

Gilles Deleuze

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Transcription: [La voix de Deleuze](#), [not indicated] (Part 1), Antoine Storck (Part 2) and [not indicated] (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

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Part 1

... obviously, they had to do with cinema, but what it came down to was this: [*Pause*] For a long time, let's say, the movement-image was in the driver's seat, which isn't to say it was the only determining factor. In a certain way, the movement-image was determinant—in what way was it mov—...determinant? Movement-images were the determining factor because the montage they—plural—were put through, the montage applied to movement-images such that, through the intermediary of montage, movement-images yielded an image of time, which was thereby necessarily an indirect image of time.

The main idea—I'd like for you, basically, if it interests you, for you to see how—and I'll go further today—to try and put together the main touchstones for our investigation. See, let's assume this idea—it might not be true, for all I know, but right away, we'll add, yeah, sure, but, but, but we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves: with that sort of time, we find phenomena we should think of as aberrations in movement. There are aberrations in the movement of cinematic movement-images.

While it's true that, through montage, movement-images offer us an image of time—an indirect image of time, necessarily—be careful! The sort of aberrations of movement already present in the movement-image might already point the way to a direct time-image. Hence the significance of these aberrations in movement, and in a way, cinema has from the beginning always been torn between two regimes: that of the movement-image, insofar as it yields an indirect image of time once subjected to montage, and that of aberrant movement, which reveals or makes us aware of a direct time-image.

And these aberrations in movement were just as fundamental, just as important as movement-images themselves; it's simply that they likely, we probably didn't perceive them as we've since learned to perceive them. Looking back, where did we learn to perceive them in a new way? Well, it's the fundamental event I described before: a groundbreaking moment which seems to me more important than the sound revolution, again, because the sound revolution is only one technological revolution among others. And revolution has never come down to technique or technology. What was revolutionary, then? It was the relationship between movement and time which came to be overturned—where, rather than deriving our image of time from movement-

images, [Pause] now the movement-image, what remained of it, was but the first dimension of a more profound image. This deeper image was a direct time-image; cinema would now give us time-images. [Pause]

What was this reversal rooted in? At the base of this reversal was an interrogation, taken further and further, of the movement-image's laws. What was the law of the movement image? The movement-image's law was its sensorimotor scheme. [Pause] How is this sensorimotor scheme the law governing movement-images? It's insofar as the movement-image, governed by its sensorimotor scheme, depicts a character in a given situation [Pause] who reacts to said situation and modifies it, [Pause] a sensorimotor situation. Sensorimotor situations are the rule for movement-images, such that the latter yields an indirect image of time.

What did this revolution entail? The revolution consisted in—and it's on this that I'd like us to, I think... because all of this is up for debate—in what sense? You'll see why I'm interested in organizing things this way. For reasons that should surprise no one, after the war, no one believed in it; they no longer believed in it. They didn't subscribe to it—not personally, not politically, etc. The sensorimotor scheme was called into question, especially. Hadn't that been the case before? Yes, it was suspect before, certainly, but before it always came in the form of an aberration in movement. Whereas now it's no longer a matter of aberrations in movement; really, it's a question of what's normal or normative. The normative or normal state of things is now a lack of sensorimotor situations.

Sensorimotor situations are the old way of doing things. Ah! The old way... [Pause] Now what do we have? Something completely different. We have what I've called purely audio-visual situations.¹ [Pause] Meaning what? It means exactly... You understand here, right away we ought to avoid a misunderstanding—as your investigation makes progress, you start to counter yourself with objections—you could always say, well, cinemagoers have always been in and faced with purely audio-visual situations, full stop. Yes, of course, obviously, but that's not it; that's not the point. It's about the character on the screen, [Pause] they were in sensorimotor situations. What's totally new is actually this new breed of character; but it isn't that—it's a way of more clearly grasping a new breed of character who sometimes doesn't know what to do and sometimes doesn't want to.

At any rate, their situation exceeds any motor response. [Pause] It's out of their hands—what *is* in their hands? Seeing and hearing. Of course, then, they still do something—again, we should always bear in mind that there's more to the story; once you work out an idea, there are going to be wrinkles—but what do they do? Ultimately, it's no longer action, it's—and I went over this a lot, two years back—it's... it's a ballad.² It's a ballad, the film-ballad, playing with both senses of the word, ballad: ballad as a stroll and ballad as a sung-danced poem. [Pause] They are ballad films. So, [the character] might move quite a bit.

Take *Taxi Driver*, by [Martin] Scorsese [1967]—okay, what do we find? It isn't action; what does its movement consist in? That of perpetually being in a purely audio-visual situation, i.e., in the mirror, he sees what's happening on the sidewalk—that's what I mean by “being in a purely audio-visual situation.” And every character in so-called modern cinema, in the post-war period... I brought up a few examples from Rossellini—if Rossellini founded this kind of cinema

in Europe, it's because—in his major early films—what defines neorealism isn't any social content—it's that realism had previously come down to a purely sensorimotor scheme; neorealism is this sensorimotor scheme's rupture. It's the guy faced with an audio-visual situation, like that, and then—what can he do? He has no riposte; he has no response; he has no motor scheme for responding to it. Hence, I described it as a cinema of seers, a cinema of visionaries.

In other words, the image is no longer sensorimotor—the movement-image, yielding an indirect image of time; the image has become purely audio-visual and now yields a direct time-image. It's a cinema of seers. Well, as I was saying, does that make it a celebration of passivity? No. Of course, there is passivity. There might be charming characters, the characters might be... they might be bourgeois. In Rossellini's work, they're often bourgeois. Again, the bourgeois woman in *Europe 51* [1952], the bourgeois woman in *Journey to Italy* [1954]. In early Godard, they were outsiders, [Pause], and so on. What do they have in common? They're seers, visionaries. [Pause]

So, that's where the reversal comes in: movement is no longer primary in relation to an indirect image; the movement-image is no longer primary in relation to an indirect image of time. [Pause] So, that's based on the requirements of a sensorimotor scheme, but now, what “open up” a direct image of time, a direct time-image, are purely audio-visual situations. We penetrate into the time-image. That's still unclear, you might say. Yes, it isn't clear yet! Why do sight-sound situations, cut off from any motor extension—precisely because they're cut off from any motor extension—open onto a direct time-image? I'd like for you to appreciate how, in any investigation, there's a time where your idea hasn't been filled in yet and is still only a matter of intuition.

Then I assume that some, when I say that, right, there are some that don't see it, there are some who feel a bit lost, right? Our problem—I'm not saying that some are better than others, right, because on the other hand, with other things, it's different, it's the other way around. Here we have one line of inquiry, then, this overturning of the relationship between movement and time, the course of which I've sort of sketched out by examining a situation with cinema. And I was saying that, in that case, we have to recognize Rossellini, with everything that followed, as *the* major engineer of this reversal in Europe. Well, he's the first to have done it, it seems to me, the first to achieve this time-movement reversal, such that movement is basically no more than the residue of a deeper time-image; instead of being the principle whereby we derive an indirect image of time, it became no more than the residue of a deeper time-image into which cinema was to take us.

Hence, once again, the absurdity of the idea that cinematic images are necessarily in the present. And again, when I say that that's wrong, I'm not talking about flashbacks, which have never brought cinematic images out of the present—[Pause] I have something completely different in mind: namely, that, in these situations, if for example you think of [Alain] Resnais films, they're really films where time-images predominate, based on audio-visual situations. Thus—I'm not trying to pin down an inventor, but if *anyone* invented it, it was Ozu in far-off Japan: even before the war, he had achieved this major reversal. And then this reversal led to all sorts of consequences. As we saw, because, alongside the time-image, other aspects would emerge, i.e., just as the image became a time-image, the visible and sound image became legible as well, a

reading of visual images and sound images. And lastly, more and more, the camera would take on functions of thought.

Well, that's where I left off, and you can sense what we're hoping for in our investigation—it was, well, say, well, let's put all that aside and see if we can't find something happening in philosophy, in a completely different time, in a completely different way, that also uniquely bears upon the image, the regime of images. *[Pause]* Well, how might that have taken place? So, with that, with that, then, we got to the first part of our investigation—here's where I'd like for you to take over for me, for this first step. Or there are several ways you might step in: you might very well think there are things about this outline that don't hold up; or you might think of some things that confirm it—obviously, it's the hypothesis I prefer *[Laughter]*—but at that point, you need, you need to bring me proof, because such proof means revamping things. So, for example, with Ozu, you might think that no, Ozu doesn't, that Ozu doesn't work, or that it's even better than I'm making it out to be, I don't know. Ah, you have something to say? Good.

Hidenobu Suzuki [First Speaker]: I guess he's going to say a few things, and then I'll come in afterwards.

Deleuze: Alright, I'm listening.

Second Speaker: I'll start with a rather baseline impression, the distinction between empty landscapes and still life. Watching Ozu's films as a Japanese viewer, what I found inspiring, touching, was above all, let's say, his empty landscapes—and simplifying somewhat, I felt there was something lasting about this image. And at the same time, what I felt, well, was—to reference another image that gave me the same impression—a shot from Wenders, from *Kings of the Road* [1976]: a truck starting to move, and there are powerlines overhead. So, there's an odd movement with the train station and wires, and that was my impression.

And so, well, after class, I thought about the relationship between empty landscape and still life, and *[Pause]* from there, my feeling was that I asked myself: is there already something in empty landscapes that evokes time, I mean even, well, in Ozu's early films? *[Pause]* And *[Pause]* there, well, on that, I wasn't so sure how I felt, so, I talked to him, and he then gave me a few examples of this idea, i.e., right, from the work of [Paul] Schrader—he tries to look at a sort of revolution using the idea of painting. Then, well, starting from the mountain we first see, and then, well, with a little understanding of what I want to do, I look for the mountain's meaning, and then third, looking at the mountain with, well, enough of an understanding at least, you no longer look for the meaning “of the mountain.” And I'm trying to frame Ozu's revolution along these lines, and in my opinion, what might be interesting, if we're looking for the presence of the image and of time in—well, I'm getting ahead of myself—free indirect discourse in Japanese, which has a place in Japanese culture, of course, well, we find this aspect of free indirect discourse all over the idea of Zen. And so, well, I personally think that, to elucidate the idea of Zen, if we try to look for, to explain using free indirect discourse, free indirect discourse as an aspect of Japanese culture, it seems to me that it comes down to contemplation for Ozu, and that's my general impression.

Deleuze: Great, great, I don't understand. I mean, you've brought in a new concept; you've brought in free indirect discourse, saying: well, it's even closer to a time-image, to a direct time-image, than either empty landscapes or still life. So, I'm very intrigued, but I don't really understand where free indirect discourse fits in, with Ozu.

Second Speaker: In other words, well... then... it's that...

Suzuki: Can I say a few things?

Second Speaker: I can give some examples and then, okay...

Deleuze [to the Second Speaker]: And then we'll pick back up.

Suzuki: Alright, then, if you want, I'll go over what he said a little bit. And to sort of second his thoughts, I mean, I also, well, I had the feeling that, well, I felt like, like, it seems a lot like how you were describing still-life, like that was already there in the empty landscape, and then—just speaking in terms of my baseline, gut feeling, I think that, well, I'm picking up a bit of what you were calling “the pure, unchanging form of that which changes” in the empty landscape or shots of empty interiors. And then, for example, I think, the example you brought up last time—the shot from the beginning of the film, *Floating Weeds* [1959], the lighthouse with the bottle, the beer bottle, and I think it's a landscape, but at the same time, there's a composition...

Deleuze: Where?

Suzuki: And I dwelt on the question that way for a while, looking for some examples. Because, well, it's been a long time since I've seen Ozu's films, and my memory is a little hazy. But, for example, at the very end, or near the end, of a film called—in French, I think it's *Late Autumn* [1960]—the mother and daughter are eating a sort of cake or Japanese dessert, at kind of a bistro, and beside them is a window, and they're really talking to each other, they're chatting, there's both chatting, and then all of a sudden, their eyes move to the window. That is, what we see is both of them face-to-face and then they both turn toward the wall where there's a window, which we don't see, and then we see a mountain, and really, it's the mountain head-on.

Or, in another film—I don't know what it's called in French, something like *Start of Summer*, I think³—there's a scene with an old couple in front of a museum, a museum in Tokyo, and suddenly they watch a balloon floating up, and we watch it float up into the sky.

Or it reminds me, for example, of this scene from the end of the film, *The Last Caprice* [*The End of Summer*, 1961], this elderly rural couple looking at the smoking chimney of the crematorium—where they hold funerals; it turns out the grandfather of the family has died—so, that was... so, if you will, examples of scenes that take place outside, if you will, of outdoor landscapes. And there are, I also thought of examples of empty interiors from *Late Spring* (1949), near the end, after the daughter's marriage, the old man, her father, goes back to his, well, to their house, and at one point we get a shot of the daughter's room, empty, with a mirror. And then I think of the shot—there's not just one, there are several—of the hallway in *Journey to Tokyo* (1953), the empty hallway. Or there's the scene of the interior of the mistress's house, the

former mistress, in the *Last Caprice*: the structure of the house is such that there is a room right next to the entrance, and then there's a kind of small courtyard, with a hallway on the left, and then there's another room in back, and we can see in frame, in any case, in the foreground, in the foreground, the room, then this small courtyard, and then a room further down. And precisely when the father dies, when the grandfather dies, he's in this room, the first room, and at one point, we get a shot of the small courtyard before, if I recall correctly, before his son and granddaughter arrive, i.e., after they've gotten the call from his mistress informing them of his death.

Basically, with all these scenes that fit in, if you will, with how you're classifying or categorizing empty landscapes or empty interiors, I notice something that is, that... I pick up the same—how should I put this? —I'm picking up the same thing I did with the shots you described as “still life,” and sometimes I think there are compositions in those shots.

Deleuze: Yes, yes, yes...

Suzuki: And so, if you will, that's my first point—should I go on, or... ?

Deleuze: Obviously, of course...

Suzuki: No, I mean, if you prefer I didn't...

Deleuze: Ah, in case I want to respond? Yes, because I don't have to respond. That's fine; I'm on board with that. Well, what really struck me was, as you know, how problems are posed and addressed. Well, suppose I've seen Ozu, I've read a bit on Ozu. In a job, we're all there; we see certain things; we read certain things. I was struck by the fact that every commentary, even the best ones—since there were some great Japanese commentaries on Ozu, as well as European ones—what struck me was how, I thought to myself, funny how they're conflating these empty spaces and still lifes. So, for them, they have the same effect. I'm not about to say to these folks, you're wrong. No, that's not, that's not what's at issue. I can see that it has the same effect on them. Now we're lucky to have two Japanese students, two Japanese comrades, as they say. [*Laughter*] And here our Japanese comrades say, “Well, yeah, if they're both in the same category, it's because they leave the same impression on us.”

The immediate objection I want to make—not an objection—how can we tell which of us is right? They say it's the same effect; I say no, they don't have the same effect. There's no telling, because the argument he gave, that there are in-betweens where you'd be hard-pressed to say whether it's empty space or whether it's a still life, [*Pause*] that bothers me no more than it bothers them or backs them up. Suppose that I'm right, that empty space and still life are really distinct, are two very different things. When you have two different things, inherently different things, you can always blend them such that it seems like there's middle-ground between the two—thus, that there are intermediaries or transitions between empty space and still life, so on and so forth. Thus, that's not where we disagree.

So, I think that the only deciding factor between us is our way of getting there, right. We both start, we begin with feelings; hence why I claimed that there is never a concept with no affect.

For me, these two types of images do not have the same effect. Of course, that's a bit sneaky because if they don't affect me the same way, it's because I already need for them to not have the same effect on me. But who knows, which comes first? That doesn't mean... [*Interruption of the recording*] [34:38]

... understand, I'll take what I can get where I can get it, I think, ah, well, if it doesn't have the same effect on me, it must be obvious. I immediately think of painting, and I think to myself how we never mix up [*Pause*] landscape painting and still life painting. Well, on that point, I think—hence why I developed, why I brought it up—Cézanne's example, which isn't a particularly clear example, where already we find a strong awareness of empty landscapes. In a completely different context from that of Japanese art, then—but not completely unrelated—we already find a clear awareness of empty landscapes; there's also a clear awareness of still lifes, and so? Well, the composition isn't the same, and yet, there can be all sorts of grey area, transitions between the two.

And then I think, well, it's not that I think they're wrong, it's that they've mixed them together, and anyone who mixes them together will end up, as I see it—I'm not sure, which is why I'm talking my way through it—they're going to end up with a completely different problem from mine. I'm not saying their problem won't be a better one; it will be just as interesting, more or less, but I'd be surprised—hence my reaction to all this about free indirect discourse, which came up so unexpectedly—it wouldn't surprise me if they insist on conflating empty space and still life because they need it for a problem, which will turn out to be completely different from the one I've been dealing with. That explains it, then, since they're posing a different problem. When people disagree, it's always because they aren't... they aren't posing the same problem.

Why, then—I'm not just being stubborn and saying that a still life or empty space doesn't have the same impression on me with Ozu—but at the same time, why, why do I need it to be so? I can describe an impression and my motivation for said impression; what's my motivation? Well, it's that I'm already caught up in a problem: I don't what to conflate what I'm calling audio-visual situations, on the one hand, and direct time-images on the other. Why not? Because otherwise it gets messy, otherwise it doesn't work, my whole thing falls to pieces.

What I mean is that just as sensorimotor situations correspond to an indirect image of time, [*Pause*] so too do purely audio-visual situations [*Pause*] have their correlate in a direct time-image. Obviously, it isn't the same relationship: pure sensorimotor situations... [*Deleuze corrects himself*] purely audio-visual situations will lead us to their corresponding time-image, while sensorimotor situations won't get us to a time-image, since their image of time was indirect. They built an indirect image of time by way of montage. That doesn't change the fact that I absolutely need to distinguish between sensori... purely audio-visual situations and their correlate, time... their correlate, the direct time-image.

So, if I need that, [*Pause*] if it really is a necessary distinction, there's no helping it. I mean, I could have avoided it earlier, but it can't be helped now. There's no way around it because emptiness has to affect external or internal spaces. It's the purely audio-visual situation. [*Pause*] The direct time-image these situations lead to has to be distinct from such situations. How? Exactly the same way, as the Japanese say, full is both distinguished and at the same time not

distinguished from empty. [Pause] And so for me, emptinesses, empty interiors, empty landscapes, can only constitute an audio-visual situation, but they do not yet provide a direct time-image. Time-images can only be composed, can only be composed through a different form, precisely that of the still life.

That's why I need [Pause] the two to be distinct. Picking up there, then, going back... There are some who can't feel it—it's necessary in two different ways, I believe: because I feel it, and because my problem, at this point, requires it. You might ask, what about a problem? What do you mean your problem "requires it"? Indeed, problems make demands. I mean, problems always refer to conditions. A problem has certain conditions, the conditions for the problem itself. That's why problems aren't solved by opinions; we've gone beyond opinions. In terms of opinion, I felt that they were different; they felt that they were the same. That's interesting, but it doesn't go very far, right? We could, we could spend all evening [Laughter], right. Problems are different. Mine, then, is this business with audio-visual situations, direct time-images.

Thus, I need a clear distinction between empty space and still life even though they are strictly correlative, and what's more, I need for still lifes to be more in-depth. To the point, I need empty landscapes, empty interiors, to be no more than an envelope for still life. [Pause] I need them to have the same relationship as that between empty and full, whatever the relationship between empty and full might be. Because, again—and here I'm circling back—when I say that there's a complementarity between purely audio-visual images (i.e., those cut off from any motor extension) and direct time-images, a complementarity defining modern cinema, [Pause] all the more reason that there be no confusion or identity between the two, not in the slightest. Otherwise, I wouldn't be able to make heads or tails of how it develops, how a time-image develops.

Then, from there we get to the second part, where I still don't know: they [*the Japanese students*], they conflate them for reasons along those lines, because their impression is that it's better, but it's not just because they feel that it's better; it isn't because they have a different opinion from mine. We think we have opinions, but that's too easy, see, it's what's terrible about opinions. We think we have such and such an opinion; I'll give you my opinion, but what we don't often realize in conversation, when we're chatting—what we don't realize is that our opinions presuppose problems. Simply put, an opinion belies a problem we aren't conscious of, and we've never had a problem we didn't make for ourselves. So, I'm offering my opinion; I don't know what the problem is. I don't know what problem is guiding me.

What's with the pressure of public opinion? That's what it is! They conceal their problems and ask for our opinion. [Laughter] Right, so, that's why it works so well, and people are always ready to give their opinion, right? They don't know what their problem is; everything possible has been done to hide it from them, you know? Well, they [*the Japanese students*] aren't doing that, but the very fact that they reject my proposed distinction makes me think they do so for the sake of a very different problem, hence this odd reference out of the blue to free indirect discourse. [Pause; Deleuze looks at Suzuki] Alright, go ahead! [Laughter]

Suzuki: So, there's something else that stands out to me when I watch Ozu's films, and it has to do with the the gaze, the characters' gaze. Well, I'm thinking of examples of scenes where the

characters, where two characters, primarily, face each other. And, well, at least in later films, Ozu's post-war films, he shot them using a method which I think is called shot/reverse-shot. And in fact, watching Ozu's films, his characters don't actually make eye contact—for example: if you film a character talking like this, for example, more or less from the left, one character looks slightly to the right, and usually, when you cut to the other character, they have to be facing the opposite direction—I mean, in relation to the camera, slightly to the left—and in fact, Ozu absolutely disregards this sort of thing, what's taken to be sort of the grammar of filmmaking. He even says: there is no grammar; he specifically says: I believe that filmmaking has no grammar. What's my problem with the gaze? Precisely that, if we disregard this way of filming shot/reverse-shot, in a way, it troubles the position of the subject itself.

In addition, the way Ozu films these scenes, he does so from a very low angle. I don't know what they call it in French—it's "low angle" in English—when filming his characters. And I have a feeling, in any case, that it's somehow tied to this problem of the gaze. This way of filming and the problem of the subject in the Japanese language. That is to say, in Japanese, there is no—grammatically, in any case—there is no subject. That is, uh, I don't say "I," or I can opt not to say "I," at least, when saying "I'm talking," for example. The same thing goes for "you," "you all," etc. And in Ozu's films, ultimately, my sense is that, through this sort of unsettling of the gaze, through this disturbance, my sense is sort of—How to put this?—at any rate, we no longer know who's seeing. Because the character, the characters are facing each other, but their eyes do not meet. In any case, right, with respect to this sort of cinematic grammar, in a way the gaze loses its subject, the subject as such, where the... at any rate, we don't see who's seeing, exactly. That really stood out to me.

Then I thought about the sort of indiscernibility we've discussed before. From there I thought of what Pasolini wrote about free indirect discourse. The way he describes this kind of obsessive framing reminds me of Ozu's preoccupation with fixed shots. That's all why the linguistic subject of free indirect discourse came up, which he [*the second speaker*] just now brought up.

And still on this problem of the gaze, I think that in a way it confirms what you talked about last week. In any case, the issue with these strange gazes was already there, as far as I can tell, in Ozu's pre-war films. For example, in a film called *I Flunked, But...* [1930]: you see the students coming in—it's for an exam—and they're really coming in the same one direction, and there's something funny about it, but also quite striking. That is, well, if you will, there's kind of a courtyard, since it's a campus, and you can see several buildings, at least two buildings. But nevertheless, when the bell rings, the students all uniformly walk into the same building—I mean, how do they walk? Really, they're all walking the same way. Or another film, called *Tokyo Chorus* [1931]: there's a scene where the main character, the protagonist, is at a zoo, and suddenly this panic breaks out. I think there's some lion or tiger or something that's gotten loose, and everyone's running, but in this panic, everyone's running the same direction. This kind of, well, it's almost manic, I feel... the way this sort of scene is constituted, constructed—I find it rather bizarre in Ozu's films.

And then, for example, I don't know when the film was... after the war, at any rate—called *Early Spring* [1956], certainly not "Late" [Spring], but "Early"—and at the very beginning, we see people walking to the station, it's the morning, everyone's going to work, and everyone's

walking in the same direction, and really, no one is walking any other way. Or, for example, there are scenes in *Late Autumn* [1960], where the girl and her fiancé are eating in a small Chinese restaurant, and we see them from an angle, from behind, and they're eating their food, facing a wall which is like 30 centimeters from their heads... but they're looking, well... they're both, like this, I'd say they're lined up, right, and there is the wall. So, they're looking in the same direction, and even the way they're eating: exactly the same, one, then the other.

Finally, there are examples like that, which stood out to me, and... and it sort of makes me think either of scenes like that or those where, in most cases, like where there are two characters, and they're both sitting with the same posture, sitting or standing the same way. For example, I'm thinking of this famous scene from *Journey to Tokyo* [1953]. [*Airplane outside*] The old couple is on a short trip from Tokyo, leaving Tokyo, to a sea-side spa, and they're walking around... and at one point, they're both sitting like this, facing the sea, and we see them from behind.

Or in the film, *Late Autumn* [1960], the young girl who ends up getting married at the end of the film—it's more like at the beginning—and she's with her best friend, her and her best friend, and they're waiting, the friend who's just gotten married is leaving with her husband for their honeymoon, and so, we see them there, both of them, from behind, and it's a really symmetrical shot. There is—if I recall correctly—there's a building on both sides, there's a space further on, there's the railroad, and them waiting for the train. I think, then, for me, there are compositions in these shots.

And then, I'm also reminded of the well-known scene from *Floating Weeds* [1959], the one with the father and son going fishing, and there is... I think it's the sea—wait, no, it's a river—flowing by, and they're both, so, each has a fishing rod, fishing...

Student: [*Inaudible question about the film's title*]

Suzuki: *Floating Weeds*, yes—and we see them fishing. And what they do, is they let—how should I put this?—their lines drag in the current, and at some point, they reel back in, both of them together, a little further upstream. And then [their lines] eventually come back: that's all they're doing in terms of movement. And so, that's happening, if I remember correctly, in the same one shot. And again, at the very beginning of the film, I think it's after the shot you mentioned, with the beer bottle and a lighthouse, as the boat—which the actors are on—comes into the harbor. All of a sudden, the camera's on the boat itself, with the boat slowly moving, in the same shot, we see the lighthouse moving like this.

Deleuze: Yeah, yeah, yeah, you can pile on with examples, sure.

Suzuki: What I'm getting at with these last few examples is that there is movement, but the movement is no longer movement-as-action.

[*Although this marks the line between Parts I and II in the Paris 8 recording, the audio is uninterrupted*] [59:05]

Part 2

Deleuze: Obviously, obviously, but you had gone further earlier, that's been settled. Once again, the crisis of the movement-image doesn't imply a lack of movement. It means, among other things, that these movements are no longer residual, and that they don't form an action. That, that's almost our starting point—I mean, you shouldn't go back to where we started, because you had already moved beyond it—I'm fine with that, because my sense is that, well, everything, everything is coming into focus. I don't know if it's any clearer for you, but in fact, what he wants is to pick up on a side problem; he's caught up in a lateral problem, I think. [Pause] I'm not saying it's a bad one.

Let's get back to the task at hand: hence why I was saying it came back to our starting point. We're no longer dealing with sensorimotor situations; these are purely audio-visual situations, right. Purely audio-visual situations—what does that mean? Right away, we need to see what's entailed by this new perspective, what belongs to it. It goes without saying that the image's elements forge completely new relationships. Why? Precisely because the elements [*Deleuze corrects himself*] the relationships between the image's elements are no longer governed by any sensorimotor scheme.

Once our sensorimotor scheme has melted away, we find ourselves in a purely audio-visual situation. It goes without saying that, in such an image, elements are related in ways irreducible to how they were before, when their relationships were enforced by a sensorimotor scheme. Everything you just went over, as I see it, everything you just went over, the problem you posed—and while you brought up free indirect discourse, that came down to saying that the elements of the image in Ozu have autonomous relationships, irreducible to those dictated by any sensorimotor scheme. The relationships they form are strangely free. As for this freedom of relations, we're familiar with it in its simplest form: false continuity, or mismatch cuts.⁴ Mismatch cuts from one image to another are fundamental—the mismatch might be the direction, it might be the gaze, it might be anything, but it highlights how the relationship between images is different, since their connection no longer conforms to sensorimotor requirements. Thus, a new breed of relationship is born, what we might call free or autonomous relationships between an image's elements.

And then, Ozu stuck with silent film for a while, but think about how... it's the same with Bresson, it's the same with Dreyer, [Pause] where there, too, the extent to which their filmmaking already heralds—with the rupture and collapse of sensorimotor relationships, with the rise of audio-visual situations, with the—the idea that, already, the elements of the image, its visual elements and its audio elements, form relationships completely different from those imposed by a sensorimotor scheme.

Hence, this new approach to filmmaking has completely reconfigured audio and visual relationships in rather diverse ways, say, how Bresson famously understands the audio-visual relationship. But, through all this kind of cinema, in Dreyer, in all of it, the image can form, indeed, the image can have or can establish new relationships between these elements which were otherwise repressed, held back by sensorimotor requirements. So, I claim that he [*Suzuki*] is taking up a side problem, and that's fine—Does anyone have a piece of chalk? [Pause] Ah, here's a piece on the floor [Pause] Oh, no, no, I'll do it with my finger, if you want—

[*Deleuze goes to the board*] See, if I put, if here I put the sensorimotor image—I’ll show you—it’s an indirect image of time. What do they draw from each other? Montage, [*Pause*] right. When I had—and here’s where I left off last time—when I reach purely audio-visual situations, I have a purely audio-visual situation, i.e., our sensorimotor scheme is shaken or has collapsed. Now, I claim—I’ll draw three arrows, like this, see? [*Pause*] From these purely audio-visual situations, right, first arrow: they’ll open onto direct time-images, [*Pause*] and that will be a new understanding or understandings of montage, what [Robert] Lapoujade suggested we really think of as “montrage” rather than montage.⁵ Montage hasn’t necessarily—it might often be limited, but it hasn’t disappeared; it’s just a completely different sort of montage. Based on purely audio-visual situations, what really brings us over into direct time-images is “montrage.” Which, last time, I suggested we call “chronosigns.”

But, simultaneously, the sensorimo... the audio-visual situation doesn’t just use “montrage” to open onto direct time-images. [*Pause*] What else does it do? The other thing it does this time doesn’t correspond to the old form of montage; it has much more to do with former ways of cutting. [*Pause*] Between its own elements, as an image, it will bring about completely new relationships, either from one image to another, or within the same image, since such relationships are no longer beholden to the demands of the sensorimotor.

And this is where I claim that not only do purely audio-visual images lead to direct time-images; they also lead to “legible images.” By legibility, I mean these new relationships between elements of the image or between two images, the now free audio-visual relationships which are absolutely necessary, again, a necessary consequence.⁶ If the image has ceased to be sensorimotor, the elements of the image form original relationships: all these audio-visual discrepancies—even in terms of audio, all the discrepancies between audio elements. It means, at every turn, there are disconnects, offsets—and why? Because what hooks things together is the sensorimotor scheme. Thus, we find a whole system of mutual “unhooking,” of the visual with respect to the audio, of the audio with respect to the visual, of the audio with respect to the dialogue, of the dialogue with respect to the audio, etc., etc., of color with respect to form, or what have you. In other words, we’ll end up with a new Analytic of an image’s elements. And that, I claimed, is no longer a time-image; it’s the legible image. It’s no longer a chronosign; it’s, let’s call it—since we need a technical term for it—it’s, it’s the “lectosigns.” [*Pause*]

And then lastly, when the situation, the image, becomes purely one of audio-visual, there’s a third direction which, this time, lines up much more with—I’ve done montage, cutting—this one corresponds much more closely with the phenomenon of “framing” or “shooting.” Third, purely audio-visual images will point to—in the same way they pointed to direct time-images and to the autonomous relationships between its elements—third of all, they lead us to the camera’s noetic functions, that is, the camera’s functions of thought. [*Pause*] Only, I was saying, right, so we can have some points of reference so far as our terminology is concerned, let’s call them “noosigns,” since in Greek, *noos* refers to the mind.

Thus, I claim that purely audio-visual images refer [first] to “chronosigns,” or direct time-images, [second] to “lectosigns,” or new relationships between the image’s elements, [and third] to “noosigns,” the thinking camera’s new functions. [*Pause*] See? So here, I’m putting all my

sign-categories in those terms, since we could describe the purely audio-visual image in terms as *opsign*, *sonsign*—*opsign* and *sonsign*, pointing to *chronosigns*, to *lectosigns*, to *noosigns*.

What I'm claiming, then, what he [Suzuki] just said—I was thinking, what's so bad about my account? Why does he want a different one? Obviously, he turned off at a different fork in the road. From... we agree on this much: Ozu invents purely audio-visual images. For me, the first thing that interested me was how—this is the top arrow [on the board]—how that leads to a direct time-image. That is to say, I went from the sight-sound image to the direct time-image. And well, he, he, [Pause] interestingly, he said, no, that doesn't do it for us! What's so surprising is how they—they were interested in the other arrow. That's why they refer me back to free indirect discourse. With free indirect discourse, they may very well tell us, indeed, when the image is one of audio-visual, it leads to new relationships between its audio and visual elements. There's a new "Analytic" of the image; the image has a certain legibility.

Hence all this about which character is looking in the image, and so on. He could just as well ask, which one is hearing? Where is the noise coming from? Where does it come from, and how is it related to the audio, the visual, or what not. In other words, that [on the board] is the line he was interested in, that line there, the second one, the one that goes from the audio-visual image to what I called *lectosigns*, the new relationships between the image's elements. And so, ultimately, someone else could come along and base their entire intervention on our third aspect. [Pause] Do you see what I mean? Whereas, for me, my whole account was based on the first arrow, on this point of view—I absolutely needed empty space and still life to be distinct, but if I move to the second arrow, from the audio-visual image to the *lectosign*, I don't need that distinction at all. I'd need a totally different one; I'd need a different system of distinctions, namely, what new relationships are formed between the image's audio and visual elements, regardless of whether the image is a still life or an empty space. [Pause]

You understand what I'm getting at? Here, I feel we're touching on something—we're not making any progress on our project, but I think this is better—it's obvious that... Nevertheless, I'm glad I now understand where our two problems part ways. In my mind, then, I was planning to first deal with the time-image, then the legible image, then the thought image. Well, for them, clearly, it seems they're much more immediately interested in the legible image, with the new relationships between its visual elements.

And again, see, what makes these new relationships? They're no longer selected according to a sensorimotor scheme; they're no longer filtered through the sensorimotor. Thus, they form rather paradoxical relationships. If you consider late Godard, for example, the relationships between the music, the audio and the visual, right, the way they're related is astonishing, impossible even, from the perspective of sensorimotricity. Don't forget that in Godard's penultimate film, *Passion* [1982], where the worker stutters and the boss coughs, i.e., it's the sign of an ailing sensorimotricity, and Godard never let it slip by! It could just as easily have been a clubfoot, it could have been anything. No, the cough, the boss's cough and the worker's stutter are clearly essential parts of an approach to cinema. That doesn't only make it, I'd argue—it's not only a visionary cinema; it's also a type of cinema where the visual image—this is what you have to understand, hence the role of text in Godard's work, etc.—visual images and audio images as such must be read. That's not to say that they're transformed into text, but their text can be seen

and heard. Hence, we get free relationships between the text—for example, Godard’s electronic text—visual elements, audio elements, all of it: free relationships, i.e., relationships free of any sensorimotor requirements.

So, if they don’t want the same distinction I do, it’s because they’ve gone down a path where there’s no need for such distinction; they’re dealing with a different problem. Obviously, then, you’ll say, *Well, isn’t that nice—aren’t you clever, taking all three problems*. Yes, that does make me clever, [*Laughter*] because I’d think of it as just another form of proof if one of you says... [*Pause*] I’ll dismiss you out of hand if you say, *All three problems are bad; they’re poorly posed*. But obviously, it would also be nice if one of you said, *There’s a fourth aspect you’ve missed, there’s a fifth aspect you’ve overlooked*. Except my only fear is that, if we add another aspect, it will be because my three are... are poorly put together. But if you like, in keeping with—it’s not a discussion but a kind of, of collaborative inquiry—I feel that what we’re doing today shows you how attentive and care I think is necessary, whenever you have an idea, in trying to determine what problem it plugs into.

As I was saying, unless someone else wants to chime in... Circling back before we move on to the other aspect—the clock is ticking, but that’s fine, I don’t think we’re wasting our time—perhaps it’ll be clearer now. Something I said last time—because I thought it was funny; it’s been on my mind—I was saying that we might describe four periods of slapstick.⁷ And then I thought I had been a bit hasty; it’s silly. I’ll try to pick them back up. I think, say, you might point out six, seven, maybe eight [periods]; I count four major periods, four slapstick eras... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1:20:34]

... madness, there are still sensorimotor schemes, and what’s more, the most diverse sensorimotor schemes, that is, all causal series intersect. I’d argue that the common thread tying slapstick together is famously the pursuit, [Max] Sennett, right, and the like. With that sort of slapstick, there were always—you get these intersecting causal series corresponding to as many sensorimotor schemes, and it all swarms on the screen, multiplying, teeming, reinforced, colliding, right. That, I’d say, is the first age of slapstick, which gave us all the great slapstick actors.

What about the second stage? Well, in the second stage... I’d argue that the first stage corresponded neatly to the sensorimotor image. [*Pause*] Obviously, in this second period, sensorimotricity carries on, it persists, and, what’s more, it is refined as time goes on, refining quite a bit. To cite a few examples: Harold Lloyd invents a vertical sensorimotricity. You might ask, did he invent it? No, his wasn’t the first; at any rate, he makes a structure out of it, a vertical sensorimotricity, a climbing sensorimotricity. I’m not suggesting that it didn’t exist beforehand; he draws parts of it from earlier slapstick.

Laurel and Hardy invent a sensorimotricity that breaks down over time, which I see as an incredible breakthrough. [*Pause*] One of them whacks the other, or is whacked by the other, the principle of “tit-for-tat”—this fantastic temporal decomposition is just one element, one main component of Laurel and Hardy’s slapstick.

Buster Keaton invented something extraordinary known as “the trajectory gag,” that is, a long sequence shot in this wide array of different movements combines into a single trajectory. [Pause] For example, he goes down—off the top of my head, I don’t remember too well—he goes down a fireman’s pole, there you see, like a in fire station, he falls onto the firetruck just as they’re leaving, the truck makes him tumble, etc., he’ll fall onto a horse, and it’ll be a single shot—which was quite the feat at the time—there’s a famous shot like that, where in one long take, in one long sequence, he gets off the train, he knocks over the water tower... no, he triggers the water tower so it dumps onto the bandits, right. But it’s all one sequence-shot, see, a whole array of different movements united as one trajectory. That’s the great, great... some great Buster Keaton. Thus, I claim, in this second period, the sensorimotor obviously remains, but again, its form is refined more and more. And everyone has their own signature: there’s a Tramp sensorimotricity, there’s a... whereas before, it wasn’t really like that. The great [Max] Sennett had a signature style, but, [Pause] well, they all had their signature, right, their sensorimotor patterns, one of the fundamental elements of slapstick, their own “bits.”

What defines this second stage? It’s not just that it retains the sensorimotricity. It’s that, I was saying, it introduces affective elements. It introduces affective elements, [Pause] and it’ll regulate its sensorimotor patterns, using affective rules and categories to regulate its sensorimotor patterns. [Pause] And the advent of the affective in slapstick won’t make it any less slapstick. It isn’t a mix between slapstick and melodrama; we get a new form of slapstick, and it moves in two opposite directions, as you might imagine. If the place of affectivity or affect’s expression is as we’ve discussed, as we’ve discussed in detail, right—if it takes place in the face, well, it’s because this is when we start getting close-ups in slapstick.⁸

What form will that take? The two major faces, much like two opposite ends of the spectrum, are Chaplin and Keaton. Why are they different ends of the spectrum? Because one is—we’ve been over it, I’m not going back over it, just refreshing your memory—one is affect as reflection, as impassive reflection—affect’s first pole—[Pause] and the other is affect as intensive rise and fall. And this time it’s Chaplin’s face. But, but everyone invents their own affective element; during this second stage, among all of slapstick’s moonstruck creatures, the moonstruck creatures of slapstick. Among the greatest of these moon-men are Laurel—we could call them “lunatics,” each one a form of affectivity—Laurel’s way of being a lunatic, [Harry] Langdon’s being a lunatic, constantly stuck in irresistible slumber and waking dreams. There, the affective element is also very, very strong.⁹ And then you find the slapstick brand of lunacy in Harpo Marx twice over, both in his insatiable impulses [Pause] and his heavenly serenity, i.e., the peace of his harp-playing.

Alright, that would be our second stage. The affective element ends up governing sensorimotor activities, sensorimotor activities which, from there, are purified, take on a finesse, a—I don’t know quite how to describe it—a purity, a totally new purity compared to the first period of slapstick. But really, just to say, we shouldn’t assume that it’s better; we should think of it, well, as... [Deleuze doesn’t finish this sentence]

Then there’s a third stage. There’s a third stage that, of course, coincides with the talkie, but [Pause] but, but, the talkie, right, made it possible, but the talkie didn’t do it alone; what talkies did was make it possible, that’s all. And what do we find this time? I claimed that now it isn’t

about introducing affect, of adding affective values to sensorimotricity, but about the introduction of images, of mental images, really. There's still sensorimotricity, but I mean, how are actions and reactions framed? By mental images. What should we call these mental images? Such mental images are images of logical relations, that is, actions and reactions, what remains and subsists of sensorimotricity, but more as, literally, a "screen" passing over and under a whole sequence—a mental frame, a frame made up of mental images.

And what's the deal with these mental images, which act as and depict logical relations? Obviously, they've been talked about. They've been discussed in two ways—which will help us pin down a sort of third era of slapstick—they're talked about, on the one hand, by Groucho Marx and by Fields, by W. C. Fields, [as] logical relations, mental images whose essential material—always, and across all disciplines—is nonsense, nonsense. [Pause] But also, in my opinion, the extent to which Chaplin was absolutely fundamental to a particular approach to talkies hasn't been given the recognition it deserves. People are often content to say, they're content to leave it at: he took a long time to get there, he only took up [talkies] begrudgingly. Once he did, he took such an unusual approach to them, one that, as I see it, has never been duplicated since. In his case, it's not like Fields or Groucho Marx, which might be called mental images in the form of a nonsense argument—now, it's a mental image in the form of discourse, as a discursive image.

You'll notice how Chaplin's major talkies give us images where, ultimately, speech is totally subordinated to a discursive form, i.e., backwards. Even when they're short, Chaplin's speeches are intended to be and come across as provocative. You can always say that, oh, these are some weak speeches, or whatnot. No, no, that's missing the point—their value doesn't reside in their content. It isn't the subject matter that matters; it's the role of discourse as a new image, a new type of image. Whereas the others... whereas Fields, Groucho Marx inaugurated the nonsense image—it was really an image in Groucho Marx or Fields—Chaplin inaugurated the discursive image in talkies, the discourse image. Like with the speech in *Monsieur Verdoux* [1947], what's revealed is really "an image," a type of image—it's Chaplin. Or the speech at the end of *The Great Dictator* [1940], which it'd be completely idiotic to describe as vaguely humanist—it's a provocative speech. It's provocative; it amounts to saying, *Look—Look at yourselves, your society, the state it's in*. It's his speech in *Limelight* [1952], his big speech about life, which gives us this image, where while Chaplin is talking, encouraging the young woman who's lost—who's been paralyzed, to learn to use her legs again, he pantomimes the different stages of life—you can clearly see that the discursive image is a truly cinematic one.

Well, it's something, I think, completely new—in both cases, whether the nonsense image or Chaplin's discursive image—both cases allow us to define a third age of slapstick. This time, it's as if... See, in the second stage, the sensorimotor image is what—well, I'm complicating things, but I like classifications so much that I can't help it, it's fun—sensorimotor images end up being governed by affective, lunar elements. In the third stage, sensorimotor images are guided by [Pause] mental images, that is, images of logical relationships, either in the form of nonsense or in the form of speech.

What's left, then? Right, that brings us to the post-war period. What happens? – If we find any corroborating evidence... on the other hand... the more proof we find, the better our schema is

likely to be – What happens? Well, what we find is that [*Pause*] as I went through the three previous stages—I shouldn't get ahead of myself—the less important sensorimotricity became. It was there, of course, but its significance tends either to wane in favor of mental images—or in Fields, there isn't much sensorimotor activity at all; there are still big car chases, or what have you. Ultimately, though, even the affective aspect of sensorimotricity tends to fade away. But it was still there; sensorimotricity as such wasn't in jeopardy yet.

What happens after the war? Is there still slapstick? The answer is yes. And again, it's wonderful when things happen at roughly the same time, because two great slapstick actors emerge: Jerry Lewis in America, [Jacques] Tati in France—you'd have to check their exact dates, but Tati came to film rather late, Jerry Lewis rather early; I don't know the exact dates, but it doesn't matter—anyway, they do not influence each other, no influence whatsoever; more than influence, they have something in common. What do they have in common? For the first time, their slapstick is no longer sensorimotor, not the least bit sensorimotor. Slapstick characters are confronted with purely audio-visual situations. What makes a situation funny, you might ask. It's obvious what's funny about a sensorimotor situation: things get knocked over, right, and so on. What could be funny about a purely audio-visual situation? It turns out to be just as funny as a sensorimotor situation. [*Pause*] Of course, the character still moves, they have their own “bit”—it won't be the same type of bit, either with Lewis or with Tati. They wind up in pure sensori—... purely audio-visual situations.

In the case of Tati, it's about windows, glass. Glass, in particular, imposes a purely audio-visual situation: showrooms, waiting rooms. We know Mr. Hulot is at his funniest when he's in a waiting room or showroom or looking through windows. What happens? [*Pause*] Needless to say, Tati is part of what we're talking about. You might say that Tati, as much as Ozu, as much as Bresson, is someone who completely reinvented the problem of audio-visual relationships. And a Tati soundtrack is nothing to sneeze at. Neither is its relationship with the images.

Well, what does he do? Well, he never *does* anything, right, he never does anything. There are accidents—window accidents, yeah, there's the guy in *Playtime* [1967], who's so shocked by Hulot's silhouette that he doesn't even see the window, even though he's an officer who should know better, and he smacks his nose and then is wearing this big bandage. Right, well, there's the distribution of sounds and noises in the waiting room in *Playtime*, the auto show fairgrounds in *Traffic* [1971], the empty fairgrounds, the full fairgrounds, etc. I was saying that, that, uh, such fairgrounds are as essential for Tati as amusement parks are for Fellini. And for similar reasons: amusement parks offer Fellini purely audio-visual situations, just as Tati, in *Traffic*, finds purely audio-visual situations in the exhibition fairgrounds, the waiting situation, the sound of chairs falling apart, and so on, the sight, the sound—and what results? It's quite strange.

Moving on to Jerry Lewis. Same thing. The slapstick character is in a situation where he doesn't know what to do. It's something new with slapstick. In Jerry Lewis's case, he does it differently from Tati; he has absolutely no idea what to do. No matter what happens, he doesn't know what to do. As Americans say, and as they say in a Jerry Lewis film, he goes too far. What does it mean that he goes too far? See, his mannerisms are constantly inhibited, the sounds he makes are—they're inarticulate, his mannerisms are inhibited, stymied. He's always wanting to do something and can't manage to do it.¹⁰

Right, but what happens? What happens is that, with this motor impotence—for both of them, ultimately, their only “bit” is their motor impotence. What do they both do in their motor impotence? They do not act—how do I put this?—Something takes over for the action they can no longer do; something takes over for their action. What is it? Easy. What makes this modern slapstick? Let’s call it a wave, a beam. They always have the misfortune of coming up against a wave or beam, which takes over for their action, stirring up trouble, nudging their purely audio-visual situation over into catastrophe or disaster. [Pause] So much so that, in a way, all it takes for the house, the electronic house, to go haywire is for Mr. Hulot to show up. The same for Jerry Lewis: all he has to do is walk into a room, and, unwittingly, he’s smack dab on a beam spelling out the collapse of the sensorimotor situation.

You see, what will this new kind of slapstick substitute for a sensorimotor scheme? Because we might actually call—getting a bit fast and loose—but we should actually call it a slapstick of electronics. And that the earlier forms of slapstick were those of the tool, the machine. I’m simplifying things somewhat, but it’s so we can back up a little. The slapstick of electronics, the slapstick of the electronic age—what is it? This is essentially what the electronic age is, right, it’s not the old machines. Like Chaplin’s machines, for example, right, the big assembly line in from *Modern Times* [1936]; it goes crazy, it’s comical, it goes haywire. Trains in the Marx Brothers—all the trains in earlier slapstick, I won’t even get into it, really, that’s slapstick of the machine.

Slapstick in the electronic age is very different, very different in that it’s not that machines go haywire; on the contrary, it’s about their cold rationality, cold machinery is what’s responsible for everything that goes wrong. So, we’ll say, sure, everyone’s familiar with the theme of machines turning against us. We could always say that—it’s not wrong, but that’s not it. [Pause] Consider Jerry Lewis, for example, all the electric machinery and the way he leans so heavily on using his own techniques, since he uses video assist. But the interesting bit I want to highlight is the lawnmower attack, when he’s attacked by robotic lawnmowers [*It’s Only Money*, 1962]. There are the things in the department store, the little, the little trolleys taking off in order, which is the important part, in order to ruin the store [*Who’s Minding the Store?* 1963] It isn’t about machines going haywire, right. And then the greatest bit in Jerry Lewis: that vacuum cleaner sucking everything up, sucking up merchandise, customers’ clothing, paneling—if memory serves—all along the floor, or the walls, right, this insatiable vacuum cleaner, right, this electronic vacuum.

Here you can clearly make out a relationship: the sensorimotor situ—... the purely audio-visual situation of the slapstick character, a situation that doesn’t extend into movement. He’s there in the waiting room. What’s going to stand in for his failure to move? He always crosses a beam; he always steps through a beam of energy. Quite different from the old days, the industrial age, the age of machines. In the machine age, to one extent or another you had to act as the lever, you had to be a source of energy; it has to be put on a beam of energy. That’s the difference between older and more modern dances: you have to ride a wave. The artistry of Jerry Lewis, much like Tati, fundamentally comes down to riding a wave, [Pause] that is, I could sum it up by simply saying: sensorimotor situations are replaced by sets.

Why? Because a set precisely what a purely audio-visual situation is. There's no longer a sensorimotor situation, there's only a set. The showroom is a set, the waiting room is a set, the house in *Ladies Man* [1961]—Jerry Lewis, you know, it's still a well-known house, a house in cross-section—the house with the girls, seen in cross-section: a set, purely a set. It's why Jerry Lewis is so taken with musicals, since they deal solely with audio-visual situations, with sets, though what's substituted for action is completely different: dance. [Pause] Well, here we have slapstick using purely audio-visual situations, then, right, a set that doesn't afford action. Instead of sensorimotor situations, we have décor, and what do we have instead of action? We have beams of energy pulling the character along, taking them away—if necessary, causing them to swarm and multiply.

Hulots swarming everywhere—you know, especially in later Tati films, there are Hulots all over the place—he suddenly makes them swarm, makes them briefly collide with other characters, joining up with a character and then splitting up with them. In other words, sets replace sensorimotor situations, and what replaces action? Something like the “back-and-forth.” [Pause] One of the loveliest things about Jerry Lewis, and about Tati—in completely different ways—you get this back-and-forth, i.e., characters run into each other, clump together, and then split. It's some really great filmmaking.

Well, for those who remember *My Uncle*, *My Uncle* has one of the most beautiful scenes: the little steppingstones, those steppingstones, which lead to this wild kerfuffle. You have to walk on the steppingstones, not the grass, and so there's this hilarious steppingstone ballet, where tall, clumsy Hulot reaches out for somebody, but they're stuck on the same little stone. They're hit with the same beam. The characters clump together, and then it's like one of them barely manages to get off the beam. That's always how it goes. And in Jerry Lewis—it's the greatest—there are clusters of people, bumping into each other at one moment and then separating. Then there's the swarming, the notorious swarming—with Mr. Hulot, there are all sorts of Hulots swarming around—in *Traffic*, for example, there are Hulots everywhere, but even in *Playtime*, it's swarming with Hulots. In Jerry Lewis too, there's a proliferation of uncles, a rather bizarre proliferation-reabsorption in *Three on a Couch* [1966], etc.

This is what I mean when I say no more sensorimotor situation, no more motor situation, nothing but sets; no more action, nothing but a back-and-forth. Only it turns out this new formula—what I'd call the electronic approach of the fourth period of slapstick, using sets and energy beams, or sets and back-and-forth's—there's a sort of complementarity, a sort of agreement that's rather... And I believe this is the slapstick of our age because it is, that's really how it is. As basically one last piece of evidence, on these lines, we see that post-war slapstick—and Jesus, this isn't to say it basically makes the three earlier forms of slapstick obsolete; just as there have been different periods before, right, there will be further periods still, we're still waiting for the next one—at any rate, what we can say is that these images, again, these images—coming back to the subject at hand—what is a set? Well, it's a description that denies its object's independence—harking back to what we discussed at the start of the year—a pure description, i.e., a description that replaces its object. That's what a set is, a set as such; it's a purely audio-visual situation. It no longer affords action; it's slapstick without action, slapstick using energy beams and a back-and-forth. The beam of energy will not yield any action between characters; it will build up a back-and-forth where characters meet, fuse, separate.

While the energy beam still—think of the wonderful scenes in *My Uncle*, where there's the maid who doesn't want to trigger the motion detector because it causes cancer, and so on, with the two poor, the poor idiots locked in their house and can't get out of the garage, or whatever—it's not simply an electronic comedy due to its subject matter; it's an electronic comedy because it's the comedy of our day, and because that's how we live.

How come we don't believe in action anymore? It's not that we no longer believe in action, but that this is what our experience is like. We don't experience action anymore, our lives are filled with this back-and-forth, with beams, with waves. What we call "low-frequency waves." Jerry Lewis films are—it's an undulating comedy, an undulating slapstick, and not... it's no longer an action slapstick. Jerry Lewis and Tati are undulatory slapstick. Their bits themselves, as it happens, are low-amplitude; it's a low-frequency wave. As soon as they appear, they manage to get mixed up... It's exactly like *Monsieur Hulot's Holiday* [1953]: he opens the door, and he lets in a big wave, the energy beam of the storm and the wind. That's what this new form of slapstick is all about. Yet, somehow, we laugh harder than ever before. You don't appear to be laughing, [Laughter] but you know, we're laughing, not more than ever before, no, but as much as we ever have, right?

I guess, if you want to understand what I mean, picture in your mind: Hulot enters his little beach hotel, right, where there are all these people, some writing, others doing whatever. He opens the door—*wham!* You might say that was already a thing. Perhaps. There's the famous storm in Buster Keaton [*Steamboat Bill Jr.*, 1928], in the form of the power of nature; that's very different. It's still slapstick, but it's an action slapstick, it's an example of sensorimotor slapstick. Here? Not at all, not one bit.

I say this is what our lives are like, you know, we all experience things this way. Our problem is that we are too tired, we are never too tired. But our age has made us tired, everything we hear makes us tired, and so on. It wears you out so much that we've changed, we're no longer active, we've sort of turned into watchers or seers. And I don't think our lack of action is because we've become—speaking for myself, too—because we've become complete morons, that's settled, right, we should be committed, like Godard in *First Name: Carmen* [1983], [Laughter] it's wonderful how we get this way of knocking on wood. [We hear Deleuze knocking on something] We are seers. There's no opposition here, they aren't mutually exclusive. Beckett is a seer, and he has to knock on his head because he isn't sure he exists. How come? Because he doesn't act. There's no action. If we cannot act, does that mean we don't care about anything? About nothing, nothing at all—and it might even be this visionary side of us, as kind of like seers, that actually leads me to suggest that it offers a new form of politics.

Right, so we're seers, we're in situations—think, how do we spend the best years of our lives? In waiting rooms, right? What is there to do in a waiting room? It's a purely audio-visual situation, right? Waiting to hear our number, we think ah, well, it's just like the situations we find in Tati. And what do we do then, what do we do? Well, we're no longer an energy source. To act is to be an energy source, or to use an energy source. [Pause] We aren't one any longer. Our problem is being caught in beams of energy.

Then, as we hear from experts, consider new dance moves. Dance moves which are no longer sources, no longer produce energy. Supposedly, then, we've gotten lazy, but that's not it; we haven't gotten lazy, nor have we... What we've become is the result of our age. We're no lazier than before. But we're no longer an energy source. It isn't our fault. We've lost our energy sources. [*Airplane noise*] They no longer fit us. Even a train, an adequate energy source for us, which made the industrial age famous, but now we're in an undulatory age. But what is action? We've stopped acting, sure, but then what do we do? We're caught in a beam, a low-frequency wave. That's what modern sports are about. The bicycle is so old-fashioned, you know; bicycles produce energy. Boxing produces energy. Those kinds of sports belong to the industrial age. But the sports that seem to fascinate people today come down to riding a beam of energy, right, hang gliding, aquaplaning—they have nothing to do with producing energy. It's about catching the beam at the right time.

So, with Jerry Lewis and Tati, they're caught in a beam headed toward catastrophe from the beginning. That is, they're on a set, a purely audio-visual situation; they're screwed by a beam of energy, an energy beam that will ruin the set. Right, Jerry Lewis's shenanigans, the energy beam of electric lawnmowers, the energy beam of the insatiable vacuum cleaner, the energy beam of little trolleys. None of it involves a machine in control; it doesn't go that far. It corresponds precisely to how people are today, how we act today. That's the electronic age.

What's emerged, then, is clearly a different kind of slapstick, a powerful one, that rediscovers precisely... One of the earliest essays on Tati, one of the first good essays on Tati, was titled "Mr. Hulot and Time," an essay by Bazin, André Bazin.¹¹ He tried to show how this form of slapstick—which he still had trouble pinning down, since *Monsieur Hulot's Holiday* was one of Tati's first films—how, though he had trouble defining it, something essential about this approach to slapstick had to do with time, and it was something new. We'd be able to say, yes, if you take Tati or Jerry Lewis [*Pause; Deleuze goes to the board*] the thing about their situations, their purely audio-visual situations, leading to a direct time-image, to new ways of relating the image's elements, its audio and visual elements, its soundtrack, etc., and to new camera functions: we get all three. There, that will again be a sort of slapstick that sacrifices the movement-image or only hangs on to the movement-image's residual effects, i.e., the guy caught in beams, etc., pulling away from any schema, no longer governed by any sensorimotor scheme, leading us to our three new types of signs. [*Pause*]

Does that make sense? As a result, everywhere we'd find... thus, I argue that what's revolutionary is the overturning of the relationship between movement and time; a consequence of this revolution was the development of chronosigns, lectosigns, and noosigns. They form a group. – I promised we'd take a short break for our smokers, and then I'll pick back up and attempt to delve into the second aspect of the image. [*Recording cuts out*]

See, we're moving on to a different turn of events, and it's the same thing, only it happens in a very different context; by no means does it follow the same rhythm, and when you get right down to it, what we'd need—you won't have any trouble—is for us to forget all that, as we discover it a second time around, this time in philosophy. Philosophy, then, has slower rhythms than cinema. It's driven by powerful rhythms belonging to the Earth, and no longer those of a rolling camera. [*Deleuze laughs; Pause*] Good.

And suppose we start there, what will we find? We get what came before, what happened before. Once upon a time... Well, once upon a time, time appeared to be subordinated to movement, and I might say, subordinated to the movement-image. Why can I say that it was subordinated to the movement-image? Because what the folks I have in mind referred to as “phenomena” [*Pause*]—i.e., that which becomes present, that which is shown, images—were specifically defined in terms of movement. That which appears to us is movement, hence, it really is a movement-image. And so, time was derived from movement-images. Through what means is it derived from movement-images? An immense machine, an immense montage you might call the planetarium. What a wonderful sort of time! You could have guessed that this was the time of the Greeks. [*Pause*] The only thing that came [*Pause*] from the movement-image, via a vast cosmic machine, was an indirect image of time. [*Interruption of the recording*] [2:06:25]

Part 3

... in such a way as to give an indirect image of time, this movement-image, suddenly—not suddenly—here and there, a truly scandalous feature starts cropping up: aberrations in movement, aberrations in movement. And these aberrations in movement were a thread to the world. [*Pause*] They threatened to topple it over into time, into a liberated time, time which no longer depends on movement. [*Pause*] If it’s true that time was an indirect image derived from movement-images or from phenomena, it’s also the case that these movement-images or phenomena harbored aberrations which risked plunging us into a fathomless, [*Pause*] unruly time, [*Pause*] since it would no longer be governed by movement. Such aberrations in movement were what heralded this sort of time. [*Pause*] That being said, we shouldn’t take the Greeks for children. Right?

And what is it?—I’m going fast because...—what is it? At a certain level, what’s going on? Well, [*Pause*] there’s this constant refrain: time is what measures or numbers movement, as we’ve seen, or it’s an interval of movement, we saw. We already covered that a lot last year—so I won’t get back into these, I’ll take them as granted—some define time as an interval of motion; others claim it’s how we measure or number movement. At bottom, they all have something in common. They make time something that depends on movement, or they make time dependent upon the movement-image, such that time can only be an indirect image of time.¹²

But how do we define movement, then? Because it’s a bit messy if we say that time measures any movement whatsoever. Because, as one Greek will later say, it’s one of two things: either the time measuring movement is proper to that movement, to this movement and not some other movement, and so there will be as many times as there are movements. Or else time is the measure for *any* movement, whatever it may be, at which point we run into the same problem as we do with quantity or number, regarding what number measures—where I can say “ten,” but “ten” can just as well mean ten apples or ten chairs or ten people; it’s an abstraction. Our only solution, the only clear way to get around this difficulty would be for there to be a movement of all movement. If there is a movement of all movement, [*Pause*] then yeah, I can say that time is what numbers movement. [*Pause*] But easier said than done—what will it take? We’ll need very advanced astronomy. [*Pause*]

You find such high-level astronomy, for example, in Plato's *Timaeus*. Grossly over-simplifying it, this is how I'd paraphrase it: the earth is there in the center, immobile, and there's an outer sphere turning in one direction along an axis. This outer sphere is called "the fixed sphere" because it carries the stars. And between the earth and the sphere of fixed stars, [Pause] there are [Pause] seven spheres [Pause] which turn in the opposite direction than that of the fixed sphere, and which are moreover infinitely more complicated, moving on various axes. Each of these spheres holds one of the seven planets, right. [Pause] Follow me so far?

It's incredibly complex; it's an incredibly complex astronomy marshalling all of Greek mathematics, all Greek geometry, marshalling the equivalent of projective geometry—extremely complex, really. You'll see if you look read through these parts of the *Timaeus*. All the *Timaeus* does is gather up all sorts of Greek theories.¹³

What is the movement of all movement? [Pause] Well, it's their least common multiple, [Pause] the movement formed by the whole of these spheres [Pause] insofar as they begin from a certain position with respect to the sphere of the fixed stars [Pause] and ultimately return to the point where the seven wandering planets have the same position with respect to the fixed stars. In other words, when... do you get it? That's the Great Year, the astronomical eternal return. Suffice it to say, when Nietzsche talks about the eternal return, this had absolutely nothing to do with it, since, well, he'd have had to be an ignorant fool—and Nietzsche was neither—he wouldn't have pitched this piece of ancient Greek astronomy as a particularly new idea. So, that's a non-starter, he means something else.

But then, if you see what I'm getting at, this is the movement of movements: when all seven bodies, the seven planets, have returned to the same position in relation to the fixed stars, each lying, again, on a sphere rotating on its axis, etc., at a certain speed—their common multiple is the Great Year. They say, there, that's time; I could even say, it's time in its entirety. Time, as a whole, numbers the movement of all astronomical movement. [Pause] Well. I have no desire to develop that any further, and I believe it's been worked out a thousand times over by a specialist on Greek and medieval physics named [Pierre] Duhem. For those interested in digging further into Greek astronomy, his books are long but fascinating, quite interesting, but it becomes clear you have to know a lot of math—more than I do, at any rate—to follow along.¹⁴

Right, then, why do I bring it up? What interests me is that these Greeks, right, they can tell, they're the first to realize that that doesn't just happen by itself. That is to say, everywhere you look, movement presents aberrations that cast doubt on the possibility of measuring it with time. And these errors, these aberrations are really what I'd like us to home in on. It's not this business about the great circuit and its astronomical movement, about the great planetarium—I'll take that as a given, sure. Hold on to this conceit of a sort of perfect harmony, one formed over millennia, the Great Year. They have ways of calculating it; some folks go so far as to say, about this Great Year, right, that it takes more than ten thousand years for the spheres to reach the same position compared to the year [sic] of the fixed stars. Well, that's all well and good, but what I'm interested in are the anomalies, the aberrations. Here's one that shows up right away.

The first aberration is what I'd call a mathematical aberration in movement. [Pause] It's not hard to see; it's that the seven globes, the seven spheres, can only line back up in the same position

with respect to the sphere of the fixed stars on one condition: when their multiple relationships, their relationships with each other and with the sphere of the fixed stars, are so-called “rational” relationships. Follow me so far? What do we mean by rational relationships? Still with me? Feels like a trick question. They’re relationships capable of being expressed as a whole number or fraction. [Pause]

Suppose that an astronomical relation, or some such ratios, [Pause] can only be irrationally expressed, like the square root of two. [Pause] What then? If they’re expressed as irrational numbers, everything’s screwed, it’s all ruined. We’re back to the irreducibility of movements. The Great Year won’t come back unless... But Greek mathematicians were familiar with these incredibly mysterious irrational numbers, i.e., numbers expressed neither as integers nor as fractions, and they had discovered them in the simplest way: this whole business with diagonals... no, triangles, [Pause] right? And it shook up, it shook up Greek mathematics. Here we find an aberration in movement, where the relationships between speed and position are expressed irrationally.

Perhaps one could compensate for irrationals? But, at which point, it explains why the planetarium is... why we shouldn’t rush to put stupid ideas in the Greeks’ mouths. In particular, we shouldn’t hastily assume they believed the earth was immobile, and that things revolved around the earth. Because you can already find so-called “heliocentric” systems—at least in part—among the Greeks, where the planets revolve around the sun. And how are there partially heliocentric systems in this great planetarium? There have to be. Again, none of the globes have the same mobility, the same speed, the same rotation axis. So, it gets complicated; sometimes it’s necessary to inject somewhat heliocentric systems in order to neutralize irrational relationships. In short, preserving the idea that time measures motion immediately comes up against mathematical anomalies in physical movement. [Pause]

And second of all, there will be physical anomalies, and the Greeks are fully aware of it. How come? The closest planet to us is the Moon, as everyone knows; [Pause] the sphere nearest to the Earth’s is the one carrying the Moon. [Pause] What is there between us and the Moon? The Greeks have such a poetic name for it, for our world, our atmosphere, where we all live out our lives: “the sublunary world.” We are “sublunary creatures.” It’s hard to think of yourself the same way when you’re told that I’m not sublunary. [Laughter] So, there. Alright, then. [Pause]

Does the sublunary world correspond to what I might call—I’m slipping in this word because it’s used—to the “metaschematism” of the great planetarium? In Leibniz, again, you find “*metaschematismus*.” [Pause] See, it’s the great scheme; the great celestial scheme, the great movement driving all the globes, including the moon, in different directions, etc. But do we sublunary creatures and our Earth, conform to laws commensurate with those governing the superlunary world? Or does our sublunary domain enjoy a degree of independence, causing its disharmony, its anomaly, [Pause] which is the second aberration in movement: in the sublunary world, movement is no longer that of rotation. [Pause]

There are physical aberrations in movement. This time, it’s no longer the mathematical aberration of irrational relationships, but the physical aberration of movement that doesn’t conform to the meta-schematism, that may well conform to sublunary patterns, [Pause] obeys

them, doesn't obey them, more or less obeys them. And the Greeks actually went quite far with this. Never do the planets—save for some mystics, and there were Greek mystics—the planets never directly determine... the course and motion of planets do not determine the course of the world. [Pause] Why? Because the course of the planets constitutes celestial movement, right. There is time as the measure of celestial movement, in all its complexity. That, then, is the purview of the meta-schematism. [Pause] But in our sublunar atmosphere, in our sublunar activity, if our movements respond to celestial influences, such influence can only be indirect and extremely convoluted. [Pause]

The second aberration: movement's physical aberration. Doesn't that also offer a glimpse of time in its pure state, either freed from movement, or, or else linked to a completely different movement, for which it would no longer serve as a measure? What would it be, then, for movement? [Pause] And here's where Aristotle comes in, and I'd like to end here so that you can think more on it, so you have something to reflect on, maybe. Aristotle says something rather beautiful. It's like Aristotle's chain of being. Here's what Aristotle tells us. He says [Pause]: beings are forms. Yeah, sure, fine, whatever—Greeks were always saying things like that, that beings were forms.

But okay, [Pause] what is form? It's what primarily belongs to a being. Form is what primarily pertains to a being. For example, [Pause] "having horns," for what reason? —He's right, there's no denying him here—"having horns" is the form of the herbivore. But if you show me a hornless herbivore, Aristotle has an explanation for that. Obviously, horns might not have developed, he demonstrates, and it's irrefutable, the sort of thing that will fully remain into 19th century natural history. The herbivore—not all herbivores, right—vertebrates, at any rate, you know what I mean—its form is "having horns." What is the form of the triangle? What primarily belongs to it. Like the herbivore and "having horns," what primarily pertains to triangles? What primarily pertains to the triangle is its being three straight lines enclosing a space.

Well, see, that's why I'm always saying—to do philosophy, there are things you have to know; you have to... some things you have to know by heart, just like how mathematics implies a base knowledge. If you don't know it, you'll be fine for the most part, but there are some things that will give you trouble. On the other hand, we shouldn't confuse form and essential properties—form or essence on the one hand, essential properties on the other. Form or essence is what primarily pertains to a subject, right, and its essential properties are what apply to the subject universally. That's already a strong distinction, rather clever, eh? It's what universally applies to the subject.

But, I hear you say, form or essence does apply to its subject universally: all triangles are built with three straight lines—sure, sure, what primarily belongs to the subject universally applies, but not the other way around. There are things that universally apply but do not primarily apply, that apply by consequence. They derive from its essence or form, but they are not essences or forms; they are modifications—*pathai*, as the Greeks say, *pathai*. Okay, what's that? Well, having forms [*sic*] is the herbivore's essence, but having a third stomach is the property that follows as a result, and it universally applies to the subject. All horned herbivores have a third stomach or should have one; you just have to look for it. Still with me? All triangles have angles that add up to two right angles. It's an essential property following from their essence. Right?

Now you have a criterion for your chain of beings. For each type of being, you'll ask: in what regard is its essence more or less directly, more or less distantly tied to its essential properties? That is, in what ways do its essential properties stem from its essence? They always do, but in what ways, through what means?

First, let's say its essence directly leads to its essential properties. *[Pause]* These are pure forms. *[Pause]* There is no matter. Pure forms without matter—I'm simplifying things—along the lines of the prime mover, what Aristotle calls the prime mover, and everything the prime mover implies. *[Pause]* So here, the essential properties of pure forms stem directly from said forms.

So, here soon I'd like to call it a day; I'll leave it there so we can pick up next time; this is where we'll pick back up.

Second, suppose there's a gap. You need some intermediary to get from essence to essential properties, from form to essential properties. In that case, you'd say that such forms imply matter, and that the link between form and essential properties doesn't happen by itself but calls on some external cause. Example: heavenly bodies. *[Pause]* Heavenly bodies are forms; their essential property is their movement, a circular movement—as we saw, there is... for astronomy, etc.—it's a circular movement. Their only movement is a local, circular motion.

Only, there must be a cause; the prime mover is this cause, otherwise the essential property of circular, local motion wouldn't flow from these bodies. Therefore, they have matter, a uniquely local matter. Local matter is a body which undergoes no other change than that of position—thus, an unalterable body that does nothing but move. *[Pause]* You see? *[Pause]* But they're still rather close. I mean, their essential properties are still rather close to their essence; the only, their only intermediary is their mover, the prime mover. But since they have an intermediary, they have matter—but it's the purest sort of matter, a purely local matter. They have no other matter.

Taking it a step further, it's much more complicated with sublunar physical phenomena. Their essential properties are tied to their essence, but they're linked by causes infinitely more complex than the prime mover. At the same time, these superlunary forms have matter, but that's not enough. This matter is not a local matter, in that the modification of its forms, its essential property or properties, does not come down to local, even rectilinear movement. They have a local motion and local matter, but they are also subject to corruption and generation. They are subject to alteration, i.e., they have, if I may, a much heavier sort of matter, while at the same time they refer to causes as intermediaries between their essence and their properties.

Understand that, on each rung of this hierarchy, at each turn, there will be aberrant movements in relation, in relation to the level, to the level above. Movement will literally constantly be aberrant with respect to the earlier model. Hence the reign in the superlunary world, the reign of what he calls the "automaton," what he calls "chance," what he calls "contingency," etc. Which, which will introduce physical anomalies all over the place. That's not all. There will be psycho-political anomalies, *[Pause]* because the soul also has movements. There are movements of the soul; there are movements of the city. There will also be economic, economic anomalies. So, the Greek world is turned around, and throughout the great planetarium of the cosmic image, the

astronomical movement-image, measured by time, at every stage we find aberrations in movement that stir up trouble. Where do these aberrations in movement take us?

Well, there we are, right? We'll have to sort it all out next time, then, before our break, so we'll go pretty quickly. [*End of recording*] [2:39:22]

Notes

¹ *Situations optiques et sonores pures*. Often translated as “pure optical and sound situations.”

² See Sessions 17 and 18 of the *Cinema 1* Seminar (May 4 and 11, 1982). As if anticipating the English reader, Deleuze points out the two senses of the word, “ballad,” in French. See Tomlinson and Galeta’s translation notes in *Cinema 2*, p. xvii.

³ The film might be *Early Summer* (1951)

⁴ A *faux-raccord*, in English, is sometimes translated as “jump cut,” but this buries the “false” [*faux*] so pertinent to Deleuze’s aims. In other Deleuze translations, the reader may find it put as “false continuity,” which is apt, given Dreyer’s engagement with the American-forward style of continuity editing. A “mismatch cut” communicates that a *faux-raccord* is a deliberately “off” instance of the “match cuts” that are the bread-and-butter of continuity editing.

⁵ See the previous session for this distinction; see *Cinema 2*, p. 41, where Deleuze refers to Lapoujade without citing the date for Issue 45 of *L’Arc* (1971).

⁶ On the legible image, see *Cinema 2*, pp. 23-24, 229-234, and especially 244-247.

⁷ Deleuze had already discussed slapstick in detail; see especially Sessions 13, 15, and 18 of the *Cinema 1* Seminar (March 16, April 20, and May 11, 1982), Session 5 of *Cinema 2* (December 14, 1982), as well as the previous session. See also *Cinema 1*, Chapters 9, 10, and 11, and *Cinema 2*, pp. 64-67.

⁸ On the face and affect, see Sessions 9, 10, and 11 of the *Cinema 1* Seminar (February 2 and 23, March 2, 1982); see also *Cinema 1*, Chapters 6, 7 and 8.

⁹ Deleuze offers these perspectives in *Cinema 2*, p. 64.

¹⁰ On “going too far” and the figure of the “loser” in Lewis, see *Cinema 2*, pp. 65-66.

¹¹ From *What is Cinema?* (Paris: Cerf, 1976)

¹² On the interval, see Sessions 13 to 19 from the *Cinema 2* Seminar, starting March 3, 1983.

¹³ See also Session 13, from the *Leibniz and the Baroque* Seminar, for an extended treatment of the *Timaeus* (March 17, 1987).

¹⁴ For a similar account of the Great Year, see Session 14 of the *Cinema 2* Seminar (March 15, 1983).