November 30, 1982
What do I need? In this movement-image, I see nothing but movements. … To define the plane of matter, I am only seeking movements and intervals of movements. This is why last year when I was more involved with cinema, I said that there was still someone who made manifestos on: to make the cinema of the future, … give me of movements and intervals of movements, and I will make the world like the cine-eye, that is, all Vertov’s theories that consist and rest on the two notions of movements and intervals of movements. And what did Dziga Vertov think he was doing? He considered himself to be creating materialist cinema worthy of the communist society of the future. And this materialist cinema only required movements and intervals of movements. Once again, I’m not surprised because the first chapter of “Matter and Memory” … seems to me to be the most materialistic text in the world. So, Bergson has so much to say that he goes immediately further. He says: what is this interval of movements? I give myself nothing but matter, images which, instead of immediately transmitting the movement received, feel that there is an interval between the movement they receive and the movement they render. What are they? Let’s give them a name:… These are living images.
Seminar Introduction
In the second year of Deleuze’s consideration of cinema and philosophy, he commences the year by explaining that whereas he usually changes topics from one year to the next, he feels compelled to continue with the current topic and, in fact, to undertake a process of “philosophy in the manner of cows, rumination… I want entirely and truly to repeat myself, to start over by repeating myself.” Hence, the 82-83 Seminar consists in once again taking up Bergson’s theses on perception, but now with greater emphasis on the aspects of classification of images and signs drawn from C.S. Peirce. This allows Deleuze to continue the shift from considering the movement-image, that dominated early 20th century cinema, toward a greater understanding of the post-World War II emphasis on the time-image.
For archival purposes, the English translations are based on the original transcripts from Paris 8, all of which have been revised with reference to the BNF recordings available thanks to Hidenobu Suzuki, and with the generous assistance of Marc Haas.
English Translation
Before approaching Peirce’s classifications, Deleuze reflects on Bergson’s development of his conception of movement, plane of immanence and blocs of space-time, laying the groundwork for his much-desired classification of signs and images. Using several illustrations (cf. The Movement-Image p. 228), Deleuze defines four types of images and, in the process, develops the context for returning to the detailed analysis of Beckett’s “Film”. In this light, Deleuze concludes that a fifth type of image exists, the indirect time-image, and also a possible sixth type, the direct time-image, the latter being the ultimate goal for the current seminar.
Gilles Deleuze
Seminar on Cinema: Classification of Signs and Time, 1982-1983
Lecture 03, 30 November 1982 (Cinema Course 24)
Transcription : La voix de Deleuze, Lucie Lembrez (Part 1), Marie Lacire (Part 2) and Sophie Tréguier (Part 3); additional revisions to the transcription and time stamp, Charles J. Stivale
Translation, Charles J. Stivale
Part 1
… character that we maintain or by which we define the plane of immanence or plane of matter. Same thing, right? We saw the reasons why it suited me to talk about a plane of immanence. It’s the same thing; Bergson speaks of a plane of matter.
So, still given my need this year to have diagrams – aie, aie, aie, so long as I can’t get up, I can’t draw my diagrams – so there, we saw my plane of immanence, here it is. [Deleuze indicates the blackboard] At the point we’ve reached, we can or we must define it in three ways, three strictly equivalent ways, since ultimately, the point we are reaching in this plane of immanence is a series of equalities: [Deleuze writes on the board] image = movement = matter = light. — [The sound of music is heard] There’s music that is not part of the recording — [Pause]
I am saying, we grasp three fundamental characteristics of this plane of immanence or plane of matter. The first characteristic, I am saying: it is the infinite set of movement-images insofar as they react upon each other on all their facets and in all their parts, that’s it. I consider this point to be fully examined in our two previous meetings.
The second characteristic, I say: this plane is also the collection of lines or figures — it doesn’t matter — the collection of lines or figures of light, [Pause] lines and figures of light opposing rigid lines or geometric figures that do not yet exist. And in fact, we have seen that on this level of movement-images, all this is very coherent, nothing solid can be assigned, no more than can be assigned a right and a left, a high and a low. Good. A collection of lines of light and figures of light insofar as it is absolutely something other than what later will appear as a rigid line or geometric figure or solid body and which returns to this status that we have seen — that Bergson offers, in sentences which seem to be metaphors and which are not that at all since these are so many nods to the theory of relativity, namely the idea that on the plane of the matter which is ultimately exclusively and uniquely light, matter is light – well then, on this plane, light does not stop diffusing. No more than the plane indicates a high, a low, a right, a left, a solid body, light on this plane, which does not stop diffusing, that is, being propagated in all senses and all directions, possesses neither reflection nor refraction, that is, no cessation of any kind. It just keeps spreading, it diffuses.
At the level of this second characteristic, this allowed us to answer an important question: how does Bergson dare to call “image” something which does not appear to anyone, that is, which does not refer to any eye, to any consciousness since no eye is there, no consciousness is there? Or I can say as well, there are as many eyes as you want. But the eye in the sense you might give it is just one movement-image among others, so it strictly enjoys no privilege at all. Or else why talk about image? This is because the eye is actually within things. The images are light. Images are light, and this light continues to spread exactly as the image is movement. And movement does not cease spreading, that is, from received movement, it immediately transforms into reaction movement, from action movement into reaction movement, a system of action and reaction.
I can also say at that point, if the eye is within things, on this as well, Bergson has an extremely beautiful text which is: “if there is a photograph, [the photo] is already taken and drawn in things”, “is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things.”[1] In other words, it is indeed a universe of images, images for no one, light for no one. This light does not need to reveal itself. It does not reveal itself, says Bergson very oddly, since it keeps spreading, diffusing. Which implies what? That undoubtedly light will not reveal itself insofar as it will be stopped by any opacity whatever. But on this plane of immanence, there is still no room for any opacity whatever. Things are luminous; by that very fact, things are movement, are lines of light, figures of light.
In other words, already I can say certainly and speak of “perception”, but in what sense? I would say that things are perceptions or images are perceptions. Who perceives? No one. The images themselves, what do they perceive? They perceive exactly up to where they receive movement, and up to where they execute, they react through movements. In this sense, an atom is nothing but a movement which, as such, is the perception of all the movements by which it is influenced and of all the movements that it exerts through its own influence on other atoms.
So, I would say every image is perception. Not even perception of oneself since there is not, there are no things. But each movement-image is a perception of all the movements which act on them and of all the movements by which it acts on the other images. In other words, I would say of each thing that it is a total perception; I would say of each thing that it is a — let’s choose a more technical word perhaps which makes it easier to understand — each thing is a “prehension”. Each thing is a movement-image which as such “grasps” [préhende] all the movements it receives and all the movements it executes. [Pause] It is like saying that, on the plane of immanence, there are only lines and figures of light. This is the second characteristic.[2]
So, the first one was the plane of immanence and the infinite set of movement-images insofar as they vary with respect to each other. The second characteristic is the infinite collection or the infinite outline of lines and figures of light. [Pause] The third characteristic, and from our first session at the end, it was Anne Querrien who said, we must not exaggerate, right? You will not escape it, we will have to introduce time. It will not simply be necessary to introduce movement and light; we have to introduce time. And I said yes and no. And then on that point, since that’s how we work, right? sometimes it’s an intervention, sometimes I have a letter from Anne Querrien in more detail on how she understood the matter; she could also have presented the intervention orally, and then obviously, I thought, well, obviously she’s right.
And then that posed a problem which interested me a bit regarding the letter of Bergson’s text because even in what I am saying here, to what extent are we unfaithful to Bergson or are we remaining faithful to Bergson? Well, I believe that we are very deeply faithful to Bergson, and this question which may then interest some of you, not at all interest others who do not care whether or not we are faithful to Bergson. As for me, I’m interested, it interests me, but anyway it interests me moderately. But I think we are very … Anyway, we had Anne Querrien, she intervened and said, well, okay, fine, we’ll see, and that’s what I didn’t do the last time, but it can in fact be identified.
I think she’s right when she says, on this plane of immanence which is already very strange –because what matters isn’t the word “plane”; we will see why it’s the word “plane” — and obviously, time matters. Why? The two ways in which I have defined it, because unless we’re conceive it according to the old tradition of the light as instantaneous, for example, according to a tradition even of the Cartesian type, we have seen that this was not the case, that Bergson had in mind a settling of scores with Einstein’s relativity. By settling scores, I don’t mean a fight; I understand a clarification between philosophy and physics. Well, light and time imply, well — much more according to the first characteristic — the plane of immanence itself is an infinite set of movements. [Pause] In this sense, it implies time as a variable. I would say that the plane of immanence — we have no choice — necessarily involves time. [Pause] It necessarily includes time as a variable of movements that take place “on” it. I put “on” in quotes, but you have to speak as best you can since, in fact, it is indistinguishable from the movements that take place on it.
In other words, this is the third characteristic of my plane of immanence: it is a block of space-time. It is a block of space-time.[3] But it’s, it poses all kinds of problems here because here, in chapter 2 of Matter and Memory, we thought we had understood everything, and we receive a huge blow. For on the first page of chapter 2 of Matter and Memory, Bergson tells us that the plane of matter is “an instantaneous section in the general stream of becoming”.[4] What section? Ah! We can’t help but say it. It’s an instantaneous section. So, he seems to deny it the dimension of time. It is an instantaneous section of becoming. Suddenly, here we are disconcerted; we are very disconcerted. Good. [Pause]
We have to agree to the idea — we will take a closer look, so we are searching, searching, searching — we ask ourselves, how could he have said that? I mean, there’s just something wrong there. How can he in fact — understand the problem — how can he say this is an instantaneous section when he has just explained to us that the plane of matter is the set of all movements, of all the movement-images that vary with respect to each other? This variation and this mobility implicate time, so it’s not an instantaneous section. Apparently, this is what one must call an instantaneous section; by definition, it’s immobile, and constantly so. In all his other texts, Bergson very precisely connects instantaneous and immobile. When he talks about an instantaneous view of movement, that means an immobile position.
So, he can’t mean — yet he says it — he can’t mean that it’s an instantaneous section. In fact, it is a mobile section. A mobile section is a temporal section. It’s a section that encompasses time. This is what we called last year a perspective, not spatial, but temporal.[5] So, the plane of immanence is a mobile section. Henceforth, it implicates time as a variable of movement, so it cannot be instantaneous. We do not have a choice.
Fortunately, in chapter 3, another passage shows us that Bergson is more careful, because in chapter 3, he tells us that the plane of matter is “a [transversal] section of the universal becoming”. This is, well … “a [transversal] section of the universal becoming”. He tells us that as such, it is “the place of passage for movements received and [returned]”. But “the place of passage of movements received and returned” can only have one meaning: it’s that it implicates time, just like light, just like lines of light, and the figures of light implicate time. So, it’s not an instantaneous section after all.[6]
Still, why does he say it? Understand here because it i … I insist on this greatly because it is, it is, it is a way of reading philosophers. When one writes, and then writing, reading, or whatever might be written, when people write, well, they still have a main theme that varies. Let us assume — what I am saying is abstract — that each page has a corresponding main theme and secondary themes. When I do something, when I create something with my main theme, I could go pretty fast with my secondary themes. I can’t say everything at once, so I will have occasion to use something called convenient expressions [commodités d’expression]. I will be forced to go fast over a particular point which is not my main point. If then someone tells me, but you said that, and that seems to be contradictory, I will say no, it wasn’t contradictory; at that point, I was going fast. Fine. And this is the case when he says, the plane of matter is an instantaneous section of becoming; this is precisely on a page where he no longer cares what the plane of matter is, where he is concerned with something else altogether. So, we can agree to the idea that he’s going fast. However, this is not an adequate answer. He’s going fast, okay, but he says, “instantaneous section”.
Let’s look a little further – Yes, sorry, a little later, ok? [No doubt a student wants to ask a question] — well, this will be clear. In what sense does the plane of matter implicate and does it necessarily involve time? I have just said it: as it merges with the movements which occur on it, as it merges with the movements which are continuously exchanged and propagated on it, that is, with this collection of movement-images, [Pause] we can consider a kind of overall movement of the whole plane, since it is the infinite set of all movement-images, an infinite set, an infinite set of movements. These are translational movements, translation implicating displacement on the plane, displacement in space.
And Bergson has a great idea that here I no longer want to discuss because I discussed it a lot last year, and so I am reminding you, but which will be fundamental for us.[7] So, I consider this as a given; I am summarizing it for those who are not up on this. It’s a very clear idea after all. It consists in telling us this; forget all of the above for a moment. It consists in telling us, you see, a translational movement is a change of position between — let’s say, since we can’t yet use other terms — between images. For example, A comes to point B. A which was at point A comes to point B. A translational movement is a displacement in space. We have seen that, at the level where we are on the plane of immanence, translational movements are diffusions, diffusions, propagations, in all senses and in all directions. Okay, these are translational movements.
Bergson has a very simple idea which is perhaps … which is like a kind of, for him, a kind legacy from Aristotle. This is because the translational movement in space has no reason in itself. That’s what I’m not going to repeat, all of Bergson’s reasons, no matter; you just need to understand this point. A translational movement in space always expresses something deeper and of a different nature. But what is it? A translational movement in space always expresses a qualitative change, or what we can call an alteration. [Pause] Alteration is a qualitative change. [Pause]
What changes qualitatively? Bergson’s answer is very precise: the only “thing”, in quotation marks, which might change qualitatively, that is, which does not stop changing as a function of its nature, is what must be called the Whole. Only a Whole, or the Whole, it doesn’t matter, only a Whole or the Whole changes and keeps changing, it is its nature to change. [Pause] So let’s translate: a translational movement in space expresses a change in the Whole. Good. [Pause] We’re getting to something. This is almost some terminology that you need to grasp fully.
What is this Whole? This is something we haven’t encountered at all yet; fortunately, we encountered it last year, but this year, we haven’t encountered it at all. Qualitative change, all that … My plane of immanence, my plane of matter, it only encompasses translational movements in space. It doesn’t encompass anything else. Qualitative change, what is it? Whatever keeps changing, that’s what becoming is. Granted. Becoming does not stop changing. Not even what becomes; there is no what becomes, there is becoming. Becoming does not stop changing. This is its definition. Becoming is qualitative change. Becoming is alteration. Alright, very good. But we don’t know what becoming is, right?
That’s because it’s the Whole as well. So fine, becoming is the Whole, but we don’t know what it is any more than the Whole. Hey, it’s still interesting for us because we see, we don’t understand anything yet, but we understand so many things before understanding. We at least understand that we should not confuse “set” and “Whole”. The plane of immanence is the infinite set of movement-images or, if you prefer, figures and lines of light. Ok, that’s fine. But whether these are translational movements, those of this infinite set, whether these are translational movements, whether these are lines and figures of light, they express something which is of another nature: qualitative alterations and qualitative changes in a supposed Whole, that is, in a becoming.
Ah, well, then, if the Whole … Here I have another series of parities that has nothing to do with my parities from earlier. These parities that I am putting aside, which I currently have absolutely no idea what to do with, [Deleuze writes on the board] are: Whole = becoming = qualitative change or alteration. [Pause] Moreover, everything that Bergson tells us to guide us, and this moves us onward sentimentally, we tell ourselves, surely this is something very important what he is telling us. Namely, he is telling us that according to him, philosophers were seriously mistaken about the nature of the Whole, and that is why they did not understand what becoming was, according to him, namely that the Whole is the opposite of a closed totality, that a closed totality is always a set [ensemble], but that it is not a Whole, and what is the Whole? Well, it’s the opposite of what is closed, and the Whole is open.
And last year I was saying, when I was trying to discuss this Bergson thesis: well, you see, this seems to me the only point where there is a coincidence. Only this is a fundamental point between Bergson and Heidegger, the only point of resemblance between Bergson and Heidegger. But this is really a point, a point that is important. It is about having created a philosophy of the Open with a capital O. And at that point, the similarity goes very far because in Heidegger, to say being is the Open, and to connect oneself in this respect with two great poets, Hölderlin and Rilke, their whole theme of the Open, to say that being is the Open also implies that being is time. And for Bergson, the Whole is the Open, and the Open or the Whole is becoming. It is the universal becoming.[8]
So, why am I saying that? Let’s come back then to what we have the right to discuss. We weren’t really allowed to talk about all of this. Except for … We weren’t allowed to really talk about it yet. We don’t even know where it might come from, that Whole, becoming, all of that; we just have our plane. We can say, well, it is not difficult: if it is true that translational movement always expresses a change in a Whole, a qualitative change in a Whole, in a Whole which, for its part, is Open, well, it goes without saying that the plane of immanence, the plane of matter will be a mobile section of this Whole or a mobile section of the universal becoming. Moreover, if I take, if I consider a set of movements on the plane of immanence that expresses a change in a Whole, I would say, good, it is a presentation, it is a block. And if I consider another set of movements that expresses another change, I would say, it’s another block.
In other words, my plane of immanence is not separable from a multiplicity of presentations, each of which — now I can complete my diagram, we are making so much progress that we can already let everything go; we have almost enough … — [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] I can complete my diagram — I can say that each p’, p”, and — how we’ve already said – p, I don’t know what, p”’ — is a block of space-time, each of these blocks being a movable section, a temporal section, temporal section taken on what and from what? A temporal section on — here, I am placing a big question mark — what he calls a universal becoming, but which obviously will be of a different nature than my planes of immanence. We’ll see. Good.
So, I am saying, and this was the last point regarding the general characteristics of the plane of immanence, well yes, not only is it an infinite set of movement-images, not only is it an infinite collection of figures of light, it is also an infinite series of blocks of space-time. There, then, we have a fairly coherent series: an infinite set of movement-images which react on each other; an infinite collection of lines and figures of light that never stop diffusing into each other; an infinite series of blocks of space-time, each of these space-time blocks being considered as a mobile section or as a temporal section of universal becoming. Okay, so at that point, even the question “Are we being faithful to Bergson?” no longer arises; obviously we are faithful. There you are. There you have the first point. Yeah … [To a student]
A woman student: I have a problem…
Deleuze: Ah, my God, it’s true.
The student: … on the second [Inaudible] You are saying that the second characteristic, that the plane of immanence is a collection of figures of light that are rigid…
Deleuze: No! [Answers from several students, including the woman student who corrects herself] … which are not rigid, which are luminous.
The student: In Duration and Simultaneity, when Bergson talks about these lines of light, and when he describes in particular this experience of [unclear word], he clearly shows that they are rigid, since you have a triangle of light that you stretch like a balloon, like a [unclear word], and what changes are angles; the lines always remain.
Deleuze: That’s no big deal.
The student: So that means that, in fact, and he says it, we are dealing with a space which is [unclear word] and that, Einstein says it too, it is a space which is absolute, which is rigid, which is homogeneous. And so, time is instantaneous, and therefore the plane of immanence is a transversal section, in fact, but immobile and instantaneous on an infinite becoming. So, the model is [unclear word]
Deleuze: Yes, and that is very easy to understand. Here I am answering very quickly because in my opinion, this is not a real difficulty. In Duration and Simultaneity yet again, it is a confrontation with the theory of relativity. He does not place himself at all on or at the level of a plane of matter as we have just defined it, a plane of pure movement-images. He puts himself on a plane where so-called rigid or geometric lines and lines of light coexist. He notes that relativity creates a reversal, that the theory of relativity reverses the relationship between the two types of lines. And it is already on this point that I, I would insist much more than you perhaps, namely that while pre-Einsteinian physics considered that it was the rigid lines or the geometric figures which — here I’m choosing a vague word — which commanded the lines of light or determined the movement of lines of light, the theory of relativity creates an absolute and fundamental reversal, namely that it is the lines of light and equations that can be established between these lines and figures of light which will determine and control the permanence and solidity of the lines that will be called rigid and geometric. So it is solely in this aspect that I can embrace or invoke Duration and Simultaneity.
Having said this, when I shift my focus to Matter and Memory, so if I add, what is the problem of Duration and Simultaneity? In my opinion, it’s that Bergson completely accepts the idea of a primacy of the lines of light and figures of light. In this sense, he is Einsteinian. This is a drama, Duration and Simultaneity, this is the drama of, of a … this is the drama of a philosopher, or writers, they also know these dramas. The drama is a book that… I’m going to tell you about the drama of Duration and Simultaneity. He completely accepts this first great principle that he derives from relativity. He also accepts a second great principle of relativity, namely the idea or that he will translate — the word is not his, so it does not … — but what corresponds to blocks of space-time. He accepts it too. And why does he accept it, because he’s not an idiot? Because once again, he knows enough mathematics to understand the theory of relativity very well. But he does not claim to be a genius in physics, nor in mathematics. He does not claim to bring anything new to mathematics or physics, otherwise he would have studied mathematics and physics instead of doing philosophy. So, he doesn’t claim to discuss the theory of relativity at all. He doesn’t pretend at all to say, “Einstein was wrong, I’ll explain it to you”; we must not exaggerate, right? He hasn’t lost his mind.
However, for readers, when they read Duration and Simultaneity, they believed that Bergson was discussing the theory of relativity and thought that Einstein, literally, was mistaken. You will tell me, it was not difficult to explain to people that he didn’t mean that. No, when you’ve written a book that undergoes such misinterpretation or that is received in such a way, it’s ruined. To straighten it out, the book would have to be redone. He’d have to do it over. In fact, when you get involved in these topics, you already have something else to develop, so there’s no question of revising a book. This was not even a question; it was ruined for Bergson. Hence his very rigid attitude: not only up to his death, he forbids any reissue of Duration and Simultaneity, which confirmed to people, which confirmed to all the idiots the idea that Bergson himself realized he was wrong. But in fact, that’s not it. He was not in a position to correct a widespread reader error. Well, that’s not possible, it’s not possible to correct a misunderstanding. Not possible. At that point, you have to do something else, you must not spend your time correcting something; it can’t be done. So there, he was screwed to some extent because what was it about? So, until his death, and even beyond his death, since his will is explicit, he prohibited as long as he has the power to do so, that is, as long as he has heirs capable of maintaining its prohibition, it prohibited any reissue of Duration and Simultaneity, and it is therefore quite recently that Duration and Simultaneity could be republished.
But I believe that it is not a settled question because one does not explain, one has not explained in my opinion, one has not explained, it seems to me, what I assume happened; this is a hypothesis that I am presenting to you. Because the problem for him was completely different: it was really, I accept the theory of relativity; moreover, he is one of the fundamental figures of modern science. Once again, he’s not a madman, he’s not going to start arguing with Einstein on Einstein’s level. What he says is something quite different, namely the question is this: I accept the figures and lines of light, first of all. Second, I accept blocks of space-time. There you are. Having said that … So, in the end, I accept all of Einstein. Having said that, is Einstein entitled to conclude that there is no universal time? Well, the question is simple. Does the theory of relativity allow us to conclude a theory, a theory of real time, of real time, a theory of real time according to which there would be no universal time? This is the question. Bergson’s thesis is very simple. It is to say, beware, the theory of real time is no longer a matter… [Interruption of recording] [43: 09]
Part 2
… the only goal, meaning: in my case, I am taking a step towards Einstein, that is, I would not think of arguing about what he says in physics, why the devil does Einstein believe it possible, him, a great physicist, to create a philosophy which is not even well-known. He says: not only is it not well-known but it presents a philosophical thesis according to which there would be an irreducible multiplicity of time. What Bergson will try to show in Duration and Simultaneity is that the idea of blocks of space-time, and even of an infinite series of blocks of space-time, does not prevent the uniqueness of real time, conceived as universal becoming. There you have his position; the book becomes extremely clear.
And once again, we are not yet able to understand this history of becoming. But what interests me is just having established the idea that, in fact, the plane of immanence here, or the planes of immanence, that is, in fact, the plane of immanence merges with its infinite series of presentations. Well, all of these planes of immanence are, in fact, mobile sections of a universal becoming. So, your objection is very correct if we stick to Duration and Simultaneity, but in Duration and Simultaneity, it is not at all a question of the plane of matter, as Bergson understood it. It’s already a matter of a plane where, of course, there is matter, there is light, but there is also what we do not yet have here: rigid figures, solids, which we ourselves will see, on the level of Matter and Memory, although he is not posing this problem, but it will be up to us to complete. He has so much to do; we have to be faithful to him. We will have to fill in the holes he left or whatever. At the point we’ve reached, we will have to take into account the formation of geometric lines. You understand? I can’t give them to myself yet, I don’t have them! At this level, I only have lines of light! On the contrary, in Duration and Simultaneity in which the chapter to which you are referring is not a chapter of philosophy, which is really a chapter on physics, he gives himself both at the same time! He does not ask himself where the lines of light come from and where the geometric lines come from; what is there? On the one hand, there are geometric lines, on the other hand, lines of light that are in an utterable relationship, you understand? … Yes?
Anne Querrien: I find that entirely paradoxical.
Deleuze: Ah, you don’t agree. Well, I suspected as much!
Querrien: Yes, yes, I do! I even agree very, very much in a way, but I find that he doesn’t need to display any plan. That is. that Bergson is very, very correct in saying that Duration and Simultaneity does not need lines to be within becoming on the condition of geometry changing, and to return somewhere, in relation to what I had told you about the geometry of cathedrals, that is, for the workers who do not know a section’s analytical and descriptive geometry, precisely there was a section at ground level from which the cathedral were sketched, and the dimensions, according to the movement of stones and the elevation they had, they had dimensions at ground level which were variable. So, there was only one section, which [unclear words] in three dimensions. You follow?
Deleuze: Right, yes, I follow.
Querrien: It is another type of geometry precisely of relations between lines of motion and lines of geometry, therefore, where there is no conservation of distances. So, effectively there is only one plane which is an instantaneous section. From the moment that becoming is posited as existing, an instantaneous section, in fact, suffices; there is no need to have thirty-six sections. And this is completely connected with what we were talking about with Félix [Guattari] in terms of the plane of consistency.
Deleuze: No, no, no! It’s not that you’re going too fast, but … On the one hand, there is a question of fact. Bergson, he needs it, because — there is no … I mean, there is no place for argument — he described p, p second, p third, etc., to infinity. He has that himself. So, he has this plurality of presentations since the plane of matter does not stop being displaced at the same time as, there, we are going to see, we cannot say it yet. Why? Because on the plane of matter there is also something which is constantly being displaced and whose maneuver we have not yet been seen. So, he needs it. On the other hand, since you are saying that the plane of matter is necessarily a block of space-time, … what?
Querrien: I’m telling you that what’s sufficient is a representation. So, we can choose to represent that in the dimensions of space and time because they are the ones that we’ve rehashed the most with mathematics, but we could very well imagine that this might be in readjusted dimensions, [unclear words] but given that, so we take these dimensions, and we can have a succession of times as you say, but there is also, it’s conceivable, an instantaneous section which would be a kind crystallization. The two things are not contradictory; at the same time, we can say that, on the one hand, there is an instantaneous section of becoming, and then say, on the other hand, there are series of spatio-temporal blocks.
Deleuze: If you cause all the representations of the plane of matter to be crystallized, there will be a problem, it seems to me. It’s this: at that point, what is going to prevent you from confusing it with the Whole?
Querrien: Indeed, that was the risk. The Whole… yes. [Unclear words]
Deleuze: Well yes.
Querrien: But that could happen.
Deleuze: That could happen, but then, I’d say that there, there you are unfaithful to Bergson. That’s not serious. It would be another system.
Querrien: [Unclear words]
Deleuze: Yeh, yeh… I don’t know [Deleuze bursts out laughing].
Richard Pinhas: I believe that in Bergson himself, there is a fixed terminology which helps us greatly. It is that without appealing at all to a dualist, we can call upon the lesson of point of view, and the point of view that we could have on the side of duration would not be the same compared to an immobile section or a mobile section, which Bergson calls “impersonal time” when he begins to speak of it. And one could say, this is a hypothesis, from the point of view of duration, indeed, one can practice immobile sections within becoming, but that these immobile sections, from the point of view of impersonal time, which relates to the Whole, these immobile sections would in reality become what they are, namely mobile sections. [Pause] And so, we would have two opinions that come from two different points of view, but which address the same problem. These are terms of … Is that it?
Deleuze: That would work.
Pinhas: That would work. But these are completely Bergsonian terms. I mean, Bergson himself calls them impersonal. [Several unclear words]
Deleuze: Well, it’s the same thing.
Pinhas: It’s the same thing with [unclear word].
Deleuze: … the universal and impersonal time are the same. So, it’s all right. You see how beautiful it is. With that then, let’s move forward quickly because … I was saying, and this was in our first session already. I was saying, well, let’s come back to the simplest case. You do not forget that I am maintaining, and everyone agrees at least that it is possible, that it is a possible representation, this series of space-time blocks.
So, I am saying, we’re only holding onto one; let’s go back to “p” there. It’s not that I am deleting the others, but I am placing them in a simple case. This is all complicated enough. What can happen? What can occur? Because we’re stuck there! We are so stuck that we are quite incapable of understanding what this story of the Whole is, of becoming which refers us to an element other than the plane of matter. We are asking: what can happen on the plane of matter thus defined, that is, thus defined by the three definitions, by the three preceding characteristics? And our response, the last time, Bergson’s response, one that left us so astonished since, once again, these are things that we see in Matter and Memory; these are things that … it’s very odd. He said, well, it’s not difficult; imagine, we will see, imagine that, at certain points of this plane of matter, of our plane of immanence, what arises? Once again, I am not allowed to call forth anything that exceeds movement or light. [Pause] So, what holds a promise there, or I do not know… it’s so beautiful that, that let’s try to follow it as far as possible before asking ourselves if all that is really true.
He says, well, the only thing that can happen in all these shifts of movement, of actions, of reactions, is intervals, intervals of movement. [Deleuze writes on the board] What does that mean? He puts forward nothing other than movement. He’s just saying, at certain points on my plane of immanence, there is going to be a gap between the movement received and the movement executed, some weird atoms — how were these things able to form? We’ll see — weird atoms, an interval between… These are movement-images; they are special movement-images. Imagine some special movement-images traversed by an interval, an interval between the movement that this image receives and the movement that it transmits — [Deleuze writes on the board] in all directions; we shall see, is it still in all directions? — nothing but intervals, or as he says, gaps.
So, he’s very confident here in saying, — is that…? I don’t know — but he’s very confident in saying: but I don’t know anything other than movement. What do I need? Well, what I need, I was telling you about movement; now I’m talking to you, and I’m telling you, there are certain movement-images, I give myself nothing other than movement-images. There are some movement-images, why? I don’t know, I don’t know yet. There are certain movement-images that present a gap between the movement received and the movement performed, an interval of movement. I only ask, to define the plane of matter – so here, we are taking another step; he has an additional demand — in order to define the plane of matter, I am only asking for movements and intervals of movements.
That’s why last year when I was considering cinema more, I said that there was still someone who is a great man of cinema who said exactly that, who made manifestos about it: I am only asking, to make the cinema of the future, I am only asking for movements and intervals of movements, and who added, the intervals of movements are even more important than movement. But give me movements and intervals of movements, and what will I create for you? The world as a “cine-eye”. I will make the world for you as a cine-eye, that is, all of Dziga Vertov’s theories which consist of and are based exclusively on the two notions of movement and intervals of movement. And what did Dziga Vertov think he was doing, rightly or wrongly? He judged that he was creating materialist cinema worthy of the communist society of the future, and this materialist cinema only required movements and intervals of movement.
I would say in this regard, that does not surprise me because, again, the first chapter of Matter and Memory — I am emphasizing this — the first chapter strikes me as the most materialistic text in the world. So, Bergson has so much to say that he immediately goes farther, he immediately goes… He says: what is this interval of movements? I give myself nothing other than matter, images which, instead of immediately transmitting the movement received, feel that there is an interval between the movement they receive and the movement they render. What will this be? Let’s give them a name since this is a very special case. [Deleuze writes on the board] These are living images. Let us not forget our identity which is completely established, and which continues: image = matter = movement, etc. They will be living materials.
And, in fact, how do we define a living being, as opposed to a non-living one? We define a living being by the existence of an equal interval between the movement it receives and the movement it gives, that is, the movement it executes. That’s it, a living being. That’s it, a living being, but what is even more alive than the living being? And Bergson goes there directly since he is reserving the study of the living being for later. He’s saving it for another book. Here, what interests him, in Matter and Memory, is to reach as quickly as possible a living matter which is the most advanced, the most complex expression of the gap or of the interval, namely, the brain. That is, he immediately addresses a very complex degree of the elaboration of living matter. And he said, what is a brain? A brain is matter. That’s why you are not going to believe that there are images in the brain; the brain is one image among many others. It is a movement-image. It is a movement-image. It’s just like everything, it’s a very special movement-image. It is a movement-image that shows as much of a gap as possible between the movement received and the movement executed.
And what does a brain allow? That is, in other words, the brain is nothing! It’s nothing, it’s a gap. It’s an interval. But it’s an interval that counts because what happens when there is an interval between the movement received and the movement executed? Two things happen: I would say at that point, the image is literally “quartered” [écartelées].[9] Living images are quartered images. I call a “quartered image” an image that shows an interval between the movement received and the movement executed. And what does that imply? It implies two things that are going to be fantastic, which is going to be the blossoming of the new even if we don’t understand how or why. It’s weird, this whole story. All that is needed is an interval between the two, so that what? So that the action undergone is fixed and isolated, isolated, fixed, isolated, fixed, yes, isolated, fixed from the rest of the images. [Deleuze writes on the board] You will tell me, several always act on a movement-image; yes, yes, several are acting on it. But when I find myself facing the image privileged with intervals, it will be able to isolate a main action. So why? [Pause]
In other words, it manages to isolate the action that it is undergoing, which was impossible for the other images on the plane of immanence, and even anticipates the action that it is undergoes. And on the other hand, since there is a gap, the reaction it produces, the reaction it executes, the reaction it retransmits, what is it going to be capable of? Thanks to a gap, thanks this time to the delay, you see, there is anticipation on one facet — I am isolating the action that I am undergoing, and I anticipate it — on the other side, there is a delay. The gap is a delayed action. The interval gives me a little time. Why? Well, instead of my reaction being the retransmission of the action undergone or the propagation of the action undergone, everything occurs as if living images were capable of producing delayed actions, that is, new actions in relation to the actions undergone, actions which do not immediately follow from the actions undergone. On the one hand, actions undergone, isolated and anticipated, on the other hand, actions that are delayed, and therefore new, in relation to the action undergone. By this, you recognize living beings, and preferably, living cerebral beings, endowed with brains. Okay, so it’s okay. That’s good. We just needed the interval. Vertov and Bergson have a common struggle.
So, the interval was enough for us. Good. Ah yes! But we need a little more. That is, here, this now is becoming so easy, let’s … let’s extend it a bit. We tell ourselves, yes, but still anyway, he is exaggerating by going immediately to the brain. So, we will try to say what happens before that. We have to imagine, we are going to imagine a story which is the story of the earth; at that point, we choose a book on the origins of life. And we tell ourselves, well, on the plane of immanence that was entirely permeated by … Oh no, we still have to add something.
You did not fail to notice that what I have just said in this appearance of intervals, with its two aspects, as soon as images appear on the plane of immanence, as soon as movement-images appear which quarter the received movement and the movement executed, that is, isolate the action undergone and anticipating it, and delay the action executed, henceforth they produce something new. Well then, here, as soon as it appears, I can say that I have taken account of these special images, from an immanence point of view, from what point of view? From the point of view of the first characteristic of the plane of immanence, namely, an infinite set of movement-images. I have said that the plane of immanence being defined as an infinite set of movement-images reacting on each other, certain very special images appear on this plane which will be called living images, or living matters, and which exhibit an interval of motion. Alright, good.
Scholarly rigor requires that I state what is happening although all these points are linked from the point of view of the second characteristic of this plane of immanence which was: diffusion of light and propagation of lines and figures of pure light. What is going on there? I have to find something corresponding, you know? That I might say, well then, here as well, this is also the equivalent of the interval. The interval was in terms of movements, the interval of movements. But I am saying, the story of movement was the first characteristic of the plane; the second characteristic of the plane is light, its propagation and its diffusion.
What is happening from that point of view? What are living images? Living images, well, there you go! It’s not nothing. These luminous images, my luminous images from earlier, before bringing in special images, quartered images with small and large gaps, well, what was happening with my lines and figures of light? Diffusion, propagation in all senses, in all directions. Each image was luminous in itself. It was not receiving light from elsewhere. There was no consciousness that came to illuminate them from outside; they didn’t need it. Things were luminous in themselves since these were images of light. Just that light, yet again, wasn’t revealed because it didn’t have to be revealed. Why would it have been revealed? To whom?
Well, because, at the same time, there are lots of references, there are gimmicks [trucs]; I’m sure Bergson has some, so he has some, in the same sense that I was talking about settling scores with Einstein, he is also settling scores with the Old Testament. [Laughter] Oh yes! Bergson was Jewish, very, very … his story is very complicated. He converted to Catholicism with the woman of his life, but he wanted to keep it absolutely a secret because it was Hitler’s era, so he wanted to continue to be known as Jewish. He remained so very deeply, so it’s a very, very curious story. And Bergson’s relationship with the Old Testament seems very, very fundamental to me, and even Bergsonism, although this story of light is not… it is not… it is closely linked to all kinds of things: to art, but also to all kinds of religious themes in his works.
Okay, but hey, what might happen? I am saying that this light did not have to be revealed. This is good because often we hear at catechism, it seems, we hear children saying: “But, before the light, what was there?” Bergson’s answer is: before the light, there was the light, precisely before the light. [Laughter] We must not speak, we must not speak about before the light; we must speak about “before the light is revealed”. This is not the same at all! But the diffusion of light, the universal diffusion of light, is the plane of immanence. There has always been such a plane. Moreover, as we’ve seen, from all time, long before there was any living cell; that is good.
Okay, yes, so let’s not waste time, what’s going on? It doesn’t have to be revealed, fine. But here we see that this time, special luminous images appear, which I call living images. It’s the same thing. Insofar as being luminous images, what is special about them? I mean, what the interval of movement is to movement, what is this going to be in relation to light? And here, they have a very special property: they are quartered images. They will stop light. They are only going to have one power: they will reflect the light; remember: they will reflect the light. Living images will reflect light. All the more so when these living images have a brain, or when they have eyes, they will be increasingly complex phenomena of reflection of light. This is what the interval of movement is to movement, the reflection of light is going to be for light. That is, they will receive a ray — see, it’s the same thing — they will succeed in isolating a line of light and — that, that corresponds to the first aspect of the movement-image, and the second aspect — they will reflect light.
In other words, what will they provide? They will provide the photo, if there is photo, stretched within things at all times. Only the photo was translucent, Bergson said; we should even say transparent, literally; the photo was transparent. The photo was in things, but it was transparent. What was missing? Bergson moves forward, and Bergson’s style is a grand style; it’s a very grand style. What was missing was behind the plate, he said. And the plate was nothing more than each movement-image. Behind the plate, what was missing was the black screen; the black screen necessary for light to be revealed. What do the living images bring from the point of view of light this time? The black screen that was missing, and only the black screen that was missing.
In other words, what is consciousness? Confirmation of what we saw last time. Ultimately, what is consciousness? Consciousness is the opposite of a light. All of philosophy has existed upon the idea that consciousness is a light. Well, no! What light is, is matter, and so there you go. Consciousness is what reveals light. Why? Because consciousness is the black screen. Consciousness is opacity; consciousness is opacity which as such will reveal light, that is, will cause it to reflect, therefore, a complete reversal. It is not consciousness that illuminates things. It’s the things that illuminate themselves, that illuminate themselves so well that light is not revealed, the photo within things is transparent, but it is there. The living image is required to provide the black screen, which the light will struggle to reflect.
And we are nothing other than that. Earlier, we were between movements and nothing else. We were just small intervals. To the extent that we had a brain, we were large intervals. And now it’s not much better, it’s fabulous as a settling of scores with humans, [Laughter] and now what are we? You thought you were lights, o poor people! you are just black screens. You are only opacities in the world of light.
So, you understand, what does it mean next when Bergson is blamed for not having recognized consciousness and ignoring the unconscious? What do you want him to do with the unconscious once he says the way he’s defined consciousness is pure opacity, it’s raw opacity? He really doesn’t need the unconscious. I am not sure what he would do with it. He’d already put everything necessary into consciousness, so okay. There, it works.
Fine. That’s the second characteristic of these living cerebral images, cerebralized because it’s a higher level of complexity. And see how the two echo each other! It’s really well done! I mean, the same couple: sustained action that was isolated, delayed action that was henceforth new, and then there, the isolated line of light and reflected lines of light, they’re equal! The black screen from the point of view of light and the interval from the point of view of movement correspond perfectly to each other.
And I would finally ask a third question. The third question is … [Deleuze writes on the board] The third question is very simple, but I will leave it precisely. Since my plane of immanence has a third characteristic, which is to be a mobile section, a mobile section of universal becoming, [Pause] from this third point of view, what will special images bring, living images or material? Since we haven’t even seen the stories of universal becoming, we can only answer one thing. What are they not going to bring? We are entitled to assume that these living images are with the universal becoming, of which the plane of immanence, of which the plane of matter is a section, is a mobile section, well then, that these special images are in a very particular relationship with universal becoming, in a privileged relationship. But I can say no more than they will not be like the plane which nevertheless contains them; these living images will not be simple mobile sections of universal becoming, that they will have a more intimate relationship with this universal becoming. But which one? We do not know anything.
So, let’s go ahead, we’ll put that aside. We cannot because we don’t have the means, and then we are in no rush. So, let’s complete it anyway, because we tell ourselves that he is exaggerating when he immediately puts forth the brain; he proposes it wonderfully because he analyzes the brain as matter. He shows… — there I’ll skip over it; you will read it, the first chapter, and then I presented it last year[10] — he shows very well how the brain is ultimately only a kind of matter capable of stopping the action undergone and delaying the action received, this he shows marvelously, by undertaking a brief but very beautiful analysis of the relationship between the brain and the spinal cord, very, very beautiful, nothing to revise. It seems to me he insists greatly all the theories of the brain. You know, the brain is not at all an aggregate of things that touch each other; ah, contemporary brain biologists are very odd. For a long time, discussion occurred about all kinds of things that touched each other, that were connected in the brain, that came into contact. Today, contact talk, intracerebral phenomena, these are not the trend at all. They talk about stuff, they talk about so many jumps, what jumps, about actions that jump from point to point, well, all of that. Here, I believe that Bergson’s texts would hold up very, very well with all that, with contemporary conceptions.
But in my concern to add a little something, I am saying, oh well, what could happen? What I like about it is the detail. All that was not possible when the plane of immanence was very hot, it’s “hot” [Deleuze says it in English], that is, yes, the lines of light, all that, how hot all that was! The plane of immanence above all was hot, very, very hot, [Deleuze writes on the board, something to show the heat] quite hot. I am saying that because here as well, this doesn’t seem like much; we have to speak simply, but if you refer to any reputable book on the origin of life, you will learn that life could not appear in certain conditions of extreme heat. Moreover, that the materials which prepared life could not appear under such conditions, however simple they might have been, yet they were not simple. Okay, something like a loss of heat was required. So where did that come from? It’s beyond me, but anyway, I’m probably not the only one.
We must assume that on my plane of immanence, a cooling occurred. And that, of course, is annoying [Laughter; Deleuze indicates his diagram], the diagram of cooling since I can account for its heat, whether it is hot and boiling, my figures of light, my lines of light, that, we can account for, that, that works. But now it’s getting colder. Okay, I’ll think about it; by next year, we’ll have to found it. Well, if anyone has a reason… You see, what bothers me is that I can’t find a reason that invokes an outside of the plane of immanence. So, we would have to… the only way out is to show that by chance, we understand, by chance, that there is a plane of immanence which has sectioned, being a mobile section of the universal becoming, has sectioned the universal becoming in such a way that there was, that the effect of there being the plane of immanence’s cooling, it’s no easy trick to show that. And then it doesn’t matter, it wouldn’t change a thing. Let’s assume that we have shown that it cooled off, you understand? It’s gotten colder.
So, we were starting in… I was saying that the universal movement, the universal variation of movement-images, the universal rippling of movement-images, with the cooling, will start to form movement-images [Deleuze writes on the board] which were very far from the living being, but which were already a little strange. But their oddity, about which everyone is unanimous, well, all the scientists are unanimous in saying, they could not appear as long as the earth was very hot. For you have already understood that my plane of immanence is the earth, and not just the earth, it is the universe. It could not appear when the earth was very hot. What is this? It is these materials — I am still speaking in terms of matter-imagery — it is these images and these very special materials which are not yet at all alive, and which have the property of turning, what? Well, [turning] the plane of polarization of light towards what we will call a right or a left. And these are the so-called “dextrogyre” or “levogyre” substances or materials. [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] Dextrogyre matter rotates the plane of polarization of light to the right as their name suggests, and levogyres rotate them to the left. That could not appear when the earth was very hot. This is fine. With such kinds of matter, I already have a “right”-“left” constitution. Right and left cannot be defined without reference to an up, a down. That bothers me. In other words, as soon as such substances appear, I already have axes, orientations.
You understand that this is going to be essential to explain the operation of isolation that I had brought up a bit earlier. If directions now are established thanks to these substances which [have], we assume, a cooling of the plane, [thanks] to these substances which define a right, a left, an up, a down, there is nothing alive yet. But there is something that’s in the process of developing. All this is we call, this is the term that is so beautiful among biologists who deal with the origins of life, it is what they call soup, pre-biotic soup. So here we have my plane of immanence with large areas of pre-biotic soup. [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] There is more then, a quite satisfactory expression. Let’s say, we have to … What can we say? Let’s say we already have to conceive of micro-intervals in the pre-biotic soup. This expression should make everything very clear. Already in micro-intervals, this is very, very odd in these substances.[11]
But when will the simplest, most rudimentary living substances appear? These micro-intervals will be confirmed — [Pause, Deleuze laughs at someone close to him] Very witty, yes! [He continues to laugh] Someone here said, there are eyes in the broth, right? [Laughter] – these are micro-intervals that confirm each other, and then the whole evolution of the life, and that Bergson will not develop it from this point of view; he will also have other things to do, in Creative Evolution when he speaks of life, but we must conceive of it as the rise of micro-intervals of dextrogyre or levogyre substances, starting from them, the rise towards macro-intervals, intervals assignable in time. And why, in fact, did we need to insert time? You understand this: in our plane of immanence, in our plane of matter, it is because, in fact [Deleuze turns away from the microphone so a few words are unclear] the notion of interval even, if you do not propose time, you are bringing forth a case of a pure spatial gap, and this pure spatial gap will have to be a time interval. … Yes?
Anne Querrien: It isn’t only temporal [A few inaudible words] … with the cooling, that means that the section… [some unclear words]
Deleuze: That the section… yes?
Querrien: … that the section occurs in [unclear words]. At that point, the intervals [unclear words] … and we are not in the dimensions of space and time. There are other dimensions within becoming than space and time, for example, there’s temperature.
Deleuze: If there is temperature, you understand, first of all, this is not easy, right? If there is temperature, it can be, obviously, yes, the temperature, all alone, that is too obvious, yes, as an intensity. Only, intensity, temperature already, it is on the side of light, it was caught in light. So, you cannot toss it back into becoming except in a completely different form. [She tries to answer] You need two temperatures, right, like with Malebranche, a temperature “a” and a temperature “b”; so we’re not done with this, right?
Querrien: So, there you have some more research for the future!
Deleuze: Yes, that’s right then, [Deleuze laughs] we have more research to do.
So, you see, well, I’m trying to go faster over this because the rest, we’ve seen. So, you see that evolution could be conceived as the evolutionary and progressive affirmation of what I might just as well call intervals of movement, the black screens or reflections of light, or — in parentheses — the privileged or special relationships of the universal of life. [Pause] So what is going on? Now we have them, these special images. What are we going to call them? To show clearly that for the moment nothing has been introduced other than movement-image, that we’ve introduced about movement or light, in fact, only of the interval of movement, only the black screen. That is, literally, nothing. We will call them “zones” or “centers of indetermination” … [Interruption of the recording] [1: 29: 51]
Part 3
… that stops movement, that delays movement, that reflects light, all that. Living and cerebral images, that is, suddenly, we were born starting from prebiotic stuff, from dextrogyre, levogyre substances. We are finally born, each of you is on this plane, but in what state? My God! [Laughter] A black screen state, that is, the best of yourself. A screen, a state of an interval of movement, and that’s what each of you is. How do you distinguish yourself from each other? Obviously, you don’t receive the same movements, you don’t execute the same movements, you don’t reflect the same rays of light, not the same. Everyone carves out their world in it, on the plane of immanence.
As a result, if I choose one of these men here, you are no more determined than the other; you are nothing but centers of indetermination. And if you could stay that way, without a doubt, this would be happiness! There are some who fall back into it from time to time, periodically. [Laughter] One can consider, for example, but then this would almost be a therapy; one can consider certain diseases as a return to the state of centers of indetermination, but these diseases, in fact, are prodigious conquests; this is Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge.[12] This is the return to the plane of immanence; it’s good that the mere fact of knowing such happiness should be enough to cure these states that some people complain about.
But finally, that doesn’t matter, so how does it happen? So there, I have a center of indetermination. What is happening? Three things are happening. I am saying that here this goes in threes; it’s not my fault, ok? It doesn’t matter, and that doesn’t correspond at all to the previous three characteristics. They go in threes as well, they go in threes. But we did not see it as well as here, we did not see it with adequate bases, it seems to me. Now we should understand everything. As a result, I am recalling this for those who… [Deleuze does not finish the sentence]
First thing: what happens as a function of this center of indetermination, that is, of this very special movement-image. Well, it’s your choice, since you have systems of expression that vary, as you will; you will say: one action is isolated from the others, among all the actions, well yes, what does that mean? This very special movement-image is as if it had specialized one of these facets. It’s not like … You remember the status of the pure movement-images we started from? They receive actions, execute reactions, that is, they undergo variations on all their facets and in all their parts. This is why I have insisted so much constantly on this Bergson text, on all their facets and in all their parts. Well then, there, these special images, these images, these centers of indetermination, everything happens as if they had delegated a facet to the reception. This is why it already supposes the distinction of right, of left. A parenthesis that I forgot — but as I forget, you will fill in yourselves — it is already at the level of the prebiotic soup that we begin not to see solids, but to tend towards an elaboration of solids. And the path of the living being and the constitution of things into solid, that is going to be the same, that is going to be an entirely simultaneous path. There will be something solid there.
But then, I am saying, this is no longer at all the state of the movement-images which act and react on all their facets and in all their parts; these privileged images, these living images have taken, have specialized one of their facets at reception. They do not receive action, not only on that facet, one might say, but they have a facet capable of isolating the actions they receive. So, they have a privileged facet for reception; that’s it [Deleuze draws a diagram on the board] – to designate, no, this is not clear, this is not good, it has to be very clear — here is my little gap, here is my special movement-image, my center of indetermination, my gap… fine.
And there, on one side of the gap, it specialized one of those facets at reception. Okay, it is under attack from all the other facets by actions it had undergone. That does not prevent it from having a privileged receiving facet; with the evolution of the living being, this surface, this facet of reception will bring forth sense organs, all the more so with the development of the face. There the organs of reception are becoming more and more specialized. Good. This receiving facet is very important since, in fact, it makes possible the isolation of the action undergone [Pause] and anticipation of the action undergone, that is, to apprehend possible actions because, in fact, with the development of sense organs, perception at a distance will occur.
In other words, thanks to this first facet specialized in reception, I can say that the living image “perceives”. [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] And what will this perception-image be, then? A perception-image will be [Pause] the image of an action undergone insofar as isolated and even forestalled, anticipated, by a moving image which is by a movement-image which receives it, a special movement-image that receives it. In other words, I can say, in all necessity, my living images, as a function of the gap they present, will have perception-images.[13]
And you see, at that point, the status of perception. When I said earlier, atoms are total perceptions, they perceive everything they undergo and everything they do, therefore, these are total prehensions. In perceptions that you or I have, this is obviously nothing more than what an atom perceives; we perceive much less, that’s a subtraction. We only have partial perceptions; that’s even why they’re conscious. We only have partial perceptions. We perceive excitations, that is, actions undergone that we isolate at the same time, that is, we subtract them from the rest, hence a wonderful page by Bergson on — and which, here, is very important for all cinema, it seems to me — on the comparison of perception with a “framing”, framing being precisely the operation which makes it possible to isolate on an infinite set of actions undergone or excitations undergone, a particular finite set of excitations. The operation of perception will be a framing, or as he also says, an enframing [mise en tableau]. There we are.
So, I have perception-images which are no more than movement-images, which are less. The center of indetermination is satisfied with isolating the actions undergone, and it is this operation of isolation from the set of all the variations that constitutes perception and that constitutes the framing of the world by the living being. So, I have perception-images, I would say, there, the center of indetermination, [Deleuze continues his diagram on the board] the living image gives itself perception-images. First point. [Pause] And if I try to translate in terms of light, the same thing: as a black screen, it blocks light by a privileged facet; it will reflect light, and this operation of stopping light and reflecting it will constitute perception. Perfect. Clear, then! So, the living special image itself has perception-images.
Second, let’s move on to the other end [Deleuze indicates the diagram on the board], the other gap, the other dimension of the gap, an interval between the action undergone and the executed action such that the executed action is something new compared to the action undergone. Time has passed during which the living being could develop what we would no longer call a simple reaction, but a riposte or a response. And a riposte or a response, that is, a new reaction in relation to the action undergone, that is what is called action, strictly speaking. When we say, the living being unlike an inanimate thing, the living being acts. [Pause]
And what does that imply? That does not only imply — and after all, you indeed understand that from perception to action, there is a continuous passage — it is even what we mean most bluntly when we say that all perception is sensorimotor, perception is already astride action. This is in fact perception; it was not satisfied being a framing, that is, to isolate certain actions undergone in order to stop and forestall them. It was defined not only by framing or isolation. It was also defined — it is time to say this now — by a new phenomenon which did not include the plane of immanence, a kind of curvature. Around each center of indetermination, the world took on a curvature. [Pause]
In fact, the set of actions which were expressed on the center of indetermination [Deleuze writes on the board] acted as a kind of, organized a kind of milieu of which the center of indetermination was going to be the center, such that the world was curving, and that was what defined the horizon of perception. Perception was not just a framing; it was a framing taken from a horizon, and the horizon was no less created by perception than the framing itself, since the plane of immanence “before” living images did not include and did not have to include a horizon, no more than it included verticals and horizontals, no more than it included right and left. We must add the horizon to these new things, right, left, up and down, etc., which only formed with the cooling of the plane of immanence. And in fact, how do we define a horizon without a vertical axis which we have seen precisely that the plane of immanence refused? So, there was a curvature, and that was still an aspect of the perception-image. This circular world around us which I have the certainty as a perceiving subject that it closes, that it closes itself behind me, or that it is open behind me… [A student would like to pose a question] Sorry, one second, you will speak later, because otherwise I am … I am finishing this point.
And so, we were astride the curvature of the world, we were still in the perception-image, but we were already in the action-image. Because there, as a function of this curvature of the world, of different actions undergone, there are, there will be a centripetal movement, on, towards the center of indetermination which, as a function of the interval, will be able to organize its response to the set of excitations that he has retained, that is, the set of excitations coming from its horizon, coming from milieu.
As a result, the curvature of the world makes us pass from the perception-image to the action-image. What is the action-image? Once again, it is a movement-image which is defined as follows, it is a very special movement-image since it is the image of a reaction insofar as this reaction does not immediately follow from the action undergone. And so, I can say that the center of indetermination not only included perception-images, it also included action-images. [Pause] Yes, did you want to say something?
A student: [Inaudible comments]
Deleuze: With cinema’s out-of-field? No, I do not think so. Yeah, wait, I have to think about it. [Pause] Yes, cinema’s out-of-field is first of all an out-of-frame; I’m not saying it’s solely an out-of-frame. It means that there is something going on outside the frame. And is this the horizon? Yes … my first … I don’t know, this is too complicated. My first answer is no, because a shot includes a horizon perfectly. The horizon is already a dimension of the shot; so, the out-of-field which is not solely an out-of-frame, but which is also, from another point of view, an out-of-shot, it is not a phenomenon of horizon. [Pause] No, I would say no; I would say it’s more complicated, that it’s something else. I can’t say what, but no.
I think, for example, it’s obvious, some images in Westerns include a horizon by themselves, and when they include an out-of-field, for example, as in [Howard] Hawks who greatly manipulates the out-of-field, when they include an out-of-field, it never forms a horizon, much more, yes. No, here, I understand your question better. At first glance, I would say that an out-of-field never constitutes a horizon. If you ask me on this that “what does it constitute?”, I haven’t thought about this; it’s too complicated. I can’t answer, but I’ll think about it for next time.
So, what do we have left? Well, yes, I have defined two types of images, two new types of images, the perception-image and action-image which correspond to the two facets or to the two limits of the gap, to two limits of the interval. I told you last time, there is still something there. What is happening between the two? What is happening in this interval, for these living images? These living images are strange — Bergson’s answer, I give it in raw form, and I’ve already given it, and then I’ll explain it a little bit – A raw answer: what’s going on is a third type. What’s going on, what’s filling that gap, is affection, affection, affect if you prefer. I am saying, very good, this is our third type of image, affection-images.
Very complicated, right? Because once again, okay, they occupy — and Bergson simply tells us this — well, indeed, what is affection? It is an image in which, unlike perception-image, the object and the subject coincide. That is, it is a self-perception. So, it’s not a perception. If it’s an affect, that means it is not a perception. Well, a self-perception is an affect, it is not a perception. In other words, these living images have one last privilege: not only to perceive, not only to act, a third privilege, they alone, Bergson says who is speaking there, in the manner of, he is trying to be as clear as possible, they know each other “from the inside”, he says. One could also say, they are experienced “from within.”[14]
They are experienced from within, see what that means. This is what happens between the gap, and in fact, I feel myself from within between what and what? I experience myself from within between small a and small b; I feel myself from within between the arousal I receive and the action I execute. And, the less arousal I feel, and the less I’ll action, I will take actions, the more I will experience myself from within, right? There, yes, I would only have affections, at the extreme. They will have devoured everything, the affection-images, if I suppress my perception-images and my action-images. And how do we then suppress affection-images finally to get some peace, and return to the plane of immanence? This is another chapter, but one that we really got into last time. It was the lesson of nihilism, but we must not forget it, this lesson of nihilism, but anyway we are not there.
More precisely, what does Bergson mean? He means, look at these special images; they either consented or they accomplished an incredible thing, namely, they sacrificed movement-images, they managed to immobilize one of their facets. So, they gained tremendous mobility, the mobility of action in their motor organs, but they immobilized one of their facets, a relative immobility, immobility of the receptive facet, but at what cost? The price is pain, and pain in all its forms: physical pain, moral pain, agonies of all kinds, even metaphysical.
Why did they immobilize one of their facets? And see, your organ-carrying face is not very mobile. You don’t see what you have; it’s awful. Understand, an atom sees everything everywhere. [Laughter] You don’t see everything that’s happening behind you. The most basic living beings have a greater advantage because these are micro-intervals that they have, but we are clever with our heads. The fear of things, we live in fear, you understand? Why are we afraid? It’s obvious. Think of an animal like a horse, its anguished eyes. We will be considering Beckett’s film again later, and it is no coincidence that it poses the problem in the cinema of how to live with all that.
But after all, we have immobilized a facet, well, and there is a sort of despair. This came at the price of… we gained a lot from it, but we lost something: we’ve opened ourselves to dangers, namely all the actions that we have not even isolated and that attack us and that will penetrate you. You are going to be a thousand times defenseless, and that is going to create affects, all that, to create affects, and what will the affect consist of? A desperate “tendency” since at that point, movement, you have sacrificed your mobility on one of your facets. As concerns this facet, your motor skills, that is, the other facet, can only provide the support of a tendency. Again, Bergson’s wonderful definition of affection: “a kind of motor tendency on a sensory nerve.”[15] A motor tendency is what is painful. What hurts is a motor tendency on a sensory nerve. The sensory nerve is the immobilized plate in the service of perception. The motor tendency is the state that action takes in relation to this plate. So, it’s the same thing.
Understand that the two definitions of affection seem very different in Bergson, but they are the same. The first definition of affection: that which occupies the interval; [Pause] henceforth, that through which the living image experiences or feels, feels, feels itself. The second definition: a motor tendency on a sensory nerve.
From then on, we are approaching the goal that we are seeking. If you don’t mind, I can make my diagrams, only my diagrams, they are, I don’t know, the diagrams … Always the one who makes them tells himself: this clarifies everything, this makes everything crystal clear, and then those who do them. look, they understand, again they thought they understood, and then with the diagrams, people no longer understand anything, then it is no longer less for… like that, then poof, the diagrams, [Pause] because, my diagrams, as it is so, obviously, I’d be surprised if… there you are. Here is. [Deleuze writes on the board] I insist that this is going to be very important since my goal, you remember, is to arrive at a classification of images and signs, in any case, my first goal. [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board]
That’s it, so far that’s fine. My plane of immanence “p” only encompasses movement-images which vary with respect to each other. [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] In fact, it is on that plane, well, there is already an error in my diagram; my plane must continue all the way to my little point. Here it is. [Pause] This is the center of indetermination, we call it “s”, like that. [Pause] I would need it. This is not a Bergsonian diagram, I must add, because later I will be making a Bergsonian diagram which, in my opinion, alas, is much more beautiful. But why then am I drawing this one? Well, because I can’t help it. Here it is.
Notice that henceforth the movement-image has a dual status: on the one hand, movement-images refer to each other and vary on all their facets and in all their parts. On the other hand, they all refer to the center of indetermination “s” and vary with respect to that center. So, with the emergence of centers of indetermination, the movement-image has taken on a second regime which does not replace the first, but links to the first. I would say about movement-images that they continue to refer to each other on all their facets and that, on the other hand, at the same time, they all refer to a center of indetermination on one of these facets. There you go, that little twist, [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] these are movement-images; [Pause] this is difficult because I’m not sure how to do it, I’ve done it better, I don’t know how to do it.
I am saying that referred to the center of indetermination, the movement-image takes on three figures; so, I am placing the image-movement there, referred, as you’ve seen. It has a double relationship: movement-images refer to each other, on the one hand; on the other hand, at the same time, they all refer to the center “s”. I am saying that insofar as they relate to the center “s”, they give rise to three kinds of movement-images: [Pause] perception-images — [Pause] aie aie aie, my diagram is not pretty [Pause] — the action-image. Why do I put the other one in the middle? Since it occupies the gap that is included in “s”, so this is its normal place; affection-image. In fact, my diagram very poorly takes account of something, that perception-images and action-images belong in the relation to the center “s” no less than…, such that I am forced to do that, [Deleuze writes at board] and then that’s how I’ve corrected my diagram. OK? There you are, it is already really very, very important; what is very important?
What is very important is that I can say that I already have four kinds of images. First, in my search for a classification of images, first of all, I have the movement-image; second, a living image which merges into three kinds of images, that is, the living image is no more than a complex of perception-images, affection-images and action-images. [Long pause] If you want to go back to the plane of immanence, to the plane of pure matter, you will have to ask yourself: “how can I do away with action-images and how can I do away with perception-images?” And, obviously the hardest one, the last, but the hardest: “how could I do away with affection-images?” that is,” how could I be done with feeling myself?” which is the worst one.
Hey, that one will interest us later, but I have no more time; that one is the extinction of the three kinds of images. It’s the opposite; today we have just created the birth of the three kinds of images. The extinction of the three kinds of images would be just as tricky. I’m just saying also that this strange work in Beckett’s cinema, which Beckett called “Film” and which I had started — but now I don’t have time to start over, it would take too long — I had started to comment on this very, very bizarre work by Beckett and in which he had Buster Keaton acting, poses successively — and there you would have to confront this because I find that Beckett, well, he was within his rights, obviously he was within his rights — he himself splits his film, which he calls “Film”, into various slices, but I’m sure he’s hiding the truth.
The truth is quite another thing: it is that there are only three moments [temps], there are only three moments in the film, and the three moments correspond exactly to the question: to develop conventions – this is a film based on a system of conventions, properly Beckettian conventions – to develop conventions according to which we would show how Buster Keaton, that is, the character x or the character M., how the character M. — because Beckett prefers M. — how the character M. first does away with the action-image and then does away with the perception-image. I am saying, how to do away with — for those who know this work by Beckett — how to do away with the action-image, covers the whole part in the street and on the stairs, and is subject to a rule — yes, I’m giving it, so I would need a third diagram; that would be perfect — is subject to a rule: action will continue as long as the camera captures the acting being, the character M., at an angle of less than 45 °. If it goes beyond 45 °, [Deleuze marks on the board] if it goes beyond 45 °, the action stops. Why? By virtue of the intolerable anguish of the character M. It is the whole first moment that covers the street and the staircase.
A second moment, in the bedroom. This is the problem of: “how to do away with the perception-image? “. At that moment, we realize, in fact, which proves me right, which proves me right, is that — Beckett does not say that – it’s is that in the bedroom, we realize that 45 ° as the limit of tolerability of the action was only due to the conditions of the action in the street and in the staircase, namely that there was a wall and that the character was speeding along a wall, the camera filming him from behind, and he stopped acting, that is, running when the camera went beyond the angle of the rule of 45 °.
In the bedroom, it’s not like that anymore. In the bedroom, you can conclude for yourselves, if I ask: what is the tolerability angle of perception? It’s no longer 45 °; the camera is in the room, and there, there is a passage intentionally, in my opinion, intentionally obscure passage where he asks how to do it, etc., well, you would have to read that. [Pause] The camera and the angle of tolerance are 90 °, twice 45 °. 45 ° on the right, 45 ° on the left. As long as the camera does not exceed these 90 °, it’s fine, the character continues to perceive. If it goes beyond … And at that point, the character doesn’t stop, he’ll finally have done away with the action-image, and he tries to do away with the perception-image. He will do away with the perception-image by expelling and covering everything in the room, that is, by chasing the dog, the cat, covering the mirror etc., etc., a very lovely story. And then, still seen from behind, the camera can only see M. from behind, otherwise the tolerance threshold has been exceeded.
And finally, in his room, [Pause] in the middle, the only object that has remained uncovered is the matrix basis of everything Beckett, namely the rocking-chair, the rocking-chair which is like the object of the universal rippling, finally the material rippling.[16] And Buster Keaton collapses in his rocking-chair, still seen from behind, and falls asleep. He has done away with the perception-image just as he did away with the action-image. The conditions: 45 ° for the action-image, 90 ° for the perception-image. There, the camera starts into movement. It crosses the tolerance threshold. It takes advantage of the 90 ° while he’s asleep. Obviously, he wakes up, in intolerable anguish. Intolerable anguish, intolerable anguish, he thrashes about; the camera moves back, it returns to its domain of tolerance. As soon as it moves out, he wakes up, he gets scared. It’s fear, it’s really fear like a horse.
Think of the problems, yes, the bi-ocular problems, think of the spatial problems as animals see it, all of that. It’s no surprise that horses become completely mad, you realize, with danger everywhere, I don’t know, danger. How beautiful this film is because it is really the film of danger, danger everywhere, the danger of acting, the danger of perceiving, and the final danger, and he falls asleep. So, the camera shamelessly takes advantage of it. It moves directly in front, and what happens when it comes in front? Sorry, 90 minus, no, 360 minus 90, [The students help him with the math] 270. So there, I have 270 °, that’s it, I think, right? I have 270 °, that works … my circle is 270 ° in front of the circle, it’s right in front, and it will get closer. And at that point, is revealed, we see the first frontal close-ups of Buster Keaton with only one eye, since this is monocular vision; the other is covered with a black cloth, and the camera is replaced by the same face, but which does not have the same expression. There, panicked terror; here, attention, nasty and extreme attention; the closer the camera gets, all the signs of panic multiply. He tries to escape, no longer possible, he has no further action. He is stuck in this last moment; the moment in favor of the 270 ° remaining, the camera comes to occupy the face to face, and at that moment, is revealed as “identical”, namely this is self-perception, that is, it’s the affection-image. How do you do away with affection-image, that is, being perceived by yourself? The film’s final response, at the maximum terror, in the rocking-chair, Buster Keaton crumbles, and the rocking-chair has slower and slower movements, and everything suggests that, not that he’s dead, but that he has joined the true plane of immanence, the plane of rippling, that is, where there is not, where there was not yet perception-image, action-image, affection-image, the world we all dream of, really!
But then I would like, [A student would like to ask a question] — yes sorry, I’m ending because… and then you’ll talk; I won’t be long – All this is not enough for me, that was for a second diagram, it was a little playtime. But here, what do I have left? What do I have remaining? So, I have four types of images. You see why I am not making a special case for the living image. The living image, now I would say it, it’s really the complex of three. And I am saying, in relation to the living image, the movement-image has given rise to three types of images. So, I have my four main types of images: movement-image; perception-image; affection-image; action-image. What am I missing? All this takes place on the plane. I haven’t left the plane.
We have seen that the plane was, in one way or another, a mobile section of a Whole, of a becoming whose nature we don’t know. Since this is for the future, I still have to mark it down. How am I going to mark it? I am making dotted lines on purpose. [Pause] And I am saying [Deleuze writes on the board] that there, I am outside the plane, finished. This is the plane which is a mobile section, of what? I don’t really know. Of a Whole? Of a universal becoming? [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] A mobile section of time? We’ll see. We know that in a way, just enough has been said to conclude that all of this is kind of the same thing. The Whole is the Open, it’s what changes; becoming is alteration, qualitative change; time and becoming, real time is becoming. But all this, we don’t really know how, we have acquired nothing on it. I am saying that my three types of images, and moreover, my plane of immanence, my set of movement-images which is specified in three types of images, indirectly converge toward, call it a Whole, a becoming, a time of which it is the mobile section, okay? As a result, I can … [Interruption of the recording] [2:16:31]
… short-circuits my three kinds of images, so I will establish a relation, this time one that’s full, then with dotted lines, between my plane of immanence, my plane of matter, [Pause] and that of which it’s the mobile section, that is, the Whole, becoming, time. This relationship with this something = x, I can say as well that it is the set of perception-images, affection[-images] and action[-images], which it maintains, or else, the infinite set of movement-images. OK?[17]
Hence a huge problem, but if you’ve understood this, that’s more than enough for today. A huge problem, this Whole, this becoming, this time, it’s either one thing or another; I see only two hypotheses: either it is not itself an image, a type of image, but it can only be the product or the indirect result of the confrontation of all the images. Fine! So, in that case, there would not be time-images, but time would be the result of the confrontation of all the movement-images or, if you prefer, of all perception-images, action-images, affection-images. This would amount to saying: the Whole can only be grasped indirectly. [Pause] If I translated in terms of cinema, I would say: time can only be a matter of montage, montage being the confrontation of types of images. [Pause] In my diagram, everything invites me to believe that, in fact, the only possible relation is this indirect relation in which the Whole, time, becoming can only result from the movement-images which are its section or set of perception-images, affection-images, action-images.
Or, another hypothesis, are there cases where we can grasp a time-image, a becoming-image for itself and directly? If so, in any case, here is my summary: I have five types of images, five major types of images — considerable progress since when we look at Peirce, I am saying considerable progress, there for me, it is a matter of quantity, I want to have more, since Peirce only has three types of images. See, this is a great treasure; it’s proof that I’m right that there are more of them, so this is better — my five types of images are movement-image, perception-image, affection-image, action-image, time-image with a question mark. Is time-image an indirect image or a direct image, or can it be a direct image? Well, anyway, that gives us five types of images to consider. You realize, we’re going to have 100 signs, 200 signs based on that, because I’ll clarify right away, there will be several signs for each image, so there’s plenty left to do.
And finally, the last point and my part will be done: the diagram that Bergson gives us, much purer, much prettier, I am asking you to reflect; in my opinion, they overlap. He tells us: there you have it, plane of immanence — no, he does not tell us “plane of immanence”, but plane of matter, plane of matter — on this plane of matter, “s” at any point whatever is a center of indetermination. [Pause] He doesn’t say any more, because he’s said it before. I would point out that in this center of indetermination, as he explained, that’s all there; this is only the first chapter of Matter and Memory. There is perception-image, action-image, affection-image, eh? As for the plane itself, it is entirely occupied — there Bergson says it all the time — by movements transmitted from the light which is diffused; this is the movement-image.[18]
So, I can say that I already have my four images, and Bergson tells us: here we are in the gap — since “s” is defined by a gap, an interval, otherwise I would not have my three types of images – it happens that the tip of a cone [Pause] fits into the gap. [Pause] You see that this cone is not part of the plane. Its tip takes advantage of a determination of the plane or rather an indetermination of the plane, namely the existence of the intervals of movement, to insert itself into “s”. What is this cone? Bergson will give it various names which do not overlap; and precisely at the point we’ve reached, he has the same discomfort as we do. Very good! He will sometimes call it “memory”, sometimes “pure time” or “real time”, [Pause; Deleuze writes on the board] sometimes “to become” when he tells us that “the plane is a section of the universal becoming” in Matter and Memory itself. There you are.
I’m saying this is another presentation, so you may prefer it. In my opinion, it looks simpler, but it’s actually a lot more complicated. For now, I’m stopping here because that doesn’t rule out that, he says, the plane keeps moving, as he says, which actually assumes that his cone [Pause] keeps … [Deleuze writes on the board] See, it gets complicated; it gets as complicated as my first diagram. Good. What is happening? I would say that we find the five types of images: movement-images, perception-images, action-images, affection-images which are constituent elements of the center of indetermination, and that, [145: 00] mysterious, this mysterious cone which is time, and about which in the present state, we can ask ourselves, it’s one thing or another — and Bergson will consider, and there then I become again quite Bergsonian because Bergson will consider both of the two hypotheses — : either I can only reach the cone from “s”, and at that moment, I will only have an indirect presentation of time, and no doubt, this is what he objects to about Einstein and relativity. Or else — but at what price, under what conditions? — I can get a direct image of time which will therefore be completely different from the movement-image, and this is what I want to reach: the time-image.
It’s one of two things: either an indirect comparison of the movement-images will be born, or else it will be revealed in a type of image absolutely irreducible to movement-image, [Pause] such that we will have to lose any habit of thinking of real time in relation to movement. Would it be immobile? Your choice. It will be necessary to say: yes, it is immobile. It’s better to say it’s immobile; in fact, it will be neither mobile nor immobile but will be something else. If there is a time-image by itself which does not come from a simple confrontation of the movement-images, that is, from the three types of images, perception, action, affection, if there is a direct image of time, understand, it must be absolutely irreducible to the movement-image.
As a result, I now have, to finish and end with this, six types of images instead of five, and if we continued, I would add more. I have: movement-image. I have the three, the three constituents of the living image: perception-image, affection-image, action-image. I have a time-image resulting from the confrontation or the comparison or the relationship between the movement-images, that is, indirect time-image; and perhaps, our ultimate goal this year, the direct time-image, [Pause] that is, irreducible to any movement-image. But what could a time-image be from which I would have excluded anything that can recall a movement-image?
I am again finishing very, very quickly. If you want to establish a position based on our work on cinema last year, think about this: for a very long time, cinema believed — and not all authors from the start — but for a very long time, some of very great authors believed that, in fact, time in cinema and rhythm in cinema were a matter of “montage”, and it is all the montage-cinema that, in particular, the Russians illustrated with fundamental importance given to the montage. And it is montage that contains the secret of time, that is, of the relationship between the various types of images. It is typically a tendency, the time-image as a result of indirect relations, as a result indirectly of the relations between the movement-images, between the types of movement-images.
It is obvious that not only in current cinema, but perhaps already in the past — we will see that, perhaps we will do another session on this subject — there were attempts to offer direct time-images. In what way were these no longer movement-images? However, it could move; it’s strange, it could move. This was no longer, the purpose of these types of images was no longer movement at all. Besides, it could move, but this was completely one with a kind of return to the still shot. Under what conditions is all this possible? Who I am thinking about, in terms of images, already senior authors and no longer young? It is obvious that in Dreyer or in Bresson, there are such explorations of time-images that are very particular, or which are no longer at all subordinate to the movement-image. And furthermore, with some moderns, in a completely different way, in Ozu, well there are all kinds of … I’m going too far ahead.
So, there I have, we agree on this, I therefore have six types of images, no, five, no six, [Deleuze consults the students] I have six types of images: indirect time-images, direct time-images. There we are.
I remind you that the Beckett’s text on “Film”, the text of his film is in Comedies and Acts for Nothing, in which… what? : Comedies and various acts,[19] in which the whole film is published with Beckett’s comments, and you’ll see that, prove it for yourself: does this work or not? [Pause] Are you going to me something later, Anne? But not now, we are not going … [End of the recording] [2: 31: 20]
Notes
[1] Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.; New York: Humanities Press, 1911; 1970), p. 31.
[2] On these points, see The Movement-Image, pp. 63-64 (L’Image-Mouvement, pp. 93-94).
[3] On these blocks, see The Movement-Image, pp. 58-59 (L’Image-Mouvement, pp. 87-88).
[4] Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 86.
[5] See sessions 3, 4, and 5 in the Cinema 1 seminar, 24 November and 1 December 1981, and 5 January 1982.
[6] Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 196, translation modified.
[7] Deleuze considers translational movements in session 2 of Cinema seminar 1, November 17, 1981.
[8] See session 2 of Cinema seminar 1, November 17, 1981.
[9] About the word écartelé, the translators of The Movement-Image indicate that “this word also conveys the idea that such images are separated or diverted (écarté)”, p. 227, note 20.
[10] See sessions 4, 5, and 19 in Cinema seminar 1, December 1, 1981, January 5 and May 18, 1982.
[11] This whole discussion is in Chapter IV of The Movement-Image, pp. 61-64 (L’Image-Mouvement, pp. 91-94); see other perspectives on “pre-biotic soup” in A Thousand Plateaus, Plateau 3, “The Geology of Morals”, pp. 49-55.
[12] On Spinoza’s third kind of knowledge, see the Spinoza seminar sessions 13 and 14, 17 and 24 March 1981.
[13] On the perception-image, see sessions 5, 6, and 7 in seminar Cinema 1, 5, 12 and 19 January 1982.
[14] On this, see Matter and Memory, chapter 1, first paragraph.
[15] Bergson, Matter and Memory, p. 56. See also The Movement-Image, pp. 65-66 (L’Image-Mouvement, p. 96) for this discussion, where the Bergson quote is translated with a slight difference: “a kind of motor tendency on a sensible nerve”.
[16] In session 10 of the Cinema 1 seminar, Deleuze uses the word “berceau”, rocking-chair, which indeed appears in Beckett’s film, whereas here, Deleuze says “berceuse”, lullaby, which clearly makes little sense, despite its inherent poetry. [Paris: Minuit, 1966]
[17] On the diagrams proposed by Deleuze, especially linked to Beckett’s film, see The Movement-Image p. 66-70 (L’Image-Mouvement, pp. 97-102).
[18] On living matter and the gap in Bergson, see The Movement-Image, pp. 61-64 (L’Image-Mouvement, pp. 90-93).
[19] The text to which Deleuze refers appears from Minuit (1966); in English, as Film: A Film Script (New York: Grove Press, 1970).
For archival purposes, the augmented and new time stamped version of the transcription was completed in March 2021, revised in November 2021, and the translation was completed in November 2021. Additional revisions were added in February 2024. [NB: The transcript time stamp is in synch with the WebDeleuze recording link provided here.]