

France Culture, Sixteen Philosophical Lessons from Gilles Deleuze

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Produced by David Lapoujade. From the idea of the scream to Deleuze's reflections on cinema, Kant, and Spinoza, sixteen philosophy lessons by Gilles Deleuze, recorded at the University of Paris 8 - Vincennes-Saint-Denis by Hidenbou Suzuki, 1979 and 1987.

This production offers some of the most striking excerpts from these recordings over the course of sixteen episodes, introducing the thought of the philosopher to whom France Culture paid tribute on the occasion of the centenary of his birth in 2025. The excerpts have been exceptionally restored for the occasion. This sixteen-episode series is presented by Camille Renard, and were available starting July 3, 2025. Directed by Thomas Jost.

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1. On philosophy : concept and affect (22:29), 13 Dec 1983 + 6 Dec 1983 (Cinema III, 5 & 4)

Segment 1

Excerpts from session 5 (Cinema III), 13 December 1983

Translation, Christian Kerslake

Well, the room is full. [...] Can you close the door then? We should put up a sign, it's full, eh?, like at the movies [...]

[Our theme today] is that we do not understand at all what philosophy is when we define it simply as an art or a discipline of concepts, and nevertheless it is that. [*Pause*] This is where I link up with what was said last time about Nietzsche. But philosophy is indeed something else, because a concept – if you deal with a concept on its own, well, it's not that interesting; it's satisfying for the intelligence and that's great, and again you have to like entering into that – but, in my opinion, concepts have never been separable from two other things, and these two other things, it is necessary to call them – if only for the sake of comparison – it is necessary to call them *affects* and *percepts*. [*Pause*]. And a concept is zero, but zero, zero, zero, if it doesn't change the nature of your affects, firstly, and secondly, if it doesn't bring you new percepts.

What does that mean? We will have the occasion to come back to it ... and feel that it's all very Nietzschean, that. We will have the occasion to look at it again because take a concept, it is something intelligible, it is an intelligibility. I say: every concept must be referred to an affect, and for every concept, one must ask: what new affects are you bringing me? [*Pause*] It would still be nothing, and you see, you have to ... Only it is not made explicit, you are presented with a concept, fine, but nothing is said about the new affects it brings along with it – that's left up to you! Concepts, they are of different kinds, they can be scientific, they can be philosophical. Well, I won't get into the question what difference there is, but let's say in any case that even when it concerns scientific concepts, until we know what they change in our affects, we haven't yet understood the meaning [*sens*] of the concept.

What is in question, I would ask, if I were to take up the question of sense again? What does that mean, the meaning, the sense of a proposition? In order to find the sense of a proposition, in my opinion, it is necessary first to lead it back to a concept, or one must designate the concept on which it depends. And then, one must discover two things: what affects is this concept connected to? And what does this concept make me perceive? It is implicit that I did not perceive in this way before. In other words, every concept is inseparable from an affect and a percept, or from several of these.

I mean: what you have the right to ask of philosophy, if you are interested in philosophy (and what you have the right to ask of science as well), is that when something is proposed, it is in order to give you, to inspire new affects in you – for in any case, it will do so, even if you don't know it, but it's better if you do – and to make you *perceive* new things, along with inspiring you with new affects. – On that I would like to borrow some formulations, very frequent formulations among certain philosophers, and to say that what is involved is this: ultimately, it is

about increasing your power of existing. I use that as a term which would be common to Nietzsche and Spinoza. Or at least to modify, to modify your power of existing. [...]

Concepts have no meaning unless you have found what affections are connected to them, what affects are linked to them, how and in what ways they affect you, along with how and what they make you perceive. These are the two problems. [Pause] In other words, to put it simply, it is necessary that your way of feeling is changed by them, even on miniscule points. It is necessary that you see things ... but that you see, in the sense of perception, things that you didn't see before.

I mean in this sense, every concept is what? Is it not pulmonary and visionary, eh? I'll find a better word at some point; that is to say, it is inseparable from affects and percepts. And the English, the English saw that very well. James, for example, the brother of Henry, William James, proposed a philosophy that would truly be carved out of percepts, and he said: no concept without a percept. [It should be noted that the two Jameses are American.] Even more – concepts, he said, he was not even interested in them. What was necessary to him were new percepts, new ways of perceiving. Now as for me, I believe that there is rather a concept-affect-percept trinity which is fundamental. But a concept is something intelligible which only takes on its meaning through the affects to which it is connected as a concept, and the percepts, the new percepts it gives us. [The trinity to which Deleuze refers here constitutes the basis of his last collaboration with Guattari, *What is Philosophy?* (translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchill, London: Verso, 1994) [*Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (Paris: Minuit, 1991).]

An author like Bergson also massively, massively insisted on this: a concept is a new way of dividing up the world. In a concept, you bring together things which until then were disunited, were foreign to each other, and on the contrary and at the same time, you separate things which up until then were unified. If you feel a need to unite what has been separated up until you, and to separate what was united up to you, at this moment you can say to yourself: I have a concept. That is to say, you induce a new way of perceiving, you make something seen. But as far as that goes, a concept is not innocent. [Pause] It modifies a power of existing; it can diminish it; it can increase it. That's an affect. An affect is a variation of the power to exist, it is a variation of the force to exist. Therefore, the true philosophical trinity is: concept, affect, percept. [Pause]

So I come back a little bit to Kant. Where does that come from? You know, someone will say to us: but you had thought up until then that Reason was going to help you combat illusions, illusions coming from the senses. That is a certain way of dividing things up. There were illusions (I'm schematizing), but there was a certain way of dividing things up. There were illusions coming from the senses, but then there was Reason which was going to dissipate the illusions. In dissipating the illusions, well, Reason augments our force to exist, our power to exist, and it makes us perceive things, things as they are. All that is very coherent. You had a system. And then Kant comes along, for reasons ... but which reasons, what reasons does he have? You need serious reasons, because you cannot throw these things together just like that, just anyhow. You realize? What a responsibility! In the end, it's not all so serious, but, well, you do need to have reasons for overturning things to that point. It's not just a game! He tells us: well no, it is Reason in its vigilance which engenders illusions. This changes everything. But then one will no longer perceive the world in the same manner. One is not going to carry on being affected in the same manner; the change of concept refers to new affects and new percepts, and I say, without yet explaining why, well yes, it is with Kant that for the first time, we are going to

perceive the horizon. Until then, the horizon did not interest philosophers much. With Kant, everything that appears in experience is related to a horizon. [Pause] There is a horizon, good.

One will say: a horizon, but what does that mean? Well ...a few years ago, I remember – to arrive at my point now that we've launched into this, but don't worry, we'll fall back on our feet, that is to say, back on to the point we reached last time – I said (I think we were still in Vincennes), well, I tried to find a formula to summarize the extraordinary novelty of Kant, different kinds of formulae, formulae with their origins elsewhere, thinking that I could present the great novelty of Kantianism through four or five great formulas coming from elsewhere, in order to gain clarity on precisely how concept, affect and percept are fundamentally connected. [The formulas Deleuze develops from Kant are to be found in the Seminar on Kant, especially the sessions of 14 and 21 March 1978. See also *Essays Critical and Clinical* (translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1997) [*Critique et Clinique* (Paris: Minuit, 1993)], 'On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy', pp. 27-35.]

I think it's true for all philosophers, the philosophers that I love anyway, that they not only know something, but draw the consequences. They know that philosophy cannot just content itself with being a simple exposition of concepts; whereas others might just give expositions of concepts, and leave it to us to draw [the consequences]. No, it is necessary that philosophy *itself* grapple with affects and with percepts. It can't just leave them as consequences that the reader is supposed to draw.

Excerpts from session 4 (Cinema III), 6 December 1983

Translation, Billy Dean Goehring

Nietzsche tells us time and time again, especially in *The Gay Science*: I am the first thinker to have brought the subject of truth into question. [Based on Deleuze's later suggestion, he's primarily thinking of §344, in Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, ed. Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2001).] No one has ever understood what it meant to question truth. Moreover, I'll say that the powers of the false are infinitely more interesting than truth. I'm heralding a crisis of truth, for the sake of the powers of the false I'm going to reveal. Only the powers of the false are interesting. That's what he says, explicitly. I'm the first to have brought the subject of truth into question. Secondly, he says: the problem of truth and its crisis do not come about in the name of an impoverished and flat scientific knowledge. If you believe that—and it's precisely because we believed that that no one has ever questioned truth or realized the crisis it was in. [Pause]

The fourth passage. [Pause] So, that's the second passage we find in *The Gay Science*. With the third passage [Probably §345] if calling truth into question is strictly related to the realm of feelings or sentiments, it's simply because the notion of truth and the form of truth itself has a moral origin and only a moral origin. [Pause] So that, in questioning the subject of truth, or undermining it, what we're interrogating isn't about a variation in moral beliefs, which we're profoundly indifferent to, but the form of the whole moral standard everyone has hitherto

respected: you “must” do something, whatever that might be. [Pause] And this is where the concept of truth comes from, and he goes to great lengths to prove it.

And the fourth is a great passage from *The Gay Science* [§346], where he exhorts all of us, strange as it might sound—very difficult, it’s a difficult text, which is why it requires a closer look—“Either abolish your venerations or yourselves!” Abolish your venerations. It’s a wonderful text, and it begins with “man is a venerating animal, but he is also a mistrustful one.” [This comes from the middle of §346, where Nietzsche writes, “For man is a venerating animal! But he is also a mistrustful one.”] And so on, and so on, and perhaps that will be how it goes, a final product of nihilism: “Either abolish your venerations or yourselves!” Wow, what a great passage—a wonderful line from Nietzsche. Why do I bring it up now, before we’ve even begun to work through these texts? Because it corresponds so well to what Antonioni says. Abolish your venerations or abolish yourselves. [At the end of §346 Nietzsche writes: “[a suspicion concerning ourselves] that could easily confront coming generations with the terrible Either/Or: ‘Either abolish your venerations or – *yourselves!*’ The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be – nihilism? That is *our* question mark.”]

What’s more, he gives us the right way to understand this line: either abolish your venerations, or you’ll be forced to abolish yourselves. How come? Because your venerations are what abolish you, and they do so in two ways: because from birth they burden you with a form given in advance, the ruinous form of a “you must,” which you can only fend off with pathetic little tricks that do nothing but enhance your discomfort. If you don’t abolish your venerations, you abolish yourself, either because you’ll be forced to honor your venerations, to obey them, or else—which isn’t any better—you’ll be forced to escape them, but in a way even more useless, more desperate. In either case, in either regard, these parts of Nietzsche work through this knot, this conceptual knot between morality, truth, and time.

And if I had anything, there is one philosopher who I think was the greatest of the pre-Socratics. The greatest of the pre-Socratics was the one who gave meaning to philosophy. It’s not—it’s not cut and dry. But as I see it, it’s Empedocles. Everyone has their favorites, so I’ll tell you mine: for me, it’s Empedocles. [Laughter] It’s Empedocles. I would have said... since we don’t have the text, I might have said Heraclitus, or Parmenides, instead of Empedocles. Some of Empedocles’ work has survived, but not all that much, really—so, that’s my choice. Yeah. Because Empedocles did something outstanding. He—look, you’ll see why I’m bringing this up—he did something—everyone knows, right, that philosophy isn’t... it means “friend of wisdom,” you know? Heidegger had a big part to play in the shift, and he tried to explain what “philos” means in Greek, because it wasn’t exactly the same as “friend.” Because I’m not much of a Heideggerian, I’m not exactly on board with Heidegger’s commentary, on what he thinks the real meaning of “philos” is.

I see it differently. Empedocles pulled off something incredible. He made it so that the problem depends—up to then, there was an interest in the difference between true and false, even before

Empedocles. And generally speaking, it was a question of wisdom, of “*sophia*.” Even then, the problem of what’s true and false was a question of “*sophia*.” Empedocles is the first one to have said—we’ll see why later on; we’ll talk more about Empedocles next time—Empedocles is the first one to have said: no, there’s something else behind true-and-false. ... [1:55:21]

... Behind true and false, there is love and hate. Personally, when I say that, it sounds so novel, it’s flips everything around. I won’t say that I really buy it, that it’s love and so on. It’s a complete revolution. It’s huge. We talk about what’s true, about “*alatheia*,” but behind that, there is love and hate, and the conflict between them. It wasn’t like that with Heraclitus—there was conflict, but it wasn’t like that, it wasn’t a struggle between love and hate. In other words, [Empedocles] reveals love and hate to be behind true and false. From then on, from there on the “*sophos*,” the sage, becomes “*philo-sophos*.” The act of philosophy is that of discovering that the question of love and hate lies at the very heart of the question of truth. Nietzsche is a philosopher insofar as he always reminds us that the question of love and hate lies at the heart of the question of truth, to the point that those who say, “I want the truth,” are fundamentally hateful. It’s a peculiar turn of events. Empedocles was the first to carry out this reversal. And we’ll see why he did it; he did it in a very, very precise way. What Empedocles did was incredible. He’s truly one of the greats.

2. On philosophy: the abstract and the concrete (21 :19), 28 April 1987 (Leibniz & Baroque 15)

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 15, 28 April 1987: Principles and Freedom (10) -- “What is Philosophy?” and the Notion of Substance

Transcribed and translated by Charles J. Stivale

I’d like to tell you here the full situation currently in philosophy. Myself, I believe that there are two ways of doing philosophy; with this, I am pleased about what Comtesse said. He situates himself as well... Or else, no doubt, there are lots of ways of doing philosophy. I choose two among them because they are what concern me right now.

But I tell myself that it’s annoying that there’s such a difference in the very conception of doing philosophy. I would say that there’s a first conception of what it is to do philosophy that I would define by a first characteristic, specifically *the abstract serves and must serve to explain*. So here, I am really talking to you as in a conversation, a discussion, so, a café discussion, right? I can say, I’m not saying anything of... It’s just this: the abstract serves to explain, the abstract must explain. In fact, this is a tendency of philosophy that consists in trying to explain phenomena or that which appears through *principles*. These principles can be, we will explain things starting from principles, for example, the first principle, the One or Being... The One, Being, you see, it’s the first principle, [*Pause*] the True, lots of them. These are abstractions that explain. [*Pause*]

And then, without changing, always in this same conception, transcendent principles stopped being invoked, but you are going to see, in some ways, seeking to explain through transcendent principles, but that perhaps didn't change much, this time they explained through *subjective abstracts*. I mean, it was reason that was called on to explain phenomena, reason as faculty of a subject, and no longer as first principle on the side of Being. In one case, I'd say that reason is defined as a faculty of discovering principles of the intelligible. In the other case, reason is no longer at all discovered from the rational, discovered from abstract principles. Reason becomes a faculty that pursues its own ends. [*Interruption of the recording*] [46:38]

... of Ideas, with a capital I, but it's a faculty for realizing its own ends, and the question becomes, is reason able to realize its own ends in this world? And you see, in some ways, I'd say in both cases, whether it's the subjective abstract or the objective abstract, the abstract is called on to explain. Is the intelligible able to explain phenomena, or else is the faculty able to explain phenomena, in one case by discovering the first principles, in the other case, by realizing its own ends? [*Pause*]

In these conceptions of philosophy through the abstract, I believe, in which the abstract is always something serving to explain, it seems to me that there has always been an encounter of something that causes scandal. And I was speaking of this the last time: scandal can appear in a thousand ways. Generally, let's say, it's, and hasn't stopped being, the existence of evil in phenomena. [*Pause*] I was telling you that, in some ways, classical philosophy finds its kind of launching point (*butée*) with the famous earthquake of Lisbon (1755), [*Pause*] and there you have philosophers saying in some ways, how is this possible? How could a world present such phenomena and such a radical form of evil if it was explicable through the One, Being or Goodness? And this rings the death knell for Leibniz's philosophy. How can one say that God chose the best of all possible worlds once one admits that this world produces the Lisbon earthquake?

On the other side, a phenomenon was produced that was no doubt even more impressive, and when we seek the explanation on the side of a reason able to realize its own ends in the world, we are told that the product of the Enlightenment was what? It was Auschwitz. How is it possible to believe in a faculty of reason that would realize its own ends in the world while the coldest exercise of rationality occurred in the organization of concentration camps? [On the possibility of thinking after Auschwitz, see *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 106-107; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 102-103] And if you will, I see a certain similarity between Voltaire's reaction in relation to Leibniz that rings the death knell of the first kind of abstract, and the reaction, a truly enormous and beautiful reaction by Adorno just after the war, how is this possible, what is philosophy? Or from Jaspers, when Adorno and Jaspers pose the great post-war question, how is it possible – for one, Jaspers, in the world of the atomic bomb, for Adorno, in the world of concentration camps – to still imagine philosophy as the process of a reason that would realize its own ends in the world? [*Pause*] And I am saying that Adorno's texts are splendid in this light and Jaspers's texts as well.

That the situation then soured, when lesser talented thinkers began saying, which seems very different to me, that suddenly the concentration camps were Marx's fault, Hegel's fault, etc., going all the way to Kierkegaard, [*Pause*] I don't want to cite the author, but a recent text, nonetheless by a very admirable man, asks the question of knowing if Kierkegaard's conception

of subjectivity wouldn't be one of the distant causes of the existence of the concentration camps. [Given that this is a "very admirable man," this could be Jean-François Lyotard.] There is something that is wrong here. As long as it was Adorno, the question was very specific. It wasn't a question of saying that the concentration camps were Hegel's fault or Nietzsche's fault, that it's someone else's fault. It was a question of saying: can we maintain the conception of philosophy that we inherited from the Enlightenment, that is, of a reason that works to realize its ends in the world when we see that rationality has had as primary product the strict and rigorous organization of concentration camps? And if philosophy doesn't ask this question, we don't need an hour of reflection, it goes without saying. So, I am saying that what weak thinkers in France made us discover about this, or believed to have made us discover ten years ago, was Adorno's focus – which wasn't yet translated at that point – it was Adorno's focus as well as the Frankfurt school's in Germany right after the war, when they were able to pose the problem in terms full of dignity and philosophical rigor. Fine. [Regarding "weak thinkers ... ten years ago," this no doubt refers to the so-called "New Philosophers" against whom Deleuze wrote an article in 1977, republished in *Two Regimes of Madness*, pp. 139-147.]

You see, I am really saying something extremely simple, assuming that there have been two conceptions of abstract principles, reason as faculty of the intelligible and reason as faculty of realizing its own ends. The second conception starts with the Enlightenment – we are really doing a bird's eye view of history – the other is what we can call the Greco-Classical conception. And well, the two conceptions collide with something scandalous. But for me, this scandalous aspect is perhaps above all in the fact that this question is poorly posed, and was this the good way of doing philosophy by starting from an abstract that was supposed to explain things and account for things? Since, at that point, this abstract was evidently going to collide with the concrete real, and the concrete real could only be the Lisbon earthquake, or could only be, worse still, the concentration camps.

And if there's another way of doing philosophy, I am telling you here, I am saying ... You will pardon me because this is, it's like this; it's only to ... I am myself saying, this has no ... I am saying, for me, philosophy has always been something else. This is why... There are a lot of authors who influenced me greatly, but that doesn't belong to... I don't believe that I've been unduly influenced by all those who relied on the abstract for explanations. This is to... And I am fully aware that I am not at all certain to be correct, and once again, I am bracketing the abstract, [since] I indeed understand that for those who believe in this conception of the abstract as explanation, this abstract is not at all abstract. But I am saying that it is abstract anyway because these are principles, right? These are principles and faculties that are confronting the real in the way it appears. [Deleuze develops these two conceptions of philosophy in the opening chapters of *What Is Philosophy?*, and for the following reflections, see pp. 44-49.]

For me, philosophy has never happened in this way. For me, if you will, the abstract in its nature must be explained, and this seems to me to be the first great difference between two ways of doing philosophy. I am not at all saying that the abstract is nothing. I am saying that the abstract is itself what we must explain, the One, Being, Goodness, Reason. That's what needs explaining. How can all that explain anything at all? [Pause] The abstract must be explained, but then, what does it mean to do philosophy if we don't talk about the abstract? I would even say that Descartes's "I think" is abstract, and here, all principles are abstract; everything serving as principles are abstract, objective principle or subjective principle, and for me, philosophy has

never consisted of this. It consists, yes, in how to explain the abstract itself, that which is incapable of explaining anything whatsoever. Fine, philosophers are those who make themselves responsible for explaining the abstract. How? How do we explain the abstract?

Well, I am talking about this second conception of philosophy. One must start off from experience, and I call that empiricism. You'll tell me that I am not the first to call that empiricism, except that experience, we all know, is very difficult to find. What experience, eh? What is experience? Why? Because usually it's covered over by abstractions. So, it's very difficult to grasp the experience; one has to remove all the abstractions that cordon it off. So I even think of attempts; there have been attempts in all sorts of directions. The different empiricist philosophers have made attempts. Bergson made a famous attempt by invoking a method that he called "the method of intuition". You see, on that side, there are no principles. These are not principles. Phenomenology – a completely different approach, [where] there's as much diversity in this... -- was seeking what Merleau-Ponty called "the savage experience".

But this is very difficult because one must be really certain that with these terms, the savage experience or something else, abstractions aren't already slipping in. Notably, the savage experience as Merleau-Ponty defined it contains all kinds of acts that aren't acts of reason, but that are acts of consciousness, that are an entire organization that, it seems to me, presupposes abstractions, that I am not certain deserve the name of "savage experience". So, good, but what would this experience be? [Pause] Well, I think something very simple about this, and it's that here there is a link between pure logic and empiricism, specifically the determination of experience is much less concerned with intuition than concerning with Combinatorics, simply, and that there is only one exploration of what we must call multiplicities, that is, that which is freed from any principle, [such] principle being the principle of objective or subjective unification. There is only one exploration of multiplicities that can cause experience to emerge.

In other words, I believe that far from starting off from abstract principles, philosophy must proceed into cartographies, and whatever might be the given problem, creating a cartography is necessary. That is, one must trace the domain of experience to which the problem refers, these domains of experience never existing ahead of this process. We have to construct them, and the domain of experience is extraordinarily heterogeneous. [Deleuze and Guattari describe this cartography in chapter 4, "Geophilosophy", in *What Is Philosophy?*] We must create the map, and for me, this is an activity, a cartographic activity that is strictly opposed to the activity of principles. [Pause] So what is this, this cartography? Simply put, in the end, [Pause] experience is what could be called a fuzzy aggregate (*ensemble flou*). It's a fuzzy aggregate, that is, a collection of disparates; we still have to choose them, the disparates. It's in this way that there's a Combinatory. We choose them in light of given problems. Fine. But all this, it's just words. A fuzzy aggregate, how does one define it? Uniquely through what occurs to it after. It's an aggregate in which a series of consolidations is going to be produced. [Pause] Right here, I am proposing this: I define the fuzzy aggregate as an aggregate to consolidate; it's this "to consolidate" that interests me.

What I am saying is as simple as this: problem, you want to make a box. [Pause] You look for some boards. I'd say, you look for some boards, and you don't even know how – and furthermore, you're clumsy – you don't even know how to put them together, and you correctly think, how can I consolidate this aggregate? Fine, you have to use nails, you know, then use a

hammer, and from this, you are going to derive a box that will be an enterprise of consolidation. Fine. What does it mean to consolidate a fuzzy aggregate? Consolidating a fuzzy aggregate, I'd say, means discerning and determining the aggregate of the processes that occur in it. You see, I am not considering the question of principles. I am considering a question of processes immanent to the fuzzy aggregate. Experience, I'd say, is the aggregate of processes able to be produced in a fuzzy aggregate with the result being a consolidation of the aggregate.

There are all sorts of these processes, and they vary with the aggregates considered. I will list several of them: I'd say there are processes of unification; there are processes of centralization; there are processes of totalization; there are processes of subjectification. This is odd, you may notice, and in fact, it indeed marks the difference between the two conceptions of philosophy. What others called principles from which they started off, I myself can only find them in the state of a secondary process – thus, something else completely, these are not principles – being produced in a fuzzy aggregate in such a way that a consolidation of the aggregate results.

But furthermore, these processes have no privilege – unification, totalization – and have their equivalent in abstract principles. But you see, I maintain my commitment: it's the abstract that must be explained, and I explain it by saying that in such an aggregate, there are particular processes of unification, particular processes of totalization, and particular processes of centralization. But there are all sorts of other processes obviously, processes that resist totalization, centralization. At that point, I'd say that the components of the aggregate that define experience, components of the aggregate, must be the object of an extremely varied study according to each case.

3. On philosophers' screams and concept creation (23:17) 30 Oct 1984 + 28 April 1987 (Cinema IV 1 + Leibniz & Baroque 15)

Segment 1

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

Lecture 01, 30 October 1984 (Cinema Course 67)

Transcription: La voix de Deleuze [transcribers not attributed]; additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Graeme Thomson & Silvia Maglioni

A philosophical cry can always be translated in terms of discourse. But then something resists, and if you have the slightest taste for philosophy, you know that these are its cries, and it's here that philosophy finds the points of its birth, and of its *life*.

And what are they? Because, at first glance, they could easily be mistaken for simple propositions that are part of the discourse. Well, no, no, no, no, they're something else. So, what do they refer to? And why do they do so? Are they founded, unfounded, are they completely arbitrary? What makes a philosopher raise a philosophical cry? I mentioned the cries of alarm

that birds make, they're not songs, but at least we know why – they sound an alarm. There are cries other than those of alarm. There are cries of love that are not the same thing as bridal songs. So, if the philosopher is someone who cries out in his own way, what does he have to cry out about? Let's look for examples.

When I read Aristotle, I see an admirable discourse that is Aristotle's song, and I recognize this song, it's a way of singing that has no equivalent. I don't confuse Aristotle's song with Plato's song. And then, all of a sudden, I hear something in Aristotle, and I stumble on the formula: “It is indeed necessary to stop”. If we were to make a real analysis of the propositions, I'd say, ah, that's very odd. When Aristotle tells us what substance is, he develops it in a speech-song. When he tells us “It is indeed necessary to stop”, it's not a proposition of the same nature as the former. “It is indeed necessary to stop” is a cry. [Deleuze brings up Aristotle's "cry" in session 1 of the first seminar on Leibniz, April 15, 1980.]

What does he mean by this? He means: you won't be able to go back... it's odd, that these are already written propositions, propositions that can only be expressed in the form of an interpellation, you... He doesn't have to say it explicitly. He tells us that you can't endlessly go from a concept back to a more general one. “It is indeed necessary to stop”, meaning that there are ultimate concepts. Well, I don't know if there are ultimate concepts any more than you do. But here you have someone telling you that it is indeed necessary to stop, but they can only do so in the form of a cry. In other words, *it is necessary for thought to stop somewhere*, for it to grasp the point at which it can go no further. I'm not saying I'm right or wrong in this, it's a matter of sensibility, I'm not trying to convince you of anything, but I have the feeling that this is no longer part of philosophical discourse, it's a philosophical cry. And if we say to him, why, why is it necessary to stop? The question isn't even relevant. Here we've reached a point where philosophy no longer has to give its reasons. So, who is this cry addressed to? This is perhaps the most important thing about the hidden part of philosophy.

Descartes wrote a philosophical discourse that he calls the *Meditations*. It's his own song, and in *Meditations* there appears the famous formula “I think therefore I am”. And “I think therefore I am” can be considered a proposition or part of a philosophical discourse. It has its place in the *Meditations*, in the second meditation to be exact – there's a first and then a second, etc., there are five in all, occurring precisely in the order we've come to refer to as the order of reasons – it's part of philosophical discourse, and yet it shatters it. “I think therefore I am” is formulated as a cry. It's Descartes' cry. Why is it a cry? It's because his statement is: You can't deny that if I think, then I am.

What's the point of all this? The important thing is this aspect of the cry, and indeed, “I think therefore I am” claims to do what? It claims to give us a new type of definition of man, against Aristotle's. For Aristotle, man is a rational animal. Descartes says that this is discourse. To say that man is a rational animal is discourse, because “animal” and “rational” are concepts that themselves refer to other concepts. And he says: no, we need to reach something else, and “I

think, therefore I am” is supposed to replace – although it pertains to a completely different world – it’s supposed to replace “man is a rational animal.” The true determination of man is “I think, therefore I am”, and not at all that “man is a rational animal.” In other words, he wants the determination of man to be expressed in a cry.

I’m leaping forward. When Leibniz says “Everything has a reason” ... and when he is able to derive from this, a thousand things for the philosophical discourse that will compose his own system – because this “Everything has a reason” leads to many things, this idea that everything has a reason... but why shouldn’t there also be things that don’t have a reason? Well, actually no, Leibniz doesn’t want things to exist without a reason. Long before being a logical principle, “Everything has a reason” is a cry. Or else, it already convinces us that there are *cries of reason*. The cries of reason are generally expressed in the general form: You cannot deny that... You cannot deny that it is necessary to stop somewhere, you cannot deny that everything has a reason, you cannot deny that if you think, you are.

And, strangely enough, philosophy also includes cries of unreason. It’s not only reason that cries out. There are cries of unreason. Contrariwise, we could say that these can be expressed as “What if I deny”. What if I deny that two and two make four? You’ll tell me that’s all just words. No. Dostoevsky utters the cry of unreason, “I deny that two and two make four”. In other words, he launches a battle against the self-evident. Dostoyevsky, in this famous text which is also philosophical, cries out: “I want, I want someone to account for every victim of history; I will not rest, and I will not leave you in peace, until you have accounted for every victim of history”. A disciple of Dostoevsky, [Léon or Lev] Shestov, throughout his work, repeats this... Well, what is it? *The cry of unreason*. It’s not that unreason has the privilege of crying out, but there are cries of unreason just as there are cries of reason, and sometimes we don’t know which is crying out, whether it’s reason or unreason. Okay.

“Give me a body, then”. Isn’t it odd that thought, which for millennia sought to escape from the body, should come to say – and is this a discourse? – “Give me a body, then”. “Give me a body, then”: you can tell right away – I don’t know but I want you to feel that this is something you can almost sniff out – that it’s a philosophical cry. [Deleuze begins chapter 8 of *The Time-Image* with this phrase, referring to it as “the formula of philosophical reversal”, p. 189. See also session 16 of the Leibniz and the Baroque seminar, where Deleuze attributes it to Kierkegaard.] So philosophy itself depends on having a flair or a superior capacity, a *taste*. And why not? What is it that judges concepts, if not the cries themselves? Isn’t it only through the cry that concepts can come to life? If you’re not sensitive to this philosophical cry, you’re not sensitive to philosophy. It’s just the way it is for fish. Philosophical cries are like the cries of fish. If you can’t hear the cry of the fish, you don’t know what life is. If you don’t hear the cry of philosophers... the cries of philosophers, you don’t know what life is and you don’t know what philosophy is either! You don’t know what thought is! But of course, you do know what the cry of the fish is, and what the cry of philosophy is. So, philosophers are fish? Okay then.

[Antonin] Artaud spoke of *affective athleticism* in relation to his theater and, even more, to his conception of thought. [See Artaud, *The Theatre and Its Double* (New York: Grove Press, 1958).] There is a philosophical athleticism. Philosophical athleticism is the power to utter specifically philosophical cries. What am I getting at? I would say that, well, only philosophical thought presupposes an image of thought, a chronotope, a time-space in which cries resound, period. I'll stop here with this.

Segment 2

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 15, 28 April 1987: Principles and Freedom (10) – “What is Philosophy?” and the Notion of Substance

Transcribed and translated by Charles J. Stivale

I personally hate any reflexive philosophy because that deprives it of being like all other disciplines, that is, a discipline of creation, and I proclaim this very strongly because I believe that this is what philosophy has business reflecting on anything whatsoever; philosophy's concern is to invent, and it invents concepts with the desire that the concepts it invents will be as beautiful as the paintings a painter creates, as the music a musician creates, or the discoveries that are equally creations made by a scientist (*savant*). As a result, between philosophy and science, there is no relation of reflection. The great principle of any discipline is that those who practice this discipline are entirely adequate for reflecting on it when they want to or when they are able to. Once again, it's no discovery to say that those who have reflected best on cinema are the filmmakers who have undertaken to make them and who have enjoyed reflecting about them. The most beautiful texts on architecture are texts by architects. The most beautiful texts on painting are texts by painters. This goes so much without saying that we're ashamed to say such things. Therefore, if philosophy proposed to reflect about whatever subject it might be, well then, its days would be so sad that I wonder who would need it at all.

On the other hand, on the other hand, it has its own work to do on itself, and the problem – and here's the mystery, whatever that mystery may be – is that philosophy can produce important concepts only when they have a certain mode, not one of resemblance, but when they have a certain mode of correspondence with the functions of science, with works of art. [Pause] As a result, through the rapport with science, the question of philosophy has always been never to reflect about science, but always to create the metaphysics that corresponds to the science of a particular era. Let no one tell us that metaphysics was fine for science back in the old days. During the period of ancient science, there was a metaphysics corresponding perfectly to this ancient science.

Well, just as Bergson wanted it, it's up to philosophers to create the metaphysics corresponding to modern science. We must take literally Bergson's great text. Once again, he says something quite simple: what defines – he speaks very quickly – he says, what defines generally ancient science? It's that it defines movement with reference to privileged positions; it selects privileged positions out of movement. What defines modern science? It's that it defines movement with reference to any instant whatever (*l'instant quelconque*). [Pause] Ancient metaphysics created

exactly the metaphysics of ancient science, specifically, how is it possible that it defines privileged positions? What do they consist of? Where do they come from? This was doing the metaphysics of science. Bergson believes himself to open up the metaphysics of modern science when he says: a conception of time is necessary to account for the time reference of any instant whatever, and he answers, my conception of duration, far from being opposed to science, constitutes the metaphysics of this science. Duration is precisely the metaphysics that refers to the movement connecting to any instant whatever. [On Bergson's theses on movement, see chapter 1 of *Cinema 1: The Image-Movement* (University of Minnesota Press, 1986).]

Final point for distinguishing the two kinds of philosophy: I'd say there is a philosophy that in the end always linked itself to the eternal, the eternal by right, etc., but at the same time that it became the metaphysics of modern science, philosophy was led more and more to change problems and to pose the opposite question, of what is the emergence of something new. And that seems to exist fully with Whitehead, with Bergson. That appears for me with Whitehead when he says, the problem is one of creativity. The problem is the emergence of the new.

But I can say that this was a bit what I wanted to tell you. This is linked to everything we are doing on Leibniz because I'd like for you to sense that Leibniz seems to me – if you've accepted this kind of grand distinction, these ways of, these two ways of doing philosophy – Leibniz seems to me strangely at the hinge point for both of them. There are all sorts of elements... And this is required! All of us are like this! All of us are deeply incoherent, all. We hold onto something from a tradition, and then we enter into something new. We never stop having, of being unbalanced. And in Leibniz, I'd like for you to be open both to the extent to which he enters into the entire stream of traditional philosophy, so-called traditional, and how at the same time he brings about such innovations, such innovations that the future of philosophy flows through him.

So, that's what I wanted to tell you, in this way, to see what you think of this, this mystery. I myself feel, you know, extremely... In philosophy, I believe that... First, it's very different according to whether I'm speaking to philosophers or to non-philosophers. Philosophers owe it to themselves to have read almost – not immediately, since this takes time – to have read almost all the great philosophers. That's not difficult because, you know, there's not a huge mass of great philosophers, right? That's not a heavy load in the end. [Laughter] If we say a good dozen, that's already not so bad, so it's not an infinite task. That doesn't mean one has to wait sixty years to be a philosopher, but still to have read them more or less... But non-philosophers are something else entirely. But where they link together, philosophers and non-philosophers, everything that I've just said is a concept of philosophy, -- and it's through this that it matters for me, -- where philosophers and non-philosophers are equal and are strangely linked to a kind of task in common. [On philosophical and non-philosophical rapports, see also "H as in the History of Philosophy" in *Gilles Deleuze, From A to Z (L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze)*.]

What I mean is that in any event, you will have your attractions, and this is, for me... You will have your kinds of affects, the philosophical affect, the philosophical affect that makes you say, for example, that makes you say this also for literature or poetry, ah yes, that writer, not that he belongs to my family (*est des miens*), but I belong to his (*je suis des siens*), I belong to his family, and perhaps if we discovered this, whatever strikes me in this way, but that's in fact the problem. And so, strange things can occur, and for a long while you might not be reacting. I

mean, two kinds of reading are necessary; two kinds of rapports are necessary with philosophy. Becoming a philosopher is not about suppressing the non-philosophical rapport with philosophy. Philosophy is nothing if it isn't capable of inspiring a non-philosophical rapport, that is, a rapport that it has with non-philosophers as non-philosophers. To think that philosophy has a rapport with non-philosophers in order to make philosophers out of them seems to be itself an atrocity. It's not a question of this. Simply, and what is even more complicated, two things are necessary: the non-philosopher must have a rapport with philosophy, but in which he/she keeps his/her quality of non-philosopher. And the philosopher must also have with philosophy a rapport in which he/she can maintain his/her quality and virtue as non-philosopher. It's only in this way, I believe, that we can pose the problem of a non-philosophical rapport with philosophy. So there you have what I had to tell you on this point.

4. On the rhizome (20:30), 28 April 1987 (Leibniz & Baroque 15, 72:30-94 :15)

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 15, 28 April 1987: Principles and Freedom (10) -- “What is Philosophy?” and the Notion of Substance

Transcribed and translated by Charles J. Stivale

In the first conception of philosophy, that I am calling abstract, they have but a single image that haunts them, it's the tree. Everything is tree, and why? Because the tree is everything that you might want, notably it's coexistence, it's consolidation of a process of totalization, of centralization, of unification, such that the tree is a metaphor that indeed works everywhere, the tree of knowledge, the tree everywhere, it's the tree. We are even told that the brain is a tree.

And we ourselves said with, I believe, great conviction and, moreover, being very sure that we were right, we said, but no, the brain is not a tree; it's grass. [*Huge laughter*] What did that mean? That meant something quite important. That meant that you use a model that is the tree without ever placing it into question and that it's an absolutely abstract model, whereas trees are processes of nature, agreed, and if you don't confront them with other processes, for example, with the processes of rhizome, the rhizomes are not trees, well then, rhizomes are not at all processes of unification. On the contrary, they are processes of dissemination, processes of junctions of dispartes, it's all that you'd like. Fine, I am telling you all that, but it was the whole meaning of our attempt, and in this sense, I believe that it was going toward the side of a certain tradition of philosophy that was violently opposed – well, not violently! – which was opposed to the other conception of philosophy. And I believe that here, I am saying this poorly. I am doing it almost on purpose to express myself at this level, if I can, of the most obvious language (*langage le plus courant*).

And so, I think of Foucault, and I tell myself, in some ways, I'd tend to say that Foucault was completely on the side of the empiricist conception. For him, he called that *apparatuses* (*dispositifs*). [*Pause*] Simply, a curious confusion occurred because Foucault allowed himself once to argue, and the one time he allowed himself to argue was with the Frankfurt school, and notably with Habermas, a descendant of the Frankfurt school. So that people believed that Foucault was posing the same problem as the Frankfurt school, and just as the Frankfurt school

had asked the question, how can reason as pure faculty have engendered, one way or another, the concentration camps, so too Foucault had asked an analogous question, how could reason as faculty of the Enlightenment have engendered the great milieu of incarceration, the prison, etc., or the psychiatric hospital. And in my opinion, this was all to the good because that [argument] enriched everyone, and the Frankfurt school used Foucault, but that wasn't at all his thought. His thought was to start from experience, a very strong logical empiricism that opposed completely the other conception of philosophy; doing the analysis of what he called apparatuses, that is, discerning the processes, and not the principles, discerning the processes in action within a particular apparatus, processes of centralization, of totalization, etc., and the processes of resistance to these processes, processes of resistance that perhaps were primary in relation to those that they resisted; processes of flight, processes of, well, processes of resistance. [Pause]

So there, I mean, if it was true that there were two ways of doing philosophy, the first characteristic of these two ways, of these two directions, one would consist... [Deleuze does not complete the sentence] And then here as well, there are affinities, there are affinities. For all of you, I am trying to say, either you find yet other conceptions, or you are going to have confidence in principles, and you are going to watch with the greatest attention what a principle becomes when it is realized or accomplished in the world. And I announce to you that you will be the man of scandal, with what that risks at times. What brings a danger is that this scandal is something trumped up because you will be surprised by a thing that was understood from the start, specifically that the world doesn't obey pure reason. Or else, you will be tempted by the other path, that is, this philosophical cartography that consists in defining aggregates in which processes exert themselves.

Second characteristic to oppose the two philosophies: [Pause] I'd say in a first case, in the first case, philosophy is the search for the universal and the necessary. [Pause] Of course, this isn't a question of making them say nonsense, since these are great philosophers. It's not a question of a universal or of a necessary *in fact*. It's not a question of saying, for example, all men are alike, no. Philosophy has always presented itself as a search for a universal and a necessary *by right (de droit)*. Kant wrote on this point some definitive texts, what is universal and necessary by right itself – and this is required since it's in the name of principles. It's well understood that the world does not achieve by itself and spontaneously the universal and the necessary. So, it's a question of a universal and a necessary by right about which one wonders under what conditions they could be realized in the world. [Pause] But if all philosophy is defined by the art of concepts, I'd say that in this first conception of philosophy, the concept is the universal and the necessary by right. [Pause] For example, we will be told that human rights are the universal and the necessary by right, [Pause] and we will be told that since Kant, the philosopher has been the guardian of human rights. [Pause] I'm going fast, because otherwise... It's just so you...

And the other conception of philosophy, I believe, occurs... is very, very different. It says, no, a concept has nothing to do with the universal and the necessary by right because [Pause] a concept is an object of a creation and not one of discovery. [With] the universal and the necessary by right, you see how these connect back to the preceding difference. The universal and the necessary by right are either the pure intelligible as principle, the One, Being, etc., or else [Pause] the subject as pure activity, that is, reason as pursuit of its own ends, the reasonable subject. Thus, it's either rationality or else reasonability. [Pause] At that point, in fact, in such a conception, philosophy is the arbitrator of true and false. The true is what is universal and

necessary by right. My only remark is that this doesn't go very far. It's odd. It doesn't go very far because we immediately fall upon scandal, once again, the scandal being that the universal and the necessary by right do not stop being buffeted by the concrete real and its conceptual presentation being rather quickly completed.

We have seen this, and that's why what we've done is so useful for me. I am saying that a concept is not at all about determining a universal and necessary by right. A concept is what? [For a more developed definition, see *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 21-24; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 26-28.] It's a system of singularities. What am I calling singularity? The little that I have said allows me now to define it in entirely common terms. I understand fully that some more fully developed philosophical definitions are necessary, an attempt we have undertaken from the viewpoint of Leibniz all this year. But I am saying that it's an aggregate of singular points, it's an aggregate of singularities, and if I am trying to define these singular points quite superficially uniquely with what I have just said, I'd say that singularities are precisely that which marks out the start and finish of a process operating in an aggregate, in an aggregate of consolidations. [Pause]

So, if in an aggregate you follow the trail of a process of centralization, you have a singularity, or perhaps even two, or perhaps even three or four because these can bifurcate. If you take, if you follow a process of dissemination, you have other singularities. The aggregate of singularities that will correspond to an aggregate will be called a concept, or a part of the aggregate will be called a concept. [Pause] I'd say that, far from this being the universal and the necessary that define the concept, it's the singularity. If you do not produce concepts that might be emissions of singularities, you are not doing philosophy, at least according to this second conception. Thinking is not meant for discovering the universal and the necessary. Thinking is for emitting singularities and hence – here as well, I feel myself being Nietzschean, notably... or Mallarmean – it's to produce a dice throw, if you assimilate the points on the die to singularities. From this viewpoint, it's no longer a question of true and false. A dice throw can be a winner or a loser; it's not true or false. A dice throw can be important if your existence depends on it. It can be unimportant if you just do it like that, mechanically. But I'd say that the concept in this second conception is the second characteristic that opposes the two conceptions of philosophy, the concept as singularity.

And here, obviously then, I'd like for someone to raise an objection for once, you understand, in order to show you the extent to which there's a... [Deleuze does not complete this] Someone might tell me, well yes, but we see that you could care less about law, and that you only recognize facts. The mere effort to imagine this objection already wearies me so much [Laughter] that I am exhausted because it's awful, so you understand? Put yourself in my place, with somebody telling me that. On one hand, on the other (*tantôt, tantôt*) here as well, [since] this depends on mood, it depends on mood, but may God act so that mood is not only a psychological given, but a philosophical one. If I am in a bad philosophical mood, I say, that's how it is, buddy, that's it, so long, see ya. [Laughter] If I am in a good philosophical mood, -- and besides, this isn't good; one must not be in a good philosophical mood [Laughter] – what am I going to try to explain? I am going to try to explain that law is not such a simple matter as that, that law is very, very complicated, this whole matter, and notably, I am saying, here as well then, [it's] our affinities, always bearing the deepest mystery of ourselves, what do we, do you... This is nothing compared to when one wonders how a woman can pursue the same kind of man in her

intimate life or how a man can pursue the same kind of woman in his intimate life, something that doesn't always happen, but sometimes it does. But this is nothing compared to the deeper philosophical idea, on which the other depends, our affinity with ideas. What happens for me to connect with an idea?

So finally, law, law, I return to the law. Let's assume that among you, all of you are interested in the law. I doubt that, but anyway we can pretend, that a certain number among you are interested in it. But the law means nothing. What in the law are you interested in? What interests you in the law and in what is not the law? For generally, when I'm interested in something, it's above all because there's something dwelling in this something that doesn't belong to the something. I seem to be creating an opening to psychoanalysis, but I'm not opening up psychoanalysis [*Laughter*] since this something is precisely what we have just called an idea. [On this topic, see "I as in Idea" in Gilles Deleuze, *From A to Z (L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze)*.] Fine. But I don't know; if I am assuming that you are interested in law, what interests me in law? I am going to tell you: a single thing interests me finally in the law, and it impassions me, and if I were to stop being a philosopher, that's what I would have done for a career, the law, to create... But not to create just anything at all; [it's] to create jurisprudence. You know generally what jurisprudence is. It's the juridical acts that concern the application of a law when its application is problematic, that is, when one doesn't know which law to apply. The legislator, how ever skillful he or she may have anticipated things, isn't expected to have anticipated everything, and the evolution of law can only occur... or perhaps, I don't know. No, I am already saying too much; perhaps the evolution of law occurs in part through jurisprudence. [On jurisprudence and some of the following examples, see also "G as in 'Gauche' (Left)" in Gilles Deleuze, *From A to Z (L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze)*, and also *What Is Philosophy?* pp. 106-110; *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* pp. 101-105.]

So there's a very beautiful example of jurisprudence. I follow these [cases] very closely; I even cut them out of the papers when there's a jurisprudence case that really attracts me, and the more insignificant it is... [It's] in the recent stories about alcoholic drivers, right? [*Laughter*] But there's a very interesting case. A prosecutor told himself, ah well, let's piss them off (*les faire chier*), these alcoholic drivers, and this created a problem in law. How? How to go about this? He told himself, let's take a look at whether we can't equate the car that plowed into some pedestrian, if we can equate it to a weapon. – Ah, this thrills me; the problems thrill me. This is so much lovelier than crossword puzzles, and it raises all kinds of problems. – Can it [the car] be equated to a weapon? If so, the car can be confiscated since, in our system of law, in fact, the car can be confiscated from the start of the inquiry, independently of any judgment, since weapons linked to a particular crime are confiscated. If I kill someone with the gun that I borrowed from you, the gun gets confiscated as part of the inquiry's evidence. So, if the car is equated with a weapon, fine, here's a beautiful case of jurisprudence. [*Pause*]

An indecent act (*outrage à la pudeur*). This [law] is difficult to apply. It's a very complex notion, right? It's coming back more frequently because more things in this domain are occurring. Right? I'd like, I'd really like to write to [Charles] Pasqua [*Minister of the Interior, 1986-1988*] [*Laughter*] because I'd give him some advice. During the Vichy government, they wanted to apply... They had first created... No, it must have dated from just before the war, but it was interpreted in the form of an indecent act *toward others*, for example, exhibitionism creates an

indecent act, an act harming your sensibilities (*pudeur*). But you know then, there was a jurist during Vichy... [*Interruption of the recording*] [1 :33 :19]

... He wasn't able to. He said, there's certainly an indecent act against one's own sensibilities. So, he said that striptease – there already was striptease – [the case of] striptease. The jurists objected, how can striptease be condemned since we cannot call this an “indecent act” since the audience is consenting and they are paying for it, and this is opposed to other determinations of indecent acts? And the jurist said, well, be careful, it's not at all like that. The woman undressing in public is inflicting harm to *her own* sensibilities. You see? The indecent act took on a whole different dimension. Henceforth, they could condemn it. That's very interesting.

5. On flows and process (20 :58), 27 May 1980 (Anti-Oedipus + Reflections 1)

Seminar on Anti-Oedipus and Other Reflections, 1980

Lecture 1, 27 May 1980

Transcriptions: [Voix de Deleuze](#), Frédéric Astier; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Initial translation, unattributed; new translation, Charles J. Stivale

The whole interpretation of antipsychiatry, that is, of [R.D.] Laing and [David] Cooper in their early phase, is fundamentally the idea of a schizophrenic process, which they interpret or specify by saying, “yes this is a trip”, the idea of the trip-process. What does that mean? There, they are rather forceful; you see why Jaspers employed a lot of phenomenological methods. In fact, how does this idea of the process somewhat belong to phenomenology? It is because it rather responds to a kind of lived experience, for example, of the schizophrenic himself, the theme of the trip that constantly appears. It's no coincidence that at the same period, right, drug people (*drogués*) proposed, American drug people went very far within a conception of the trip, all of that. [*Pause*]

So, I think that Guattari and I were taking “process” in yet another direction, but that does not matter; it seems to me that it was to that tradition that we were connected. So, can we move forward if we say, “schizophrenia or psychosis, is fundamentally linked to a process”? Well, I think, what does that mean? This means that maybe schizophrenia reveals something that happens to us in detached parts or in small bits (*en petite monnaie*) and always and everywhere and fairly constantly, specifically, we do not cease to be as if caught, snatched (*rapté*), carried away, by what? It's on this point that we contributed a little something because we said the most useful word yet is flows; we spend our time being crisscrossed by flows. And process is the development (*cheminement*) of a flow.

What does “process” mean in this sense? It means rather, it's quite a simple image, like a stream that digs its bed, that is, the trajectory does not exist before, the trajectory does not pre-exist the trip. That's what a process is. Process is a movement of a trip insofar as the trajectory does not

pre-exist, that is, insofar as it traces its own trajectory. In a certain way, we called it a *line of flight*. This is tracing lines of flight, and lines of flight do not pre-exist on their own trajectory.

One can always say that with the other lines, there are, in fact, trips for which the trajectory pre-exists. If you remember, for example, if some of you remember what we did last year when I was trying to determine the “movement” within a particular type of space that I called *smooth space*, this comes down to the same thing. In the smooth space, every line becomes, or everything tends to become, a line of flight because, precisely, the trajectories do not even pre-exist the projectiles. It’s not the pathway on train tracks; it’s not the striated space, that is, there are no striations that pre-exist the movement. Fine. [See ATP V seminar 1, 11 November 1979; see also *A Thousand Plateaus*, plateau 14.]

So, let’s suppose that in our life, I’m not saying we’re made of that, but either that there are moments, or even unconsciously -- after all, maybe the unconscious is made of that, of flows and processes -- you understand that we already commit ourselves a lot, because if I say that the unconscious maybe is made of that, it amounts to saying: but no, it does not work under the law of structures; it does not work under the distribution of persons, this is another thing. This is a world that is completely depersonalized, that is unstructured, not at all that something is missing, but its business is elsewhere. The process is ultimately the emission of any flows whatsoever (*de flux quelconques*).

So, I can already reconnect something, for example, from schizophrenia. I can say: Well yes, let’s try to see, how precisely does the schizophrenic himself feel the impression of the trip, with all that this implies? Whenever we consider or whenever we are involved with something, each of us privileges certain aspects. Myself necessarily, when we’ve encountered schizophrenia, what have we tended to privilege? In the end, the thousand declarations by schizophrenics, where their problem is not that of the person; their problem is not that of a “structure”. Their problem is that of a problem, but ... what seizes hold of me, and where does it take me as well? So, well... Fine.

But in this respect, what fascinates me is the way schizophrenics are dealing with what? You understand, they bide their time. That’s what created one of our reactions against the eternal family coordinates of psychoanalysis. It’s because I’ve never seen a schizophrenic who really has family problems; it’s quite another thing. In the end, it’s all too easy what I am saying because we can always say: There are familial problems, but in any case, at least grant me that he/she does not state them and does not experience them as familial problems. How does he/she experience them?

One of the strongest things, it really seems to me there -- it’s almost what I like most now when I think back to *Anti-Oedipus* -- one of the strong things of *Anti-Oedipus*, in my opinion, -- and that must be something that survives -- it is the idea that delirium is the immediate investment of a historical social field. I am saying, that must be something that survives because this is a kind of simple idea; it’s not complicated to say: well, you know, eh, in the end, what delirium are you creating? You’re creating a delirium about history and society; it’s not about your family! About your family, I always think back to Charlus’s quite satisfying comment, in *In Search of Lost Time*, when Charlus arrives, pinches the narrator’s ear and tells him, “Hey, you could really care

less about your little grandmother, you little rascal!” [See *Anti-Oedipus*, 88 and 314. See also *Proust and Signs*, 146. See Marcel Proust, *In a Budding Grove*, in *In Search of Lost Time*, II, trans. C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, rev. D. J. Enright (New York: Modern Library, 1992), 473.] Well, fine, to some extent, this is about all of us. That doesn't mean that we don't love our grandmothers, our fathers, our mothers; of course, we love them. But the question is knowing in what form and as what.

I believe that this is never the social field; if you will, the operation, the whole operation of psychoanalysis, is perpetually to flatten out the social field onto family members and the family structure. I call a family member, the image of a father, the image of a mother, etc., and this is the tendency of personology. I call a family or familialist structure, the father's name, the mother-function, defined as a structural function. And whatever the differences, there is at least one common point, it is this perpetual flattening out onto familial coordinates, whether they are interpreted in terms of persons or whether they are interpreted in terms of structure.

And for me, delirium is exactly the opposite. Someone who creates delirium, this is literally someone who haunts the social field, the historical field. And the real question is: why, and how does [delirium] operate its selections, its historical-global selections? Delirium is historical-global. So, once again, to say this is, I believe, almost the simplest idea, the most concrete idea, the one that engages me the most. And strangely enough, [this idea] did not work at all in the end, because I think that what is nonetheless striking is that *Anti-Oedipus*, I think, is a book that had a lot of influence, on a lot of people, but each one individually.

The fact is, melancholic defeat has never prevented in the least any psychoanalyst from continuing his stupidities, and no doubt, this was forced, this was inevitable. But at the time, it was less obvious than it was inevitable. So yes, I insist a bit on that. If you take someone in delirium, this is someone who, through a historical-global field, through a historical and social field, draws his lines. So, it's the same thing as the process that carries us away.

Once again, delirium, what is it? It's not about raving about my father and my mother. It consists of creating delirium about [the] black, [the] yellow, the big Mongol, Africa, what can I say, etc., etc. And if you take... Then, of course, I can hear the immediate objection coming right away, the immediate objection coming right away: “Well, yes, but what is there beneath this?” I say there's nothing underneath, because that's the bottom, [and] that's the top. And if you do not understand, then I choose some examples very, well, of grand delusional figures. And that's why over the course of a year, we formed a group here, especially with Claire Parnet, and another, with another student named [André] Scala. There were several of us who undertook the following operation, something at that time that interested us greatly: we selected examples of delirium, and we compared the examples in which psychoanalysts or psychiatrists spoke, and we took the statements of delirium, the utterances of delirium, and the utterances of delirium retained by the psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst were taken. So, we really possessed something like two texts, and we just put them side by side. [Deleuze refers to academic year 1973-74 and work that was published by Deleuze, Guattari, Claire Parnet and André Scala as "The Interpretation of Utterances", originally in Deleuze and Guattari's *Psychanalyse et politique* (Alençon: Bibliothèque des mots perdus 1977), in *Two Regimes of Madness: texts and interviews 1975-1995*, trans. Ames Hodges & Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e) 2006), pp. 89-112.]

And this was unbelievable. I mean, experiencing this, we cannot forget this experience given how frightening it was because here we saw the kind of *forcing* of the psychoanalytical or psychiatric operation; we saw how much this forcing occurred, then, in real time (*sur le vif*)! I'll select an example: what is Schreber, President Schreber, the famous President Schreber? So, we had studied this [case] very closely; we spent an enormous amount of time on this. If you select this delirium, what are you seeing? It's quite simple; you see a guy who keeps on creating delirium about what? About Alsace and Lorraine. He is a young Alsatian -- Schreber is German - - he is a young Alsatian who defends Alsace and Lorraine against the French Army. There is a whole delirium of races. President Schreber's racism is frantic, his anti-Semitism is frantic, it's terrible, with all kinds of other things in that direction.

It's true that Schreber has a father. What does this father do? It's not nothing. The father is a very well-known man in Germany. And he is a well-known man for inventing some veritable small torture machines, sadistic machines, that were very fashionable in the 19th Century, and that originated with Schreber. Subsequently, a lot of people imitated Schreber's [machines]. These were torture machines for children, for the proper education of children. In magazines still from the end of the 19th Century, you will find advertisements for these machines. For example, I'll cite the most innocent one, for example, some anti-masturbation machines, with which children sleep with their hands tied, all that. And these are pretty terrifying machines, because the purest, the most discreet one, is a machine with a metal plate in the back, a metal jaw support there, so that the child might sit properly at the table. These machines were very successful, highly successful. [*Laughter*] So fine, the father, he's the inventor of these machines.

When President Schreber gets delirious, he also gets delirious about an entire system of education. There's the theme of Alsace and Lorraine; there's the theme of anti-Semitism and racism; there's the theme of the education of children. Finally, there's his relationship with the sun, the rays of the sun. I am saying, behold, he's raving about the sun, he's raving about Alsace and Lorraine, he's raving in the primitive language of the primitive god, he invents a language for himself of, drawing from forms of Low German, fine. He's raving about the sun-god, etc. You place Freud's text alongside, and what do you see? Well, it just happens that Schreber wrote down his delirium, so this is a good case. You place Freud's text alongside it, and I assure you, well, if you remember this text: on no page is there any of that at all. It's about Schreber's father insofar as being the father, and only that, all the time, all the time, Schreber's father, and the sun is the father, and the god is the father, etc., etc.

And what has always struck me is that schizophrenics, even in their misery and pain, are not lacking in humor. It does not bother them so much when you tell them that, when they have to endure that talk. They tend, in fact, to agree; first, they want to be appreciated, to be cared for, they have so much..., so they're not going to.... Or they get angry, they say, "Oh stick it! Leave me alone!" There was a show on TV about schizophrenia not long ago where there was a perfect schizo who asks for a cigarette; the psychiatrist, I do not know why, he says: no, no, no, no cigarette, so [the schizophrenic] leaves and says, she says: oh, well, very good. Now, you understand, when you say things like this: "But the sun, you're raving about the sun, but the sun, finally, don't you see that it's your father?" The schizophrenic, what do you want him to say, what do you want him to say? It's as if, it's like when you ask him: what's your name? to write his name on the hospital, on the register, on the hospital register. It doesn't bother him so much

because he will say: “Yes, yes, yes, Doctor, yes ... the sun is my father, only my father, it’s the sun, fine.” He’s raving about the Virgin; for example, Gérard de Nerval, good. [See *Anti-Oedipus*, 125, and in Nerval’s works, see Gerard de Nerval, “Aurelia,” in *Selected Writings*, trans. Richard Sieburth (New York and London: Penguin, 1999), 265-315.] They say to him: “But don’t you see that the Virgin is your mother” He’ll say: “Well yes, but of course, that’s what I always said, I always said my mother is the Virgin.” He builds up his delirium, he puts his delirium on its feet. This happens a lot.

I’ve never seen anyone get delirious, once again, get delirious within familial coordinates. How is it... Of course, parents emerge within delirium, the theme of parents, but why? Solely insofar as they are useful as kinds of transits, doorways, that is, they place the delirious subject into relations with historical-global coordinates. “Oh, my mother, it’s the Virgin!” But what matters isn’t the relationship with the Virgin; what matters is... Take Rimbaud, for example; I mean, nonetheless, one must not snuff out the ravings. So, of course, all the delirious subjects are not Rimbaud. But still, I believe that delirium has great power (*puissance*). Delirium has great power; the person who is raving might be reduced to impotence, yes, and the delirium might reduce him/her to impotence. But, the power of delirium, what is it? Rimbaud starts to rave, not in the form of his relations with his mother. Because, come on, we really must not exaggerate; it’s shameful the way that... It’s humiliating, I don’t know; there’s something so reductive to bring delirium back perpetually to... as if people who are raving were doing so just to repeat stories.

I cannot even recount early childhood stories, because the child never lived like that. You understand, a child experiences his/her parents in a historical-global field. He/She does not experience them within a familial field; he/she experiences them immediately. Imagine, you are a little African child during the colonization. Fine. You see your father, your mother. In this situation, what are your father and your mother in contact with? They are dealing with the colonial authorities, they are dealing with this, that. Take an immigrant child today in France. He/She experiences his/her parents in relation to what? He/She does not simply experience his/her parents as parents; never has anyone experienced his/her parents as parents. Take someone whose mother does cleaning work, and someone whose mother is a wealthy bourgeoisie. It is obvious that what the little child focuses on, and very quickly, very early, he/she focused, through parental themes, on vectors of the socio-historical field.

For example, if a small child is taken very early by his/her mother to a stranger’s home, that is, to the mother’s employer’s home, as often happens for cleaning ladies. It is obvious that the child has a certain vision of “lines” of a historical field, of a social field. As a result, once again, I jump from all my... It’s the same idea. When Rimbaud launches his kinds of delirious poems, what is he telling us? He says to us: “I am a negro, I am a negro, I am a Viking, I am Joan of Arc, I am of an inferior race for all eternity.” That’s what raving is. “I am a bastard, I am,” etc., and I am a bastard, that does not mean I’m having problems with my father and my mother. [An approximate quote from Arthur Rimbaud, “Bad Blood”, in *A Season in Hell*, in *Rimbaud, Complete Works, Selected Letters*, trans. Wallace Fowlie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 174-83.]

It means that delirium is this kind of investment, it is this kind of investment by desire of the historical and social field. As a result, for us, the interpretation we've been offered, the rules for listening to delirium, it was essentially that, basically that. It is obvious that parents are only "signposts" of all these vectors that crisscross the social field. As a result, already giving dignity back to delirium, or restoring dignity to the raving person, is for me to conceive that the delirious person is not trapped within childhood problems, because it's already true of the child that if the child becomes delirious, he/she'll do so in this way.

You understand, this has been tested within the same research perspective, this has been tested regarding the kind of psychoanalysis which appears the least compromised in these stories of flattening out [delirium] onto the familial field, namely Melanie Klein. And Melanie Klein analyzes a little boy named Richard. [See Melanie Klein, *Narrative of a Child Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1961).] And for me, this is really one of the most shameful psychoanalyses imaginable. Because it is during the war; Richard is a young Jew, he has only one passion, the geographical maps of war. He constructs them, he colors them in. His problems are Hitler, Churchill, what is all this about, what does war mean? [Comment by Claire Parnet] Yes, he moves ships and armies around, etc. And here, it is stated by Melanie Klein, it is out of evil intention (*mauvais esprit*), she doesn't stop saying: "I stopped him, I showed him that Hitler, is it the 'bad daddy', that Churchill is the good mother", etc., etc., etc. This is so painful, and the little guy cracks up.

This analysis is very interesting, because there are I don't know how many sessions, everything is timed. This book was published in France, this shameful psychoanalysis, it was published in France at Editions Tchou. It's frightening; at first, he manages fine, and he is even quite humorous. He jokes with the aging Melanie; he says: Oh, you have a watch? he says to her, which means clearly: I want to get out of here! So, then she says to him: Why are you asking me that? So, she interprets, she says that he feels threatened in his unconscious defenses. Oh, come on! He has only one desire: to get out, get out, get out. And then little by little, he can't take it anymore. He can't take it anymore; he just isn't up to it. What do you want him to do? So, he accepts everything, he accepts everything. He accepts everything, but at what cost? I don't know. Fine.

And for each case, it's like that. Whenever you see delirium, you find these affirmations, which are splendors of delirium and at the same time, their true reason for existing. This is about the relationship someone has with Celts, Blacks, Arabs, the etc., and who does not have ... and if this is an Arab [speaking], it's about the relationship he/she has with the whites, with etc., etc., with the particular historical era.

Let's talk about masochism; here we have a case where there isn't even any delirium. There could be delirium, but there's not necessarily delirium. If you will, if we take it back to... So, I'm choosing this case because it's a case that I had studied a long time ago, the case of Sacher-Masoch himself. [See Deleuze's study of Leopold von Sacher-Masoch in *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, trans. Jean McNeil (New York: Zone Books, 1989).] We are then told that psychoanalysis never stops talking about the role of the father and the mother as the generator of masochism, specifically in which case and in what figure this father-mother duo will always generate either a masochistic structure or masochistic events. But all this is extremely painful.

Masoch's father, for example, if we take this case -- I'm not saying that this is a general case -- he's a prison director. So, for this, psychoanalysis, has a strange answer which is still its famous notion that seems particularly suspicious, [the notion] of "after the fact" (*par après*). It says, ah, right, all that, it comes after the fact. But at the level of one's early childhood, this does not intervene. What matters is the family constellation.

6. Homage to Michel Foucault: on sovereignty, discipline and control (22:00), 8 April 1986 (Foucault 18)

Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986

Part II: Power

Lecture 18, 08 April 1986

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq

Translated by Christian Kerslake; additional revisions and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Therefore, even if there is an overlap, using Foucault's texts as a basis one cannot rule out the ensuing hypothesis of three (and not two) juridical formations.

First: the formation of sovereignty, with the French Revolution as termination, broadly corresponding to the Middle Ages in part and the classical age. Absolute monarchy.

The second formation: the disciplinary formation of the post-revolutionary period, Napoleon and the 19th century. And, of course, in the process of being unlocked already at this period, the apparition of the third formation, founded this time on a biopolitics of populations, sketched out in the 19th century and bursting forth in the 20th. You see where I want to get to: corresponding to these three formations, there would be three very different subjects of right, three very different juridical formations.

How to name the third, if one manages to isolate it? One will say, we might as well use the word that the American author I spoke to you about with regard to literature, [William] Burroughs, makes use of, this is a formation of the power of control. [Deleuze will develop these ideas in a 1990 article, published in *L'autre journal*, "Postscript on Control Societies"; this text will be republished in *Negotiations* (1990), trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 177-182.] One would therefore have: power of sovereignty, disciplinary power or power of discipline, and power of control. What is the terrible power of control of which Burroughs has made a portrait? I am saying this, I authorise myself in saying this, because of his admiration for and his knowledge of him; Foucault's admiration for Burroughs -- despite the fact that, to my knowledge, he never mentioned him in his writings -- was very great, and the analyses Burroughs had made of social control in modern societies after the war had particularly struck Foucault. -- [A student says something to Deleuze] Yes -- [Pause] Let us try to characterise these formations, very... [Deleuze does not complete the sentence]

In the case of the formation of sovereignty, I will go rather quickly: Foucault gives it two interesting characteristics. These are the operations of deduction [*prélèvement*]: there is a power consisting in deducting from man on the one hand, and on the other hand, deciding death. This is the right of the sovereign. Good. I do not want to say more on that, it would involve too much. I say this: you can agree that one could say: this is, in pure right, the God-form. The subject of right is God. That is to say, the sovereign. Identity of the sovereign with God, why? God is on the one hand he who deducts – the deducting is God's share [*la part de Dieu*], sacrifice is God's share, it is the economy of deduction, the economy of sovereignty. And on the other hand, it is he who decides on death. It is the judge.

What happens when one passes to the disciplinary societies? In disciplinary societies, as we have seen, so I can go relatively quickly, there is a little regrouping. Maybe you recall how Foucault defined discipline. To discipline was to subject a small human multiplicity, taken within assignable limits, to a series of determinate operations. It was to discipline it: precisely, to impose tasks. To discipline for Foucault was to impose tasks on small human multiplicities, taken within assignable limits. And he responded: what appears in the 19th century is the formation of great milieux of confinement: prisons, schools, barracks, factories, etc. You see. I say this is discipline. You can see what this opposes, it no longer involves deducting, it involves the composition of forces. Why the composition of forces? It involves the composition of forces in order to produce an effect greater than they would have produced if they had remained isolated. To compose forces as a function of obtaining a useful effect. It no longer concerns deducting, it concerns composing, it is a completely different goal. It no longer involves deciding on death, it concerns the disciplining of bodies. I think that, according to Foucault's analyses, one can say that it is in this disciplinary formation that the notion of man, that the juridical form 'man', is constituted. And what counts in such a formation, in fact, is not the relation of man with the sovereign, it is the relation of man with man in order to derive a maximum of effects. The subject of right is no longer the sovereign, the subject of right is man.

Then, looking at the options, you will say: either the third period almost comes down to the same as the second; or it is a complication of the second formation ... But for myself I believe it would perhaps be interesting to stretch things and to say: this is truly a third formation. What is it? The third age of right, at the level of the biopolitics of populations. What is the biopolitics of populations? How is it distinguished from the training of bodies, from the discipline of bodies? It is absolutely distinguished because this time it concerns what? The biopolitics of populations appears when right sets about administering life, says Foucault, administering life in any open multiplicities whatever. You see the importance of the difference between discipline and biopolitics. The one is in an open space, with large multiplicities to which limits are not assignable. They can only be treated by the calculus of probabilities, hence the development of the calculus of probabilities and the meaning [*sens*] of the social control of probabilities, the probabilities of marriage in a nation, the probabilities of mortality, probabilities of natality. Natality, nuptiality, mortality ... I am looking for others: planning [*planification*], expansion of cereals, the uprooting of vineyards. Vineyards, cereals: these are populations also, it is not only men who are populations. What is involved is truly administering populations, in open spaces. It is necessary to reduce the cows? That is what administration [*gestion*] does. It is more than discipline, it is more than the disciplinary society, so what is it?

This is why the word 'control' ... There is a social power of control that is very different from disciplinary power. Maybe the power of control took root, sketched itself out, at the same time as disciplinary power was consolidating itself. But it is not the same juridical formation, it seems to me. And it is not the same subject of right. Why is it not the same subject of right? We have seen that the subject of right of the formations of sovereignty is in the last instance the sovereign, that is to say, God. The subject of right of discipline is man. The disciplined man. Discipline has the function of forming man as subject of right. And man as subject of right is man in relation with man, in such a way that the maximum of useful effects arises from their composition. Note that the form, from that moment on I would say, the subject of right is no longer God, it is the person. In the humanist age, the subject of right is the person and rights [*droits*] are the rights of the person, and what is the person? It's the person in man as a disciplined being. This is what Nietzsche will say so admirably: man is a being capable of keeping promises. This is the subject of right [*droit*].

The disciplined man or, as Nietzsche will say more pugnaciously, the domestic man, giving his ultimate definition in the marvellous pages of the genre 'how to train man ...' – this will be the Nietzschean version of Foucault – how to train man to keep his promises? There is a training of man which makes of him a subject of right, that is, which makes of him a person. And the relation of person to person, the whole of the right of the person in the 19th century, is the contract. The contract is the relation of person with person in such a way that from this conjunction of persons arises the maximum of goods.

All of that might leave you a bit perplexed. What an ancient thought it is. As you must already be anticipating, right no longer thinks of that. Nevertheless, these are the notions that seemed sacred. So that is what happened in a time that is now distant. But now I say we are in the age of the biopolitics of populations. The population can be equally cereals, sheep, vineyard, men; all of that is included in populations, that is, the numerous multiplicities without any assignable limit except for the limits of probability. The scales of probability replace the assignable limits of confinement. That is to say, the zones, the zones of probability. You have zones of probability for how many French go on vacation in Spain, etc. There are no more limits: you have no limits; you have no need to have any limits.

You understand why this is not confinement? The third age can no longer be that of confinement. Confinement, one no longer has anything to do with it, since the assignable limits are replaced by the zones of frequency. It is the zone of frequency that counts. Why do you need to confine people since probability certifies to you that you will find them all on the highway [*autoroute*] on such and such a day at such and such an hour? It goes without saying that confinement is absolutely useless, in this regard it even becomes costly, it becomes stupid, it becomes socially irrational. The calculus of probabilities is much better than the walls of a prison. So, this is a power of control and no longer a disciplinary power. For my part, I think it is necessary to say it; and all the elements are in Foucault for one to be able to say it. The disciplinary power he analyses in *Discipline and Punish* is a finite power. The proof is that Foucault, at the end of *Discipline and Punish*, examines the question: why has prison stopped being such a pregnant form today?

You'll ask me: why should one say that? It is necessary to have the eye of a sociologist, and Foucault is obviously justified. Prison will survive, for years, decades, and will harden. But when things harden, it is a sign we are dealing with survivals. Everyone knows at the end of the day that the penitentiary regime is, with regard to our modern societies, an absolutely maladapted regime, which is no longer sustainable since there are too many people to put in prison, so it is no longer necessary to find disciplinary forms, it is necessary to find forms of control. And everything happening today, I would say it's the same thing: the army explodes in the barracks, the students explode in their schools, what else ... the workers in their factories. This is why everyone has to listen very carefully to all the stories about a return to working from home, to part work; questions of the arrangement of labour time are questions that are absolutely fundamental today.

Again, grant me that this does not mean that we are moving to better times, because the strategy continues at the level of formations of control. But all the evidence shows that prison is no longer adapted to punishments, the factory is no longer adapted to labour, school is no longer adapted to teaching; that is, that it is the end of the disciplinary milieu which were milieu of confinement for arithmetical multiplicities. What is necessary for us are milieu of control, open onto probabilistic multiplicities. And they will be found; there's no need to worry; there's no need to worry; the misfortune is on its way, but evidently there are still some people ... but, you know, the types who say, 'make the prisons tougher', they do not even believe it, they know very well that the regime is completely screwed, that prison is finished.

But, fine, their discourse nevertheless retains a meaning, which is that this could go on for 30 or 40 years; there could be another 30 or 40 years only if this hardening occurs. So yes, before control has fully shown itself, it will be necessary to assign ... There are problems, you understand, when one assigns placements for working prisoners; the whole village does not want it, they say 'why are they screwing us over?', and all that. Planting a psychiatric clinic in a village creates problems; the people say: oh, we do not want all these mad people hanging out in cafes because All that creates problems, constantly.

And then one must, in fact, set up radars of control, that is, the ... It is necessary to see the zones of frequency. All this takes a long time, but finally, it becomes obvious. You know it as well as me. So in order to be vigilant about what is going on currently, I'm finding that very interesting: the whole debate in France on the arrangement of labour time, and in relation to that, if you see what I mean, the sad character who ends up saying: me, I'm in favour of the re-establishment of the death penalty ... it is funny, but ... at the end of the day it's not funny for everyone, but that doesn't stop it ... It is not fully serious, it is not reasonable, all that. To make up for it, what is reasonable in the most terrible and coldest sense of the word 'reasonable' are these new forms, which will be forms of control and not disciplinary forms. The age of discipline is over, I believe that. It's finished.

What does that mean, 'the age of discipline is over?' Well, to the advantage of the age of control. Think about the history of maps, for instance, it is astonishing. That is not discipline, maps, that is control. The unification of maps, the magnetic map, that is a product of control. It's interesting. That is not the old discipline. The walls of the school ... Now this is very ambiguous because it is true that the most active parts of the left are right to struggle for the abolition of

prisons, for the abolition of the psychiatric hospital, for abolition, etc. But one must see that their enemies are not the old ones. It is not crude types acting like buffoons and saying: 'Yeah, psychiatric hospital, yeah, prison!' Their enemies are the controllers who are absolutely in agreement with them, who say: Yes! Why yes! No prison! Wonderful idea!' The battle never happens where one thinks. Strategy never happens where one thinks. As Foucault will say, it happens elsewhere ... Strategy occurs between the abolitionists of the death penalty. The true struggle happens between the abolitionists of the death penalty, it does not happen between the preservers of the death penalty and the abolitionists.

7. From Nietzsche to Foucault: power and violence (13 :00), 14 Jan 1986 (Foucault 10)

Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986

Part II: Power

Lecture 10, 14 January 1986

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq; additional revisions and time stamp, Charles J.

Stivale

Translated by Christopher Penfield; additional translation revisions, Charles J. Stivale

The philosophy of force in Nietzsche is very simple in a sense, consisting in saying: atomism has always been the mask of a dynamism of a different nature, and force is precisely what, in its essence, is related to another force. In other words, there is an essential plurality of force, and this essential plurality will bear witness to the Nietzschean notion of distance. To wit: force is inseparable from the distance to another force. And what will Nietzsche call "will"? Here, it must be said, is such a strange conception of the will. But you can perhaps sense that it is a rich and profound conception. And well, if force is essentially in relation with force, the will will be the differential element of forces. If force is in relation with force, essentially, then force cannot be conceived outside of a difference between forces. Distance is the difference between forces. This distance, or the difference between forces, is what one calls "will".

So, there, Nietzsche monitors his terminology very well, he does not confuse force and will, he makes will the difference between two forces. In what form? We could define will in Nietzsche as the differential element by which a force relates to another force either to obey or to command. Those interested in this point, see *Beyond Good and Evil*, §19. You find a very curious analysis of will.

Henceforth, something -- here I am opening a very short parenthesis -- something must seem obvious to you, it is: how and why Nietzsche broke with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer believed in the unity of desire [*le vouloir*]. He believed in the unity of desire. And where Nietzsche's argument, where Nietzsche's comments are very beautiful, very strong, is when he continues: as soon as one believes in the unity of desire, one is already suppressing will [*la volonté*]. We have already suppressed the will, why? This is the very story of Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer rises all the way to the idea of the unity of desire through all its manifestations. Unity of desire through the one who commands and the one who obeys. Unity of desire through the executioner and the victim. But if there is a unity of desire through the executioner and the victim, the will must

necessarily be denied and suppressed. In what form? In the form of pity. The desire of the executioner, when he apprehends the unity of desire with the victim, is necessarily suppressed in pity. And this will be the entire movement of the philosophy of pity in Schopenhauer and the suppression of the will in asceticism.

But look, Nietzsche slips underneath Schopenhauer, saying: you could only fall into pity and asceticism since you had posited the unity of desire. You could only deny desire since you had posited its unity through all its manifestations. In other words, we can only understand what “desire” means if we take it as an irreducible multiplicity of forces, such that desire can never be anything except the differential element of the forces present. That is to say, ...desire is the relation of a force with another force, either to obey or to command. Or rather: either to command or to obey. For we obey with our will, no less than we command with our will.

Why do I recount all this? If you understand this point, it is very simple, ...the Nietzschean conception of force and desire (*vouloir*). It is no doubt so that, from this moment on, you are prevented from stupid misunderstandings about ... Nietzsche and fascism, for example. But, further, see how Nietzschean Foucault is. If he goes so quickly through his theory of power on this precise point, it is because he figures that Nietzsche has said what is essential, namely: in what sense force is not violence. [*Pause*] What is violence? No doubt violence is related to force. We will even say: violence is the effect of a force on something or someone. In a certain way, this amounts to saying that there is only molar violence. It is the effect of force on something or someone... Like when it is hot... It is the effect... But we are not looking for the effect of force on something or someone; rather, we seek the relation of force with force. Violence states nothing about the relation of force with force. And perhaps one will say: force is inseparable from violence, which would mean that force is inseparable from the effect it has on something or someone. But the relation of force with something or someone, that is, the relation of force with a body or a soul, is not the same thing as the relation of force with force. What defines microphysics is the relation of force with force. What defines macrophysics is what results, that is, the relation of forces with something or someone. [*Pause*]

In other words, force cannot be defined by violence; it is a force on a force, or, if you prefer, an action on an action. Violence is an action on something. On something: why? It will be said that violence is the action of deforming. How can a force be deformed, since it has no form? I mean that on all these points, Foucault can go very quickly, which is to say, the only text where he explains himself on what has just been said is precisely an interview, an interview appearing in [Hubert L.] Dreyfus and [Paul] Rabinow's book on Foucault, [*Michel Foucault, Un parcours philosophique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1984); *Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, 1983).] but the text itself is by Foucault. On page 340, what does Foucault say? Here, I will read slowly: “what defines a relationship of power” -- which is to say, a relation of forces, I would say just as well: what defines a relation of forces – “it's that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on others. Instead, it acts upon their actions: an action upon an action, on possible or actual future or present actions.” [Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” *Power: Essentials Works of Foucault, Volume 3*, 340.] An action upon an action, this is what constitutes a relation of forces or of power. “A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks, it destroys,” and all of this presupposes a form. “[I]t closes off all possibilities.

Its opposite pole can only be passivity... A power relationship, on the other hand, can only be articulated on the basis of two elements that are indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that 'the other' is recognized and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up."

"The exercise of power can ... pile up the dead and shelter itself behind whatever threats it can imagine. In itself, the exercise of power is not a violence that sometimes hides... It is a set of actions on possible actions; it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; it releases or contrives, makes more probable or less..." [Foucault, "The Subject and Power," *Power: Essentials Works of Foucault, Volume 3*, 340-341.] This last point interests me, if you have understood everything, because Foucault proposes an initial list of what we can subsequently call categories of power. To repeat: it induces, seduces, makes easier or more difficult, releases or contrives, makes more probable or less; here is a list that appears a bit bizarre. What is interesting about it? We have no choice but to follow the letter of the text, for it is the statement of relations of forces, the relation of force with force. Foucault tells us: be careful, the relation of force with force does not consist of violence, but rather of incitation; a force cannot do violence to another force, but instead it can incite another force, induce another force, make it easier or more difficult for another force, make other forces or the exercise of other forces more probable or less. Hence a list of categories of power.

8. Transformation in cinema (30:49), 31 Jan 1984 + 13 Nov 1984 (Cinema III 10 + Cinema IV 3)

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

Lecture 10, 31 January 1984 (Cinema Course 54)

Transcription: [La voix de Deleuze](#), [not indicated] (Part 1), Antoine Storck (Part 2) and [not indicated] (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Billy Dean Goehring

Segment 1

For a long time, let's say, the movement-image was in the driver's seat, which isn't to say it was the only determining factor. In a certain way, the movement-image was determinant—in what way was it mov—...determinant? Movement-images were the determining factor because the montage they—plural—were put through, the montage applied to movement-images such that, through the intermediary of montage, movement-images yielded an image of time, which was thereby necessarily an indirect image of time.

The main idea—I'd like for you, basically, if it interests you, for you to see how—and I'll go further today—to try and put together the main touchstones for our investigation. See, let's

assume this idea—it might not be true, for all I know, but right away, we'll add, yeah, sure, but, but, but we shouldn't get ahead of ourselves: with that sort of time, we find phenomena we should think of as aberrations in movement. There are aberrations in the movement of cinematic movement-images.

While it's true that, through montage, movement-images offer us an image of time—an indirect image of time, necessarily—be careful! The sort of aberrations of movement already present in the movement-image might already point the way to a direct time-image. Hence the significance of these aberrations in movement, and in a way, cinema has from the beginning always been torn between two regimes: that of the movement-image, insofar as it yields an indirect image of time once subjected to montage, and that of aberrant movement, which reveals or makes us aware of a direct time-image.

And these aberrations in movement were just as fundamental, just as important as movement-images themselves; it's simply that they likely, we probably didn't perceive them as we've since learned to perceive them. Looking back, where did we learn to perceive them in a new way? Well, it's the fundamental event I described before: a groundbreaking moment which seems to me more important than the sound revolution, again, because the sound revolution is only one technological revolution among others. And revolution has never come down to technique or technology. What was revolutionary, then? It was the relationship between movement and time which came to be overturned—where, rather than deriving our image of time from movement-images, [*Pause*] now the movement-image, what remained of it, was but the first dimension of a more profound image. This deeper image was a direct time-image; cinema would now give us time-images. [*Pause*]

What was this reversal rooted in? At the base of this reversal was an interrogation, taken further and further, of the movement-image's laws. What was the law of the movement image? The movement-image's law was its sensorimotor scheme. [*Pause*] How is this sensorimotor scheme the law governing movement-images? It's insofar as the movement-image, governed by its sensorimotor scheme, depicts a character in a given situation [*Pause*] who reacts to said situation and modifies it, [*Pause*] a sensorimotor situation. Sensorimotor situations are the rule for movement-images, such that the latter yields an indirect image of time.

What did this revolution entail? The revolution consisted in—and it's on this that I'd like us to, I think... because all of this is up for debate—in what sense? You'll see why I'm interested in organizing things this way. For reasons that should surprise no one, after the war, no one believed in it; they no longer believed in it. They didn't subscribe to it—not personally, not politically, etc. The sensorimotor scheme was called into question, especially. Hadn't that been the case before? Yes, it was suspect before, certainly, but before it always came in the form of an aberration in movement. Whereas now it's no longer a matter of aberrations in movement; really, it's a question of what's normal or normative. The normative or normal state of things is now a lack of sensorimotor situations.

Sensorimotor situations are the old way of doing things. Ah! The old way... [Pause] Now what do we have? Something completely different. We have what I've called purely audio-visual situations.ⁱ [Pause] Meaning what? It means exactly... You understand here, right away we ought to avoid a misunderstanding—as your investigation makes progress, you start to counter yourself with objections—you could always say, well, cinemagoers have always been in and faced with purely audio-visual situations, full stop. Yes, of course, obviously, but that's not it; that's not the point. It's about the character on the screen, [Pause] they were in sensorimotor situations. What's totally new is actually this new breed of character; but it isn't that—it's a way of more clearly grasping a new breed of character who sometimes doesn't know what to do and sometimes doesn't want to.

At any rate, their situation exceeds any motor response. [Pause] It's out of their hands—what *is* in their hands? Seeing and hearing. Of course, then, they still do something—again, we should always bear in mind that there's more to the story; once you work out an idea, there are going to be wrinkles—but what do they do? Ultimately, it's no longer action, it's—and I went over this a lot, two years back—it's... it's a ballad.ⁱⁱ It's a ballad, the film-ballad, playing with both senses of the word, ballad: ballad as a stroll and ballad as a sung-danced poem. [Pause] They are ballad films. So, [the character] might move quite a bit.

Take *Taxi Driver*, by [Martin] Scorsese [1967]—okay, what do we find? It isn't action; what does its movement consist in? That of perpetually being in a purely audio-visual situation, i.e., in the mirror, he sees what's happening on the sidewalk—that's what I mean by “being in a purely audio-visual situation.” And every character in so-called modern cinema, in the post-war period... I brought up a few examples from Rossellini—if Rossellini founded this kind of cinema in Europe, it's because—in his major early films—what defines neorealism isn't any social content—it's that realism had previously come down to a purely sensorimotor scheme; neorealism is this sensorimotor scheme's rupture. It's the guy faced with a audio-visual situation, like that, and then—what can he do? He has no riposte; he has no response; he has no motor scheme for responding to it. Hence, I described it as a cinema of seers, a cinema of visionaries.

In other words, the image is no longer sensorimotor—the movement-image, yielding an indirect image of time; the image has become purely audio-visual and now yields a direct time-image. It's a cinema of seers. Well, as I was saying, does that make it a celebration of passivity? No. Of course, there is passivity. There might be charming characters, the characters might be... they might be bourgeois. In Rossellini's work, they're often bourgeois. Again, the bourgeois woman in *Europe 51* [1952], the bourgeois woman in *Journey to Italy* [1954]. In early Godard, they were outsiders, [Pause], and so on. What do they have in common? They're seers, visionaries. [Pause]

So, that's where the reversal comes in: movement is no longer primary in relation to an indirect image; the movement-image is no longer primary in relation to an indirect image of time. [Pause] So, that's based on the requirements of a sensorimotor scheme, but now, what “open up”

a direct image of time, a direct time-image, are purely audio-visual situations. We penetrate into the time-image.

Segment 2

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

Lecture 03, 13 November 1984 (Cinema Course 69)

Transcription: La voix de Deleuze, Julien Denoual (1st part), Julien Queleuennec (2nd part), et Laura Cecilia Nicolas (3rd part); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

English Translation: Graeme Thomson & Silvia Maglioni

This kind of world behind glass that proceeds by way of slogans, advertisements and so on, mannequins and models, where its automatic character takes on all the dimensions you can think of. Ultimately, the rupture is such that... what happens exactly? We can no longer even believe in this world. What I tried to say last time was this: the sensory-motor rupture, or if you prefer, the rupture of conformity, of nature-mind accord as world, puts us in a situation where the problem of belief replaces that of knowledge. Namely: how can we, or *how will we be able to believe in this world as it is?* The question of belief is no longer: how can we believe in another world, or believe in the possibility of transforming this world, but how can we believe in *this* world? What reason do I have to believe in this world?

I won't come back to that, because I've already tried to develop it quite thoroughly, and there I was referring to [Jean-Luc] Godard, when he was asking: what's going on if the world is like a bad movie? If the world is like a bad movie, how can we believe in the world? What are we asking, what are we asking for today? Not to believe in another world, nor even to believe in the possibility of changing the world, but to believe in *this* world. We're asking for reasons to believe in this world as it is.

So we need an ethic or a faith, and here I was invoking Rossellini, because Rossellini's words seem to me quite admirable when he repropose something Tolstoy said. We so badly need to abandon art. We always speak of those who have abandoned art, but we never speak in any great depth about the conditions in which this happens – conditions that remain somehow mysterious. Rimbaud's decision, and those of others. And then there's another kind of break. One of the greatest acts of abandonment was when Tolstoy decided that art wasn't worth a damn, it wasn't worth a single hour's effort. And Rossellini seems to be quite Tolstoyan in the way he says that cinema is finished, at least from an artistic point of view. What I'm asking for is an ethic or a faith. An ethic or a faith, okay. Why is art no longer sufficient? Rossellini puts it very well, and I think his answer fully applies to this point of my analysis: art has completely endorsed the rupture between man and world. Art never ceases to sing of the loss of world, and Rossellini says

this very well. So now I'll read a short passage of Rossellini that I think is quite wonderful. I don't remember where it is... ah, okay.ⁱⁱⁱ

“What irritates me, what infuriates me in today's world? Today's world is too gratuitously cruel [...] it is the practice of a voyeur, of a pervert. In other words: it's cruel. I react very strongly to all this because I firmly believe that cruelty is always an expression of infantility, always. Today's art gets more and more childish every day.” How true that sounds! “Everyone seems to have a mad yearning to be as childish as possible. I don't mean naive: childish. From infantility we have fallen to the bottom of the human scale. We have become anthropomorphic monkeys: we'll soon move on to the stage of the frog or the eel.” That's a good one! “This is what angers me. This total lack of decency. This infantility, we have seen it in the nouveau roman.” He's quite right, if we choose to define infantilism as this kind of feeling of loss of world, of the rupture between man and world. “This infantility, we have seen it in the nouveau roman. We see it in an absolutely unbelievable form in painting. We have gone as far as total vanity, sickness. And all this in a world that's daily becoming more serious, more complex. Now, since this world has been made by people, I must always accept it, in spite of all the moaning and groaning that goes on, such as: ‘We are heading toward total destruction, the atomic bomb, etc.’ Today, art is either moaning and groaning or cruelty. There is no other measure: either you complain, or you devote yourself to the gratuitous practice of petty cruelty”.^{iv}

If you think of a painting like *Bout d'organe*, a painting like that... all this is true, it seems to me. Well, he's... he explains that he doesn't make art anymore, and he's going to make a cinema that will be a cinema of ethics and faith, in other words, what he calls a purely didactic cinema. But what is this? What does it concern? Because for him, the problem is not to endorse the rupture between man and world. It is to find the means to give us reasons, whatever they may be, to believe in this world.^v

He may be a Catholic, but it's a Catholicism that's strictly unimportant except perhaps to him. You see how, at this point, whether Catholic or atheist, as I said before, there's absolutely no difference. It's even striking that all these authors who, after Kant, went down the path of substituting belief for knowledge, all these authors at the same time made a very odd conversion to belief. I'd say, in my view – though we need to be cautious here – this was already the case with Pascal. If Pascal was one of the first, before Kant, to have placed belief at a deeper level than knowledge, and even to have replaced knowledge, including mathematical knowledge, with belief, it was also because he subjected belief or faith to a very odd conversion, namely that belief and faith would consist in believing in this world. The point was for the world to be restored to us, to be given back a link between man and world. And that's what it would mean to believe. To believe would be to rediscover a reason or find reasons for believing in the world, in other words, a link between man and the world.^{vi}

So, when Rossellini says no, when he labels infantile any position that derives its joy from the rupture between man and the world – at which point it can only be moaning or cruelty – it's not

in the name of Catholicism that he demands belief. It was already in Kierkegaard. With Kierkegaard, belief consisted of: Give me back the world, give me back the world, *this* world. Just as Pascal's wager was: Give me back the world, this world. So, at the same time as belief replaces knowledge, belief undergoes a conversion, a fundamental conversion that, in my view, can be found in all the authors who take part in this substitution of belief for knowledge, and who all converted in very different ways. They all convert belief, which ceases to be a belief in another world and becomes a belief in this world, in other words, the restoration of man's relation with the world. And what Rossellini wants to do is precisely... and this is why he invokes ethics beyond art, it's not a question of plain old morality, he thinks that art is incapable of renewing the connection between man and the world. One needs ethics, one needs faith, he says.^{vii}

Well, in the same way, if I take Godard – I said this quickly last time but everyone knows, and he's the first to admit how much he owes to Rossellini – I think he understood this about Rossellini very well. What he understood admirably about Rossellini is this: the world makes bad cinema, as he himself says. The world has become a bad movie, and man has broken with the world. This is the rupture, the collapse of the sensory-motor schema. We are in the world as though faced with pure optical and sonic situations. We're in the world as if we were looking into a display window showing us a series of abominable things, or a series of exciting things, whatever you prefer. We ask for reasons to believe in the world, that is, we have no choice. The sensory-motor rupture means that we no longer have any reaction to this world. So, the only way we will again be able to react is if we find reasons to believe in a link between man and the world. At that point, well, at that point surely, if a link between man and the world can be rediscovered, *this link will constitute a new form of action*. But if you cannot find a belief in some kind of link between man and the world, if you don't fall into the category, as Kierkegaard would say, of ethics or faith, a faith that is a faith in this world, there's no way you will find this action.

So, when I say that Godard understood something of Rossellini, this is exactly the question he poses to modern cinema. And generally speaking, when Godard poses a question, he will be the one to answer it. He doesn't wait for someone else to give him the answer. It'll be up to us, later this year, to see what direction he takes in formulating this answer. But if it's true that the world makes all kinds of bad cinema, isn't it the responsibility of cinema and of filmmakers to bring cinema's critique into the world, and through this critique, to restore a relation between man and the world, that is, to give us a reason to believe in the world? If we no longer believe in the world, insofar as the world makes bad cinema, wouldn't cinema itself be capable of restoring our belief in the world? So, this would be the sole function of cinema, not at all to give us the illusion of a world, but to give us reasons to believe in the world. And in this sense, *cinema would be the only art, or perhaps non-art*, capable of giving us reasons to believe in the world.

Hence the question: What does it mean to believe in the world? Well, we've begun to see that believing in the world necessarily means believing in life in the world. And what does it mean to

believe in life in the world? In this world, believing in life in the world means that, despite the window displays, there's something alive, or between two window displays, or somewhere, there's something that lives. So, what does it mean to believe in the world, or to find reasons to believe in it again? Above all, it means believing in the body.

But what does it mean to believe in the body? What does it mean to believe in the body? Obviously, the body is the link between man and the world. To believe in the body. So the intentions of modern cinema would no longer be... it would break with the model of knowledge, and with any image of knowledge and knowing. It would pass over to the side of belief. It would be an art capable of giving us reasons to believe in the world – in other words, to believe in life or to believe in the body. Okay. So is that the way it works?

In any case, we can clearly see both these aspects. The modern cinematographic image is, as I said, an image fundamentally cut off from the world. We'll see later why, but for the moment, I only wish to refer to the great ancestors of contemporary cinema, namely [Carl] Dreyer – the image cut off from the world that typifies Dreyer's cinema – and [Robert] Bresson. But by giving us an image cut off from the world, it claims to give us reasons to believe, to give us reasons to believe in the links between man and the world.

If this were the case, cinema would be an astonishing practice. Once again, it would no longer be a matter of questioning the role of cinema in relation to the imaginary, a problem – I don't know why – that sickens me in advance, that seems to me to be of no interest whatsoever... it's not that, it's not that. It's a question of belief, and this doesn't mean believing in the story that's happening, because of course there is no longer any story. No. You have to give the world reasons to believe. It's the world's fault. The world has started making bad movies. Well, it's up to cinema to give us reasons to believe in the world again. Which would imply, which would at least imply a cinema that has a political character.

So this brings me to my second point, I'm doing some... after all, we're still constructing our program. I was saying, the second aspect, the second mutation of thought is: “Give me a body, then”. And I said last time: well yes, it's no longer the body that disturbs thought. This is no longer the case. In the old model of knowledge, it was the body that separated thought from itself. Now, no! Give me a body. Give me a body, or give me back reason to believe in the world, it's the same thing.

9. On bifurcating time (21 :58), 10 Jan 1984 (Cinema III 7)

Seminar on Cinema, Truth, and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

Lecture 07, 10 January 1984 (Cinema Course 51)

Transcription: [La voix de Deleuze](#), Sabine Mazé (Part 1), Laura Ochoa et Fabienne Kabou (Part 2) and Morgane Marty (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation, Billy Dean Goehring

Someone famous for flashbacks [is] Mankiewicz. Why does he use flashbacks? Why does he use flashbacks? [Pause] It's an unanswerable question if we're focusing on the flashback itself. However, it becomes obvious if we consider what Mankiewicz is thinking—as a thinker. [See *The Time-Image*, pp. 48-53.]

Hence why I always insist on approaching Mankiewicz exactly as I might approach Kant or Robbe-Grillet. What is he up to? What makes Mankiewicz tick? He does have a way of thinking, and we can find his thought in his work. What does his work tell us, then? It doesn't seem complicated to me! If I were discussing a philosopher, I'd say that it's rather unusual; here we have someone who, above all, does not believe in fate. [Pause] Immediately you can tell why that's particularly pertinent to time. It amounts to saying that, for him, say what you will about time, but there is no fate.

What does it mean to say that he doesn't believe in fate? What's going on in his work? It seems clear that he understands—now, what I'm trying to do is reconstruct a way of thinking as it emerges, and we don't have any proof either way. You might ask, why does he think that? We have nothing to stand on. *Why?* I can't explain *why* I think something, why I believe it. That's the last question to ask. [Pause] That's just how it is. Well for him, it's that things are always splitting! Always splitting or branching. And we have to take that literally. We're constantly splitting or branching within time. [Pause]

You could imagine a philosopher. Let's say, suppose Mankiewicz never made film and instead wrote books about philosophy. He would have explained himself. Explaining what can be explained isn't any clearer; rather—is it clearer? Cinema isn't any simpler than philosophy. Imagine it was a philosopher who said it, that things split or branch in time, that we're constantly splitting within time. Which immediately implies that time splits. I'm not talking about things branching in space; forks and branches in space are no big deal! A fork in the road is no cause for concern. Splits or branches in space depend on something deeper: splits in time. It's not even right to say that I'm split within time; I ought to say that time is always branching or splitting. It bends and curves; it's anti-fate. [Pause] Time bends and curves; it branches. Right. [Pause] And there are always, always—not always, it lets up—it splits into branches, and then those branches split into branches. There are so many splits, and it's time—time is what's splitting.

If only Mankiewicz had been a writer! But it turns out there is a writer who went down this road, someone we've talked about, so I'll just go from memory—wonderful, it's a sort of reunion—I'm talking about Borges, “The Garden of Forking Paths.” The main thrust of “Garden of Forking Paths” comes down to saying: a forked path isn't within space, it's time! A bizarre notion. When you have... when you're hit with an idea like that, whether it's your own or one that you encounter, you don't ask, “Why do you say that?” It's obvious that that question

wouldn't only be absurd or impolite—it would actually be devoid of all meaning. Why does he say that? The real question is: what does it help us see, what effect does it have on us?

Which brings us back to what I was saying: there is no concept without affect and percept. Here we have a concept: branching time. The statement of this concept: it isn't space—branches don't happen in space; they happen in time, since time as such splits within itself. I hope that just hearing that—I can tell you, because it's not me—it's... you already feel something. If you don't feel anything, no need to come back. It's a litmus test. What I'm calling the affect associated with a concept is the emotion or emotions [the concept] gives you; if you feel no emotion, you won't have a sense for that concept. And so you'll be moved by other concepts. I don't know anyone who isn't affected by any concept whatsoever; to each their own.

The second question concerns the percept, i.e., what does it make me see? Otherwise, it would be—how would you distinguish philosophy from the rest? Let's say that for philosophy, I say, "Well, it deals with concepts." Alright, it deals with concepts, but how do you isolate those from affects? How do you separate them from percepts? In other words, how is it separate from the arts or sciences? It's the same story here, so along the same vein, I don't see why we cannot jump from Kant to Mankiewicz, so long as we don't mix them up. I'll be frustrated if you come away having mixed them together, because that's not what we're doing.

So, that's what Mankiewicz says: time splits and keeps on splitting. Does he really say that? Yes, that's really what he says, all the time. That's all he says; he only has one idea. When you have an idea like that, that's all you need, that's enough for one lifetime, enough for a body of work. Immense bodies of work have been built on less. Anyway. See, there are a number of things involved: splits or branches, since time is branching. Of course, that applies to character development. With Mankiewicz, a character never develops linearly—this is where things become anti-fate—I say "never," but there is one counter-example. Even better—we had to find one, had to, because it proves our point, and not because it's an exception. We'll see why there's one example of someone who doesn't split, as far as I know.

But apart from that, things are always splitting, character development included, but the concept of branching or splitting goes further than a character's development. Characters change, but how do they change in Mankiewicz? Every character changes. How do they do so in Mankiewicz? [Pause] They do so by constantly getting off track. When something derails it goes off course, like a train: a diversion. It's always deviating. Hence his narration is constantly twisting. I consider him to be one of the great falsifying narrators. His narration is constantly twisting and turning. It splits and branches even before things get off the ground. Right. [Pause]

Why? One example *Cleopatra* [1963], which he later disowned. You know, he made two major historical—or theatrical, rather—films based on two Shakespeare plays: *Julius Caesar* [1953] and *[Antony and] Cleopatra*. He vehemently disowned *Cleopatra*, claiming the film was foisted upon him, that he hadn't been free to do what he wanted, etc., etc. Still, many regard it as a wonderful film. Why is he interested in Shakespeare? Something wonderful in Shakespeare fascinates him—it shows up in *Cleopatra*, in Shakespeare's *Cleopatra*, namely, that *Cleopatra* is constantly portrayed as temperamental, as the all-wavering, universal wavering, her wavering having become a cosmic power. She constantly splits and branches. She is the great brancher,

does not consist, does not stop deviating with her own deviation. She links her deviations together. She branches and splits, just as we might say a hair has split ends. Cleopatra has split ends.

You might think, sure, she's fickle, she's inconstant, granted. So, what? She's inconstant—that's obvious. But that isn't the point. What's important is *why* she's so fickle and inconstant. She can't help it. And yet it isn't fate. She is time; she is time personified, she is time become woman, that is, she splits into branches, and her branches split into branches. She's constantly splitting. Marc Antony is madly in love with her. She betrays him, but she isn't the one betraying him; time is splitting. In Mankiewicz's hands, Cleopatra *is* time. Time is a split end, whose split ends keep on splitting, proliferating into further split ends—that's what time is. "The Forking Garden Path." Then poor Marc Antony is reduced to nothing; he drinks to forget, he constantly breaks up and makes up with Cleopatra. And then in the fantastic conclusion, in one final split, Cleopatra will ultimately return his love for her, she he can die happy, in a way.

And we find some of the same characters in the earlier tragedy, *Julius Caesar*. Marc Antony is back. And this time, it's funny, because here Mankiewicz was able to do what he wanted. Brutus is not a man to split. Certainly, he has a lot of affection for Caesar, and yet he kills him. He kills him, right, but that doesn't qualify as a split; he's a unilinear man. Once he commits himself to the Republic, he won't turn back; he'll go all the way. He may be close to Caesar, but he kills him. He might be a clever politician and skilled orator—he goes straight to the people and explains, linearly, why he killed him, saying, "You all know that Caesar was going to put the Republic to an end."

In other words, naïve Brutus doesn't know, doesn't understand what it means to branch or split. And then there's Marc Antony—before he falls in love with Cleopatra, before they meet—who... the second Marc Antony, right, for those who haven't seen the film, is played by Burton, who does a wonderful job; the splitting Cleopatra is Elizabeth Taylor; in *Julius Caesar*, Brutus is played by [James] Mason, and Marc Antony is [Marlon] Brando in a marvelous performance. Mankiewicz's interpretation of Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* is fascinating. Brando is a branching or splitting man, one who constantly splits; he understands how time works. In a major scene from *Julius Caesar*, Brando—Marc Antony—presents himself as a man of battle, a warrior who doesn't mince his words, doesn't mess with politics, and yet he delivers a ten-minute speech to a crowd of Romans, causing their opinion to split, [*Pause*] rallying them to Caesar in a fantastic, split speech out of Shakespeare. All Mankiewicz had to do was pull from Shakespeare. At every point of Marc Antony's speech—look it up in Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar*; no matter the translation—it splits at every point; each time Marc Antony lauds Caesar's murderers as honest citizens so devoted to the republic, he deviates, with an aside about Caesar's glory. To the point that Brutus, unaware of this splitting and branching, unaware of its power, before he can even learn what it might be, finds himself banished, driven to suicide and dying before he knows what's happening.

And that's what's extraordinary, I think, about Mankiewicz's interpretation, which, in my opinion, is totally Shakespearean, but he takes this interpretation to the extreme in his film. You can't simply say that Brutus is an idiot, you know, and that Marc Antony is clever. Yes, Marc Antony is clever, but what makes him clever is that he's familiar with the branching or splitting

nature of time. What was Brutus' blunder? He didn't think to have someone observe Marc Antony's address to the people. Not only did he go off on his own; he didn't have anyone observe it because of his upright character: an upright character doomed by time—because time splits, branches.

Good, if we understand that, sure, it's obvious why. Why are there all these flashbacks? Why, in most of the films that – I'm getting too far afield, but hey, it will be useful for another day, uh... why are there so many flashbacks in Mankiewicz's films? [Pause] Try to understand; we're closing in on something. There have to be flashbacks in Mankiewicz because, if time splits, it splits in such imperceptible ways that time could be branching or splitting at any given moment, and most of the time you can't tell when it's happening. I'm not the one splitting; what's branching or splitting is something within time. I feel it unconsciously, I follow the branch, but I couldn't have a clear awareness of the split in the moment. That's because the splits or branches in time are beyond people and consciousnesses, can only be grasped in the past, save for certain instances where there is no flashback. But if there are so many flashbacks in Mankiewicz, it stems from his theory of time or his sense of time, an understanding of time I find extremely significant, extremely profound. An understanding of time where, in its essence, time constantly splits or branches; as a result, if any other writer comes close to Mankiewicz—and I'm not ruling out... I don't know enough to be sure, but I'm not ruling out the possibility that they knew each other, that Mankiewicz was an avid reader of his—if any author came close to Mankiewicz, it was Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald.

With Fitzgerald, too, there's no point in asking why. The question, "Why?" is so ridiculous. There is one question, the question of questions. He paid for it with his life; he paid for it all his life; it's the question that shaped him, the question he was born for. Imagine each of us were born for this question, the tragedy of never finding your question. At which point, you do not die, you're immortal, you hang on for your entire life, looking for the question you were meant to embody. So, find it quickly in order to find peace; you're not likely to answer it, but you will have peace once you find your question. Fitzgerald's question was, literally, "What happened?" What could have happened here? For some, the question is "What will happen?" Not so for Fitzgerald. His question was never "What's going to happen?" It was "How could it have come to this?" You must be devoted to a question. So here, it's a matter of affect; hence there's this constant, diabolical kind of circulation between concept, percept, and affect. You can't tell which comes first. Fitzgerald is always put in situations where he ends up, like, "it's come to this"—all of his writing is: "What could have happened to make it come to this?" [Pause]

Handsome, rich, happy—now he's miserable, down on his luck, aging and basically incapable of writing anything at all. What could have happened? How did we get here? And when it comes to a couple—Fitzgerald and his wife—it turns into a sort of musical duo, one of the finest things in all of literature. How did we get there? Well, I think "How did we get here" can only be understood once we approach time as essentially branching or splitting. Because it isn't our fault, it's no one's fault—as Fitzgerald is always saying—it's not your fault, it's not mine. What is it? It's easy to just say "time," but what we've come away with is a time so unusual, so forceful—time that splits, that's always been splitting. And so, we've derailed, gone down split ends, gone off track before we even realized it, and here we are—this is what it's come to.

See, it can only be grasped in a flashback. At that moment, the flashback is no longer purely conventional: something else makes it necessary. It is essential for splitting time, but in Mankiewicz there isn't one single response. What's essential is that the workings of pseudo-memory are rooted in time. In other words, memory never uncovers time's secret. [*Pause*] What our pathetic memory can recollect from time it can only do so based on the side of time it's familiar with.

10. On the collapse of the American dream (21 :40), 25 Jan 1983 (Cinema II 9)

Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983

Lecture 9, 25 January 1983 (Cinema Course 30)

Transcription: [La voix de Deleuze](#), Eugène Bitende Ntotila (Part 1) and Guy-Parfait Assassa; revised by Fabienne Kabou (Part 2); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Charles J. Stivale

Everything is a dream, all American cinema is ultimately historical. All of American cinema is eternally the birth of a nation, America being the most original birth of a nation such that it alone recapitulates all the births of all other nations. And that is part, not all, part of the American dream.

And as we have seen, the American dream has two groups: synsign, binomial. Synsign: our nation is the great encompasser that will found the most diverse peoples, the first aspect of the dream. The second aspect of the dream: our nation will produce men, real Americans, who will always win in the duel. Fine, well, that's the American dream! But hey, when did the American dream end? The American dream, I mean... you have to distinguish two things. The American dream, we must distinguish the doubts about this dream. You have to distinguish when it collapses. The moment it collapses is in the postwar years. And it collapses, one of the main reasons it collapses, in my opinion, it collapses for other reasons as well, but one of the main reasons is the explosion of minorities. This is the moment when the awareness and the action of minorities begin to say: melting pot, we'll see about that. We are not sufficient for the melting pot. And that supposes new emigrants, that supposes, on the one hand, the awakening of the black movement; that obviously supposes the Black Panthers, but that supposes the rise of new minorities.

So here, these are guys who, we can't even ... this is a whole, this is a whole, there's a whole story of emigration, you know. The great melting pot dream, you'll find it in [John] Ford, well, he's an Irishman. Yeah, for the Irish, that works. They will finally have a nation. Okay, that works well for the Irish. But for blacks, for Griffith, when it came to blacks, liberalism is done, right? Is the American nation a melting pot for all minorities? Ah yes, but careful, not for the blacks. Why? It's going to be interesting because what is Griffith going to reproach black people for? Why this shame of "Birth of a nation", however beautiful the film, this shame which marked

him, which created his torment and the sadness of his life etc., why? Why? We'll see, it's not hard to understand, I think. But therefore, I am saying: the American dream collapses after the war. Now we must be honest: even for an American, all there is that's American, one has to be a little, I don't know, a little strange to keep talking about the American dream. We sense that this is not working any more. There are other things, there are other things, but ... And in cinema, that did indeed stop after the war.

But, but, but, but, I am saying, there is quite another thing, the doubts about the dream, because the doubts about the American dream, that's what I wanted to explain very quickly. It has always been an integral part of the American dream. That's why you can't say: there are guys who believed in the American Dream, and then there are guys who already doubted it. Doubts about the American dream have always been an integral part of this American dream. And it's quite a Machiavellian but an historically very interesting operation. Because I would also like to relate it to the Marxist dialectic in a completely different way. I am saying doubts are part of the dream. Why? Because the American dream has always presented itself as a dream that derives its strength from being a dream. *[Pause]* Yes, it's a dream. The proponents of the American dream have always told us: I am not in danger of being contradicted by the facts. Whatever facts you present to me, I will tell you, well, and it's even worse, it's even worse what you are telling me, but the American dream lives precisely from this: that it is only a dream. And that's its potency, being a dream. That's a strange idea. What does that mean, then? So, the more you tell me, no, but you've seen your corrupt judges, have you seen all that? I would say, yes! The other responds: I'm not an idiot, I've seen it all. And I am telling you my dream is but a dream, and that is how it is powerful. Ah that's funny. Why? I say, why?

This is their idea, I imagine, I imagine. Here's their idea, I guess: America is the rebirth of all nations in the mode of rebirth of a new nation, because fundamentally America is a "healthy" community. Why is it a healthy community? Precisely because of the two characteristics of the dream -- you are going to tell me, we are going in circles... well no, we are not going in circles -- because of the two characteristics of the dream, namely: melting pot of a minority, and then production men who know how to dominate the situation, ah, well, *[Pause]* this is a healthy community.

But what is a healthy community? Rather, let's ask: what is an unhealthy community? To, to move forward: what is an unhealthy community? One would say in sociology, a morbid community or a pathogenic community, what is a pathogenic community? Well, some would ask, what is there that's pathogenic in a community of criminals? Let me choose two examples: a community of criminals, a community of alcoholics, the bar world, the world of crime. What is there that's pathogenic? What is there that's unhealthy? What's so morbid about that? Here, you can feel it. A simple answer is: in one killing occurs, and in the other, too much drinking occurs. That's it, that's it, but that's not it, that's not it. Here's the reason why it is pathogenic. But if, following the monumental method, we seek the effect according to which it's pathogenic, we are not dealing with the causes. They drink too much, okay, but after all, fine, and so what if they drink too much. They kill, ok, *[a few unclear words]* and how is this pathogenic, how is this morbid? It's because these are societies or communities or groups that can no longer remain deluded about themselves. This is what defines the pathogenic milieu for the pre-war American. These are communities that cannot remain deluded about themselves.

Oh, hey, so, this is a community that... Oh, it's very, very sad, a community that cannot remain deluded, according to the American nation, and then I'm not sure that corresponds to anything in Europe. And then, I'm not sure that corresponds to Americans either, because I don't know, but I see them like that. People from before the war say that. If by any chance there was an American here, as he would necessarily be post-war, I am saying that his disagreement, his objections don't matter. He would have to send to me his father, his grandfather, so I have time. [Laughter] Well, if they can't remain deluded about themselves, how do you expect criminals to delude themselves about their own society? The law of the underworld, after all, the law of the underworld, everyone knows that ... In the end, everyone knows what? I don't know. But everyone suspects that this is a joke. They betray each other whenever they can, whenever they have an interest; they denounce each other, it's the world of denunciation, of betrayal, well, all that. The law of the underworld is for the... I guess it's for tour buses, I was going to say Japanese; no, the Japanese don't get fooled by anything, it's for the tour buses in Pigalle. We tell them, this is the law of the underworld. No, there is no law of the underworld. These are communities which, when they enter into an alliance, they know very well, and here, American crime cinema has shown very well how pathogenic these communities are.^{viii} In this respect, they cannot remain deluded. No matter how many blood oaths they swear, the sworn promises, all that, as soon as they leave the room, one guy makes a call to turn everyone over to the police. [Laughter] They are not deluding themselves.

What about the alcoholic? What about the alcoholic? I am going to tell you because here, I am certain – no personal experience [Laughter] --, because everyone knows, who hasn't known these alcoholics, and who doesn't even have their favorite alcoholics, because they are charming, they are charming? And what is it about an alcoholic, deep down? When he's not deeply alcoholic, an alcoholic dreams, right? He dreams a bit. He believes himself, he believes himself to be strong, he believes himself, etc., he believes himself... But a real alcoholic, a real alcoholic? And that's where I encounter the Americans -- [Jack] London, who was a real alcoholic, a realest of the real alcoholic -- they had so many great, great alcoholics. Without great alcoholics, I don't know what American literature would be like [Laughter]; there wouldn't be any. We have to be fair to it. There was no literature, no American literature. If I immediately remove the ones I identify immediately, eh, Edgar Poe, [F. Scott] Fitzgerald, [William] Faulkner, that's quite a load. Jack London, he doesn't stay with it heavily, right? Plus all those who were alcoholics that I don't know about, who were drinking in secret, [Laughter] well, why alcoholics? It's not that they're phonies like criminals, no, it's not that.

When they're really alcoholics, do you know what they're doing? Do you know what their desperation is? It's that they've figured out the secret of things. That's what alcoholism is! I'm saying that a man who claims to have figured out the secrets of things is an alcoholic and nothing but an alcoholic, even though he has never had a drink in his life. He has his alcohol, he has his own alcohol, one just has to discover what; he has seen the depth of things. And what is the depth of things? The depth of things is the masquerade, it is the universal masquerade. The depth of things is that we are all ripe for death; the depth of things is that we are puppets, and behind our way of being puppets, there is nothingness.

And the alcoholic has seen this nothingness that existed through people and within people, and that's what makes the alcoholic basically someone desperate. That is, at the point of a possible treatment for alcoholism, each of us can each imagine one's own, I will be a doctor -- I am not saying that at all about drug addicts; drug addicts are not at all the same -- but the alcoholic, it's in this that the thing must be attacked, this kind of absolute nihilism, this absolute nihilism of the alcoholic. And London, who knew this from experience, has some splendid expressions. He tells us: "Alcohol does not allow a dreamer to dream." I consider this to be one of the most beautiful ways to define alcohol. That's it, alcohol, that's what alcohol is, it's what does not allow a dreamer to dream. Ah, ah, understand why at first, so it's trap is that at the beginning, it instead allows dreams and some very pleasant daydreams. But as soon as you're within the thing, that's over. It doesn't allow you that.

I know an alcoholic who I prefer and that... and he's a village alcoholic: he's a grocer, a grocer. He's really, he's really dead drunk at 8 AM when he opens, when he opens his store. Can you imagine? That's not nothing, living with a guy like that, oh it's not nothing! It happens. He's there. And so, when I see him, it's shameful. Because I have real compassion and very great esteem for him, and you know what it is, things are very different. I can't help laughing at the same time since, ah, it's disgusting that I can laugh because it shows that I'm participating in his alcoholism from an angle that I too am claiming to have seen the depth of things, which is really vile; ah I hadn't seen that in this story, I got off on the wrong foot.

But it wasn't only with him that I've seen this. But I think it connects. There is something analogous to this state of perfection, I only saw it in this man. Whatever you say to him, he responds with a laugh, but a laugh that no longer has anything human, a laugh that is a kind of snicker, not at all hostile, not at all aggressive. It's not aggression. A laugh so strange, so strange which is: ah yes, behind what you are saying, behind what you are talking about, I see, I see something, I see. And what is that something he sees? Basically, a bad potency [*une puissance mauvaise*]. It's not at all that he's nasty. Not at all. I tell him: "the weather is nice", he has this laugh: "ah ah ah ah" -- I can't imitate him [*Laughter*] -- and that doesn't at all mean: "you poor asshole. You think the weather is nice, it's not nice." That's not what I mean. It's, "okay, the weather's nice, and then so what, and so what? What do I see behind this what does 'the weather's nice' mean? What is this masquerade?" I ask him: "How are you, your daughters?" Well, there! [*Laughter*] There he reaches the peak of a snicker [*Laughter*] that isn't even about the daughters' ingratitude toward their father, if that was it; it's a cosmic snicker. "How's it going... My daughters... I've seen, I've completely reaching the end of this, completely reached the end of everything."

So, I would say the alcoholic like the criminal, for very different reasons, these are communities. That's why they get along with each other. There are alcoholic communities, then criminal communities, I forget, there are others. That's why; they cannot delude themselves about themselves. They are smart, they are not deluding themselves. They know, they know something very profound. London, more and more inspired, said: "Alcohol is pure reason". That, I find that sublime as an expression. [*Laughter*] "Alcohol is pure reason," which is, in fact, the opposite of dreams, the opposite of imagination. This is all in a very beautiful book by London in which there is the worst and the best. The best part is when he talks about what alcohol is, which is called *John Barleycorn* [1913], which was his manifesto, which had enormous significance in

the United States, which was his manifesto against alcohol. Now, it's pure reason, it's cold reason. In other words, these are communities, like crime, like alcohol. You have communities that we can call pathogens according to the Americans, because they can no longer have any illusions about themselves.

So, I am returning to my topic, understand: I can very well say a community is healthy as long as it can still maintain illusions about itself. You can tell me, this is wrong, this is not true, but I am trying to reconstruct American thinking about the American dream. A community is healthy. It is basically good and sane and liberal, whatever it does, when it can still maintain delusions about itself. Okay, the American dream is just a dream, but that's how it gains its potency. What would it risk in [John] Ford's day? Hence Ford's words: "I believe in the American dream". But "I believe in the American dream" doesn't mean at all "I believe the American dream is a reality"; it means exactly the opposite. "I believe in the effectiveness of the American dream as a dream", that is, I believe that we are still a community capable of deluding ourselves about ourselves, and that in this way, in that way, and that there is something good in this nation.

But that didn't last. They can no longer delude themselves quite as much -- we can find some who do, of course, we always find everything -- they can no longer delude themselves so much about..., they have passed into a state much more similar to that of aging Europe which, for a very long time, could not maintain any illusions about itself. We were specialists, so we really were the perfect alcoholic civilization. As for illusion, this was not our forte. You understand? But then here, there is something very, very important because next this will go very far. For Ford and for everyone, there is a limit; you step out of the healthy community, that is, the American dream, when you fall into a state in which you can no longer delude yourself or your community. So, this is the criminal's case, it's the alcoholic's, who else is it? It's the traitor's case, it's the informer's, it's the snitch's.

When you've done something like that, when you've done something like that, when you've indeed turned someone in, you can't have many illusions about yourself. The American dream is driven away. And one of Ford's finest films is "The Informer", "The Informer" [1935] which presents an Irishman who is driven to denounce his group and who falls into a kind of abjection, it is degradation. American degradation, you see, is very special. This is the man who falls into a community that can no longer maintain delusions about itself. It is either the degradation of crime, or the degradation of alcohol, or the degradation of betrayal or denunciation. Hence the importance of the traitor in all of American cinema.

But a further step was needed, a further step was needed. Someone had to arrive for whom denunciation had been a problem -- here I am speaking without joking -- both a metaphysical and personal problem sufficiently serious for him to say, well, yes in fact! Denunciation does not rule out the American dream. There is something moving about this attempt. Because there are always times when you will be called upon to denounce someone. For if you do not betray others, you will betray yourself, and you will betray justice. And this guy who made this very, very bizarre attempt, this obsessive attempt, this sickly attempt, and which marked, in my opinion, the end of this type of image in the cinema, the first manner action-image, is obviously [Elia] Kazan.^{ix}

Yeah, denunciation is part of the American dream itself. So, what if the American dream included denunciation? Okay, fine. But how was he saying that? He was saying that just as the American dream was collapsing everywhere and in all sorts of ways. We could still go along with it, that didn't help. And above all, he found himself with his personal problem, etc., etc.

11. New cinema: memory of the world and ceremonies of bodies (23:06) 22 Nov 1983 + 13 Nov 1984 (Cinema III 2 + Cinema IV 3)

On Cinema, Truth and Time: The Falsifier, 1983-1984

Lecture 2, November 22, 1983 (Seminar 46)

Transcription: *La voix de Deleuze*, Hélène Burhy (Part 1), Marc Haas (Part 2) and Nadia Ouis (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and timestamp, Charles J. Stivale

Translation: Samantha Bankston

I only have one idea about so-called Third World cinema, and what strikes me is that, in very different ways—I'm not claiming to create a category for it, between Indian film, Filipino film, Moroccan film, or Egyptian film, for all that—I'm saying: if there were a constant? Why shouldn't there be a constant? Just as we can speak of German Expressionism, why can't we speak in some way about cinema in Third World? I'm saying that what they have in common is the direct construction of memory. You'll tell me that's a platitude. No, it's self-explanatory. It's not at all the case that they wish to relate to the past; first of all, it's extremely equivocal—so I'll add: the constitution of a non-psychological memory; it's not a question of finding one's roots, it's not that. —It's that oppression, misery, colonization, whatever the case—there are very, very different cases in all these countries—which have made a veritable break from their chronology, a kind of chronological rift. This can come in the form of: but yes, we've stolen their past, it can be that. But it can also take more complicated forms: a sort of chronological rift. We didn't just steal their past, we transplanted them, we exported them, we put them in other territories, and so on. Right. [Pause] So it's not a question of them reconstituting a memory. First of all, their government would hate it, and that would be nothing, strictly speaking. But that's not the issue. Reconstituting a memory has never served anyone. What has been of service—and this is much more upsetting, much more aggressive—is to serve the world as a memory, to constitute a place that can only be a memory of the world. Because that upsets the world.^x

Where's my memory? Even people have a memory, but not me, huh? but that a place... It's the secular mystery, it's the secular mystery of oppression. I mean, what's the Christian mystery? In some tiny village, Christ was born, the universal became incarnate. You have countless beautiful passages by Péguy on this theme; you also have passages by Kierkegaard on this universality that is incarnated in the purest singularity: this tiny village, etc. Okay. But what about the secular mystery? There are mysteries in secularism too. It's that a disinherited place, a disinherited place—not at all because it's rediscovering its memory, but precisely because of its misery, as a precise consequence of what was suffered, etc.—is like the irrefutable witness of the memory of

the world. —I don't mean that it should be put in a museum, that it should be conserved like that. Everything that happens is valuable for the memory of the world.

Everything that people do now in this regard serves as a memory of the world, [but] it's not up to them to remember! I am not saying that the Third World has to reestablish its memory. I'm saying that all actions in currently poor, destitute, exploited countries, that everything occurring there is inscribed in a memory of the world. So, it's not surprising: I think that in cinema, I'd almost say that the exemplar of all these cinemas, one of the most advanced, it seems to me, is nonetheless Canadian cinema. I think that a guy like [Pierre] Perrault is quite important in modern cinema, fundamentally important, fundamentally. So, of course, the younger generation treats him like an old fart, in the manner: you're hassling us with your tales of memory. And I think it's because they haven't understood him. He's not at all pretending that the Quebecois — well, yes, he is pretending this; I won't at all say, it's less clear than I'm stating it; of course, the Quebecois... -- they have to rediscover their memory. He says this, but he also says something much more profound, much funnier: Quebec also has to make an effort and, in this location, a location surrounded by an entirely different civilization, the memory of the world must be inscribed there, for a memory of the world.

The memory of the world and time are the same. Time is not something that destroys, but something that conserves. The form in which time conserves is the memory of the world. Well, the memory of the world is in Quebec or in the Philippines, not in our libraries.

Segment 1

Sur Cinéma, vérité et temps : le faussaire, 1983-1984

2ème séance, 22 novembre 1983 (cours 46)

Transcription : [La voix de Deleuze](#), Hélène Burhy (1ère partie), Marc Haas (2ème partie) et Nadia Ouis (3ème partie) ; révisions supplémentaires à la transcription et l'horodatage, Charles J. Stivale

Je n'ai qu'une idée sur les cinémas dit du tiers-monde, ce qui me frappe, c'est que de manières très différentes -- je ne prétends pas en faire une catégorie, entre le cinéma indien, le cinéma philippin, le cinéma marocain, ou égyptien, tout ça -- je dis : s'il y avait une constante ? Pourquoi il n'y aurait pas une constante ? Tout comme on peut parler de l'expressionnisme allemand, pourquoi on ne pourrait pas parler d'une certaine manière du cinéma du tiers-monde ? Je dis, moi, ce qu'ils ont de commun, c'est la construction directe d'une mémoire. Vous me direz, c'est une platitude. Non, ça s'explique. Ce n'est pas du tout qu'ils [146 :00] souhaitent se rattacher au passé ; d'abord, c'est très équivoque -- alors du coup, j'ajoute : la construction d'une mémoire non-psychologique ; il ne s'agit pas de se retrouver des racines, ce n'est pas ça. -- C'est que l'oppression, la misère, la colonisation, quoique ce soit -- il y a des cas très, très différents dans tous ces pays -- ont fait véritablement une rupture de leur chronologie, une espèce de faille chronologique. Alors ça peut aller sous la forme de : mais oui, on leur a volé leur passé, ça peut

être ça. Mais ça peut avoir des formes plus compliquées : une espèce de faille chronologique. On ne leur a pas seulement volé leur passé, mais on les a transplantés, on les a exportés, on les a mis dans d'autres territoires, etc. Bon. [Pause] [147 :00] Si bien qu'il ne s'agit pas pour eux de se reconstituer une mémoire. D'abord leur gouvernement détesterait ça, et ça ce ne serait rien, à la rigueur. Mais ce n'est pas ça le problème, se reconstituer une mémoire, ça n'a jamais servi à personne. Ce qui sert beaucoup c'est -- et ça, c'est beaucoup plus embêtant, beaucoup plus agressif -- c'est : servir au monde de mémoire, constituer un lieu qui ne peut-être qu'une mémoire du monde. Parce que ça, ça embête le monde. [Sur le cinéma du tiers-monde, voir L'Image-Temps, pp. 282-291]

Où en est ma mémoire ? Même mémoire d'un peuple, pas moi, hein ? mais qu'un lieu... C'est le mystère laïque, c'est le mystère laïque de l'oppression. Je veux dire le mystère chrétien, c'est quoi ? En tel petit village, le Christ est né, l'universel s'est incarné. [148 :00] Vous avez des pages innombrables et très belles de Péguy sur ce thème ; vous avez des pages aussi de Kierkegaard sur cette universalité qui s'incarne dans la plus pure singularité : ce petit village, etc. bon. Mais le mystère laïque ? On a aussi des mystères en laïcité. C'est qu'un lieu déshérité, un lieu déshérité -- pas du tout parce qu'il retrouve sa mémoire, mais en fonction précisément de sa misère, en fonction précisément de ce qu'il a subi, etc. -- soit comme le témoin irrécusable d'une mémoire du monde. Je ne veux pas dire qu'il faut le mettre en musée, qu'il faut le conserver comme ça. Tout ce qui s'y passe vaut pour une mémoire du monde.

Tout ce que les gens y font actuellement vaut pour une mémoire du monde, ce n'est pas à eux de se rappeler ! Je ne suis pas en train de dire : le [149 :00] tiers-monde, il faut qu'il reconquière sa mémoire. Je dis que toutes les actions des pays, actuellement pauvres, misérables, exploités, etc., c'est que chaque chose qui s'y passe soit inscrit comme une mémoire du monde. Alors ce n'est pas étonnant : je pense qu'au cinéma, je dirais presque l'exemplaire de tous ces cinémas, un des plus avancés, il me semble, c'est quand même le cinéma canadien. [Voir L'Image-Temps, pp. 182-189] Je crois comme un type comme [Pierre] Perrault a une importance dans le cinéma moderne, une importance fondamentale, fondamentale. Alors bien sûr, il se fait traiter par la génération jeune un peu de vieux con, sous la forme de : tu nous embêtes avec tes histoires de mémoire. Et je crois que c'est parce que il n'a pas été compris. Il ne prétend pas du tout que les Québécois -- si, il le prétend, je ne dirai pas du tout c'est moins clair que je ne dis ; bien sûr, les Québécois... Il faut qu'ils retrouvent leur mémoire. Il le dit, [150 :00] mais il dit aussi quelque chose de beaucoup plus profond, de beaucoup plus drôle. -- Il faut aussi que le Québec aille et que dans ce lieu, là dans ce lieu-là entouré par une tout autre civilisation, il faut que s'inscrive la mémoire du monde, pour une mémoire du monde.

La mémoire du monde et le temps, c'est pareil. Le temps n'est pas quelque chose qui détruit, quelque chose qui conserve. La forme sous laquelle le temps conserve, c'est la mémoire du monde. Eh bien, la mémoire du monde, elle est au Québec, ou bien elle est aux Philippines, elle n'est pas dans nos bibliothèques.

Segment 2

Seminar on Cinema and Thought, 1984-1985

Lecture 03, 13 November 1984 (Cinema Course 69)

Transcription: La voix de Deleuze, Julien Denoual (1st part), Julien Queleennec (2nd part), et Laura Cecilia Nicolas (3rd part); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

English Translation: Graeme Thomson & Silvia Maglioni

I was saying, the second aspect, the second mutation of thought is: “Give me a body, then”. And I said last time: well yes, it's no longer the body that disturbs thought. This is no longer the case. In the old model of knowledge, it was the body that separated thought from itself. Now, no! Give me a body. Give me a body, or give me back reason to believe in the world, it's the same thing.

An admirable text by Artaud, “Situation of the Flesh”, says it all. Ah, it's such a beautiful text. It's in the first volume of Artaud's *Complete Works*, an early text by Artaud. You can see the connection very clearly: Rediscover reasons to believe in the world... Give me back a body. “There are intellectual cries, cries which stem from the marrow's *delicacy*. This is what I personally call the Flesh. I do not separate my thought from my life [...] One must have been deprived of life, of the nervous irradiation of existence, of the conscious fulfilment of our nerves, to realize to what extent the Sensation and Knowledge of all thought is secreted in the nervous energy within our bones...” One needs a spell and so on... “I am a man who has lost his life and who is seeking every way of re-integrating it in its proper place.”^{xi}

It's clear that in this text, it's the second part of the sentence that counts, although very often we readers of Artaud make the great mistake of limiting ourselves to the first part, the part that speaks of Artaud's demolition, Artaud's destruction, which would be equivalent to a rupture with the world, Artaud's loss of world. Yet, Artaud always conceived this loss of world in relation to his efforts to restore his own beliefs. And by what means? He tried everything. How to find reasons to believe in the world? That is, reasons to believe in a world that necessarily go through the flesh, and therefore through the body? Hence the title of the text: “Situation of the Flesh”. And his first response, or one of his first responses, will be cinema. And we'll have to take a closer look at what he meant by this, because very strangely, by using a language which is very close to that of the early pioneer filmmakers, he says something that seems to me radically new, a bit like what Comtesse said earlier regarding Élie Faure. Okay.

I would say that's what counts... every time you read Artaud, you have to think about this: this is not a man who simply says “I am a man who has lost his life.” He adds: “and who is seeking every way of re-integrating it in its proper place. For in some measure, I am the Generator of my own vitality. [...] For me, whoever says Flesh says apprehension above all, hair standing on end, flesh exposed, with all the intellectual depth of this show of pure flesh and all its sensory consequences...” and so on.

So, as I was saying, it has to go through the body. It's inevitable. "Give me a body". Does this mean that everything is permitted? There are always misunderstandings on this point, and I can't be the one to judge. I don't know if they are misunderstandings. Does this refer to a culture of the body? Does it mean a body ceremony? I don't know, I don't know. Maybe it has this sense, maybe not. No. Does it involve a glorification of the body? No. Does it involve health? No. "Give me a body, then" doesn't refer to any of that.

You must understand that this means something else. "Give me back a body, however fragile it may be" – this is not a well-made body we're asking for. It's just a body. And maybe people who have a very well-made body don't actually have a body at all. Maybe "Give me back a body" means "Give me back a link with the world". I know of athletes who are afflicted by a loss of world. Think of those poor little gymnasts, the little gymnasts... I don't know how to say it, but it's like they're really in a display window. That's right, an athlete's body is entirely part of the display window world, meaning that their sensory-motor systems may appear to be in good condition but it's absolutely not the case. They're in full sensory-motor breakdown. It's a catastrophe. They don't believe in anything anymore. They don't believe in anything and, in any case, they no longer have any reason to believe. So that's not what is at stake in having a body. What could it be to have a body?

Now, Spinoza, who was consumptive, had a body. Strange. [D.H.] Lawrence, who also had consumption, had a body, even if it wasn't in the best of shape. Nietzsche, who was half blind and suffered from migraine, he had a body. What went through that body? A link with the world, a relation with the world. A belief, okay. I would say that from Kierkegaard on... in Kierkegaard, in Nietzsche and so on, you can find the same theme: a body, we need a body, man no longer has body. So you have to connect the two questions – and that's why the linkage seems to me absolutely... – to find reasons to believe in the world means to give yourself back a body. And the two are absolutely connected.

So, at this point, I could make a new detour, like a kind of encounter with cinema, in terms of this second aspect of "Give me a body, then", and I'd say that this concerns the same cinema... I'm thinking of Bresson, Dreyer, Godard and many others. Perhaps, perhaps... These are just possible directions for our program – you don't need to raise objections, I haven't yet covered this. That's what I always say. It all remains to be seen – films that would aim to give us back a link with the world, to give us reasons to believe in this world. As I was saying, this same cinema will also be a cinema of bodies.

What do I mean by a cinema of bodies? I mean a cinema in which sensory-motor reactions are actually replaced. We're still in the regime of loss of world, in other words, you understand that "Give me back a body" doesn't mean "Give me back sensory-motor schemas", it doesn't mean – I don't quite know how to put this – it doesn't mean "Give me back the world of knowledge, the old world of knowledge". Since it is belief that will restore it to us, this will obviously be a completely different kind of world. And it will be a completely different kind of body. It won't

function through sensory-motor reactions, so how will it function? Well, as I was saying, there's something very odd happening here, and this is where a whole new type of cinema makes its appearance. In terms of the cinematographic image, what is it that comes to replace sensory-motor linkages in a whole area of modern cinema? Linkages of attitudes or postures.

It's a case of saying there's no longer any story. A story, if I try to formally define the notion of story... I would say a story is the unfolding of sensory-motor patterns. You can see why: stimulus, action, new stimulus, action. The unfolding of sensory-motor patterns constitutes a story. When we're in pure optical situations, or pure sound situations, it's as though we were in front of a display window. There's no longer any story. So what do we have instead? It will be a strange cinema. As I was saying, take a look at some modern films: there is, of course, a pseudo-story, but where does their real interest lie? In a sequence of body postures, body postures that link up with one another: bodies bumping and kissing, pressing against walls, sliding down. As I was saying, the archetypal image of this cinema, well, the body leaning against the wall, sliding, crouching, and then the two bodies bumping into each other and kissing. What is this logic of postures? We're called upon to discover a whole logic of postures that has replaced the logic of action.

As I mentioned, among the great modern filmmakers – I don't need to elaborate since we'll look at all this in more detail later – in my view, in terms of modern cinema, France was one of the poles – I'm not saying it was the only one – but one of the fundamental poles of the New Wave. It was Godard's and [Jacques] Rivette's cinema of the body, with its linkages of postures... if you think back to a great scene in *Prénom Carmen* [1983]: the two lovers jamming themselves in doors, throwing themselves up against windows, and so on and so forth. You can't say it's a story. It's a linkage of postures, but at full speed, two meteors, two meteors in a linkage of different postures.

Rivette... this also constitutes some of the great moments in Rivette's cinema. And when I said that it's not theater, and this is why it is cinema, it was because, in fact, these linkages of postures are purely cinematographic and perpetually place themselves *in relation* to theater. In Rivette's work, there's an explicit reference to the theater, but it is *outside* the theater that the characters enter into their postures. It's in relation to the supposed play, in relation to a supposed play, that Rivette's bodies enter into autonomous postures that don't duplicate the play's theatrical attitudes but compete with them and constitute the real cinematic material.

In the post-Nouvelle Vague era, whether it be [Chantal] Akerman, as I was saying, or [Jean] Eustache, whether it's – given that attitudes are vocal and sonorous as much as visual – whether it be Akerman, Eustache, [Philippe] Garrel or [Jacques] Doillon, you have a continuation of this... I seem to be denying their originality but, on the contrary, I believe very deeply in their originality in relation to the Nouvelle Vague, but this too is a cinema of postures and attitudes. As I said, in America it was [John] Cassavetes – Cassavetes being surely the greatest filmmaker to have created a cinema of the body, the development of which we find in American experimental

cinema, sometimes in ceremonial forms or ritual forms, but keeping all the transitions between everyday attitudes and ceremonial attitudes.

What I mean is that you have a linkage between attitudes or postures, which is no longer a sensory-motor linkage. And this is why I suggested borrowing from Brecht a word that I think is very useful, *gest* (*gestus*), to designate the linkages between attitudes. Therefore, all this cinema, this type of cinematographic image, will no longer be narrative. It will display a *gest*, and it will be up to us to discover this *gest*, that is, the linkage of postures, the formal linkages between one attitude and another. And what does this imply? And how does a *gest* go beyond bodily attitudes? Is Brecht right in thinking that all *gests* must be social or political?

Let me take a quick example that I think I missed before. If you go back to *Prénom Carmen*, I'd say that the body attitudes of the lovers, for example, refer to a *gest* that is distributed in a very, very complex way, but which forms part of the musical *gest*... in the sense that the curve of the violinist's arm, for example, at one point provides the *gest* that corresponds to the attitude of the two lovers when one, bending their arm, embraces the other, and therefore there will be a whole system of resonances and echoes, visual echoes, sonic echoes and so on, in which the linkages between bodily attitudes will constitute a *gest* that is at once political, social, aesthetic and musical, and which will give this cinema a high level of complexity. It will literally be a cinema of "Give me a body, then".

I suggested last time, to help you prepare for your future analyses, that in the post-Nouvelle Vague era, someone like Garrel seems to me to go very far in this direction, because Garrel has done something that, in my view, had never been done before in cinema, namely, he has exploited something that cinema had been criticized for lacking, namely the fact that it didn't give us the presence of bodies – as opposed to theater, where the body is present – and he turned this around to make a superior cinema of it, namely, a cinema that would allow us to see the process by which bodies take form. Now, this may sound a bit abstract, so how did he manage, in practical terms? If you've seen any of Garrel's films, you'll be able to sense how he achieved this precisely by giving what at first glance might appear to be inordinate importance to the white image, the black image and all their varieties that would become material through which bodies are constituted. And this will be an extraordinary cinema in which *gest* and attitude will enter into perpetual resonance with the three fundamental bodies – the three fundamental bodies being woman, man and child. And these will be the three fundamental bodies of Garrel's cinema, which you find in... and here he seems to me to be infinitely creative in this respect.

But if I try to provisionally sum all this up, I'd just say: look at the coherence between my two points. My second point consists in saying: don't suppose that bodily attitudes, bodily postures or attitudes are reactions. We're no longer in the world of sensory-motor schema. So, what are they? *They are literally elements of belief, the building blocks of belief.* This is where the two points are so closely linked. They are the building blocks of belief. This would allow us to understand Pascal's "make yourself silent, dumb nature", in another, and I believe more precise, sense.

Pascal says: Do you want to believe? What is belief? To believe is to assume a posture. Assume a posture. Now, this is generally understood in the sense of getting into the habit of kneeling down and saying your prayers and so on. But obviously he means something else. *Belief literally inscribes itself*. Postures are the genetic constituent elements of belief.

Okay, so we move quite naturally from the first point, the substitution of belief for knowledge, to the second point, advocating for a cinema of attitudes, or rather advocating for bodily attitudes in general, because this doesn't only apply to cinema, since it's through bodily attitudes that we can re-establish a link with the world, or restore our belief in the world, in this world, with all the dangers that this entails, once again, namely that the posture becomes purely ceremonial, as occurs in a certain trend of experimental cinema, or that the posture becomes solely quotidian, as in another trend of experimental cinema. What happens in this case, precisely? I mean, in both cases, there will no longer be a gest. When a gest becomes solely theatrical, or when a gest dissolves into everydayness, there's no longer any gest. Our question would be, under what conditions – to use Brecht's beautiful notion – under what conditions is there a gest that would be a real linkage between postures, a link of bodily attitudes through which a belief in the world can be restored to us?

12. On capitalism and its famines (20 :41), 18 March 1980 (A Thousand Plateaus V 12)

Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980

Lecture 12, 18 March 1980

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq and Mariana Carrasco Berge

Translation by Charles J. Stivale

Do you perhaps sense that we are getting closer, -- but we are trying to get closer to something concrete in a very, very gradual, very careful way -- we are already getting closer to something concrete? If we want to understand even a little bit, for example, about the current oil-nuclear narrative, you can see that this is the typical case of this periodic process of capitalism, namely: depreciation of existing capital-creation of new capital; this corresponds exactly! This is why, here as well, the oil crisis is not imposed on capitalism from the outside, but that it is really a limit, in the sense of an immanent limit, depreciation of a type of qualified capital-recreation of a new capital. This is absolutely necessary so that, precisely, the limit is produced as both what we keep getting closer to, and what recedes as we get closer to it. It is the process of creating a new capital on the periodic depreciation of existing capital that is going to be, it seems to me, one of the most fundamental capitalist processes.

And so, let's just try to draw a conclusion. If you understand this point, that capitalism works on precisely these two phases -- this kind of double phase: depreciation of capital-creation of a new capital – that gives us something. That provides a status to something which is, in fact, very

maddening in capitalism, namely its powerlessness -- here, we will try to see this concretely -- its powerlessness to go into reverse. What does "to go into reverse" mean? Obviously, that cannot mean going back to... to... the ax, the flint, the primitive state, etc. ; it is not about that, but the powerlessness in political and economic choices to return even to something that would have been possible a few years before, as if, in fact, the nature of the immanent limit literally defined what we must call an irreversible arrow, an irreversible course of capitalism, which obviously causes our misfortune.

What do I mean here? So here, we must try to speak concrete; we have to start all over. If I summarize the set of notions that I am grasping in this second heading of saturation, I am saying: saturation is the immanent limit. I am saying: the immanent limit is a limit that is both produced by the system, to which the system keeps getting closer, and which recedes as one gets closer to it. I am saying: the relation with this limit, the relation of the system with this limit, defines an irreversible arrow, an irreversible course, good, etc.

And a book has just been published that I find very beautiful, so... it is... it is... and... and which seems to me to be... which concerns a completely different subject, but which seems to me to be an illustration of this subject, if I try to say concretely, well yeah, you see how it works, the immanent limit. It's a book by Robert Linhart, ... which is kind of an investigation into what's going on in Brazil right now. The book is called *Sugar and Hunger*. *Sugar and Hunger*, f-a-i-m, and has as... as a subtitle, "An investigation into the sugar regions of northeastern Brazil".^{xiii} There we are; I would just like to relate some points from this book, and read some passages. And my only comment would be to mark what way I need this, that is, how this is the very illustration of one of the overly abstract topics that I have just tried to develop.

Linhart tells us one thing that... he says it so perfectly that, I mean, even if we thought this, he recreates it for us... fine. It's very beautiful, the way he says it. He says this: you know, hunger, well yeah ... the problem of hunger in the world, right, hungry people, ... obviously, this is not a ... this not an exterior limit. This is what he calls "produced" hunger. In a way, we all know that hunger is produced. What am I trying to say, more confusedly, when I speak of an immanent limit? Well, this is precisely in opposition to an exterior limit; in other words, hunger is not encountered as the result of scarcity; it is produced as the result of an organization. In other words, although the word is not pretty, we must speak of a hunger, f-a-i-m, as "sophisticated" in opposition to ... or else a hunger that is not at all a hunger from scarcity; it is not hunger from scarcity at all. What is produced is hunger, there you are ..., there you are; the system produces hunger. This is ... there we have it, the ... the immanent limit. How does it produce hunger?

One must show that it [the system] produces it in the very process of its development, that capital produces hunger in the very process of its development. So, as a general idea, this is ... nil: everyone... everyone will be ready to say, "okay, fine". Every time we find a concrete, an extremely concrete analysis to make sense of these abstract expressions, this will obviously take on a ... greater importance. Well, let's take the example of sugar cane in the northeastern region of Brazil.

Here it is -- and I just need to add: this is indeed part of the process of "producing in order to produce" and at the same time "producing for capital" -- the development of sugar cane, what

does that mean? That means it's really a blind development, ok! More and more plots of land will be taken by the sugar cane: to produce in order to produce sugar. You will ask me: why? Because, at the same time ... it's at the same time producing for capital, for sugar capital. Fine. So, we produce in order to produce sugar because, by that very fact, it is the only way to produce to produce for sugar capital. What does this mean? This means that each plot of land will be planted with sugar cane. So, what does that mean? That means: development of a huge property, a large landholding. You see, to produce in order to produce sugar and to produce sugar capital, this apparent contradiction is already being completely dissipated! There is only sugar capital that can produce sugar in order to produce sugar. Everywhere you go, [it's] to make cane sugar: this is not nothing, that, because [there's] an immediate consequence – sense in what way [there's] the limit; once again I'm relating all of this to show, in a specific case, how the limit is produced from within and not encountered from outside -- because... what is going to happen, if you are in this situation?

You ... you can conceive it: this is indeed a question of developing capital, not of its creation. In other words, you can imagine that this situation, compared to the previous situation, has at least two catastrophic characteristics, two catastrophic characteristics from the point of view of the populations. First characteristic: collapse of private land plots. Ah well, yes, in ... in the early stages of sugar capital, this is a kind of stage of the big farm, but the big farm, however strict the regime -- and this was not ... and this was no party! -- the big farm still preserves for agricultural workers the possibility of small private land plots where they can grow diversified crops, a minimum, a minimum of diversified crops. The development of sugar capital -- sugar cane everywhere -- has for its first consequence, what? Monoculture.

And I am not telling anyone something that ... I am not saying, no ... I am not teaching anyone anything if I recall that one of the fundamental problems of Third World economy is precisely the capitalist misdeeds of monoculture, or of monoproduction. Why? Because it is within this monoculture already that we understand how, already, the limit is produced from within. In what sense? In the sense that all the land is occupied in the form of the large property which wipes out all that was left of the private land plots that could be cultivated by the agricultural workers. Practically they go to the city. Once again, it's not that the old days on the farm were good: on the contrary: it was... there are even positive reasons why they emigrated to the city. But, really, there is a movement that must indeed be called deterritorialization. This will be the basis for the formation of large city slums. And furthermore, any possibility of a diversified, somewhat diversified food is eliminated. Specifically, the small private land plots allowed the maintenance of a certain heterogeneity in the diet. Monoculture has a catastrophic result which is there is no longer any local possibility of a diverse food supply. The homogeneous food of the Brazilian northeast becomes, not even the absence of food; in a sense, it's almost worse -- well worse... we don't know what is the worst -- it's a kind of black bean: a starchy black bean type, the regional food there.

Here we have Linhart's text which strikes me as very ... if you follow me, it seems to me that here we grasp on the spot the constitution of ... of what I called the immanent limit. This is precisely what he calls "a modern hunger". I mean, a modern hunger is, if you will, hunger, f-a-i-m, immanent hunger; this is not a primitive hunger, or so-called "primitive". This is not a hunger that would be the encounter with shortage; this is a hunger produced by the mechanism of

modern capital. This is what he says; I'll read slowly: the text seems to me very ... very clear, right: "As I collected testimonies and data, hunger appeared to me with terrible clarity, like the material and the product of a device complicated to the point of refinement. Hunger was not a merely dramatic, almost accidental absence of available food." -- That would be external hunger; it would be "shortage" hunger, -- "... as they present it to us when they want us to believe that it would be enough to quench it by charity or emergency relief movements. The hunger of the Brazilian northeast was an essential part of what the military power called the development of Brazil". In the end, just as the limit is a constituent element of development, hunger is a de... constituent element of development.

"This was not a simple hunger, a primitive hunger; it was an elaborate hunger, a perfected hunger, a hunger in full flight, in short, a modern hunger. I saw it progressing in waves, called economic plans, development projects, industrial poles, incentives for agriculture, investment, mechanization and modernization of agriculture". -- Indeed, this sugar monoculture implies a highly industrialized agriculture. -- "It took a lot of work to produce that hunger. In fact, a lot of people were working at it quite hard. This took place in buildings, in offices, in palaces, and in all kinds of command and control posts. This hunger buzzed with purchase orders sent by Telex, with lines of credit in dollars, marks, francs, yen, with feverish transactions. They were never done going into the details of producing this hunger. Store owners, bankers, shipowners, executives, experts, businessmen had their share of this, as did an army of intermediaries, broker-dealers and consulting firms, planning institutes, and generals, politicians, police officers. Through its very characteristics, this hunger was confused with the development of the mode of production, a sugar-based monoculture, a monotony of food, a slow, patient hunger, a snacking hunger progressing at the rate of the market economy."

And in fact, he quotes the testimony -- here I... -- he quotes the testimony of a doctor who analyzes very well this type of hunger linked to a monoculture, and there you are... The doctor says: yes, with the disappearance of a ... small land plots, where an agriculture could still be maintained, ... a somewhat diversified culture, with the development of a sugar-based, very, very industrialized monoculture, "now we encounter sugar cane even in the cities, and the peasants no longer see any other food than black beans, cassava, exceptionally dried meat: no fish, no milk, no vitamins. Malnutrition during embryonic life and the first eighteen months of childhood leads to permanent mental impairment. Children are missing up to sixty percent of the brain's neurons, and this destruction is irreparable. Another consequence: the average size of peasants decreases", etc., etc.

There you have it, if you will; as the first point, I am saying that, if one understands this well... this notion of produced hunger, what Linhart proposes we call "modern hunger", the hunger which is produced by a process of development as such, we have exactly what I was trying to have you sense, to have you understand, namely this status of the immanent limit. And I would like to discover if we also have the means of giving a concrete status to the idea of the irreversible arrow, something irreversible in this movement through which a limit is produced, a limit constantly pushed back, at the same time as it is reached. For this process is terrible; I mean hunger has never been a way in which ... through which people are killed. In a way, this would be almost too good if ... if people, as they say, they ... they would die from this. There are many people who are dying of hunger, but what is terrible about hunger is that hunger also multiplies

the hungry, that is, it reproduces in this way as many as it destroys in this way. And this is indeed the process of the limit which is perpetually pushed back at the same time as we approach it and never stop approaching it.

And in fact, what is this irreversible arrow in the capitalist system? I am trying to return here to this same situation in Brazil. Here is what Linhart tells us: it is that the development of the highly industrialized sugar-based monoculture which ravages and wipes out all the small remaining plots, well, this is not yet the final word because here is the tale that he relates to us and which is very fascinating, it seems to me. It is that this sugar-based monoculture has a first major stage of development, namely, to produce sugar for the sake of producing sugar, but it does not stop there. A second big stage of development [is] sugar alcohol being used as a mixture for gasoline to make the cars run. Fine, this corresponds well to producing in order to produce: something must be done with this overproduction. The sugar market is not doing well, the global market ... So, fine, they're going to use some of the al ... the alcohol in sugar to make cheaper gasoline. Okay, so this is ... I am saying this is a second stage of development since it is no longer about large land ownership: the whole automobile industry is entering the race for sugar development.

Only what will happen? Starting from a certain proportion, sugar alcohol in relation to gasoline (here as well, this is very proportional), special motors are needed. As long as the proportion is minimal, you can still do it by ... by adapting the classic engines, the engines in classic cars. When the proportion increases, sugar alcohol in relation to gasoline, special engines are needed. So, there is a need to initiate, to build factories that will manufacture these engines, obviously, with foreign capital. This is what occurs in this region of northeastern Brazil. That involves huge investments. Here I do not need to force or develop this; I assume you understand immediately: this is the same, this is even an example of this process or this irreversible arrow that I was talking about earlier, namely "depreciation of existing capital-recreation of new capital". I am saying: sugar-based capital is undergoing a depreciation as evidenced by the global price of sugar, which, in fact, is very low. The depreciation of existing sugar-based capital corresponds to a recreation of new capital, this time in the automotive industry, which will use sugar alcohol provided that a new type of engine is built.

Result: if I take these two stages of sugar cultivation -- sugar cultivation, in a first stage of development, which destroys all the plots of land, all the plots that would have allowed the maintenance of a still diversified diet; second stage: transition to the automotive industry which will manufacture types of engine -- sense that even if I could say: at the first stage, one revolution was still enough, let's say... forgive me a random word: a "limited" (*restreinte*) revolution was still enough to bring down the sugar monoculture, for example, to reform cooperatives, to reestablish the possibility of a relatively diversified diet, etc., at the second stage, this is no longer possible. Why? Because it is the aggregate of industrial investments that themselves depend on this sugar monoculture. To reverse this will imply, at that moment, much more difficult, much more complex operations, will imply an all the more radical revolution, which, at that moment, collides, at that time, with interests that are so multiplied that it [the monoculture] risks being liquidated.

So, that means that things weren't going well before; afterwards, things are even worse. At the same time, it is.... it's the progression of this limit, if you will, this kind of very, very curious

limit, this kind of really gnawing limit, right, which makes you keep approaching it, [while] it recedes, and at the same time, it outlines an absolutely irreversible arrow.

13. On the new terrors of war (23 :08), 25 March 1980 (A Thousand Plateaus V 13)

Seminar on Apparatuses of Capture and War Machines, 1979-1980

Lecture 13, 25 March 1980

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq et Mariana Carrasco Berge

Translation by Charles J. Stivale

And I am saying a very simple thing: this is somewhat, if you will, the relationship of capitalism with its own war machine. It seems to me, under current conditions, not at all times. Everything happens as if the modern war machine -- well, all these are hypotheses, well, it is not so much ... [*He does not finish the sentence*] It seems to me... the more we proceed, the more it's really time to stop --, ... everything is happening as if the modern war machine, that is, let's say, since World War II, since the Second World War -- but there were principles before, there were premises before -- everything happens as if it had somehow become autonomized, but in a very special way, that is, as if [the war machine] was witnessing a power of the axiomatic which nevertheless went beyond the axiomatic itself. What does that mean?

You still remember those Clausewitz concepts that I tried to propose because they seem very, to me very enlightening for understanding anything at all about the problem of war.^{xiii} This is because, just like capital -- since we saw this the last time -- just like capital, and this is undoubtedly the deepest link between war and capital, just like capital, war has an aim and an objective, and that the two are not the same thing. [*Pause*] And that the aim of war is the political aim pursued by the warring State or States, while the objective is the immanent objective of war, which Clausewitz defines as overthrowing or annihilating the adversary. I'm saying that, for a long time, we could almost define pre-capitalist wars like this: by saying that in pre-capitalist wars, the aim and the objective receive a kind of ... agreement, a variable and fairly well-determined agreement, namely: war continues its... -- war as war -- pursues its objective: to overthrow the adversary, under the condition of an aim, namely: to overthrow the adversary in order to obtain such and such a thing, for example, to conquer a province, to gain an economic market -- there are already trade wars (*guerres commerciales*) --, etc., etc. And to overthrow the adversary, that can mean all kinds of things, it depends on what way one identifies the adversary according to the aim: sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be to destroy the enemy army, sometimes to overthrow the adversary, it will be... [*Interruption of the recording*] [46: 24]

... it works like this. The first sign of ... At that moment, the war machine is indeed caught up in the State apparatus: in fact, the objective which refers to the war machine is subordinated to the political aim which refers to the political aim of the State that makes war.

What occurred when the war tended to become total? I believe that one can, in fact, assign a tendency to total war from the moment when capitalism seizes the war machine and gives it development, material development, fundamental material development since it is even in this way that nomads -- who until then were the autonomous war machine --, it is through this that nomads will be dispossessed and will perish.

Well, what happens is that when the war tends to become total, at the same time the objective and the aim, it seems to me, tend to enter into a kind of contradictory relation. There is a tension between objective and aim. Why? This can already be seen with Napoleon: the main elements of ... the first great establishment of a total war is obviously the Napoleonic wars; everyone says it; it's ... it's a triviality. It won't get resolved: the second big step in total war is the 1914-18 war. The third great stage of total war is fascism. And what is there ... what is there ... in common with these three stages? It is ultimately, I believe, the declaration of a kind of tension, of contradiction between the political aim and the objective ... and the warlike objective. Why? Because as the war becomes total, the objective -- to use Clausewitz's term: overthrowing of the adversary -- knows no bounds. The adversary can no longer be identified with the fortress to be taken, with the enemy army to be defeated; it is the whole people and the whole habitat. It is the entire enemy people, at the same time as, from the perspective of the country which ... of the other country that is pursuing the war, that is waging war, it is the entire [enemy] people who are invited. So, the objective -- to overthrow the adversary -- becomes such that the adversary can no longer be identified, assimilated to something definite, but becomes the totality of the enemy people, the totality of the enemy habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited, and that's total war.

You see, that's why the misinterpretations that are sometimes made about Clausewitz are based on a very specific point: when Clausewitz defined the objective of the war as annihilating the adversary, some, too hastily, say: ah well, Clausewitz is the creator of the concept of total war. Not at all: annihilating the... the adversary is what Clausewitz calls not "total war", but "absolute war", and [the] Clausewitzian absolute war has nothing to do with total war, since Clausewitzian absolute war -- namely, the objective: to overthrow or annihilate the adversary -- receives a variable figure according to what the adversary is identified with. To overthrow the adversary can once again be taking a fortress, and then that's it. But war becomes total when the overthrow or annihilation bears on the entire enemy people and the entire habitat. At that point, the objective becomes unlimited; why? It's never ending.

And I recall the texts which seem to me the best,... analysis of... this... of fascism -- but in a way, it was already obvious for Napoleon -- when, for example,... Hannah Arendt does not stop saying that in her book on totalitarianism... -- so it doesn't matter that, for her, she identifies totalitarianism and fascism -- but what she says, in my opinion, only applies to fascism, and not to everything for totalitarianism.^{xiv} It is obvious that fascism can only be defined like this: not by a State apparatus -- the State apparatus, she shows this very well, in the analysis of fascist institutions, is a kind of facade, it's a kind of facade, it's an office (*bureau*) behind which there is always another office --. What fundamentally defines fascism is the initiation of a movement that has no other end (*fin*) than the movement, that is, the unlimited objective. A movement which has no other end than movement, therefore, which has no other end than its own acceleration, is

precisely the movement of absolute destruction. So that is very, very important in Hannah Arendt's book.

The student near Deleuze: [*Inaudible; question on the reference to Arendt*]

Deleuze: It was translated into French under the title, I believe *Totalitarisme*, at the Seuil. And that fits very well with [Paul] Virilio's analyzes of the fascist State.^{xv} It also overlaps with texts from ... Hitler's lieutenants, or Hitler himself, when they invoke a movement with no destination or purpose. The movement without destination or purpose is the movement of pure destruction, that is, it is the movement of total war.

So, I'm just saying: at that moment, you understand, there is a sort of autonomization of the war machine in relation to the State apparatus, and it's true that fascism is not a State apparatus. Moreover, I would say, to complicate matters, all that goes too much without saying: it is not enough for the military to take power somewhere for a war machine to become autonomous. In totalitarian regimes, strictly speaking, it is often the military who have the power: it is not at all a "war machine" regime! Not at all, on the contrary: it is a totalitarian regime in the sense that there is one of them that says: the minimum State.^{xvi}

But the fascist State is quite another thing! The fascist State is -- and precisely, it is not by chance that the fascists were not soldiers --. A General Staff, when it takes power, it can create a totalitarian regime; a fascist regime, [that's] much less certain. A fascist regime is ... it's ... it's such a ... twisted idea ... it's not even the military, that. The German General Staff was ... in the end, it was ... it would have liked to have been in power, but Hitler got there ahead of them. So, there could have been all the arrangements that one wanted, one cannot say that fascism is an emanation of the German General Staff. It is the emanation of ... something quite, quite different.

And this is where we see a war machine that becomes autonomous in relation to the State, hence once again Virilio's very good idea: the fascist state is a suicidal state. Of course, it is about killing others, but one will consider one's own death -- and this is the truly fascist theme of living death -- one will regard one's own death as the crowning death of others. You find that ... in fact, it's, that is ... you find it in all fascisms. Totalitarianism is not that at all, right? It's a lot more... how would I say, it's a lot more "petit bourgeois", totalitarianism; it's a lot more conservative! Well, little matter, we've already seen all that.

I am saying: that, all that, is rather a way to answer a question which, in a certain way, with hindsight of the years, seems less and less obvious to us: why the hell did the United States prefer to ally itself with Stalin's Russia, with the Stalinist USSR, rather than coming to an understanding with Hitler? We tell ourselves: after all, well, once it's done, we tell ourselves: fine ... this is not so obvious; at the beginning, it was not so obvious, even at the level of the allies, at the level of England and France, right! Everyone knows how there was an interesting political pattern, namely: they attacked... they attacked... fascist Germany [unleashed] itself... on Russia! That was interesting, ... well, it might have happened!

To the question "in the end, why did the tendency toward an alliance with the Stalinist regime rather than with the Hitler regime win out?" I think the answer is relatively simple: it is that the

allies must have had, I suppose, the impression rather quickly that in the fascist regime, there was the autonomization of a war machine which finally, at the extreme, was uncontrollable by capital -- I am assuming, right? This is a hypothesis, like that, ... a very abstract hypothesis, perhaps an idiotic hypothesis, fine --, and that finally, the Stalinist regime or the bureaucratic socialist regime was able to give capital much greater security and guarantees. If you will, it's awful to... to say, it seems to me, but... what is awful to say is that in the fascist movements, there is a mass characteristic of which the countries capitalists must have been very wary, a sort of mass movement, a movement appealing to a kind of ... of ... "we'll get you, we'll destroy the world, and then we'll kill ourselves afterwards." There is something, there is a kind of machine there, of movement ... of movement for movement.

And one of the strongest points in Hannah Arendt's book is when she shows that the more the Nazis saw that they were going to lose the war -- they sense this very quickly, right? --, far from this ever being for them a motive to stop, or to moderate the movement, it is a motive to precipitate it. They can only endure, they can only postpone the outcome, namely the loss of the war, by accelerating the war; they cannot do otherwise. If this hypothesis is correct, I believe that this is the most profound reason why the allies made the alliance with the Stalinist regime and not with the regime... because, in other respects, they would have preferred much more to make the alliance with the regime... with the Nazi regime.

So there we have this very, very odd situation, right, where the objective of war, when the war becomes total, the objective of war becomes unlimited and, at that moment, comes into conflict with the political aims that a State apparatus pursued through war up to that point. How to bridge this abyss? Well, in fact, that's what's been said, and that is, that's what Virilio, it seems to me again, analyzes so well about the contemporary war machine. Where the fascists also,... were only... precursors, where the Nazis were only precursors, it's because they had constituted a kind of autonomy of the war machine, with a whole economic regime subordinated to this war machine, subordinated to armaments, etc.; they had done all that. But they still needed this war machine to be realized in wars. In other words, they kept something of the old approach, namely war will be the materialization of the war machine.

So, what I'm saying is very much a summary due to trying to shape (*tailler*) some notions, some concepts; I don't mean to say that today it's not like that. The war machine today, well, it's obvious, it pursues wars as well. It also needs ... it's obvious, we see that all the time. And I'm saying that nonetheless, there is something that has changed: it doesn't need this in the same way. I would say: we tend towards the following situation -- in order to be careful, right? -- we tend towards the following situation in which the modern war machine no longer even needs to materialize itself or, at the extreme, no longer even needs to be materialized in real wars, for it would be the war machine itself which would be war materialized. In other words, the war machine does not even need to have wars as its object, since it discovers its object in a peace of terror. It has conquered its most extreme object, adequate to its total character, namely: peace.

Which implies what? Obviously, which implies all the catastrophic, apocalyptic visions of today. So, don't make me say that there is no more war: of course, there are still wars, but these wars have become parts of the peace itself! And what did the concept of "Cold War" mean if not that? The concept of "Cold War" meant, it seems to me, explicitly the state of a war machine which,

for whatever reasons, no longer tended to be materialized -- except through ever possible accidents, we are told -- no longer tended to be materialized in a war, in a real war, but was in itself and by itself a materialized war, which already led many American authors to say for a long time, well, the Third World War, we are there; it has already started. Hence all of Virilio's remarks in this regard appear to me to be correct, when Virilio assigns and offers the following characteristics: this new war machine, which I call power (*puissance*), therefore, you see its relation with capitalism: at once how capitalism does not control it and how, at the same time, capitalism is in a fundamental relation with it, in a relation of fundamental confrontation with it; so, the characteristics indicated by Virilio, again, it is this war machine taking peace for its object and no longer war.

Henceforth, it's the whole topic of the enemy -- second trait -- it's the whole topic of the enemy that changes. The enemy becomes any enemy whatsoever (*l'ennemi quelconque*), and this is really an axiomatic notion, that of any enemy whatsoever. [Pause] This war machine acquires a power to capitalize, how to say this, a knowledge, and not just a knowledge: an almost unlimited scientific and technological power, [Pause] following which the tendency for the very distinctions between war and peace diminish, tend to disappear. Hence, finally, comes the general phenomenon of the militarization of civilian functions, particularly by assigning any object whatsoever which is anyone, anything. It could just as well be locusts on a radar screen, as ... as three Indians in a row, as ... as ... a rocket, as ... all of that. There, there is an odd cave dwellers thing; so, I tell myself: in modern profession, yes, right! Atomic submarines ... what it is about these guys living there ... living in ... sheltering in the submarine, right? And what ... how do their eyes appear, right? Or they look at the radars where they see it as some kind of cloud to be interpreted, okay. Are they... are they... crabs? Or are these some enemies approaching? Well, ultimately, it's the any enemy whatsoever. Fine, there you go.

See, there you have it, all that ... I will try to group under this fifth heading, and in fact, how is this war machine the equivalent of some kind of power of the continuous? It is that at the level of this war machine -- and here I am thinking of ... once again, of texts by Paul Virilio which explain this, which develop this very, very well -- it is that all the points of space, however distant they may be, are put into contact, "are put into contact", that is, all the points of space exist in a topological neighborhood: however distant they may be physically and geometrically, they are in a topological neighborhood. This is called the age of nuclear war.

And it is obvious that, if nuclear war is presented to us as a kind of limit of... of... of... apocalypse, etc., it is almost in the sense... It would be necessary to compare, if you will, my heading 4, here, "Power", and heading 2, "saturation" since, there, the apocalypse of nuclear war is exactly the limit. This corresponds entirely with the limit of our other register, register 2, regarding saturation. This is an immanent limit: if it takes on the apocalyptic aspect, it is because, in another way, not quite at the limit, it is exercised as such already! It is exercised entirely as such: it does not stop pushing its limit, but at the same time, it is this [limit] which draws the new map of the world which, in fact, is a map that is no longer a geographical map, but a topological map, with the most distant points in contact.

14. On lifelines and dangers of fascism (20 :40), 27 May 1980 (Anti-Oedipus + Reflections 1)

Seminar on Anti-Oedipus and Other Reflections, 1980

Lecture 1, 27 May 1980

Transcriptions: [Voix de Deleuze](#), Frédéric Astier; augmented transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Initial translation, unattributed; new translation, Charles J. Stivale

I would really like almost to conceive of myself and conceive of others solely as packets of abstract lines. So, these lines represent nothing, but they work, they work. And for me, schizoanalysis is only this: it's the determination of the lines that make up an individual or a group, the outline of these lines. And this concerns the entire unconscious. These lines are not immediately given, neither in their respective importance, nor in their dead ends. That's why rather than a story, I dream of a geography, that is, a cartography, to create someone's map.

So yes, I am asking, what is hard segmentarity? And certainly, we are segmented from all sides. We are segmented from everywhere; it's a first kind of line that crosses through us. I mean, we are first segmented immediately: work, leisure, the days of the week, each day, each night, etc., you see. It's a segmented line: work, days off, Sundays, in the end, of the daily grind kind (*métro-boulot*), a kind of segmentarity. There's a whole bureaucracy of segmentarity. There is the office, where we go; when you go from one office to another to obtain the slightest document, we see what social segmentation is. We get sent from one segment to another.

But there is also an even more troubling and more difficult segmentarity. This is to say that already the line... I couldn't say that there's "a" line of segmentarity, and it's not the same for everyone. It's so variable for everyone according to one's line of work, according to one's lifestyle. We are segmented like verse, right! But we cannot say that this isn't good; it depends, it depends what you get out of it, but it's a first component of your lines. One segment, another segment, another segment! -- Oh, I'm coming home? Ah, I've made it home, whew, the day is done. Ah! Don't let anyone come bother me! -- Moving from one segment to another. There are some people, take note of this, there are some people who have rather few lines, for whom this line is as if weakened, weakened. These people are quite attractive, those who have a very weakened segmentarity. We get the impression that they are too mobile, that they move from one segment to another much faster than others, that they have a much more flexible segmentarity. Good.

But I am saying that, generally, there is already in this domain of segmentarity an entire packet of lines, and not just a single one, because you understand that the line of segmentarity is very oriented from the perspective of time. Notably, it is following segmentarities that the sad evolution of the life unfolds, for example: one ages, from youth to old age. This is another segmentarity; you see that these intersect all these segmentarities, man, woman. Here, men; there, women. All that gets segmented, young, old. So, fine! -- Ah, I was young, I'm not young

anymore. Ah, I had talent, talent, and what's become of him? -- You recognize the tone, but, for Fitzgerald, it's not at all a whining tone, for those who have read him. What is this phenomenon of "loss of youth", "loss of beauty", "loss of talent", which occurs along this line? And how are we going to endure it? There it is, there are always ruptures, breaks on this line. We go from one segment to another by a sort of break (*cassure*). There are people who endure it; this line is already very different for each person or for groups. But groups give an entire status already to this first line.

And then there is another kind of line. We know well that, at the same time, it's not that the first one is a mere apparition, but we know that, at the same time, other things are happening, that there are not just men here and women there, that there is the way men are women, the way women are men in things much more..., so, a line that's much more, how would I say it, literally, much more molecular. [It's] a line where it is much less apparently sliced than... Someone makes a gesture, right? Someone within the context of his job makes a gesture, and I get this feeling of unease -- novelists have always played on this a lot -- I get a feeling of discomfort; I say to myself, well, this gesture is not appropriate (*adapté*). Where does it come from? It seems a bit incongruous; it comes from somewhere else; it comes from another segment. There is like a kind of mixing of segments.

This is no longer a line of segmentarity somehow pre-established; it's a line of thin segmentation in the process of being made, of tiny thrusts, of small things, a little grimace, that comes from where? Bizarre. [It's] a line that no longer proceeds by "breaking" (*cassure*), a kind of binarity, dualism -- man-woman, rich-poor, young-old -- but that proceeds by... By how? Fitzgerald says, by "tiny cracks" (*petites fêlures*), small cracks like on a plate, that will break only because of the small cracks, but these are not the same pathways, that of the big break and that of tiny cracks. So, in the end, we realize that we have aged on the first line, while aging is a kind of process that continued for a long time on the second line. The time of the two lines is not the same. There we have a second type of line which is very diverse. It's a second packet of lines.

And then there are lines, yet again, of another type, the lines of flight, the lines that are created and on which we create. Sometimes we say: but these are as if caked in sand, they are like mouthfuls, sometimes they release, passing through veritable holes, [and] they re-emerge; sometimes they are ruined (*foutues*), ruined [since] the other two types of lines have eaten them, and then they can always be returned. What is this third type of lines? Let's suppose that it is ... I am saying, to create a schizoanalysis of someone, it would be to determine these lines and the "process" of these lines.

And finally, to answer the question, [it's] a very simple thing: let's call "schizophrenia" according to the outline of lines of flight. And this outline of lines of flight is strictly coextensive with the historical-global field. As a petty bourgeois Frenchman who did not leave my country, once again, what are my ravings about? I create delirium about Africa and Asia, as a kind of revenge. And why? Because that's what delirium is, that's what delirium is. And there is no need to be crazy to be delirious.

So, if I call this process, it is this flow that carries me off into the historical-social field following vectors. To call this the trip in the manner of Laing and Cooper, I see no problem with that for, in

fact, I can just as well get delirious about prehistory; I can very well make prehistory my business. Anyway, this is what one gets delirious about.

So, what happens? I am saying that each type of line has its dangers. I believe that the danger peculiar to the line of flight and lines of flight, to these lines of delirium, is what? In fact, it's a kind of real collapse. What is the collapse? But the danger proper to lines of flight – and it's fundamental; this is the most terrible of dangers -- is that the line of flight turns into a line of abolition, of destruction, that the line of flight, which normally and as process is a line of life and must trace new paths of life, turns into a pure line of death. And finally, there is always that possibility; there is always that possibility, that the line of flight ceases to be a line of creation and goes around in circles, like spinning around on itself and sinking into what one year we were calling "a black hole", that is, becomes a pure and simple line of destruction.

I said, that's what, I think, explains a number of things. This explains, for example, the production of schizophrenia as a clinical entity. The schizophrenic as someone ill -- and I believe that schizophrenia is fundamentally and deeply an illness -- this is it: it is someone who, in the grasp of the process, is carried off by his process, by "a" process; well, he can no longer hold on. He does not hold on; it's too hard. It's too hard. You will tell me, one still must say why, what has happened? If necessary, if necessary, nothing has happened. I mean, nothing attributable has happened.

There is a wonderful text by [Lev] Shestov about the famous Russian writer Chekhov. Shestov does not like Chekhov; wrongly, he does not like him, he even hates him. He states the reason he does not like Chekhov. He says: You understand when you read Chekhov, you always have the impression that something has happened, and you cannot even say what! Namely everything happens as if Chekhov had tried something, which did not even require considerable effort, and then as if he had sprained his foot, and he comes out of this incapable of anything, as if for him, for him, Chekhov, the world is over, and he is only bitterness. What happened? What happened to make someone crack up? You'll tell me, cracking up like Chekhov did, it's not bad, huh? Yes, but... ! Maybe we can have a different vision of Chekhov. But what happens when someone actually cracks up, in fact? What was it he couldn't stand?

In any case, I am saying, it is there and it's at this level: what was it that someone couldn't stand? Well, it's this something that he could not stand, something that marks, it seems to me, the turning point of the line of flight which ceases being creative, and which becomes a line death pure and simple. There are two ways to become a line of death. It is to become a line of death for others, and often, both are very connected, and line of one's own death. And in the end, why is it related?

This is complicated, but I am considering cases. How is it that, for example -- I'm considering cases there, always literary -- what happens, what happens in famous cases, like [Heinrich von] Kleist, Kleist, who really wrote through a "process"? This process gives him all sorts of very schizophrenic signs: stuttering, involuntary movements, muscle contractions, all that. But all that feeds his style for a long time. And a style is not just something aesthetic; a style, you live as you speak, or rather you speak as you live. A style is a way of life. With all that, he invents a style, a kind of style, that makes Kleist's phrase recognizable among all phrases.

What is happening? So, all that will lead to a very delirious idea, which was there from the beginning in Kleist, namely: how to kill oneself as two (*se tuer à deux*)? How to kill each other? What occurs so that his line of flight crosses Germany? One sees very well what this process is in Kleist's case: he jumps on horseback, and he crosses Germany. It is the great German Romantic movement. Well, you'll tell me, it's not just the process; okay, it's not just the process. Let's say it's already the geographical sign of the process. There are people who stay in one place and are seized by the process.

It seems obvious to me that Beckett's characters are intensely living what might be called "the process". We cannot, it seems to me... We can only interpret Beckett with great difficulty in terms of persons, of personology, or in terms of structure. This is a matter of process too. And something goes wrong; what does it mean? It means the process is really turning, something that should have... -- But what does the phrase "that should have" mean? -- [Should have] been a line of life, that is, of creation, that should have been a kind of extra chance given to life, that turns into a deadly enterprise. How to kill each other together? An exasperated death in the manner of Kleist, or else a peaceful death. Peaceful deaths do occur. What makes Virginia Woolf sink into her lake, there, and drown like that? So, it is not at all an exasperated death; it's just that, in a certain way, she got fed up. She's fed up with what, someone who, in fact, undertook a prodigious process? What is happening?

So, I am saying, in exasperated forms, it's like that, if you will, if I try to give a concrete, lived, living content to the notion of fascism. I have tried several times to say the extent to which, for me, fascism and totalitarianism are not at all the same thing. Fascism – what I am saying sounds a little mystical -- but it seems to me that [fascism] isn't mystical. Fascism is typically a process of flight, a line of flight which then immediately turns into a mortuary line, death of others and death of oneself. I mean, what does that mean? All fascists have always said it: contrary to totalitarianism, fascism fundamentally implies the idea of a perpetual movement without object or purpose. Perpetual movement without object or purpose: in a way, one can say this is what a process is. In fact, process is a movement that has neither purpose nor goal, that has only one object: its own fulfillment, that is, the emission of flows corresponding to it.

But there we have fascism when this aimless and pointless movement becomes a movement of pure destruction. Provided that what? Provided that others will be put to death, and that its own death will crown that of the others. I mean, when I say [fascism] sounds quite mystical, what I'm saying about it is that, in fact, the concrete analyses, it seems to me, confirm it very strongly. I mean, one of the best books on fascism, which I have already quoted, which is that of [Hannah] Arendt [*The Origins of Totalitarianism* 1951], which is a lengthy analysis even of fascist institutions, shows sufficiently that fascism can only live through an idea of a kind of movement that is constantly reproducing and accelerating, to the point that in the history of fascism, the more the war risks being lost for the Fascists, the more [there is] the exasperation and acceleration of the war all the way to Hitler's famous last telegram which orders the destruction of habitat and the destruction of the people. It will begin with the death of others, but it is understood that the hour of our own death will come. And here, Goebbels's speeches from the beginning said this: we can always present propaganda, but what interests me is why the propaganda was oriented in a direction from the beginning.

In this respect, that is completely different from a totalitarian regime. And one of the reasons why, it seems to me, one of the important historical reasons, there is again why the Americans, and even Europe, did not make an alliance with fascism. Well, we could trust them; it's not the morality or the worry of freedom that guided them along. So, why did they prefer to join forces with Russia and the Stalinist regime, about which we can say anything we want, and this is a regime that can be called totalitarian, but it's not a fascist-type regime, and this is very different. It is obvious that fascism exists only through this exasperation of movement, and that this exasperation of movement could not provide sufficient guarantees in the end. And the mistrust of fascism at the level of governments and the states that created the alliance [with Stalin] during the war, it seems to me, if you will, this is where there is always a potential fascism when a line of flight turns on a line of death.

15. On "un-power" of thought, from Heidegger to Foucault (18 :28), 22 April 1986 (Foucault 20)

Seminar on Foucault, 1985-1986

Part III: Subjectification

Lecture 20, 22 April 1986

Transcribed by Annabelle Dufourcq

Translated by Melissa McMahon; additional revisions and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale

And first of all, I'll cite Heidegger. And I'll say: if you take, well, we may as well take a specific text, it will be true for the whole of Heidegger's work, but what is it about in Heidegger? First, it is about the proposition: thinking comes from the outside. Thinking always comes from the outside. The text I am referring to is: *What is Called Thinking?*^{xvii} And it is a splendid text, right from the beginning. You can... read the first pages, the first twenty pages of the text, and you'll find everything we need there. It's not enough to read the first twenty pages, but you'll find everything we need there.

Thinking comes from the outside, what does that mean? That means that of course we have the internal possibility of thinking. And Heidegger almost says: traditional philosophy has always been based on us having the internal possibility of thinking. But invoking the internal possibility of the thinking being to think says nothing about what prompts us to think. And we only think if something prompts us to think. We who have the internal possibility of thinking, we only think if something prompts to think. You can see the appeal to the outside, this something can only come from the outside. You don't have to push it very far to say: and from an outside that's further away, more distant than any external world. Why? Because what prompts us to think isn't something that belongs to just any external world.

For those who know a little Heidegger, it is nothing that belongs to the domain of beings [*l'étant*]. What prompts us to think is the being [*l'être*] of beings, which is to say the Outside. An Outside more distant than any external world. Otherwise, we have the possibility of thinking, but this possibility remains eternally empty. Which Heidegger expresses by saying: yes, we have the possibility of thinking, the same one that was invoked by the traditional philosophers, the same one invoked in the seventeenth century, but having the possibility doesn't mean we are capable of it. Capacity is not the same as possibility. The text is splendid: "Man can think," "Man can think in the sense that he has the possibility to do so, but this possibility doesn't yet guarantee that it is something within our power." I remember another translation that I prefer, but which doesn't change anything in the text: "this possibility does not yet guarantee that we are capable of doing so." Okay, "not capable," what does that mean? We are capable if we confront... We become capable of thinking if we confront what prompts us to think and which is more distant than any external world. But what prompts us to think, if we encounter it and confront it, here again: do we encounter it, do we confront it? Heidegger's answer is famous: it happened once, it was the Greeks. It was the Greeks who confronted this outside, which is to say who discovered being as distinct from beings.

So, if what prompts us to think is in fact encountered, then we become capable of thinking, and of thinking what? We become capable of thinking this: that we are still not thinking. What does that mean? That we don't yet think just because of the simple possibility of thinking. What does the thing that prompts us to think? It prompts us to think that we are still not thinking in virtue of the simple possibility we have of thinking. So much so that the "we are still not thinking" is the inside; that's what is inside our thought. That we were still not thinking is the inside of our thought. As the inside of the outside, insofar as the outside prompts us to think. Why? Because the outside doesn't give us cause to think without withdrawing in the same movement that it gives itself, a famous theme in Heidegger, so much so that the inside of this outside is the "we are still not thinking," which Heidegger expresses in one of those formulas he does so well: "Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that we are still not thinking," this is the splendid beginning of *What is Called Thinking?* I am trying to place the emphasis on... I would say that thought is no longer in a relationship with the thinkable. I am saying that thought is fundamentally placed in a relationship, in an essential relationship with something that is unthinkable and unthought. We are still not thinking. If you prefer, instead of the traditional possibility of thinking, which is a logical possibility, Heidegger gives us an impossibility which is – two words – onto-logical. The whole... the whole of traditional philosophy is founded on the logical possibility of thinking. See Descartes. Heidegger promotes an onto-logical impossibility of thinking.

And here is an author – very briefly – who unquestionably owes nothing to Heidegger. The connection to Heidegger goes via Blanchot: it is Artaud. And even though I say that one of the greatest contemporary texts on thought of the twentieth century is Heidegger's *What is Called Thinking?*, one of the greatest texts is also Artaud's: the letters to Jacques Rivière. And what does

Artaud say? Thought is inseparable from a vital incapacity [*impouvoir*]. It is no longer an onto-logical impossibility, it is a vital incapacity. “It is part of thought not to be able to think, that is my drama,” says Artaud.^{xviii} But what does that mean, “his drama”? It doesn’t mean his clinical case, since Artaud doesn’t experience himself that way; it doesn’t mean his psychological problem, it means that his drama is to have reached something in thought that eludes thought itself. It is not enough to have the possibility of thinking. You still need to have the vital power to think. I am saying that if we carried out a differential comparison, and the difference is fundamental, what Heidegger, who in this respect still conducts himself like a great philosophy professor, presents as an onto-logical impossibility becomes, in keeping with Artaud, a vital incapacity.

But if I’m looking for what they have in common, it is that the unthought is the inside of thought. And thought is fundamentally related, not to the thinkable, but to the unthought. And you can see how far removed this is from traditional philosophy. Traditional philosophy was not unaware of the unthought, but for traditional philosophy, the unthought is by its nature of a different nature to thought. The body, for example. The passions, for example. That which eludes thought. Here, in contrast, in these twentieth-century forms, the unthought, at a deep level, shares a nature with thought. It has the same nature as thought, it is the distant that is the closest, to the point where there is a strict identity between thought and this unthought, thought is fundamentally related to the unthought. And in *The Order of Things*, Foucault takes up this theme in its entirety, to the point where you don’t know whether, at first glance... you say to yourself: this is Heidegger, based on... certain expressions.... This is Blanchot, this is Artaud. It is Artaud when Foucault places the emphasis on the vital problem of the unthought. It is Heidegger when he places the emphasis on the onto-logical problem of the unthought. It is Blanchot when he relates it to this line of the Outside. Fine.

But then, wonder of wonders, it is Foucault. And what does it mean to say, “it is Foucault”? It means he gives it his own particular inflection as well. And that’s what I want to get to, to something that has no equivalent in Heidegger, nor in Blanchot, nor in Artaud. What is it? It’s that, for him, the relationship of the outside and the inside, the inside being always the inside of an outside, that is not what is original, but, this relationship in his work, or this relationship between thought and the unthought... you understand: if thought amounts to saying [*Deleuze whispers, inaudible words*] if thought confronts this outside, this Outside that is more distant than any external world, if thought confronts this outside, well, from that point, the closest thing to thought, what it discovers as its interior, is the unthought. But, in Foucault, it is – it seems to me, and I think this touches on something that concerns Foucault’s whole oeuvre – it is not an onto-logical impossibility, as in Heidegger, nor a vital incapacity, as in Artaud, it’s the specific contribution of Foucault – it’s not something he chose, we are not in the realm of... of theory, it is something that engages life, and thus thought as well – it is this sort of hallucinatory powerlessness. A hallucinatory powerlessness will be at the heart of this identity of thought and the unthought.

Why? I mean, what does it mean, in Foucault, that the inside is by nature the inside of the outside? It means an operation of doubles. The inside is the double of the outside. That is what I would say is Foucault's singular inflection. It is to have reinterpreted a general theme which he, last in line, shares with Blanchot, Artaud, Heidegger, with differences between one author and the next, the fundamental difference is I think to have taken his interpretation in the direction of a hallucinatory double, the inside as the double of the outside. It's a curious thing, what does that mean: the inside as the double of the outside? And which is, by that token, the unthought as the double of thought. And the whole end section of *The Order of Things*, even though there are often echoes of Artaud, even though there are... it's the theme of the double. It is the theme of the double that is specific to Foucault and what allows him to reinterpret what he shares with Artaud, what he shares with...

And it's on this point, which I would like you to reflect on between now and next time, because that's where we will have to... In other words, when the line of the Outside forms a fold, it produces doubles. And, mind, it is not the other who is a double of me. It is me who is a double of the other. It's not the outside that is a projection of the inside, it is the inside that is an interiorization of the outside, a fold of the outside. The double is the fold. What does that mean? What is the double as a kind of folding? It's what's called a doubling [*doublure*].^{xix} The inside is the doubling of the outside. To produce a double. To fold is to produce a double.

And suddenly, if we see that perhaps Foucault rediscovers this in his last books, we tell ourselves, my god, he has always been talking about that, in fact, this third dimension of the fold, conceived as the formation of the double and the process of doubling. To fold is to double. Why did Foucault love Roussel? Why did... even more, I have a hypothesis, my only hypothesis is that he always protected himself from Heidegger with Roussel. That's why he had a passionate relationship with Roussel.

16. Joy and eternity (25:19), 17 March 1981 + 7 April 1987 (Spinoza 13 + Leibniz & Baroque 14)

Segment 1

Seminar on Spinoza: The Velocities of Thought

Lecture 13, 17 March 1981

Transcriptions: Part 1, Yaëlle Tannau (duration 31 :13); Part 2 Cecile Lathuillère (duration = 46:50); Part 3, Suzanne Larrieu & Véronique Boudon (duration 46:55); Part 4 Guy Nicolas (duration 30:52); Augmented Transcription, Charles J. Stivale

Translated by Charles J. Stivale

The question of immortality is: in what sense and in what form does the soul survive the body? As it has been posited by theology and philosophy, from -- if you will, there, it seems to me that whatever their differences which are great -- from Plato to Descartes.

From Plato to Descartes, what is posed is really the question of the immortality of the soul. And the immortality of the soul, at that point, it necessarily goes through the problem of a before and an after. Why? What determines the before and the after from the point of view of the immortality of the soul, namely, the moment of the union of the soul and the body, specifically, the before of the soul is before the incarnation, before the soul unites with a body? The after, the after of immortality is after... the soul, after death, that is, after [it has been joined to the body].

Hence the discomfort of all the authors who wanted to speak of an immortality of the soul. What is their discomfort? It's that the immortality of the soul can be grasped or can be conceived only through the still temporal kinds of a before and an after. And this is already the whole theme of the *Phaedo* which deals with the immortality of the soul, in Plato. The dialogue of Plato, *Phaedo*, proposes a great doctrine of the immortality of the soul, precisely in the form of the before and the after, before the union, after the union.

When Spinoza opposed eternity to immortality, you can see quite well what he means. From the standpoint of immortality, if you will, I can know that the soul is immortal. But what does immortality consist of? It consists of saying that I know, for example, I then know by what knowledge -- that's something else -- but I know that my soul does not die with my body. Even if I admit the Platonic idea that this is a kind of knowledge, I do not know in what form. And everyone says so. Why? Because immortality indeed seems to exclude the before and the after. Through this, it's already an eternity. But precisely it can only be learned or known in kinds of the before and the after. And Descartes will say it again. In what form? That the soul is immortal, this I can say, I am sure, according to Descartes. But, in what form? I do not know. I can at most affirm that, affirm that there is a before and that there is an after, that the soul is not born with the body and that it does not die with the body. I can affirm the "that"; I cannot assert the "what" or the "how". An intellectual intuition would be necessary, as they say... as they say. But we don't have intellectual intuition. Very well.

Spinoza doesn't pose the problem in that way because, for him, the problem is not at all a before and an after; it's an at the same time as. I mean, it's at the same time that I am mortal that I experience that I am eternal. To experience that I am eternal does not mean that there is a before, that there has been a before, and that there will be an after. It means that, from now forward, I'm experiencing something that cannot exist within the form of time.

And what is it if it cannot exist within the form of time? Namely, that there are two absolutely opposite meanings of the word "part", namely, there are parts that I have. These are the extensive parts, external to each other, and these, I have them in the time mode. Indeed, I have them temporarily, I have them within duration. I have them in time mode. These are parts external to each other, extensive parts that I have. Fine.

But when I say, "intensive part", I mean something completely different. The two meanings of the word "part" differ in nature. Because when I say, "intensive part equals essence", it is no

longer a part that I have. These are no longer parts that I have. This is a part that I am. I am a degree of power; I am an intensive part. I am an intensive part, and the other essences are also intensive parts. Parts of what? Well, parts of the power of God, says Spinoza. Good. He talks like that, so fine.

To experience that I am eternal is to experience that "part", in the intensive sense, differs in nature, coexists and differs in nature from "part" in the extrinsic, extensive sense. I experience here and now that I am eternal, that is, that I am an intensive part or a degree of power irreducible to the extensive parts that I have, that I possess. As a result, when the extensive parts are torn from me, equaling death, that does not concern the intensive part that I am for all eternity. I experience that I am eternal, but once again, on one condition, provided that I am raised to ideas and to affects that give this intensive part an actuality. [Pause] It's in this sense that I experience that I am eternal.

So, this is an experiment (*expérimentation*) which means an eternity, but of "coexistence", not an "immortality" of succession. It is from now forward in my existence that I experience the irreducibility of the intensive part that I am for all eternity, that I am eternally with the extensive parts that I have within the form of duration. But, if I have not actualized my essence, or even my relations, if I have remained within the law of the extensive parts which encounter each other from outside, at that point, I do not even have the idea to experience that I am eternal. At that point, when I die, yes, I lose the greatest part of myself. On the other hand, if I made my part intensive, "proportionally the largest", what does that mean? Here, obviously, there is indeed a small difficulty. Now it brings into play, if you will, in a kind of proportional calculation, the extensive parts that I have and the intensive part that I am.

It's difficult since there is no common nature between the two meanings of the word "part". So how can he say that one and the other are larger or smaller relative to each other? He tells us: when I die, sometimes what perishes, namely the extensive parts which go elsewhere, what perishes from me is in some cases the largest part, in the other case, on the contrary, a fairly insignificant, fairly small part. It would therefore be necessary that the intensive part and the extensive parts have some sort of common criterion in order to return to this rule of proportion, namely, of the two cases, of the two extreme cases in which sometimes the extensive parts that disappear constitute the largest part of myself, sometimes, on the contrary, they constitute only a small part of myself because it is the intensive part which took the largest part of myself.

Well, we cannot go any further, namely that perhaps it's up to us, in existence, to establish this kind of calculation of proportions or lived sense of proportion. It must be said that, yes, what is important in a life? Good. What is important? The criterion of importance. What are you going to give importance to? This is importance. It's... We must almost give importance to importance. This, it isn't important; that, it's important. We would almost have to make of it a criterion of existence. What do people judge as important in their lives? Is it... What's important, is it talking on the radio? Is it creating a stamp collection? Is it good health? Perhaps, all of this... Is it... What is a happy life in the sense that someone dies saying to himself: after all, I generally did what I wanted, I did pretty much what I wanted, or what I hoped for? Yes, that's good. What is this curious blessing that one can give to oneself and which is the opposite of a self-contentment?

What does that mean, this category, what's important? No, we agree, that's annoying, but it's not important. What is this calculation? Isn't that it? Isn't it the category of the remarkable or the important that would allow us to create proportions between the two irreducible meanings of the word "part", what depends on and what results from the intensive part of myself and what, on the contrary, refers to the extensive parts that I have?

So, and then obviously, there is always the problem: premature death. The singular essence passes into existence, good, and then... I'm a baby that gets crushed. Well. How far does the Spinozist rule apply, namely: but the time that I last does not matter in the end? Spinoza says it very firmly, and there, he has the right to say it since he did not die very old, but still, he was not a crushed baby. [*Laughter*] He had time to write the *Ethics*, so still, the babies who die, Spinoza's rule: but after all, when I die, it only means one thing, namely, I no longer have extensive parts.

Here, we are embarrassed when facing the case of premature deaths. Because a premature death ... Fine, we can always say: he has his eternal essence. But this eternal essence, once again, as we read in Spinoza, is not simply an essence like a mathematical figure. It's an essence which exists as an essence only to the extent that it has passed through existence, that is, in which it has realized its degree, in which it has realized its degree for itself, that is, the intensive part that it was. It goes without saying that when I die prematurely, I did not realize the intensive part that I was. In other words, I have not at all expressed, I have not at all "caused to be" the intensity that I am. So, it's okay when you die, all the same, at a certain age, but all those who die before... I believe that there, in fact, you must not... You must rather... [*Deleuze does not complete this*]

If we imagine that a correspondent could have said that to Spinoza, to ask Spinoza that, what would Spinoza have answered? I don't think that he would have been clever at all with this. He wouldn't have at all... He would have said something like: well, yes, that it was part of the irreducible exteriority of nature. You see, it's like everything, the whole cohort of people who have existed, who will exist, who are poisoned, etc., that this whole problem of the extensive part of ourselves, was such that in some cases it could indeed make... I would say that, in Spinozist terms, we must almost say: the one who dies prematurely, well yes, this is a case where death is imposed in such a way that, it is imposed in such conditions that, at that time, it concerns the greatest part of the individual concerned.

But what we call a happy life means doing everything we can, and that, Spinoza says formally, doing everything we can precisely to ward off premature death, that is, to prevent premature deaths. What does that mean? Not at all preventing death, but acting so that death, when it does happen, ultimately only concerns the smallest part of me. There we are, I believe, as he saw it, experienced and felt things. Good. I mean, do you have any reactions, questions to ask?... Yes? But no theory, just feeling. [*Laughter*]

Segment 2

Seminar on Leibniz and the Baroque – Principles and Freedom

Lecture 14, 7 April 1987, Principles and Freedom (9) – Logic of the Event

Initial Transcription by Web Deleuze; Augmented Transcription and Translation by Charles J. Stivale (duration, 2:35:30)

Whatever the abomination of the world might be, whatever the abomination of the world might be, there is something that cannot be taken from you and through which you are invincible. This is not your egotism; that is, there as well it's full of... It's certainly not your egotism; it's not your tiny pleasure about being "me". It's something much more grandiose that Whitehead called precisely *self-enjoyment*, that is, this kind of vital heart in which you contract your elements, whether these are elements of a music, elements of a chemistry, vibratory waves, etc. ... and become yourself by contracting these elements and by turning yourself back toward these elements. It will be this type of joy, a joy of Becoming, this joy of Becoming self that you find in all thinking of the vitalist kind.

And, you recall – I remind you of this just to make some necessary adjustments -- “let this joy increase!”, that's the formula of subjective optimism, “let this joy increase!”, that is, that it might become the joy of more and more people. And that does not mean that the world will go better, and that does not mean that there will be fewer abominations. It's something else. It's a question of something else. It is not a question of saying that abominations are going to leave me indifferent. On all these points, Leibniz expressed himself marvelously in the text to which I refer you and that we have already used quite a bit: *The Philosopher's Confession*. Being content with the world, he tells us, that doesn't at all mean: take good care of your ego. That's not at all what it means. That means precisely finding in the self the strength to resist all that is abominable, and finding in the self the strength to endure the abominable when it happens to you.

In other words, *self-enjoyment* is being worthy of an event, knowing how or managing to be worthy of the event.^{xx} Who can ever predict: I would be worthy of the event that happens to me? Whatever the event might be, be it a catastrophe or falling in love, there are people who are unworthy of what happens to them, even when these are not very prodigious events. Being worthy of what happens! It's a theme that runs through philosophy. If philosophy is useful for anything, it's for this kind of thing : persuading us, not teaching us, persuading us that it's a problem, that one must know how, that it would be better to know how to be worthy of what happens to us, that it would be a great misfortune or that it would be a great good fortune. Because if you manage to be worthy of what happens to you, at that moment you will know very well what is unimportant in what happens to you, and what is important in what happens to you. In other words, what is important in an event? What has no importance at all in an event? It's not necessarily what one might believe. One must already have all these ethics of worthiness/dignity (*dignité*). Being worthy (*être digne*) of what happens, that's what vitalism is. In Leibniz, consider the entire end of *The Philosopher's Confession*, it's there.

And you recall Leibniz's idea, specifically that thank God the damned exist, for the damned having reduced the region that has devolved to them, having narrowed their subdivision (you recall: the small clear region that they expressed). Because they vomited on God, henceforth they have renounced this clear region. The damned having fallen into an extreme confusion due to hating God, it's an idea, once again, that seems sublime to me, the idea of the damned: it makes you want to be one! [*Laughter*] That's what they did, and henceforth it's thanks to them [that]

they left fantastic unused quantities of virtual joy. Let us take hold of these joys, let us take hold of these empty, unfulfilled *enjoyments*. We must appropriate them to ourselves. Then the damned will be furious in seeing that their damnation serves us, and is useful for something. Yes, damnation serves to increase the total quantity of *self-enjoyment* of the aggregate of those who are not damned or not yet damned. There we have the fourth element.

And then there is still a fifth element. You certainly sense that there is a necessary fifth element that I will outline quickly. It's that everything asks for it, it's *feeling* that asks for it: *feeling* demands that there is a kind of conformity of one *feeling* with another in the same prehending subject, a kind of conformity of *feelings*. Conformity means: belonging to a same form, to a same subjective form. The prehended demands something else than an instantaneous or immediate presentation. [Pause] *Self-enjoyment* presents itself as the affect of a pure Becoming of self, a becoming oneself. All this implies a sort of duration into which the event plunges and of which the minimum is a junction of an immediate past and near future. I was telling you: that's what optimism is in the end, persuasion that it's going to last, persuasion that after one beat of my heart another one will follow. And if this persuasion results in telling oneself or reaching a point that, perhaps, it won't always be this way, but there will nonetheless be another heart, fine, perhaps there is a link among *self-enjoyments*.

In other words, what I grasp and what I feel is never reduced to an immediate presentation, including *feeling*. It's grasped by a prehending subject which, one way or another, plunges into the past and tends toward a future.

ⁱ *Situations optiques et sonores pures*. Often translated as "pure optical and sound situations."

ⁱⁱ See Sessions 17 and 18 of the Cinema seminar I (May 4 and 11, 1982). As if anticipating the English reader, Deleuze points out the two senses of the word, "ballad," in French. See Tomlinson and Galeta's translation notes in *The Time-Image*, p. xvii.

ⁱⁱⁱ On Rossellini, belief and art, see *The Time-Image*, p. 172. This *Cahiers du Cinema* interview with Rossellini can be found in English in R. Rossellini, *My Method: Writings and Interviews* (New York: Marsilio, 1995), pp. 138-152.

^{iv} *My Method*, op. cit., pp. 145-146. Deleuze quotes this same text, with some notable variations and omissions, in *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 129.

^v *My Method*, op. cit., pp. 147-148.

^{vi} On this cinema, which seeks to replace the model of knowledge with belief, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 171-173.

^{vii} It should be noted that, while presenting an entirely moral position in choosing to make only didactic cinema, Rossellini does not utter the word "ethics", nor this phrase. See *My Method* pp. 146-148. As for this phrase, see *The Time-Image*, p. 173, where Deleuze says on his own account: "We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are a part."

^{viii} Deleuze says "le cinéma noir américain" in contrast to "le film noir américain", a genre that he recognizes specifically. So, the translation would normally reflect this distinction, American Black cinema, and not American film *noir*. However, in the context of what Deleuze says in the lines following this cinema characterization, the logical translation choice makes very little sense, hence rendering this as American crime cinema, a cousin as it were to film *noir*.

^{ix} On Kazan and these aspects of American cinema, see *The Movement-Image*, pp. 156-159 (*L'Image-Mouvement*, pp. 215-217).

^x On Third World cinema, see *The Time-Image*, pp. 282-291.

^{xi} See Antonin Artaud, *Complete Works Vol. 1*, London: Calder & Boyars, 1968, pp. 164-165.

^{xii} Robert Linhart, *Le sucre et la faim* (Paris : Minuit, 1980). Let us note that Deleuze needs to spell out the French word for hunger, *faim*, to avoid confusion with its homophone, *fin* (the end, the goal).

^{xiii} We saw these distinctions in the preceding session; see *A Thousand Plateaus*, pp. 419-421 (*Mille plateaux*, pp. 523-524).

^{xiv} The Hannah Arendt reference in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33) is to her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York : Harcourt Brace & Co., 1951 (*Mille plateaux*, p. 283, note 31).

^{xv} In the same note in *A Thousand Plateaus* (p. 538, note 33), one finds a reference to Paul Virilio's book *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976 ; Galilée, 1993).

^{xvi} It's to Paul Virilio that Deleuze and Guattari attribute this term in the texts they cite in *A Thousand Plateaus* the corresponds to it, *Vitesse et politique* (Paris : Galilée, 1977) and *L'insécurité du territoire* (Paris : Stock, 1976) [*Speed and Politics*, Semiotext(e), 1986 ; no translation for the second].

^{xvii} Or *Discourse on Thinking* (1959).

^{xviii} This statement is not in the correspondence with Rivière. It might be a synthesis of Artaud's remarks to Rivière, Blanchot's remarks on the correspondence, and maybe Artaud's correspondence with George Soulié de Morant.

^{xix} *Doublure*, in tailoring, is lining, or in theatre, film, is understudy, stand-in, body double, stunt double. Both of those meanings would be pertinent resonances in this context, but undoubtedly "doublure" is intended in a more abstract way, an overlapping.

^{xx} Deleuze develops this reflection on being worthy of one's events in *Logic of Sense* (NYC: Columbia University Press, 1990), Twenty-First Series on the Event.