

Gilles Deleuze

On Cinema, Truth and Time: the Falsifier, 1983-1984

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Part 1

... it is better to be careful: it's mutations rather than revolutions, eh? So two mutations completely independent of each other, but which have this in common, a philosophical mutation and a cinematographic mutation, which have this in common: to affect and reverse the relation of movement and time. [*Pause*]

And the last time, we had at least made a little progress with regard to the situation before the mutation in the domain of cinema; and then we had begun to define the mutation itself: how did it break out, what was it prepared by? By all sorts of things, but how did it break out after the war? Obviously, the causes are multiple for it being after the war. So taking this up again this week, I feel once again the need to summarize – for my part I see, in order to define what went before the mutation, I see five traits, no four, four traits. I ask you to keep them in mind because really, we are going to proceed by saying for each trait, here, this is what happens [in cinema], and then in philosophy one finds ... you'll see. All that involves a system of equivalence, with all the dangers that entails, which is to say, above all, it's all up to you: it's necessary not to mix things up, but try to remain sensitive to how something happens there – and then happens elsewhere, at another moment, under another form. The disaster would be if we say to ourselves, well, Kant and [Yasujiro] Ozu, it's all the same thing! I take this risk; it is a risk, we risk it. But if one concludes that from it, or if there is space to conclude that, it's catastrophic; we've botched it.

I say, first characteristic: with regard to the cinematographic situation – as we have seen, I summarize, I am not going to develop it again – what is given are movement-images; the montage deals with movement-images, and there emerges, through the intermediary of montage, an image of time which, from that moment, can only be an indirect image of time. And it is the montage which will determine the indirect image of time. [*Pause*] And we saw how, to our astonishment, someone like Pasolini, once again, made from out of montage a conception which seems to me a conception that one can call an absolutely classical conception; which does not exclude the greatest novelties of Pasolini in other domains and even in connected domains, neighbouring domains.

Second characteristic: this image that has become classical, what happens before the mutation, etc., I can therefore define it according to a second trait, and I would say, it is the unfolding of a sensory-motor schema, [*Pause*] the unfolding of a sensory-motor schema. What does that mean: “unfolding of the sensory-motor schema”? It means a sequence of perceptions and actions [*Pause*] through the intermediary of affections. We rediscover the three types of images that we had analysed so much another year: perception-images,

affection-images, action-images which are the three major species, the three major types of movement-image. We are shown a character who perceives, who reacts to certain perceptions and who experiences affections. So a whole sensory-motor schema, passing through perception-action, perception-reaction, to what is perceived, through the intermediary of the affection, a whole sensory-motor schema is developed. The image of time is indeed an indirect image of time since it follows from the development, from the unfolding [*Sound from outside; pause*] ... It's as if we weren't here ... [*Laughter*]. What did he say? He came to take our chairs ... – you see, since the image of time follows from the unfolding of the sensory-motor schema.

Third trait: the image is presented as a description that we called 'organic description'. And you see, that obviously implies the sensory-motor schema; it is already the development of the sensory-motor schema, it is typically an organic development. So I say, third trait: the image is an organic description. The organic description, once again, is a description which presupposes the independence of the environment or of the object that it describes. The image is given to us 'as' presenting an object to us in some mode, or an environment, or a state of things, independent of this image. This is organic description, [*Pause*] description that presupposes the independence of its object. And as we have seen, and here we rediscover this result, it seems to me, at another level, which is why I insist again: organic description is fundamentally connected to a truthful narration. By truthful I do not mean that it is true; it merely claims to be such. It is only the claim, just as organic description refers to an object that it 'supposes' – it's a question of a supposition – which it supposes to be independent. Truthful narration presupposes the truth of what it narrates, regardless of whether what it narrates actually is true or not true.

And at this juncture, what is that? If organic description is description which presupposes the independence of its object, truthful narration, that will be what? Well, it will consist in this: that, at this juncture, a *subject*, the subject which acts (you see, it's still the sensory-motor schema: perception of the object – reaction of the subject to the object), the acting subject passes from one object to another, passes from one situation to another. In other words, something happens. This is the unfolding of the sensory-motor schema. This subject which passes from the object to another or from one situation to another, following a well-developed sensory-motor schema or schemas, this is what could be called through the narration 'the subject of the enunciation'. [*Pause*] And what counts from the point of view of unfolding of the sensory-motor schemas, that is to say, from the point of view of the movement-image, is that whatever the ruptures, whatever the complications, etc., it is on the same *plane*, precisely on the plane of a narration, it is on the same plane that the subject passes from one object to another.

You will say to me, yes-but-no: because he can dream, he can remember, flashbacks, etc. That does not matter, that does not matter; there will be a unifying plane. Even if he submits to cuts, there will be a way to restore a continuity. At this juncture, the demand is that the unfolding of the sensory-motor schema not only passes from one object to another, but that all these objects and the subject which passes from one to the other, be on the same plane – rather than narration, I would call it 'narrative'. And it will refer to a subject of enunciation, a subject of enunciation which relates the narration. [*Pause*] This third aspect, Bergson gives us its law in his theory of sensory-motor recognition. And in fact, it's a point you should hold onto – here we develop it as much as we can – this sort of Bergsonian law of sensory-motor recognition which seems to me very profound, very simple but very profound, it is: the subject passes from one object to another while remaining on the same plane, [*Pause*] like, I

said to you before, the cow going from one tuft of grass to another tuft of grass on the green plane of the meadow.¹ [*Pause*]

So that in this theme of sensory-motor recognition, I could also say that the image of time is always an indirect image. To what extent? To the extent that it stems from the development of the situation or the objects – passage from one object to another – and at the same time stems from a development of the subject, all taking place on the same plane. From which we conclude the image of time. You have the two aspects that we will be led to rediscover (we will see how) in philosophy: the objective point of view, the development of the situation, the passage from one object to another; and the subjective point of view, the development of the subject in these passages. And time, as an indirect image, can flow from either point of view.

Finally, last point, fourth trait – and which seems to me the most interesting: everyone knows that no cinema, when it attains a certain level of genius, is contented by that. And we have seen the answer: there never ceases – from the oldest, most primitive cinema – there never ceases to be something astonishing which appears, namely – and this is even what defines the cinematographic image from the beginning – *aberrations of movement*. The cinematographic movement-image presents me with aberrations of movement. [*Pause*] All I'm saying is: pay attention here, you have to be very, very careful; you have to be ... It's a question of evaluation, of sentiment, okay. These aberrations of movement, they are there! That does not prevent them from being taken up into the play of movement-images, a play that submits itself to the sensory-motor development, to the sensory-motor schema. Therefore, it doesn't prevent these aberrations of movement that are present in the movement-image from being, in a certain way, secondary.

But that doesn't prevent certain authors of genius from highlighting them either, and I would ask: what are these great aberrations? And this is where the thesis of Jean-Louis Schefer seemed very interesting to me, consisting in saying: the movement-image in cinema is inseparable from certain aberrations of movement, so that what strikes us in the cinematographic image is less the movement than the disquiet that is added to it.² And this thesis seemed very, very interesting to me, and meant – independently of the developments that Schefer gives it –, ultimately meant things that were extremely simple and obvious, in the end obvious. I cite them again: “It is very often the case that movement does not imply any distancing from the mobile object [*Pause*], as though, even if you are immobile, you would follow the movement.”³ There is a sentence, for example, in [Jean] Epstein – Epstein, you see, is a very great French *auteur* of silent cinema – and one of Epstein's sentences strikes me as typical: “A fugitive goes at full speed ...”, “or a fugitive flees at full speed ...”, at high speed – I can't quite remember – “but he always remains face-to-face with us.”⁴ So we can see, here we have a simple example.

Or Epstein loved giving the example of the spinning wheel, where he said: it's enough that you look at the movement-image of a spinning wheel, in the cinema, to see absolutely extraordinary anomalies of movements, namely that it turns in a jerking movement, sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another, sometimes motionless as if it were sliding. He loved in his writings – since there are writings, Epstein having been one of the first *auteurs* of cinema to have reflected on cinema and to have made a kind of philosophy of cinema – Epstein constantly recalled (his works and his writings have been republished by Seghers and are being rediscovered again, for those that are interested – he created a philosophy of cinema that he called ‘lirosophy’, from the word *lire* [to read]⁵, and they're beautiful, quite beautiful, the writings of Epstein)⁶ – he constantly returns to this example of

‘the wheel’, or to the example of the ‘fugitive’. He says, well, anomalies of movement, other anomalies of movement: these are because the use of false continuities (and deliberate false continuities) obviously appears very early in cinema, very, very quickly! What still appears in and is constitutive of the most classical cinema, the oldest cinema, are perpetual changes of scale and changes of dimension, that is to say, passages from long shots to close-ups, etc. Also, in terms of anomalies of the movement, slow motion and accelerated motion, which really constitute the most elementary acts of cinema.

Now if you consider all that, here’s the question. Everything we said, the three previous points are true, but the situation is still more complicated than we think. For if it is true that – this is exactly our point, our question, which we will not resolve immediately – it is very simple at the same time; me, I find it, I don’t know, I find it very interesting, and I hope you feel the same! I say: if it is true that the movement-image such as it dominates in the cinema that has become classical, in the pre-war cinema, gives us through montage an indirect image of time, the fact remains that this movement-image presents aberrations of movement. [Pause]. Don’t these aberrations of movements put us on the track of a time-image which would no longer be an indirect image of time, but which would be a direct image of time, of a completely different nature? You will say to me, but then isn’t all that mixed together? But yes, it is mixed in together; there would be both. There would be, in its favor, inasmuch as the movement-image cannot give us in all rigor ... [Interruption in the room]. Come in, but don’t take any more chairs, ... eh?

A student: [*Inaudible sentences*]

Deleuze: Yeah, but no, I’m not telling you off, it’s just that you don’t need to take any more chairs, do you? ... [Pause] I’m waiting for her to come back in because ... [Pause] Why is she taking so long to find a chair? [*Laughter; pause*] Where did you find that chair? [*Laughter*] Eh? [Pause] In another room, well okay, but then we’re going to have dramas! [Pause] I’ve got a feeling that that was already why we got kicked out from the other place.⁷

A student: It’s one of the reasons.

Deleuze: It’s one of the reasons, yeah, yeah, yeah! [Pause] You know, it’s not that ... I was thinking to myself at the end [last time], I was thinking that in spite of all the genuine reasons I’ve been giving you for not going to the amphitheater, I was thinking, all the same maybe I’m exaggerating, because I’m putting them in an impossible position. So, in a great burst of humanity, I said to myself, let’s go and have a look. And it’s even worse than I thought, even worse than I thought. I wouldn’t be able to do anything; it would be worse than before. The amphitheaters are sadistic; it’s a mezzanine, ... no, it’s on the ground floor. All the guys passing by and who don’t give a damn – they’re just waiting for a lesson – when they hear something’s going on, they come in and it’s like here with the door creaking. They come in from there, they go up to the back, [*Deleuze laughs*] and after five minutes, they say they’re bored and they leave. And it doesn’t stop, it doesn’t stop. Suffice to say that ... [Jean] Narboni, put him in an amphitheater, and he goes crazy, he couldn’t work at all anymore, he couldn’t do anything. In the end, I came out saying to myself: nope ... Well, all that’s just to say one must not keep taking the chairs, eh. [*Laughter*]

You see, that’s what interests me! Is it that already ... Obviously one can always say there is a mutation, but once the mutation has come about, it is obvious that one will have – with certain authors of cinema who have become classical, who played around a great deal with

aberrations of moment in the movement-image – the impression that these authors were already completely modern. So, I take two cases: one case which was, if you like, relatively aborted, although this involves a very, very great filmmaker: it's precisely Epstein. When you watch a classic again – or what has since become a classic – like “The Fall of the House of Usher” [1928], [*Pause*] a story of Edgar Poe directed by Epstein, there is a famous use of slow motion. All the gestures are stretched out in a sort of slow motion, and Epstein's slow motion is famous in this film – in other films, it is not a general procedure – for this film, he was right up on the cutting edge of the use of slow motion. Or the gestures, truly, the gestures are as if ... This aberration of movement, it is obvious that it makes us enter into the feeling we are in Time; we have here the feeling that, through these aberrations, we are glimpsing a direct time-image, in which we are.

You see the two co-exist. Obviously then the greatest authors – who have thereby been recuperated by modernity ... but then one suddenly understands, you understand, that makes us understand something about ... there are things that cannot be grasped, except by extraordinary critics, there are things that cannot be grasped at the time. We need time, and that varies for people. With what is currently happening, we are more or less slow, or we are more or less swift to understand the point of novelty something has. First of all, we are buried, we have our eyes completely covered over by the vast domain of the false, of false novelties, of idiocies, etc., and which affect us all.

But here I appeal to my example, because everyone must have, must study, his own example in this regard. If I take my example: as far as I was concerned, it took me more than five years after the moment it first appeared (after the first [Alain] Robbe-Grillet or the first [Michel] Butor), to have a vague sentiment that with the New Novel, something new was happening – five years! It's true that I'm not particularly endowed with speed for understanding what is happening, but that's something, eh? Five years to digest that, and to suddenly say, but it's something fantastic. Hopefully those who were immediately sensitive to the novelty of the New Novel, maybe it didn't turn out well for them. Maybe it went a little too much without saying, maybe they didn't ..., but it takes time, eh? Time is necessary. So, I say to myself: the critics who received the last works of [Carl] Dreyer, obviously we must blame them for their extraordinary insolence, which touches on idiocy, when they declare: it is null, Dreyer is a dotard, and so forth; which was the reaction of the critics. Today it's obvious that his films were great and were cutting-edge, they were precisely ahead of their time. But those who were cautious, those who weren't in the know, those who said “what on earth is that?”, well I don't think we should blame them too much.

On that I don't know: your generation, what was new for it? At the moment, I'm not sure I know. But think of Beckett; discovering Beckett's novelty, that didn't happen overnight. With Beckett, it's perfect; he passed from one moment where no one was talking about him because people found it grotesque or lamentable or stupid, or etc., to another moment where oh, that's all passé, no one talks about that anymore [*Deleuze laughs*]. That imposed itself so well that, outside of literary criticism, you will not find anything in the papers, you won't find anything on Beckett. He never ceased to be treated ... They went from one stage where they completely criticized him, directly to another stage where they didn't talk about him at all anymore. As Marguerite Duras said, it is better, it is much better, to pass to the second stage; that is the ideal. The worst is when they talk about you, it is worse still, but it is very hard, it is very hard to ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

Now, if Dreyer seems to be something fantastic to us today, I think it's because he is one of those who ultimately used the most complex, the most subtle means to produce anomalies of movement. Even the Epstein procedure, time slowed down, could only serve once, he could not do it twice – there is no formula applicable to two cases. Whereas with Dreyer, you have all the aberrations of movement, both at the level of the apparatuses, and at the level of the passages in space, as well as at the level of false continuities, with such a virtuosity that, obviously, when people said “This is not cinema” (because there were interminable conversations, interminable ... about how the characters didn't even look at each other, or how one was behind the other, etc.), on the contrary, everything that was happening was cinema; everything was there, at the same time. But literally one couldn't see it, it was not visible.

For my part, I believe that in order to rediscover it – except in certain special cases – neorealism was obviously necessary, which however does not descend from Dreyer, the New Wave was necessary, so that the genius of Dreyer's films became evident to us, because this genius consisted exactly in this: to impose on the movement-image aberrations of movement that were sufficiently great for us to immediately enter into what he himself calls a fourth and a fifth dimension, the fourth dimension being Time and the fifth dimension being Spirit. And he went as far as to say: it is a question of suppressing the third dimension, that is to say of ensuring the flatness of the image – hence the very astonishing aberration of movement – of ensuring the flatness of the image, short-circuiting the third dimension in order to enter directly into relation with a fourth and fifth dimension. [*Interruption of the recording*]

... Time is subordinated to movement but under the following conditions, namely that the image of Time derives from the movement-images through the intermediary of montage, so that it is only an indirect image of Time. But nevertheless, there is a whole cinematographic work going on underneath, namely that [*Pause*] this movement-image also presents me with aberrations of movement in such a way that, in a certain way, I am determined to enter directly into Time and which points, and I glimpse, through the movement-images, thanks to the aberrations of movement; aberrations of movement, precisely, allow me to glimpse through the movement-images an image of time which is no longer an indirect image of time, but which is a direct image, a direct time-image. Understand, there is not at all a contradiction; there is a complication of a state of things.

Now I insist on this, because when we move to philosophy and to the history of its mutation with regard to movement and to time, we will see that there is a long, long epoch where in effect – and we have already seen it elsewhere, so we won't go back over it much – where time depends on movement, derives from movement, and therefore an indirect image of time is inferred from movement and inferred in general from celestial movement, from cosmic celestial motion. But we will see, because there (it will even become amusing if we insist on our comparison without above all introducing confusions), from the beginning, this ancient astronomy goes out of its way to highlight the aberrations in celestial motions, and it is even there that the word *ab*-errations takes root. There are aberrations, and these aberrations are even known mathematically and physically, with the idea of the incommensurable number. So there are aberrations of astronomical movement. [*Pause*] So that in this history of philosophical astronomy, it will be necessary to say both [*Pause*]: yes, what is primary is the cosmic movement-image, and to derive from that an indirect image of time; but at the same time, this cosmic movement gives rise to aberrations which for their part open up to us, or make us glimpse, what? What did the ancient Greek, what did the Greek glimpse through astronomical aberrations? [*Pause*] He had to have glimpsed something in them.

You see, here there is going to be a rebound of certain problems. For one thing, take this first point: how to define the state of the image before the mutation at the level of cinema? And then, I would ask, how to define the mutation after the war? Well, what I mean is that here are my four points, and it is necessary that I rediscover them point by point. I'll start with the second, [*Pause*] the second point. The second point, earlier, was the empire and the unfolding of the sensory-motor schema. And I was telling you last time, well, what happens after the war? I'll touch on this again in a lighter mode, since in my memory, I talked about it quite a bit a couple of years ago.⁸

So, here I come back to a point of departure because, well, I was saying for those who weren't there or who don't remember anymore – it was a while ago – well, you see, for my part, what strikes me, once again, is that if we start from the mutation of neorealism, Italian neorealism, I don't think it's the real that defines neorealism, neither real form, nor real content. I mean, there are some who say: well of course, there is a social content of neorealism. That is not a very interesting thesis since it is belied from the beginning. We are then forced to say that [Roberto] Rossellini ceases to be neorealist very quickly; he made two neorealistic films, and after that it's over. And others like [André] Bazin say in a more intelligent way, it seems to me: it is a new form of reality, it's a new form of reality, good. This is much more interesting, but it doesn't seem to me ...⁹ [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

If I try to put it most simply, what seems to me to be the mutation of neorealism is the relaxation and, at the limit, the rupture, of the sensory-motor schema. You no longer find – I'm going to say a very simple thing – you no longer find yourself in characters who are in a situation and who react to a situation through the intermediary of emotions. You see, that corresponds exactly to my second trait from earlier. It is the collapse; it is the spilling-over of sensory-motor connections. Why after the war? In that period, it was quite simple, and the sociological causality was obvious. Well, it's because after the war, we find ourselves in a situation, we find ourselves in an absolute powerlessness. [*Pause*] You will say to me: during the war too. No, not exactly. There are two ways of being powerless, two very different ways: there is the way of cinema that has become classical. They tie me up and they gag me, and then they leave me on the train tracks, tied up, gagged, and the train approaches. That's an eminent situation in the cinema that has become classical, which you can find in a film noir or which you can find in the burlesque. I would say that the character is indeed reduced to powerlessness, but he is reduced to powerlessness in virtue of the demands of action. And what happens there will be in line with sensory-motor schemas, that the train crushes him, or indeed that he is saved at the last minute. If he is reduced to powerlessness, if he can no longer react to the situation, it is in virtue of the demands of the situation and the demands of action and of the development of action.

Whereas here, you understand, in neorealism, we are put in a situation, into a type of situation which, to my knowledge, did not appear before, situations cut from their motor prolongation. Why? For a very simple reason: the character finds himself in a situation where, literally, he does not know what to do! [*Pause*] This could be in a thousand ways. He doesn't know what to do, because in a way, there is nothing to do. So that can be a sad sight. What I tried to show already the last time is that no, it's not a sad spectacle at all; on the contrary, it is a path which will give us a vision, which will open up great riches to us and which will open up for us in particular a whole new form of the comic.

It's that he finds himself in situations, okay, where either he does not know what to do, or there is nothing to do; we should multiply the cases here. It can be extraordinary situations, limit situations: let's call it, following a philosophical concept, a 'limit-situation'. It can be the arrival of death – that is a limit-situation, that – ; it can be an extraordinary event, the eruption of a volcano; or it can be a completely everyday situation: [Pause] I take my little walk, it can be everyday like that; or I wake up in the morning, and I make a coffee: an absolutely ordinary, everyday situation. What will define the new image? This kind of mutation – everyday situation or limit-situation, it doesn't matter – ultimately, they will penetrate into each other.

What will be the case, whether it be something everyday or something belonging to a limit or extraordinary, is that the situation is cut off from its motor prolongation. The character finds himself in a state of having no riposte or response. So, he's passive, left on one side – let's proceed slowly – yes, he is *passive* in a certain manner. In what sense is he passive? It would be better to say he is *receptive*; he receives things in full effect, he still receives things in their full effect, yes, but what is closest to him scarcely concerns him. Even his death only half concerns him, not completely; you see, there is no motor prolongation. You will say to me, so he is a spectator? No, I prefer ... okay, all that, we should keep hold of all the words when trying to approach something. Let's try to find the best word. Everything happens as if he were *visionary* deep down. Cinema has ceased to be a cinema of action; it has become a cinema of the *seer*! Seer, seer: we must not exaggerate. Yes: of receptivity, [Pause] of receptivity, that's fine! [Pause] The volcano erupts, and the woman says: "My God, my God, I'm finished, I'm finished. What beauty!" [Pause] Faced with tuna fishing, the woman says: "What horror, my God", but she also grasps its beauty. She has no riposte, she has no answer! She has no reaction to the situation.¹⁰ [Pause]

Or in an example we commented on at length a couple of years ago, and which Bazin commented on at length – but I think we draw from it something different from him – the little maid prepares the coffee – that's fully in line with the sensory-motor schema – as before, you can see it's more complicated than what I'm saying because, of course, the sensory-motor schemas remain. They have to remain so that we can be, more fundamentally, shown the moment where they no longer function. So she prepares the coffee ... all that, she enacts all the habitual gestures of automatic recognition. And then her eyes cross her belly. And she sees her big pregnant belly. And she starts to cry. She had reactions in order to make the coffee, yes, those were linked up, and then her eyes cross her belly and she doesn't know what to do, she doesn't know what to do. Good.¹¹

This can occur in what is most everyday, and it can occur in what is most extraordinary. The neorealist signature will be that. The sensory-motor situation gives way to what? To what I called 'pure optical and sound situations'. By pure optical and sound situation, it is necessary to understand: situations that are no longer prolonged [Pause] in a motoricity, in movements. [Pause] And of course, there are still some going around it. I'm not saying that the image no longer moves. You recall, we have said it from the beginning: beyond the movement-image, that does not mean, there is no longer a movement-image; it means that what is fundamental is no longer the movement-image. It is what? It is the exposition of a pure optical and sound situation, that is to say, cut off from its motor prolongation. And I would say, at that moment, you can understand everything: what do these guys who were so different, so different like De Sica, Rossellini, [Luchino] Visconti, [Federico] Fellini, [Michelangelo] Antonioni, have in common? What is there in common? Well, that! It is that. But each does it in a very, very different way.

If I take Antonioni, it is his famous method of the *report* [*constat*]. This is the report, it is the famous report in Antonioni: namely, the point of departure is a report that will never be explained, a report of something that will never be explained. Namely, a woman has disappeared on a small island, or a couple has broken up. [*Pause*] As Antonioni says, what is interesting is what happens ‘afterwards’, once everything is over. What happens afterwards? Well, no doubt the famous dead time; [*Pause*] afterwards things *drag*. How will they drag? What will Antonioni draw from that? Feel here how I’m making a step forward: if the classical sensory-motor situation could only deliver us an indirect image of time, perhaps pure optical and sound situations, like it or not, will make us penetrate directly into Time and into a weight of Time. They are going to penetrate us, they are going to project us into an interior of Time, but here I’m going too fast. I say: a cinema of the visionary, yes. So Antonioni will proceed with his reports.¹²

Fellini for his part will advance with his *spectacles*. There is no longer a situation-action linkage; there is a succession of *shows*. That does not mean that these are sketches. Not at all! Without doubt there is a law, for Fellini there are rhythmic laws, very important laws for passing from one show to another. Everything is organized as a succession of variety shows, of variety spectacles. And in everyday life itself: think of “I Vitelloni! [1953]: they put on spectacles for themselves. There will be a sequence of spectacles which is no longer at all of the sensory-motor type, but which will proceed by optical and sound situation.¹³

Visconti we looked at very quickly. I say: the first sign of neorealism; why is it in “Obsession” that we recognize the first sign of neorealism?¹⁴ It is once again because he does something of which I don’t think he himself, at the time, felt the importance; yet he must have known, it’s not that he didn’t do it on purpose. But it has such an insignificant air: he introduced between perception and reaction this extraordinary little moment which, in my opinion, did not exist before in cinema [*Pause*]: that moment where the character needs, does not know how to react, and needs to appropriate for himself through his eyes and ears what is given to see and to understand. He is lost. He has to *appropriate for himself* before reacting. Perhaps he will never react! There also, he is in a state of pure optical-sound situation. [*Pause*]

Claude Ollier had a very beautiful formula for Antonioni; he said: “He substitutes” – and think, for example, of “L’Avventura” [1960], but he also said this about “The Cry” [1957] – “He substitutes for the traditional drama a pure optical drama.” I believe that Ollier saw something very, very profound; it’s exactly that! But it holds for the others too. It holds for the whole of neorealism; moreover, it also holds for the New Wave.¹⁵

I would say that the first great mutation that corresponds to my second aspect from earlier, is the establishment of pure optical and sound situations, which two years ago – and now we have need of them – I called, being concerned with a classification of signs (I called them this in order to be colourful), *opsigns* and *sonsigns*, that is to say, optical and sound signs, which are substituted for the sensory-motor sign.¹⁶ If I open a parenthesis – it will be the same thing – if I open a parenthesis, you can see – one has the feeling we are on the path of a hypothesis – because we say to ourselves, okay, if the sensory-motor situation sent us back to an indirect image of time, the pure optical and sound situations, what are they going to do? Meaning: don’t they make us penetrate into a direct time-image? We cannot say it yet, but we can think it. Yes, the character no longer reacts, but there will be the whole effect of the situation in him, on him. And the effect of the situation which is no longer prolonged into motoricity, that

belongs to pure time. The character in a pure sound-optical situation will be precipitated into time exactly like the heroine who before the eruption says “I am finished, what beauty, my God”, a bit of pure time, the volcano, these latter scenes being from Rossellini’s “Stromboli”, just like the scene of the little maid in De Sica’s “Umberto D”. In fact, the little maid, when her eyes cross her belly, and she starts crying: everything happens as if she had acceded to a bit of time in the pure state.

And you see in what sense I say: the character no longer has a reaction: either because it is too much, or in any case, because it is too powerful for him; [*Pause*] or because it is too beautiful; or because it is too unjust. But all the inanities, it seems to me, about incommunicability, solitude, etc., ultimately inanities, ... well not inanities, but all that seems absolutely secondary to me in this cinema. Incommunicability, solitude: who cares about that! I have the impression that the things everyone says: I suffer from it, I suffer from it, are really a way of saying ... it’s not that, no, it’s not that at all, it’s not that. That was never Antonioni’s problem, that’s not possible, problems like that, these are problems of Ultimately one cannot have such a feeble problem, it’s not possible.

The problem is necessarily of a completely different nature. The characters, they are alone; necessarily they do not communicate, but for a much more serious reason: because what defines modern life is that it never stops putting us into pure optical and sound situations. The sensory-motor schemas, one doesn’t have them anymore, and they break, they keep on breaking down throughout the day. And I can’t even make my coffee anymore without my sensory-motor schemas jamming. So of course, afterwards, I can say ouch, ouch, I am alone, and incommunicative, I’m cut off and incommunicative ... Good, okay, I’m all alone and incommunicative, ... but because of my coffee maker or because of my bicycle; for a simple reason, because the sensory-motor schemas are failing more and more.

And at the same time, it is full of optimism because as I said to you last time, these are situations where, obviously with a little practice, one becomes a seer. We see something, and this something, whether it is the too-beautiful or the too-unjust – the too-unjust of the poor pregnant girl who does not know what to do, the too-beautiful of the volcanic eruption, the too-powerful, the sublime, of the volcanic eruption – I learn to see something. You can sense that this cinema will be a pedagogy of the image such as there has never been, and that this theme of a pedagogy of the image in post-war cinema will become fundamental; and that everyone will pass through it, ultimately all the greats, and that they will even sometimes pass through a desert. They will traverse a long desert, alone and incommunicative, in order to construct a pedagogy of which we will have understood nothing except five or ten years afterwards, unless we were particularly endowed for it, eh? Good.

I’m thinking of Rossellini’s final period, a great attempt at a new pedagogy of the image. I’m thinking of the whole period that one could call [Jean-Luc] Godard’s ‘middle’ period which, in my opinion, goes up to “Every Man for Himself” [*“Sauve qui peut (la vie)”*] [1980], which will be devoted to a fantastic pedagogy of the image. I’m thinking of the Straubs right now, and then perhaps one of the greatest, of Ozu, who we’ll talk about. And all that, all their cinema is inseparable from an enterprise of this pedagogy of the image which teaches us to become seers. Well, ‘visionary’, ‘seer’: I would say this is a species of Romanticism. These are Romantics!

In any case, for the new realism and the New Wave, that seems obvious to me. It is a fantastic Neo-Romanticism. Why? Because if one takes Romanticism seriously, serious Romanticism,

it was precisely, it's a question of denouncing, it's a question of – this is why it's not simple reflexivity, passivity – it's a question of having to become seers, in order to denounce, to apprehend, even in the most everyday, something which is intolerable, what William Blake called the empire of misery, the empire of misery beyond us and within us. For the misery which is our own, inside us, is the same as what we submit to from outside ourselves. And to become visionary for Blake was the work of the poet, but of a new type of poet, namely one who had a kind of revolutionary task in a new sense of 'revolutionary': to teach people to see.

Because all our sensory-motor schemas, they are made so that we pass by: understand, it's even made for that. Our sensory-motor schemas, they are made so that we pass by. Indeed, they are made – recall our distinctions earlier – they are made for us to pass from one object to another; they are made to treat us like cows. You pass from one clump of grass to another, and you leave it alone. [*Laughter*] Good, very good. That is a sensory-motor schema. Or you say "Hello Pierre, how are you doing, how is your family", etc., that's to say, "You being good, eh?"

Our sensory-motor schemas, when something is too beautiful, well, they generally still function, don't they? When something's too beautiful for us, what happens? I'll tell you what happens. We dodge what is too beautiful through metaphors. Metaphor is the dross of the sensory-motor, all the more sneaky because it doesn't look like it, eh? Metaphor is the shame of literature; it is the shame of everything, it's the shame of, ... it's the shame of ... That's why linguists are so interested in it. [*Laughter*] It is by nature a sensory-motor evasion when you longer know what to do. It gives us something to say, eh? So yes, well, when something is too beautiful, one always finds a metaphor. When it is too unjust, when one perceives that something is too unjust, when it is too beautiful, well yes, all at once ... You're having a nice bus journey, there's an old American lady, singing along, etc., and then, oh, there's a landscape one didn't anticipate. Even the old American lady drops her camera. With something beautiful, we take a photograph of it, it's a sensory-motor reaction, it's a way of dodging, isn't it? Wait, let me take your photograph – that's revenge. You want to look at that? But it's too beautiful, eh? Well, here, look at it anyway. It's the same as with landscape. I photograph you like that, you're not going to get too shirty about it, eh, and then when I get back from vacation, I'll show it to my friends. That's all sensory-motor expansion. Good.¹⁷

There are cases where we are a little ill or feeling minimally human. 'Goddammit', we mutter, just lolling there with our arms hanging. But then, it might not be anything massive, just a little river or stream: one sees something. All of a sudden, we have seen something, we can't quite believe it, we can't believe something we've seen. So, either we hurry to forget it; or: we will no longer be quite the same. We will have seen something in the little stream. In some picture, I see something. At that moment, you stop snapping photographs, I stop letting myself be photographed, there is no more dodging, it becomes strange, and nevertheless I am receptive. And what I see, it's too beautiful, it's intolerable.

At any rate, we will call 'intolerable' everything that transcends our sensory-motor thresholds, something that belongs to the intolerable. I have seen some poor people; I know, I know that there are people who live with I dare not say how much per month; I have my sensory-motor schemas. I say oh yes, oh dear, poor old folks, poor old folks, it's not pleasant to be old. It's a bit like: oh, that reminds me ..., as soon as it reminds me of something, everything's fine. I have my sensory-motor evasion; as soon as something reminds me of something, there it is, I become sure I don't see anything, just as with metaphor. Memory and metaphor are perfect for that; they don't prevent you from sleeping.

There are cases where that doesn't work. You're in the street; you see some character there, you don't know why, he is a real jerk. But then you suddenly understand something you haven't understood about his or some other similar case like him. Now you understand, you see something. You see something. You have become, for a brief moment, you have become a seer, and you have grasped more in one second than you have grasped for 15 years. And either you will quickly forget, or there is something which will no longer be the same in you. Good. You won't say, for example – you see a workshop, a workshop where you see some particularly hard factory work going on – you're not going to fall back on your sensory-motor evasion: ah well, people have to work, work has to be done, eh, nothing to be concerned about. Even to you, that will seem ridiculous. You will have perceived, you will have glimpsed something that you can't quite believe. Rossellini, [*Pause*] this time in "Europe '51" [1952]: the bourgeois woman sees the factory and she stammers, "I thought I was seeing convicts, I thought I was seeing convicts." Yet she had seen them a thousand times while driving by, the factories, you can see them, it's not difficult. Then one day: "I thought I was seeing convicts"; it turns awry for her, she has seen something. Good. It is, she no longer has ... [*Deleuze does not finish the phrase*]

Why does this belong to neorealism? Precisely, it's because, for those who recall the image, the factory is not at all realist. How is it neorealist? It is absolutely not realist; it is an almost abstract image. Rossellini kept very little of it; he kept just a few signs. He kept some sound signs, and there is a purity to the traits of the factory; it's almost a blueprint, the image is almost a blueprint. [*Pause*] It's indeed sufficient for that, it's ... he wants us ... he can't go any further. It's an image, it is not a sensory-motor image [*Pause*] that would presuppose the independence of its object. It is a pure optical and sound image which merges strictly with its object and which replaces its object. It is a pure description. It is a pure description. It is a purely optical and sound situation. And instead of reacting to it as I react to the object – in the case of an organic description, I react to the object supposed to be independent of the description – now I am in front of a purely optical and sound image. There is no description, there is no reaction, I cannot react, I cannot react to the object, there is no object. The description holds for the object. I have seen something intolerable. That's it. [*Interruption of the recording*]

Part 2

Do you understand this point? So the question is: are we not going to have a direct time-image here? Really, that remains to be seen. So that I would have: sensory-motor situation → indirect image of time; pure optical and sound situation → direct time-image? Point of interrogation. You see, we are still at the very beginning of the hypothesis. To better situate ourselves ... when I say, it doesn't have to be tragic, all that isn't tragic, that's because, think about it, it's the same thing in burlesque. – I can expand or would you prefer me to move onto other aspects? Because all that, I can talk about it later, I don't know, is that okay for you? Are you following all right? Don't forget that it's only a first characteristic we're in the process of isolating. – The history of burlesque, I would have to recount the history of burlesque in the cinema. I would say that there are four great ages; there are four great ages of burlesque, it seems to me. You'll see why I recount this.¹⁸

At the beginning, it is exasperated sensory-motricity with sensory-motor series that intersect on all sides, which burst out, which intersect, all that. Good, this is the first great epoch of burlesque; I suppose that ... I won't specify, it goes without saying.

Second fundamental stage: it is the introduction of an element, or of the emotional-affective element, into the sensory-motor schemas. [*Pause*] Of course, all the sensory-motor exasperation subsists. It is conserved. Even more, we can refine it, because there are the vertical series of Harold Lloyd; there are the completely broken down series of Laurel and Hardy; there is everything you want in the sensory-motor which continues. So the first age continues in the second age and even receives a new richness. But what is new is the affective element, the emotional element, in which all that bathes. And we will find it in the two outstanding figures of the second age, we will find it in the pure state, under the two forms of affection.

This refers to things ... I'll just say that when we worked on this two years ago, we found two poles of affection which were: the reflexive face, the impassive reflexive face, and the intensive face which passes through an intensive series. And in both cases, it was affection. I say, with Buster Keaton, the impassive reflexive face with the splendid eyes of Buster Keaton, and with the intensive face of Chaplin who, for his part, goes all the way up the whole intensive series of an affection or goes down the whole intensive series, you have the introduction of the intensive element which will penetrate all the sensory-motor schemas and transform them. And, still in this second period, you have the introduction of the great lunar characters. The great lunar characters: it's Laurel, in the couple Laurel and Hardy; it's [Harry] Langdon (Langdon's great sleeps and Langdon's waking dreams); and it remains in the form to come, of Harpo Marx. They seem to me the three great lunars, yes: Laurel, Langdon, Harpo. Good.

Third age. It is with the talkie, because with the talkie ... but we must not consider the talkie here as having itself brought about the revolution; it is one of the material conditions of this third age of the burlesque. This is what I called "the introduction of the mental image". The mental image is not the head, the image in someone's head. It is something that will emerge with the talkie. And it seems to me a very big mistake to say that Chaplin did not do talkies. Of course, he made a belated use of it, but I think that he made a radically new, original use of it.

It's because with the third age of the burlesque the image is no longer just sensory-motor. It is no longer only affective, as in the second age; it will be as if enclosed, completed. The whole sensory-motor framework will be as if enclosed by a mental image, that is to say an image which takes objects of thought as its object; [*Pause*] namely, a mental image is introduced into the burlesque. Under what form? The talkie was obviously necessary under the double form: either of the discursive image in Chaplin, the discourse-image, a fundamentally provocative discourse; or else under the form of the argument-image, fundamentally logical nonsense, but logical nonsense as the secret of logic itself, under the two great figures of W.C. Fields and Groucho Marx.

But I insist on the novelty of this introduction of discourse not only into the burlesque, but into cinema in general, in the great talkie films of Chaplin. Provocative discourse: the final discourse of the "Dictator" [1940], the discourse of "Monsieur Verdoux" [1947], the discourse of "Limelight" [1952], which are fully cinematic; what I call for convenience sake the 'discourse-image' and to which corresponds, but in a wholly different style, the non-sense argument that Groucho Marx and Fields will push to a degree as great as that of the great English writers. Good.

And all that remains. What happens after the war? Is there a new burlesque? Yes, yes, everyone knows that there is a new burlesque, and how could we define it? It would give us a rudimentary basis if we could define it in the following way: in a certain manner, all the same, all of the preceding burlesque, with its complications and its evolution, remained a burlesque of movement-images, that is to say ... [*Interruption of the recording*]

... a pure optical and sound [image]. I don't even want to expand on that, and I think this is the fourth age of the burlesque. There, it is not at all any longer a character who reacts to sensory-motor situations, it is a character who finds himself in the state, yes, of a 'seer'. And he witnesses pure optical and sound situations, situations to which there is no planned response, even if something takes charge of responding for him. Something will take charge of making a riposte for him, but it won't be him. For his part, he is, I cannot say a spectator; he is a 'seer' of something. Obviously, from the point of view of cinema, that will be very important because it will imply researches in sound of a new type, but which you already find in neo-realism, in the New Wave, etc., since to construct pure optical-sound situations cut off from their motor prolongation, that will renew, that will overhaul all the givens, all the givens in the relationship between the audio and the visual in the image. This is why a whole pedagogy of the image will be necessary.

And I see for the moment two ... the two greatest figures in this fourth age of the burlesque are: in America, Jerry Lewis, and in France, [Jacques] Tati. It is obvious that if you reflect on Monsieur Hulot and what differences there are between Hulot and the pre-war burlesques, Hulot does not cease to find himself – and the more Tati develops, the more this is affirmed – he never ceases to find himself faced with situations, above all sonorous, pure sound and optical situations, ultimately ...¹⁹

What is the status of the key situation of waiting, waiting in a bank hall, or an exhibition hall? The exhibition hall²⁰ or the waiting hall²¹ are as indispensable to Tati as the amusement park is indispensable to Fellini and for the same reasons, exactly for the same reasons. The amusement park is the succession of schematic shows, it is a set of pure optical and sound situations, the "Vitelloni" [of Fellini, 1953] already set up their own amusement park, and in Tati, everything culminates with the exhibition hall, the optical-sound relationships between a chair and the noise it makes when one sits on it. Hulot is taken up into pure optical-sound situations for which he never has the slightest riposte or, when he has a riposte, it becomes even more complicated, one passes to another optical-sound situation. You see, it is ... And I think that in Jerry Lewis ... I think that these are great decorators. It is not by chance that filmmakers do not trust decorators. They have to do everything themselves; they have to make their own sound, they have to do ... It is obvious that here too there is a redistribution of roles. It is not that there is no need for decorators, but you understand that in such a cinema, in effect, the director completely changes his role. Why? Because he is no longer just an action-film director. He must therefore ... Everything now rests on the pure optical and sound situations, and therefore his relation with the decor has to be fundamental, very, very ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*]

All that, where does it come from? I had an idea, it's the role – but we will come back to this – the role that had been decisive as a passage between this post-war cinema and this pre-war cinema, well, it was in a sense the daftest thing in cinema, namely it was the American musical comedy. And I wonder if at the end of the day the American musical comedy was not almost what had the most influence on Europe, which however did not know how to make musical comedy. But they made use of it in a quite different way. That is, without the musical

comedy, would there have been, could there have been this mutation? Why? For a very simple reason, which is that, you can see what a musical comedy is. You will tell me that it moves, it's a rudimentary movement-image. Not at all, not at all, it doesn't belong to the movement-image, it doesn't belong to the sensory-motor, the musical comedy. The musical is decor that presents itself as decor: that is to say, what is a decor that presents itself as decor? It can go as far as a painted canvas, a postcard, whatever you like, those will have ...
[Deleuze does not finish the sentence]

Everyone knows the films of Stanley Donen, and that's how he works: flat view, flat image, it's very interesting, violently colored, violently colored flat image. Broadway, Broadway postcard, Paris postcard. What are you going to do with a postcard? There is no motricity, you are not in a sensory-motor situation. You cannot take a stroll in a postcard; you cannot stroll around in a film-set, that doesn't happen. When the film-set presupposes an independence from its object, you can stroll around in it, otherwise you don't stroll around in film-set, not at all. You are in an optical and sound situation, and that's all. And so you have these famous film-sets which are given over to colour, in effect, where the whole problem of color in cinema is going to come into play; less with Donen than in Minnelli who is a great, great colorist.

And what will correspond to the pure optical-sound situation? Well precisely not the motricity of a character, but something absolutely different, namely, dance. It is dance which will surround, which will confer on the pure optical and sound image, what? A whole world or a whole space that it would not otherwise possess. You will tell me: but dance belongs to movement. Well yes, but what kind of movement? What kind of movement? I would say, at the limit, it's a movement that has become – but we will see that later, we'll see ... I'm just stating the hypothesis – it's a depersonalized movement, pronominalized, separated from its motivating source. It is a movement that has become a movement of the world. You tell me: yes, but the great dancers, they have a style. Yes, of course they have a style. They each have their way of depersonalizing movement. It no longer belongs to sensory-motricity, that is to say, to a situation which is prolonged in a movement of the character. It is absolutely something else: it is the postcard, in the sense of an optical and sound situation, cut off from any motor prolongation; and dance, as a movement of the world which is substituted for the sensory-motor relation. So, it's not yet ... Of course, I'm not saying that it's new realism, nor the New Wave, all that ... For example, a burlesque like that of Jerry Lewis flows directly from musical comedy, whereas previous burlesque flowed from other paths, whether it was the circus, music hall, etc., that's obvious, isn't it?

So that's my first trait, you see: there is no longer – I'm summarizing it – there is no longer unfolding of the sensory-motor schema, that is to say, organization of perception-affection-action from which would derive an indirect image of time. There is a pure optical and sound situation, the formation of a cinema of the seer, the formation of a cinema of the visionary, which perhaps, perhaps – hypothesis – introduces us into a direct time-image. This is my second characteristic which I started with.

Third characteristic: I was talking about descriptions – here I can go very quickly since we already broached it – a pure optical and sound situation that leaves the character distraught. You sense at the same time that what I'm saying is false; it's false in part, it's false in appearance: the character continues to react, all that, but with regard to the image ... I would say that what is most important in the image no longer passes through that; that's what you have to understand. What is most important in the image no longer passes through that; it's

that the character, even when he walks, his walk is no longer sensory-motor, his walk is no longer a reaction. Literally, he does not know what to do. He does not know what to do and it's not just in a negative sense that he does not know what to do. He does not know what to do because he has to *see*, because he has something to see. They may be agitated, these characters – they are enormously agitated – but it is the appearance of something deeper. And just as the character in the film has something to see, we spectators are taken to task as visionaries to come, if we do not know how to see something in the image.

So I say, by way of consequence – you sense that I could go through a development for the New Wave, all that goes without saying – I say, well yes, in the third characteristic, these uniquely optical and sound situations, these opsigns and these sonsigns, are – as opposed to organic descriptions – they are pure descriptions, inorganic descriptions; that is to say, what is a pure description? These are also what we called crystalline descriptions, namely, descriptions that have replaced their object. And I say, the decor of a musical comedy is typically a description which has replaced its object – in that sense, it's extremely modern, and the musical comedy has had a fundamental influence – a description which replaces its object and which coincides with its object, and of which we found a first approximation in Robbe-Grillet: namely, it never stops erasing and creating its object, it never stops erasing it and creating it.²²

And we found another more advanced formula in Bergson, and it is the second Bergsonian law, the law of the other recognition, the law of recognition which is no longer called sensory-motor, but which is said to be 'attentive'. [*Pause*] Namely – it will be the law, at the same time, of pure descriptions according to Bergson – namely, we no longer pass from one object to the other on the same plane, but we are going to make a single and same object pass through different planes, [*Pause*] which simultaneously reveal ... We are going to make a single and same object pass through different planes which simultaneously reveal more and more profound aspects of the object [*Pause*] and more and more intense levels of the spirit, of the spirit that grasps this object. You can sense that this is the formula of the visionary. And each aspect-level will correspond to a circuit, [*Pause*] a circuit, if you will, of the physical and the mental, or of the real and the imaginary, through which we defined the crystal-image or the crystalline description.

So I can make a little schema, ... but I haven't got a chalk so actually I can't make a little schema; yet it would have made everything clear. [*Deleuze looks at the board while searching around*] I'll do it with my finger, you'll follow me immediately, eh? [*Pause*] Ah, I'm going to take this little piece of chalk ... [*Deleuze moves towards the blackboard*] My little schema, it's not easy because this one is not in Bergson, but I place great store in it; it should be there in my opinion, it must be because he forgot a page.²³ [*Laughter; pause; Deleuze writes on the board*]

You see the principle? [*Laughter*] It's a kind of endless butterfly. What could I do? Engrave it with a knife? You've seen it in any case, it is visible. [*He returns to his place*] There, everyone has seen it. The further away you are, the better you can see in this case. You understand why I did my two things. There, you see the whole left part of the drawing – you see the whole left part – these are the deeper aspects of the real that is seen and heard, or the optical-sound description. The right part is the most intense levels of the spirit, that is to say, ... [*Pause*] The left part is the real part; the right part is the mental part and it is the circuits, the perpetual circuits. Or I would say the left part is the descriptions which replace the object; the right part is the hypotheses, always renewed; and a description is annulled and is replaced

by another description which forms another circuit. – It's a bit annoying but anyway ... It's annoying that I lost the chalk, but something always has to be missing. I can redo it if you want? – No, it's all clear: don't miss the loops, you see, don't miss the enlargement that happens each time. It's like a butterfly expanding at the edges. It's quite simple.

Obviously that corresponds to – I'm not going to go back into that here – this third characteristic, it corresponds to the crystalline description, falsifying narration, crystalline narration, since at each circuit, you have a description which holds for its object and which will be replaced by the following description. So it grows at the edges. This is why my schema is so important, since it suggests the growing at the edges that is proper to crystal formation. [Pause] And falsifying narration, since the hypothesis ... since the narration will necessarily be ... or the narrative will necessarily be hypothetical, basically, a hypothesis for each description, leading to the erasure and re-creation, the erasure of the previous description and the creation of the following description.²⁴ [Pause]

So what would I say [Pause] about the third characteristic, to correspond with the third characteristic from earlier? Well, with the third characteristic, I would say, what has happened? One could say a very simple thing: the aberrations, the aberrations of movement have come to the fore. [Pause] It's not that the movement-image would have disappeared; in fact there is always ... it is simply limited, it is less and less interesting, if you like, whereas it was so interesting at one time. But there, it becomes less and interesting, the movement-image. In certain forms of very modern cinema, one could say the opposite, that it reclaims and conquers new dimensions, but it doesn't matter. What counts is what has now come to the fore: it is the aberrations of movement.

So it's no longer like earlier where, the movement-image being given, the aberrations of movement, which the movement-image delivered up to me, allowed me to perceive a perhaps unknown time-image. Here it is no longer that; the aberrations of movement now occupy the whole scene – and I'm not going back over that – in particular, it's the disconnected spaces, the disconnected spaces, that is to say, spaces whose parts do not have a determinate connection, [Pause] so that they burst, with [Robert] Bresson, [Pause] but also such as they will be taken up again, renewed, by the New Wave, in particular by Rossellini ... sorry, by neorealism, in particular by Rossellini, Antonioni. We talked about Antonioni's disconnected spaces, where one part really does not connect with the other since, in fact, the connection can only be made – I would say, in the case of Antonioni – through the gaze of someone who has disappeared, through the gaze of someone absent – thus an eminently hypothetical gaze that sends us back to our butterfly. Good, the disconnected spaces of Antonioni, the disconnected spaces of Rossellini; and the disconnected spaces of Godard or of [Jacques] Rivette, which give a further extension to them.

For example, the way Godard films sketched-out apartments and the way in which in Godard, you always have the movement of someone turning around, you see the way in which Godard's characters twist around. You have a kind of law of the disconnection of space. Or in the later Godard, such as "First Name: Carmen" [1983], you see astonishing disconnections, musical, audio-visual disconnections which are a marvel, truly a marvel; the treatments he brings about, using music at the same time, are very beautiful. You will truly find there a whole world of disconnections; but anyway, we have already talked so much about disconnections that I shall pass over that.

But all these people will participate in aberrations. It is the aberrations which come and pass to the fore, so that I can say, just as in the pre-war history, I would say that what is determining is the movement-image, okay, to be sure, but I would also specify: be careful! Pay attention! – it is not only the movement-image, since the movement-image also yields up to us aberrations of movement.

Now I say, what is important is the pure optical and sound image, without motor prolongation, [*Pause*] that is to say, the disconnected spaces, all that. But I specify: be careful! Obviously, the movement-image subsists; it still subsists, but it no longer has anything more than apparent value, it only has the value of a signpost. The serious things no longer pass through it. [*Pause*] Why? For a simple reason: it is because – we are forming our hypothesis – because, without doubt, the optical and sound image has introduced us into a direct time-image which no longer follows anymore from movement, has introduced us into a direct time-image which no longer follows anymore from movement [*Deleuze repeats*]. We therefore have the pure optical and sound image relation or, what amounts to the same: the aberration of movement and the direct time-image have passed to the fore.

And for Antonioni, for Antonioni, our malady is not failure of communication, it is not solitude, we have only one malady, it is Chronos – which allows for a mildly humorous remark, namely that every malady is chronic, [*Laughter*] and obviously a real disease is chronic; if your disease is not chronic, you are not sick, eh? Chronos is the only malady; Chronos is the only malady, this is what Antonioni tells us. And I think that Antonioni has no other thought than that; but again, one great thought, a single great thought is enough. And it doesn't mean "what a pity it is to grow old"; it means that our being-in-time – to speak I don't know how –, it means that our being-in-time is of such a nature that, in a certain manner, we are sick. Why are we sick of our being-in-time? When we discover it as direct being, that is something else.²⁵

So does that mean that there is no longer montage? Since you remember, you remember our idea: montage was what drew from movement-images an indirect image of time. Now we are in our hypothesis, could it be that there is a passage between aberration of movement or sound-optical situation and direct time-image? So is it that there is no more need of montage? Is it that there is no more need ... in a way, it's the same thing as the question: is there no longer a need for the movement-image? Obviously, it is necessary that there is the movement-image; obviously it is necessary, obviously, otherwise cinema would not be cinema. I'm just saying, once again, that it is no more than a signpost. But it subsists, the movement-image. And montage? There I would not say the same thing, obviously.

The movement-image, I can say, in any case, is limited – as I said before (it was the best formula – not last time, but the one before) – I was saying, you understand, the movement-image subsists in this mutation, but it is no more than the first dimension of an image which does not cease to grow in dimensions. It is no more than the first dimension of an image which does not cease to grow in dimensions [*Deleuze repeats*] – we will see these other dimensions – but the second dimension of this image, more important than the first, is already the direct time-image, Chronos, the malady. The characters of cinema are necessarily sick; how could they not be? They are seers; they are seers, the chronics, the chronic seers. You realise the situation? Chronic seers, there is no living like that. To be a chronic seer in the situation of seeing the intolerable, what a life! And yet that also makes for burlesque, I mean, don't worry, it's also funny, all that.

But then, sometimes this will be a cinema which will tend, just as it tends to limit the movement-image, to impose significant limits on montage; [*Pause*] perhaps in the case of the Straubs – we will see that later, these are more complicated problems – and certainly in the case of Marguerite Duras. But to limit montage, what does that mean? We will see. Sometimes they will give to montage a new function; in that case, they do not limit it; they will give it a new function, which will be precisely independent of a sensory-motor development. What will this other function be?

There is an article I quite like by [Robert] Lapoujade, in the issue of *L'Arc* on Fellini, where Lapoujade cites Fellini, Resnais, and a certain number of others who are famous *monteurs* – I think that would also suit Welles who has never hidden that, for him, montage remains the fundamental form of the cinematographic act. – [Lapoujade] says, we should find another word for the modern *auteurs* who have a sense of montage, who do not limit montage at all, but who give it a new function, and he proposes the word – it's his idea – 'montrage'. They no longer make montage, they make 'montrage'. What does that mean? For *montrage* is not *showing* [*montrer*] an image; it is exercised on a set of optical and sound images, just as montage was exercised on a set of movement-images. What would that be, *montrage*? Isn't it necessary to find another word again? How to define this new form of montage, for example, among authors, in effect, like Fellini, Resnais, Welles, all that? We will see this later.²⁶

But then here we are, it's our hypothesis which corresponds – I've rejoined with it, I've looped the loop – to my little 'a' of before the mutation.²⁷ My little 'a', this was *movement-image-montage*, and through the intermediary of montage, *indirect image of time*. And then we fall back into, in that case, a problem which is therefore the pure optical and sound image or, let's say, opsign and sonsign, [*Pause*] which will give – either without intermediary or through the intermediary of a 'montrage', as Lapoujade said, or in any case of a new conception of montage – ... what will result? Well, immediately perhaps, a direct time-image; it will be a cinema of time.

But what will this be, this 'time'? Nothing will turn out to be more stupid, more commonplace, more falsely commonplace, than the idea that the cinematographic image is by nature in the present. [*Pause*] I don't know where that could have come from, because from the beginning, we knew that the cinematographic image could not be in the present. The cinematographic image is obviously not in the present to the extent that the movement-image itself, the movement-image, for its part, would be in the present. But the movement-image always presents us with aberrations of movement, and the aberrations of movement, for sure you can always try to define them in the present tense. But it's obviously not the case, they are not definable in the present. There is a very deep link with something which the present does not account for: the aberrance is precisely what should not be there when it is there. Impossible to define aberration without a reference, without a temporal reference that exceeds the present. But anyway it doesn't matter for the moment; we will come back to all that.

Then, last point: if we give ourselves this mutation in cinema, what would the consequences be? Just as when one gives oneself the mutation in philosophy: what consequences? [*Pause*] What consequences? [*Deleuze laughs a little*] I'll acknowledge here that this slightly comes from a taste for rediscovering here my predilection for a classification of signs.

The first consequence, I can say, is the direct time-image. But I'm not sure yet; these are suggestions. All I can add is that pure optical and sound situations will not open up a direct

time-image, a direct path into time, without also opening up other things to us. And what will they be? It will be a new pedagogy of the image, that is to say, the pure visual and sound image cannot be analyzed in the same way as the movement-image was analyzed; it will imply another type of analysis. [Pause] Moreover, in a certain manner, the purely visible and audible image will become something other than an image seen and heard; it will accede to another level. It will be, in a certain manner, a *read* image. There will be a readability of the visible and the audible, as if the visible and the audible as such were becoming readable, that is to say, made the object of an analysis of a new type, an analysis which I could summarize like this: an analysis which no longer consists in seeking the elements of a thing, of an image, but the conditions. You will tell me that this isn't clear. No, it's not clear. But all that is necessary is just that you feel that there is a significant difference here, between going back towards the conditions of the image, instead of analyzing it into its elements.

And finally, it will involve a whole new relation with thought. The pure optical and sound situations will enter into a new relation with time, with the analysis of the image, and with thought. The typical example, I'm not sure myself, but the typical examples we could take from Godard. However, the example which is perhaps the most ..., at the same time one of the most ..., which remains one of the first typical examples of this, occurs in Antonioni's masterpiece, his first feature-length film – and he hit his target here for the first time – “Story of a Love Affair” [1950]. You will find everything there. I mean, you find: the establishment of a pure description, namely: the description replaces the object. In effect, the whole story revolves around an investigation – for those who have seen it, I'm saying this for those who remember this film a little – the whole story revolves around an investigation; and this investigation does not proceed through flashback, it proceeds through pure description. And we find there a very beautiful case of pure description, rather than flashback – it is when the maid retraces the exact movements and gestures she made previously. It's not a flashback, she does it herself all over again; she has her shopping bag, she puts the shopping bag down, etc., and she redoes her actions. So there, that is played out as a pure description; and likewise the famous scene with the elevator, which is a very beautiful case of pure description, involving a melange of two descriptions. Good: and that opens onto a direct time-image that is typical of Antonioni: what happened? What could have happened for us to end up here? The weight of time upon us. [Pause]

At the same time, the components of the image are of an extremely new type. As Noël Burch says, who has analyzed this aspect very well, it's very curious, but the camera – there are many movements – the camera escapes the alternative which was still classical at the time, of either following a character in movement, or else of making the movements around a character, and instead accedes to quite particular functions of thought. In “Cronaca di un amore” [“Story of a Love Affair”], all this is already clear; but to think of that, you have to think about ... [Deleuze does not finish the sentence]²⁸

Well, in addition, there is obviously the whole direction taken up by *cinéma vérité*, as much in America as in France. Constantly keeping in mind the key formula of Jean Rouch, namely, that *cinéma vérité* never meant cinema of truth, but only means one thing: truth of cinema, truth of cinema, that is to say, without doubt a coming-to-consciousness, or an ascent of the camera to a new function, beyond merely recording movements or producing movements around something. So what would these functions of thought be?²⁹

I would say, if I continue to call my pure optical and sound situations cut off from their motor prolongation *opsigns* and *sonsigns* in a categorization of signs, that *opsigns* and *sonsigns*

open themselves immediately onto three types of signs, which are going to result from them: *chronosigns*, direct images of time; *lectosigns*, [Pause] namely, the analytic conditions of the image, the analytic conditions of the image which render the image readable, as much as visible and audible, lectosigns; and *noosigns* – *noos* meaning spirit or thought (*n* double *o* - sign) – noosign, namely referring to the functions of thought of cinema. [Pause] I would therefore have here a whole series of signs absolutely ... [Deleuze does not finish the sentence]³⁰

One last thing remains ... Okay, now we are going to look at a case, an exemplary case, we are going to look at an exemplary case, because it seems to me that historically – perhaps I am mistaken – he was the one who was the inventor of this mutation. If you grant me this mutation after the war, the inventor of this mutation, who did it before the war, comes from a long way away from Europe, a long way away from America: it is Ozu. And this is where I want to take up the striking example of Ozu, not to say that the others who came after ... [Deleuze does not finish the sentence]. Ozu had undergone the influence of American cinema; he drew things from it, in my opinion, which nourished the mutation and then, when the New Wave ... [Deleuze corrects himself], er, when neorealism goes on to carry out the great mutation (followed by the New Wave), the question is: did they already know Ozu? Perhaps some of you are familiar with him. But I wouldn't want to take that for granted. It must have been the case that familiarity with Ozu only came later on. It would surprise me if Rossellini had known Ozu. Either way, it is completely different.

That doesn't stop me from asking: who was it who first invented, introduced into cinema, pure optical and sound situations? And I answer: it was Ozu, that's who. And then if someone asks me: and what follows from that? I would say: for the first time, a direct image of time, a direct time-image. You will say to me: ah! But if you say that ... [Deleuze does not finish the sentence]. I would say: well yes, that's how it is; it was the Japanese, that's how it is. He did that, Ozu, it was him. It was him and ... then the importance of his discovery in Europe afterwards – if it's indeed right that it happened after the discovery of Ozu in Europe – well, in a certain manner, you understand, that would be unfortunate because Europe then went on to make the mutation on its own account with other means. So when Ozu was discovered, it could only have been with a kind of deep admiration ... But what allowed Ozu to make this advance? Without doubt something that was profoundly Japanese, but also something which depended, which had depended, I believe, for my part – I don't feel like one of those who say that Ozu's best work is from before the war – something which really had to be consolidated by the post-war period and by the special conditions of the post-war period in Japan, in order that the great unity of this whole mutation in cinema could emerge in the post-war period. So let's look at Ozu, and that will suffice for today.

Or do you want a little rest? No, a little rest, no? It is what? Is it midday? [Indistinct sentences; pause; one hears Deleuze whispering indistinctly to someone near him] So there you are, no rest, no, no rest ... We have to ..., oh, I completely forgot, do they open? That would surprise me. Do the windows open? Open the window! [Pause] I'd be surprised, they look like the ones in high-speed trains. Open it then. You don't have to smoke; you could give it a rest a bit over there, eh? There is a saturation of smoke. Be nice. Stop smoking for a quarter of an hour; then the next time ... I had completely forgotten about it, but we need to settle this whole smoking thing. I don't want it anymore. I will give you, I will make you ... [Interruption of the recording]

Part 3

... It's complicated, this affair, but at the same time, it will turn out to be very simple. [*Pause*] I'll say this: look, there is a point everyone agrees on. Of course, there is movement, to be sure, in Ozu, there is movement. There is movement, there is no action. There is no action, but there is movement. That is absolutely confirmed. Obviously, the movement-image is not suppressed. There is even always a voyage, a leaving and a return, whether on the train, on bicycle; he loves that, Ozu. There is movement, but it no longer belongs to movement anymore. He is a voyager, for sure.

And his real subject is the most everyday life. The more ordinary it is, the happier he is. But then how does he make a scenario out of that? Above all, he does not at all seek to tell a story. Since he knows in any case that what he will tell will be the same thing as in the previous film, there is not much to seek. He does not seek to tell anything. What then is he looking for? Which aspect of the actor does he want – not which actual actor – rather, what kind of countenance, what kind of body does he want? And that's what he asks of his screenwriter, along with the furnishing of any topic of dialogue whatever. I insist: any whatever. A type of actor, physical and mental, and any topic of dialogue whatever. That's all he needs to start with. And above all, nothing extraordinary. The most everyday, daily life, everyday banality.

Good ... but you will ask me, everyday banality, what is that? It is precisely ready-made sensory-motor schemas. Yes, a bit like we said for De Sica: I prepare my coffee in the morning. In appearance, it is that, well yes, but in appearance only, because the sensory-motor schemas, they never stop slipping out of sync, they never stop cracking. In the simplest dialogue, it's: I can't take it anymore, I can't take it anymore. Here I am with other people, they're talking to me ... I have my sensory-motor responses, but I barely listen. Think of a doctor, seeing his tenth patient, he must barely listen, it's only when he's all alone by himself at home later on that he can just about start to form a response. We hardly dare think about what's going on in the doctor's head. He has his sensory-motor montages, okay, but then all that starts to slide.

In a family conversation, ouf ... There too, it's also "the possible, the possible, otherwise I'll suffocate."³¹ Look at that guy walking out. What's he looking at? An empty space, a landscape, then he goes back in. He takes up the random any-conversation-whatever again. With a little exhalation, the sensory-motor schema has slipped, or has suddenly become weakened. He can no longer take it. He has grasped, and he knows it, it's striking, he has grasped the intolerable in everyday life. The intolerable in everyday life, understand, it is dangerous, huh, because there are already so many ways it can appear. People can have an easily irritated character. It's not those I want to focus on, because that's bad, it's just flat. The great irritated types have more to do with sensory-motor schemas. I don't want to talk about them. I want to talk about the more subtle creatures. Not the choleric, not them at all. The choleric are pure sensory-motor. They shoot off with their anger, and there it is, out it comes.

I want to talk about something else, like when it's truly something other that slips into us. It's not my anger. It is that I'm suffocating. It's not that you're irritating me. We are way beyond that. It's: I can't take it anymore – it's not your fault, it's no one's fault, I just cannot take any more. I go over to the window, and then pace back again ... Don't worry, I'm coming back, just wait a second, I'm coming back. If you like, it no longer belongs to sensory-motricity, it's that I've fallen right into a hole. It's that the sensory-motricity either has got entirely distended, or there is some kind of hole. And I find myself in a pure optical and sound

situation; I gaze at the empty landscape. I have grasped the intolerable in everyday life, in what is most ordinary.

I was saying earlier, when we were still talking about neorealism, that there is what belongs to the remarkable, and there is what belongs to the ordinary; but that in any case for neorealism the two come back to the same thing, or one follows from the other. Take Antonioni: there is something extraordinary, something remarkable. For example, a young girl has disappeared on the small island: that is extraordinary. Where could she have gone on this whole little island? And then there is something ordinary, because it is all reported, it is never explained, and on top of that there are dead periods in the search when no one believes she is going to be found. In that case I can say: there is something remarkable and something ordinary.

In Ozu, no doubt, no doubt, that has to refer to the secrets of Japan, no? There is absolutely no longer anything ... ‘Remarkable’ and ‘ordinary’ are no longer pertinent distinctions. I’m saying that in order to express my absolute disagreement with an interpretation by an American – okay, he’s specialist on Japan, so perhaps I should be more modest, but I am not convinced. I am sure he is wrong. His name is Paul Schrader. Paul Schrader, in his interpretation of Ozu’s work, which he calls a ‘transcendental cinema’ (so we will have to come back to this point), proposes a distinction between a first stage ... He distinguishes three stages, Schrader; we’ll see what the third is. I would also like to distinguish three, but they are not the same, you understand. So that’s why I’m quite happy at the same time, since they’re not the same. Otherwise, I would get you to read Schrader, and that would be enough. So Schrader, [*Pause*] Schrader says: there is a first stage, it is everyday banality in Ozu.

And then there is a second stage which he calls ‘disparity’, that is to say, what contrasts with everyday banality – or the decisive event. (Schrader’s text can be found in translation, translated very well, I think, by Dominique Villain, in *Cahiers du cinéma*, number 286, March ’78³²) So he calls the second stage *disparity*, or the *event*, or the *decisive act*. And he gives an example. He gives as an example the famous examples in Ozu of sudden tears. For example, a father is very happy with his daughter’s marriage, and then he suddenly starts crying, sudden tears. [*Pause*] Or, the most famous case, one of the most beautiful, is “Late Spring,” [1949] where the daughter looks at her sleeping father, and she gives a little smile, and then we see a vase, we come back to the girl, and the girl is on the verge of tears. Or in “The End of Summer” [1961], it’s a very frequent figure in Ozu. In “The End of Summer”, there is the girl who makes a sour remark about her father after the father’s death, of the type: oh, he was so annoying! And then she bursts into tears. Schrader, for his part, sees a decisive action there, or as he says: the expression of an emotion which up until then had been repressed, and which contrasts with everyday banality. He makes a second stage from it which he needs. So he reintroduces into Ozu – this is what I’m insisting on, it’s through that that it already appears to me very European, and therefore cannot really be Japanese – he reintroduces our distinction between the ordinary and the remarkable or the extraordinary.³³

But what is more it seems to me that he reintroduces it really badly. Why? Because I just ask myself what the decisive action, or the decisive event, is when the daughter, who was smiling a bit, passes to the verge of tears looking at her sleeping father. What is there that is remarkable in that? I only see the uniform unfolding of a single and same reality of everyday banality, one point, that’s all. I search in vain for anything remarkable, for repressed emotion. I don’t see anything at all; I see an everyday banality which has a certain duration, and that’s it. And why? And why? It’s because, let’s put ourselves in the place of a Japanese person,

although we don't need to, we are all Japanese. I'm saying to you that, at a certain level, what must be said is: there is the ordinary *and* the remarkable. Yes, there are things that are striking and others that are not striking; there is the banal and the singular. But at another level, no. Everything is up to you, it's as singular as you would like, or as banal. Everything is banal.

Everything is banal, well that must remind us of something; we have talked about that. It is the great Chinese philosopher, Leibniz³⁴ [*Laughter*]; the great Chinese novelist, Maurice Leblanc, when he depicted his philosopher, the Professor of Everyday Philosophy, who said: "Everything is ordinary, everything is everyday".³⁵ To our eyes, yes! To our eyes, there are extraordinary things. But in what sense to our eyes, in our eyes? To our eyes, how? To our optical eyes? But not to our *seeing* eyes. It is because we are not seers that it seems to us that there is nothing extraordinary. If one is a seer, if one is a little visionary, everything is equally banal, or everything is equally extraordinary. These are just pragmatic eyes: the distinction between remarkable and ordinary only holds for pragmatic eyes. The eye of the seer ignores the distinction between the banal and the extraordinary.³⁶

Ah, he ignores that: and why? For a very simple reason. Leibniz, what does he tell us, Leibniz? He says: "One can propose a sequence or series ..." ³⁷ – in Chinese, this means series³⁸ – "one can propose a sequence or series of numbers that is absolutely irregular in appearance, where the numbers increase and decrease variably without any apparent order ..." Here, we say to ourselves, that's not banal, this sequence of numbers: it is extraordinary. And yet, "whoever knows the key to the formula ..." – he loved searching for keys, Leibniz – "whoever knows the key to the formula and who is able to understand the origin and the construction of this sequence of numbers, will be able to give a rule, which, once properly understood, will show that the series is quite regular, and that it even has properties that are beautiful. One can make this even more evident in lines ..." – here he speaks as a great geometer – "One can make this even more evident in lines: a line can have ..." – learn this by heart, it's a really beautiful sentence, I like it a lot in any case – "a line can have turns and returns ..." – the departure and return of the voyage to Tokyo – "a line can have turns and returns, ups and downs, cusps and points of inflection ..." – that is to say, in mathematics, what one calls "remarkable points" – "breaks and other varieties, in such a way that one can see neither rhyme nor reason in it ..." – this is our situation in the world – "and yet, it might be the case that one is able to give the equation and the construction, in which a geometer would find the reason and the propriety of all these so-called irregularities ..." – and he concludes ingenuously – "and this is how one must go on to judge those of monsters ..." – the irregularities of monsters – "and other so-called faults in the universe." This means that our eyes here are solely pragmatic.

So, all of a sudden, I see something, and I say: Ah! This is something extraordinary. It's exactly like when I'm not doing mathematics, I find myself before a point that I will call an *extremum*, in a curve, in the representation of a function, and I say: well, this point here is a remarkable point. Indeed, it is a remarkable point, yes, yes, yes! But in another way, it is completely regular, completely ordinary; if you have the equation of the curve, it is all normal. So what does this mean? What does it mean for our situation, for us men? And how am I right back in Ozu?

The situation for us men is this: let us call 'universe' the law of series, the law of ordinary series. I would say, in a certain way, in the universe, everything is ordinary, even if it exists for the sake of the highest law of God. Everything is ordinary. Nature is the series of

regularities. In other words, nature is everyday banality. [Pause] That's true nature: only when one has the eyes of the seer does everyday banality have an inexhaustible beauty. It is that, you understand, it is that. When you are a seer, the marvelous spectacle of the world is that of everyday banality. He speaks for life.

The problem is men are not seers. Men, with their little pragmatic eyes, never stop putting disturbances into the series. They put disturbances into the series. The series which was supposed to be over there, he puts it here. If I rip up a sequence from its series in order to put it into another series, then, yes, I'm going to say: it's extraordinary. [Pause] Now, men, they never stop doing that. But as Ozu says, women, for their part, know much better that one shouldn't do that, and that there is a means of not doing it; and that the good order of nature and of the world is that the father dies before the son, and that the son dies before his son, and that if things proceed in that way, nature is satisfied and reveals to us its splendor. Don't upset the series.

Don't upset the series. Yes, but the men, the males, never stop upsetting the series. As it's said in a very amusing film by Ozu, where there are three guys, who think they are doing the right thing, who want a daughter to get married, but the daughter does not want to get married because she has her mother, so they decide that the mother must get married before the daughter ...³⁹ [Laughter] And there is a female character who says to them – they are rather burlesque here; it's good burlesque Ozu – who says to them: you have disturbed the still waters, you have disturbed the still waters [Deleuze repeats], that is to say, you have taken from one sequence there, and you have stuffed the thing over there where it shouldn't have been, you have disturbed the order of the series, and one finds oneself in a situation from which one cannot get out.

Hence the post-war period and the importance of the post-war period for Ozu; the post-war period, what is it? It's the Coca-Cola series, that's how he experiences it. After the war is the Coca-Cola series, which has collided with the Japanese series. And that produces a clash, it makes a clash, because it is the series of whatever you like – whiskey, Coca-Cola – which collides with what? Well, with the wigs of the geishas⁴⁰, the Japanese series par excellence, as he shows in – I'm not totally sure, let me know if I'm pronouncing it properly – in “An Autumn Afternoon”⁴¹ [1962]. There is, you know, the guy with regrets, who says, “Ah! Remember before the war! Ah, the war!”, and who then parades around a little, giving a military salute, and who says to his former captain or commander (I can't remember): “Hey, Captain or Commander: what if the opposite had happened? If the opposite had happened?” [Deleuze laughs while paraphrasing the dialogue] “If we'd actually won? Then over there we would have brought in ...”, he says, “what would we have brought in over there? *Sake*, the *samisen*”, ... what is the *samisen*?

Hidenobu Suzuki: A musical instrument.

Deleuze: Ah, it's a musical instrument. “... and geisha wigs. The Americans wouldn't be able to escape, they'd be wearing geisha wigs, they'd have to play the *samisen*, and they'd have to drink *sake*; while look at us now, we've got the lot, we've got their whiskey and their Coca-Cola, their distinct lack of wigs, and we've got their shamelessness and their music.” You see, that's typical of Ozu. In both cases, what the war does is throw series out of sync.

Now, from the point of view of the image, it's very important because he lets in ... when we talk about colors in Ozu after the war, it's fascinating. There is the very elaborate series of

what we Europeans call the ‘washed-out’ and ‘subtle’ shades of Japan, subtle or washed-out from our perspective. And then they collide with, well, the red label Coca Cola ... no, the red label Johnnie Walker or the red Coca-Cola can, which often make an appearance in Ozu. And there, you have a kind of ..., you’ve taken a bottle of Coke from America, or a can of Coke, and you’ve stuffed it into the series – even from the point of view of each of the color series – you’ve jammed it into the color series that corresponds to a completely different law. You have disturbed the order of the series.

And the contemplation of Nature – this is what I’ve been leading up to, I’m returning to my idea – ... What is intolerable about everyday banality? Whatever the situation, you can’t get away from everyday banality, but what’s intolerable about it is that men don’t stop messing around with it. [*Pause*] If men didn’t mess around with it, what would it be? It would be splendid, because it would be Nature in itself. When one of Ozu’s characters leaves the conversation and goes to look for a brief moment at the snow-covered mountain, it means that the snow-covered mountain is Nature itself, it is certainly not a ‘decisive’ view or an extraordinary action. It is, on the contrary, the presentiment, or what gives us the presentiment, that there is a regularity in the universe, that there is an order to the series: mountain-valley, snow- [*Pause*] – we need to complete it – snow-sun, I don’t know, Winter-Spring, etc.

So there is absolutely not the slightest duality between, as is said according to Schrader, the ordinary on the one hand and the extraordinary or what is decisive or a disparity on the other. There are two states of the ordinary: the sensory-motor ordinary, which is that of the series disturbed by man and by the restless activity of man, [*Pause*] and the sublime ordinary, which is the series once their laws, their regularities, have been reconquered, and which can only appear to the eye of the seer, and which will define pure optical-sound situations. One can only gaze at them. See, it is not at all an opposition. There are indeed two stages. But this second stage, it is what? It is either an empty landscape, an empty outdoor landscape, the snow-covered mountain; or an empty interior; and these are the famous empty spaces of Ozu. They are Ozu’s empty spaces. [*Pause*]

So the distinction is not at all that of *ordinary-decisive*. The distinction is this: the disturbed sensory-motor ordinary gives way to an ordinary of Nature that only the eye of the seer can grasp. And this ordinary of Nature, we grasp it in the empty landscape or in the empty interior, in the deserted landscape or in the empty interior, which allows us to restart our analysis because the empty landscape ... I think that Ozu, in effect, was the first inventor not only of those pure optical and sound situations where the guy gazes like that for a long time, in a long shot, at the landscape, at the end of an insignificant conversation. The optical and sound situation has been there from the beginning; it no longer belongs to the sensory-motor. So I’m saying not only did he invent that, but I think he was the first to invent disconnected spaces and empty spaces, the deserted landscape and the empty interior, that is to say shots which last for a long time, of empty interiors of which one doesn’t even know whether they are occupied or there’s no one there, whether there’s someone in the background or not.

And the deserted landscape – here obviously we will see how this is not equivalent to the photo – that is the object of this second aspect, empty landscapes. It restores to us the secret of seeing, I think, to know how to see these empty spaces, these deserted landscapes, these empty spaces. What made for both the scandal of Ozu and the glory of Ozu, whichever you like, is in fact completely opposed to the spaces of the other great Japanese [directors]. If you think, in fact, of the kind of space found in [Kenji] Mizoguchi, which is a space absolutely ...

very, very beautiful, unbelievably beautiful and also new, where there are lines joining one being to another, invisible lines which unite the beings, what I called in a previous year the 'lines of the universe' which go from one being to another being, or from beings to things, and which trace a whole space through lines like those belonging to the universe;⁴² if you think of the space of Kurosawa, and what empties the space, condemning you to these empty spaces, to all that – to my knowledge, he was the one who did it first, because he did it from his silent period onwards. He nailed it in his silent films, even if he did prolong the silent film for an overly long time. But with regard to the question of dates, I think that this would be one of the rare cases where one can affirm a primacy over ... [*Deleuze does not finish the sentence*] He's the one who discovered that. The others, when they rediscovered it, simply rediscovered what he had done in their own ways, I believe.

But then I want to add that my disagreement [with Schrader] intensifies, because in my opinion, all the writers, all the critics of Ozu have clearly grasped the importance of this sense of space. I'm thinking of two of them in particular. Noël Burch did some marvelous commentaries, and an American called [Donald] Richie also did some marvelous commentaries.⁴³ The Japanese, I suppose, the great Japanese critics must also have grasped it. Schrader himself obviously talked quite a bit about [space]. But all I want to say, for my part, is – I don't know if someone's already said this, I hope not – is that in my opinion ... Well, earlier, I reproached Schrader for distinguishing two things which should not have been distinguished, or for making a bad distinction, by distinguishing between two stages, that of the ordinary and that of the decisive. But now I'd like to make the inverse reproach, because I'd like to reproach all of them, not just Schrader, but Burch too, and Richie too, despite the beauty of their analyses, for contaminating two things which should be absolutely separated in Ozu: namely, deserted landscapes or empty interiors, on the one hand, and on the other hand, something completely different which should be called 'still lives.'⁴⁴ And these are not the same thing.⁴⁵

It is not at all the same thing, not at all the same thing. What's the difference, you ask? I will specify. Noël Burch suggests a word, the problem, to designate it, and he's right. Noël Burch suggests a word, and as he speaks very good English and American, he was lucky: he calls it 'pillow shots.' These shots, this type of shot in Ozu, are 'pillow shots', he says, that is to say [in French] *plans oreillers* – Japanese pillows you see, pillow shots. Richie, in order to designate the whole ensemble, suggests the word 'still life' [*nature morte*]. But in any case, what they have in common, and Schrader too, is to put in the same group, whether it's 'pillow shots' or 'still life', deserted landscapes and empty interiors, on the one hand, and on the other hand, object compositions. [*Pause*] And for my part, I feel that we would have the greatest reasons to distinguish them, so that there would be three stages, but not at all the same as Schrader's three stages. Schrader says the three stages are the ordinary, the decisive, and what he calls 'stasis', that is to say, landscapes or object compositions. For us, the three stages would be: everyday banality or the ordinary, empty spaces or interiors or landscapes – landscapes, deserted interiors, or empty interiors –, and object compositions in the third place. Why, regarding what in Burch or Richie is called 'still life', would I like to make a big distinction? It is well-founded, it seems to me; it is well-founded, it seems to me [*Deleuze repeats*]. There is a big difference. I'll take an example which will fit well, I hope ... I'll take the example of Cézanne.

Well, Cézanne, that's not insignificant, that's not insignificant, because he happens to be a typical case. He tries everything, Cézanne, to achieve his goal; in order to achieve his fantastic goal, he tries everything. He tries everything, right up to the portrait. But above all

what he is known for, his masterpieces ... I'm not saying that the rest is bad, but finally he himself was not happy with it ... As [D.H.] Lawrence says in that sublime text on Cézanne which I've often spoken to you about⁴⁶, as the English novelist says, who did such a beautiful text on Cézanne, no, Cézanne was never able to understand what a woman was, never. With men he was slightly better, but not strong, no, he didn't know, he couldn't manage it. Although the way in which Cézanne fails, goes so far beyond the way in which any painter succeeds He could not, he never understood Mme Cézanne: not possible, no. He understood landscape; that, landscape, he understood better. Yes. But his true masterpieces were still lifes; *that*, he understood. He found what he was looking for: it was the apple. Woman, he did not understand. The famous landscape of Aix-en-Provence he almost understood, but that wasn't it yet. Where he did triumph, Lawrence says, was in discovering the appley being of the apple.⁴⁷ The appley being of Mme Cézanne, he did not find; the appley being of the landscape, he *almost* found. What does it mean to say that he understood the appley being of the apple? What difference is there? One can botch it at landscape and succeed at still life. Where is it? What would the difference be? What does he do, Cézanne, in his landscapes? His problem is how to extract himself from the banal image, how to leave behind the everyday image, how to attain a true image. It is that.⁴⁸

It is the same problem with the filmmaker. How to arrive at true images? This is the problem that Godard has always claimed for himself: there are no true images, how to attain true images? How to arrive at an image? Well, how *do* you get to a true image? How to undo all those clichés that occupy us before we can even ..., that is to say: how to be a seer? How to be a little bit of a seer? Cézanne's response at the level of landscape is: in order to extract oneself from the cliché, from the ready-made, from the banal image, in order to make a true image emerge, it will be necessary to *make holes*. One must make holes. It will be necessary to reach in one way or another a certain emptiness, which gives us the presence to itself of the landscape. It is by way of a void. You need a hedge surrounding a void. Or, at the end, in the very late landscapes of Cézanne, he leaves holes. These are the famous holes that have provoked so much discussion. He leaves holes. That's what it takes.⁴⁹

In other words, landscape in the case of Cézanne is in a sense elevated to the level of an eminently Japanese art which will be that of the void, the void being evaluated by the absence of a possible content. It will be necessary to suppress the content, where this imposes itself. It is through the suppression of content that one will be able to arrange a landscape. One will have to make holes in order to extract it, [*Pause*] in order to extract it. Very curious. Cézanne's still lifes, his object compositions, though, no longer need that. And in fact, it's not the void that's involved, it's not empty spaces. A still life is not the same problem as a deserted landscape or an empty interior. What's the problem this time? A still life is rather ... In what way is it a composition? It is rather something which envelops itself into itself and which becomes its *own* content. I would say it's almost the opposite. So with that, there is no longer any need to privilege, it's the opposite. It's truly the opposite. [*Pause*] Instead of being a content which holds through a vacuity or through holes made in the content, it is a content which envelops itself and which becomes its own content, through the composition. And that, Cézanne knows how to do.

You will say to me that he was not the first to make still lifes. Yes, quite: he knows to do it in a radically new way. It is in the still life that he will finally triumph. And then, after Cézanne, they will all fall back onto the question: still life: landscape or portrait? And there will be the immense letters of Van Gogh, formidable letters: "I think I've found a way to return to the

portrait!";⁵⁰ he approaches the portrait with fear and trembling. And after Cézanne, this whole story will get underway: still life, landscape, portrait; still life, landscape, portrait.

Okay, so what are still lives in the true sense in Ozu, then? It is not at all the same thing as empty landscapes. [Pause] First of all, it is so little emptied out that there is always something changing around the still life. Obviously, there are intermediaries between still life and empty landscape. Take one of Ozu's most beautiful films, what's the title again? ... it's "Floating Weeds" [1959]. Watch out because there are two. There is "A Story of Floating Weeds" [1934] and "Floating Weeds". It is in "Floating Weeds" that there is an admirable composition, with bottle and lighthouse – we should talk in the same way we talk about a painter – 'Composition with Bottle and Lighthouse': you have the beach with, in the foreground, a bottle, nicely posed there, and in the background, a lighthouse. Everything else is empty. A marvel, it's truly beautiful. But then that's ambiguous: is that a still life or is it an empty landscape? Most of the time, there is no difficulty. For example, when he makes a long shot of a vase, I can say: it is a still life. When he shows an empty room, I can say: this is an empty space. There are compositions ..., in one Ozu, for example, there is a famous composition, a still life with fruit and golf club.⁵¹ Just like in the 17th century, you could have a still life with fish and umbrella, whatever, or with a pair of glasses, whatever you like.

Now, what happens in a genuine still life in Ozu? I say: there is always something which changes, but not it, not it. What changes, for example, is the daughter who, before, looked at her sleeping father with a little smile, and afterwards has tears in her eyes.⁵² Between the two, there is the long shot of the vase: still life. Or he excels in still lives with a time variation. I mean, the morning that dawns, it is almost still dark, still life, the day has begun. Sometimes: formidable still life of Ozu: light falling on clothes. That is all. The light intensifying, the clothes functioning as still life. I am saying something very simple. What is a still life? It is inseparable from a change. [Pause] It is inseparable from a change. It is very different from the deserted landscape, or the empty interior. The still life is inseparable from a change, so much ... [Interruption of the recording]

... from smiling to tears. [Pause] The still life is the unchanging as necessary correlate of that which changes. It is form filled by change itself, it is pure form filled by change. One more step. It is the immutable form of change. It is the form of change. Why? It is the form of what changes and which is filled with what changes. [Pause] Why? For an obvious reason: the form of what changes does not itself change. Why can't the form of what changes itself change? Because if it itself changed, it would change into another form which, for its part, would not change. The form of change does not change. The still life is permanent, and pure permanence. The still life is permanent and pure permanence, how come? The form of what changes does not change, and nevertheless everything within that form changes, yes. Every content of this form changes, but it, the form of what changes, does not change. How would it change without having become its own content?

The form of change does not change. But my God: the form of change does not change, that's not in fact a Japanese poem. And God, I don't want to make any rapprochement, but that happens to be what Kant said. Kant defined time by saying to us: time is the form of what changes. Time is the form of what changes, but pay attention, the form of what changes does not itself change. Hence there is only one time. If time itself changed, it would have to change in another time, and so on to infinity. If time itself changed, it would be necessary for it to change in another time, which in its own turn would have to change in another time: an infinite regress. So we are condemned to say: the form of what changes, the form of any

possible change, is immutable, and that is time. Time, it is the immutable form of what changes. Ozu's still life is the immutable form of what changes. *[Pause]*

And the Japanese, in their Zen wisdom, found the phrase to say what time was. So there is no need to even understand what they mean, because it's a phrase which speaks so much to us. They say to us, according to the monk Dōgen – who has been translated into French, in I do not know which publishing house –

Hideobu Suzuki: *Les Éditions de la Différence*.

Deleuze : Ah, yes ... *[Pause]* What is it, what is it ... *[Deleuze looks for the reference]* ... Ah there: it is “the visual reserve”, the “visual reserve” – and of course, we can add “sonorous” to that, it must be a translation error *[Laughter]* – “the visual and sonorous reserve of events in their justice”⁵³, that is to say, in their justice – I don't even need to comment on it – in the regularity of their course, since we have seen that everything is regular. But beyond Nature, there is time, there is composition, there is the still life which is not the work of man. There is a still life⁵⁴ which is the work of God. Beyond the empty spaces, beyond the empty interiors and deserted spaces, beyond nature, there remains ... beyond all of that: there is the visual reserve, that is to say, the immutable form of what changes. *[Pause]*

Antonioni was to say in an interview much later ... He came up with an expression which left me dreaming. He entitles an article – but the article is not really about that unfortunately – he was to entitle an article ‘The Horizon of Events’⁵⁵, where he says in passing ... – actually no, it's in another text, in another interview, where he says something very curious – but also in this text on the horizon of events – there's a funny thing I found really striking. He says, you know, the Japanese, they hate science-fiction. I didn't know that at all. Is that true? He says, Japanese cinema: no science-fiction.

Claire Parnet: *[Indistinct sentences, but she does not seem to agree]*

Deleuze: Well, it's Antonioni who said it. *[Laughter]* They hate it. They say it's an American thing, science fiction is to do with the Americans. The Japanese, they hate it, because first of all they have historical reasons to hate it. Hiroshima is not science-fiction ...⁵⁶

Claire Parnet: It's true that Japanese science-fiction arrives later on.

Deleuze: Ah good. That's because they had got it from the Americans by then. *[Laughter]* Once again, Ozu would say: here we have one more terrible collision, yet another displacement. But Antonioni for his part also gives a reason. He says that it's because we Europeans have never known how to unify the horizon. The horizon of events, we have never known how to unify it; we're poor types – well, I'm forcing the text a little, but barely – he almost says it, he says that, we can say that he says that, Antonioni. He says, you understand, for our part, we have our horizon of everyday banality, and then on the other hand, we know that there is a cosmic horizon, a horizon which is constantly being pushed back by space travel, etc. But we have our horizon, our humble horizon of the shepherd, of sheep. (For us, it's St-Denis on the horizon, we were chased out and all that, that's my damned horizon ... well that's my horizon, eh? That'll have to do.⁵⁷) And then the cosmic horizon. Then the Europeans took as their little horizon: my daddy, my mummy, my family ... and then finally you get ... *[Maurice] Pialat, [Laughter]*, it's going to turn out badly.⁵⁸ They have taken what they could. But then the Americans took the wider horizons, they have taken the cosmic

horizon, the horizon that never stops receding and yielding up its monsters. But he says, all that, it's a Western affair, that.

For the Japanese, of course, they are not interested in that, because for them, no: for them, there is only one horizon. There is the horizon, the only horizon, which is the visual and sonorous reservoir of events in their justice, and which is just as cosmic as it is everyday, which is absolutely the same, the most everyday, the most cosmic, all of that. When they are on the Moon, the Japanese will say 'So what?', they will say: it's all quite ordinary. It's all ordinary; and then they will make a copy of the Moon, where they will discover all the regularities of the Moon. They will make a blueprint of it, and that will make films possible for the new Ozu, which will take twenty years to be understood.

Therefore, on which I can conclude ... – I see that you have a more and more dejected air. [Laughter] – I think it's time to end by just saying one more little thing. Well, all I wanted to show was that there was perhaps a connection, which defined the mutation of cinemas, between the pure optical and sound image and the direct time-image. If there is a connection between a pure optical and sound image, a pure optical and sound situation, and the direct time-image, one of the forms under which you find it in the pure state is Ozu. [Pause] And his direct time-image, it is what? It is precisely the still life. This is how it is absolutely different from a photo. These still life compositions of Ozu are the immutable form of what changes, that is to say, they are time in person, a bit of time in the pure state, and are without doubt equivalent to what Cézanne had succeeded in doing with his composition of apples. What Cézanne's apples succeeded in doing, Ozu's vase succeeds in doing in its own way; a little bit of time in the pure state, that is to say the immutable form of what changes, where you have the connection between pure optical and sound situation and direct time-image. [Pause]

Please be kind enough to reflect on this, and I would like it if next week we began with interventions from you on this point. [End of recording]

Notes

¹ Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991 [1896]), p. 158.

² Jean-Louis Schefer, *The Ordinary Man of Cinema*, translated by Max Cavitch, Paul Grant and Noura Wedell (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2016 [1980]), p. 105: "Cinema adds to objects the disquiet of its movement." This sentence appears in quotation marks in both the original French text (*L'Homme ordinaire du cinéma* (Paris: Gallimard, 1980, p. 115)) and the English translation, but no reference is given.

³ See the more expansive discussion of this point from Schefer in the preceding session (17 January 1984). Although Deleuze says he is "citing" the point, the citation does not seem to be directly from Schefer's text. It may possibly refer to the following passage: "Nor do I know, in this confrontation between gaze and body that is a spectacle, how the one watching sees each body that it is separating from act, retreat, and disappear – each body that is henceforth only destined for action and yet that leaves, in its spectator, not so much its image as its former center of gravity, which its immobility preceding action and its solitude before all confrontation required" (Schefer, *The Ordinary Man of Cinema*, pp. 104-105). Cf. also the discussion of Schefer's ideas in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), pp. 36-41.

⁴ The passage is from 'Bilan de fin de muet' ['Assessment at the End of Silent Cinema'], originally published in the journal *Cinéa Ciné pour tous*, January-February 1931, reprinted in Jean Epstein, *Écrits sur le cinéma, 1921-1953*, Volume 1 (Paris: Seghers, 1974, pp. 229-237). The paragraph concerned is a poetic description of the scene of a battle, filmed with the mobile "artificial eye" of the new American cinema: "Un fuyard crevait sous lui, moteur et pneus, mais il nous restait face à face; il fuyait et nous le regardions les yeux dans les yeux, indétachables comme sa conscience." ["The fugitive below breaks down with a flat tire, but he remained face-

to-face with us; he was fleeing and we looked at him eye-to-eye, indetachable like his own consciousness”] (p. 233).

⁵ In fact, the title of Epstein’s book is *La Lyrosophie* (Paris: Éditions de la Sirène, 1922). An editorial note to the reprinting of two chapters of *La Lyrosophie* in *Écrits sur le cinéma, 1921-1953*, Volume 1, says that *La Lyrosophie* “is not properly speaking a text on the cinema”, but that it contains “the philosophical conception developed by Epstein in his later writings” (p. 15).

⁶ Jean Epstein, *Écrits sur le cinéma, 1921-1953*, Volume 1 (1921-1947) (Paris: Seghers, 1974); Volume 2 (1946-1953) (Paris: Seghers, 1975). For an English selection of Epstein’s work (including extracts from *La Lyrosophie*), see *Jean Epstein: Critical Essays and New Translations*, ed. Sarah Keller and Jason N. Paul (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2012).

⁷ Deleuze’s Cinema seminar changed rooms starting with this session. See the discussion in the preceding session (17 January 1984), and the anecdote recounted by François Dosse: “One day, Deleuze was surprised to find his classroom door open, and he mockingly explained to his students that the administration had developed a plan of action, complete with strict rules, to prevent them stealing chairs from the neighboring classrooms” (*Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010 [2007]), p. 355).

⁸ See Sessions 18 and 19 of the first Seminar on Cinema, 11 and 18 May 1982; see also *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 272-273.

⁹ Deleuze begins *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 1-2, with this difference from Bazin and his work *What is Cinema?* (2 vols., translated by Hugh Gray, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967 (Volume One) and 1971 (Volume Two)).

¹⁰ This is a reference to Rossellini’s film “Stromboli” (1950)

¹¹ This refers to Vittorio De Sica’s film “Umberto D” (1952); see Session 18 of the first Seminar on Cinema, 11 May 1982. Cf. Bazin, ‘Umberto D: A Great Work’, in *What is Cinema?* Volume Two, pp. 79-82.

¹² On reports in Antonioni, see Session 4 of this Seminar, 6 December 1983, and also *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 5-9.

¹³ See the contrast between Fellini and Antonioni in Session 4 of this Seminar, 6 December 1983, and also *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 5.

¹⁴ See the discussion of this film in the preceding session (17 January 1984).

¹⁵ Ollier talks of “a sort of optical drama lived by the character” in *Souvenirs-écran* (Paris: Cahiers du cinéma/Gallimard, 1981), p. 18; see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 9.

¹⁶ See Session 21 of the First Cinema Course, 1 June 1982.

¹⁷ Deleuze aligns himself with Godard and Robbe-Grillet in the critique of metaphor; see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 20-21; 284 n. 37.

¹⁸ Deleuze has already considered burlesque in great detail; see above all Sessions 13, 15, and 18 in the First Seminar on Cinema, 16 March, 20 April and 11 May 1982; and Session 5 of the Second Seminar on Cinema, 14 December 1982; see also *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, chapters 9, 10, and 11.

¹⁹ On Jerry Lewis and Jacques Tati, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 64-67.

²⁰ In fact, the park, in “Traffic” (1971).

²¹ In “Playtime” (1967).

²² This is a reference to Robbe-Grillet’s collection, *For a New Novel* (translated by Richard Howard, New York: Grove Press, 1965 [1963]); see Session 3, 6 December 1983, and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 5-7, 44, 68-69.

²³ It sounds like Deleuze has tilted the well-known schema of the actual and virtual in Bergson’s *Matter and Memory* (p. 105) onto its side so that it is horizontal. The schema is reproduced in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, 289.

²⁴ On crystalline narration, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 127-128.

²⁵ On Chronos and malady in Antonioni, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 23-24.

²⁶ See *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 41 (and p. 288 n. 23) where Deleuze cites Lapoujade without giving the date of the issue of *L’Arc*, 45 (1971).

²⁷ “*Mon petit ‘a’ de avant la mutation*”: “petit ‘a’” is a Lacanian term (*objet petit ‘a’*) often used by Deleuze and Guattari, here perhaps also indicating the first letter of the word ‘avant’.

²⁸ On “Story of a Love Affair”, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 5, 8, 23-24. Burch’s discussion can be found in *Theory of Film Practice [Praxis du cinéma]*, translated by Helen R. Lane (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981 [1969]), pp. 27, 75-80.

²⁹ On Rouch’s formula, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 23, 151.

³⁰ Deleuze introduces these signs in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 23.

³¹ This phrase is a citation that Deleuze attributes to Kierkegaard's *Concept of Anxiety*, but as Ronald Bogue points out, the sentence is not to be found in that work; see Bogue, 'The Art of the Possible', *Revue internationale de philosophie*, 241.3 (2007), p. 278.

³² This refers to extracts drawn from the book *Transcendental Style in Film: Ozu, Bresson, Dreyer* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

³³ Deleuze discusses Ozu, and Schrader's interpretation of his work, in detail in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 13-18.

³⁴ On Leibniz, mathematics and Chinese philosophy, see Session 5 of the Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque, 6 January 1987; cf. also *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), chapter 3, note 10, p. 147, with its reference to the annotated edition of Leibniz's 'Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese' (1716) by Christiane Frémont, *Discours sur la théologie naturelle des Chinois* (Paris: L'Herne, 1987). An English translation of Leibniz's 'Discourse', along with three other texts, is contained in Leibniz, *Writings on China*, ed. Daniel J. Cook and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1994).

³⁵ See Session 3 of this Seminar (29 November 1983) for a detailed discussion of Maurice Leblanc's *The Extravagant Life of Balthazar*.

³⁶ Deleuze refers to Leibniz and Leblanc in this regard in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 14-15.

³⁷ Here Deleuze begins to quote from Part Three of Leibniz's *Theodicy*, # 242. What follows is E.M. Huggard's English translation of the passage, preceded by a section from # 241: "The question of *physical evil*, that is, of the origin of sufferings, has difficulties in common with that of the origin of *metaphysical evil*, examples whereof are furnished by the monstrosities and other apparent irregularities of the universe. But one must believe that even sufferings and monstrosities are part of order; and it is well to bear in mind not only that it was better to admit these defects and these monstrosities than to violate general laws, as Father Malebranche sometimes argues, but also that these very monstrosities are in the rules, and are in conformity with general acts of will, though we be not capable of discerning this conformity. It is just as sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics which issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom of them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to my principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences of general acts of will. [#242:] It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to elucidate these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where everything proceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by a close contemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the vision of the ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of numbers perfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase and diminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who knows the key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the structure of this succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule which, being properly understood, will show that the series is perfectly regular, and that it even has excellent properties. One may make this still more evident in lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and downs, points of reflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and other variations, so that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, especially when taking into account only a portion of the line; and yet it may be that one can give its equation and construction, wherein a geometrician would find the reason and the fittingness of all these so-called irregularities. That is how we must look upon the irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other so-called defects in the universe." (G.W. Leibniz, *Theodicy*, translated by E.M. Huggard, La Salle: Open Court, 1985, pp. 276-277). The *Theodicy* was originally written in French and published in 1710. Deleuze may also have been familiar with Alfred Fouillée's 1875 selection of extracts from the *Theodicée*, which presents the foregoing text under the heading 'Monsters'. Fouillée adds a note to the final sentence: "This is how Goethe and Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire reason." (Leibniz, *Extraits de la Théodicée, avec Introduction, Notes, Éclaircissements sur l'histoire de l'optimisme par M. Fouillée* (Paris: Ch. Delagrave, 1875, pp. 179-180).

³⁸ Deleuze distinguishes here between *séries* in the plural and *série* in the singular, but it is probably a joke, in line with the preceding descriptions of Leibniz and Leblanc as 'Chinese'.

³⁹ This is the film "Late Autumn" (1960).

⁴⁰ The English subtitles to the scene in question in "An Autumn Afternoon" mention "topknots" rather than "wigs".

⁴¹ The French title of "An Autumn Afternoon" is "Le Goût du saké" ["The Taste of Sake"].

⁴² On 'lines of the universe', see Session 17 of the First Seminar on Cinema, 4 May 1982; in Mizoguchi, see also *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 192-196.

⁴³ See Noël Burch, *To the Distant Observer: Form and Meaning in the Japanese Cinema*, ed. Annette Michelson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Donald Richie, *Ozu: His Life and Films* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

⁴⁴ It should be borne in mind in what follows that the French for 'still life' is *nature morte* [dead nature].

⁴⁵ On these references, see notes 25, 26, 29 in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 13-18.

⁴⁶ D.H. Lawrence, 'Introduction to these Paintings' [1929], in *Phoenix* [Volume I]: *The Posthumous Papers of D.H. Lawrence*, ed. Edward D. McDonald (London: Heinemann, 1936), pp. 551-584; translated as 'Introduction à ces peintures' in *Éros et les chiens* (Paris: Bourgois, 1973), pp. 253-264; see also *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 284 n. 38. (The footnote is misaligned in the text and correlates with the reference to footnote 39 on p. 22).

⁴⁷ In the essay, Lawrence first discusses the apple in the following passage: "The actual fact is that in Cézanne modern French art made its first tiny step back to real substance, to objective substance, if we may call it so. Van Gogh's earth was still subjective earth, himself projected into the earth. But Cézanne's apples are a real attempt to let the apple exist in its own separate entity, without transfusing it with personal emotion. Cézanne's great effort was, as it were, to shove the apple away from him, and let it live of itself" (*Phoenix* I, 567). From there, he goes on to develop the idea of "appleyness": "Cézanne's apple is a great deal, more than Plato's Idea" (*ibid*, 569). "The only part of [Cézanne's life-model] that was not banal, known *ad nauseam*, living cliché, the only part of her that was not living cliché was her appleyness" (578). The development perhaps culminates in this passage: "It is the appleyness of the portrait of Cézanne's wife that makes it so permanently interesting: the appleyness, which carries with it also the feeling of knowing the other side as well, the side you don't see, the hidden side of the moon. For the intuitive apperception of the apple is so tangibly aware of the apple that it is aware of it *all round*, not only just of the front. The eye sees only fronts, and the mind, on the whole, is satisfied with fronts. But intuition needs all-aroundness, and instinct needs insideness. The true imagination is for ever curving round to the other side, to the back of presented appearance" (579).

⁴⁸ For references by Deleuze to Lawrence's Cézanne and 'apple being' [*l'être pommesque*], see Session 6 of the Seminar on Spinoza, 13 January 1981, and Session 2 of the Seminar on Painting, 7 April 1981.

⁴⁹ In this regard, see *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, pp. 21-23. Cf. the following remarks by Lawrence: "The cliché obtruded, so he just abstracted away from it. Those last water-colour landscapes are just abstractions from the cliché. They are blanks, with a few pearly-coloured sort of edges. The blank is vacuum, which was Cézanne's last word against the cliché. It is a vacuum, and the edges are there to assert the vacuity" (*Phoenix* I, 581).

⁵⁰ Possibly a reference to a letter from Van Gogh to his sister: "What I'm most passionate about, much more than all the rest in my profession—is the portrait, the modern portrait. I seek it by way of colour, and am certainly not alone in seeking it in this way. I WOULD LIKE, you see I'm far from saying that I can do all this, but anyway I'm aiming at it, I *would like* to do portraits which would look like apparitions to people a century later. So I don't try to do us by photographic resemblance but by our passionate expressions, using as a means of expression and intensification of the character our science and modern taste for colour" (Vincent Van Gogh, *Ever Yours: The Essential Letters*, ed. Leo Jansen, Hans Luijten and Nienke Bakker (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2014, Letter 879, to Willemien van Gogh, 5 June 1890, p. 742). Cf. Deleuze's Seminar on Foucault, Lecture 5, 19 November 1985: "And you find, in Van Gogh's letters, an awe-filled discovery that the age of the portrait was returning."

⁵¹ In "What Did the Lady Forget?" (1937).

⁵² In "Late Spring" (1949); cf. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 17.

⁵³ Deleuze is here citing the subtitle of a recent French translation: Dōgen, *Shōbōgenzo: La réserve visuelle des événements dans leur justesse*. Textes choisis, traduits et annotés par Ryōji Nakamura et René de Ceccatty (Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1980). See *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 17 and p. 284 n. 30. (The footnote is misaligned in the text and correlates with the reference to footnote 31 on p. 17).

⁵⁴ This could be translated as: "There is a dead nature which is the work of God."

⁵⁵ Antonioni, 'L'Horizon des événements', *Cahiers du cinéma*, no. 290, July 1978.

⁵⁶ The interview Deleuze alludes to is from *Cahiers du cinéma*, no. 342, December 1982; it is translated in the collection of Antonioni's writings, *The Architecture of Vision*. In the relevant passage, the interviewer says to Antonioni, "I have just come back from Japan, and despite the fact that there is a lot of technology there, too, there isn't the same interest in science fiction as in the United States. The Japanese feel little interest in other possible worlds. Do you think we will ever get to explore them?", to which Antonioni responds: "The Japanese are very practical. For them, technology only serves an immediate purpose, making things that are useful to mankind and can be sold abroad, not things that are useful to go into space." ('My Method', translated by Andrew Taylor, in Michelangelo Antonioni, *The Architecture of Vision: Writings and Interviews on Cinema* (ed. Carlo di Carlo and Giorgi Tinazzi; American edition by Marga Cottino-Jones (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1996), p. 366. Deleuze refers to the two texts in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 284 n. 31, but drops the reference to Japanese science fiction. (Again, the references in the latter translation are out of sync and the relevant main text on p. 17 incorrectly refers to n. 32).

⁵⁷ Francois Dosse notes: "In 1980, Alice Saunié-Seité, the minister of universities, relocated the experimental Paris-VIII university campus from the Vincennes Woods in eastern Paris to the northern Saint-Denis suburb." (*Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, p. 397).

⁵⁸ Perhaps a reference to films focused on familial conflicts by Maurice Pialat.