory-motor schemas, the well-oiled sensory-motor schemas that defined American action cinema.

What constitutes the break with American action cinema, in terms of this collapse of sensory-motor schemes, is Italian neo-realism.¹⁶

So, if we really want to discover what was the essential act of Rossellini and De Sica – and also of Antonioni, but in a completely different way – the two directors, the two who were fundamental in proposing this kind of collapse of sensory-motor schemas are definitely Rossellini and De Sica. This is the first phase of Rossellini's cinema. Of course, later he will change. He will step into this breach and will go on to develop a very singular form of cinema. But the act of his first period, his first period, as one might speak of a painter's periods, is to produce the collapse of sensory-motor schemas. Which doesn't imply a character who no longer moves, I'd like to clarify this. The character might move a lot, but it will be – we've seen this in previous years – in what mode? In the mode of shuffling or stalling [*piétiner*]¹⁷, moving in a to-and-fro, strolling or wandering, and no longer of taking action in response to a situation.¹⁸

And what are these characters who are stalled or wandering around or moving back-and-forth? They're seers, visionaries. And if we ask ourselves, once again, what is the *Nouvelle vague*? In what way is the French new wave ahead of Italian neo-realism? It's on this point, that the nouvelle vague can take for granted the collapse of sensory-motor schemas, that is to say, there is no longer any action cinema. There is a visionary cinema, yes, which we will gradually learn is no less entertaining, no less animated than the other. But what's certain is that we no longer have a sensory-motor extension. These are characters that are caught up in pure optical and sonic situations. This is the first aspect of this new domain. So, whether these are sets or exterior locations, they are nonetheless pure descriptions, which is to say, images that stand for their own object, like postcard views.

Second point: from this moment on, one shouldn't be surprised that – this will take us a little further – one shouldn't be surprised that we're no longer dealing either with Euclidean space nor hodological space. Entirely new spaces will increasingly arise in cinema. The sensory-motor schema, if you like, functioned in a concrete, lived hodological space, and in an abstract Euclidean space, which was the space corresponding to the movement-image. In this new situation, there will no longer be a hodological space because – I come back to the example of the hen here – when we are in a situation where there is no motor extension, we are much closer to the hen, which is to say... well, what is a hen? It's very interesting and you mustn't think about this in purely negative terms, meaning that here we are not even in a state of being able to distinguish what would be an obstacle and what a goal. First of all, there are no more goals. And how could there be obstacles? Obstacles, obstacles, it all depends on what we call obstacles. What we have here are vague and scattered obstacles.

In the situation in which I find myself, we are no longer in a position to distinguish what is an obstacle and what a means of overcoming it. Why is this? It's because we are below this level, we find ourselves confronted with a space that is literally *pre-hodological*, a kind of space of wandering, a space where the centers of forces cannot organize themselves into goal-means-obstacle, because there is a perpetual overlapping of perspectives. More than this, there is a perpetual overlap because space cannot be constituted, by which I mean hodological or Euclidean space cannot be constituted. It will be a space of stalling, shuffling, wandering, pacing back-and-forth, a space of strolling or going on a trip [*balader*]. And as we've seen, when I speak of a space of strolling or stalling. it's by way of opposition to hodological space, but it also has an abstract form. Just as there was an abstract form of hodological space – which was Euclidean space – there are abstract forms of the space of

strolling or wandering, the space of overlapping, the space of a back-and-forth movement. These all have abstract forms. It's not because it's a hen rather than a dog that it's less mathematically complicated. On the contrary, what do we have here?

Well, as we have seen, in my view, there will be two principal forms: they will either be spaces whose parts do not join up. Hodological space already presupposes connection, and the connection of the parts is of the Euclidean type, and it's insofar as the parts join up that tensions can be established between such and such a point... between one part, and another. But before, before tensions can be established between the joined-up parts, the parts must be connected. Now *a space of wandering is a space where the parts are not connected*. I mean that Euclidean space is a space where the connection of one part to another is univocal. Why? Because it is achieved by a minimum path. I go back to my idea which in the end is the only thing new about what I said earlier, that there is a profound accord between Euclidean space and the resolution of tensions according to minimum laws, or according to laws of extremum.

But one can conceive of other types of space where while a given section of the space can be defined, its connection with a neighboring section is not because it can be made in an infinite number of ways. So here I come back to the problems of before. Under what conditions can we make use of a scientific notion in philosophy? A space such that there is no univocal connection of its parts is something well known in mathematics, it's a Riemannian space¹⁹. As such, it's not a concept, it's an operator. It is an operator of equations and functions. It has a perfectly scientific status. Okay.

How can we make use of Riemannian space without it becoming metaphorical and without it consisting in applying a scientific domain to a non-scientific domain? My first answer would be that we can try something like this: we extract from the mathematical operator a characteristic, a characteristic that has very little importance for the scientist, namely: a space whose parts are not univocally connected. And out of this characteristic borrowed from the mathematical operator, we make a philosophical concept, a space of coming and going, a space of wandering which will be defined as follows: a space whose parts are disconnected.²⁰

We've seen that cinema – we looked at this in previous years – the extent to which cinema makes use of such spaces. Antonioni's disconnected spaces are famous, as are those of all the great directors who systematically operate through false continuity shots. As Resnais said of *Last Year at Marienbad*, by way of justification he said that there wasn't a single connection that was not a false connection in *Last Year at Marienbad*. One might say that false continuity in cinema typically marks the constitution of a disconnected space. At this point I could perhaps afford to say – with less naivety than if I hadn't taken the previous precautions – I could speak of Riemannian space as a concept, given that Riemannian will now refer to the characteristic I wanted to extract from Riemann's scientific operators, namely the disconnectedness of the parts of a space.

So, in the case of Antonioni, you find this in all his spaces of false continuity, you find it in the moment... well, we already discussed this extensively the other time. But his wouldn't be the only case. With Cassavetes... Cassavetes strikes me as one of the greatest creators, one of the greatest directors of disconnected spaces. I mean, not only in his *cinema vérité* side but in also in his fiction films, where you never completely know when one bit of space connects to another bit of space. It all remains indeterminate, but in terms of a singularly positive indeterminacy. But in the end, once again, Antonioni and Cassavetes don't have all that much

in common. So we can immediately conclude that each case, each of these cases, contains all sorts of sub-cases.

But I would say that we shouldn't stop there, because while pure optical and sound situations refer, for example, to disconnected spaces precisely because they no longer have a motor extension, they can also refer to other types of space. These won't quite be Riemannian spaces. I would... So, we can really get going now. If we have avoided the two dangers, then philosophy is strictly entitled to make scientific borrowings. In a space of wandering, stalling or shuffling about of the "hen and fence" type, we must really speak in terms of a probabilistic space, which has a completely different structure from so-called Riemannian spaces, that is to say disconnected spaces. So not only would I have disconnected spaces, I would also have probabilistic spaces which can be very, very interesting in themselves. Moreover, I might also have... the thing they have in common is that they are in any case opposed to Euclidean space.²¹

I might also have spaces that in mathematics would be called topological spaces, which again, just like Riemannian spaces, are not at all Euclidean spaces. So, we should go and take a look at the work of other directors, and one in particular, whose work in any case we will have to consider before the end of this year. In this sense, his work has a great originality, because... this would allow me to position what I'm talking about in relation to the Nouvelle vague which, it seems to me, makes use especially of disconnected spaces, though what I'm saying here is a bit... but I believe that there is one great director of probabilistic spaces and topological spaces, and that is Resnais, in whose films one finds some very intriguing types of space. We'll see this, we'll look at it as we continue with our analysis.

So that's my second aspect. First aspect: pure description, that is to say, pure optical and sound situation. Second aspect: the space that corresponds to them is no longer hodological space, but a space of stalling or wandering. It's no longer Euclidean space, it's a space that is sometimes Riemannian, sometimes probabilistic and sometimes topological.

Third aspect: this is all very well, but so far, I've only defined the optical and sound situation in a negative manner, as something that doesn't extend into another actual term. It's an actual image, but it doesn't extend into another actual. There's no longer a succession of actuals, and it's exactly because of this that the space wavers. So, if there is no longer a succession of actuals, there must be something else. Yes, there has to be something. It's an actual image, but there's no longer a succession of actuals, yet there has to be something. You can already sense from earlier where we're heading. It would be a very satisfactory answer if we could say that there is necessarily no longer any succession from one actual term to another in a Euclidean space. But there is *a circuit between the actual image and a virtual image*. How wonderful it would be if we could say that. We would have joined up with our initial hypothesis. Instead of a succession of actual images linked to each other, I would have a circuit, a circuit from an actual image to a virtual image that would then return to the actual image, which would itself return to another virtual image that would return to the actual image, which would return, etc., etc., etc. I would have an expanding circuit, where actual and virtual would never stop exchanging in a mutual image. That would be wonderful We could say then that we've found it.

What would it be, what would such a circuit consist in? And immediately a response presents itself, it comes to us so immediately that we already know it must be false, but that doesn't matter, we have to traverse it anyway. And so we would say, well yes, the matter is quite

clear, we have a solution, only it's no more than an apparent solution. It looks like, it's very... It's quite clear. When a situation no longer extends into action, when an actual perception no longer extends into action, it enters into a circuit with something else. And what is this something else? It enters into a circuit with a recollection-image, it enters into a circuit with a recollection. The actual perception-image enters into a circuit with a recollection-image. The pure optical and sound situation enters into a circuit with recollection-images, thus, the vision of the drowned and the hanged, a situation that has lost its motor extension. I am going to die – the actual situation of "I am going to die" enters into a circuit with all the recollection-images of my entire life – I see my life flashing before my eyes. And here Bergson adds: at cinematographic speed. For cinema, in its heyday, often abused stories of visions of the dying.²² It must be said that as regards cinema, it was in German expressionism, that's where it happened... Do you follow me? That's it! I would say that there is a circuit of actual perception-image and virtual recollection-image. The recollection-image is the virtual image, and the perception-image is the actual image. *When perception does not extend into action, it enters into a circuit with a virtual recollection-image.*

Examples... I can give you two examples: one from life at its most concrete and one from cinema. I always take the example that corresponds to what Bergson calls "attentive recognition". I'm walking down the street, I pass someone, and I say to myself: I've already seen that person somewhere. Yes, I am in a pure optical and sonic situation. Why? Because I don't know... I literally don't know what to do. If I pass someone in the street and I say to myself: Oh, yes, it's my pal, it's my pal, it's my pal Julot... I'm in a sensory-motor situation, since the mere perception of my friend causes me to say: Hello, how are you, and the kids? And so on and so forth. I link the actual with the actual. And how are you? What have you been up to? – that's the best way to put it – what have you been up to? I go from actual to actual. Okay. But then I pass someone and say to myself: I'm sure I've seen that guy before. As Bergson put it very eloquently, speaking of attentive recognition, I extract a description from him, it's something that happens almost spontaneously, that is to say, I retain certain of his characteristics. That's what my actual image is: where did I see that face? Meaning, for example, where did I see that sly look? Where might I have seen such a cunning look?²³

So there, you see, this is a description. I call it D1. I don't know what to do. I have no motivity, I'm in a pure optical and sound state. I say to myself: Ah, if I could hear his voice, it might tell me something. I make an appeal – here I use very Bergsonian terms – I make an appeal, an appeal to what? To myself, to my depths. And no doubt, I have a sensation as to what this appeal consists in. Wouldn't it have been at school? That sounds familiar. Isn't he a school friend? Wasn't he at school? This is not a recollection, but *a region of memory*, and what I'm doing is exploring this region of memory. How can I explore my past? We already touched on this question last time and it's something that will crop up again.

I explore. What does *explore* mean here? It means, well, a kind of overview, an overview of this region, a panoramic vision of the region to see if something in the area corresponds. I try to find it, I recapitulate, I visualize the scene: school – nothing corresponds – and I come back to this guy, you see?

And returning to the guy, I extract another characteristic from him: Ah! Not only does he have shifty eyes... not only does he have shifty eyes but – and this is why the region I'm exploring gets slightly larger – also his mouth is a bit twisted. So, I have a description that I call D2, and again I make my appeal: Wouldn't it be more likely it was in the army? And I summon this new region of my past. You notice how – and we'll need this later – all these

regions are strictly coexistent in relation to the situation. There is no relation of succession, they are coexisting regions: school region, region etc., all coexist with respect to the situation under consideration. If you understand all this, we are very close to the fundamental paradoxes concerning the essence of time, which for the moment is absolutely not a question of succession.

Then I convene my army sheet which I call S2. But nothing comes, still nothing. So, I go back to another description, D3. And I summon a new region of the past, and so on. until finally there's a glimmer of light: Ah, yes! It's, it's... – depending on the situation – it's someone from... No, I see, it's him, there, I've got it, I've got it, it's someone I met in such and such circumstances. But sometimes I get no reply, I tire of exploring my regions: Never mind, maybe I've never even met the guy – something like that – Maybe I saw him in a dream... Ah, maybe I saw him in a dream? So, you see, wouldn't this be the circuit of circuits? Wouldn't it be the circuit that envelops all the other circuits? There it is! There is the figure! Actual image, virtual image, which each time enter into a circuit. Each actual image will be defined by a pure description, each virtual image by a memory or zone of recollection, and the actual image and virtual image will coalesce to form a consolidate with many more layers that are added to one another and that are superimposed on each other.²⁴

Second example from cinema, where we have this same figure that would be useful to me: a famous film by Marcel Carné, *Le jour se lève*.²⁵ What do we see in *Le jour se lève*? Because at first glance, it seems to contradict some of what I've just said, but in reality, not at all. There is, at least, what appears to be a pure optical and sonic situation. The hero is barricaded in a hotel room in a no-exit situation, and we know right from the start that he will die, that he's besieged by the police, and also that he committed a crime in that same hotel room not long before. The hero is Jean Gabin. There is a description of the hotel room, in a state that I call D1. And the hero, Gabin, holed up in his hotel room, summons his recollections. But what is really interesting in Carné's film is that he has understood something regarding the phenomenon of memory, namely, it is not a question of making continuous flashbacks. It's a question of multiplying the circuits, of superimposing the circuits, each time returning to the basic description, that is to say, the description of the hotel room.

You have the hotel room at D1, in the D1 state, and a circular flashback in which the hero summons a region from his past. Back to the hotel room, but in the meantime, with the police laying siege to the room, the description of the room has changed. Bullet holes, the reinforcement of the barricades the man has made. So, this is D2, a new flashback and a new circuit of an area. And each time we will have a D1-S1, D2-S2, D3-S3 circuit. Okay, fine.

Lucien Gouty: At the end, I think he breaks the mirror...

Deleuze: At the end... well, yes, we can't bring the mirror in right away. The mirror will have a fundamental role, yes. Oh yes, we're not quite done with this problem yet. But this is all I need for the moment. Our question is very simple: does the recollection-image... does the circuit formed between actual perception-image or pure optical-sound situation and the recollection-image, does this circuit provide us with an answer to our previous question? [*Tape interrupted*] [1:46:25]

Part 3

... Why is this too easy? We've seen it in part. What time is it? This is exhausting. Five minutes to twelve? Ooh! Don't you want a rest? Don't you? I can't go on. A little rest, okay? [*Tape interrupted*] [1:46:47]

... That's right, so, you're... Why don't we get our answer? I say this to reassure you, that it's only a matter of being scrupulous. If you follow every moment carefully, you'll see there is no more difficulty. No more difficulty. Why is it that... well, basically, I would say, we're in the middle of looking for the virtual image that enters into a relationship with an image, that forms a circuit with an actual image at the point when this actual image no longer has a motor extension. You see how in any case, when the actual image no longer has a motor extension, it forms a circuit with a virtual image or else remains in the void. It can happen that it remains in the void, but at that point, there's nothing more to say, we don't know anything, we've finished our year. Well, maybe it will remain in the void, perhaps... Or else it forms a circuit. If it forms a circuit, it's not with an actual image, but with a virtual image. But with what virtual image? We just came close to a kind of solution, which is that it would be with a recollection-image.

And then thunderbolts start raining down on our heads. No! It is the god who says no. The god has said no. And why did the god pronounce this unequivocal no? It's because after all, the recollection-image is not, or is not entirely, a virtual image. But what do we mean by not entirely? And this, it seems to me, is the grandiose force of Bergson, once again, in *Matter and Memory*, to have shown this in a definitive manner, in my view – when I say in a definitive manner I mean according to me – that *the recollection-image is not a virtual image but a virtuality in the process of becoming actualized*. This is exactly what Bergson's thesis says. It is a virtuality in the process of becoming actualized, but becoming actualized in relation to what? It's a virtuality in the process of becoming actualized according to a new present, that is, according to the actual present... as a function of the actual present that evokes it. So perhaps this virtuality indicates the path towards what we are looking for, but it does not yet give us what we are looking for. It is *in the process* – it is no longer an actual image, but it is not yet a virtual image – it is already in the process of becoming actualized in function of the requirements of the new present, meaning according to the requirements of the actual image.

Now this we have seen, and it allows me to regroup things. In the first term, we saw a strange thing, which we saw as two things, one of which was in danger of hiding the other, even if the latter was more important than the former. We saw that the flashback in cinema was a derisory procedure, that it was a purely conventional derisory procedure that gave us no real past. The flashback operates like a sign of the type "Attention! This is the past!", but it's a purely external sign, a purely conventional sign. Hence the first conclusion we arrived at: the flashback is radically insufficient in relation to the recollection-image.

But if it is radically insufficient in relation to the memory-image, it is for a more profound reason. This more profound reason is that *the recollection-image is itself radically insufficient in relation to the past*. And that's the most important thing. And why is this? It is here, once again, that Bergson's idea appears to me to be the most profound, namely: the recollection-image bears the mark of the past only insofar as it is in the past that we went in search of it. The recollection-image does not have its own mark, it only inherits its mark. It has the mark of the past only because it is in the past that we went to fetch it. In other words, there is something deeper than the recollection-image. There is something deeper in the past than the recollection-image, from which the recollection-image borrows the mark of the past. Hence

Bergson's splendid formula: just as we perceive things where they are present – meaning in matter and space – we remember them where they are in the past and in time.²⁶

Well, as I was saying, we've already seen this, we've seen that the great flashback directors were filmmakers who themselves denounced the flashback's inadequacy. That is to say, they are directors for whom both the flashback and the recollection-image always receive their necessity from elsewhere, that is to say, always receive their *mark* from elsewhere. And perhaps you don't recall this, but we devoted a fairly long analysis to the case of the greatest director of flashbacks in cinema, Mankiewicz. And our conclusion regarding Mankiewicz was exactly this: that the flashback is a procedure that Mankiewicz himself considered completely derisory, that is, without any value in itself. He gives us recollection-images, but these recollection-images must receive their necessity from elsewhere. And the necessity, the absolutely brilliant necessity that Mankiewicz discovered, was the idea – which suits us perfectly – that *time is in essence a bifurcating power*, that it is time that bifurcates, and that simply the bifurcations of time are so subtle that they cannot be grasped at the moment they occur but can only be grasped later. We cannot say it any better: the recollection-image has no necessity in itself. The recollection-image receives its necessity from something else, which is time itself. And it is from time itself that the recollection-image receives the mark that distinguishes it from other images, namely the mark of the past.

The bifurcation of time cannot be grasped at the time, the bifurcation of time can only be grasped afterwards. The bifurcations of *The Barefoot Contessa*²⁷, which constitute the whole duration of the film, the bifurcations of *Cleopatra*²⁸, the queen of bifurcation, the queen of undulation, can never be grasped in the moment, in the instant. Hence, if Mankiewicz uses flashbacks and passes through recollection-images, it is because he has a much deeper conception of time that justifies this use, that makes it necessary and that infinitely overflows it. This overflow is the extraordinary conception of a time that forks, that splits and that never stops splitting, just as one speaks of a hair's split ends. Time in Mankiewicz's cinema is extraordinary, it's a forked time, it's a forked time and the splits and re-splits. It never ceases, it never ceases to split. It's like a lock of split ends.

So we understand that if the bifurcations of time are such that they can't be grasped in the moment, if they are micro-bifurcations, then you can only grasp them afterwards. So, yes, you need flashbacks, you need the recollection-image, but it's not the flashback and the recollection-image that count. What counts is what gives the flashback and the recollection-image their full necessity, namely the cinematographic conception of a time that forks, and this is Mankiewicz's art, to present this time that forks, which makes him one of the great filmmakers of time.²⁹

Well, I just wanted to remind you, to explain that in itself the recollection image cannot provide an answer to our question: what is the virtual image that enters into coalescence with the actual image? Because the recollection-image is not a virtual image, it is a virtuality in the process of becoming actualized, which therefore refers to a deeper virtual. Okay. You understand? Is that illuminating enough? Is it clear? Listen, today it's certainly clear, isn't it? It's definitely clear.

So, another possible answer, while we're at it: Well, okay, I don't know, we'll have to see. Suppose I say to myself: okay, it isn't the recollection-image that is able to form a circuit with the actual image. That's not what it is. That will still be a mixed solution – I'm not saying that it won't produce some extremely fine works – but it will be a mixed, hybrid

solution. It won't provide a solution to our problem. And immediately, you'll say to me: oh, but then, we see another solution. We see another solution, which would be the dream-image.

The dream-image would be the virtual image that enters into a circuit with pure actual images. Why is this? And indeed, as I was saying, isn't the dream-image the maximum envelope, the external envelope that surrounds all the circuits of recollection-images and that finally feeds on all these circuits? The panoramic dying vision. My whole life flashing before my eyes at cinematographic speed. This would be the dream-image. Well, let's see if it works.

And indeed, the dream-image seems a good answer to our question; again, we have a hope, and yet you sense it will be an endless disappointment. But one must have hope. If you don't have hope, the game no longer works, and that's no fun at all. It might even be tedious. Every time a little hope must stir in us. "Oh, I think have the solution", because that's how it is when you are searching for something, it's painful, you have to suffer, right? You think you have it, and then it's gone, you have nothing at all. The next day, you say to yourself: this isn't working, it's not working at all.

But at first sight, it seems to be going very well. Because... I take up some of Bergson's famous commentaries on dreams. Bergson puts it very eloquently, when he asks: what is a dreamer? Or rather, what is a sleeper? A sleeper is not someone who no longer receives external stimuli. On the contrary, while we are sleeping, we receive many external stimuli, for example: a draught of air passes over my feet which are sticking out beneath the blanket... this is an external stimulus. Or the metal head of the bed collapses on my neck, that would be an external stimulus. What's more, even before I fall asleep, several things with very poetic names happen to us that we sometimes call entoptic lights, sometimes hypnagogic spots, which literally lead to sleep, or else phosphenes. All these beautiful phenomena – you can produce phosphenes easily, right now even, if you close your eyes, and press two fingers very hard into the eyes, until you see motes of colored, modulating dust which are the phosphenes. Anyway, in short, hypnagogic spots, entoptic lights and phosphenes basically all belong to the same family.

And, in the phenomena of falling asleep when you pass from the threshold of wakefulness to sleep, very often you experience entoptic glows with all their marvelous colors, like those of the phosphenes, which can be very beautiful. Every child... what child hasn't pressed their thumbs into their eyes to produces these wonders? There are even some violet ones, but you have to wait for them, because this really is a birthing of colors, a genesis of colors. If I recall well, you have to go quite far before you reach violet.

What does all this mean? The thing that falls on my neck, the air current at my feet, the entoptic glows, or the phosphenes, what's all this about? My neighbor's dog barking... the sleeper continues to have what are perfectly actual sensations. Simply, as Bergson says very well – and this suits us perfectly – they no longer have a motor extension. Why is that? Because, as he says, *to sleep is to become disinterested*.³⁰ There is no longer a motor chain. There is no longer a chain to follow. That is to say, when I'm asleep and my neighbor's dog barks, I don't go to the window to shout – or else it would be my double – to shout "Shut up, you, lousy dog!", which is a motor response... or else to drop a stone on its head. Or if the bar falls on my head, if I don't wake up, I won't get up. I may turn over and this will animate my dream. But turning over isn't a motor response; it's something that gives rise to a new sensation. I would say that the sleeper is, by nature, given over to pure optical and sound

sensations that are cut off from their motor extension, since the motor extension is the criterion of the waking state. All right? Fine.

So, what will it do? Again, either it will remain like that in a void, or else it will form a circuit. Well, remaining in the void is what I do when I'm not yet asleep. Floating in the void is what I'm doing when I see phosphenes. I produce phosphenes, you see it's a real aesthetic activity, producing phosphenes with my thumbs like this - there, I already see some that I can describe to you, and it's very... oh! It's amazing! There I had a really lovely one, a little ball of gold, when my eye... a little sphere of gold which then became like a square of a checkered tablecloth, a grid. And it was yellow, you see, the hue of gold, and if I remember rightly with this gold it will begin to sting. You have to go through it, and then you have to see, it can vary depending on the individual and the condition of their eyes. This is all quite possible to do? Can I get to the violet one? Here we go again... marvelous! Now it's scattering into little dots and bigger dots, but they vary enormously... Ouch, ouch, there are lines... lines, stripes... stripes, ah but now nothing 's changing. Oh, this is amazing, no it's like bubbles. Yes, there are bubbles coming in, water bubbles, gas bubbles, gas bubbles bursting on a surface which is the surface of my eye. What else? But it's still... ouch, ouch, ouch, it's changing. It makes your head spin too. You see, I can't see anything... I see you as phosphenes, how lovely you look. So, oh now I want to go back there.

Yes, notice that Sartre in *The Imaginary*, also has a very fine passage on phosphenes, where he says that phosphenes float in the void. In the void. You don't assign them to a space: they just float there. Exactly like particles in a ray. They are not caught in a particular space-time, they float for themselves, they remain in the void. But when you are sleeping, you are subject to sensations, sensations that are cut off from their sensory-motor extension. With what are they going to form a circuit? With images, dream-images. And what will this produce?

I'll take an example from Bergson: I begin with a phosphene – he was lucky, he had obtained a beautiful phosphene... or perhaps it's just an observation he makes – a green spot, a green spot with white circles. So here we have an actual sensation. And with what does it form a circuit? "A lawn spangled with daisies."³¹ You see, this connects and immediately transforms into... You sense that if I say, "a lawn spangled with daisies" and no more than that, we have an association of ideas, but this isn't yet a dream. It's not a dream. When does it start to take shape as a dream? The sleeper is unaware of the entoptic light, the green surface with white circles. On the other hand, there is his dream, the image of a lawn spangled with white flowers... but this really only becomes a dream because the image is immediately transformed into a billiard table covered with balls. The one is already the other. And at the same time the dream will constitute... it will constitute a strange story which when you wake up will cause you to say: where did I come up with something like that? Where did I go? In one and the same space-time, in one and the same story, the daisies turn into billiard balls. There's a story, for example, there's a character who is in both of these situations. You see? The whole of these transformations, or anamorphoses, are no longer simply free associations – taken together the anamorphoses constitute the dream itself.

Obviously for cinema, for cinema this is essential, it's a godsend. Everyone knows that cinema... but at the same time, what already convinces us that this can't be the solution to our problems is that in all the examples we take from cinema, you see how we are taken a long way back. It was a very old cinema that still believed its vocation was linked to a kind of production of dream-images. But which cinema was this? That's of great interest to us. It was European cinema, it was European cinema that saw – even the French school, or the pre-war

German school – it was European cinema that saw this as a way of asserting its originality – I don't want to say in a gratuitous way – of asserting its originality in relation to American cinema, that is to say, the cinema of sensory-motivity. And both the French and the Germans – meaning the Expressionists – will make films the main part of which, or even the entire film, consists in a dream. And regarding dream, I can't think of a single American film that would be a dream. There may be some, you'll tell me there's one famous case that people are always quoting, *Peter Ibbetson*³², but this is obviously not a dream film; it's a mock-dream film that doesn't at all resemble... – we'll look at this case – but dream films to the best of my knowledge only occur in European cinema, and in any case, *Peter Ibbetson* would be a very late example. So, there's something interesting here: will the dream-image give us an answer to our question? Is it the dream, the virtual image that comes to coalesce with actual sensations? You see how this is a second level of our answer?

We have to take a closer look at how dream-construction functions in cinema. I'll take some examples that show an image anamorphosis, and this is what would ensure the virtual image. It would be exactly this series of images anamorphoses that would constitute the greatest circuit since it can in fact borrow from all the regions of my past. Insofar as it can borrow from all the regions of my past, it constitutes the greatest circuit. You see? I'll give you some examples. Oh yes, when I said before that there were no dream images in American cinema, I was wrong. There is one, there is one... but it is a very unusual example.

Here, I'd like to take three examples. *Entr'acte*³³ by René Clair. In *Entr'acte* there is an image anamorphosis that will become famous, this is the dancer's tutu seen from below, which becomes a flower. You see, photographing the dancer as she dances on a mirror before revealing herself as a woman with a beard is a pathetic gag. And then, the camera films her from below on a glass plate and the tutu becomes a corolla while the dancer's legs become stamens. Good. In *Entr'acte*, there is a series of anamorphoses that continue over a longer sequence: we have the city lights, gas lamps that turn into piles of upright cigarettes that are planted in the ground and that transform into the columns of a Greek temple that are in turn transformed into silos.³⁴ Fine.

A series in... is it *Un chien andalou* or is it *Le chien andalou*? *Un chien andalou*³⁵. In Buñuel's *Un chien andalou* we have a famous series consisting of a tuft of underarm hair, sea urchins, a lock of hair, a lock of cut hair, a circle of onlookers. Here you have a very beautiful... you have a very beautiful series of anamorphoses.³⁶

The only American example I can think of is Buster Keaton. In a famous dream – but Buster Keaton is not the only one, though his way of working is so technically bizarre – in *Sherlock Jr.*³⁷, where the series is: actual situation, actual situation, we see Buster Keaton himself, falling off a garden seat. This is the actual situation. Obviously, he's in a state of complete hypnosis, of sleep... and this imbalance of the chair will turn into a precipice over which he leans – and this will produce some unforgettable images that are among the greatest things in the history of cinema, this series of anamorphoses in the style of Buster Keaton – him leaning over the edge of a precipice, which turns into a lion's mouth where he sticks his head, which then turns into a cactus in a desert where he tries to sit before it becomes a small rock lashed by waves, a little rocky islet lashed by the waves, from which he dives, but by then it becomes a field of snow into which he plunges only to finally find himself back in the garden where he started with the seat. There, the circuit is perfect.³⁸

From the point of view of cinema, we can't help but notice that there were two methods. It's not easy. How do you account for these anamorphoses? Technically speaking, there are two methods, two equally interesting methods. You might have your own preference... Oh, we have to finish. What time is it?

Student: Quarter to one.

Deleuze: So, I still have... I still have a little time. I'll say this very quickly, if you compare the two methods, there's one that in that epoch can rightly be called avant-garde. Which is why it might not be the best. We'll call "avant-garde" this method that makes use of every way of manipulating the image to obtain these anamorphoses, which can be physical or chemical manipulation, physical manipulations such as double exposures, cross-fades or dissolves. I'm not even talking about camera movements, all the possible camera movements, all the unusual camera movements, high angle, low angle, and in the laboratory, all the various chemical manipulations you can do to images. What is the advantage of this? You obtain a kind of continuity of anamorphoses, by superposition or by cross-fading. What is the other advantage? You end up with a pure kinetic abstraction consisting of pure, abstract movements. So you can bring the image to pure abstraction. A typical example of this tendency is René Clair's *Entr'acte*, where, with the joy of a true pioneer he makes use of every technique that was available at the time.

Buñuel makes a formal statement. He says: It makes me laugh that they called *Un chien andalou* an avant-garde film when in my mind it was completely anti-avant-garde. It was a declaration of war on the avant-garde. And it's very clear what he means. If you look at *Un chien andalou*, it's quite simple, there is a minimum of effects, a minimum of technical effects. The anamorphoses are produced through clear montage-cuts. I think there have been very precise analyses of the movements of the camera in *Un chien andalou* and we can count very, very few. There is perhaps one low angle shot and there may be one or two accelerations of the film-speed. There is a refusal of all the ways the image can be manipulated, which is what makes the film interesting and why we can consider him an anti-avant-gardist.

How does he obtain this effect? He obtains it by a method that can only be called a method of unhinging. Each image becomes unhinged from the others, each image is detached from the others. You will tell me that in order to obtain anamorphosis, there must be a continuum. Yes, but it's the same case with Buster Keaton, where you have a fantastic attempt to create a series of anamorphoses simply by detaching the image. What a challenge! There would be no difficulty today because there is a process, which would not look as good, but which is in fact easy to do, which is transparency. In the dream of *Sherlock Jr.*, it would be enough to make transparencies. But when Buster Keaton made *Sherlock Jr.*, the process of transparency was unknown; there were no transparencies. You had to, you had to – and Buster Keaton explained this – you had to be extraordinarily meticulous in your technique to keep the character in exactly the same position through the succession of sets. So much so that each set can be out of sync with the others while the character follows the movements that correspond to each set. So we will be seized by what are still the character's sensory-motor sequences, but with each successive image unhinging itself from the previous one, with the result that these sensory-motor sequences at most are no more than a façade.

So obviously, in this way, you can't obtain, you can't arrive at pure abstraction. You will have, for example, in the example I gave you of the circular model – the sea urchin which

becomes hair which becomes a circle of onlookers and so on – you will have a circular form, but this will never lead to the abstract form of the circle. You will have a circular form, but it will never lead to the abstract form of the circle. It will always be caught up in images that are permanently detached from one another. So here we have two very different methods. So, this is what we have this time. We no longer have circuits of relative recollection-images. We have a circuit that, theoretically speaking, could go on indefinitely.

So, the question we must ask is: Is it here that we will find the virtual image that relates to the actual image we started with? The answer for the next time is: No, no, no, it won't be here. That's it. So next time we'll settle all this very quickly, and we'll finally enter the crystal-image.

Notes

¹ This refers to the discussion in Session 14, March 29, 1984.

² These remarks recall, on the one hand, *A Thousand Plateaus* (1980), especially Plateau 6 on the body without organs, and the expression of the need for caution, "And how necessary caution is, the art of dosages, since overdose is a danger." See *A Thousand Plateaus* (trans. Brian Massumi), Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1987, p. 160. On the other hand, Deleuze expresses this sentiment about speaking of what one knows on several occasions, notably in the preface to *Difference and Repetition*, and in his letter to Michel Cressole, Letter to a Harsh Critic: "What one says comes from the depths of one's ignorance, the depths of one's own underdevelopment." – reprinted in *Negotiations* (trans. Martin Joughin), New York: Columbia UP, 1995, p. 16.

³ Chapter 4 of *The Time-Image* is entitled "The Crystals of Time", which obviously corresponds to the developments in this session.

⁴ With Guattari, Deleuze will be able to "say it better" in *What is Philosophy?* (trans. Hugh Tomlinson & Graham Burchell), New York: Columbia UP, 1994.

⁵ In *What is Philosophy?* The term used for science will be "functions". See also the development of these remarks in session 15 of the seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, April 28, 1987.

⁶ See *The Time-Image*, p. 69, where Deleuze quotes Bachelard from his *La Terre et les rêveries de la volonté*, Paris: Corti, 1948, p. 290.

⁷ See *The Time-Image*, p. 68. Here Deleuze appears to be referring to two passages of Bergson, the first from *Matter and Memory*: "For, on the one hand, complete perception is only defined and distinguished by its coalescence with a memory-image, which we send forth to meet it." See H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, op. cit. p. 127; and the second from *Mind-Energy*: "The memory seems to be to the perception what the image reflected in the mirror is to the object in front of it. The object can be touched as well as seen; acts on us as well as we on it; is pregnant with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles the object, it is incapable of doing what the object does. Our actual existence then, whilst it is unrolled in rime, duplicates itself all along with a virtual existence, a mirror-image." See H. Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, (trans. H. Willdon Carr), Westport, London: Greenwood Press, 1975 p. 165.

⁸ Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) was a German-American psychologist. Widely acknowledged to be the founder of social psychology, he was a pioneer in the study of group dynamics and organizational development. As part of his work on *genidentity*, a theory he developed according to which objects could be considered as multiple entities that exist in phases, changing from minute to minute of their existence, he introduced the concept of hodological space, describing the simplest route or itinerary that could be achieved, according to one's goals, through the resolution of different fields of forces, oppositions and tensions.

⁹ Deleuze speaks briefly of hodological spaces in *The Time-Image*, see pp. 127-128, p. 203. He returns to the question in analyzing the cartographic space of the unconscious in the essay "What Children Say" in *Essays Critical and Clinical* (trans. Daniel W. Smith & Michael Greco), Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1997, pp. 61-67.

¹⁰ Sir D'Arcy Wentworth Thompson (1860-1948) was a Scottish biologist, mathematician, classics scholar and a pioneer of mathematical and theoretical biology. His most well-known work, which Deleuze refers to here, is the 1917 book *On Growth and Form*, which was instrumental in the development of the scientific theory of *morphogenesis*, the process by which patterns and body structures form in plants and animals.

¹¹ *Every Man for Himself* (orig. *Sauve qui peut (la vie)*, 1980) is a film by Jean Luc-Godard, co-written with his partner Anne-Marie Miéville and starring Isabelle Huppert, Jacques Dutronc and Nathalie Baye. Exploring connections between the parallel lives and existential situations of a call girl and a filmmaker and his estranged partner and daughter, the film marked Godard's return to commercially distributed cinema after a long hiatus

exploring the possibilities of video and television, some techniques of which, such as the slow-motion breakdown and analysis of images, he incorporated into the film. The climactic scene Deleuze mentions here is one in which Godard deliberately evokes the ending of his first film *A bout de souffle* where a dying Jean-Paul Belmondo utters a similar phrase, marking how Godard considered this film his “second birth” into cinema.

¹² See session 1, November 8, 1983.

¹³ See the previous session, April 24, 1984.

¹⁴ Kon Ichikawa (1915-2008) was a Japanese director and screenwriter. Emerging in the post-war period, along with Akira Kurosawa and Mikio Naruse, as part of the generation immediately following Ozu and Mizoguchi, his films ranged across many different genres. He is most well-known for the string of films he made in collaboration with his screenwriter wife, Natto Wada, between the 1950s and 60s including the anti-war dramas *The Burmese Harp* (1956) and *Fires on the Plain* (1959), *Odd Obsession* (1959), *Ten Dark Women* (1960) and *An Actor's Revenge* (1963).

¹⁵ *An Actor's Revenge* (orig. *Yukinojō henge*, 1963) is a film by Kon Ichikawa starring Kazuo Hasegawa, Fujiko Yamamoto and Ayako Wakao, which tells the story of a 19th century kabuki actor, a female impersonator who plots to take revenge himself on the three men who drove his parents to ruin and suicide. The film's deliberate extension of artificial theatrical space to the off-stage, where the actor persists in the female mannerisms of his onstage persona, is coupled with its use of elaborate lighting and montage effects, making the film a key early work of Japanese new wave cinema.

¹⁶ *The Time-Image* begins with a discussion of Italian neo-realism. See Ch. 1, "Beyond the Movement-Image."

¹⁷ Here Deleuze employs the verb *piétiner*, which in French can mean to trample or tread on something, or else to shuffle along, to become stalled, to get nowhere. Here we have translated it in the latter sense.

¹⁸ On the subject of Italian neo-realism, see sessions 8 and 9, January 17 and 24, 1984.

¹⁹ Riemannian space describes a space where the parallel translation of a vector between two given points is a path-dependent operation, that is, it gives different results along different paths. In *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari initially refer Riemannian space to the idea of patchwork, which they describe as “an amorphous collection of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways.” See G. Deleuze & F. Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (Trans. Brian Massumi), Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, pp. 485-486, 488. See also *The Time-Image* p. 129, where Deleuze relates the idea to the disconnected, fragmented spaces of Bresson's films.

²⁰ On these spaces, see sessions 6, 11 and 14 in the seminar Cinema 2, December 21, 1982, February 22 and March 15, 1983; sessions 4, 7 and 9 in the current seminar, December 6, 1983 and January 10 and 24, 1984; see also *The Time-image*, pp. 5-16 and elsewhere.

²¹ Deleuze refers to these spaces in several contexts in *The Time-Image*, pp. 169, 277.

²² Deleuze refers to the visions of the dying in *ibid*, pp. 55-56.

²³ See *Matter and Memory*, pp. 98-99; see also *ibid*, p. 44, note 1.

²⁴ For an illustration of this circuit in Bergson, see *ibid*, pp. 44-47.

²⁵ *Daybreak* (orig. *Le jour se lève*, 1939) is a film directed by Marcel Carné from a screenplay by the poet Jacques Prévert, based on a story by Jacques Viot and starring Jean Gabin, Jules Berry and Arletty. Considered a key work of poetic realism, the film concerns an iron foundry worker who shoots and kills a dog trainer, his rival for the affections of the girl he loves, before locking himself in his apartment. There besieged by the police, he begins to recollect the events that brought him to this situation.

²⁶ This is not actually Bergson's formula but Deleuze's own, which he reiterates in slightly different form, and expands upon, in *The Time-Image*: “just as we perceive things where they are present, in space, we remember where they have passed, in time, and we go out of ourselves just as much in each case. Memory is not in us; it is we who move in a Being-memory, a world-memory.” See *The Time Image*, op. cit. Ch. 5 “Peaks of Present and Sheets of Past: fourth commentary on Bergson,” p. 98.

²⁷ *The Barefoot Contessa* (1954), is a film written and directed by Joseph L. Mankiewicz and starring Ava Gardner, Humphrey Bogart, Edmond O'Brien, Marius Goring and Rosanno Brazzi, which recounts the tragic story of a dancer turned movie star and the men she becomes involved with, from the perspectives of two of the men who knew her best, the washed-up film director who first discovers her and his unscrupulous publicist colleague.

²⁸ *Cleopatra* (1963) is a film directed by Joseph L. Mankiewicz with a screenplay adapted by Mankiewicz, Randal MacDougall and Sidney Buchman from the 1957 book *The Life and Times of Cleopatra* and from histories by Plutarch, Suetonius, and Appian and starring Elizabeth Taylor in the title role alongside Richard Burton as Marc Antony and Rex Harrison as Caesar. Recounting the struggles of Cleopatra, the young queen of Egypt, to resist the imperial ambitions of Rome, the film had a troubled production history with Mankiewicz being called to replace the original director, Rouben Mamoulian and rewriting the screenplay himself. Mankiewicz eventually disowned the finished film on which he did not have final cut and which was some two

hours shorter than his preferred version. For more on this film and on forking time in Mankiewicz's cinema see the seminar Cinema 3 Session 7, Jan 10, 1984.

²⁹ On flashbacks and bifurcations in Mankiewicz and Marcel Carné, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 48-54.

³⁰ "In place of attaching myself to life, I detach myself from it. Everything has become indifferent to me. I have become disinterested in everything. To sleep is to become disinterested. One sleeps to the exact extent to which he becomes disinterested. A mother who sleeps by the side of her child will not stir at the sound of thunder, but the sigh of the child will wake her. Does she really sleep in regard to her child? We do not sleep in regard to what continues to interest us." See Henri Bergson, *Dreams* (trans. Edwin E. Slosson), London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1914, p. 53.

³¹ *Ibid.* p. 56 (translation modified).

³² *Peter Ibbetson* (1935) is a film directed by Henry Hathaway and starring Gary Cooper and Ann Harding. It recounts the story of a boy and a girl who are separated in childhood and then drawn together by destiny years later. Though he is unjustly imprisoned for murder, they have the ability to dream themselves into each other's consciousness and so are able to partly live together in a dream-world.

³³ *Entr'acte* is a short silent experimental film by René Clair. Now considered a masterpiece of dada and surrealist cinema, it was made to accompany a ballet-play based on and featuring work by the artist Francis Picabia. Picabia himself appears in the first scene of *Entr'acte* along with the composer Erik Satie, and the film also features brief appearances by Marcel Duchamp and Man Ray.

³⁴ On these effects and these same films, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 57-59.

³⁵ *Un chien andalou* (1929), a.k.a. *An Andalusian Dog*, is a short film directed by Luis Bunuel from a screenplay he wrote with the surrealist painter Salvador Dali, with sequences connected by a freely associative dream-logic.

³⁶ The sequence Deleuze mentions actually cuts directly via an iris effect from the sea-urchins to the circle of onlookers who surround a man gazing at a severed hand on the ground.

³⁷ *Sherlock Jr.* (1924) is a film by Buster Keaton about a hapless film projectionist who dreams of being a detective and who finds himself banished from the house of the girl he loves after being framed for a petty theft he did not commit. Returning to his job he falls asleep while projecting a crime mystery film which in his unconscious mind becomes the setting for his idealized dream-self, Sherlock Jr. the world's greatest detective, to solve the mystery afflicting his life, whose stakes in this dream-film are raised to comically dramatic proportions.

³⁸ Here Deleuze only partly recounts this sequence from *Sherlock Jr.*, which begins with the Buster Keaton character, a film projectionist, asleep in the projection booth, at which point he begins to dream of leaving his post and entering the film he is projecting, whose events he substitutes with the drama of his own life and where his dream-self is thrown from scene to disconnected scene more or less in the sequence that Deleuze describes.